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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.

VOLUME XXII.

WOOLWICH :
PRINTED AT THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
And Published by Messrs, DULAU & Co., 87, Soho Square, W.

Cmemmmmee!

1896.

TOUL81

Bitte at 7
ae

CONTENTS.

PaGE.
Okehampton Experiences, 1894. By Major A.J. Hughes, R.A. (4 lecture
delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, 11th October, 1894). i
Ancient British Ordnance now in the peel: Museum, Madrid. aie Lieut.-
Colonel J. C. Dalton (h.p.), R.A. : 50006 vane!
Record targets: being a short description of those now in use and a com-
parison of their merits. By Captain P. E. Gray, R.A. ese 27
Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Edited hy Colonel
F. A. Whinyates, date R.H.A. Chapter I. . nase 35
A Method of calculating the ee te of Coast Defence Fire. By Mo
R. M. B. F. Kelly, R.A. 5g8 5b saoeo et cpt ae 55
A Plea for heavy guns in Fortress Defence. ty one G. Were. R.A. 69
Notes on German Manceuvres. By Major J. F. Manifold, R.A. ............ 71

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Edited by Colonel
'F. A. Whinyates, Jate R.H.A. peat I]. and III. re Continued pats om

$00 By INO. thy Ais HOM) 0 3657600 560308003 : 81
The Story of the Civil War in America. A Review. ee es E.S.
May, R.A. Sand add 0qn 00Hde0 SotaGe O08 00 109

Diary of Lieut. W. Ree R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Edited be Colonel
F. A. Whinyates, date R.H.A. Le nee IEW, © Continued ae om th 107,
ENOL) sO peNOXITE). so Jn oe 113

General Bourbaki’s Campaign in January and ase 1871. By T. M.
Maguire, Esq.. LL.D. (4 Lecture delivered at the R.A. ae,
Toone, December 18th, 1894). . ohooh (eloieiecsieernettts aareaettatone Sire > Alsi

Coast Artillery in Action. By Lieut.-Colonel J. R. J. Jocelyn, R.A.
(4 Lecture delivered at the Roy eee Artillery a ea Woolwich, 8th
November, 1894). . ate aS 151

Captain Thomas Brown, Chief Fire-Master in the West Indies, 1693. By
Charles Dalton, Hditor ve Eng es Ari ay Insts and Commission
Registers, 1661-1714. . Bob coeos 5 Le

Torpedo-Boat Raids on Harbours. By Lieut. C. G. Vereker, R.A. ......... 179

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Edited by Colonel
F, A Whinyates, late R.H.A. conn Vv. mage Jrom p. 180,
No. 3,. Vol. XXIL).. Hooncd SotinoidobAagnugnagsencuonsgood ake)

vi. CONTENTS.
PAGE
Proposed Slide Rules for Calculating Battery Commandeyr’s Corrections. of
Ma jOneAn Catt ansard seh sAcam ayyuek pest eer cin. ey eath heap emnrene se h29 (il!

Co-operation between Guns and Cavalry. By Major E.S. May, R.A. (4
Lecture delivered at the FES Ar eee ana ie mae 7th
Mb, HBOS) o00000e00 000 ase . 207

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Edited e Colonel F. A.
Whinyates, date R.H.A. Picea IL, (esti 10, ee es Pe 199,

No. 4, Vol. XXII). “ . 241
With the Mountain Artilleries of France and a Tay, Ee Bene: Isl, 5 C5 10,
Simpson, R.A. ees short yte stare + 259

Terrestrial Refraction and Mirage. By Major P. A. MacMahon, R.A.,
ERS. (4 Lecture delivered at the kk ea coe Institution,
Woolwich, 7th Kebruary, 1895). Wa REE Sr 5 . 269

Royal wAatilleryasb ame ee csanerdosieciceriapys-taiceior seis teladeterea Meehan eaaekis sr eneeed ee Oo

Diary of Lieut. W. core R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Hdited by Colonel F. A.
Whinyates, late R.H.A. eae eer Pant els ee ee P.

207, No. 5, Vol. XXII). Renate bog DOL
Abstract of the Proceedings of the Tee Highth Annual General Meeting of
the Royal Artillery Institution. . : ars cabooondBbogs dooads Abt

The training together in peace time the Garrison mln Mery Forces of the
Empire, including Regular, Militia, Volunteer and Colonial Artillery.
(Silver Medal Prize Essay, 1895). By Captain E. G. Nicolls, R.A. ... 327

The training together in peace time the Garrison Artillery Forces of the
Empire, including Regular, Militia, Volunteer and Colonial Artillery.
(Commended Essay, 1895). By Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Williams, R.A.,.. 353

Centenary Cup. Communicated by the Secretary. .........sscscecsreseecerenene SOT

Instruments for looking through thick walls with small apertures. By
A. H. Russell, Captain of “Ordnance, U.S. Army. Communicated by
NG) SECTOWBIRY. cooosovcooceuce REECE n oon hOeU EET rca doco ater een aotere wee)

An account of the Relief of Chitral Fort from Gilgit and the Siege of Chitral.
By Lieut. C. G. Stewart, R.A. . Bae ath aan Mocsananss Uae eee sooo BOY)

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Edited ae Colonel
F. A. Whinyates, date R.H.A. ee Thos Pants JUL, Cele:
from p. 310, No. 6, Vol. XXIL). . sna PH veer ee rch OO

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A., in the Peninsula. Hdited by Colonel
F. A. Whinyates, date RHA. ee Wo, Tet IL, ae

Srom p. 423, No. 8, Vol. XXII). . BS cddond Soocedendeos odn, CHD
Eastern and Western Views of Mountain Air. A Review. ath es
H. C. C. D. Simpson, R.A. Sods opuode 960 a . 439

Notes on German Manceuvres, 1894. “Be Colonel A. E. Turner, c.3.,

CONTENTS. Vil.

PAGE

Siege of Gibraltar. By Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel J. Adye, RA. weccecscesseeseves 457

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Ldited by Colonel
BAY Whinyates, date R.H.A. sae eee arteekl, Saas

from p. 487, No. 9, Vol. XXID). ne : vee . 485
Terrestrial Refraction and Mirage. yt Lieutenant I. M. Brown pe O. pa

REAR ehom she yas incda dda scecaseaan oe . 497
The Artillery in Chitral. iy ness G. F. Herbert, R.A.. depen iacrmaconue BAU

More brief considerations on Uoast Defence. By Col. D. O’Callaghan,

A new method of setting the ne of wheels. o mae G. P. Owen,
The Ammunition Service of a Fort. spe Major R. F. Johnson, R.A ........, 517

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula, Edited by Colonel
F, A. Whinyates, date R.HL.A. eee IT., Part III. (Continued
Strom p. 496, No. 10, Vol. XXII). BOCODODS GodaGnudd soe cad odode LOCH

The Casualty Returns of the German Artillery at the Battles of Colombey,
Mars-la-Tour, and Gavelotte. By Major F. G. Stone, D.-A.-A.-G., R.A.. 587

Adjusting Clinometer Planes of Ordnance. By cue W. E. Donohue
(EOIME) Sie Ater. Pe ROST Ee Noose sianachert poo AGT . 545

On the employment of Ar ini in Cuba. ay Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Dalton,
R.A. 00.600.600 : : .. 547

Extracts from old Order Books, R.A., Sheerness. Communicated on Goat
Wi. J&L, Crmmommmers, IRL, 5000000000 soosbAdNdDSCO DEO ECOHNAsODSIOG0G000 HUES

Balak ¢A leeolllegiion), Idsf 18 40. We noocc00 000000 000000000000 nod 00h ood 00n OIL

A few hints on marching at home and abroad. Hy Major J. Hotham,

A list of the Artillery Company in Scotland at the time of the Union, and
their Pay. By Charles Dalton, Lditor cy gree ad Lists and Com-
mission Registers, 1661-1714. Asa .. 579

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A. in the Peninsula. Edited by Colonel
F. A. Whinyates, date R.H.A. oe ete JUMoy Jee IOUT : Continued
Srom p. 585, No. 11, Vol. XXII) ........ donhosdoboonabotdadbacn SOB
£4 YF D1

LIST OF PLATES.

TO FACE

PAGE
Map of Spain and Portugal.. seas pnbu cooeduobe acoRdN God ell
Map of the Country round Castel mene aml Cindad Tothige Benin eet nto 91

Map to Illustrate General Bourbaki’s Campaign 1871........cc0..ccssssseveevee LB]
Slide Rule for Calculating Tide Correction ....,...

Vill, CONTENTS,

TO FACE

PAGE

BattlevofeAlbueraye Maye Othe Sa lenemnmsiacacercsenecter seek sc asetetemateck avace ce es

Battle of Balaclava... 6G dagho -appocdencusccoodbooootedGonnndeaoa eHeiee

Map of a Part of soa ema ae tM ae ase ee ee eetss 208

French Mountain Artillery... ies 500 BY)
View of the Grand Attack on i Cactton of Geile on take 33th Septem

ber, 1782.. Tian : Stpboccioo 100 sob-s00DOROKE vee 457

The iranian stoaaies Bis a . Hort, "Plate Th aonona0 codnOdOHodsOsed vod EG BOW)

Battle of Mars-la-Tour, Comparative Table of Shencikie.. Safehew sen area) ctson OAs
Sketch shewing the Route of “Hi” Troop, from Cantonments 1 in n Portngal to

the Field of Vitoria... 50000600009 600 050000 nON1GG4085.600000 000 da9c00 0neG0900b0 BAY

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894:

MAJOR A. J. HUGHES, R.A.

(A Lecbure delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, 11th October, 1894).

COLONEL R. D. E. LOCKHART, R.A., IN THE CHAIR.

THe CaatrmMan—Gentlemen, the subject to night and the lecturer
are both well known to you. I only ask you to take note of anything
that occurs to you in the lecture that you may disagree with, or which
you may think specially worthy of notice, or which you do not quite
understand.

GrntLEMEN—It was with great diffidence that I accepted the kind
invitation to deliver a lecture on this year’s Okehampton Experiences,
for now that the system of practice is so well-defined and known, the
changes from year to year are very small and, consequently, I am afraid
you will find the lecture in a great measure a repetition of those of
former years.

The system of issuing schemes, giving orders, &c., was very similar
to that of the two previous years.

The chief alterations in the practice were—

First, there were more changes of fire when in action and, there-
fore, fewer changes of position.
Secondly, the targets were more diverse.

BrigaDE Practicr.

The interest in the Brigade practice centred rather in the fire
tactics, transmission of orders, &c., than in the actual shooting, for
owing to the necessity of using up the common, nothing else was em-
ployed. No results were therefore taken, and when the effect is certain
to be unknown, not much interest can be shown in the actual shooting.

Orders were generally written and sent by dismounted orderlies.
One Brigade-division had a system of mounted orderlies, which ap-
peared to work well. When in action the orderlies of the Officer
Commanding the Brigade-division remained mounted, some little dis-
tance in rear of, but within sight of, the Officer Commanding; one of them
always keeping a watch on the Adjutant. When an order had to be
sent, the Adjutant having written it, started off with it towards the
orderlies, seeing him coming, one of them at once galloped up, took the
order, and returned to await his turn again.

Owing to the varieties of carriages, sights and clamps now in use,
great care has to be taken in sending orders for range and fuze from
one battery to another, and mistakes arose on several occasions; in

1. You. XXIt. 1

2 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894.

fact, with batteries coming from different stations, it is very hard to
avoid them.

Take the following case of three batteries, A., B., C., equipped as
follows :—

A. having Mark II. carriage and Mark I. sight.
baat a BS i » with altered clamp.
C.

Say the range is 2100 yards.

If using T scale and yards, B. and C. would have the same elevation,
2.e., 2100 yards, and A. a greater one (2200) ; whilst, if using Scott’s
sights and degrees, A. and B. would have the same elevation (8° 3’), and
C. the lesser one (2° 48’). Thus, not only has the Adjutant to know what
carriages and sights the batteries have, but even their clamps.

The question, raised at this lecture two years ago by Col. Ollivant,
as to whether it is necessary for a Battery Commander to verify, before
adopting a range and fuze passed to him, still appears unsettled. The
balance of opinion certainly is in favour of acceptance at once, because :

99 39 If, 33 Ee) 92

First, verification is generally impossible, on account of the num-
ber of shells falling on the target.

Second, concentration should be sudden, and if each battery has
to verify, if cannot be so.

It is, however, difficult to tell whether such a fire would be effective.
I think it should, for there is rarely more than 50 yards between the
elevations fired at by batteries when practising on the same day over
the same ground: unless, of course, through bad observation any bat-
tery has not found the range. It would, I think, be interesting to
arrange a Brigade-day, so as to have range reports and test the question
thoroughly. ‘Targets to be placed so that each battery had a separate
one to start with, and as soon as each had reported range and fuze,
the Officer Commanding could (in place of concentrating) change the
targets amongst the batteries, who should open at once with the given
range and fuze.

OccuPATION OF PosITIONS.

The two methods, as usual, gave rise to a good deal of talk.

With regard to the deliberate, it struck one that it was a mistake for
the Section Commander and gun-layers to make a race of it when
doubling out to the Battery Commander. The latter could not start
his instructions till all had arrived; further, the rush looks bad, and has
the disadvantage that the layers arrive breathless, and shaking so
much, that many are quite unable to set their sights. A slow, steady
double appears quite sufficient.

The chief cause of failure of the deliberate was, that the gun-layers
did not pay sufficient attention to choosing positions for their guns
from which the target could be seen over the-sights; consequently,
after the guns were in action they often had to be shifted. In order to
avoid this, in some batteries the Section Commanders, before returning
to the battery, placed their layers, and gave them orders not to move.
This generally worked well, and is quite worth the extra time it takes.

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 3

Section Commanders before leaving the layers should look to the
dressing, and if one section cannot see the target without advancing
far to the front, it appears desirable that the Section Commander should
report it. This seems trivial, but neglect in reporting it often had bad
results, as the following case, which occurred more than once, shows.
The layers of a battery coming into action by the deliberate method,
having had the target pointed out to them, extended from the right
and took up positions for their guns; now, in consequence of the
ground, the layers of the left section, in order to see the target, had to
advance further to the front than those of the centre and right, this
generally ended in one of two ways, both rather disastrous ; either—
as the battery was coming up the left section layers, getting nervous
about their dressing and seeing the Commanding Officer on their right,
dressed back in line with the remainder, and, consequently, the guns
could not see the target; or else, if they stood fast, the guns when
in action were so far in advance that it was dangerous for the others
to fire.

When, however, the Battery Commander was on the left flank, 7.e.,
the advanced one, the other layers dressed up and no evil resulted.
This seems to point to the necessity for the Battery Commander, after
the layers are placed, but before the battery arrives, dressing them up
on to the most advanced layer, rather than to the flank on which he
happens to be. Sometimes the Battery Commander, when pointing
out the target, appeared to go further forward than was necessary,
and it was suggested that better concealment would be obtained if he
only went sufficiently forward to be able just to see the target, and
that the layers, after they had extended, should advance far enough to
be able to see it over the sights. A few tried showing the target to
the Section Commanders first, and then they showed it to their layers.

With reference to this, one must remember that the ground at Oke-
hampton, a bare hillside with no bushes, &c., makes it very hard to
avoid exposure; further, the exposure always appears more to an
onlooker with the battery than from the target. The group of layers,
when seen from a flank, or from behind at a distance of a few yards,
appears very different to what it does from the front at 38000 yards.

On several occasions, together with officers of the courses, I stood
looking out from a bomb-proof close to the target. Although the
range was only 2000 yards, very little could be seen, and had we not
known exactly where to look for the battery, it could easily have
escaped notice until the first gun.

I think more criticism from the target end of the range, especially
during Brigade practice, would be valuable; but, of course, it must be
from a bomb-proof close to the target, and not from the usual position
of the range-party on a flank.

One of the causes of the direct method coming to grief was that
of not advancing sufficiently to the front for all the layers to see the
target over the sights; although done in the hope of not exposing the
battery, it appears a fatal error, for on all occasions, and most certainly
when the direct method is employed (1.e., range short and great rapidity
desirable), the first desideratum is to be able to see the target over the
sights without any running up. ;

4, OKEHAMPION EXPERIENCES, 1894,

With both methods it sometimes happened that a flank section, even
if run up to the safe limit, was still unable to see the target. When
this is the case, and there is room on the other flank, the easiest
way out of the difficulty appeared to be for the section to be limbered
up and moved round, fire in the meantime being continued with the
other guns. Should this be impossible, clinometer elevation must be
given to the section, the angle of sight being obtained from one of the
guns that can see the target. This method with our present clinometer
is very complicated, as it entails two different elevations in the battery,
and under such conditions it is very easy for the Battery Commander
to make a slip. With a clinometer having an adjustable zero, such as
the German or Scott’s sight, fitted as recommended last year, it is
comparatively simple. All the Section Commander would have to do
would be to set it at the 7 elevation, place it on one of the guns that
could see the target after it was laid, and automatically register the
angle of sight by working the small screw until the bubble is in the
centre ofitsrun. The Battery Commander, thus relieved of all trouble,
could begin with four guns, and the other two would be ready to open
fire by the time he had ranged.

Failing such a clinometer, the best way appears to be to ignore the
angle of sight and use clinometer elevation for all the guns, only planting
pickets for those that cannot see the target, the remainder laying for
direction over the vent and muzzle.

The method of one section using quadrant and the remainder T ele-
vation was successfully employed by one Battery Commander; on all
the other occasions, as far as I know, the guns simply remained out of
action. Seeing this happen with a single Brigade-division on posi-
tions so well known, it seems probable that with a long line, sections
or even, perhaps, batteries could easily find themselves so situated
that they must either have recourse to pickets or remain silent.

At Brigade practice, when employing the direct method, the inter-
vals between batteries sometimes suffered, and appeared to be best kept
when the final advance was done in short echelon; this was especially
noticeable in those cases in which, owing to the lie of the ground, the
line of advance was not quite at right-angles to the position to be occu-

ied.
; The system, mentioned last year, of the Battery Commander pointing
out the target to the nearest Section Commander, and leaving the
others to pick it up from him, again answered well. In pointing it
out to the nearest Section Commander, the best and quickest was
generally for the Battery Commander to lay the first gun.

Misunderstandings of right and left were very rare ; in fact, I only
heard of one, due, I believe, to the words ‘‘enemy’s left”? being mis-
taken. ‘There was more doubt when numbers were employed, and one
heard such questions as, “ His own number two, or do you mean num-
ber two from the right ?”? It would tend to obviate these if all numbers
were to be as read, 7.e., left to right, or else that the numbers were al-
ways to begin from the firer’s right.

SIGNALS AND ORDERS.
A few batteries used a number of extra signals. It appeared, however,

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1594. 5

that those at present in use are quite sufficient, and that more are only
confusing. Repetition of, and extra orders, were still sometimes heard.
A repetition considered necessary by some Battery Commanders was
that of repeating the range after a doubtful observation. This seems
unnecessary, because, having been given once, the guns are ready laid ;
further, it causes delay, because of the many repetitions which it necessi-
tates (four for each doubtful round), and also because the layer, hearing
an elevation given, forgets that his gun is already laid, and is apt to put
his sight in the gun and start re-laying. During slow fire, time was
sometimes lost by the Battery Commander, intent on the target, not
noticing when a gun was ready. ‘l'o obviate this some Commanding
Officers allowed their Section Commanders to draw their attention
verbally ; others trained their recorders to always look in the battery,
and then when the Section Commander signalled, to say “ Gun ready,
Sibenae
APPEARING TARGETS.

Petards were always fired at any new target, both as it appeared
and also a few seconds after. The moving targets, both cavalry and
infantry, also fired them just previous to, and when they began to move ;
and orders were issued that, whenever any petards were noticed, fire
was to be at once turned on to that target. ‘The system worked well,
and even when the petards had to be supplemented by orders, they
were of great use in enabling the Battery Commander to quickly find
the new target.

In one series a target of kneeling dummies appeared on the left flank
as the battery was on the move. When it appeared, some batteries»
were in column of sections, most of them wheeled towards the target
and came into action front, others wheeled away and came into action
rear. ‘This latter was generally considered best ; it was quicker, and
had the further advantage that, should any of the horses be struck, the
limbers would not prevent fire being opened ; to do it, however, re-
quires practice, because, undoubtedly, one’s natural inclination is to
wheel up.

A few batteries even preferred coming into action rear on ordinary -
occasions. ‘I'his preference is partly due, I think, to the time limit.
For with action rear the first gun is, as a rule, got off slightly quicker,
because Nos. 1, 2 and 8 can go on with the laying while 4 and 5 are
strugeling with the magazines ; but with action front they can do little
until 4 and 5, having got rid of the magazines, have come to the wheels.

On the other hand, the great essentials of dressing and intervals,
with action rear, are rarely so good, and this difficulty, in the judg-
ment of most, more than over-balanced the slight advantage of a
quicker first gun.

HicHELON AND Movine Targurts.

An echelon series, very similar to the trial two fired last year, formed
part of the battery service. The target consisted of three sets of 15
standing dummies (each in line), and three sets of 15 kneeling dummies.
They were supposed to represent advancing infantry, and were placed
in echelon at different intervals, the farthest at about 2200, and the

6 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894.

nearest 700 yards. The battery fired for four minutes at the furthest,
and three minutes at each of the others.

The average results in the 19 minutes were :—Rounds fired, 60:2 ;
hits, 81 ; dummies disabled, 32°3; but the chief interest lies in the
various methods adopted for attacking such a target. Although, per-
haps, hardly a service target, it was generally considered a good one,
since it required quickness, and shewed if a battery could adapt itself
to novel conditions.

The following three methods were employed :—

1, Telling off a ranging section and keeping the other four guns
for time shrapnel, in a very similar manner to that laid
down for an advancing target.

2. Ranging on the farthest, in the usual manner, and then keep-
ing up ordinary fire, and when the change of target was
ordered, simply giving “Change target. Range ——,
fuze ——,” and if these were not correct, changing either
without interrupting “ ordinary fire.”

3. Very similar to the second, but using “ rapid fire, by sections,”
in place of ordinary fire.

The first system appeared to answer well provided there was no
hitch, but if anything went wrong, such as a ranging gun being out of
action for a short time, the whole battery was liable to be upset.

The second method was, by almost universal opinion, considered the
best. It seemed to run smoothest, and casualties hardly affected it; as
many rounds were fired as with the others, and better results were
obtained.

The third system resulted in uncontrolled and, consequently, unaimed
fire, and great waste of ammunition.

A slow-moving target, advancing from about 2000 to 1000 yards, was
tried for the first time at Okehampton. Although the ground had pre-
viously been considered too rough, it worked well, and only two runs
were spoilt by the rope being cut. Next year there will be a better
target, running on rails down hill. Whe series was to range on a
column, distant about 2100 yards, and then, as soon as ordinary fire was
reached, the moving target, placed about 50 yards to the flank of the
column, started off, firing petards as it began to move, in order to draw
attention to it. It advanced at a walk for about 900 yards, the average
time it was moving being about 10 minutes. The number of rounds
fired at it in the time varied from six to 41, the average being 23.

Some Battery Commanders adopted the system of a ranging section,
whilst others tried ordinary fire round the battery, dropping range and
fuze as the target advanced.

Failure in the ranging section system was generally due to the delays
caused by :—

1. Not giving the order for the time sections soon enough.

2. Changing the fuzes of the second and third rounds after they
were already set.

3. Not setting the second and third fuzes at the limber.

4. Ranging section not giving sufficient deflection to ensure the
rounds being to windward.

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 7

The result of the first was that the order for ‘rapid fire’? came be-
fore the sections were ready, consequently, after the order had been
given, there was a long pause before a gun fired. This pause led to
the second error, for the Battery Commander, seeing the target advanc-
ing all this time, and thinking it was getting ahead of the battery,
would alter the range and fuze for the second and third rounds, and
the re-setting of the fuzes caused a yet greater delay.

The necessity, when firing at a moving target, of not giving orders
too quickly one after the other, or altering those once given, was very
evident. Perhaps an actual example will explain better. Say the rang-
ing section is at 1800 yards, giving a minus, and the remainder loaded
and laid at 1750 yards, fuze 8, and two shell ready at fuze 73, 74: the
Battery Commander fires another round and obtains a plus, and at
once orders ‘‘ Three rounds, rapid fire.” The first four rounds all
burst on graze, shewing fuze 8 to be too long. One’s inclination is to
order the other fuzes to be shortened, and should one do so the delay
caused by altering them will probably allow the target to get inside the
range; further, the torrent of new orders upsets the battery. In such
a case it appears better not to attempt to alter the fuzes, but let them
be fired, they will act on graze and do some damage, and the next
batch can be ordered shorter.

The third reason, z.e., limber numbers not setting fuzes, was perhaps
the most frequent. When fuzes were set at the limber the system
worked well; thus, one battery took only 50 seconds to fire its first set
of rapid fire (two rounds a gun), and 1 minute 30 seconds for the next
(this time three rounds a gun).

The fourth cause led to many ranging rounds being lost, and was
lable to throw out the Battery Commander.

The other system, a kind of ordinary fire through the battery, was
very similar to that described for the echelon target. The following
modification appeared to give the best results: On the change to mov-
ing target being ordered, the Battery Commander gave “ Range ——
slow fire,” and fired until he had roughly fixed its position, and then
started ordinary fire. The fire was from the right. After No. 4 had
fired, the Commanding Officer gave new length of fuze to right section,
and after No. 6 had fired, gave final elevation. You willsee that it is
not exactly ordinary fire, for the right section waited to load until they
received a new fuze. Also, the centre and left Section Commanders
made a drop in range and fuze, on their own account, from that
ordered for the right section. The centre giving 25 yards less eleva-
tion and ¢ fuze; the left 50 yards and 4 fuze. It is considerably
simpler than it appears from the explanation, and it certainly worked
well, and at ranges when observation is easy, say under 1800 yards,
would probably give a more effective fire than with a ranging section.
At longer ranges the latter is probably better, as it fixes the position of
the target with greater accuracy.

A great deal of time was often taken up changing from the standing
to the moving target. The latter, although it fired petards both before
and after starting, was certainly hard to see; but even after the layers
had made it out, there was often a further delay, generally caused by in-

8 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894.

decision as to what was to be done with shell in the guns at the time the
change was made, and many batteries did not get fairly started at the
target until it had completed almost half its run. The quickest change
was made in 80 seconds, and was by a battery employing the ordinary
fire method, and it certainly is one of the advantages of that method,
that the change is easier and quicker.

RancGina.

The system of ranging by echelon, or ladder of distances, again
cropped up and was tried on several occasions, with almost invariably
bad results. Thus, on one occasion the Commanding Officer mis-
judged the range, about 2100 yards, by over 400 yards, and used eight
ranging rounds before obtaining a plus, whereas with the ordinary
method he would probably only have needed half as many. It ap-
pears to me that quickness in ranging for elevation at short ranges
should be gained more by quickness on the part of the Battery Com-
mander in making up his mind and giving orders for the next round
at once, than by an elaborate special system that is liable to collapse
should anything unforseen occur. Almost always, at short ranges,
glasses can be dispensed with, this alone will save 10 or 20 seconds a
round. Again, ranging to 25 yards is not required before going to
fuze, at so short a range there is little difficulty in working both to-
gether. Some Battery Commanders gave three lengths of fuze as
suggested last year, and it again appeared to work well; some even
attempted it at long ranges, but at these I hardly think it succeeded.

The judgment of distances was often at fault, and how difficult it is
to estimate even a short range, 700 to 1200 yards, was conclusively shewn
by the three series fired at those ranges. It was rarely that the first
elevation was within 300 yards, on some occasions not within 700.
Another thing noticed at short ranges was that the fuzes almost in-
variably were very short, this was especially the case when firing down
hill, most batteries having them from 150 to 200 yards short.

FIRE FROM UNDER COVER.

The fire from under cover was hardly so successful as that of last
year. ‘The position was certainly a more difficult one, for it required
very careful reconnoitring to get the battery well covered from the
enemy’s view. Insufficient reconnoitring and moving the layers out too
soon generally ended in extra delay; it saved time in the end to
thoroughly reconnoitre the whole front to be occupied before calling out
the layers, for when once the latter are out any change is sure to lead
to confusion.

The actual time taken planting pickets varied from two to nearly
14 minutes, and was quickest in those batteries whose layers planted
their pickets as at drill. The Commanding Officer pointing out the
position of a front flank picket and the other layers simply extending
from it. Done this way, from two to three minutes is ample time in
which to plant them. It also saves time if Section Commanders re-
main out and superintend the planting of the pickets, only returning
to the battery when the layers are in position.

Another difficulty of the position was, that the guns were often on

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 9

considerably different levels, and this not being noticed led to difficulty
in ranging. Hven when noticed it is hard to correct, especially with
our present clinometer. The correction for each section has practically
to be guessed, some idea of it may, perhaps, be ascertained from the
range-finder’s range in combination with the rule of one minute giving
an inch in each 100 yards; or roughly, 10 minutes will give the cor-
rection for the same number of feet that there are 100 of yards in
range. The difficulty, however, of remembering such rules and figures
would, I think, induce one to evade rather than overcome the trouble.
Thus, if the slope is from a flank, one could range with the centre sec-
tion, and then on opening ordinary fire the section on one flank would
shoot long and that on the other short, the mean trajectory being cor-
rect. Or again, as actually happened, a cross-fire may attain the
desired object if the target is inclined to the line of fire. Another
difficulty that cropped up was that of deflection. It being sometimes
forgotten that after the first general deflection for wind the Battery
Commander must order it for dividual guns according to the result
of their fire, since the pickets may be wrong and Section Commanders
cannot see the target. He can either order the actual deflection him-
self, thus “ No. 2 gun 10 minutes more deflection right,” or else can
call out “last round 20 feet to left,’ and leave the Section Commander
to give the necessary correction.

RESULTS.

The results are arranged in as nearly as possible the same form as
those of last year, but even so, afford small basis for comparison on
account of the different nature and positions of the targets used.

As to the artillery target, it is the first time for some years that so
short a range, 2000 yards, has been used. The results are rather dis-
appointing, for the difference seems to have led to no increased effect.
The guns were placed just short of rather a flat crest, the background
was dark, and made the target difficult to see, only about three guns
on one flank being at all clear. They were first placed so that the
ground line of Holstock, where the bateries come into action, could just
be seen, but when placed thus, it was found they could not be seen
from Holstock except with glasses, and then only with difficulty, they
were therefore run forward until about the upper half could be seen.
It would be rather interesting to let them fire petards every 30 seconds
and try a series at them as at first placed.

Two series were fired under conditions suggested by officers of the
other arms. Both were arranged with a view to seeing the depth
covered by shrapnel bullets.

In the first series the targets consisted of four lines covering one
another at 300 yards distance. The first line contained 50 kneeling
dummies, the second and third 50 standing, and the fourth 20 Hessians.
The battery began on the third, then changed to the second and then
the front, firing for five minutes at each. The average effect of two
batteries was fourth line, 40°5 hits 19 Hessians; third line, 157 hits on
36°5 dummies; second line, 107 hits on 37 dummies; first line, 38°5
hits on 19°5 dummies. In this series the effect due to the depth is

10 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894,

only shewn by the results being greater than the average results at
single targets. The other series shewed them better, for the bat-
tery only fired at the front line. The target consisted of three lines,
first, 90 kneeling dummies; second, 70 standing dummies; third, 24
Hessians. The distance between the first and second was 200, and be-
between the second and third nearly 300 yards. The time taken was
nine minutes 40 seconds, during which 56 rounds were fired.

The effects, first line, 827 on 84; second line, 82 on 44; 38rd line,
22 on 13, were good, and the results on the second and third lines are
all fairly due to the depth of the shrapnel and not to exceptional
rounds, because in the whole series no time shell and only two percus-
sion burst beyond the front line.

CoMPETITIVE.

The change from the column to a 4-gun battery for the first series
seemed popular. From the results it appears as though four marks
per dummy was hardly sufficient to put the series as regards marks on
an equality with the second and third. Taking Okehampton, Glen-
beigh and Shoebury (87 batteries), the average marks obtained were
in the first series 38°6 ; in the second, 63:1; and in the third, 60; from
which it seems as though six for each dummy disabled in the first series
would be a better proportion.

Only 12 batteries out of 45 fired the whole of the rounds, so that the
time seems about correct. Perhaps a better distribution would be to
give eight minutes for the first, seven for the second, and six for the
third, so as to lay more stress on accuracy at the long range, and ra-
pidity at the short. Almost everyone was unanimous in wanting the
fire discipline marks kept up. If anyone still had any doubt on this
point, the result of dropping them in India should convince him.

For instance, Colonel Ward in his report states that he found batteries
“ holding up the trails and lowering them together ;” similarly, Colonel
Tyler after giving examples, states: “No check is placed on plans
and devices which may be introduced at the will of the Commander.
Opinions were much more divided as to the necessity of keeping up
the qualifymg marks for firing, and it certainly seems hard that
batteries at Okehampton and Lydd should have to obtain the same
number as those at Glenbeigh, Shoebury and Morecambe, which are
admittedly easier ranges for effect. It appears as though each station
should have its qualifying minimum, or else it might be done away
with and batteries take places 1, 2, 3, &c., at each camp.

There seemed also a desire to have the Competitive extend over the
whole Service practice. It would of course tend to eliminate the luck,
still I think one would have too much Competitive. Perhaps the most
feasible suggestion in this direction was, to have the Competitive, much
as it is at present, and to add the effects only, of one or two days’
Service practice, settled on by each Camp Commandant. Its chief
objection is that, when there is only a time limit and no fire discipline
murks as a check, hurried fire and great waste of ammunition often
spring up, the fire being conducted on the principle that if you only get
off enough something must hit.

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 11

HiQUIPMENT,

The sight graduations and clamps were as usual the cause of many
errors. A sight marked in hundreds and fifties, from 1400 to 2000 ;
and in twenty-five yards at longer ranges, was tried; the fifties being
represented by a short line and the twenty-fives by a dot; although
the figures are rather crowded owing to the short radius, they appeared
better liked than the old one.

The greater number of errors in the laying examination were caused
by the sight slipping when putting it into the gun. Perhaps a ratchet
sight, somewhat similar to that on the quick-firer, might be tried ; or, if
this is considered too complicated, a better clamp. A plain nut that
screwed up the sight in a somewhat similar manner to the nut on a
hammer-vice might answer.

It also seems desirable that the sight should be strong enough to
stand being left in the gun when fired ; for even with the greatest care
such a thing may happen, and a bent sight seems a heavy penalty.

Some batteries had the clamp altered so as to use a Mark I. sight in
a Mark II. carriage. This rather complicates matters, for although it
makes the sight correct for the yard scale, it throws out the degree
scale and makes the tangent sight and Scott’s sight disagree. Thus, a
Battery Commander using the tangent scale employs a Mark I. range-
table, whereas when he uses a Scott sight he must employ a Mark II.
table. It would obviate all these difficulties if all sights were made
like those for heavy guns, the yard scale being on a slip that can be
changed should the carriage or charge be altered.

The mekometer was again liked ; one Battery Commander considered
it more reliable to accept the mekometer range than to determine it
by T scale laying, and said he would have no hesitation in accept-
ing its range when under 2000 yards and opening with time shrapnel
at once, at longer ranges only using a very few ranging shots.
Personally, I disagree with this, and think the results hardly justify
it. Several series were spoilt owing to Battery Commanders dis-
trusting their own observations and believing the range-finders. On
service also the range-finders would probably be oftener wrong, even
the mild excitement of the Competitive apparently upset them. In the
first series there were six out of 15 cases in which the range-finder was
not within 50 yards of the true gun range. In the second series eight
out of 15, and in the third four out of 11: a total of 18 out of 41, equal
to 43°9 per cent. ; applying the same test to the elevation fired at (i.e.
range as found by observation) the figures are first series, three; second,
two; third, one; or only 13°3 per cent. These figures so astonished
me that I thought they must be wrong, and I therefore went through
all the Service practice 1894 and Competitive 1893, the latter gave 87°5
for range-finder and 5:7 for observation, whilst the Service practice, ex-
cluding Competitive, gave 32°7 for range-finder and 24 for observation.
Although, of course, these figures are by no means conclusive, they all
point the same way.

The results of observation would, I think, shew up even better if
one could get over the dislike of calling rounds doubtful. In look-
ing through almost any practice report one finds more wrong than

12 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894.

doubtful observations. In some ranging series I have seen four wrong
out of six rounds and yet no doubtful; with such a large propor-
tion wrong, some must have been doubtful, and it would have been
better to have classed them as such and repeated. A doubtful round
entails only the loss of one round, whereas a wrong observation generally
leads to several being lost. This same difficulty occurs in India, thus
Colonel Murdoch in his report on Muridki says: “ Wrong observation
was the most frequent fault; it must, at the same time, be admitted that
the observation at Muridki is particularly difficult. A fault in obser-
vation that was noticed frequently was declaring a round plus or minus
when it was doubtful. Of course such a round should be recorded as
‘not observed’ and be repeated even more than once if necessary.”

HWXPERIMENTS.

The Ordnance Committee have kindly allowed me to give the following
notes of the experiments carried out at Okehampton this season.

The Q/2-guns and equipment were again used by “ P” Battery, and
were much liked by all who saw them, and it has, I believe, been
definitely decided on for the Horse Artillery. The twist of rifling is to
be further tested. Experiments so far appear to show that the lesser
twist, 1/35, gives a closer pattern (the 1/28 covering about ten feet more
at 75 yards burst), but the shell is not so well centred, and it is doubtful
if the accuracy is sufficient to ensure good ranging. ‘lhe tubes were of
a different pattern to those tried last year, and gave no trouble.

Much interest was also taken in the trial of the 15-lb. shell carried out
by the 75th Battery.

The charge was 153 oz. cordite, giving a muzzle velocity of 1550 f.s.

A radial vent was employed, and the tubes were almost identical to
those used with the Q/2, and appeared very satisfactory.

The shell has a base burster of 14 oz., and contains 216 bullets.

Mark I. carriages were used, they were fitted with steel pockets, one
on each side, to carry two fuzed shells and two cartridges, the two
weighing | qr. 16 lbs.

The service limbers and wagons were employed, the boxes being
altered to carry fuzed 15-lb. shell and cordite. The number of rounds
carried being as at present. I am unable to give the exact weight
behind the team, but it is approximately the same as with 12-lb. shells.
The weight gained by the use of cordite being about equal to the
extra weight of shell, tubes and steel pockets. ‘Two of the guns were
fitted with wheels similar to those on the Q/2 equipment, and they
seemed to answer well. Should they be adopted there would be a gain
of about 1 cwt.

Two experiments were carried out to test the smoke-giving properties
of shrapnel and ring shell. In the first, service shrapnel, shrapnel
with special fuze, and ring were tried. In the second, shrapnel and
ring; these latter were 15-lb. shell, the shrapnel had a base burster of
1} oz., and the ring one of 44 oz. compressed powder down the centre.

In both experiments the shrapnel came out best. It is hard to say
why 13 oz. gave more smoke than 44 oz., butit certainly was so, and I
can only imagine that the latter was not thoroughly consumed,

Percentage
: > Men hit] of targets
No. of Hits per 2
iRenioes we per destroyed Remarks.
2 Rounds. Shell *\5 Still per minute
in action.

No. of Average time
Series. in action.

ARTILLERY IN THE OPEN.

j Okehampton... 0 1893 2845" 24 19°8 6 guns, 3 wagons, and 40 standing

{ On Bluff.
; 3285 24 21°6 . (tuscan

» Yes Tor.

Average of me :
1892 and 1893 2845 to 3320 229

1894, 2085 A, 17°6 g fe ° 6 guns, 6 limbers, and 42 dummies. 1 Blackdown Neck. —

fi 2870 “ “d 2) 6 gans and 3 wagons. n East Mill Tor.

Competitive. 4 gun detachments.

‘ \ 2680 26 dummies.

15 standing. 15 standing.

100 kneeling. ; er ees ee the supports :

81 kneeling dummies in line at 1
pace interval.

STANDING DUMMIES IN LINE.

between groups, 1 pace be-

V2
24°75 | 100°5 34 | 80 dummies in 4 groups, 25 yards
tween dummies.

23°7 54:1 25°6

(| 81 standing dummies in line, at 1
pace interval.

13°6 87°2
AVERAGE RESULTS OF BATTERY SERVICE.
|
43°7 Wee || : ° 0 49 dummies.
48 jeu ds : 43°67 Including Competitive.

48°2

cover.

§ n if and undey|

Including Competitive.

| Okehampton

Canny Target. Remarks,
2 On Bluff.
ims, 3 wagons, and 40 standing u
umiies. -
w nm “es Lor.

" ins, 6 limbers, and 42 dummies.

" ims and 3 wagons.

apetitive. 4 gun detachments.
26 dummies.

" anding. 15 standing.

y 100 kneeling.

neeling dummies in line at 1
pace interval.

u immies im 4 groups, 25 yards
between groups, 1 pace be-
tween dummies.

1 anding dummies in line, at 1
pace interval.

immics.

{

n Blackdown Neck. —
n East Mill Tor.

In one series in 1893 the supports j
were kneeling. ;

Including Competitive.

H nf and under

cover.

Including Competitive.

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 13

Three clinometers, namely, the Watkin with double drum, the
German, and a modified Austrian, made in the Arsenal, were tried, the
latter appeared most liked. However, I believe that before a final
decision is made, a Scott’s sight, fitted with an adjustable bubble, is to
be tested, in the hope that, if successful, it will obviate carrying an
extra clinometer. :

Tur Cuarrman—Gentlemen, we have listened with great interest to
this lecture, and we shall now be glad if anybody will start a discussion
on any points that have occurred to them. There must be many, I am
sure, who will be able to give us the benefit of their experience in
certain matters.

AVERAGE RESULTS OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICE.

3 2 Rounds. Hits. Marks.

Station & e

practised at. | ‘g s
Bee iy piles | 10d dp ae | Wee soo) ie 1) adi | Tae,
Okehampton—
4-pun average 4 | 22-5 | 28°22 | 24 12°5 | 49°25 | 58°75 | 86 49°5 | 43 90:5 | 221°5
|
6 on " 11 | 19-63 | 23°36 | 23-81 | 19-09 | 49°54 | 45-9 | 23-09 | 40:9 | 44-45 | 91-54 | 200:27
General 1 15 | 20-4 | 23°33 | 23°36 | 17°38 | 49°46 | 48 26°6 | 43.2 | 44°06 | 91-26 | 205:93
Glenbeigh—
4-pun average 5 |20°6 | 23°8 | 24 31-2 | 157 | 187:6| 51:2 | 82:2 | 73-4 | 93-8 |2963
6 ou " 3 |16°3 | 24 24, 18-6 | 194°3 | 182-3 | 46-6 | 80 72°3 | 946 | 293°6
General 1 8 |19 23°8 | 24 265 | 171 | 13865 |} 49°5 | 81:3 | 71:3 | 94-1 | 295-4
Shoeburyness—
4-gun average 4 /19 23 24 21-2 | 1692 | 102-7 | 42 82°5 | 62 83 269°5
6 + " 12 |19°6 | 22°5 | 22:6 | 81-88 | 122-58) 180°36) 47:3 | 73 72°66 | 89-58 | 282°59
General , 16 | 19°5 | 22°6 | 28 29:1 | 184-2 | 128-4 | 46 75°37 | 70:0 | 87-93 | 279-31
Morecambe—
4-gun average 1 | 24 22 24 29 144 93 64 82 78 96 820
6 un u 2 |23°5 | 23:5 | 24 24-5 | 124 11380 | 88 64 71 94, 267
General 1 3 | 23°6 | 23 24 26 181 |117:6] 46-6 | 70 73°3 | 94°6 | 284-6
|
| oe

Lydd—
4-pun average 3) |) alos}. |) 0S} | iB} |) ahs} 39°6 82°6 | 24, 38°66 | 58°66 | 89°66 | 195-0

14 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894,

DISCUSSION.

CotoneL G. H. Marsuatu.—l shall endeavour to make my remarks as brief as
possible, because my real object in coming here is to hear what others have to say
and to get suggestions for next year; therefore I should like to hear as many
suggestions as possible.

Tam very glad that Major Hughes touched on the subject of occupation of
positions. Whatever method we adopt, obviously it is of the first importance
that we should put our guns in such a position that we can see the target over
the sights. In the direct occupation, there was, in many cases, much hesitation
on the part of commanders in going forward boldly and taking up a favourable
position. I think that a good deal of that is due to the teaching that we have
had for many years, and it is hard to get out of it perhaps, that cover was the first
consideration. That I think was the teaching, not only in our drill-book but in
all drill-books. This is now changed, and we are taught (and I think very rightly)
that it is the first consideration to be able to hit the enemy, and that cover is of
secondary importance. Another matter which, I think, has influenced com-
manders in that respect is, that they have been impressed by the undue importance
attached to the effect of modern long range infantry fire on a battery unlimbering.
In that connection I think it will be of interest if you will let me read to youa
record of some experiments at Glenbeigh this year of long range volley firing at
an artillery target. These are not really ‘“‘ Experiences of Okehampton,” but they
bear on our experiences there. The strength of the party firing consisted of one
officer, three section commanders, and 44 rank and file. The target consisted of a
battery of six guns in action, with three wagons, and 40 dummies to represent
detachments. In the first series the range was 2515 yards ; the time occupied was
17 minutes 50 seconds ; the number of rounds fired was 459; the effect was mJ,
but that I discard, as I do not suppose that the greatest advocate of long range fire
would say anything about 2500 yards. The second series was at the same target at
1707 yards, time 13 minutes; 463 rounds were fired; the effect on the target was
two hits on two men. ‘The third series was at the same target, range 1730 yards.
This was not fired against time ; I presume the time was unlimited. The rounds
fired were 439; the effect was nid. In the fourth series the target was an infantry
column, 95 dummies; 1750 yards range; no time limit, the rounds fired were
440; there were 30 hits on 80 men. In the fifth series the target was a battery
in action of four guns, 27 dummies in the detachments; range 1150 yards; time
15 minutes, 489 rounds; the effect was two hits on two men. In all the series
the ranges had been taken before firing commenced. I think that these figures
are very interesting. We find that 1830 rounds were fired during the four series
(I have left out the 2515 yards series), and that there was practically no effect at
all, except at the infantry target. I think, with the lecturer, that we should look
from both ends of the range, and I do think that there is a great deal of
unnecessary striving for cover from this fire, especially when we find, as the
figures tell us, that there is practically no effect.

It is very satisfactory to notice that all the changes which have been made
recently, and that are impending in tactics, in drill, and in equipment, are in the
direction of simplicity; all field artillery are agreed that, especially in equipment,
you must have simplicity. We are within measurable distance, as regards equip-
ment, of having only one projectile (the shrapnel), only one fuze, the shell carried
fuzed in the limbers, only one enumeration for everything (in yards), and a very
simple and very efficient shoe-brake. I think that with such simplification we
may look forward to great improvement in the rate of fire, and in our fire effect,
and I hope, at the same time, that we shall keep up the very high standard of fire
discipline that we already possess.

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 15

CotoneL E. A. Oxtivant—TI think I must have been the officer referred to by
Major Hughes, as the one who used mounted orderlies at Brigade Service Practice.
If so, I should like to say that in addition to mounted orderlies, each battery had a
dismounted orderly in rear of the Battery Commander, so as to avoid any mounted
orderly coming into the firing line; and I think that that adds materially to the
advantages of having mounted orderlies.

I think that at Okehampton some Battery Commanders are a little inclined to
follow what I may term the letter and not the spirit of the book. One sees officers
who, even at short ranges, begin by bringing out their range-takers, and ranging
with common shell in precisely the same manner as if they were firing at a long
distance target, and this, even at a cavalry target advancing rapidly. That, I
think, is due to their going entirely by the letter and not considering the spirit
of the book.

Then, as regards casualties, we must all of us recognise the very great importance
of practising their replacement. A certain amount of confusion takes place when
a casualty occurs at practice, due to a great extent to the fact that the Staff
Officer touches the supposed casualty, and says: ‘‘ You are out of action,” and
nobody knows that this is the case, it is not sufficiently understood. I cannot help
thinking that it would be better if we had some system by which we could label
our casualties at the moment, by a red label or other mark, which everybody could
see. There was a great tendency this year when the Major was shot for the senior
Subaltern to take the command ; nobody ever thought of sending for the Captain,
who was in rear. I should like to add one word on the question of sergeants
acting as layers at the Competitive Practice. Itappears to me that they have lost
a good deal of their interest in laying; now the sergeants have to carry out a
considerable part of the instruction in laying, and I think that they might be
allowed to lay at one series of the Competitive, which would give them some
interest in it. It would be easy enough to keep up the same number of layers,
and the chief umpire could choose two out of the three sets when he came on the
ground, so that the number of layers would not be diminished, and the sergeants
would have a personal interest in the shooting.

Masor H. C. C. D. Stupson—I attended this summer, at Bousson, in the
Italian Alps, the Brigade-division practice of three 9-pr batteries of the Italian
Mountain Artillery Regiment, and Major Hughes’s statement as to the faultiness
of the echelon system of ranging appeared to be fully borne out. Owing to its
employment, and the absence of all attempt at verification on the means of the
small bracket, the practice throughout, except at a moving target, was very in-
different. One point struck me as worth noting, and that was the custom,
whenever the targets represented a battery, of firing a succession of petards as
denoting at them a hostile battery in action. This made the ranging, when the
small bracket was being found, very difficult, owing to the impossibility of
distinguishing the bursting shell from the petards being fired on the target em-
placement. The guns, on coming into action, were invariably placed under cover,
and not run up into position until loaded, which operation was effected very rapidly,
owing to the shell being always carried fuzed in the boxes, a detonator merely
being dropped into the head of fuze on orders to load being given. The range-
finder was rarely used, and when it was, gave most unsatisfactory results. Rate
of fire was quicker than ours.

After each series, officers, Nos. 1, and layers fell out for the customary
““palaver”’ on the tactical idea and the shooting, which commenced, first of all,
by the remarks of the Battery Commanders (after which Nos. 1 and layers fell
in), followed in succession by those of the Major Commanding the Brigade-
division, and concluding with the Colonel’s critique.

I had previously attended some mancuvres of an Alpine group in the French

16 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894.

Alps, near Modane, and witnessed a 12-pr. mountain battery of the French
artillery working in action at a field-day. They used the clinometer much more
than we do, but were very slow entering into action—two minutes—partly owing
to the clumsiness of their equipment and packing. ‘They carry all shrapnel
with the exception of a few melinite for incendiary purposes.

The advance into action, both by French and Italian batteries, over difficult
ground was at a very smart pace, owing to the fine stamp of their pack mules,
for which the Governments pay a high price.

Masor J. McDonnetu—I should like to ask the lecturer whether he thinks
that anything would be gained by having the ranging rounds laid by an officer,
or by a selected layer. At present the Battery Commanders sometimes are
entirely thrown out, and start ranging in a wrong direction, through a wrong
elevation being put out, or a round being wrongly laid. If the ranging rounds
were laid by selected officers, that risk would be somewhat reduced perhaps. I
have been asked to ask that question by an officer who is unable to be present.

Caprain E. W. Buunt—l should like to say a word for the poor range-takers.
I received a rather unexpected impression of the necessity for their employment
at the cavalry manceuvres this year. The ground was very undulating on the
Berkshire Downs, and it frequently happened that the Cavalry Commander, intend-
ing the collision to take place on a certain point, planted the battery, and for some
time there was nothing to shoot at ; we could see for a minute, perhaps, a mass of
cavalry, then they disappeared, and there we were waiting with nothing to do.
Then the battery range-takers were set to work to take the range of prominent
features on their expected line of advance, and when the cavalry appeared again,
that gave us some guide as to what range to adopt. The only feasible way of
opening an effective fire at all, appeared to be, to do what the lecturer has rather
condemned, namely, to guess the range and fuze. The target stays such a very
short time in any one spot, that guess-work is the only way of competing with it,
and judgment, assisted by a range-finder, is very much better than unaided guess-
work.

Masor EH. 8. May--I should like to ask Major Hughes a question on one small
point. On page 8 of the lecture, he speaks almost always of short ranges and so
on. He says: “ At so short a range there is little difficulty in working both
together.” What range does he refer to as ‘‘so short a range ?”

Masor A. J. Hucues—About 1200 or 1000 yards.

Masor H. 8. May—Then on page 10 I do not think we are given the range
at which these experiments were carried out against the dummies in position,
where the results were so good.

Masor A. J. Hueuns—lI may answer at once that the range of the first line
was from 800 to 900 yards.

Masor EH. 8S. May—Then, again, 1 think it would be interesting if Colonel
Ollivant were to tell us something more about the mounted orderlies, where they
came from and how they were trained ? I think it is a matter that interests us all
very much. We all see the desirability of efficient mounted orderlies, or agents
de liaison, as the French term them, but the difficulty is where we are to get
them, and how we are to train them.

CotoneL EH. A. Outivant—I am afraid the mounted orderlies were not
trained before the Brigade-division came to Okehampton, and one had simply to
take any sparemen. ‘The peace establishment of a field battery does not allow one
to have permanent mounted orderlies. The only thing that can be done with field
batteries is to take any odd men who may be available. The orderlies stand dis-
mounted a few yards in rear of the Commanding Officer, one of them mounts

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 17

when called by the Adjutant and gallops along the rear of the line to whatever
battery the order is for.

Cotonet G. H. MarsHatt—Did you not always have one orderly from each
battery, so that each one knew where to go to ?

CotoneL H, A. OLLIVANT—Yes, the ‘orderly always went to his own battery,
unless it so happened that I wanted to send two messengers too quickly, one after
the other.

Masor E. O. Hay—Gveat efforts have been made during the last year or two
to train signallers, and I wanted to ask some one from Okehampton, perhaps the
lecturer will tell us, what use was made of battery signallers, and with what result.

Masor W. N. LLoyp—We should be glad to have Colonel Marshall’s opinion
on the ‘‘ deliberate” method. I feel that it is treason to say anything against it,
especially as it commends itself to us in peace manceuvres, by reducing the con-
fusion of a battery coming into action toa minimum. But as a method to be
practised on active service it is not sound, and does not commend itself to me.
Let us for a moment soar above the usual three batteries which we are accustomed
to play with; let us imagine we have twenty batteries on active service about to
come into position by the “deliberate” method. What happens? First of all
we have a staff of officers reconnoitring the ground, followed by twenty Majors
and range-takers, then come 60 Lieutenants with 120 layers, making in allan army
of over 300 men.

In the jirst battle of a campaign, the enemy might possibly permit this
manceuvre to go unmolested, but having taken in the meaning of it, all subsequent
attempts at the “ deliberate’? method would meet with a warm reception. Again,
we cannot always expect to find a position ‘sufficiently clear to enable us to lay
out our layers deliberately for this method, troops will surely be moving into
battle, or to take up their positions which would cause confusion. I wish to draw
your attention to the fact that it is not a method in my opinion which would be
employed once in fifty times on actual war service, and that we make an error in
employing it so frequently in peace time.

We want rapidity of movement in coming into position 49 times out of 50.
We want to seize quickly opportunities which may offer themselves from time to
time; and I feel convinced that too much use of the “ deliberate? method is not
a step in the right direction.

CotoneL G, H. Marsyatt—I do not know why Major LLoyd should father
the “deliberate” method upon me, because it existed long before the present
drill-book was introduced. As a matter of fact I rather agree with Major LLoyd.
The conditions under which the “deliberate ’’ method should be used are very
fully laid down in the drill-book. I cannot exactly remember them word for
word, but I think the following condition must exist : There must be a preparatory
position close to the firing position ; there must be cover, surprise to the enemy
must be possible, and the range must be long. If you take the drill-book con-
ditions you will find that the occasions for the employment of the “deliberate”
method are rare, and there is no doubt that in many cases officers do not quite
appreciate this. At Okehampton they very often used the “deliberate” method
when surprise was not possible, owing generally to the nature of the ground. I
certainly do not approve of the use of the “ deliberate” method, unless the con-
ditions as laid down in the drill-book can be obtained.

Masor E. 8. May—I am afraid I may be opening up rather a difficult subject,
but in using the direct method, would you usually take guns slightly down the
slope, or would you strive to keep them on the reverse side of the hill or crest ?
I ask the question because I have heard gunners often unfavourably criticised at

18 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894,

manceuvres, by officers belonging to other arms, for apparently exposing guns and
wagons unnecessarily, by placing them somewhat down the slope. Of course it
is impossible to lay down any ruleapplicable to every nature of ground, but, when
in a hurry, men are apt to act largely according to habit, and it is as well, there-
fore, to medicate some normal method. I should say that, in our service at
present, the tendency is to get on top, or in front of, rather than behind the crest.

CotonEL G. H. Marsuaty—tThat is avery large question. I think it is very
much a matter of the back-ground, and also the nature of the slope. If you have
a very steep slope I should say that it was inadvisable to go down forward into it,
because you immediately put yourself into a position to enable the enemy to
observe every shell very distinctly. If the slope is a very great one you are
rendering his observation of the fire very easy, otherwise I think that the going
forward is an advantage.

Tuz CuarrmMan—If no other gentleman desires to speak, I will now ask Major
Hughes to reply to the remarks that have been made.

Masor A. J. Wueues—With regard to the questions that have been asked,
first with regard to what Colonel Ollivant said about casualties, I should think
that some label would be a very good thing. Some Battery Commanders adopted
the plan of sitting down, or tumbling down, which seemed to answer well,
although perhaps it is not very dignified. With a view of getting more practice
in regard to casualties, it has been suggested that the Captain should take one of
the Competitive series.

As to the suggestion of sergeants laying in one series of the Competitive, several
officers mentioned it to me this year during the practice. The only drawback
appears to be, that if you have a battery with five sergeants who are layers, and
one who is not, it is rather invidious having the other five out and not him.

With regard to what Major Simpson said, as to petards being fired from the
target battery, I hope that next year we may use them inasimilar manner. This
year was the first time that they have been tried, and they were not very
extensively used.

As to the French using the clinometer more, that also, I think, is rather the
tendency with us. Several reports, that have come in, have suggested that more
clinometer laying should be done.

As to what Major McDonnell said about the ranging rounds being laid by an
officer, I am sorry that some officers, who have had much experience of actual
shooting with a battery, have not given us their opinion; but to me it appears that
it would be rather slow. I believe it is done abroad. I saw in some book that
in Germany, when the target is difficult to see, one man goes down and lays all
the guns for the first round. In such a case, i myself, should prefer each layer
to use the clinometer for elevation, direction being given from the end of the
handspike.

With regard to what Captain Blunt said as to range-finding, I did not mean
to disparage the 1ange-takers. Certainly, on occasions with a quick target
or anything like that, one must accept their range at once. But what I more
especially intended to point out was, that with a standing target, like an artillery
one, at a long range you must range on it, and only use the range-finder’s range
as a guide for the first shot.

With regard to what Major May said as to the firing at short ranges and being
able to work the range and the fuze together, that was rather with regard to the
three series fired at short ranges, which varied from 700 to 1200 yards. I think
the nearest was about 700 yards, and the furthest 1150 yards.

As to signallers, I saw very little use of them indeed, except in signalling from
the battery. to the range party during the elementary practice, and then they were
not very successful.

OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 19

I think that is all that there is to answer. Colonel Marshall having already
answered Major LLoyd.

Tur CuarrRMAN—Gentlemen, I think there is no doubt that we have run too
much in the direction of the “‘ deliberate’? system of taking up positions. I
agree with Major LLoyd, and Colonel Marshall bears me out, that there has been
a mistake in this way. It is rarely, I should imagine, that one would be able to
practice it on service, though it is a good system for occasions, and would be
most useful when practicable. I think, that when once you are launched in
action, you will, as a rule, have to take up positions rapidly, and take your chance
as to cover. Most hunting men, when travelling by train, choose their places in
the fences, and get over them very easily and successfully, and I think that, in
the same way, useful practice can be had by military men, particularly when riding
through a country, if they selected positions for batteries, or troops, and then pro-
ceed to test them and see what they turn out to be. No doubt we should often
be disappointed, and find that what appeared very promising was not so satisfactory
as we had expected, but practice would enable us more readily to fix on positions
that were good.

I agree with Colonel Ollivant, as far as my experience goes, that mounted
orderlies would in most cases be the best way of conveying messages, a mounted
man for each battery, and a dismounted man stationed in rear of each battery,
seems to me asystem that ought to work very well.

I was glad to hear from Colonel Marshall that the tendency now is towards
simplicity, and to getting one type of everything as far as possible. The case,
noticed by the lecturer, of an Officer Commanding a Brigade-division having to
give three different settings to as many batteries, must create difficulties and
chances of error, and the sooner that sort of thing is done away with the better.

I do not think there is anything else that I can usefully refer to, but I should
like, with your approval, to tender a vote of thanks to Major Hughes for the trouble
he has taken and for the valuable lecture that he has given us,

Carried with applause,

ANCIENT BRITISH ORDNANCE

NOW IN THE \

ARTILLERY MUSEUM, MADRID.

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. C. DALTON (a.p.), R.A.

Durine a recent visit to Spain, I was once again enabled to pay a visit
to the Artillery Museum in Madrid, which, as I have before remarked
in these pages, contains a splendid collection of ordnance from the
earliest times, in addition to a rare assemblage of military models and
curiosities of all kinds, both ancient and modern. ‘The collection is
contained in one handsome and spacious building, and is under the
charge of a director, with a sub-director and staff, who are officers on
full-pay of the Spanish Artillery. The Spanish nation is justly proud
of their National Military Museum, and no expense and pains are spared
to keep it up to date, and worthy of the distinguished corps which is
entrusted with its management. On the occasion of this visit, I had
the advantage of being personally conducted over the Museum by my
old friend Colonel D. Ricardo Vidal, now employed in the Spanish War
Office, but who, until recently, was himself in charge of the Museum.
I therefore saw the collection under exceptional advantages. Colonel
Vidal pointed out to me, amongst other objects, a very handsome bronze
gun, made in England in the reign of Hdward VI., and on my evincing
great interest in this and in other ancient pieces of British ordnance, he
most kindly offered to let me have a descriptive list of the English
ordnance in the Museum. I have since received from him the promised
list, a translation and brief explanation of which, I venture to think,
cannot fail to be of considerable historical interest to the British
Artillerist.

1. The oldest Hnglish piece appears to be that to which I have
already alluded, and which figures in the Madrid catalogue under the
number 3937, and is thus described :—

18-pr. demi-cannon, made in the form of a culverin. The exterior is
partly twisted and bears in relief on the first reinforce a scorpion, below
which is the following inscription :—

“QVI VITAM, QVI FORTVNAS AMISERAT OMNES LEGVM
HT JVDICIO JAM PERITVRVS HRAT EDVARDI SEXTI
NVNC MVNERE VIVIT ET ILLI POST SVMMVM GRATES
DEBET HABERE DEVM.”

Below this, and in larger letters one reads :—

“ Robert and John Owin, bretherin, made this pece, anno 1551,’

1, vou. xxII,

22 ANCIENT BRITISH ORDNANCE.

The gun is of bronze, ig 14™ (54") calibre, and 342° (11’ 24”)
length of bore. It has no dolphins. It is not known how this piece
came into the possession of Spain.

Major H. C. L. Holden, R.A., has kindly supplied me with both a
literal and a rhythmical translation of the inscription on this gun, as
follows :—

“One who had forfeited life and all his fortune by legal verdict, and
was on the point of being put to death, is now, by the boon of Hdward
the Sixth, alive, and to him, after the Great God, is bound to owe
thanks.”

or,

“ A luckless wight his fortune lost,
Condemned by law to die ;
Now lives to thank his king on earth,
Next to his God on high.”

The latin inscription on the gun which, in the original, is somewhat
apbreviated after the fashion of the day is, as will be seen, in
hexameters and pentameters.

Iwas much struck with the beautiful workmanship and excellent
state of preservation of this gun which, like many of our own old and
interesting pieces of ordnance, is at present, lying outin the open air.!

2. No. 3799 in the Spanish catalogue, isa Falconet, the breech slot
of which is closed by an iron wedge (or vent-piece containing the
chamber). On the upper side, between the trunnions, it bears the

monogram . Inthe chamber there are two similar stamps Sez
XR R

and vay On the chase is engraved the weight, 107 lbs., and on

the breech, the weight of the breech closing wedge (or vent-piece),
viz.: 22 lbs. 8 ozs.

This piece is of bronze, its calibre is 88"" (2°67), and its length
97™ (38:18"). It was captured from the Cochin Chinese, in the time
of Isabel II. of Spain. I presume that this piece dates from the reign
of William and Mary, 1688.’

1 The gunfounders, Robert and John Owen (see ‘‘ Proceedings,” R.A.I., Vol. II, p. 156), lived in
A.D. 1538, and are thus mentioned by Stowe :—‘ About the latter part of the reign of Henry
VILI., three brethren that were gunfounders, surnamed Owens, got ground there (in Houndsditch)
to build upon, and to inclose for casting of brass ordnance. These occupied a good part of the
street on the field side.”’ ine ‘ j

In the above quoted number of the “‘ Proceedings,” Lieut. Edgar, R.A., describes the old guns
in the R.M. Repository, Woolwich, and amongst them there are several pieces made in the
reign of Henry VIII. and in that of Edward V1., but none of them exactly correspond with the
gun we are describing. ‘‘ Tomas Owen” (the third of the Owen brethren) is mentioned as maker
of a fawcon of Edward VI., in 1560, and Robert and John Owen, a brass facone in 1549, but
a much smaller piece than that now at Madrid, which was made two years later. The inscrip-
tions on the two pieces are very much alike.

In Cleveland’s notes (‘‘ Proceedings,” Vol. II, p. 850) we find, ‘‘ John Owen, gunfounder,”
mentioned in the list of Edward VI. Artillery, as receiving 12d. per diem, in A.D. 1548.

21 saw a similar piece to this in each of the Artillery Museums at Stockholm and Christiania
this year. That at the latter place is a particularly good specimen. The breech-piece (or vent-
piece) is hollowed out to take the charge, it is lifted into and out of the slot in the breech by a
handle.

ANCIENT BRITISH ORDNANCE. iy

3. No. 1286 in the catalogue. Bronze mortar of 938™ (3:°65")
calibre, with a chamber in shape of a truncated cone (the lesser end
being so small that the chamber is almost conical). The thickness of
metal is very slight. From the appearance of the bed it is on, it would
appear to be in all probability a naval piece. The mortar bed has an
eye on the fore-part to hook on to a pin-tail, and an apparatus, the chief
feature of which is a toothed arc, by which elevation or depression can
be given to the mortar. ‘The fact that the weightis engraved near the
vent as 0. 1. 6.4 (? 1 cwt. 6 1b. 4.028.) would seem to point to its being
English or Dutch, but whence it came is not known.!

4. Nos. 39380 and 5748. Two bronze guns of 15:5: (6:1")
calibre, and 312™ (10' 2°8”) length of bore. The weight engraved
on the chase is 55. 2. 13 on one piece, and 56. 0.9 onthe other. On the
first reinforce is the following inscription :—

“ By the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Goodricke,? Knt. and Bart., Lieut.-Genl.
and the rest of the principal officers of their Majties Ordnance. Guli-
elmus et Maria Mag., Brit. Fran et Hib Rew et Regina Anno Regni
tertio.”

On the second reinforce a G and M intertwined, surmounted by the
Royal Crown. The vent is of iron. It isnot known whence these guns
were obtained.®

5. No, 3144. English service 12-pr. howitzer, cast in 1827. The
British Legion, which fought for Isabella II. in the civil war, had a
complete battery of four 6-pr. guns and two 12-pr. howitzers. This
piece is supposed to be one |elonging to this battery.

6. No. 3635, Cast-iron gun of 14° (54") calibre. On the chase
hoop there is the number XJ; on the first reinforce XVI. Il. 0; on the
near trunnion 1775, and on the off trunnion VB. This gun was
captured from the Moors at Tetuan.

7. Nos. 8935 and 3936. Two cast-iron guns 14° (54”) calibre. The
off trunnion has on it /86P; the near one “ Carron 1809 ;” on the first
reinforce the cipher GA and 3 intertwined, surmounted by the Royal
Crown and the A\. ‘hese guns are supposed to be relics of the Penin-
sular War.

8. No. 3380. Carronade. On the breech is “ 18P Carron 1805.”
It also dates from the Peninsular War.

9. Nos.land2. Two cast-iron guns of 14°" (54") calibre. On the
near trunnion the word solid, on the off, B. Near the vent 41. 8. 24;
between the trunnions a monogram of the letters G.R. 3, surmounted

1 There does not seem to be any satisfactory evidence to point towards this mortar being English.
In Lieut. Hdgar’s paper, in Vol. IT of the “Proceedings,” R.A.L., p. 186, there are briefly described
two small Dutch brass mortars chambered, somewhere about the size of this: also on page 168
there is a description of a “ sort of mortar (brass)”’ of about this size, which is. English.

? We find frequent mention of Sir H. Goodricke (Goodriche) in Cleveland’s MS., in the reign of
Wilham and Mary. According to Kane’s list he was made Lieut.-General of the Ordnance on
26th Apyril, 1688, and probably continued so until 1702. =

§ There is in the Tower of London a brass 18’ mortar with an inscription on it identical with
the above, except that the piece was made one year later. (Hdgar’s paper, p. 194).

94, ANCIENT BRITISH ORDNANCE.

by the Royal Crown. These pieces were captured from the natives in
the island of Jolo (Phillippines) in 1851.

10. Nos. 8891 to 8895. Five English service 54" howitzers, cast in
1794 and 1804.

Il. Nos. 5372, 3857, 8858. Three English service 42" howitzers,
cast in 1807 and 1808.

12. Nos. 8938 to 3941. Four English service guns, medium 8-prs.,
cast in 1807. :

13. Nos. 3656, 3853, 3855. Three English service light 3-prs., cast
in 1807 and 1808.

14, No. 8148. English service 9-pr., castin 1811. 1t is supposed
that all the above numbers, 10 to 14, date from the Peninsular War.

15. No. 8561. English service heavy 6-pr. In the year 1855, this
gun was discovered buried on the field of Talavera. It was cast in
1796, and bears an indentation on the breech from having been struck
by a shot.

16. No.3660. English bronze mortar of 22°™ (8°6”) calibre. Above
the vent is the inscription “Raby & Co., fecit 1771.” Above this again
is the monogram G.f. 3, with the Royal Crown. Its weight is given as
4N 20.

17. No. 8689. Bronze mortar 3i™ (12°2”) calibre, with a cylindrical
chamber, similar to No. 16. Copper vent. An inscription, in Spanish,
states: “ This sacred Mortar was made in London by order of Sidi
Mohamed ben Abdallah, Sultan of Algarves. May God protect him!
Fort Surah (Mogador) year 1184, (A.D. 1770).” ts weight, as en-
graved onit, is 4850 Ibs. Both these mortars (16 and 17) were captured
from the Moors at Tetuan.

18. No. 3631. Another bronze mortor, taken in Tetuan, of 82™
(12°6") calibre, and with cylindrical chamber. There are two dolphins,
also a Royal Coat of Arms, with the mottoes “ Diew et mon droit” and
“ Honma soit qui mal y pense.” Above is a war trophy with the words,
“Tria guncta in uno” and “A Rege et Victoria.” On the breech is
“ W. Bowen, fecit 1764. 251A 14.” .

19. Nos. 8639 and 3640. Two bronze guns of 10°6™ (41") calibre,
and 282™ (91:2) length of bore. On the first reinforce there is the
following Arabic inscription, “ By calling on God, victory follows. This
is a present made to the Sultan Mohamed ben Abdallah ben Ismael the
blessed, defender and pacifier of the Algarves, from the Great Monarch of
England, France, Ireland and Scotland, George LLI., the thunderbolt of
war. Year 1183 (A.D.1769).” Onthe breech there is another inscrip-
tion which reads, “ In the pious name of the God of piety. There 1s only
one God, the eternal, the just. He who shall be chosen and aided by Him
will rejoice in Heaven and on Harth. There is no power nor strength
but of God.” Both pieces are handsomely chased and engraved with
military trophies, palms, scrolis, &. They were captured at Tetuan
in 1860.

ANCIENT BRITISH ORDNANCE. Zo)

There are, therefore, 34 English pieces of ordnance at Madrid, as
above described, besides several minor pieces of later date such as
Whitworth and other mountain guns, taken from the Carlists at various
times, which it is not necessary to describe.

So far as I could ascertain, many of these pieces have been left behind
in the Peninsula by the English during the numerous campaigns which
England has waged in that country, others have been captured by Spain
in her wars in Marocco, Phillippines, Cochin China, &c., from the natives.
Some were presentation pieces, as will be seen, others were probably
bought or exchanged by the countries in question. There were none,
as far as I could see, of which there was any evidence to show that they
had been captured by Spain from England. It would, however, be
very interesting to know how the oldest pieces here described came to
find a home in Spain; and especially to know under what circumstancs,
and by whom the inscription on the gun described here as No. 1 was
made. Perhaps some of the readers of this paper may be able to throw
light on the matter.

PEM FMT 4

phe
. eee 2
athe cial

ain

eldsy La diet aa es ee a neat
; :

Pare. bc

Pars

RECORD TARGETS:

BEING A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THOSE NOW IN USE
AND A COMPARISON OF THEIR MERITS.

CAPTAIN P. HE. GRAY, R.A.

Ir is not many years since Garrison Artillery practice was, by all ranks,
regarded as an objectless, perfunctory annual duty. It took place under
what are, to our ideas, the very reverse of service conditions, and con-
sisted of a number of rounds, fired off at an anchored barrel, each
gun-captain or No. 1 correcting his shooting from his own observation,
or by the advice of his Divisional Subaltern Officer.

The ultimate object of the whole practice was attained when the
barrel gracefully went to pieces to a well-directed shot.

The Commanding Officer of a battery usually undertook the duty
of judging the Rights and Lefts.

The results of each round were signalled up from the range-party,
firing ceasing to allow this to be done.

The more barrels that were expended, the better was the practice.
Instruction was comprehended in the destruction of as many barrels as
possible.

The idea of carrying out annual practice on a recognised scheme,
directing the fire of a fort by the orders and will of one officer, who
would observe and correct the shooting for himself, and on his own
judgment ; who would hold the fire of his command, as it were, in the
hollow of his hand ; in short, the instant, quiet, and effective application
of what we now call Fire Discipline in Coast Defence, was not even
thought of.

There were thoughtful officers of Garrison Artillery, no doubt, who
remarked, after a more than usually impressive display, at the expense
of the long-suffering barrels with their flags, that, though magnificent,
it was scarcely an example of Service Practice; for what enemy would
ever stand still and allow himself to be shot to pieces, unless his ship
was sinking ?

A naval officer would hardly attempt a regular artillery duel with
forts, by anchoring his own ships and giving the enemy every possible
chance against him. The practice at anchored targets was no doubt
excellent as a means of testing the eyesight of layers; and by way of
accustoming the detachments to concussion and noise, it was every-
thing that could be desired; but, as a preparation for attack by an
enemy’s enterprising and swiftly moving ships, cruisers, and torpedo-
boats, endeavouring to run past with an ulterior object in view, the
practical instruction of the annual practice was nil.

il, WOln xorar,

Hong Hong
target.

Portsmouth
target.

28 RECORD TARGETS.

So, grew up, tentatively at first, more rapidly as its vast importance
became recognised, that branch of applied gunnery which is known as
Coast Defence; and in its train came into being, as necessary adjuncts,
specialist gun-layers, depression range-finders and their uniform and
effective use, groups and group differences, Commanding Officer’s ob-
servation and corrections, moving targets, schemes of practice, strict
Fire Discipline, and Record targets.

Record targets are designed to represent actual ships, and to travel
at a fair rate of speed.

The forerunner of the Record target was the single or double Hong
Kong, which is still far the best bad-weather target we have. It is
cheap, handy, and extremely light. Used singly it represents any
desired position of a ship, usually the bow, and hits are counted as the
shots fall within given limits, laterally, and in range.

It is usually taken to represent the bow water-line, because layers
are instructed to invariably aim at that point. If the Fire Commander
knows that this is being done consistently, he can himself then correct,
with confidence, to bring the shots to any desired point of impact.

Two Hong Kong targets, connected by a tow-rope, represent the
length of a supposed ship. All shots, within limits, falling between the
two are counted as hits.

The objections to the Hong Kong are its small size, which renders it
difficult to see at long ranges, the impossibility of its recording effective
hits, for if it represents the bow water-line—a shot through would be
far less effective than one 50 feet astern of the target. It is also liable
to tow under, nose-first, when turning, and in rough weather, owing to
weight of tow-rope. This may be prevented by using an ordinary
square cork buoy, made fast to the tow-rope between target and tug.

Dismissing, then, the Hong Kong, useful and seaworthy as it is, we
come to Record targets proper, which are required to fulfil the follow-
ing conditions, or as many of them as possible :—

(1.) Visibility at long and short ranges.
(2.) Hvery hit to be recorded.

(8.) Strength.

(4.) Seaworthiness.

(5.) Lightness in towing.

(6.) Cheapness, in first cost and repair.
(7.) Durability.

One of the first was known as the Portsmouth pattern target. It
was a long, narrow boat-shaped body, having an iron centre-board
keel at the stern, and a superstructure of light iron masts and tape
lattice-work. Its length was over 60 feet, its breadth at water-line
about 8 feet, and its height 12 feet. It towed remarkably well, but
was very heavy, very expensive, and could be dismantled by one or two

lucky shots.

Tt was cut clean in two at Plymouth by a shot at water-line; and the
bow portion was used for some time alone, until it was again cut in half
by a similar shot.

RECORD ‘TARGETS. 29

A target called the Devonport or Richardson pattern was then in-
vented.

It was designed to illustrate the breadth, as well as the height and
length of a war-ship, and to offer the same target area when not
exactly broadside-on to the battery.

It was built in such a manner that no one shot could pass through it
without leaving a record; but no single shot could do any extensive
damage.

Light wooden cross-pieces and lathing were built up upon two keels,
12 feet apart. These were fitted with bags of cork chips to give the
necessary buoyancy.

The structure resembled the frame of a house-roof, was made of the
lightest deal scantling, and from the ridge-pole hung “chicks” or
curtains of laths, strung on tape, which could be rolled up when
not required. The length of target was 40 feet, its height above water-
line 12 feet when new, but as the cork bags became water-logged, it
sank deeper.

An end view of this target was somewhat as follows :—

DEVONPORT OR RICHARDSON TARGET.

AA = Cork Bags. B = Cross-piece. Cie Chicks

It was cheap and easy to build, and at first it answered well, but as
the cork bags became thoroughly soaked, the cross-pieces B, of which
there were 10, entered the water, and the resistance they offered was
so great that towing at a fair rate of speed was out of the question.

The original target was found to be too unwieldy in one piece, and a
second pattern was designed, in two sections, connected by lashing and
stays. This was rather handier, and the sections could be used separ-
ately in very rough weather.

The great objection to this target altogether was its difficulty in tow-
ing, on account of the cross-pieces, which difficulty has been overcome
in the target known as the “Improved Richardson 1893 pattern.”
Major-General Richardson so far altered the design of his first targets
that the cross-pieces should be well clear of the water.

The cork bags also offered considerable resistance, and these were
very ingeniously disposed of, by making each keel double and stowing

Devonport

or
Richardson
target.

Richardson,
improved,
1893 pattern,

gs of cork chips, the ends of each

RECORD TARGETS.

keel being built into a cut-water.

30
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RECORD TARGETS. 31

The cut-water at either end was continued up to a height of 6 feet,
with a similar upright in the centre of each keel. These uprights
formed the main supports of the structure. Cross-pieces at their tops
connected them, and also at a height of 6 feet 6 inches from the bottom
of keels. In addition to these, there were four uprights from each keel
connected by cross-pieces and forming knees at a height of 6 feet
6 inches. The whole of these frames were constructed of deal scant-
ling, 6 to 9 inches by 14 inch.

Upon the floats themselves was built up a framework, covered with
tarred canvas, stretched down to the tops of floats, and from each
projecting end depended a “chick ” of laths and stout twine.

The extreme length of target, including “ chicks,’ was 36 feet; the
canvas roof being 20 feet long, each top corner painted white. The
target area for fire effect was 432 square feet. The keels or floats being
3 feet in depth, and the cross-pieces connecting the uprights being
6 feet 6 inches from the bottoms, all parts, except those running in the
direction of movement, were at least 3 feet clear of the water—a very
great advantage.

This target is cheap, seaworthy, and tows lightly, It records every
hit, and can be severely punished before it becomes disabled.

The Mitchell pattern target consists of a pair of long, narrow boats,
placed parallel, and 10 feet apart. They are divided into water-tight
compartments, and are covered in with tarred canvas. Its particular
feature is the steering apparatus, which is ingenious.

At the stern of each boat is a rudder, whose tiller is connected to
the bridle by yoke-lines—the two tillers are connected by an iron rod.
The bridle runs freely through a rounded wooden float, to which is
fastened the tow-rope. As the tow-rope veers, the float slides, carrying
with it one or other yoke-line, thus steering the target into the wake of
the towing steamer.

The superstructure, resting on wooden cross-pieces, about 14 by 8
inches, of deal, and on edge, consists of light wooden masts, carrying a
lattice-work of cotton webbing.

The tops of masts are ornamented with small flags. The length of
target is 36 feet, and height above water-line is 12 feet.

MITCHELL TARGET.

Zetia

ree Oa a errr x
— WATER LINE .—=

= — = = =

A A = Tillers. B B = Yoke-lines,

The above is a rough hand sketch only, and is not drawn to scale.
| This target answers fairly well as a record of hits, but has the fail-

Mitchell
pattern.

The Ryder
Target.

BO RECORD TARGETS.

ing, common to all webbing targets, that a shot may carry away a
mast, and with it the whole of the webbing “ bay,” making an aper-
ture through which subsequent shots may pass, leaving no record. of
perforation. It is also awkward to hoist in and out of the water with-
out straining.

The writer has seen a single shot, ’twixt wind and water, completely
wreck this target.

The boats, if perforated, are certain to settle down, which brings the
cross-pieces into the water, and makes the target most difficult to tow.

Wooden buoys are provided to place at intervals along the tow-rope.
They make it awkward to handle, and have not been used at this
station as it 1s often an advantage to allow the rope to sink a few feet,
and so permit a fishing boat to cross between the launch and target.

The Ryder pattern target is cheap and simple in construction.

It consists of two long, narrow rafts of flat timber, pointed at the
ends, and connected by flat wooden cross-pieces. It is in two sections,
fastened together by chains and lashing.

The superstructure is of the usual lattice webbing type, supported on
eight wooden masts and iron rods.

It tows well and easily, and its being in two sections gives elasticity,
and flexibility in riding over heavy seas.

Its greatest disadvantage is, that a single shot cutting the two centre
masts will cause the whole two sections of webbing at the centre to
collapse.

A direct hit on water-line, also, cuts cleanly through the rafts, al-
most invariably through both, as has happened more than once this
season at Plymouth. Its length is 36 feet, and height above water-
line is 12 feet.

The annexed rough hand sketch is not drawn to scale.

THE RIDER TARGET.

In presenting the above notes, the writer puts them forward with no
claim to originality, the details of these and other Coast Artillery targets
being, no doubt, well known to Garrison Artillery officers.

He presents, however, the foregoing short description of those Record
targets now in use, in the hope that it may not be uninteresting to
some officers who have not had the same opportunities of seeing them
used and comparing their points.

The late Commandant of the School of Gunnery, Major-General

RECORD TARGETS. 30

Richardson, laid down as his opinion, that the use of Record targets,
which Coast Artillery should be encouraged to hit, is the best training
for actual warfare, when every hit can alone be effective, and every
miss but serve to encourage an enterprising enemy.

On one occasion only has the writer seen the Richardson target dis-
abled. It was struck 8 times in 12 rounds, being hit repeatedly on
the angles of cross-pieces, and having the ridge twice cut through.
The sea was rough, and it was blowing a whole gale of wind in squalls;
the target gradually opened out, collapsed and turned over, the only
portion which was saved being the two floats.

It was as severe a test, from wind, waves and fire effect, as could
possibly occur to any target. Its final disappearance was almost inevit-
able, and few targets could have lived as long under the circumstances.

An indestructible Record target remains still to be invented.

ID) IE AN EY) NE

JAMPAIGNS IN THE PENINSULA,
FOR THE YEARS 1811, 12, AND 43,

LIEUTENANT WILLIAM SWABEY,

AN OFFICER OF

“aan Hb IES © I=

(PRESENT ‘“‘E” BatrERy),

ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATHS, late R.H.A.

INTRODUCTION.

TuE favourable reception accorded to the recently published “Diary of a

Cavalry Officer,” induces the belief that the narrative of his services during the
- campaign in the Peninsula, under Lord Wellington, by Lieutenant W. Swabey,
Royal Horse Artillery, may be found equally instructive and entertaining.

Through the kindness of Lady Bowman, daughter of Lieutenant Swabey, who
served in “EH” Troop from 1807 to 1820, I have been lent and authorised to
arrange for publication, the diary kept by her father during a portion of his ser-
vice in the Peninsula. It embraces the period between July, 1811, and August,
1813.

Lieutenant Swabey, in after years, appears to have written his reminiscences of
some of the events in which he was concerned, adding amusing accounts of
adventures not touched on in his diary ; I have introduced these in their chrono-
logical order, placing them between brackets, so that the recollections of later
years may not be confused with the daily record.

For the better comprehension of the narrative, I have divided it into separate
parts and chapters, prefacing each part with a brief outline of the general military
situation at the time, as gathered from the Wellington despatches, Napier’s history,

1, Vol, XXII,

36 SWABEY DIARY.

and other authorities, and have appended footnotes explanatory of the history
and services of officers incidentally mentioned in Lieutenant Swabey’s pages. A
summary of the principal events of his life has been kindly sent me by his son,
the Rey. Maurice Swabey, and is as follows :—

William Swabey was born in Doctors Commons, London, on the 13th of June,
1789. He was the third and youngest son of Maurice Swabey, of Langley Marish,
Bucks, D.C.L., Fellow of the College of Advocates, and Chancellor of the Diocese
of Rochester. His early education was received at Westminster School and the
Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. On the 1st of July, 1806, at the age of
16 years, he received a commission in the Royal Regiment of Artillery, and, in
1807, was present with Captain Cockburn’s No. 7 Company, 1st Battalion, in
the land force which co-operated with Admiral Lord Gambier at the bombardment
of Copenhagen. He was ordered in July, 1811, to the Peninsula, with “E”
Troop, R.H.A., and served in it during a considerable portion of the war. He
was severely wounded at the battle of Vitoria and invalided home, but rejoined
the army before the close of the war. He was present at the battle of Toulouse,
and, marching through France to Calais, returned home in 1814 with the troop,
which the following year he accompanied to Belgium and was with in the retreat
from Quatre Bras, and at the battle of Waterloo. He received the Peninsular and
Waterloo medals. Shortly after promotion to the rank of 2nd Captain, he retired,
in March, 1825, from the service and settled down in Buckinghamshire, where
he became J.P. and D.L., and captain of a troop of Bucks Yeomanry Cavalry.

In 1840, he emigrated with nearly all his family to Prince Edward’s Island, of
which his friend, Sir Charles Fitzroy (an old Waterloo officer), was then Lieut.-
Governor. Captain Swabey continued in the colony till 1861, and developed such
capacity for the management of public affairs that he became, successively, a
member of Her Majesty’s Legislative and Executive Councils, Registrar of Deeds,
Commissioner of Crown lands, and member of the Board of Education, besides
undertaking latterly the duties of Lieut.-Colonel and Adjutant-General of the
local Militia. It is scarcely too much to say that the Statute book of the Island
is full of useful measures which he either initiated or promoted in his adopted
home. When the Prince of Wales visited the Colony in 1860, Colonel Swabey
was one of the two Military Aides-de-Camp to the Lieut.-Governor, who received
from his Royal Highness’s own hand a fine portrait of himself, in recognition of
their services. Colonel Swabey was entertained at a public banquet in the Colony
and presented with a flattering address, signed by the heads of departments and
many other prominent inhabitants, on his return to England in 1861. He was
also allowed to retain for life the prefix of “Honourable,” which was a privilege
limited to those members of Council who (prior to the Union, about 1867, of the
North American Colonies) had received their appointments under the sign manual
of Her Majesty the Queen.

Captain Swabey married, in 1820, Marianne, third daughter of Edward Hobson,
of Somerly, Hants, and Hope Hall, Lancashire, Esquire, and had a family of
eleven children. He died on the 6th of February, 1872, having, towards the close
of his life, resided for some years at Wavenden House, Bucks, a county endeared
to him by family ties and early associations. :

A few words as to “Ei” Troop, R.H.A., may not be amiss here. It was formed
on the Ist of November, 1794, and in 1811 was stationed at Christchurch, under
the command of Captain Robert Macdonald, in July of that year it was ordered
on its first active service, and embarked at Portsmouth to join the army under

SWABEY DIARY. 37

Lord Wellington in the Peninsula. The establishment was as follows :—2nd
Captain Thomas Dyneley, Lieutenants Robert Newland, Robert Harding, and
William Swabey, Assistant-Surgeon A. Macdonald, M.D., 164 non-commissioned
officers and men,! with 175 horses. The armament was light 6-pr. guns.

In 1816, after the termination of the long continental wars, various reductions
and changes took place in the Royal Artillery, and “Ei”? Troop became “ D,” when
the troop that had hitherto been so-named was reduced. It retained this letter
till a reorganization in 1859, called the Brigade System, changed the designation
of all units in the Regiment ; further alterations followed, until at the present time,
Ist of January, 1895, it exists as “EH” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, com-
manded by Major J. McDonnell,

Jevedagll! Jl

Tae Larter Periop of THE CamparGn oF 1811, rocgeTHER WITH THE 38RD
SIEGE or Bapasos.

Summary of the Peninsular Campaign, from September, 1811, to
April, 1812.

It was at the latter end of September, 1811, that “H” Troop joined
Lord Wellington’s army, which then lay in the vicinity of Ciudad
Rodrigo, for the reduction of which place secret preparations had long
been in progress. ‘T'he French army under Marmont lay at Salamanca,
and it was from this point that interruption was principally to be appre-
hended. But in December the welcome news arrived that Marmont
had detached three of his division to assist Marshal Suchet before
Valencia, and the favourable opportunity for commencing operations
was at once seized. The siege was begun on the 8th of January, 1812,
and on the 19th Ciudad Rodrigo was carried by storm.

This successful attack was followed by the yet more daring attempt
in the south, to reduce Badajos. By a rapid movement, therefore,
the main body of the army crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, and
marched on Hlvas. Soult, on learning this, advanced towards Badajos,
upon which Generals Hill and Graham were pushed forward to oppose
him. As on the previous occasion at Rodrigo, the siege was hurried
on, ground was broken on the 17th of March, and to the mortifi-
cation of Marshal Soult, who was within two marches and ready to
fight an action for its relief, Badajos was taken on the 6th of April.
On the news of its fall, he at once returned to Seville, which in his
absence had been blockaded by a Spanish force.

A few days after these events, Lord Wellington heard that Marmont
was committing great depredations in the northern provinces of
Portugal, he, therefore, at once marched back with the bulk of the
army. ‘The French, who had been stoutly withstood by the Portuguese
Militia, on his approach withdrew from Portugal.

12 Staff-Sergeants, 3 Sergeants, 7 rank and file non-commissioned officers, 7 artificers, 1 trum-
peter, 84 gunners, and 60 drivers.

38 SWABEY DIARY.

IME vd ay) SS,

Cuaprter I.

Voyage to Portugal. Sacavem. Some account of Lisbon. Changes in
troop equipment.

July 27th, 1811.—Having been on board the Benjamin and Mary,
transport “ K.I.,”1 since July the 38rd, we sailed from Stokes Bay under
convoy of the Mercur y, Captain Tancock, and the Hawke, brig, Hon?!
Captain Gordon, but our wind failing us we came to ananchor in Yar-
mouth Roads, much to our disappointment. As we lay here the beauty
of the coast of the Isle of Wight and of Hampshire, might have pleased
the imagination at any other time, but served now only to remind us of
the happy scenes we had left, a thought which not all the air y dreams
of glory could extinguish.

28th July.—Passed without any of ‘ihe ceremonies ae Telieions The
cruelty of the foul wind still occupied our thoughts, and the surrounding
scenes, with the ball-room at Lymington, so often the scene of eae
actually in view, awakened the same ideas as yesterday.

29th July.—Weighed anchor in company with the Quebec and West
India convoy with a fair wind. Passed through the Needles with eyes
fixed for a last view on the various well-known spots of Christchurch
and its vicinity, where lived those particular friends whose society had
always so great a charm for me, and the remembrance of past pleasant
days formed a melancholy barrier against the high spirits I might
otherwise have felt at the prospect of a favourable passage. 0

30th July.—We found in the morning that our progress during the
night had been rapid, and we now saw the coast of Devonshire, at too
great a distance, however, to discern its romantic beauties. ‘Towards
mid-day our wind failed, and left us to the tossing of the waves, many
of the people in consequence of the motion were sick. If this is
* soothing with its lullaby,” I hope lullaby will be good enough to leave
me to the chance of my own slumbers. I, however, felt no inclination
to be sick. Towards night the breeze, still fair, freshened, and we saw
the last of England. I should not omit that I hemmed the whole side
of a silk handkerchief to-day, and that we dined off two mackerel that
we had previously caught with our lines.

31st July.—We had a fair breeze during the aight Bat fe dle again
saw us becalmed with the same swell as yesterday acting as a
stomachic. I begun now to regret that my stock of books was gone

1 Compared with the merchant vessel of the present day, ships of this period were very small.
*¢ Those trading ’’ between Great Britain and the United States averaged from 200 to 250 tons ;
those to the West Indies and the Baltic about 250; to Germany, to Italy, and the Western Medi-
terranean, 150 ; to the Levant, 250 to 300, with some of 500 tons. The Hast India Company’s
ships were larger, © averaging 500 tons 3” (Mahan, “ Influence of Sea Power, 1793 to 1812,”’ page
225, Vol. 11). Transports for carrying troops on the expeditions at the beginning of the century
were of the former class, usually under 250 tons, and consequently very numerous. In the official
lists they were always quoted with their tonnage, ads so to avoid confusion, were mostly distin-
guished by letters in preference to numbers.—F'.A

SWABEY DIARY. 39

through whilst we lay at Stokes Bay. I amused myself, however, by
making up silk handkerchiefs. The calm continuing in the evening, we
began to apprehend a tedious passage. . . . . . .

Ist August.-—-This day passed with the usual sameness on board ship,
ib began, however, to get rough, and the wind blew from an unfavour-
able quarter. We spoke a convoy from Lisbon, who informed us that
the armies had gone into cantonments, an unpleasant piece of news, as
we now suppose operations are concluded for the present. Wind to-
wards evening still more foul. We were to-day under the necessity of
giving up tea because the water was bad. The Sergeant-Major re-
ported many sick, and almost all squeamish; little burgoo! eaten
DUMONT WIN, 6 6 6 so 6 6 6 0 6 5 6

2nd August.—A great deal of motion this morning, with a contrary
wind, and we found on getting up that the Commodore had made the
signal for putting about and retracing our steps to Falmouth, a very
mortifying sort of business.

“But, hark! the signal bids us trace again

Our steps to England, and the adverse wind,

Controlling e’en the mighty-swelling main,
Compels once more the nearest port to find.

Thus ’tis in life, few certain blessings shine,
And those but rarely, fully, understood.

Oh man! in vain thy choice, thy best design
Vain, as the Bark opposing Nature’s flood.”

We now sail at nine knots an hour, and arrived off the romantic
coast, near Falmouth, at 7 o’clock a.m. As we looked from the sea,
Pendennis Castle, on an elevated promontory, commanded the harbour.
A fort below it, some height above the water’s edge, with one on the
opposite side, facing each other, command the entrance. The appear-
ance of the cliffs is black, with ravines in every direction ; the crops
at this time of the year, various in colour, alone bespeak it an English
coast. In several places on each side of the harbour the sea runs
beautifully between the hills and forms various lakes. Altogether,
it is as striking a scene as I ever beheld, and though not wild enough
for Swiss or American scenery, it partakes of their beauties in a more
polished form. As the Trusty, Captain Macdonald’s transport, was
bringing to, a Bombardier Cochrane, being on the anchor, unfor-
tunately fell over and was drowned. He swam for some time, but
the ship being under weigh, a boat could not be lowered with snfficient
expedition. ‘This poor fellow’s fate is the more to be lamented as he
had recently purchased his discharge, but on hearing the troop was for
service, immediately joined us again ; as a soldier, he is a great loss.

3rd August.—Remained on board, not being able to procure a boat,
though we much wanted to get some fresh meat. The funeral of poor
Cochrane took place at Falmouth Church to-day, we attribute his death
to the erroneous way of treating him when taken out of the water. The
men who were in the boat held him up with his head down for the water

1 Burgoo, a kind of oatmeal pudding, or thick gruel, used by seamen.—F.4. 17.

40 SWABEY DIARY.

to run out, the most effectual method of smothering, perhaps, ever con-
trived.t This observation is worth recording, as the hurry of people in
their charitable endeavours is very often a bar to their reasoning on
the best way of making them effectual. Sergeant Wightman,’ who
was very active in getting ready and in lowering the boat, was so haunted
by the scene that in the night, fancying himself still in it, he was seen
pulling in his cot, and calling to everybody to pull. . . . . .

4th August—This morning went on shore to Falmouth. I was
much disappointed on nearer acquaintance. Its white, or rather brown,
brick houses, and the fact of its being built on the side of the hill, had
given it from the ships a too favourable appearance, for its streets are
both narrow and dirty. I should say, however, that for poultry and all
sea stock, particularly goats, it is the best and cheapest place I ever
heard of. I walked up to Pendennis which commands a noble prospect
of the sea, and opposite, the old castle and village of St. Mawes and
the surrounding country. There appear to be few gentlemen’s seats in
this part of Cornwall. Pendennis Castle is famous for its having suc-
cessfully opposed Oliver Cromwell, for which service some of the
neighbouring Cornish boroughs received their charters, and elective
franchises. It appears, however, that the safety of the garrison was
owing more to a singular accident than to their resolution, for, having
dispaired of holding out longer, they were preparing to retreat to their
boats on the sea side, and out of bravado flung over the walls two

1Tt is a common and time-honoured practice among sailors to this day, to hang a half-drowned
man up by his heels. —F.4.W.

2Sergeant James Wightman was a very gallant soldier, and hada distinguished career. He
entered the R.H.A. in 1797, went with ‘‘H’’ Troop to the Peninsula and was present at
Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, Salamanca, (where he laid the gun which wounded Marshal Marmont
just before the battle), and at Vitoria. In June, 1818, he was promoted Sergeant-Major to
“FF”? Troop, and was present at Nivelle, Nive, St. Sebastian, as well as many minor affairs
during the war. At St. Jean de Luz he was wounded in the left leg, and specially mentioned on
the occasion by Major Webber Smith, R.H.A. He received the Peninsular medal and 7 clasps.

Sergeant-Major Wightman, who was a disciplinarian, was with his troop at Waterloo, and lost
his right arm by a cannon shot. It is related that on this occasion one of the men exclaimed,
‘«* D—n that marksman,” for which language he was tried by a court-martial, but was forgiven,
as he pleaded that he used it hastily in his sorrow at seeing the Sergeant-Major wounded. Wight-
man, when taken to the rear, underwent amputation of his arm at the same time and place as
Lord Anglesea his leg, who never afterwards forgot him.

Though a one-armed man, he was eventually appointed Brigade-Sergeant-Major, R.H.A.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir Augustus Frazer commanding, and who presented him with a sword, saying,
“che preferred him to any other N.-C. officer.”” Wightman was both a good equestrian and swords-
man, he was an excellent fencer, and at stick and basket few could beat him, and he assisted to
bring out the new sword-exercise of that day, at which time, with other picked mounted men, he
attended the riding establishment then at Pimlico, and also Angelo’s fencing-rooms in London.
In 1821, he was mainly instrumental in getting up a gymnasium and small sword school in aroom
over the stables, near the Riding-house at Woolwich. This may be said to have been the parent
of the present gymnasium establishment in that Garrison.

Wightman was appointed a Lieutenant of Invalid Artillery in 1825, and as Quarter-Master,
R.A., accompanied the expedition to Portugal in 1827. He was appointed, in 1848, a Military
Knight of Windsor, where the same year he died and was buried.

He had a son who died as a Staff-Sergeant, R.H.A., and another who for many years served as
an officer in the 11th Hussars. Jieutenant Wightman had also two grandsons, who served in the
Crimean War—one, in the Scots Greys, died of cholera ; the other, in the 17» Lancers, was wounded
and taken prisoner in the Light Cavalry charge at Balaclava, and who wrot in 1892, in the May
number of the Nineteenth Century Magazine, a very graphic description of his experiences on that
day.

tt November, 1891, a picture (now inthe R.A. Institution), taken in 1821, of James Wightman
when Brigade-Sergeant-Major, R.H.A., riding a horse that was at Waterloo, was presented to
officers of the Royal Artillery by his son, Major J. T. Wightman, late 11‘ Hussars.—From Record
of Service and family papers,

SWABEY DIARY. 4]

quarters of beef. The besiegers had supposed them to be nearly
starved, as in fact they were, for this was all the provision they had ;
but now, believing their supplies were good, immediately raised the
siege. This story I take to be traditional. As to the present import-
ance of the Castle, it is a good defence against the entrance of hostile
shipping, for it has on its works, as nearly as I can remember, having
no memorandum book, 20 long, heavy 24-prs., four ditto carronades,
and three 42-pr. carronades. There is below, a fort mounting nine
24-prs., which faces the fort of St. Mawes on the opposite side. In
the present improved state of military knowledge, the Castle would be
an easy conquest from the land, as the ditch from its narrowness, and
the fact of its being dry, might be easily passed by escalade, and could
from the nature and rapid fall of the ground be approached nearly
under cover. To batter it en bréche would never be attempted, as its
great height would render such an attack useless. It might, therefore,
be tenable with a good garrison well provisioned: its intention at this
present time is, of course, to keep off invading ships . . . .

5th August.—Still a foul wind. Went on shore, hired a horse and
rode to see one of the copper mines not more than eight miles distant
from Falmouth. The way was hilly and the roads rocky and bad, the
country, however, extremely wild and beautiful; and as we rode along
we several times had occasion to say “ Well, the views at least recom-
pense us for our trouble if the mines will not.” We passed no
gentlemen’s seats worth remembering, and there appeared to be few
large farms—at least, few houses I should think suitable for a dignified
gentleman of that classif nearer London. The face of the country was
fertile, and though covered with rocks and large pieces of stone, was not
stony, and the soil was rich. There is much slate and many quarries.
The names of the places are all Welsh. The people here, as at Fal-
mouth, are uncommonly ugly, and the cottages mean and wretched.
They carry their geese, etc. to market on a pack-horse. On our
arrival at the mines, through a village called “ Comfort,” I suppose to
express the delightful insides of the houses, we found a captain of
the mine, an intelligent man, who was to be our bear leader.

The first operation was to strip entirely, and put on a flannel dress
and pair of shoes for the expedition. We then descended, carrying
candles in our hands, by a perpendicular ladder through a hole just big
enough to admit our bodies upright.

This was the shaft of the steam-engine, which is the largest but one
in England, its force being 500 horses, with a 63-inch cylinder; it
raises the water from a depth of 70 fathoms, and has several stages to
facilitate repairs in this length. When we arrived at this level we
descended by a rope, about 30 feet lower, into an excavation little
bigger than our bodies, from which some of the copper ore was being
dug. We then branched off into some of the road drifts or passages
driven to cross the veins of ore above the water-level. They are
scarcely high enough to stand upright in, and in several places we

fo}

1 Pendennis Castle, which was built by Henry VIII., was besieged by the Parliamentary troops
under General Fairfax, in 1646, and taken after a siege of several months —F.4.W.

42, SWABEY DIARY.

crawled on our hands and knees. The whole sight of a copper mine
consists in these passages, there being no large excavations as in coal
and other mines. From three adits! in various places there are holes to
the surface of the ground, through which whims or windlasses, worked
by two horses, lower alternately two baskets capable of containing each
3 cwt. of ore, which is thus got rid of when dry. The deepest adit of
the mine is 140 fathoms, and extends, from a centre about a mile, every
way. ‘The engine raises a hogshead of water at every second or vibra-
tion. In the adits, and in the descent by the steam-engine, the damp
drops on you like rain, and in several places you have to walk through
channels that convey the water, which runs very rapidly and is up to
your knees, from different parts to the engine. Owing to this perpetual
damp and the stagnation of air, miners are consumptive, and, as they told
me with great coolness, few live to more than 40 years old ; occasionally
the damp? strikes and immediately kills them, if it does not actually do
So, it incapacitates the person from holding on to the pump-rods? in the
descents, when they fall to the bottom, and their fate is inevitable
death. I had been led to suppose that miners were the most uncouth
wretches on earth: these were not so, and in general the Cornish
tongue appeared to have less of the provincial than is usual in distant
counties. The namesare certainly original. The great curiosity of the
mine was the steam-engine, which is certainly one of the most wonder-
ful products of mechanical knowledge, in the rest I was disappointed.

The mine is called the “ United Mine,” and was worked constantly
for 80 years, then closed for nine, and was re-opened two years ago.
Its return is £5000 per month; much money is sunk however, in clear-
ing the water; till that is effected it cannot be so profitable. It
employs 3800 people; when the water is gone they tell you it will
employ 5000. ‘The men work only six hours a day, that being as much
as the constitution can bear.

We had excellent hacks from Falmouth. The party consisted of the
two Lyon’s, Taylor, and myself, and the day passed pleasantly enough ;
indeed, it was a sort of release from prison. We got to Falmouth for
supper at 10 o’clock. The time passed so quickly at the mines that,
though intending to be back to dinner, we stayed there till half-past
eight ; we all brought specimens of the different ores. ‘Tin is likewise
found. ‘The metal is not prepared here, but sent by land to some place,
of which I forget the name, in South Wales.

[When we left Hampshire a gentleman, about my own age, attached
himself to us as a volunteer. Alas! poor fellow. Having run through
a handsome fortune, he has been long dead. He was a gallant spirit ;
his father used to say that there was nothing by day or by night that

1 Adit, the opening by which a mine is entered, or by which water or ore is carried away.—
EALW=s
2 The carbonic acid gas which is present in all mines.—F'.A.WV.

3 The pump-rods in Cornwall are fitted with standing boards, and_a man going down steps off
the pump-rod at the bottom of the stroke on to a fixed stage, where he stands till the up-stroke is
completed, he then steps on to the rod and descends with it to the next stage, and so on till he
reaches the bottom ; it will be understood that if the damp or gas does not suffocate, it may render
a man incapable of maintaining his hold, when he falls to the bottom and is killed.—F.4.W.

SWABEY DIARY. 43

he and I were not ready to undertake. He would run all over the rig-
ging with the sailors, and he maintained (he was an excellent scholar
as well as a Brasen-nose man) sometimes very strange opinions con- —
cerning various things. I do not know now whether he supported his
opinions mathematically or no. He would have it that a man could get
his whole body through any place into which he could put his head.
To illustrate this, we persuaded him to put his head into a round hole
in the upper bulwarks of the transport, designed for some 8-pr. swivels ;
this he did with good success, but not finding the diameter of his head
equal to that of his body, he could get no further, and strange to say,
he could not get back again, for his nose was compressed as he went
through, but could not be brought to consent to his return, and there
he might have remained, ever and anon swallowing a briny draught as
the vessel stooped to leeward and threw up the foaming spray, had not he
been most scientifically sawn out by the ship’s carpenter, but not till
he had undergone a salutary lesson in patience, and promised all the
engagements which the man chose to exact from him !

It was rather singular that he was not the only volunteer with us.
Two gentlemen, brothers, with whom I had been at school, and who
had an intimate friend amongst us likewise, came to Lisbon, intending
to accompany our steps. The eldest went out of his mind, and the
younger one got him back to England as soon as he could. It was
thought well to let the latter follow his.own bent, and a commission was
procured for him in a Dragoon regiment. The very first skirmish the
poor fellow was present at, only a few days after joining the regiment,
he was killed! I have often thought his friends owed us little grati-
tude, though they always took a lively interest ever after in our
concerns. |

6th August.—We were obliged to remain on board all day again for
want of a boat. Harding, and Bridges,? who was on his way to Cadiz
in the Royal Yeoman, the very transport I sailed in down the river
from Copenhagen, dined withus . .. .

7th August.—We went to Falmouth this day, where we met Captain
Deacon of the Hast Kent, formerly of the 1st Battalion, R.A. We dined
ENS: LOANS ja, Bt eed bh eice- ier hie el ox eee ae Ma lee tS wishes Ph

Sth August.—-Dined on board “‘8.K.,” Dyneley on shore.

Ith August.—Left Falmouth early this morning. In getting under
weigh, being to windward of No. 15 transport, we ran foul of her and
carried away her quarter-piece and sprung her mizzen-mast. She, how-
ever, put to sea. We lay-to off the harbour for some hours for the
rest of the fleet to come out, wind N.W. and very rough: though not
dangerous, the motion was very unpleasant, and the noise kept me
awake the greater part of the night; we found we were ourselves the
only landsmen not sick. N.B.—Wrote a letter to Maurice, but having
no pilot could not send it. The Fame, brig, in which my horses are em-

? William J. Lyon was appointed a Cornet in the 14th Light Dragoons on the 23rd April, 1812.
He was killed in an engagement near Lembege, in the south of France, on the 18th March, 1814.

2 Lieutenant HE. J. Bridges, R.A.

44, SWABEY DIARY.

barked, sprang a leak at sea before we put back to Falmouth, which
detained us from sailing once before when the wind was fair. j

10th August.—To-day we were obliged to breakfast on deck, holding
fast by the ropes, and nothing would stand on the table at dinner.
Newland having been in bed all day, we attempted to dine in the cabin.
The first ceremony was that the whole dinner, with the two servants
and myself, went bodily to leeward on the floor. I kept fast hold of a
chicken by the leg, and we fell-to without knives and forks! Newland
all the time in his cot. I think I have not laughed so much since I
left Christchurch. Being at sea in such weather is to some people
perfect misery, but a little difficulty is always to me more seasonable
than a life of ease, unless I can choose how to pass it. Every soul was
desperately sick, except ourselves and Sutton!—so much so, that Bur-
goo was not cooked, the men had not stomach to eat it. We waived
tea this evening, not because we were not hungry, but because the
kettle got upset in the caboose and put the fire out. . . . .

11th August.—The night passed in rolling and pitching in a violent
manner, in the morning the wind was more moderate, and towards
evening became almost calm, so we began to doubt the quickness of
our passage, with the expectation of which we had hitherto consoled
ourselves. A brig, one of the convoy, had her main-top-gallant-mast
carried away this morning. . ... . 0

I2th August.—A dead calm, which is not the pleasantest state of
weather for impatient people. In the evening, being near the Trusty,
rowed to her in the boat and drank tea: found even that bold cam-
paigner, the Doctor, had been sick. Whilst we were there we saw large
shoals of a small sort of fish jump, or rather fly, out of the water, pur-
sued by some larger species. We took them, from the length of their
erial excursions, to be flying-fish, but the sailors, though mclined to
think the same, called them ‘‘skipjack.” I should not have doubted
their being flying-fish, but could perceive no wings. NF Fe se

sth August.—Lay in all the dullness of a calm, not motionless, but
without wind. Rowed in the evening to “S.K.” and drank tea, and in
the evening took a lesson in surgery, in consequence of young Lyon
putting out his shoulder in getting up the rigging; fortunately the
Dominique was near, and a surgeon was procured without much diffi-
culty.

In the morning read many of Lord Chesterfield’s letters, apropos of
which I have only to remark that I am glad my passion for fashionable
life, as a pursuit at least, is over, and I am thankful that so much pains
was never taken to make me substitute the finesse of a courtier for the
more honourable feelings of the heart.

14h August.—Last night a favourable breeze sprang up and we
made considerable progress, and so on through the day. We saw at
some distance a grampus, but not near enough to give any idea what
sort of a gentleman he was.

1 His servant,

SWABEY DIARY. AD5

More of Lord Chesterfield : who would be a courtier must be a de-
pendent, flattering knave.

15th August.—We made the thee of Bonen 40a ae rene iid
her convoy for Oporto, left us. We now expect to be at Lisbon to-
morrow. last night though not so rough certainly produced more
motion in the ship than we have yet had ; it blew a complete gale of
wind. We were under fore and main topsails all night, and sailed at
seven knots.

I read some chapters of the “ World,” which do not go down after
the ‘‘ Spectator,” notwithstanding that Lord Chesterfield, Sir H. Wal-
pole, and Mr. Jenyns were contributors.

16th August.— Within 100 miles of eben we are teen tne a
delayed ; my patience, hitherto pretty submissive, now peat to be
consumptive, and I fear is very short-lived. :

7th August.—Still becalmed with varying de Read more of
Moore’s “ World,” from a selection of the best papers published by
somebody who thought proper to prefix a very pretty frontispiece, and
then very wisely to write an anonymous preface, in which he declares
himself annotator. How he could suppose himself capable, after draw-
ing a foolish frontispiece, in no way emblematical of the subject of the
book, of adding his remarks to those of the celebrated authors of these
periodical essays, [ am ata loss todivine. Still, as aknowledge of the
world is the best ingredient in a compilation of advice for its refor-
mation, perhaps his “remarks on life had taught him that there were
fools enough who would purchase a book with a pretty engraving to
recommend it, and so, on second thoughts, I find no reason to doubt
his competency.

18th August.—Beating to windward with an adverse breeze, the last
duck slaughtered, and the last ebb of patience gone.

19th August.—Towards night made play with a favourable breeze,
hoping to be at Lisbon before September. Read Dryden’s play of
“Tove for Love,” Otway’s “ Orphan,’ and ‘ Venice Preserved.” I
was disappointed in the first, it is tame of plot and incident, and the
language does not compensate for these defects. The tragedies by
Otway, as classical productions, are far superior; there is more spirit in
the dialogue, and they are better suited for theatrical representation.

20th August. —Sailed on our course with a favourable wind, and saw
from the “top” the plains of Vimiera, In the evening saw some flying-
fish which, on enquiry, are called Serinas,' and were pursued hy the
Bonito.

21st August.—Passed the rocis off Mondego Bay, and came close
to the rock of Lisbon, which forms a barrier on the side of Ciutra;
there is, however, between it and the city landing space for a large
army: great pains have been taken to oppose this by the construction
of forts in proper situations ; the principal one is called Cascaes. We
then passed into the mouth of the Tagus, where there are, on the left as

1 Flying-fish are rarely found out of the tropics, but many fish will make |
water when pursued by others,—f.4.1/, ‘ Z phe coreceioul giths

46 SWABEY DIARY.

you enter, two channels for ships, defended by St. Julian, which is not

cut out of the rock as described, but built on its top, and has seven

bastions, and, constructed on a sand in the middle of the river, there is

a ravelin entered by foot-bridges, beyond which the shoals prevent

the passage. Our pilot, who had been on board all night and was the.
first specimen of a Portuguese, told us that under the bridges were

dungeons for the confinement of criminals. As we sailed on, the tower

and works at Belem formed, with the opposite heights of Velha, another

line of fire to prevent ships from sailing here.

Lisbon opened on our view standing majestically on a declivity of a
hill like an amphitheatre, its appearance was grand, every building, of
which there were many tine ones, appearing to advantage. Weanchored
off the dockyard of the Arsenal, and our transport immediately began to
disembark horses,’ and the detachment, as soon as formed, was marched
under the Sergeant-Major to Sacavem, eight miles up the course of the
Tagus. It is singular that no platform is built large enough for more
than one ship to unload at the same time when so many horses are
landed at Lisbon. One tide will only bring alongside two, or if small,
three transports at most, so that a regiment of Dragoons may be five
days disembarking, there being two tides per day. Newland and I,
after seeing the horses off, found out Lieutenant Saunders,? who was
sick, and dined there at seven o’clock in the evening. Our return to
the ship was truly ridiculous, as when we wanted a boat neither of us
could make ourselves understood. After trying French and German
for some time, I at last met Monsieur le Francois, who procured us
one. ‘The difficulty then was to direct the people, but our friend, the
Frenchman, at last made them understand that I was to hold the
helm and they were to row, by which arrangement after much search,
we reached our destination on board “ K.I.,” where we slept.

22nd August.—Was employed from 4 o’clock in the morning till
7 o'clock at night, without even resting for refreshment, in disembark-
ing horses and stores. Dyneley, Harding, and Newland marched off
the parties, as soon as completed, to Sacavem. I took up my abode
in a billet with George Willis,® after getting some supper at the Mess.

23rd August.—I was employed in the early part of the morning,
assisted by a party from the barracks, in getting the guns mounted and
marched off to the Arsenal, where they will undergo some alteration.
I went to dine at an hotel at “ Buenos Ayres,” the best part of Lisbon,
and most frequented by the English. I went afterwards to the Salitre,
National Theatre, where the entertainment, as is the custom, consisted
in dancing and opera performance, neither of which were at all worthy
of notice. Though neat and well painted, for the Portuguese excel in
rough scene painting, the house is badly constructed, the sides being
rectangular, so that you must constantly turn your head in order to see

1 It is strange that, in this voyage lasting 50 days, no mention is made of the troop horses, we
must conclude there were no casualties. Sacayem was a depdt for receiving troops on arrival in
Portugal.—F.4.W.

2Lieutenant W. Saunders, R.A.
3 Lieutenant G. B. Willis, R.A.

SWABEY DIARY. 4.7

the stage, which becomes very tiresome. Nor does the interior of the
boxes at all correspond with the grandeur of the outside, as they have
only one bench in front, which seats but four people, and does not
incline to the stage. I expected, of course, to see all the beauty and
fashion of Lisbon, but looked in vain, the senhoras having little to
distinguish them from the women to be seen on foot in the streets.
Their dress is exceedingly plain, and, doubtless, if there are any pretty
women in Portugal, they have been enclosed in the convents.

As to Lisbon, the part which was built after the last great earth-
quake! by the Marquis de Pombal, the then Minister, might be called
fine, were the streets clean. ‘The houses, plastered to resemble stone,
are of an immense height and have many storeys, each, except in the
grandees palaces, holds a separate family, and they have filthy habits.
The other parts, which are not of the Marquis’s construction, are filthy
in the extreme, the stench so great that, in spite of manners on first
arriving’, one must hold one’s nose, and the streets are so intricate that
it is extremely difficult to find one’s way. Notwithstanding the con-
stant intercourse with Hngland, I was surprised to find no hotel that
could deserve the title of decent, though the one at “ Buenos Ayres”
might indeed be an exception. The people are indolent and filthy to a
degree scarcely credible, and though there are wells and springs in
almost every direction, they have no method of getting the water by
pipes into their houses, but must send for it in casks, and they even
hawk it about the streets as we do mackerel. The people at my hotel
are very unwilling to let me drown myself in it, and are surprised at
an Englishman who may have been taught the use of water, as well as
of soap and towel. In the houses which are lighted by lamps there are
no fire-grates, only stew-pans and chafing dishes, in which they burn
charcoal. Their cookery consists of a vile jumble of oil and onions,
very unpleasant to an Hnglish stomach; they, however, almost com-
pensate for it by the fruit, the chief kinds at this time of year being
grapes and water-melons, and every sort of fruit that we have in
England, except currants and gooseberries. I think our English
melons and peaches much finer. I dare not buy much as yet, as
the money has so many subdivisions that it takes some time to know its
value, and I am told that the people are great hands at cheating and
stealing.

Being now on the subject of Lisbon, I must mention that everybody
of condition keeps a carriage drawn by two horses or mules, it has
shafts or poles with two or four wheels, with a leather curtain that
draws up in front in the place of windows, and holds two, or three
people, if stuffed in as we sometimes go toa ballin England. These

1The 1st of November, 1755, will ever be a memorable crisis in the annals of Europe, and especi-
ally of Lisbon. In that city, which then contained nearly a quarter of a million of inhabitants, a
brilliant morning sun was shining on the papal festivities of All Saints’ Day. At 11 0’clock the
celebration of High Mass at 30 churches was quenched in universal collapse. The earthquake was
sensibly felt all over western Europe, northern Africa, and even in the West Indies; but the
catastrophe wrought its climax in Lisbon, where the convulsed bed of the Tagus lifted for some
minutes all its shipping high and dry, to be overwhelmed immediately after by a refluent rush of
waters, which fairly turned the harbour-quay bottom upwards and then swallowed it out of sight.
Of the thousands of fugitives who had sought safety at that spot, and who thus went down quick
into Hades, not a corpse ever rose to the surface. ‘The loss of human life in the city was estimated
at 30,000, and the loss of property at £95,000,000. “ House of Cromwell”? (James Waylen), p. 114.

A8 SWABEY DIARY.
“concerns” are of various degrees and can only be described by the
pencil, but some of the principal people have a chaise with four wheels
and glass windows drawn by four horses. The drivers are the greatest
part of the curiosity, in cocked hats, long queues, and high military
boots, but, to do them justice they drive well, though slowly; indeed,
the hills in the streets oblige them to acquire this habit, and as the
pavement is all of what is called with us Scotch pebbles, Mr. Buxton’s
rapidity would soon pitch a barouche on its beam ends. I drove ina
hired carriage to avoid the heat, which is intense and unremitting.
These are like hackney coaches, and are to be had when it does not
rain, which it has not done here for four months.

The billet Willis is in, is the common run of a gentleman’s house
here, and consists of a small bedroom within a sitting-room, full as
usual of fleas and all detestable vermin, so that it is next to impossible
to sleep. The two or three men who remained to be with me and the
guns were so annoyed in the barracks that they preferred lying out
under their carriages. I went to-day to the Marquis of Pombal’s
house, now the residence of Mr. Stewart, our Chargé de Affairs, a
quarter where the houses, as is usual among those of the nobility, are
very grandly painted and ornamented with gilt and glasses, some of
them being entirely flat and yet appearing to be carved, from the
excellence of the canvas painting, and this one is the best, because the
most recently-built nobleman’s house in Lisbon, and has a tolerable -
stone staircase. The paintings and ornaments, generally, are in imi-
tation of marble, and some parts are beautifully paved with the same
sort of tile that we have in an English dairy, but superior, and having a
good effect. In the houses in general, for instance the one where the
Artillery mess, the fault consists in its having no staircase or passage,
one room opens into another through a door in the corner, and so on.
The rooms themselves are magnificent, though not always arranged
with taste, and never with comfort.

Some of the men are fine, stout, fellows, and generally have fine eyes
and good teeth. With the exception of the labourers, one can scarcely
discriminate between the degrees of people, most of them wearing
rusty cocked hats, some with servants behind them. I have not yet
learned the difference between monks and friars,! &c., but there are
many of them idling in the streets. I should observe that the extreme
number of cripples and most oddly deformed persons is quite sur-
prising, and I am told that the mothers even deform their children
by way of ensuring them a provision by charity. ‘he aged are numer-
ous—so mnch so, that I am inclined to think that people decline here
early in life. There are no hospitals, except the temporary military
ones, to be seen. ‘hey have a regiment of police tolerably soldier-like
in their appearance, and the other regiments that I meet are as well
as can be expected. I saw a string of recruits chained together under
an escort, these they called volunteers for the army, but they do not
release them till they reach the depot. . . . . . .

1A friar is a brother of any religious order, but especially of the four mendicant orders, viz. :
Franciscans (gray friars), Augustines, Dominicans (black friars), Carmelites (white friars). Monks
and friars are equally bound to vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.—F.4.W.

SWABEY DIARY. 49

24th August.—I was employed in getting the guns conveyed from

the barracks to the Arsenal, a work of no small difficulty on account of
' the scarcity of horses, a brigade having been just fitted out and sent up .
the country. Horses of middling value, worth £50 in England, are
sold here for £150, mules frequently for £80.

25th August.—Was to have dined at Mr. Stewart’s, the Ambassador’s,
but was taken by Captain Macdonald to the Arsenal, from whence we
get camp equipage, two store carts of a new construction, leaving
our own behind, and a new forge cart of a different pattern, having a
gun-limber and lighter perch. The splinter-bars of the guns and car-
riages aro to be shortened for defiles, a box is to be put on every
carriage for stores, and the rear left box of each ammunition wagon is
to be fitted to carry 10 additional rounds of case shot. I dined in the
evening, in company with Captain M., with young Maxwell,! who is left
behind sick at Lisbon, and for the first time saw the ceremony of a
procession of the Host, which is carried amid a long train of priests to
the residence of anyone who is not supposed likely to live. It is of
course meant to represent the omnipresence of the blessed Trinity,
but I cannot separate an image as a symbol of that sort from my ideas
ofidolatry. From another point of view, as the ceremony is not per-
formed at the request of the sufferer, it appearsa good invention for an
heir to frighten a rich testator to death.

Abe Ser a :
26th August—Gunners Hollowell and Dean and two drivers, all
with dysentery, and Gunner Thomson with the ague, came in this day
from Sacavem sick, and were ordered to the Ordnance hospital. The
Portuguese are such thieves that some of them employed in the Arsenal
took off the claw hammers from several of our guns.

I dined at the Mess, and went to the Ruade-Condés theatre, the
performances here consisted of a short farce, of the merit of which, not
understanding the language, I regretted that I could form no opinion,
the rest of the entertainment was similar to that at the Salitre. I had
a better opportunity of criticising the dancing, being admitted behind
the scenes. Its merit consisted in a forced agility without grace, the
effort of mere strength, one man, indeed, who is an Italian, had some
idea. I have scarcely a right to judge, as the Opera company having
lately followed the fortunes of their Prince to Brazil, their theatres are
only the Astley’s of Lisbon. The Fandango was danced, which I think
highly disgusting. . . .. . 5 ACV ys

2th August.—Captain Macdonald found me employment in the
morning at 4 o’clock. On my way to the Mess-room, which, by-the-
bye, is in the house of the Marquis de Lalle, who has been proscribed
as a traitor and his goods confiscated, I walked into the church of Santa
Mariska, where was being performed some grand festival, at which a
Roman Cardinal officiated. The music, a full band with the organ,
was the greatest treat of that sort I ever enjoyed—so much so, that I
preferred it to my dinner; the vocal part convinced me, without further
enquiry, of the inferiority of our Opera, as they had many assistants

1 Lieutenant John Maxwell, R.A.

50 SWABEY DIARY.

from the Patriarcal band. The church is beautiful beyond description,
and rich with gilt ornaments and images in costly dresses, with pearls
and diamonds. Colonel Fisher,! who has great taste in architecture,
justly remarked that the ornaments were heavy, but the altar-piece and
canopy to the figure of Aaron above the altar are very superior in taste
as well as magnificence. All the different altars were lighted with
numerous wax torches, before these the religious prostrate themselves
and remain transfixed, as ib were, and motionless. It is impossible to
dive into the heart of man, but from beholding them you would pro-
nounce them decided idolaters, and surely the ignorant part of society
can know very little of the subject which they adore in image, and, I
fear, address their devotions only to the outward form, but I should be
uncharitable not to add that there is an earnestness in their deportment
which is at least becoming. ‘The Catholic service is performed by the
priests in Latin only, and can in no way be edifying to the people who
cannot understand what is meant; I own I was almost tempted to cry
in pity for their ignorance. I conceive the true worship of God to be
a spiritual service, whether it is a Roman Catholic or a Protestant that
humbles himself before Him. The beauty of this church induced me
to go into several others, some of which were the chapels of Nun-
neries, and I heard the fair prisoners singing from behind the gratings ;
surely it was something more than fancy that brought their voices to
my ear with but a melancholy sound. ‘Those, indeed, that I heard
were of a very rigid house, that of La Concepcion ; in some they are
allowed to visit their friends when sent for. All the churches I entered
were rich in the extreme, the plunder of these alone might even have
satisfied the rapacious Junot, who levied during his stay great contri-
butions on Lisbon.

The Duke of Abrantes seems not to have been wanting in consider-
ation for the people of Lisbon. “An extraordinary contribu-
tion of four millions sterling, decreed by Napoleon, was demanded
under the curious title of a ransom for the State, but the sum
was exorbitant, and Junot prevailed on the Emperor to reduce
it one half. He likewise, on his own authority, accepted the
forced loan [levied by himself on entering Lisbon], the confis-
cated English merchandise, the Church plate, and the royal
property in part payment; yet the people were still unable to
raise the whole amount, for the Court had before taken the
greatest part of the Church plate and bullion of the kingdom,
and had also drawn large sums from the people, under the
pretext of defending the country: with this treasure they de- ~
parted [to the Brazils], leaving the public functionaries, the .
army, private creditors, and even domestic servants unpaid.”
Napier’s “History of the War in the Peninsula,” Vol. L., p. 142.

28th August.—Newland came in from Sacavem, and I heard the sad
news of the death of a leader of one of my guns, which gave room for
me to reflect how positive I had been in recommending him to be kept,
but we cannot always be right. titan ae Teepe

1 Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Fisher, Commanding R.A.

SWABEY DIARY. 51

29th August.—Set out early for Sacavem to sit at a court-martial on
Gunners Highton and Taylor for selling necessaries; Driver Joseph
Dean, for insulting a Portuguese family; Chapple, for being absent
from stable duty; and Macmullen, for being drunk on parade and
speaking improperly to Corporal Hedge. ‘This is my first excursion
into the country, the roads are paved nearly all the way to Sacavem in
a very rough and disagreeable manner, and it becomes necessary when
one asks the distance one has to travel to know likewise how long it
will take one to go.

The houses and gardens in the suburbs have a very different appear-
ance from those in Lisbon, béing clean, the latter neatly walled and
laid out in grape walks, which form generally a continued arbour all
round them; they are stocked with peaches, strawberries, and good
vegetables, which, however, require constant care and watering. In
each garden there is a well with a wheel, round which turn pitchers,
that lift the water as they rise, and when they turn at the top, dis-
charge their contents into a trough or stone reservoir. The grain is
now cut; there is some Indian corn standing and orchards of olives,
which trees, except in leaf, exactly resemble pear orchards in Here-
fordshire, and are generally fenced with loose stone walls or rows of
aloes which grow very large here, and form an impenetrable barrier.
In the gardens there are arbours formed of a species of tree similar to
box or myrtle, containing seats, with fish-ponds and regular parterres
edged with box. The flowers now in bloom, which are planted al-
ternately, are the convolvulus and balsam. I have as yet seen no
hot-houses, though I suppose it is possible to have grapes all the year
OUNCE Memes inher ite aoe e eget csr Fer ee ace en ee eee

30th August.—Returned to Lisbon with Taylor, who dined with me:
I renewed my acquaintance with Captain Webb of the 4th Dragoon
Guards (my step-mother’s nephew), whom I found at Sacavem.

31st August.— Wrote to Kate and Mr. Walcott, and afterwards went
to the church of St. Roque to see the mosaic picture. ‘The church is
most splendid, containing, besides the High Altar, 10 chapels. To
give an idea of the richness of Catholic churches, I minutely took down
notes of one of the richest chapels, which were as follows: the footsteps
to the altar, porphyry ; the base or part on which it stands, granite; the
slab itself studded with amethysts, its edges granite. The pillars to sup-
port the canopy are lapis lazuli, their bases alabaster. A slab on which
stand the candles above the altar is cornelian, the door-posts to the
entrance of the chapel entirely of verd-antique.! For the furniture on
the altar, besides the candlesticks of silver, there are two beautiful
candelabra or claws with various devices in silver gilt, and two pieces
of alabaster in the form of butterflies with expanded wings. The front
of the altar, a representation of the offering of the Lamb, is in silver
on lapis lazul, and it alone cost 80,000 dollars. Above the altar-piece
is the mosaic picture of the Pentecost, on one side the Annunciation, and
on the other the Baptism of our Saviour. Hveryone knows what mosaic
work is, but few have an opportunity of conceiving to what perfection

1 A green porphyry used as marble and called oriental yerd-antique—F.4.W.

52 SWABEY DIARY.

it may be brought, since it even requires one to ascend a ladder and
examine them to know that these pictures are not on canvas. The
floor is in devices of mosaic.. All the parts are richly covered with
gilding, and the whole chapel cost 300,000 crowns.

I afterwards dined with Taylor at the English hotel, intending to go
to Belem, but could not stir him after dinner.

1st September.—Rode with Willis to Belem, where I saw the Prince’s
riding-school, in which I was disappointed, the painted ceiling being
very common, and the shape of the school defective, being too long and
ill calculated for its intended use. We went then to the Museum of
Natural Curiosities, which is small and very deficient in specimens of
insects and animals, the minerals and fossils are good, and the collection
of birds and reptiles well arranged. The Portuguese certainly under-
stand stuffing animals better than we do in England, and with fish,
which are here preserved in a manner I could hardly conceive possible,
they are particularly successful. From the museum we went to the
Queen’s garden. The plants, annuals, &c. that come under the de-
scription of garden flowers have few variations from the English kinds.
There were some shrubs, which I did not know, and in a conservatory,
all the Brazilian exotics, forming a fine collection and needing no hot-
house.

In the evening we saw a grand procession of priests carrying about
the Host, and attended by some soldiers; the canopy and the image of
St. Vincent, which formed part of the cavalcade, were very rich, music
playing all the while. Thermometer 87 degrees.

2nd September.—Harly dinner with Captain Macdonald, who was
endeavouring to procure quarters for Mrs. Tonyn,! who had come from
England to find her husband.

3rd September.—Rode all over Lisbon to purchase different articles
that my foresight had not provided for when I left England, particu-
larly portmanteaus, without which an officer’s baggage might as well be
at home.

4th September.—I went in company with George Willis to Sacavem,
meaning to remain there. I found very comfortable quarters in the
cleanest house I had yet seen in Portugal, with a large garden well
supplied with vegetables of every description, and grapes of every sort
in abundance. Strawberries, I remember having said, were not culti-
vated in the country, but in this garden there were some beds; it was
watered by means of a wheel turned by an ox, as are almost all gardens
about Lisbon and elsewhere. . . . che.

5th September.—Was up at 3 o’clock with the intention of shooting,
but waited on the bridge in Sacavem a full hour for daylight, and after
walking till the heat of the day stopped us, only found three birds,
which got up out of shot. I could not help recollecting the many
pleasant hours I had passed when I went to shoot last year in the
month of September. et rah ea a Pala

1 Wife of Captain Charles W. Tonyn, 48th Regiment,

SWABEY DIARY. 53

6th September.—George Willis left us, Newland and Dyneley were
both very unwell with flux,' the former, however, made a most ex-
cellent rally.

7th September Eayent to 5 TURN voy erage of Cepia Macdonald, to
inspect my new guns, and on arriving after two hours’ riding in the
most terrible heat I ever remember, found they were not ready. Dined
at the Mess in Lisbon, which place I was very happy to leave in the
evening. I started back with Newland, but about half-way I found I
had forgotten some medicine I had undertaken to bring to Dyneley,
and so was obliged to turn back, and then perform the journey alone;
no very pleasant job, eight miles in the dark over a rough, stony, road
in a foreign COU: the may unknown to me. I, however, arrived
safely.

Sth September. Ste ie At Saucon not py te he
opportunity.

Ith September --Poiedlal at ae O vale 4 in she morning, Re Feittea
to Lisbon to bring our new guns from the Arsenal, the day excessively
hot, and the dust very tormenting, returned to Sacavem by 3 o’clock.

10th September.—Kmployed from 4 o’clock in the morning till 7 at
night, packing our aaa e aud otherwise eee for the
march.

11th Sepvenotier Ms ane passed i ina annie way to ithe est a
the additional adventure of a wagon’s getting over the bridge of boats
at Sacavem ; the horse was, however, saved by the timely assistance of
men from the barracks. Some horses joined, 22 in number from the
artillery drivers, and 17 mules; likewise 22 horses and some men for
the R.H.A., who are with the ar “my. N.B.—From Lisbon, at Sergeant
Bradley’s gun, four round shot wanting.

+ Diarrheea.

(To be continued).

A METHOD OF CALCULATING THE PROBABILITY
OF COAST DEFENCE FIRE.

MAJOR R. M. B. F. KELLY, R.A.

In the Rivista di Artigleria e Genio for June 1894 there is an
interesting article on the method of calculating the probability of coast
defence fire against moving objectives entitled, ‘A contribution to the
study of the probability of fire of Coast Artillery.’

I began a translation of this but found when I came to the calcula-
tions and tables that the results for Italian guns with their method of
observation, ranging &c. would be of little interest or use to our service,
and besides I could not quite agree with all the bases of calculation in
the Italian article, factors of probability for instance having been
omitted. I have therefore taken my idea from the article above quoted
and worked it out so as to correspond as far as possible with English
systems.

The problem is as follows. Granted a Range Finder’ and system of
working it and the guns, by means of which predictive firing is possible,
and assuming that although the course of the objective will neither be
in an absolutely straight line nor traversed at a constant speed, yet,
that during short intervals of time the course will be practically a
straight line and constant in speed, that is to say, the changes in speed
and direction will not be so frequent as to make predictive firing
impossible. What should the percentage of strikes be at various ranges
for various speeds of objective ?

The result arrived at will be the maximum under the most favour-
able circumstances, when no errors beyond those inherent in the
instruments, guns and ammunition occur.

The article I have referred to commences with a long discussion on
the possibility of predictive firing, but as that forms the basis of our
system of fire control, I do not think I need reproduce it in this article.
I think we are prepared to admit, that if we have observed the path of
a ship for a certain time we can fairly predict her range or her position
at the end of another short space of time.

1 Or Position Finder,

2. VOL. XXII. 8

56 A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

The steps necessary to calculate the percentage of effective shots one
may expect at a moving objective are

(1) to reduce the objective to an equivalent horizontal area or
target having a certain length and breadth, which will vary with (a) the
gun, (6) the height of the gun above the sea, (c) the range, (d) the
dimensions of the objective, and (e) its path ;

(2) to calculate the modifications necessary in the dimensions of
the 50 per cent. zones when firimg under ordinary conditions at a
moving objective ;

(3) to compare these dimensions with those of the target.

A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE. 57

(4) By referring these results to a probability table to find the
percentage of shots that should fall in the length and in the breadth of
the objective thus ‘ projected’ on to the horizontal plane.

(5) From this to calculate the probable percentage of effective
shots.

The area of the horizontal equivalent of the leLiyet presented by a
ship will depend on

(1) length, breadth, freeboard of ship ;

(2) gun used ;

(3) height of gun above sea level ;

(4) range ;

(5) angle of approach.

The outline of the ship may be considered to be an ellipse whose
axes are the length and breadth of the ship.

Let acbd be such outline, let LZ and / the axes of this ellipse be the
length and breadth of the ship, h its freeboard.

@ the angle of arrival of the projectile, i.e. angle of descent for range
ap depression angle.

¢ the angle which the line of fire mn, makes with a, b the length of
the ship.

eae be another outline of the ship parallel to the first at a
distance mm, dependent on @ and h.

Draw pp,, 77, tangents to the two ellipses; the area equivalent to
the target is then the space pmgqq,n,p,, and this space may be con-
sidered equal to a rectangle whose length A is mn,, and whose breadth
B is such that the area of the rectangle will be equal to the area
UO GI a

The rectangle AB can be calculated from the properties of the
ellipse.

Lxt h

=r Set adiootioudod afouduosudaduodu iD),
VE cos? fb + L? sin? p tan 6 (1)

7 h Poot t Tae o
Ec ew ¢+L7 sin? &
eens ey | an eal Deere ero eereerecsssoes °
Now supposing the ship were stationary and the firing carried out
with the same accuracy as when firing to obtain the length M and
breadth NV of the 50 per cent. zones, the percentage of effective shots

could be found by working out the values of a and. of 4 , and referring

them to a probability table such as is found in the Appendix to
M°Kinlay and multiplying the two percentages together; thus, if

1 4 (taken as 100 per cent.) and re 1 or 50 per cent., the percentage

of hits would be 50 per cent., or, if the value of s gave 75 per cent.

58 A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

and of a 40 per cent., the percentage of hits would be 30 per cent.

But when firing under ordinary conditions and at a moving target other
errors besides those inherent in the gun itself come into play. M and
N would become larger in value than the length and breadth of the
50 per cent. zones.

We have now to calculate the dimensions of the 50 per cent. zones
or the probable longitudinal and lateral dispersion of shots fired under
ordinary service conditions and at a moving objective.

If two or three causes affect the accuracy of the shooting of a gun
each one of which taken by itself would produce a certain probable
error, the total error when all are acting together is found by the
expression

IHN G EI GPG ERIS, so5o000060000000000006005000000005% (3).

Example: if the probable error of a gun fired as for range and
accuracy test at a certain range is 10 yds., and if a particular gun layer
lays with a certain normal error, which at that range would produce a
variation of 20 yds., the resultant error from these two causes would be

E=NV 10? +20?=22°4,

and as this error # may have a positive or negative value,

M or the length of the longitudinal dispersion will equal

2 N10? + 20°,

To apply this to the case under consideration the causes leading to
error in range will be

(1) the inherent error in the gun AT;

(2) the personal error of the number giving, or reading, the
elevation given AP;

(8) The error in taking the range AY.

Then
I 3) NSB le NPE AOE son poveanoppbboodooseeSonskeenbe (4).

AT is simply the length of the 50 per cent. length zone.

AP can be tested for each individual, or an average can be struck.

AX is rather more difficult to evaluate, it is compounded of two
errors.

One, the error in measuring the range which we will call dz, and
the other the prediction error, or the error in estimating the distance
the objective will have advanced or retired during the “time of
firmg”; dy.

dx will be a percentage of the range and may be written dX where
X is the range. This is only true within certain limits; for instance,
with the Mark 7D D.R.F. if the error for short ranges is 1 per cent. or
10 yds. per 1000 at 10000 yds. the error will be much greater than
100 yds.

A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE. 59

As above, the whole error
AX =N da? + dy?
The calculation of the error dy is rather lengthy, so I have omitted
it and merely give the result,
=dXN2 2 ;

where 7’ is the time of firmg and ¢ the number of seconds between each
observation.

Le. 7’=time of flight + Fort time.
t=time taken by objective to increase or diminish range by
50 yds. when ranges are called every 50 yards,

T?
dy? =2dX? @?
and
0, AM Wan ee NORE belo ltste nt Mid (5).

T12
The value pcan easily be solved by reference to a F. C.’s correction
table.

2
e.g. if the correction is 50, then ¢=7' and Z =1.

He 2
If the correction is 25, =27 and = —— =]:

If it is 100, t=47 and = =

1 3L 1 NG
it SS, BS my and re Ty

The value dX can be ascertained for any particular instrument and
observer at fixed known ranges, and for all except Mark JD instrument
should not exceed 1 per cent. at medium ranges with well-adjusted
D.R.F. and well-trained observers. The values of AX can then be
tabulated for different ranges and speeds.

AP, the error in reading the hydro-clinometer, or other means of
reading Q#, should not exceed 24’ and can be tabulated in yard values
for any particular gun.

AT is found in the range tables.

From the above I can be found.

To find WV or breadth of zone of dispersion.
By similar reasoning,

IB) Wy Dy HPAES, TESTING saaobovensnabooasasesooosee+e6 (6).

A,T is the breadth of the 50 per cent. zone.

A,P is the lateral error in laying and is usually so small that it may
be taken as ‘1 per cent. of the range.

60 A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

A.S, or the error in estimating the lateral movement of the objective,
can be calculated in a similar way to AX, and is equal to

da X oh v2,
ty

where da is the value of the error in reading the bearing of the objective
by means of the arc and vernier and can be estimated at *2 per cent. of
the range, 7’ the time of flight, and ¢, the time taken by the objective
to traverse 1° of arc, and can be tabulated for various speeds if the
direction and range are known.
A B

Thus the values of A, B, Mand WN can be tabulated. Mi and wy can

be worked out and their values compared with a probability table, and

the corresponding percentages p and p, found; then P ae will be

the percentage of effective hits.

Before proceeding to work out an example I will remark on the uses
of all this rather elaborate calculation.

Stated briefly they are

(1) The interest in knowing what is the factor of efficiency we
may expect from any particular gun at objectives moving under various
conditions of speed, direction, range, Wc.

(2) It might be of value to a Section C.R.A. in helping him to
decide which of several objectives should be engaged, or at what range
to open fire on any particular objective.

(3) If a coast defence ‘Kriegsspiel’ was ever organized it would
enable the umpires to form an idea of the probable results of any par-
ticular period of the engagement.

(4) It would assist one in comparing the results of different batteries
firing at practice under different conditions.

I will now proceed to work out the tables of values for A, B, M and
N for a particular gun and objective, and then to show how these tables
can be used to ascertain the probable percentage of effective hits.

I will take as an example a 6” B.L. gun Mk IV or VI, 100 ft. above
sea level for the gun, and a ship 100 yds. long by 20 yds. wide with a
freeboard of 5 yds. for the objective.

Lxt h

As oF from (1
JE cot G+L? sin? g tan ( (1);
put

SE COP CD ELSE DN ooosns0ivssvosonssaose4e0oonoa0or (7),

Lxl h
A — Hue tan 6 Peer cere errr ness sees rd esreeresdesees (8),

2000, 5

~ dd © tand

1 Tf laying by Case II.

A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE. 61

» will vary with the value of ¢ or the inclination of Z the length of
the ship to the line of fire.

@ with this particular gun at this particular height above sea level
will vary with the range.

Now when ¢=0 the ship is advancing or retiring directly. The
value of A is obviously the length of the ship Z+ the horizontal equiva-
lent of the angle of arrival @ due to the height / of the freeboard.

But

Ll h Ih
A= + Bap ay ee) and A=L.

Similarly when 6=90°; that is, when the ship is moving across at
right angles to the line of fire,

,. &
ASG and A=l+——.

But for intermediate values of ¢, e.g. 15°, 30°, 45°, 60°, 75°, X must
be calculated by working out the value of the expression

VE cos? 6+ L? sin? f

for the different values of ; these values work out to

O20 15° 30° 45° 60° 715° 90°
It. A= 20 3299 5291 7211 8718 9672 100
Ll=100 x 20
Ll
TV, 92= 100 2 37-8 27-7 22:9 20°6 20

me must be worked out for successive ranges 1000, 2000, 3000,

tan 0
4000, 5000, 6000 yds. @ being equal to the angle of descent + depression
angle must be found by working out the depression angle at these
ranges due to the height of the gun, and adding the result to the D.A.
given in the range tables. h the freeboard =5 yds.

Ranges
yds. 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000

ie =O 94°88 64:73 43°11 30°04. 22°04
tan 6

Calculation of A.
From IV.

~=0 g=15° g=30° g=45° g=60° g=75° =90°
Ll

SC 100 62 378 27°7 229 20°6 20

From Y.

Ranges

1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000

A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

p=0
202°2
194:9
164:°7
148°1
130

122

h
Values of :
tan 6
Ranges
1000=102°2
2000 94°88
3000 64°73
4000 43:11
5000 30°04
6000 22°04
TABLE VI.
Values of A.
o=15° ¢=30°0 f=45° 6=60° g¢=75° g¢=90°
164:2 140 129°9 P25 oI 122°8 122°2

1569 132°7 122°6 1178 1155 114:9
126-7 102°5 92°4 87°6 85°3 84:7

105°1 80:9 70°8 66 63°7 63:1
92 67°8 57-7 52°9 50°6 50
84 59°8 49°7 44-9 42°6 42,

Calculation of B.

vg h h
pe mo :
= 77 = 7 a (2).

Omitting intermediate steps the result is tabulated.

Ranges
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000

dX can be taken

B (Tasie VIL).

p=15° ¢=30° f=45° fp =60° f= 75° =f = 90°

29°5 50 68 83'5 92°5 96°5
30 50 68 83 93 96
29 49 68 82 91°5 95
28 475 65°5 80°5 915 93.
275 46°5 645 79 88°5 915
27 46 63 775 87 90

Calculation of M.

WhO IRTOTE IN III NO oy obconssbGnbonponsoananbosons

GAB
aX=dX,/1+2 = cet dlc care reeled nm

as 1 per cent. of the range.

The value of ~ is obtained as previously explained.

(5).

A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

Value of

F. C.’s corr™. 25 yds. 50 yds. 75 yds. 100 yds.

100
Ida?

6000
3600

= = 17 1 16 4
From (5)
F.C.’s corr. 0 25 50 75
Vi we = @ Bla? Bde? 4 dla
Since dX is 1 per cent. of the range, we get the following value
for dX?:
Ranges 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
IDS. aX? = 100 400 900 1600 2500
Values of

From VIII. and IX.

TABLE X.
F. C.’s corr™. 100 75 50 25
Ranges
1000 yds. 900 455 300 150
2000. ,, 3600 1822 1200 600.
3000 ,, 8100 4100 2700 1350
4000 ,, 14400 7288 4800 2400
5000 _,, 22500 11388 7500 3750
6000 _,, 32400 16400 10800 5400.

SQoe2ee

AT is the length of the 50 per cent. zone and can be found from the

Range tables.

found.

TABLE XI. TABLE XII.
yds. AT AT? AP AP’
1000 23 529 48 2464
2000 18 324. 40:5 1640
3000 17 289 33-5 1122
4000 21 44] 27 729
5000 29 841 225 506
6000 40 1600 19°5 380

AP is the value of 24’ error at various ranges and can also be

By adding these three values and doubling their square root we get

the value of M as shewn in the table.

64 A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

TABLE XIII.
Values of WM.
Ranges 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
F. C. corr".
100 122 147 194 250 309 371
75 115 WA 147 182 226 271
50 112 110 127 155 189 226
25 109 99 104 120 144 172
0) 108 95 95 106 125 150

The values of V are found in a similar way.
ABN TPL IN TEAS IN IS seoonoonnosbeatost ube sebacone (6),
where A,7’ is the width of the 50 per cent. zone.
A,P is estimated at ‘1 per cent. of range (001).
AWS = da x 2 V2, da=-2 per cent. of range.

. 1 . ° . °
f,=time of flight, 4, time taken to traverse 1° of arc; omitting
intermediate steps the result is

TABLE XIV.

Values of UN.

Ranges 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
F. C.’s corr’.

2° Ti 23 34 46 58 69
1° 45’ 10 20 30 40 50 60
T° 30’ 9 17 27 35 48 52
1° 15’ 7 14 22 29 36 43
i 6 12 18 24 30 36
45! 4 9 14 19 24 29
30’ 3 fa 10 14 18 22,
15’ 2 5 8 10 13 16

0 2 4 6 9 Il 14

Example of use: gun and objective as in tables; direction of advance
$= 30°; Range 5000 yds.; F. C.’s correction 75 yds. and 15’.

A=68. B=465. M=226. N=13.

A 68 ae
Waa 3 referred to probability table=16 per cent.
t= <8 % ~ =98 per cent.
98
“16
588
98

A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE. 65

1568 = 15°68 per cent., which would give the probable percentage of
effective hits.

Except with Position Finders it is difficult to obtain the exact value
of @ or the angle of approach, but it is easy to draw up beforehand
tables giving the probable percentage of hits for objectives at various
speeds moving either directly towards or away (6=0), directly across
¢=90°, or midway between the two 6=45°. For this it is necessary
to have tables of F. C.’s corrections and a speed table in order to be able
to select the proper value for WM.

With electric range dials and when firing by Case II. the Fort time
may be taken as 2”.

The Fire Commander’s correction table will then be

TABLE XV.
F. C.’s corr".
for
Range 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 yds.
tw ww Ww wt i mw
10) 16 20 28 40 52 64.
Be 8 mo le ay 0 a time to traverse
50. 4 5 7 10 13 16 50 vd 2 ;
75 3 4 5 fi 10 12 phe
100 2 3 4 5 7 8
TABLE XVI.
for 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 yds.
Training wt nt J m” , wt t wm
9 16 24. 40 iL ak 1 28 2 16
15! 8 12 20 32 44 i
30’ 4 6 10 16 22, 34
45! 3 5 74 12 17 26| time to
ie 2 3 5 8 11 17\. traverse
1 6y 13 28 44 7 10 16| JL ofare
1° 30’ 14 25 33 6 84 14
1° 45! 14 1g 3h 5 74 12
ae 1 14 24 4 aye 84
TABLE XVII.
Speeds.
if¢=0 if ¢=45°
20 knots is equivalent to 50 yards in 43" a
15 99 bb} bP) ve 10”
10 ” ” ” 9” 13”
5 ” ” ” 18” 26”

A ship advancing directly end on at any of the speeds given in this
table will increase or diminish the range by 50 yards in the time shewn
opposite the speed in and under the column heading ¢=0. <A ship
advancing obliquely at the same speed will not alter the range by

66 A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

50 yards so quickly; the times given in the first case must be multiplied
by some factor, and when @=45° this factor is /2 or 14, These
results have been placed in the second column under ¢=45°. When
the ship is moving directly across the range is constant and the F. C.’s
correction is 0.

Example: a ship advancing direct at 15 knots, Range 5000 yards,

e=0
Time 7”, F.C.’s corr.=100, M=309.

= 45°
Time 10”, F.C/’scorr.=75, M=226.

$=90°
Time o, F. Cs corr.=0, M —125.

Table of Deflectrons.

Since 1° subtends 50 yards at a range of 3000, at that range a ship
moving directly across @ = 90° will traverse 1° of arc in the same time
that a ship moving directly end on would take to diminish the range by
50 yards, and if moving obliquely 6=45° the same factor would hold
good, so that the speed table for range would become a speed table for
deflection.

At 1000 yards a vessel moving at the same speed would traverse 1°
in one-third the time; at 6000 yards in double the time. A speed
table for deflection can thus be made.

TaBLE XVIII.

Table of times taken to traverse 1° of arc at various speeds.

Speeds 20 knots 15 knots 10 knots 5 knots
Angles of
approach @=90° =45° ¢=90° 6=45° f=90° G¢=45° G=90° G=45°
Times
Ranges Mt " ” Mu” ” Mt ” “
1000 15 2 2:25 _ 3°25 3 4:25 6 85
2000. 3 4:25 4°75 65 6 8-5 12 16°75
3000 4:5 6:25 a 10 9 12°5 18 25°25
4000 6 8:5 9°25 13 12 16°75 24 33°5
5000 75 10°5 11°75 16°25 15 21 30 42
6000 9 12°5 14 20 18 25°25 36 50°5

Taking the same example,

p=90°, time 112”, F. Cs corr. 1°, W=30,
p=" ” 163, ” 45, N=24,
p=0, sf 0, W=11.

A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE. 67

To find A and B in this case, Tables VI. and VII.

$=90° A=50, p=45° A=575, p=0° A=130,
» B=915, ep S6a5: » B=165.

The percentages can then be found,

p=90° p= 45° p=0°

A _ 50 A_o15 A _180
M125” M226” M~ 309’
B _88% B_645 = B_168
IN BX” iy We? my I ©

_ These values can be worked out and referred to a probability table,
and the percentage of hits will be found to be

p= 90° p=45° p=0°
20°5 per cent., . 11:9 per cent., 16 per cent.

The following is a table of efficiency worked out in this manner.

TABLE XIX.
Table of efficiency or probable percentage of effective shots at a ship

300’ x 60’ x 15’ from a 6” B. L. gun 100 feet above the sea level, Range
instrument D.R.F.

(1) Ship end on advancing or retiring direct, ¢=0.

Ranges 1000 2000 8000 4000 5000 6000
Speeds Percentages
knots percent. percent. per cent. per cent. per cent. per cent.
5 79 83 67:5 465 24:25 - 16:25
10 79 82 59 38°5 21 9°75
15 79 id 59 32°75 16 9°75
20 78 77 52°25 24°75 12 75

(2) Advancing or retiring obliquely, ¢ = 45°.

knots percent. percent. percent. per cent. per cent. per cent.
5 58 61 49 35 20°5 13
10 58 59 42°75 30 15°5 86
15 57 57 37 23°5 ILS) a
20 54 55 37 19°5 Oe7. 6

(3) Moving directly across, ¢ = 90°.

knots percent. percent. percent. percent. per cent. per cent.
5 55 59 45 31 21 15
10 55 59 45 31 20:75 13°5
15 55 59 45 30 20°5 IIL

20 55 59 45 30 20 9°3

68 A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF FIRE.

It will be observed that for the 6” gun, Marks IV. and VI, charge
48 lbs., E.X.E. MV 1960 fis., the probable rectangle as given in the
handbook for 1891 is nearly as large at 100 yards as at 5000, and the
50 per cent. length zone is larger, viz. 30 yards at 100 and 29 yards at
5000; in other words, the gun according to this range table is more
accurate at 5000 yards than at 100—its accuracy would appear to
increase from 100 up to 3200 yards and then to decrease. This accounts
for the apparently paradoxical result that you would get a greater
percentage of hits at 2000 than at 1000 yards.

At 3000 yards the 50 per cent. zone is still less than at 2000,
ie. the gun is more accurate, but at this range the horizontal equivalent
value of the target presented by the objective is considerably less,
consequently the percentages begin to fall off.

A PLEA FOR HEAVY GUNS IN FORTRESS
DEFENCE. |

BY }

CAPTAIN G. TYACKHEH, R.A.

In the September number of the “Proceedings,””? Major Hickman, in
a very able and interesting article on the “ Attack of a Modern Land
Fortress,” disclaims at the outset any intention of approaching the
subject in a dogmatic spirit. It is with the same disclaimer that I
would preface the following remarks, which bear on one question in
his article, viz.—

“Why not eliminate heavy guns in permanent emplacements
altogether from the defence?”

To anyone approaching a subject like this pros and cons suggest
themselves with equal readiness. Let us imagine a discussion between,
say H. and 7.—

T.—You say that guns in forts, unprotected with armour, must be
quickly disabled and that they are in no case able to obtain the same
amount of cover as howitzers. Would not guns on disappearing
carriages with top shields be even more under cover, except at the
moment of firing, than howitzers?

H.—Your shield could be penetrated by high-angle fire, and the
gun would betray its position the first time it rose to fire, and once
that was noted its disablement by vertical fire would be easy.

T—At Lydd in 1887, 30 rounds from an 8-inch M.L. howitzer were
fired at a 6-inch H.P. emplacement with all the advantages of
communication with the range party. The howitzer is said to have
shot well, but only one hit was obtained on the shield and that glanced
off harmlessly.

You lay some stress on high explosive shells, but it has been shewn
that when armour is struck, unless the shell penetrates, the effect of
detonation on the armour is almost nil.

When using vertical fire the velocity of the falling projectile is low,
and the shell is not usually adapted to armour piercing, so that it
would appear only necessary to slightly increase the strength of the
over-head shield to make it impervious to high-angle fire. Shields of
the present thickness “ Harveyed ” might be sufficient.

‘he opening through which the gun rises could be automatically
closed if desired as the gun descends.

A 9-inch shell will not penetrate a 44-in. steel plate with the velocity
due to falling from a height of about 7000 feet, and this is probably a
more severe trial that is to be expected from any siege piece.

2, VoL. XXII.

70 A PLEA FOR HEAVY GUNS IN FORTRESS DEFENCE.

H.—Well, supposing that your gun has the good luck not to be dis-
abled, what can it do that a howitzer could not do as well ?

T.—It will secure me the advantages to be got from high velocity,
long range and a powerful shrapnel shell.

The permanent nature of their mounting should enable the heavy
guns to take part in the fight up to the extremity of their range, and
to support the light artillery in the skirmishes before investment is
completed, and also in any sorties or counter-attacks made by the
defence.

Central pivot mountings lend themselves readily to a system of land
position-finding, since they have an all-round arc of fire, and the gun
can be laid from under cover.

A position-finding system, originally tried for coast batteries, making
use of maps ruled in numbered squares, could be modified to suit land
fronts. No cross bearings would be needed, as the features of the
landscape would guide the observers, who might be pushed forward to
advanced positions in the early stages of the attack, and stationed in
balloons later on.

The numbers of the squares, with the range and bearing of each,
would be posted up near the gun and fire could be directed on any
square specified by the observation parties. Specially important points,
such as cross-roads, lines of approach, or probable positions for
batteries, etc., would be more minutely sub-divided than others.

Very useful observations were made at Lydd in 1887 from captive
balloons, and photographs of the camp were automatically taken from
a free balloon with no one in it. It appears likely that free balloons
will become more manageable in the future, and there are reasons why
it would be far more difficult to hit them than captive ones.

One advantage in high velocity is in the arrival of the shell before
warning has been given by the report of the piece. It was found at
Plevna! that, for this reason, high velocity guns were more dangerous
and demoralizing to working parties than pieces whose projectiles
travelled slower than sound.

With regard to howitzers and high explosives I have seen the results
of firing with delay fuzes at casemates, and very destructive they are,
but the shells that missed and buried themselves in the ground before
bursting were quite wasted. I have also seen a 6-inch lyddite shell act
wonderfully as a man-killing projectile—over a restricted area—when
it burst absolutely on the surface, without penetrating the earth. But
even if the burst were not smothered, the upward direction of most of
the fragments militates against their usefulness, and it will be granted
that time shrapnel from high velocity guns has a more wide spread
man-killing effect than any percussion shell.

I have endeavoured to show that heavy guns, properly mounted, can
still play an important part in the defence, both in the earlier and later
stages, and it should be remembered that the defence could always em-
ploy more of these weapons than the attack, owing to difficulties of
transport, and by suppressing them would relinquish a manifest
advantage.

1 Report on War Material of the Turkish Army, 1878,” by Colonel Maitland, R.A,

NOTES ON GERMAN MANCUVRES.

MAJOR J. KF. MANIFOLD, R.A.

THE manoeuvres of the German Guard Corps were held this year over
that triangular piece of country to the east of Berlin, of which Berlin,
Frankfurt on the Oder and Ciistrin are the corners, the main
centres of operations being Muncheberg, a small station on the line
running from Berlin to Custrin, and Frankfurt. The country is of con-
siderable historic interest, as it was the scene of the most important
events of Frederick the Great’s campaign of 1758 and 1759, while the
battle of Kunersdorf was fought within a few miles of the city of
Frankfurt. The battle-field was an important point in this year’s
manceuvres, its artillery positions, which have been so graphically de-
scribed in the Royal Artillery Institution ‘“‘ Proceedings ” by Major May,
are typical of ground which could be held by artillery in the face of the
strongest attacks of infantry. Long rolling slopes of arable land, well
cleared of timber, which could be swept equally well by sharpnel of
the present day, or by volleys of canister at the shorter ranges of
Frederick’s time.

The grand parade, which is always attended by the Emperor, was
held this year on the opening instead of the final day of the manceuyres.
The display was a fine one and was particularly interesting to gunners,
as the German artillery then made their first attempt at Gallopping-
Past. The Emperor had been so much impressed by the gallop past
of the Horse Artillery on the occasion of his recent visit to Alder-
shot, that he ordered that this parade movement should be copied
by both the German Horse and Field Artillery. A certain amount
of quiet protest was made by the officers at their being suddenly
called on to perform, before very critical spectators, a movement which
they had not previously practised, for even the crowd which attends
German manceuvres is thoroughly professional ; the display, considering
the lack of practice, was very fair, though the somewhat ragged line in
which a few of the batteries went past might have been the cause of
unpleasantness had the same been seen at Aldershot. The difference
in the pace of movement of the German horse and field artillery is
not so marked as with us, it has always been the custom for the latter
to move at a gallop when necessary and they have thus become
accustomed, through length of years, to the more rapid pace ot
10

25 VO. XXII.

72 NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@UVRES.

manouvre. It is still considered by some that for field artillery to
gallop is passing beyond their province, and it ig not long since that I
heard an officer commanding a very smart field battery in India called to
account by a General officer, for bringing his guns into action at a
gallop, although at a critical stage of the fight.

The manoeuvres opened with a very severe day for the cavalry, the
whole of the eight cavalry regiments of the Guard Corps marching in
one day from their quarters in Berlin and the neighbourhood to their
billets in the villages around Frankfurt, a distance of over fifty miles.
It was a heavy day and the horses looked a good deal tucked up after
it, but the Veterinary Surgeon of one of the Ulan regiments assured
me that there had been very few cases of sore backs or of horses
rendered unfit for work from other causes. The horses of both artillery
and cavalry in the German army always appear very fine drawn, but
they are a tough lot of animals though hght and lanky in comparison
with English troop horses, but the hard condition in which they are
always to be seen, allows of their going through very severe work
without injury. ‘The horses are, for the most part, obtained from the
eastern provinces of Prussia, where they are bought when three or four
years old, by the remount committees, from the large land owners.
They are then sent to the remount depdts and remain there for a year
or more, till they are sent to the various regiments as circumstances
require.

A great deal of trouble and time is expended in training the remonnts,
most of them remaining in the school for a year at least, before they
finally take their place in the ranks. A cavalry soldier, like the re-
mainder of the army, now serves for two years only, during which time
he has to learn everything connected with his work, it is impossible to
make him a really good rider in that time, but by giving him a
thoroughly broken horse matters are very much simplified, with the
result that, although the German cavalry may not be good horsemen
individually, yet when taken as a body they are able, thanks to the per-
fect training and steadiness of their horses, to manoeuvre and drill with
the greatest precision. No horses take part in the annual manceuvres till
they are six years old, so none but seasoned animals are in the ranks, and
much of that prematurely developed unsoundness, demanding casting
at an early age, is avoided. ‘This causes the squadrons to be somewhat
weaker than they would otherwise be, but the horses, though not actually
in the ranks are always ready io accompany the regiment should mobili-
zation on a war footing be required. The system provides good horses
and is economicalinthelongrun, Itis only in the Saxon army that the
mounted services are not supplied from the depdts, but it has always
been the custom in Saxony to buy direct from the dealers, despatching
the horses at once to the various regiments, the remounts thus pur-
chased being consequently a year older than those obtained for the
depots. The Saxon officers do not uphold their system, but it is hard
to change from long established ways.

* Bicycles are now being used to a very considerable extent for all
kinds of orderly work, which can be done over roads. ‘T'wo or three
bicyclists are attached to each brigade; on the march they move at

NOTES ON GERMAN MANQ@UVRES? 73

the head of the column near the General Officer Commanding, ready to
convey orders to corps marching in rear. Hven if the roads are some
what blocked a bicyclist requires but very little lateral space, and under
such circumstances he can make more rapid progress than a horse-
man. ‘The marching discipline of the German army is very good, when
halted, even for a few minutes, troops immediately take up a position
on one side of the road, leaving the centre of the road clear.

Nothing could be better than the German horse blanket, it is made
of a warm fleecy material and is very much larger and heavier than the
saddle blanket in use in our service, it completely takes the place of
our numnah, being folded in three for this purpose, the thick, soft
material, from which the blanket is made, affording good protection to
the back. The blanket when opened for use as a covering is about
seven feet long by six feet broad, and covers the horse from head to
tail, the breadth allowing of the belly and legs to be well protected ;
the saddle surcingle is used for keeping the blanket on the horse, the
front corners of the blanket being knotted together across the chest.
The ration given to the horses of artillery and cavalry differs very
materially from what we allow—two pounds more of grain, and about
one-half the quantity of hay, being given. In barracks the allowance
of straw is seven pounds daily, but the climate of Germany is so dry
and the seasons so regular, that bedding can be disposed of much more
economically than in Hngland. Most of the officers to whom I was
speaking were of opinion that the ration of hay was not sufficient.
During manceuvres every horse gets in reality much more than the above
allowance ; bedding is always supplied to an unlimited extent by the
farmer on whom the horses are billeted, and a very considerable increase
is generally made to the Government allowance of hay through the same
source, so that one cannot judge fairly at manoeuvres of the condition
of the horses as fed solely on the Government ration, as the latter is so
largely subsidized from the farmers’ stack yard ; this gift of forage is
not always made without a considerable grumble. The amount of kit
carried on the horse is much smaller than in England, as no spare
clothing is taken by the men, the only cloth clothes allowed being the
one suib which is actually in wear, while the only change of clothing
allowed is a loose jacket and trousers of stout canvas. .These make an
excellent change after a march ; in summer, directly the men come in,
the cloth clothes are exchanged for the canvas suits, while in cold
weather the canvas is worn over the cloth thus giving a great deal of
extra warmth. This white dress always looks neat and clean, and is
well suited for all work about stables and such like duties.

A certain amount of change has been introduced of late in the
equipment of the German soldier. It is now intended that in the
actual engagements of importance that the knapsack should be left
behind. The total weight carried by the infantryman is just under
sixty pounds, an immense load for a man to march and fight under, so
on the day of battle the knapsack will be left behind, and a few articles
of absolute necessity will be carried in a small canvas bag, known as
the “sturmbeutel.” This bag much resembles an ordinary cartridge
bag, it weighs a few ounces, and when not in use it is carried at the

74 NOTES ON GERMAN MANGUVRES,

back of the knapsack under the flap ; it is intended to hold a few small
articles of clothing and the compressed ration with which the German
soldier never parts. When in use, the bag will be carried on the back,
attached to the person by the ordinary knapsack straps. The mobility
of the infantry when relieved of their heavy packs should be consider-
ably increased; till now the German infantry have never been free
from the weight of their knapsacks, and all the fighting during the war
of 1870 was done by men carrying more than half-a-hundredweight ;
relieved of a portion of this crushing weight, fighting power will be pro-
portionately improved. Some very thorough system must be worked out
which will enable a man to recover his knapsack on the conclusion of a
fight; even in the case of a victory this would be no easy matter, while
should a reverse take place, it would be an impossibility. Warning
might well be taken from the facts recounted in a recent article in the
Fortnightly Review, which tells how some of the regiments, which
landed in the Crimea without their kits, did not recover them till six
months later, a most severe winter having meanwhile been spent
without them.

Besides his kit, the infantryman now carries a share of a tent, the
smallest number of portions which can be put together is four, but
twenty pieces, or more, joined together afford the most economical
arrangement of shelter. The tents are made from a light kind of
waterproof material, dyed khaki colour ; each portion is about 5 ft. long
by 44 wide, and is carried folded round the knapsack outside the great-
coat. Hach man carries a light tent pole made in three parts, which,
when required for use, are fitted together with a socket joint; each
stick is about 18 inches long, and the three are carried at the back of
the knapsack under the straps, the waterproof tent and jointed pole
weighing about six pounds all told. To put the tent together the
various pieces of canvas are layed side by side on the ground, and
buttoned together, the edges being arranged so as to overlap about six
inches and so prevent the rain working through. The buttons are
made of alluminium for the sake of lightness, a very important matter
where every possible ounce of weight must be saved. ‘The buttons are
well sewn on, as the difficulty of reattaching them to the canvas would
be considerable. The canvas portion of the tent forms at other times
a most practical waterproof cape, buttoning across the man’s chest and
held round the waist by the small piece of tent rope, which each man
carries. In wet weather sentries and men on out-post duty always
wear these canvas coverings, and they all speak most highly of the pro-
tection which they afford. Under the old system of bivouacking, tents
were not provided. A screen of canvas or straw, about 34 ft. high, was
erected inacircle, whose area was sufficient to give lying down space to
about sixty men, the camp fire was built up in the centre, and the men
slept shoulder to shoulder with their feet towards the fire. This wasan
excellent plan in dry weather, the screen was a perfect shelter from the
wind and the men kept each other warm, there was, however, no head
cover against rain, so the screen was abandoned for the present system of
tents. The tents are good, and the men say that they find them very
comfortable, but the comfort is at times hardly earned under the extra

NOTES ON GERMAN MANQUVRES. 75

load of six pounds. ‘The artillery and cavalry do not carry tents of any
kind, when bivouacking the men sleep between the two rows in which the
horses of a sub-division are picketted, and in this way get a certain
amount of protection from the wind. At manceuvresa plentiful supply
of straw is always issued, and the gunners say that they sleep com-
fortably in the open.

The German boot differs very much from ours, it is a low Wellington,
the advantage of which is that the mud cannot work in by the ankle,
so neither gaiters or spats are required; the boot would be according
to our ideas unsuitable for marching, but it is the pattern most
commonly worn by all the working classes throughout Germany, so
that the men have always been used to it and would not readily under-
stand the mysteries of a lace-up boot, and certainly the marching power
of the infantry is beyond question. The long boots of the mounted
troops are but seldom made with much attempt at cut or smartness,
the boot fits loosely round the calf, with the advantage that whatever
may be the weather, it can be pulled on or off without trouble.

No part of the uniform is smarter or more genuinely useful than the
great-coat. The collar is the great feature, when not in use it lies well
back over the shoulders being cut so deep as to almost form a cape,
but when turned up, at night time or in bad weather, it comes well over
the ears and nose, while a small pocket of alpaca, a continuation of the
collar lining, forms a hood or cap, fitting tight on the head, so as to
allow of the forage cap being worn outside. The durability of the
material is beyond question. One evening I was talking to some men
of the lst Guard Ulans, who after a long day were cleaning their kit
and packing it away for the following morning’s parade, four of the
men were engaged rolling a cloak, and noticing its very aged appcar-
ance, I said “that cloak has given the state good service,” “yes,”
replied the owner “I think it is about time it was cast, it has been
twenty-five years in the regiment ;” the other men laughed but the man
undid his cloak and shewed the date of issue 1868, saying “it was
serving in this regiment five years before any of youwere born.” This
incident is a true example of the strict economy and care with which
everything is seen to in the German army.

The conditions under which manceuvres are held in England and in
Germany are so different, that it is hard to draw a fair comparison be-
tween the two. With us manceuvres may be said to be carried out only
on sufferance, and their present development is largely due to the per-
sonal influence of a few of the senior officers of the army, who have, in
their private capacity, obtained permission for troops to manceuvre over
a certain extent of country. In Germany the whole country is open to
the army without let or hindrance, and a General Officer is in no way
hampered by having his manceuvre maps marked in all kinds of colours
to distinguish the ground over which his men may move, from that over
which it is strictly forbidden to cross. - The actual manceuvring of the
troops is therefore bound to partake more of the real nature of war than
with us, but it is more especially in the manner in which the men are
housed and fed, that the great difference occurs.

During the manceuvres every regiment must pass two or three nights

76. NOTES ON GERMAN MANGUVRES..

in bivouac for the sake of training in camp work, and the last two days
of the manceuvres are generally devoted to movements where the whole
force bivouacs in the open, but with these exceptions the troops are, as
far as possible, billeted in the various villages in the neighbourhood of
which the manceuvres are being held. ‘his system of billetting causes
a good deal of trouble and inconvenience to the country people, and
puts them to a certain amount of expense. All arrangements for billet-
ting are made between the staff officer of the troops and the “ Schulze ”’
or government tax gatherer of the villages, who receives a notice to
the effect that a certain number of troops, say one battery of artillery,
one company of infantry and half a squadron of cavalry will be quartered
m one of the villages in his charge for one or two days, and it is his
business to distribuie the men and horses among the farm-houses in
fair proportions. Asa rule, the officers are lodged together, and a fair
sized farm may have to find accommodation for about twenty-four men
and from twelve to twenty horses, but these numbers will vary with the
number of men billeted on the village. ‘The men arrive at their billets
during the afternoon, and as the commissariat will have distributed
their rations during the forenoon, they expect to find their dinners
ready. A householder is not legally bound to cook the soldiers’
rations, but it is the unwritten law of the land that this should be done,
and to allow of weary men to cook their own food, would be an act of
inhospitality which would be far from the mind of any German. ‘To
cook-for. twenty men is no light matter, as out of this number there
are probably two “‘avantageurs”’ or candidates for commissions, who
must of course have their food apart from the others, there will also be
the “‘ einjahrige ”’ or one year’s men, who, coming from a higher social
class than the common soldiers, expect a separate mess ; three different
sets of meals will therefore have to be prepared. The rations are both
in quality and quantity inferior to ours, and the men expect the house-
holders, on whom they are billeted, to supplement them considerably
from their own larders. The soldiers generally expect to have their
ration bread exchanged for the home-made bread of the farmer.
The quality of the flour from which the ration bread is made is good,
but the bread is often badly baked and sodden. Should a bye-day
from’ manceuvre work occur, three meals, breakfast at seven o’clock,
dinner at noon, and supper will have to be prepared, so that the farm
establishment will spend most of its day in cooking for the soldiers
quartered on them.

The “avantageurs ” and “ einjahrige ” are, when possible, put into
rooms or out-buildings, apart from the other men. Most farm-houses
seem to possess an infinite number of mattresses, these are filled with
straw and make excellent beds, while all the spare blankets, quilts, and
every kind of covering, are called into requisition, without which the men
would often pass an uncomfortable night. Officers are provided with
accommodation in the owner’s house, though two or three may at times
have to share the same room ; the men are put into the barns and out-
houses, where, with the help of spare mattresses borrowed from the
house, and unlimited straw, they make themselves very comfortable.
At the recent Guard manceuvres a barn was set on fire by some of the

NOTES ON GERMAN MANGUVRES.

men anole after they had gone to bed. The dry straw caught fire
and burnt like tinder, and three men of the Third Infantry “of the
Guard were burnt to death and much property was destroyed.

Except for transport of men’s rations, Government carriage is but
little used, all carts required for bageace and the various stor es, being
obtained on requisition from the farmers, or in the town from those
persons who keep carts. ‘Twenty-four hours notice is generally given
to a farmer that he will be required to supply one or more carts, and
should he fail to comply with the order he subjects himself to severe
punishment. Officers are allowed but little baggage, a small trunk
or valise is all that is taken; with a marching order under these
light conditions, one country cart drawn by three horses will generally
suffice for the officers’ baggage of a battalion. The mess kit is always
of the lightest description, as, except in bivouacs, everything will be
supplied by the owner of the house on whom the officers are billeted.
When in bivouacs a large number of carts are required, as all straw for
the men’s bedding, firewood, etc., must then move with the troops.
The system under which the military train arrangements are managed
is most thorough, every petty detail being worked out with a surprising
degree of accuracy. ‘I'he impressed carts assemble at an early hour at
the named place, and are formed up in lines, classified according to the
number of horses by which they are drawn. ‘he wagons are then told
off as required to the various regiments and brigade-divisions of
artillery, one man being detailed to accompany each cart belonging to
his corps or regiment. ‘The carts for officers’ baggage proceed at once
to the houses in which the officers have been quartered, while the
remainder are led to the wood or straw stores, according to whatever
load they may be required to carry. As soon as the carts are loaded
they are formed up on the road, the carts being kept together according
to their regiments; a division of fifteen thousand men will require a
very large number of carts, so the length of the column is a most
serious matter.

The carts and wagons follow the direction taken by the troops, and
when some appointed place is reached they halt until orders arrive
as to the place where the troops will bivouac. This information cannot
come to them from the front till the whole operations of the day are
over and it has been decided where the troops shall pass the night.
The wagons are at once led forward and as they approach the neigh-
bourhood where the division will bivouac, they are met by orderlies, who
conduct them to the various camping grounds, selected for the various
corps and regiments. ‘This is undoubtedly carrying out transport,
arrangements as closely as possible to the conditions of actual war, for
when troops move off in the morning, it is absolutely undecided where
they will bivouac that evening. The whole system of transport is ex-.
cellent, and there is a complete absence of hurry or disorder of .any
kind. The orderly manner in which the carts are driven into their
proper positions and controlled on the line of march, could only be
effected in a country where every wagoner, though wearing corduroy.
clothes and a peasant’s cap, 18 as well disciplined as the men in the
ranks wearing the Imperial uniform. ;

78 NOTES ON GERMAN MANG@UVRES.

A detailed account of the scheme of each day’s manceuvring would
not be interesting, unless described by some one thoroughly posted in
all the arrangements connected with the work of the manceuvres, but
I will venture to give a short account of the final day but one, as from
a gunner’s point of view, the episodes were then decidedly instructive.
On the previous night the head-quarters of the First Division of the
Corps of Guards was at Frankfurt, with the object of attacking the
Second Division of the same corps, who were believed to be about
twenty miles to the north, in the neighbourhood of Miincheberg, a
station on the line of railway from Berlin to Ciistrin. The First
Division moved off at seven o’clock, two cavalry regiments, the Gardes
du Corps and Garde Ciirassiere covering the right front. After hard
marching for three hours news was sent in by the cavalry that they had
found the enemy towards the right, and the six batteries of the division
were at once ordered to the front. The batteries moved forward at a
trot for about three miles, when they were halted on a bye-road under
the cover of a long low hill. In this position the batteries made their
final preparations for action, while the General and the staff officers of
artillery were selecting suitable sites on which the batteries might come
into action, should the enemy appear in force from the expected direc-
tion. The ground to the front was of an undulating nature, but clear of
woods, and as the General and his staff examined the ground to their
front and right, they were far from expecting an attack of cavalry from
the left. Suddenly there was a hurried movement among the staff, and
orderlies gallopped in all haste towards the batteries which were on
the road, but before the orderlies could reach the batteries, the General
and his staff were seen also to leave their position and hurry towards
the rear. Directly afterwards, almost before the six batteries could
come into action, fifteen squadrons of cavalry appeared over the ridge
which the General had just vacated, and in another moment were
charging towards the batteries which were now in action about seven
hundred yards distant from the top of the ridge. The guns were
rapidly served, but one minute was all the time that was required for
the cavalry to cross the intervening space, and even with case shot the
number of rounds fired before the cavalry reached the line of guns was
comparatively few, certainly not sufficient to have checked an attack of
fifteen squadrons numbering about two thousand sabres. A more per-
fect example of how the entire artillery of a division may be surprised
and captured was impossible, and it showed the necessity of artillery
being always prepared for an attack of cavalry, even when least
expected, and of shrapnel being carried with fuzes fixed and set ata
short division.

The umpires at once decided that, considering the short space which
the cavalry had to cross, the six batteries must have been captured, and
they were accordingly put out of action. The interest in the movement
was yet far from ended, for while the gunners were standing by looking
dejected at the umpire’s decision, and the victorious cavalry were slowly
reforming their somewhat shattered ranks, suddenly two more regi-
ments of cavalry, the Gardes du Corps and the Garde Ciirassiere, who
had been covering the right front, appeared on the scene. The

NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@UVRES. 79

victorious cavalry attempted to form up and face their new enemy, but
in their disorganised state they had hardly time to do so, and the ten
fresh squadrons charging them on the flank, it was decided that they
were out of action, ‘Thus within the space of five minutes, on the one
side six batteries, and on the other fifteen squadrons, were declared to
have been rendered incapable of further action ; work of a sufficiently
exciting nature to satisfy spectators, no matter how greedy for excite-
ment. The cavalry of both sides were somewhat censured, the two
regiments of the Gardes du Corps and Garde Ciirassiere for having
failed to observe the enemy’s cavalry and thus exposed the artillery of
their division to attack, while the fifteen squadrons were blamed for
having ventured to charge without holding a sufficient force in reserve,
with which to meet the counter-attack of the enemy’s cavalry. The
whole day was equally instructive for artillery or cavalry. The troops
bivouacked that night in the neighbourhood of the ground over which
they had been manoeuvring and the following day brought a fortnights
manceuvres to an end, the infantry returning to their respective
garrisons by train, the mounted troops moving by road.

December, 1894.

ID) aL, JaN, 15e) SZ
LIKUTENANT W. SWABEY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA,

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATHS, late RHA.

(Continued from p. 53, No. 1, Vol. XXT1.),

Cuaprer II.

March to join the Army. Attached to the 7th Division. French
Movements to Victwal Ciudad Rodrigo. Actions of El Boden
and Aldea de Ponte.

12th September.—We marched at day-break from Sacavem, and I
went on to Villa Franca to procure billets, &c. for the troop.! The
road lay over a country bearing the utmost marks of the hostility of its
merciless invaders; the villages of Povoa, Alverca, and Alhandra de-
serted and ruined, houses without windows, doors, or roofs, and the few
wretched inhabitants worn out with hunger and want. The country
was interesting to a military eye, on the left the field-works, which had
been in use before Junot arrived at Lisbon; at Alhandra, the formid-
able lines stretching across the country to Mafra, not as yet quite
completed, and with the very many excellent positions in their front,
are, I hope, impregnable. Many thousands were employed in com-
pleting these works under their own engineers, the positions are by
nature very much in their favour, and art has had but little share in
strengthening them . . . . A bridge is passed here by which
Masséna’” retreated from Lisbon, and which he in vain attempted to

destroy.

There were no works in existence to cover Lisbon when Junot
occupied it in 1807. “In 1799, accurate plans of the mountain-

FUENTE GUINALDO,
: : i August 27th, 1811.
1 Memo. for Lieut.-Colonel Framingham, Commanding R.A.:—
“‘ Captain Macdonald’s troop of Horse Artillery to be ordered to be prepared to march as soon
as possible, and, when ready, they are to join this army. WELLINGTON.”
2 Prince of Essling and Duke of Rivoli.

2, VOL, XXII,

82 SWABEY DIARY.

ous country filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is
situated had been made under the direction of Sir Charles
Stuart, and these, together with the French Colonel Vincent’s
minutes, showing how to cover Lisbon, were in Lord Welling-
ton’s possession, and from these documents the original notion
of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras, made in 1810, are said
to have been derived. ‘The lines, by means of entrenchments, in-
undations, and redoubts secured more than five hundred square
miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the
ocean, and consisted of three lines of defence, the plans and
works upon which were executed and carried out by British offi-
cers alone :—

The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth
of the Zizandre on the sea coast, was, following the inflexions of
the hills, twenty-nine miles long.

The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles
in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the
mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.

The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from
Passo d’Arcos on the Tagus to the Tower of Junquera on the
coast. Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three
thousand yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover
the embarkation with fewer troops, should the operation be
delayed by bad weather ; and within this second camp, Fort St.
Julian (whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an
escalade), was armed and strengthened to enable a rear-guard
to protect both itself and the army. Of these stupendous lines,
the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was
undoubtedly the principal, and the others only appendages, the
one as a final place of refuge, the other as an advanced work to
stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable the army to
take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pres-
sure.” ‘ Memoranda of the Lines, &c.,” by Colonel J. T. Jones,
R.E. Napier, Vol. 3, p. 255, et seq., and 351.

On arriving at Villa Franca, the scene between me and the Juiz de
Fora! must have been good, neither of us understanding a word the
other said. JI, however, contrived to get the billets, &c. There was
much difficulty among the servants to-day, in consequence of their
being unused to packing mules, and they were so late in, that we feared
we should begin our march on an empty stomach, so their appearance
at 5 o’clock was extremely gratifying. As to our quarters, fleas and
bugs were the principal inhabitants, and so tormenting was their com-
pany that we did not regret a little fatigue, which supplied at last the
place of an opiate. Macdonald, Maxwell, Taylor, and I were in one
room, and that not particularly large, and never were four gents so
tormented! Men and horses, as usual, occupied the same domain.

18th September.—We marched at 5 o’clock, the country not at all

1 Juiz de Fora, a Justice of the Peace, equivalent to our billet-master or constable—F.4,W.

SWABEY DIARY. 83

improving as we advanced, little cultivation, sickly inhabitants, and
bad roads; ‘‘ Viva Senhor ” indeed saluted us often enough, but this
was all that was even to be purchased. The modern system of cook-
ery, which implies men cooks and provides second courses at dinner,
we here find defied by sowpe and bowilli at top and sowpe and bowilli at
bottom. We were provident enough, however, to supply ourselves
beforehand with materials for plum-pudding, and our cook contrived,
with the aid of our imaginations, to represent one. Sutton and Cap-
tain M.’s servant, still commending the tractable temper of the mules,
were to-day left behind. I was much alarmed at their non-appearance,
as the night before we left Sacavem, a servant of an officer of the
Guards, on his way from Lisbon, had been brought in terribly wounded
by some villains in the dark. Sutton, however, made his appearance
at about 9 o’clock, he had been left on the road, the mules being entirely
knocked up; he had then loaded my gun and waited till they freshened,
and thus, by his perseverance, brought in the baggage. His com-
panion, who had gone to seek assistance, lost his way and was still
TISSUE, 5 6 Oe ie :

14th September.—Marched this day at 5 o’clock through a country
getting every step more wild and romantic. Hyen where there were
houses, the inhabitants had left them, as well as the windows! Not-
withstanding the devastations of the French, the indolence of the
people was sufficiently apparent in the want of cultivation, the uneven-
ness of the roads, and the immense stones that lie in them. The dust
and heat were very trying, and the sick list, principally cases of
dysentery, begins to lengthen. We meet detachments of sick every
day on their way to Lisbon.

The village of Cartaxo through which we passed, is in the most
ruined state I have yet seen, on every wall is marked “ Logement de 4
comp®,” or some billet of the French army.

A mile short of Santarem are the famous positions where Lord
Wellington and Masséna stood so long at bay. They are on two
opposite hills, almost within musket shot of each other: we passed
over the bridge that communicates between them across a deep ravine,
where on either side batteries are erected within point blank range.
These positions are flanked by the Tagus, and on the left of Lord
Wellington’s, the mountains rendered an attack from the enemy
hopeless.

After the battle of Busaco on the 27th September, 1810, Wel-
lington retired within the lines of Torres Vedras, Masséna
followed and took up a permanent position in front of Alhandra.
The war was thus reduced to a species of blockade; Masséna’s
object being to feed his army until reinforcements reached it ;
Lord Wellington to starve the French before succour could
arrive. In October, Masséna being convinced it was impractic-
able to force the lines without great reinforcements, fell back to
the position at Santarem, Wellington followed, and his head-
quarters were fixed at the village of Cartaxo. In these positions
the hostile armies remained from the 18th November, 1810, to

84 SWABEY DIARY.

the 14th March, 1811, when the French were forced to retreat,
the English army advanced, and the campaign of 1811 ensued,
See Napier, Vol. 3, pp. 362-877.

Santarem is, for its size, a fine city, preferable to Lisbon, it is full of
convents and churches, from whence the fair inhabitants, as well as
the plate and ornaments have been stolen, and every step presents a
ruin. We were fortunate in our quarters, occupying a large episcopal
house which had been Masséna’s head-quarters. I bathed in the Tagus
towards evening.

The Duke of Leinster, Lord H. Fitzgerald, and Lord Delewarr par-
took of sowpe and bowillc with us, and were glad enough to do so. .

15th September.—I was employed the whole of this day in arranging
the issue of provisions, which had been very irregularly conducted.
Bathed in the Tagus and commenced a letter to my father.

16th September.—Having more time to look about me, visited the
positions where the sentries, or rather stumps of trees doing duty as
sentries, still threaten the opposite brush-wood. I shot with Taylor and
killed four quails, which bird abounds here, but the heat by Fahren-
heit’s thermometer being 97°, we could not make much of a walk of it.
Harding was attacked very sharply with dysentery, and the sick list
increased. I did not mention in its proper place that Dyneley was left
at Lisbon for the benefit of his health, and that some of our men, on
the night of the 9th, being in the act of stealing grapes, were attacked
in a vineyard at Sacavem, they drew their swords, and two of them,
Goff and Phillips, were slightly wounded, Lowrey and meee severely
so, the latter’ died whilst being carried to Lisbon. ;

17th September.—Marched at 4 o’clock, before agitate over a flat
country filled with quails, and principally producing hemp, which is
spun by the women in every village: this is performed without a wheel,
being twined round a stick, as thread or cotton is; this they do through
habit so quickly that a wheel is unnecessary.

Our destination was Golega, where I got very excellent quarters, the
patron! or master of the head-quarter billet came to pay his respects,
and spoke some French and Latin. Taylor and I got round him and
teazed him with questions, he denied the excesses of the French, which
needed no other testimony than the universal desolation of the place.
We found our rations, a pint of wine and a pound of beef per man,
suffice very well, and, indeed, neu else but a few eee was to be
had. :

18th September —Mentad very cal hate fae eo et Banik,
and for the first time had a specimen of Portuguese hills. On the
march, near Punhete, the road joins the river Tagus, which is here
extremely picturesque and beautiful, the trees coming down to its
banks and meeting the water’s edge. We passed over an arm of the
Tagus, at Punhete, by the bridge of boats, which, being removed in
the rainy part of the year, is a great impediment to the advance to

1The master of the house in which an officer was billeted was called the ‘‘ patron.’ —F.4.W.

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SWABEY DIARY. 85

Lisbon. When we got to Punhete, I was ordered on to Abrantes to
prepare for our arrival there.

“The march from Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult
mountains; to have repaired the roads between these places
would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies, as
facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the
shortest line to Lisbon. But Lord Wellington, after throwing
boat-bridges over the Zezere [at Punhete] and the Tagus and
fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello
Branco a line of communication by the left bank of the Tagus,
through Nisa, to the pass of Villa Velha, where, by a flying
bridge, the river was re-crossed, and from thence a good road led
to Castello Branco. Now the pass of Villa Velha is prodigi-
ously strong for defence, and the distance from Abrantes to
Castello Branco being nearly the same by Nisa as by the other
bank of the river, the march of troops was yet much acceler-
ated, the road near Villa Velha being reconstructed by the
Engineers.” Napier, Vol. III., p. 263.—See Map I.

This trip on a hot day, with the thermometer at 90°, I did not
admire. I did not arrive at Abrantes till it was nearly dark, Taylor
and Maxwell in company; our billet was drawn from the English Com-
mandant, nor was I ever in a dirtier hole! We all slept in a room
10 feet square, filthy in the extreme. I proposed in preference taking
shelter under the canopy of Heaven in the fields, but could not carry
my point.

19th September.—Was up early in the morning to draw provisions,
&c. for the troop. We were obliged on their arrival to have them
picketed, the stabling being occupied by the R.I.D.G.! Abranteg has
a castle of no consequence, but if its bridge of boats were removed, the
passage of the T’agus would be stopped.

Here is the grand depot of the army, and the mirror in which the
Commissariat department may be seen.” All the stores are forwarded
to the army by mules, which are pressed and become regularly the pro-
perty of Government. The pay for a mule which carries about 320]bs.
of corn, or 28 gallons of wine or spirits in casks, or 280 lbs. of
biscuits is one dollar per diem. To keep up the communication with
the army many thousands of mules are employed. The owners take
them in charge, and receive, besides the pay per mule, 18 dollars a
month for themselves. A sub-commissary is generally attached to each
regiment, who collects what supplies he can from the district he is in,
and there are flying magazines at the head-quarters of divisions, &c.,
and stationary ones on the routes from Lisbon, &c. Commanding
Officers of cavalry send detachments over the country for forage, and
the receipt is given on the regimental, district, or divisional Commis-
Sary, as it may happen to be.

1 The 4th, or Royal Irish Dragoon Guards.

2 Lord Wellington’s experience of supplying the troops by means of the Brinjarries during his
Indian campaigns in the Deccan, no doubt stood him in good stead in organizing his commissariat
supply and transport in the Peninsula. See his memo. on the subject of this Indian system of
transport and supply. ‘‘ Wellington Despatches,” Vol. III., p, 535.

86 SWABEY DIARY.

Forage is served out in straw, Indian corn, oats, barley, and even
rye. Spirits, wine, beef, biscuit, bread or flour, sometimes rice, and
occasionally a proportion of salt, are delivered to the troops. I have
generally drawn the provisions and forage ; the Portuguese commonly
preside at the minor stores, and are rigorously exact in weight, measure,
&c., and will cheat youif they can. I found much difficulty in compre-
hending their weights and measures.

“Portugal owes much to its poverty. The impossibility of sub-
sisting a large army for a length of time on the resources of any
limited portion of it formed the pivot on which the military
operations for its defence invariably turned. ‘The French were
at no time sufficiently masters of the country to establish maga-
zines ; but subsisted on the daily contributions they levied, and
never therefore could remain long united in a large body. The
British and Portuguese, on the contrary, had their floating maga-
zines on the T'agus and on the Douro, everything was drawn
from theirrear; and provided theline of supply wasnot materially
lengthened, so as to require a great increase of animals which
brought up the provisions, they could act as well in one part of
the country as another, and for any length of time. The enemy
during the whole of 1811, possessed a great numerical superi-
ority, and could alone have been prevented deriving some
advantage therefrom, by every movement of the allies being
conducted with a happy reference to the difference of the com-
missariat of the two armies.” “ War in Spain and Portugal,”

by Lieut.-Col. J. T. Jones, R.E., p. 216.

This night we slept, for the first time, under canvas, in which I found
no hardship. Our dinner was spread on a tarpaulin, and but for the
faces of friends that should have sat round it, I could have despised the
wish for mahogany claws. I bathed in the Tagus, the current is ex-
(CENSORS eam ey as ed ae aun, eo ens Mee ee eae NC a a | 3

20th September.—Was employed the whole day in drawing corn and
provisions for three days, during which occupation I was witness of a
circumstance which might have been of serious consequence. A soldier
of the 47th regiment, who was left with some meat that had been drawn,
was attacked and overpowered by some hungry Portuguese. What
was the origin of the quarrel I never could discover, but multitudes
had the man down and were stoning him, when two or three of his
comrades came to his rescue, and soon chased away the Portuguese,

‘some of whom got most heartily drubbed with no other instruments
however than fists; being in sight, I ran up with all possible speed to
prevent a disturbance, and got to the butcher’s shop just in time to
overturn a Portuguese in the act of priming his musket to take revenge
for the licking he had received, and on my walking out with it in my
hand, the people soon dispersed, for they have great respect for an
officer ; though at Abrantes we seem to be less popular than where we
have been before.

This night whilst we were all snug in our tent, and the men under
the guns, there came on what is called a “ Portuguese shower,”

SWABEY DIARY. 87

Anglice, such a storm for eight hours as never was witnessed by
Englishman before. The tent did not kecp it out half-an-hour, but I
threw my tarpaulin over me and defied the storm. I was dressed be-
fore daylight, and when the “‘turn-out” sounded, was soon half drowned
in getting the troop harnessed. ‘I'he few men who had pulled off their
boots and set them upright were fair subjects for laughter, except that
it was too serious a matter for joking, for when they tried to pull them
on in the dark, they were astonished to find them full of water. We
left at the general hospital at this place 11 sick.

21st September.—The morning turned out delightful after the rain,
and the novelty of the scene in the altered face of the country almost
made us forget the drowning of the night before. We now passed over
hills and by the sides of mountains covered with arbutus and myrtle,
beautiful heaths and other shrubs whose names, except the Hstava, I
did not know.

To my great mortification one of my troop horses died to-day, and
one of Newland’s likewise on the 19th. Last night’s drenching made
a strange alteration in our horses, but did not affect the men so much
as I expected. At Gaviaio the troop was again picketed, and we con-
sumed the last of the hay we drew at Abrantes.

22nd September.—I was sent on this morning through the most
barren, neglected district that was ever beheld. The country had a
very strange appearance in consequence of the immense blue rocks of
stone that were everywhere to be seen ; on these stones instead of in
barns, the people beat out the grain from their fields, and cover it up
with straw. When I got to Nisa, which stands high, I found our Irish
friends again in the way, and we were once more to be on the ground.
No forage was to be procured here, but I went out in the midst of a heavy
rain, and discovered hid in a valley enough for four days’ consumption,
and loaded every horse.

Nisa is an archiepiscopal city, and its convents have been grand, but
the iron hand of war has here left its marks in the form of ruin, poverty,
sickness, and desolation. F

23rd September.—Still at Nisa pene ae if Hee to he the
Dragoon Guards, but as they marched by squadrons this plan became
abortive.

Maxwell was here with us, but preferred his billet, having obtained
covering for his small number of men; our protection was the shade of
cork trees which grow like oaks, and much resemble them, the bark
can be pared without injury to the tree.

24th September.—This day’s march was by far the worst we had
encountered, the mountains we had to cross, and the sudden ascents
and sharp turnings in coming down the hills required much labour and
perseverance on the part of both horses and men. I was waiting as
usual to bring up the rear, and had much to encounter. The wildness
of the scenery y here is beyond description, so grand and mountainous, but
between the heights the valleys though uncultivated, are luxurious in
their way. Harly in the morning the mountain peaks are only to be

88 SWABEY DIARY.

seen above the clouds, which produces a very striking effect. We
passed the Tagus at Villa Velha by a bridge of boats, it was at this
place that poor Johnson! was lost in attempting to ford, the rapidity of
the stream bore him and his horse away, and it is supposed that he was
struck by the animal’s feet, as he was a very good swimmer, and swim-
ming might have saved him; his name is cut on a tree by the road
side, where he was found and buried by Captain Bull? 10 days after his
unfortunate catastrophe. I walked all day in the sun for forage, and
could only get the stalks of some Indian corn. . . . . .

25th September.—Marched for Sarnadas with foraging parties on
both flanks of the route, they were very successful and brought in a
great quantity, but my heart bled to be obliged to take it from the
inhabitants ; the poor half-starved wretches implored me to spare it for
their sheep, which as well as their goats they keep to milk, and live on
the cheese which is very bad. I gave them a full receipt, wishing
rather to err on their side in the weight, which it was impossible to
ascertain ; these receipts are all paid to the Ist of July.

Captain M. sent me on after dinner to Castel Branco, where I again
overtook Maxwell aud partook of his quarters. The town was so full of
cavalry detachments, sent there to recruit their strength, and the
R.1.D.G., that it was 10 o’clock before I could get my horses put into a
stable, and at last only through the charity of an officer of the 11th,
who let me crowd his own horses by the addition of mine.

26th September.—Fortunately the troop found quarters in conse-
quence of a sudden order for the Dragoons to march, this order put us
all on the alert, and we immediately inspected our guns, &c. We were
again under the necessity of leaving 12 men behind, we however got
the use of some of Captain Thompson’s company, and we made useful
some horses last sent up the country. Castel Branco is a large town
on an eminence, with a castle of little use, it forms a strong position
on the frontier next to Pena Macor.

27th September.—Marched and got to Pedrogiio early, and encamped

under the shade of cork trees. Late in the evening, Colonel Sherlock
of the 4th R.I.D.G., received information that French cavalry had pene-

1 Lieutenant William Johnson (Kane’s List, No. 1303), of Captain Thompson’s brigade, was
drowned in fording the Tagus at Villa Velha on 14th June, 1811. Ingleby Diary, R.A.1. ‘ Pro-
ecedings,’’ May 1898.

2 Captain Robert Bull (Kane’s List, 845) served in the campaigns in the West Indies, 1796-8,
and was nine times engaged in the Island of St. Domingo.

He commanded “‘ 1” Troop (now ‘‘ 1” Battery), R.H.A., which was formed under his super-
vision, from 1806 to 1823. He served with it in the Peninsula (generally attached to the cavalry)
from March 1809, to the close of the war in 1814. On several occasions he was absent owing to
wounds, when 2nd Captain Norman Ramsay acted for him. During the war the troop was
engaged in six battles, five sieges, 21 actions, and 28 affairs and captures; 60 engagements in all.*

Major Bull was with his troop at Waterloo where it performed important services, especially at
the beginning of the battle, and it suffered heavy losses. He received the C.B. and K.H. and
Order of St. Anne of Russia, and was made brevet Lieut.-Colonel for the campaign.

On giving up the command of the Horse Artillery at Woolwich in 1834, he was presented with a
handsome piece of plate by the officers serving, and who had served under him, as a token of their
esteem for his character as a soldicr, and regard for him as a friend. He retired the samo year,
being permanently disabled from further service, the result of wounds received during his long and
distinguished career. He died at Bath in April 1838.

*MS. record of troop service which belonged to Major E. C. Whinyates, who succeeded Licut.-
Colonel Bull in command in 1823,—F.4.1V.

SWABEY DIARY. 89

trated within a short distance of this place; which communication
induced us at that time of night to get to the store and draw three
days’ forage and provisions to carry us on; on this service I was up all
night, and at 3 o’clock in the morning the troop turned out. One of
Harding’s troop horses was destroyed this day, in consequence of a
kick which broke his thigh. He left three at Castel Branco and re-
ceived five cast horses. Newland left one and received four, I left
two and received four. N. lost a mule stung by a viper on the side.

28th September.—Our route was to Val de Lobo, but missing our
way, as well as the Dragoons, we went through Pena Macor, where in
the middle of the town an infantry regiment, the Buffs, crossed our
line of march and delayed us nearly an hour. In descending the steep
hill through Pena Macor, No. 2 ammunition wagon overpowered the
shaft horse, and he was precipitated clean through a wall three feet
thick, neither man or horse being hurt. We halted in the middle of
the day at Meimoa, but hearing of the probability of an action, and
fearing that there was a possibility of the French cutting us off, know-
ing that they had cavalry in the neighbourhood we marched again at
5 o’clock in the evening, and marching all night got to Sabugal at
3 o’clock, regularly escorted by the Dragoons. During the night, in
order to get my forage cart along, I was obliged to go back on foot
four miles, and did not see a soul the whole way; this was a trying
moment, and I thought of England and those I prized most who were
at a distance. When I met the carriage, much exertion got it up the
tremendous hills. It knocked up six horses and also repeatedly
stopped, and I had not only this difficulty to oppose, but the impatience
of the Dragoon officers who were the rear-guard. On getting to
Sabugal our tents had not arrived, and I very quietly laid my mattress
on the ground, spread my tarpaulin over me, and went to sleep, the
dew that fell was immense, but I felt no inconvenience. No. 6 gun was
overturned on the side of a hill, and the wheel driver much hurt.

29th September.—We found ourselves packed to such disadvantage
when daylight came that we immediately changed the place and occu-
pied a hill overlooking Sabugal, to get to which a bridge passes the
Coa. It was near this place that so many French were destroyed in
passing the river, by our advanced-guard, when Masséna retreated from
Santorem.

This occurred on the 3rd of April, 1811. Lord Wellington wrote

of it thus :—“ We have given the French a handsome dressing,
and I think they will not say again that we are not a manceu-
vring army. We may not manceuyre so beautifully as they do ;
but I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns
en masse with our lines. The poor 2nd Corps received a terrible
beating from the 43rd and 52nd on the 3rd ;
They tell me that the 2nd Corps lost 2500 on the 8rd at Sabu-
gal! Their loss must have been enormous certainly, but I can
hardly believe somany.” ‘ Wellington Despatches,” Vol. VIL.,
pp. 424-441.

We got intelligence here of a gallant action fought at the advanced

90 SWABEY DIARY.

posts on the 27th, between the enemy’s advance and our light cavalry,
combined with Captain Bull’s and Lefebure’s troops. The 5th regi-
ment were twice charged by a regiment of Chasseurs, and then walked
up to the cavalry with their bayonets, a thing new in the annals of war.
The 11th and 14th Dragoons, and the Coldstream Guards behaved
gallantly, and the artillery did much execution. Poor Dunn! of the
latter was brought into Sabugal wounded in the groin; he was picked
out by a rifleman. No accommodations are contrived in this army to
convey the sick and wounded to the rear, and I sat with Dunn some
hours, concocting plans for conveying him easily, and had a cot con-
structed to swing in a wagon for him—he was wounded before in
Egypt, and has seen much service.

The actions referred to were those of El] Boden and Aldea de
Ponte. Marmont, who had received a reinforcement of 11,000
men from France, having thrown a convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo,
which had been blockaded for six weeks and wanted food, ob-
serving the extended position of the allies, crossed the Agueda
and attacked them on the 27th of September, at El Boden and
Aldea de Ponte. At the former place the cavalry of Montbrun
cut down some Portuguese gunners and took two guns, when
suddenly the 5th Regiment, led by Major Ridge, charged into
the midst of the French cavalry and retook them.

At Aldea de Ponte, the French were at first successful, but eventu-
ally were repulsed. In the night Wellington fell back and
occupied on the 28th a new and strong position, on the same
day the French, who had but a few days’ provisions, and could
procure none in the country, also retired, and Marmont resumed
his old position in the valley of the Tagus. See Napier, Vol.
IV., p. 234 et seq.

50th September.—Marched to Val de Lobo with a guide, having
received orders to attach ourselves to the 7th Division? under Major-

1Lieutenant William Dunn (Kane’s List, No. 1188) served in the campaign cf 1805 in Italy, was
present at the battle of Maida, and capture of Scylla Castle in 1806, and at its defence in 1808
greatly distinguished himself. Ife served with the expedition to Egypt in 1807, including attack
on Alexandria and Rosetta, and the battle of E] Hamet, where he was taken prisoner.

He served in the Peninsula in “A” Troop, while his own, “‘ D,”’ was refitting in Lisbon after
its disastrous voyage from England, and was present, in 1810, at the operations between the rivers
Agueda and Duas Casas, at Almeida, at the affair on the Coa, the battle of Busaco, and the lines
of Torres Vedras. He joined his own troop when it took the field in 181], was with it at the
battle of Albuera, and the affair of Usaqre. At the affair of Aldea de Ponte (severely wounded),
With General Hill’s corps in Spanish Estremadura, at Ribera, and many other affairs. He served
in America in 1814. Major-General Dunn died in 1863.

2 There were eight divisions in the army known among the troops by the cant names as below :—-
Light Division—-The Division.

1st " The Gentlemen’s Sons.

2nd 0" » Observing Division.

3rd " 1 Fighting n

4th " » Supporting 1 After the affair in the
Pyrenees, they were called the Enthusi-
astics.

5th " 1 Pioneers.

6th n Marching Division.

7th H They tell us there is a 7th, but we have never
seen them.

66 Diary of a Cavalry Officer,” p. 133,

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SWABEY DIARY. 91

General Sontag, which has retired to Pena Macor, and both armies
seem tired of the campaign—the French having returned to Salamanca,
and Lord Wellington having taken up the position of Guarda, where
report says the army is likely to remain for the winter.—See Map II.

Ist October.—No pheasant shooting this day, but a hot ride to Pena
Macor to report the state of the troop to General Sontag, and arrange
the communication with him and the commissary. No corn in store
for the horses, this being the third day without it; our parties bring in
mua sian amcl laa, OM Me GORNS oto 6 5 oo a) Soon

2nd October.—Went shooting, and saw swarms of red-legged par-
tridges. Val de Lobo stands encompassed with hills on one side and
a high mountain on the other, and would be a fertile valley if that
epithet were in the Portuguese dictionary, or rather if labour were no
longer its parent. “Wolves, wild boars, and deer abound in these
mountains, but scarcely any one but the goat-herds, who feed their
flocks in the mountains, ever see them. Their way of feeding here is
rather singular: they burn the brush-wood in patches for a considerable
extent, when the herbage immediately springs up, and they wander in
this manner from place to place in their district in search of fresh
pastures. When the people saw us march into Val de Lobo they ex-
pected, judging from our retrogade movement, a visit from the French,
and fled to their fastnesses and dug holes for their treasure, for many
of these unfortunate wretches who have not bread to eat have still a
collection of money. They have begun to drop in with a mule ora
jackass, and are on excellent terms with us.

3rd October.—An order from General Sontag to reconnoitre a road
to Valverde and make a plan and general report of the country ; this is
an engineer’s task, but on the principle of “nothing venture nothing
have,” I volunteered the job, and Taylor accompanying me, we set out
_ in the hardest rain that ever poured, and were unable to make a single
observation as we went; we were thus situated eight hours, and after
dark, having a guide, got to Taletia, in a district hitherto little known.
Here I cried a halt, and the Juiz de Fora put us into a priest’s house,
where we received great attention. I had very cunningly, as I thought,
brought a change in my saddle-bags, but they were wet through, my
bed being on my mule, with my tarpaulin over it, fared better, so that
having cooked my supper I made a good night of it. The fare the
priest set before us was goats’ cheese and water-melon, neither of which
serve to fill the little gaps that hunger occasions. I had taken the
precaution to bring a camp-kettle and two days’ rations. I would have
given something for a glass of wine, but spirits, which are all we can get
now, I cannot bear. I had a firm friend, however, in my chocolate pot
and canteen, all of which the mule does me the favour of transporting. I
should not forget to mention the rapidity of the brooks which rise
suddenly with the wet and become formidable obstacles in a road; in
passing one of these we carelessly went over before our guide, who
took the opportunity de s’eloigner, and one of the men had to gallop
some distance before he could bring him back ; when he arrived at the
brook he was obliged to go up to his middle in water, and like a true

92: SWABEY DIARY.

Portuguese cried like a child, and it was not until I uncovered one
of my pistols that he would stir. As he shared our fare, he got into a
good humour at last and became very sociable, and out of compassion
I took him up behind me, which restored his temper entirely.

Our intelligent and hospitable priest let us into the whole secret of
the fertile valley of Valverde; these are the proper people to gain
information from, as they refer to the parish books, which may be
reckoned “a tell truth,” he said he would inform me as to the number
of inhabitants by those he confessed.

4th October.—Proceeded to Valverde, and from a tour undertaken
with the assistance of a friendly priest, together with the help of the
Duke of Richmond’s name! and a letter of Lord Wellington’s aide-de
camp, found materials for my report. Sutton was sent back in the
meantime to prepare dinner for us half way to Val de Lobo, we over-
took him by 8 o’clock, and made a famous repast with the aid of a
pumpkin, which is an excellent fellow in soup. We arrived at Val de
Lobo at § o’clock in the evening. wel KAN ig] See tle Ae

5th October.—I was employed all day in drawing my plan and
writing my report to the Quarter-Master-General of the division.

6th October.—Rode to Pena Macor with Captain Macdonald, and
found General Sontag ill and about to return to Lisbon. General
Baron Alten now takes the command. General Leith has the division
but is absent, it consists of two English? and two Portuguese regiments,
les Chasseurs Britaniques, Duke of Brunswiok’s Oels light infantry,
and two light battalions German Legion.

The plan of the road was made to and through Valverde with
the intention of ascertaining if artillery could assist our division in a
project of surprising some troops in the neighbourhood of Plasencia.
It was given up on account of the withdrawal of those troops, for
which I am sorry, as activity and opportunity are all I wish for at
present. My report, however, is forwarded to the Quarter-Master-
General for his information ; much good may it do him, but I should
have taken more pains and more time in the drawing part if I had
known it. REE PINS tole ky sie ae oh ea) Oe GCL

7th October.—Sent out to find a road from Val de Lobo to Pena
Macor without crossing the mountains, which are formidable to artil-
lery, in this object I met with success. I took my gun and “Clara”
with me, in hopes of meeting with a sort of grouse that General Sontag
had described to me, but did not succeed; the red-legged partridges are
numerous.

Sth October.—On duty and confined to Val de Lobo. Captain M.
very uuwell with flux. Men sickly. A little corn arrived very season-
ably to-day. ‘Two horses dead since our arrival here.’

1 Lieut.-General Charles Duke of Richmond.

2The 68th and 51st Regiments.

3 The mortality among horses in the Peninsula was great, Lord Wellington writing to Lord
Liverpool, May 28rd, 1811, thus refers to it. ‘‘It must be recollected, however, that the Peninsula
is the grave of horses; I have lost no less than twelve for my own riding since I have been here,
and many more of an ordinary kind.” Despatches, Vol. 7, p. 698,

SWABEY DIARY. 93

Cuavter III.

Change of Quarters. Life at Salgueiro. A Visit to “I” Troop,
the Light Division and “A” Troop.

9th October.—Captain Macdonald having gained permission to
change our quarters anywhere within the limit of the division, I was
sent out on a two days excursion to find a fit place for the purpose,
but was fortunate enough to find Salgueiro half a league! from Val de
Lobo well stocked with straw and hay, and in three villages that I
searched contiguous to that place there is sufficient of it for two
months consumption. I therefore returned the same day in time for
dinner.

10th October.—Employed myself in writing up my journal and set-
tling accounts, as well as arranging my writing-desk, an employment
of great importance.

11th October.—Captain Lefebure? and Assistant-Surgeon Ambrose®
came to visit us, and stayed dinner. A report is very prevalent to-day
that we shall all be employed in the Alemtejo, * though all operations
seem to be suspended for the present. We have great apprehensions
of sickness in this quarter.

12th October.—Rather troubled with a headache, which was not
decreased by idleness. I may however say that a conversation with a
French enigré who passed through was not disadvantageous to me,
many of these are employed in the commissariat department, and in
confidential situations ; this man had in charge the military chest.

N.B.—Apropos of Captain Lefebure, remember in coming into action,
when cayalry is likely to come up unperceived, not to let the limbers
of the guns turn or drive farther from the trail than to admit of the
guns being worked without the handspike.

13th October.—Being Sunday, part of the service was read at the
Park.

14th October.—Being on duty, commenced by reading the funeral
service over a driver, William Weeks, who died of dysentery after a
lingering illness. We are obliged to bury in the fields, for the Roman
Catholics do not permit heretics to mingle their dust with their own
more sacred remains. ‘The Portuguese method of interment is dis-
gusting, the corpse is buried without a coffin, and having stripped it of
its clothing, they then stamp on it in the most indecent manner that
can be imagined. Funerals are familiar objects in these climes; the

1A Portuguese league = 3°84 English miles.

? Captain George Lefebure (Kane’s List, No. 867) served in the campaign in Flanders in 1792-4.
In the Peninsula from 1810 to 1812, he was present at the battle of Albuera, affairs at Usagre,
Aldea de Ponte, Ribera, and many minor combats. He died on October 22nd, 1812, at Madrid.

3 Assistant-Surgeon James Ambrose (Kane’s List, No. 116) served with “D”’ Troop throughout
the warin the Peninsula. He was with it in the Waterloo campaign, and in the Army of Occupa-
tion in France. : ;

* Alemtejo or Alentejo (beyond the Tagus), the largest and most populous province in Portugal.

94 SWABEY DIARY.

villages are full of infection, which shews in the shape of typhus,
they call it maligna; their state of starvation and natural filth com-
bine in cherishing this disorder.

I have learnt since writing the above that the rich who can afford it
repose their ashes in sumptuous coffins. . ..... 2... ~~.

15th October.—Rode by Captain M.’s order to investigate a road, an
occupation I shall henceforth dignify by the appellation of “ fool
practice.” I lost my dinner in consequence of having the Commandant
as a companion, for he did not reflect that his state of health made his
appetite no fair one by which to weigh mine. It is here to be under-
stood that I do not grudge my time or labour when usefully employed,
but I do not conceive that buying goats and surveying cattle are at all
essential to what is called ascertaining a road. . .. .

_ 16th October.—I was engaged again in a party of “ fool practice,”
but knowing that bullock wains were much wanted, and that all the
attempts to procure them had hitherto failed, I volunteered the task
and returned two hours after dark with four well loaded with forage.
Of all the duties I have hitherto performed, this is perhaps the most
disagreeable. One cannot but sympathise with those who are obliged
to leave their farms, children, wives, &c. to join the commissariat train,
but such is the unavoidable state of affairs, and the army cannot
starve. ‘I'he pay of the drivers of these wains is more than they could
earn at home, and their provisions good, as they have the same rations
as the soldiers, which are likewise those of the officers, viz. : 1 lb. meat,
141b. bread, or more frequently 1 lb. biscuit, and 4 pint rum, or a
pint of wine, which with the labour a cavalry soldier has, is mwito
pouco. ‘To catch these drivers is not such an easy task as to feed them.
My plan was first of all to bribe the Juiz de Fora or magistrate and
compel him to come with me. I had two mounted men, no sword
or arms myself. I then went to the top of a high hill, made my ob-
servations where they were at plough, then crawled under cover of
the hedges, or more properly speaking of the brush-wood, to the spot,
and took them by surprise. In some instances I sent some men, hav-
ing four others in reserve, round by one route and went myself another,
keeping senhor Juiz, whose authority is indispensable, always at my
elbow. On seeing you the peasants immediately unyoke their oxen
and make for the mountains. I however had reconnoitred the roads
and had my videttes, so that many did not escape on this occasion. I
was at one time master of 20 beasts, but I let all the old men go, and
also those that the Juiz assured me were very poor and had families.
My difficulty now was to find wains, they all swore they had none, I
took them however to the village they belonged to, Mineresa, and after
much search and good usage they produced four, which were all I
detained ; they were soon quite reconciled and did not think it a great
hardship. The law excuses from these services such as have three sons
soldiers ; for this the Juiz is responsible; this gentleman knocked up
several times, but I went alone with him and kept him to it. My way
this day was perfumed with gum cistus, arbutus, laurestinus, and other
shrubs, and the mountainous scenery was highly picturesque, the cul-

SWABEY DIARY. 95

tivated spots are merely where these shrubs are burnt and cleared
away. A Portuguese witha grin of satisfaction pointed to where some
Frenchmen had been murdered by them.

A non-commissioned officer went on the same duty in which I was
employed and left a man in charge of a wain, who was foolish enough
to follow it by a road he did not know, and two countrymen with muskets
took it from him. I found no disposition in the people to use violence,
which they might have done repeatedly, as I always went to them alone
in the first instance and unarmed.

17th October.—On duty this day. Our duty days are not the event-
ful ones, as we are generally on those occasions confined to quarters
instead of pursuing forage, &c.

Letters received from “England, but my friends have I suppose long
before this forgotten me. Dyneley writes from Lisbon, and mentions
the death of Gunner Bartleman. The system which prevails in this
army of hurrying the sick to the rear without suitable means of trans-
port or medical attention is an evil that humanity should find a remedy
for. The 2nd Captain himself mentions that he fears his constitution
is unequal to the climate, and his surgeon presses this oping very
strongly. ;

18th Owiline Oe ain reromanes s " oop Stow ee mar nched
through Val de Lobo to-day for the Alemtejo, but made a halt instead,
and we had a merry meeting. Lost a horse of a division that came
from Castel Branco.

L9th October.—Got up ings deylignt to see STStbene of MonaraTe
to my advice, which was given from actual knowledge, he tr ied to march
to Pedrogiio by Meimoa, but failed on the hill between the latter and
Val de Lobo. Artillery on the route from Sabugal, or Guarda, should
march by Mineresa and make that their halting place, instead of Val
de Lobo, but to go to Castel Branco from this front, a route may be
given by Capinha, Atalaya, Alkains or Mineresa, Pedrogito. When on
the Pena Macor side of Sabugal, by Castaneros or St. Estavao. After
conducting Lefebure to Miner esa, | returned and started after an early
dinner to Salgueiro, but not arriving till after dark I lost my way, got
into the mountains, and my horse stopped just in time to save my life
on the edge of a precipice, on which a flat road terminated. I then
made for a light and found some mountaineers encamped round a fire,
but they were very cool and refused to act as guides till I got off and
loaded one of my pistols, when I found them reasonable and civil.

Wrote No. 5 to Henry and a letter to Y. Walcott. Beate

20th October.—The troop marched into Quinlai, I having previously
appointed the head-quarters of its cantonments within a quarter of a
mile at Salgueiro. very officer but myself were decently accom-
modated, but I am in a priest’s house of the lowest order, and he seems
disposed to honour me with too much company. ‘lhe old bull-dog in
Harding’s division died this day. The Quartermaster-Sergeant re-
turned from Castel Bom with a seasonable supply of the needful. Much
forage in this village, good stabling, but bad quarters.

21st October _—Removing quarters to Salguciro, where we have the

96 SWABEY DIARY.

casa of a Marquis to live in. It is comfortable, but too small for us
all; when I write comfortable I mean clean, for the panes are out of
the windows. The Mar quis and family inhabit part of the house, they
are obliged to keep their movables in concealment in the mountains, as
when they last fled some of their valuables were betrayed and shown to
the French, who availed themselves of the opportunity, and took away all
they could ‘get in the house, farm, etc. Our host’s situation I can easily
fancy to be romantic, but farther than its exciting comparison for fel-
low creatures who are not positive sufferers, it is not affecting, for there
is little in point of difference in situation to distinguish these nobles
from their servants, though these indeed could read and write their
own language. Beauty i in distress claims the tears of knight errantry,
but I believe in most novels that I have seen it was generally accom-
panied by cleanliness and education, and always by sensibility. ‘The
day was spent in getting in forage. Thad ea ae luck in discover-
ing it; horses are still without corn.

22nd October.—A. true commissariat tyranny was elle’ a our sf
to-day, which was the enforcing a requisition on the Juiz de Fora of
the neighbouring villages for all the Indian corn that could be found;
for this purpose a search is made and it is all seized... All I can say in
extenuation is, that it is better to supply their defenders even with the
necessaries of life they need themselves than to have their houses pulled
down and their lives endangered by the cruelty of their neighbours.
I pressed several. bullock wains this day. The horses had 10 Ibs. of
corn. We lost one mule and five horses since coming to this place.

gard October.—My employment with the troop from aa to sun-
set repeated this day ; most acceptable.

24th October.—September’s pay received this aan nO Holae ‘veined
The ‘‘ patron” honoured us with his society at dinner, and the ladies to
tea bedizened with rings, but otherwise eae dressed in woollen

habits. !

The first entry in the host containing tho Reminiscences is the
account of life at Salgueiro, it has no beginning, being pro-
bably carried on from a book that is lost. I have therefore
conjecturally supplied the first sentence which is given in
italics. That the writer did not intend these to be more than
an occasional record of his personal observatious and experi-
ences is evident from the following extract from one of the
MSS. referred to.—f.A.W.

“T do not'set up to write a continuous history of marches, bivouacs

or battles. I shall only use battles by way of occasional

subjects for commentary, or as illustrations of individual
adventures. ‘lo those who have served with light infantry
divisions or cavalry brigades, the fact of being shot at by the
enemy has a monotony about it from its frequency which
would not embellish my plan. I got through these matters
as well as I could, much the same as other people, and these
events have been so ably handled before my time by others

1 At this time in England ladies w ore ether silk or satin dresses, other materials were not con-
sidered suitable for gentlefolk.—F. A.J;

SWABEY DIARY. 97

who have moved in the higher walk of historical occupation,
that the only dread I have is that I may touch upon something
which has been written about before, for we have had within
the last 50 years military and naval history, aye, and biography
too without end.”’

During the winter of 1811, in Portugal, we inhabited part of a house
belonging to a Portuguese Marquess in the village of Salgqueiro. A large
room was occupied by some of us which served as a library, and there
was a lone book-case with heavy volumes on ecclesiastical subjects,
these we did not indeed read, but we turned them to good account by
pushing them suddenly back and crushing the rats which congregated
behind them, and seemed more familiar with the leaves than did Don
Juan, who with his mother, wife, sister and such a handsome niece,
seemed to think themselves honoured and happy at having us with
them ; our presence at least secured them from other intruders. These
simple people lived principally on Indian meal bread (better known
now in Hngland than it was formerly), chocolate manufactured at home,
haricot beans, Bacallao or salt fish, a plentiful supply of pears and
grapes suspended from the ceilings of the rooms, muscovado sugar,!
and an inexhaustible supply of olive oil and garlic, with an occa-
sional treat of a kid, some pork and chestnuts formed the culinary
stores and riches of this family ranking as considerable owners of rural
property. ‘They of course had their home-made wine and aquadiente, a
vile spirit coming nearer to spirits of wine than anything else to which
I can compare it. Butif I forget a good deal I have not forgotten the
bright eyes of Donna Maria, the fair niece which made an inroad into
more than one of our bosoms, nor how zealous was the dark beauty in
teaching the Portuguese language to those who would go to school to
her. In return we undertook to teach her English, which I cannot say
we did with that commendable fidelity which would have better become
us. I fear we rendered Portuguese of which we were asked the Hnglish,
into ail sorts of ridiculous expressions, causing the most ludicrous
dilemmas that can be imagined. I do not think this was justifiable,
but 1 have bound myself to speak the truth, and this was one of our
follies, yet on the whole our conduct was most gallant and decorous.

We had a frequent visitor, indeed for some time a daily one, in an
Irish priest, at least he was half Irish half Portuguese; there are many
remnants of Roman Catholic refugee Irish families both in Spain and
Portugal. This gentleman’s attention to us was very great, but we soon
remarked that the hour he could best spare from his more serious
avocations of performing mass, hearing confessions, etc., was the same
at which we dined, and as he became a bore, we changed the time, but
he with a surprising facility accommodated himself to this change fast
days and all. At length we told him with a very serious face that out
of respect to him as a Roman Catholic we had so far abstained from
the prayers which we usually said before dinner, but our consciences
would not allow us to omit this duty any longer, “vary vill” said
the Padre, and very piously down on his knees dropped he, while we
were engaged in a mummery which he as little understood as we prob-

1 Unrefined raw sugar.

98 SWABEY DIARY.

ably should have done the due performance of his most serious services.

Finding his Catholic piety was of too liberal a nature to despise our
Protestant observances, it was decided that the Doctor should be called
on to supply as large a dose of jalap as one being of mature age could
swallow with any chance of remaining in this world, and this was to be
infused into the Padre’s soupe and bouilli the next day.

I sat next the tureen and was intrusted with the precious draught,
and faithfully did I perform my duty, but by some mistake the mixture
was conveyed to the Commanding Officer! In vain did we watch our
ecclesiastical friend for those distortions which we had anticipated would
shortly seize his reverend countenance, calm and serene he replied over
and over again to offers to help him to renewed platesful, “of you
please,” and all was quiet. Not so with the Major, who though he bore
with heroic fortitude for many hours the tortures, for which he was
reserved, yet in the night (many of our men having died of the dy-
sentery) he called up the Doctor, who with a most hypocritical face felt
his pulse and mixed him up something as innocuous as Dr. Malpett’s
small doses of magnesia.

It was many years afterwards and when no longer under the com-
-mand of the Major, that 1 ventured to apprise him of the unfortunate
mistake, from the effects of which it took him several days to recover.

But I would not say the circumstance was not beneficial, for from
that hour he adopted a diet which perhaps saved him from many an
indisposition thereafter, for from henceforth he constrained himself to
forego all the luxuries of grapes and pears during his mortal stay at
Salgueiro.

But to return to the Padre, he was not allowed to come off scot-free,
indeed it became necessary to induce the Major! to believe that he was
afflicted by an epidemic that had attacked someone besides himself, and
who so properly as our reverend friend? Accordingly a dose still
stronger was prepared for his bodily solace, this time the work was
done most effectually, and no error in the dose reaching its right
destination occurred. In the sequel it was difficult to say who was most
punished, the poor priest by his wracking pains and great alarm, or the
rogue of a Doctor who was called on to administer antidotes every hour
through the live long mght, indeed at one time we were becoming
seriously alarmed.

Everything belonging to our host and indeed all his people, was
scrupulously protected by us, and though we did set his house on fire,
we most gallantly put it out. It has been long a military custom on
the night of the 23rd December, to sit up to boil plum puddings which
it is deemed amongst military cooks require at least twelve hours to
bring to perfection. In this our artistes were engaged when the
chimney took fire, “fogo em casa,” the cries of Donna Maria, the
wringing of hands and loud sobs of the other fair ones, and the
lamentations of Juan, his wife hanging on his despairing bosom,
“oh Juan!” were truly heart-rending, and no doubt had we not
been there the patrician residence would have been burned to the

The victim undoubtedly was Captain Macdonald, he was probably a Major when this was written.
—L AW,

SWABEY DIARY. 99

ground for not a Portuguese would have had the spirit to go within
smell of it, however, with our fellows about us we had not much difficulty
in getting it under. Even the pudding survived though at one time
threatened with calamity, and we had the blessings of the Priest as well
as the grateful smiles of our fair hostesses. One of these ladies I re-
member had some complaint which was consuming the rose (damask
rose) on her cheek, and during our stay the Doctor succeeded in
restoring its pristine bloom, but with true professional fidelity he never
told us the nature of the malady or the cure.

Not myself occupying the long library amongst the learned rats, I
slept at night in a small quarto just big enough to contain my camp
bed. It had a window, but time or tlie French had disabled many of
the glass panes, so in that land of nil, I soon made some glazed paper
to keep out the cold at the smallest possible expense of light, but much
did I rue my ingenuity, probably acquired from an erudite grower of
cucumbers in some Hneglish cottage garden, when I was requested to
stop all the broken panes in the spacious Quinta. Amongst these
simple people I believe I passed for a prodigy of human ingenuity just
caught from a manufacturing, machine-loving, scientific country.

25th October—Taylor set off to return to England, we lose in him a
good companion and an honest-hearted fellow, I hope he is cured of
rambling. Had he been here in an active time there would have been
hardship enough to make home acceptable, but as yet we have done
nothing.

Macdonald and Newland went off for a tour to the different canton-
ments. We received a report to day that the forage in a village where
we have a guard had been entirely consumed, but on my examining it
I found at least enough for a week’s consumption. Sergeant Johnson
who was away with a requisition for corn, locked his bullocks, wains
and drivers in an outhouse, where they pulled down a wall and made
their escape.

26th October—Rode off at daylight for Freixadas in a regular Port-
uguese wet day, which I have already described as being the summit of
luxury ; my road lay by Belmonte and Guarda, I arrived at my
destination at half-past 4 o’clock, having riden 11 leagues by din-
ner time, and those who travel in this country only know what such
a performance is. This is the first day that has been dedicated to
pleasure. I found Walcott at Freixadas. Major Downman! and Cup-
tain Bull’s Troop. Walcott? was so kind as to entertain me and give

1 Major Thomas Downman (Kane’s List, No 742) served under the Duke of York in Flanders in
1793-4, was present at Lamoy, Roubain, Mourveaux, and in the action near Tournay was wounded
and taken prisoner. He commanded B” Troop, R.H.A., in the Coruiia Campaign, present at
Sahagum and Benevente.

He commanded the H.A., in the Peninsula under the Duke of Wellington, from September 1810,
to May 1818. He was present at the battle of Fuentes de Honor, affair at Aldea de Ponte, siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo, battle of Salamanca, capture of the Forts of Salamanca, entry into Madrid, and
capture of the Retiro. He was at the siege of Burgos, and distinguished himself in covering the
retreat of the army from there. He received the gold cross, and one clasp, silver medal and three
Gespeand the K.C.B. Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Downman died when Commandant at Woolwich
in 1852.

22nd Captain Edmund Yeamans Walcott (Kane’s List, No. 1127), Adjutant R.H.A, served
in “C” Troop, R.H.A., in the Corufia Campaign. He was appointed Adjutant R.H.A., in England
in 1811. In the Waterloo Campaign, he was 2nd Captain of “F”’ Troop, and was especially

eee for his gallant con luct in the battle. Licut.-Colonel Walcott died on 28th February,

‘

100 SWABEY DIARY.

me what is termed a shake-down, viz., some blankets and hay, my ride
gave them as much attraction as a bed of down, and yet I found means
to lay awake and talk with Walcott for two hours after going to bed.
The road from Salgueiro to Belmonte lies across the mountains, and
the morning being very stormy, I for the first time had an opportunity
of admiring the wonders of nature in a mountainous country, parts at
times were covered by clouds, and others encircled by the rainbow, or
occasionally reflecting for a moment a ray from the sun, producing the
finest effect of light and shade that can be imagined. After passing
the Sierra the road descends to a vale which passes here for a well cul-
tivated one ; in this stand Caria and several smaller places which afford
much forage. It then passes over the Moncul, a small river that hke
many others is formed from the torrents that in the rainy season run
from the mountains and accumulate till they become a river. The road
afterwards ascends to Belmonte, a town defended by a castle and
standing on a high hill, one side of which is a nearly perpendicular
precipice. At the foot of this steep cliff a river runs through a vale,
which is seen for a great extent. Nature is extremely bountiful there,
and the pasturage is green and of an Huglish appearance. Belmonte
is ruined more than any town I have yet seen, few houses have roofs or
windows, on the road passing through there is a very antique ruin in
the form of a square tower. I can scarcely trust my architecture, or
should call it Moorish. The ascent and descent to Belmonte is so steep
that there is a paved road cut in a zigzag form, but impassable for heavy
artillery. ‘To do justice to the rest of the road to Guarda defies all the
romantic terms that are dedicated to description. It passes between
two nearly perpendicular mountains, which join at the bottom like a
trough with a stream running at their feet; the stream rushed from
stone to stone in a torrent in consequence of the heavy rain, and was
frequently beautified by falls from the mountains which passed through
trees and rocks sweeping everything before them. Mills are turned by
many of these temporary cascades produced by the incessani rain, the
most romantic bridges are thrown across in places. ‘I'he sides of the
mountains are covered with cork and chestnut trees projecting from
the ground in the wildest and most irregular manner; for when they
grow to a certain size their roots cannot penetrate far enough to give
them support, and they impend over the road in the most terrific man-
ner. Between them rocky precipices vary the scene, some of the
immense stones are so placed that the eye cannot account for their
support. The road itself is the first thing that has given me occasion
to relax in my opinion of Portuguese industry, great pains are taken to
preserve it from the waters that rush from the mountains. ‘The mills
are all overshot ones. It is remarkable that all landscape painters stick
them in their pictures. What I have often imagined an extravagance
of cloud and trees, I shall no longer question being copied from nature.
Guarda stands on the highest mountain in the neighbourhood, and

1 An overshot wheel is one the circumference of which is covered with cavities or buckets, and
which is turned by water which shoots over, or flows upon the top of it, filling the buckets and
acting by its weight only. The largest in the world is at Laxey in the Isle of Man, it is 72 fect,
6 inches in diameter, and developes about 150 horse-power, it works a system of pumps in a lead
mine, raising 250 gallons of water per minute to an elevation of 1200 fect.—F.4. IV,

SWABEY DIARY. 101

forms the centre of the famous position defending the approach into
Portugal from the Tagus to the the Douro. The city is large and
respectable, but a great part has been burnt down by the French. Of
the rest of the way to Freixadas I have only to say that it affords
excellent quarters for cavalry, having much hay and straw. Guarda is
occupied by the 5th division, Major-General Hay in command, and at
this place, which is rare in Portugal, almost everything is to be pur-
chased. There are some cloth mauufactories here and at Covilhio.

27th October—Hnjoyed myself much this day. Walcott mounted me
and we had great sport in riding over the stone walls; they consider
themselves so settled here that they have built in the windows, and
made stone chimneys for the purpose of fancying themselves in England
by dint of looking at a fire, which at best-is but smoky and only of
wood. Newland and Macdonald who are on an excursion, were of the
party at dinner. I should have gone back to Salgueiro to-day, but
Major Downman detained me on account of the weather.

28th October—Set out for Guarda where I had left Sutton with my
mare and taken to a mule; rained the whole way but my cloak and
pelisse saved my body. I was however very wet below, and when I got
to Guarda I went to dine with General Hay! and was obliged to sit all
the day in my wet things, my saddle-bags, in which I had a change,
being quite wet. I had this night neither bed or blanket, and was
obliged to lay my head on my wet saddle-bags, but still I slept soundly
and felt no inconvenience. sige Estee! Tis, ential Saectegs

29th October.—After breakfasting with the General, where I met
Moorhouse of the Guards, I returned to Salgueiro. The Moncul in
the two days since I passed it, had swollen nearly enough to be dan-
gerous, and was a good specimen of the means of defence in this
country at different times. I found Dyneley arrived from Lisbon, and
we received intelligence of the death of Gunner Lant at Abrantes. I
shall repeat no more my horror at the system of hurrying to the rear:
every case that requires hospital treatment. . . . . .

30th October.—We received intelligence that in consequence of the
wet, Corporal Batty who had gone some days before in charge of wains
for corn to Cavilhao, had been taken ill and left there. In passing a
rivulet one of the party only saved his life by good swimming. Corporal
Millar with the heavy howitzer, broke down a league short of Salgueiro,
and sent in for assistance, which I forwarded as soon as possible. I
fear they will remain out all night. Wrote to Walcott and G. Smyth.?

The arrival of this heavy howitzer is explained by the following
letter from Lord Wellington to Brigade-Major May, R.A., on
the 5th September, 1811 :—

“T had thought of attaching to each troop of Horse Artillery one
of the iron 5}-in. howitzers [weight 10 cwt.], instead of the
small brass howitzers they have now. Let me know your
opinion whether the carriages, &c. of these iron howitzers

1 Major-General Hay was killed in the sortie from Bayonne on the 14th April, 1814.
? Lieutenant George B. Smyth (Kane’s List, No. 1299), ‘A’? Troop, R.H.A.

102 SWABEY DIARY.

are so complete that the arrangement will answer. We would
contrive to give them another ammunition car to carry spheri-
cal case for this howitzer.” “ Wellington Despatches,” Vol.
WAOUL, jo. 259

31st October.—Foraging all day in the rain. The howitzer arrived
to-day, and Gunner Nettal, Driver Eld, and one sick horse from Castel
Branco. Sent Sutton to Guarda with a pack-saddle for Walcott.

Dyneley brought with him three black horses, Gunner Lowrey and
Driver Phillips, besides his own people from Lisbon. Frank Chambers!
bad with ague. Z THD Nae

1st November.—An idle day with much rain. Sutton returned late.

2nd November.—I was awakened at daylight by an unforseen order to
march to Mineresa, and contrived, having three days’ corn to draw from
the store, and to pack all the stores, &., to get the troop ready to
march by 11 o’clock. Just as Captain D. was giving the word to
march, our orderly, who was sent on to Mineresa, appeared with a
counter-order, but it came too late for me. I was particularly clever,
and sent my baggage on, the difficulty now was to get it back; how-
ever, the daily state going through the place to Pena Macor surprised
Sutton with the news, and he made his appearance just as I was think-
ing how I should make myself comfortable without a bed.

drd November.—Rain all day, Captain M. and Newland returned
from head-quarters. We heard to-day that two divisions were ordered
to the front to intercept a convoy of 8000 men who were endeavouring
to throw supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo from the Alemtejo. The news
is that a party of French has advanced by crossing the Tagus at
Alcantara to Caceres and levied contributions. General Hill? took his
measures so well that he surprised 1400, took 900 prisoners with the
treasure, and is in pursuit of the rest. ‘This was done with the loss of
six officers and 50 men killed and wounded. ‘The cavalry is in pursuit
of the remaining 500, who have taken to the mountains.

This was the surprise at Arroyo de Molinos. ‘‘ While Rodrigo
was being blockaded, General Hill co-operated with the
Spaniards in Hstremadura against Drouet, who at first joined
Girard, but after various movements returned to the Morena,
leaving his colleague at Caceres between the Tagus and the
Guadiano. Hull advancing from Alberquerque drove him from
this place on the 26th October, and hoping to cut him off from
the bridge of Merida moved by a cross road next day. On
the march he heard that Girard had halted at Arroyo de
Molinos leaving a rear-guard on the Caceres road, thus show-
ing he knew nothing of the cross road movement, and looked
only for pursuit from Caceres. By a forced march Hill
moved to within one league of Arroyo, and on the morn-

1 His groom.
2 Afterwards General Lord Hill. ‘‘ He was called by the men ‘Daddy, eat is his attention
to them, being much esteemed by all ranks.’”? “ Cavalry Officer’s Diary,” p. 108.

SWABEY DIARY. 103

ing (the 28th) attacked and surprised Dombrouski’s brigade
and Briche’s cavalry in the place. ‘T'he French force was dis-
persed, 1,300 prisoners, including General Bron and the
Prince d’Aremberg, all the artillery, baggage, commissariat,
and a contribution just raised were taken. Only Generals
Girard, Dombrouski and Briche with 600 men escaped and
rejoined Drouet. The loss of the allies was 70 men and one
officer taken prisoner.” ‘Napier,’ Vol. 4, p. 321, et seq.

This evening, the men with Captain M’s. baggage, received from
Colonel Wallace of the S8th Regiment, who was travelling with only
his servant, a French soldier with his arms, who gave himself up as a
deserter. We have him in custody, and are not satisfied as to his in-
tentions ; had his business been only to desert, he probably might have
given himself up further in advance. He is an Italian and speaks
Spanish, Portuguese, and French, his knapsack contained various
articles evidently plundered, being no part of a soldier’s necessaries.

4th November.—Excessive rain, and an approaching’ scarcity of
forage. The object of our intended march the other day was to have
inter reepted the supplies for Poe but dd were too alert, and threw
them into the place. :

5th November.—Little cone of remark this are

6th November.—Rode with Harding round the country and discovered
that my mare possessed the amiable “quality of jumping. .

7th November.—Doctor M. and the Captain went to a fair at Funda
where there was much jewellery, articles of wearing Tae corn,
cattle, and a few horses. Digi, ae ae ay ees

Sth November.—Sent Sutton forward to Sabugal with my mare and
bed, intending to start next day to Castel Bom, where I understood
the paymaster to be, to endeavour to get some money for the troop.

Ith November.—Got to Sabugal by 12 o’clock, 45 leagues, got on my
mare, and passing through Rendou, etc. made for Freneda, head-
quarters, as fast as possible to save the daylight; on the road is Villa
Mayor, a town standing on a sort of rock, from a cleft of which runs a
romantic stream under a bridge that you pass over. It has had walls
and gateways, and the ruins of an ancient castle give it an idea of
romance; the houses are dreadfully destroyed by the merciless invader.
I had not much time to spare in admiring its romantic appearance, and
passed on through Malharda de Surda, but in vain was my haste, the
darkness overtook me and no guide was to be procured. I was thus
blindly following the road only hoping that it might be right, when an
officer overtook me, and seeing I was an artillery officer, asked if I did
not want Colonel Framingham,! saying that I had passed his house at
Malharda de Surda. I was agreeably surprised with this intelligence,

1 Colonel H. Framingham (Kane’s List, No. 624) served in the Peninsula at the battles of
Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes de Honor, the sieges of Badajos, and the battle of Salamanca. He
commanded the R.A. on the two latter occasions, he received the K.C.B. and died a Major-
General on the 10th May, 1820,

104: SWABEY DIARY.

and got back just as May,! and Lindsay,? the Brigade-Major, and
Adjutant were sitting down to dinner, the Colonel being ill in bed. I
was glad soon after to get to bed in May’s room, where Sutton had
made the arrangements. The Colonel and party had been infamously
expelled from head-quarters to make room for whom? for anybody who
meureoyy Gowns) | (Clivrny cleeseayclec, GORI! 5 5 5 o ¢ 4 A 0 3 ©

10th November.—Breakfasting early, and after an audience with the
good old Colonel, I went to the paymaster, who informed me that money
had arrived, and if I could wait a day or two the troop accounts might
be settled. I easily made up my mind, and leaving the papers, rode
over to Ross’s troop at Puebla de Azava, three leagues? off, in Spain,
but through the uncommon ignorance of the people could not get
directed, every one telling me they did not know even the name of the
place. I have since suspected this was through fear of being taken as
guides. I therefore went to Alvagaria, where I found General Picton’s,
the third division, and from there got to Ross‘ in time for dinner ;
passed an exceedingly pleasant evening, played whist, had a billet to
myself, corn for my animals, and a man to take care of my horse,
CC ley ioe eleacen ice seu ie see | ee a one uk ele re Oe Ra ume ce

11th November.—Rode with my friend George Smyth to Guinaldo,
where the light division lay, they were fitting up a ruined chapel, and
Captain Bell, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, was painting scenes for the
representation of Henry IV. on Thursday week. At this place I formed
some idea of the Spanish superiority over the Portuguese; the towns

1 Captain John May (Kane’s List, No. 883) was employed afloat in bomb service from December
1797, to 10th April, 1801. He was present at the siege of Copenhagen in 1807. :

He began his Peninsular service in the Portuguese Artillery, but on 13th June, 1809, became
Brigade-Major, R.A., having exchanged with Captain Alexander Dickson; these distinguished
officers were firm friends, and their cordially co-operation throughout the war resulted in the suc-
cessful solution of many important artillery problems. Captain May, who became A.A.G., R.A.
in 1811, was present at every operation of importance from the battle of Talavera to that of
Toulouse, besides many mivor affairs. He was mentioned in despatches for the sieges of Ciudad
Rodrigo, Badajos, Burgos, and St. Sebastian. He was wounded when charging with the cavalry
the French rear-guard the morning after the battle of Salamanca, and again at the battle of
Vitoria.

Sir John May was A.A.G., R.A. in the campaign of 1815, he was present at Quartre Bras and
Waterloo. For his long and distinguished services he received the K.C.B., the K.C.H., the K.7.S.
of Portugal, the order of St. Anne of Russia, and the gold cross with three clasps. Major-General Sir
John May, who was a lineal descendant of Thomas May the historian «f the Commonwealth, died
in London in 1847. The maps he bad used during his campaigns were presented by Lady May to
the R.A. Institution in 1854, one, an original map of the country between the rivers Coa and
Agueda, is beautifully executed.

2 Lieutenant W. F. Lindsay (Kane’s List, No. 1185).

3A Spanish league = 2°63 English miles.

4Captain Hew Dalrymple Ross (Kane’s List, No. 890) commanded “A” (the Chestnut(
Troop (now “fA” Battery), R.H.A., from 1806 to 1825. He served with it in the Peninsula
attached to the “light division,” from June 1809 to the end of the war in 1814. He was present
at the battles of Busaco, Fuentes de Honor, Salamanca, Vitoria, Pyrences from 26th to 30th
July, 18138, near Bayonne; at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and forts of Salamanca ; at
the actions on the Coa, Pombal, Redinha, Cazal Nova, Fox. d’Aronce, Sabugal, Aldea de Ponte,
Castrajon, San Munos, San Milau; at the passage of the Bidarsoa, the Nivelle, and the Nive, he
was three times wounded during these campaigns, and was made a brevet Lieut.-Colonel and
K.C.B., he received the gold cross and two clasps, silver medal with three clasps, and the K.T.S.
of Portugal.

Sir Hew was with his troop et Waterloo, and he received the 2nd class of St. Anne of Russia on
that occasion. Je commanded the troops in the northern district from 1825 to 1840, he then be-
came D A.G., R.A., and later was Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance. He was made a
G.C.B. in 1855, and a Field-Marshal in 1867, and died as Governor of Chelsea Hospital in his
90th year in 1868.

SWABEY DIARY. 105

are better built, the habitable part being all on the ground floor, and
clean and neat, the kitchen utensils, etc. neatly arranged, and the
people more intelligent, better clothed, though in a manner grotesque
enough, with broad hats, large sack-cloth cloaks, sashes, and stockings
with immense clocks. ‘The women are of better complexion and make
than the Portuguese, and infinitely more cleanly, I think love may be
a Spanish passion but it cannot be a Portuguese one.

I saw here the position Lord Wellington occupied on the 25th of
last September, before he retired to Alfayates, and was sufficiently
convinced of its insecurity.

12th November.—I was much amused to-day by the herds of black
pigs that belong to the Spanish villages, the people take great care of
them, and generally kill them when about full grown, making hog
puddings; they are, however, so stingy that they will not indulge
themselves with the flesh, but sell it and hoard the money. The vil-
lagers consider the acorns, of which they take great care, upon which
the pigs fatten, their best property, they grow upon an oak, which
however does not resemble the Hnglish tree. . aS A aca Cae
18th November.—Bought a greyhound from a Spaniard, and A.
Macdonald! bought another. I sent Sutton this morning to Malharda
de Surda, the money not being yet ready. oe POR Ramen PR ioe ee
14th November.—I rode over with Captain Ross to Malharda de
Surda, had all my papers settled, and was to send for the money the
next day. There I heard a report that Bull’s troop had defeated the
French in the south. In our ride to-day Ciudad Rodrigo was pointed
out to me, it extends a great way, and at the distance from which I saw
it appears to have many grand edifices. It commands the valley of
ChOwAu Cdn mwa aan: hare 2 PM edronire ph arian,
15th November.—Amused myself greater part of the day in coursing,
killing one hare. I met to-day with a singular instance of Spanish
parsimony. Macdonald’s patron, who is barber and physician a la
Sangrado,* has the ague, and has suffered from it some time, and
knows that bark which he can procure at Guinaldo, within three miles,
will cure him, but though he allows health to be an indispensable part
in happiness, and he is very rich, still he will not buy his cure, because
(Hine) Cxqorssasts Alleromns Jo oy oe SA fs 6 Bo oo BA ny

° . ° e ° °

+ Lieutenant A. Macdonald (Kane’s List, No. 1174), ‘A’? Troop, R.H.A., served at the capture
of the Cape of Good Hope in 1806, and from thence proceeded with the expedition to Buenos
Ayres, where he was twice severely wounded and taken prisoner. (For an account of his very
gallant conduct on the 12th August 1806, see the diary of Captain Pococke, 71st Regiment, R.A.I.
** Proceedings,” No. 13, Vol. XIV., p. 510.

He served in the Peninsula from June 1809, to July 1814, and was present at the battles of
Busaco, Fuentes de Honor, Salamanca Vitoria, of the Pyrenees, and Toulouse ; at the siege of St.
Sebastian and the affairs of the Coa, Redinha, Pombal, Conderia, Foz d’Aronce, San M unos, Gave
d@’Oleron, and Aire.

At Waterloo as 2nd Captain of “H” Troop, he was severely wounded. Peninsular medal and 8
clasps, Waterloo medal and C.B., and order of St. Anne of Russia. Lieut.-General Macdonald
was brother to SirJohn Macdonald, Adjutant-General, and to Colonel Robert Macdonald, 1st Foot,
he died in May, 1856.

2Dr Sangrado was a purely imaginary character introduced by Le Sage in “Gil Blas” to illus-
trate the ignorance of doctors in his day. Sangrado’s treatment consisted in bleeding and
administering copious draughts of hot water to his patients. —F'.4.1,

106 SWABEY DIARY.

16th November.—Rode to Guinaldo and saw a rehearsal of the play
(Henry IV.), giving me a very fair expectation of being amused.

I7th November.—Intelligence came from the paymaster to say that
Lord Wellington would not allow a halfpenny to be issued to the troops,
but had appropriated the money to the payment of the muleteers and
others concerned in the transport of the provisions for the army.
These people are paid at the extravagant rate of a dollar per day for a
mule and a dollar per week for a man. When at the Commissary
General’s, I saw hundreds of these fellows standing in the streets and
gambling with their dollars all day long, this indeed is practised in the
streets of every Spanish village.

1Sth November.—After coursing unsuccessfully in the morning, I
went to dine with Captain Duffey of the 43rd, and went afterwards to
the play, where I was most highly gratified. Captain Kent of the 95th
in Hotspur was excellent, the rest of the performers exceedingly good,
and Falstaff received great effect from an officer of the 95th! This
division appears to have the start of the army, they have all sorts of
amusements in their cantonments, coursing, cricket, rackets, fives, etc.
I was invited to dine with Colonel McLeod, 48rd, but declined, I supped
with Colonel Bernard, 95th, and did not get back to Puebla de Azava
till daylight. I met Charles Heles® who, poor fellow, carries poverty
written in his countenance.

19th November.—Spent the morning in coursing and the evening as
usual. When I looked over my amusements this evening, I thought
with what little relish I entered into them, and how inferior they were
in my estimation to the delightful hours I used to pass about this time
last year, and experience has taught me how vain all other pleasures
are when weighed in the same scale.

20th November.—Ross’s troop received an order before daylight to
advance to Hl Boden. I had decided to set off home, but having to
go round by Malharda de Surda to withdraw my receipts from the
paymaster, since 1 could get no money, I got on my mule much earlier
than I had intended, Being rather in a hurry I rode fast, and when I
had got a league on my road got off my mule, when the provoking
brute set off at a full trot back to the village. There was no remedy
and I followed, in not a little passion, I could not catch him till he got
into the stable whence he came. Here was a subject for the misery of
human life! I did my business with the paymaster and got to Sabugal,
Sutton having already reached it by a shorter road. Dined with

1 Apropos of threatricals we have a good story. The late Sir William Cator, who was fond of acting,
and in spare time during the siege of Cadiz, and in the lines of Torres Vedras found many oppor-
tunities, used to relate that when he played Bob Acres in “ The Rivals,’”’ on one occasion at the
supper which took place after the performance, he proposed that they should all go out next
morning with Lord Wellington’s hounds,* in the threatrical costumes in which they were then
sitting. The suggestion was received with acclamation, and when carried into effect, his lordship,
who was out, was much amused and laughed heartily at the prank. ;

* The hounds, above referred to, were given to the officers of Gibraltar, and formed, with the
few they already had, the well-known Calpe hounds, which exist to this day. Since Cator’s day
many R.A. officers have managed them.—f.4.W.

2 Captain Eeles, Adjutant 95th, he was killed at Waterloo,

SWABEY DIARY. 107

Captain Baynes! and Pascoe? and slept in a miserable billet. Next
morning by Castel Novo to Salgueiro. At Sabugal had intelligence of
a troop of banditti formed by Portuguese deserters of all descriptions ;
their plan is murder and robbery which they practise in the mountains
about Meimoa; they had infamously murdered two woman the night
before by stoning them to death.

21st November.—On duty, a day worthy of no remark, except that
owing to some differences whilst I was away, Captain M. and the Doctor
had seceeded from the mess.

22nd November.—A. commissary this day joined us for the supply of
the troop.

23rd November.—Poor Frank Chambers still very ill, and I am under
the necessity of taking Taylor into my stable.

24th November.—Nothing out of the common way to-day. Blachley *
dined with us from Pero Vizeu.

1 Captain Henry Baynes (Kane's List, No. 1092) was at the battle of Talavera (wounded). He
was brigade-major, R.A., in the Waterloo campaign (wounded), and was made a K.H. Major
Baynes died 15th July, 1844.

2 Lieutenant John Pascoe (Kane’s List, No. 1415) served in the Peninsula and France from
August 1809 to February 1814. He was present at the battles of Salamanca, Vitoria, Nivelle,
Nive, passage of the Bidassoa, and other operations, sieges of Badajos, Fort of Salamanca, Burgos,
and St. Sebastian. Lieutenant-Colonel Pascoe died 23rd January, 1861.

3 Lieutenant Henry Blachley (Kane’s List, No. 1221), ‘1’? Troop, R.H.A., served in the
Peninsula from July 1809, to the end of the war in 1814, he was present at the siege and capture
of Badajos, affair of Castrajon, battle of Salamanca, capture of Madrid, siege of Burgos and retreat
from thence, affair of Osma, siege of St. Sebastian (both operations), passage of the Nivelle, actions
9th, 10th, 11th and 12th December, 1813, in front of Bayonne, passage of the Adosur, investment
of Bayonne, and repulse of the sortie, on which occasion he was wounded in the head by a musket
ball, the last artillery officer wounded in the war. He received the silver medal and five clasps.
Major-General H. Blachley died 13th August, 1868.

(To be continued).

109

THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA."

BY | v7 Same .
\

MAS OR “Hi SheM AY Reds VAR pala a

THosE who read Mr. Ropes’s “Campaign of Waterloo” will eagerly
take up another volume by the same author, and may yet do so with a
certain apprehensive curiosity. For, great as was the merit of the
former work, it is one thing to write a crisp narrative of the briefest
and most dramatic of great campaigns, and quite another to condense
into a concise story the weary records of a four years’ struggle. The
talent which could achieve a brilliant success in one task might easily
be found unequal to the other. We venture to think, however, that
this last effort of our author’s will fully answer the expectations which
the popularity of his other writings aroused. It is true we have
as yet but one of the promised three parts before us, and that in
it we are carried no further than the spring of 1862, but the same
judicial temper, the same faculty for weighing and examining evidence
impartially, the same lucidity of style, which distinguished his last
volume, are again present in this, and, while the old manner charms
us, the matter before us gives earnest of what is to follow. The
method of adding notes and discussion to each chapter of narrative,
which Chesney adopted in his “ Waterloo Lectures,” and which Mr.
Ropes has followed so successfully before, is again made use of, and the
book will therefore be of particular value to those who study military
history closely with a prospect, in some cases, of having their know-
ledge put to the test in a subsequent examination. But while soldiers
can follow attentively the strategy of the war, and will find Mr. Ropes
a valuable guide in doing so, to the casual reader these pages will by no
means prove too technical or wearisome, but will, on the contrary,
supply in a small compass a very clear and agreeable statement of the
salient features of a war of which far too little is known in this country.
Neither, because the bulk of the volume is not taken up with details,
let the professional student fancy that its history is too general, and
goes too little into minutix for his purposes. He need be under no
apprehensions on that score. For the truth is that the American war
affords only good ground for the study of strategy, and that but little
-of value as to tactics on the battle-field itself is to be derived from it.
The generals who distinguished themselves in that tremendous con-
test had, as a rule, a keen appreciation of what has been termed “the

1 The story of the Civil War. A concise account of the war in the United States of America
between 1861 and 1865, by John Codman Ropes. Part I. G.P. Putnam & Sons, New York and
London, 1894.

Bh Wl SBaHi5 15

110 THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

science of making war on the map.” Lee’s conceptions were often
profound, and McClellan, even when wrong, displayed that imaginative
grasp which aimed at great results, and would not be content with a
victory, when combinations, which might work a.downfall, were possi-
bie. But with comparatively raw levies and inexperienced subordinate
leaders, tactics often failed.to accomplish what strategy placed within
their reach. Seldom, we think» we might say never, was even a
carefully planned battle fought out as the supreme leader intended.
At the end Gettysburg. was finally lost through the impatience of
Pickett, and at the beginning Bull Run exhibited the uselessness of
successful strategy when the means of reaping its fruits cannot be
relied on. The zealous soldier need wade through no ponderous
volumes, therefore, to learn all that will be of practical help to him in
his career, nor need he stay to follow with strained attention the move-
ments of each brigade or battalion. He will learn sounder tactics from
the records of 1870, but he will acquire a deeper insight into the
broad principles of war if he follow the schemes of Lee and Grant.
And he may begin his studies by gaining a very clear conception of the
exact legal and political positions occupied by both parties in the pages
before us. Why the North and South quarrelled is a question, the
thorough investigation of which would need a whole volume to itself,
but Mr. Ropes has succeeded in touching on this subject with such
adroitness as to tell us just as much as we need to know in order to
understand the campaigns and no more. That the South made a
blunder in the manner in which they commenced hostilities there can
be no doubt. Far wiser would it have been had they allowed pro-
visions to be freely furnished to the little garrison of Fort Sumter.
Such an act of considerate forbearance would have gained them much
sympathy amongst their former friends, and many wayverers might
have been definitely drawn towards them by such generosity. The
patriotism of the North would not in that case have been aroused, as
if was eventually by the roar of the Confederate guns. Lincoln and
his administration in all probability would either have been attacked
for feebleness and indicision, or would have been condemned for some
ageressive action. As it was, the onus of civil war was made to rest
‘on Southern shoulders, and that too in an opening fight which had
little of chivalry about it. Then Lincoln affected to treat what was
really war as a mere insurrection. He commanded “ the persons com-
‘posing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to
their respective abodes within twenty days.” Such a view is almost
ludicrous in its contempt for the Southern pretentions. Jor the
seceding States claimed to be in fact independent nations, and they
asserted that they had as much right to leave the Union as Germany or
Italy has to quit the triple alliance of to-day. There was no doubt a
‘cunning policy at work in Lincoln’s mind, for to ask for troops to con-
quer and subdue communities which so lately had been States in the
Union could not but have had an unpleasant ring about it. But, what-
ever was his reason, his call was responded to with an unanimity and
heartiness which astonished the world. He thenceforth became the
leader of a great national movement, and was supported with the same

THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA, 111

zealand enthusiasm which a war against a foreign invader would have»

called forth.
Unfortunately his knowledge of military matters did not equal his

political sagacity, and Mr. Ropes nowhere displays the surprising grasp,

of strategy and military considerations for which he is remarkable than

in his criticism of the great Federal statesman’s administration of the:

war department. ‘The senior officers in the army of the Union were

no doubt in most cases too old for active service, and it was desirable:

to replace them by younger officers. But to place civilian volunteers far
up in the hierarchy of military command was a widely different thing.
Butler, who indeed had commanded the Massachusetts Militia, and

Banks, who had been Governor of Washineten and Speaker of the \

National House of Representatives—“ both men without any military.
training or experience whatever’”—were made Major-Generals of.
Volunteers. The case of Frémont was even worse. He had been
an unsuccessful competitor with Buchanan for the Presidency in 1856,
and he had gained some reputation as an explorer in the far North-
West, but this hardly qualified him to become a Major-General in the
regular army, still less to supersede the brave and capable Lyon in
Missouri. A national crisis is scarcely the time to satisfy embarrassing
claims or reward political services by the gift of appointments which,
involve such vast responsibilities as the commands of armies, and the
National cause undoubtedly suffered severely when duties, on the,
intelligent management of which everything depended, were entrusted
to inexperienced men. Neither Lincoln’s acumen or patriotism seem
to have been equal to the occasion here; possibly he may have been
imbued with something of that jealousy of military rank which then
tinged popular feeling in America, and has not always been unknown
over here, but more probably it was what Dr. Johnson would have
termed “sheer ignorance” of the military necessities of the situation
which led him astray.

The earlier portions of this volume are taken with the discussion
of questions such as these, where political, legal, and military considera-
tions have each important bearings on the issues, and concerning them
Mr. Ropes speaks with the knowledge and ability of a professional
expert. But he shows a remarkable appreciation of strategical pro-
blems later on, and justly gives prominence to them in his analysis.
For in truth, as we have said already, with officers and troops more or
less new to their work, tactics were usually indifferent and but few
fields were won by their skilful application. Nowhere is this better
illustrated than in the first battle of Bull Run. The Federal strategy
was good, and only failed to gain the end it aimed at because the
mechanism which it directed was not in proper gear. On the other
side a true conception of the situation underlay the schemes of the
Southern Generals, but they never were even put to the test because
of the miscarriage of an order. ‘The intentions of neither side were
therefore really carried out, while the Federals, who had all but effected
their purpose in the beginning, were defeated in the end. By the way,
we have never seen an unpleasant admission more cleverly veiled in
honeyed periphrasis than the tale of their retreat is here. “In spite

112. THE STORY OF THE CIVIL. WAR IN AMERICA.

Be Waerea unos oF WreDowele . - > ¢ 6 6 go © & 5 oc

in spite of the efforts of the gallant volunteer officers . . ... .
the great mass of the men quietly but definitely broke ranks and started
on their homeward way.”

A passage as to the indifference of the Anglo Saxon race to
military art and training is well worthy of attention in this country,
where we certainly, at anyrate until quite recently, seemed to show
much the same apathy as was once noticeable amongst our cousins
across the Atlantic. “It was not easy for men in Washington in
the winter of 1861 to believe that a hundred thousand men, of their
own race, with arms in their hands, animated by a genuine and exalted
patriotism, could not without further delay be led to victory by a brave
and energetic general . . . The difference between an army and
a congeries of volunteer regiments was not appreciated.” When a
civilian man of business can write thus the chances are that the differ-
ence has at length been learnt in America, but it needed such battles
as that of the first Bull Run to drive the lesson home. We trust the
story of what occurred thirty years ago may be sufficient, without
practical illustration, to convince the general public over here. Mean-
while we have little doubt that officers will both enjoy and profit by a
study of pages, of which space forbids us more than this inadequate
notice, nor need they be guilty of ingratitude if they do so with a sense
of favours to come. Members of our Institution at any rate will regard
them with particular interest, remembering that last summer the Com-
mittee elected their author an honorary member, both on account of
what he had already accomplished in the field of military history, and
because of an innate love of our profession which gives promise of still
greater achievements in the future.

113

ID) ab ay, dgh) NE
LIEUTENANT W. SWABEY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA.

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATES, late R.H.A.

(Continued from p. 107, No. 2, Vol. XXTI1.).

Cuapter LY.

Alarms. Difficulties as to forage. March to the front. Siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo. Return to cantonments.

26th November.—We were surprised early this morning by an order
and route to march immediately to Sabugal, next day to Aldea de Ponte ;
through Bombardier Yates mistaking his road it did not arrive till 8
o'clock. We were in harness by 12 o’clock, our road was unluckily
through St. Hstavaio, between which place and Val de Lobo the stony
hills are next to impassable, and with all our efforts we could not get
up them till 12 o’clock at night, though the distance is not in all
12 miles. It was a fine frosty moonlight night and our work kept us
warm, but we were under the absolute necessity of halting and bivouack-
ing under the trees. I got part of the troop into a church, and then
walked into the best house I could find, but my baggage was gone to
Sabugal and I slept all night in my cloak, nor had we anything to eat
since breakfast ae eee FS Oe Osi eas Dole tee a. 28

2/th November.—This morning, without much trouble at the toilet,
set at it again, the hills worse than before. Several guns were obliged
to be run up by hand as the horses would not face the hills. I was
left to bring up the rear, which I succeeded in getting into Sabugal at
7 o'clock a.m., and was excessively glad to get something to eat with
Baynes.

I was again left with the rear and got to Soita at about 9 o’clock,
having walked most of the distance, and repeatedly put my shoulder to
the wheel. We left the two store carts and the curricle cart at Sabugal,
as Captain Macdonald thought the horses would not be able to get on.
I had a miserable billet this night without a door, we put up a board
which the wind blew down in the middle of the night, and to my
considerable amusement alarmed the Doctor. We ought to, and had
the Captain been persevering, might have been at Aldea de Ponte
thisenioh ty. a oy Lic mare Ware oc gyltaceht Gy Noite Th Pe hse Sc

28th November.—Marched at day-break in a hard frost for Aldea de
Ponte. Captain M. dispatchod me to Guinaldo, head-quarters, and

3. VOL. XXII.

Ll4 SWABEY DIARY.

four leagues further than Aldea de Ponte, with a letter to Framing-
ham. Though I volunteered for the employment I set out very sulky,
because I knew it was useless and informal, as indeed it turned out to
be, O Tempora O mores ! that men will leave their heads in England. I
got back to Aldea de Ponte to dinner with Major Downman. At 9
o’clock a route came for our return to Salgueiro. It appears that
Marmont! indicated intentions of sending provisions under a formid-
able escort to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Lord Wellington had formed an
arrangement to surprise them, but they having intelligence of our
movements gave up the design for the present ABE
29th November.—Marched early and got in good time to Sabugal,
dined with Baynes. Our horses appear to freshen on their work. Met
Captain Wodehouse, of the 50th, to-day going home on his getting his
company. I could not help drawing a comparison between us, he went
to Marlow the same Board day as I did, and I was earlier in the army.?
30th November.—To-day determined to avoid the descent of those hills
that were so terrible tocome up. We made a long march to Salgueiro
by Meimoa and arrived fresh and in good time. Major Downman,
James Macleod,* and Wodehouse were with us, which turned me out
olgmy ibe iran irr. G ante ah ctem urna Aue el OR (UG: lita i aie oe
1st December.—Blachley dined with our party to-day from Pero
Vizeu. I felt chilly and unwell all the evening until when I had been
petioctly wwiellie th cy Rammer GME ser oe Lah ee une ea Bren Uomert eee
2nd December.—Was so ill with a fever that I did not get up till
very late, and was under the charge of Doctor Macdonald.
drd December.—Being a little better this day got up to dinner, but
was under the necessity of making an early retreat to my bed, where I
could not sleep, and when I did close my eyes, started in the most
alarming manner with some wild dream, generally trying to urge the
horses up the hills, and after waking could not tell what I was at for
many minutes. er eet a Sees otc Gas: UeShiery lietargs
4th December.—Violent fever to-day with the most excruciating pain
in my eyes, the Doctor thought it necessary now to be in earnest with
me, and gave me powerful soporifics, but I had again no sleep, the same
ineAvOeE) CLASHING YS NEON. 5 95 6 6 0 6 6 0 6 6 4 6 A 6 5
5th December.—Somewhat better to-day, but on getting up to dinner
WES) Olokigeal WO BOWO loeclasein 5 >. o 0 o « 6 0 8 & 6 4 0
6th December.—My fever turned into an intermittent one and assailed
me violently again to-day, my eyes were so bad that I could not bear
the slightest ghmpse of light. I passed a restless night, too ill to
think, but when the pain in my head abated I could not help sending a
longing thought to Hngland BY, US AE bbe NDS ME Rd
7th December.—This morning I found myself considerably better
pach @ornimmmnes SO ell Gay os ¢ -o Oo 6) oo wou 0) 0 0 oF
Sth December.—Continued better and was up great part of the day.

1 Duke of Ragusa, after the battle of Wagram in 1809, Marmont received his baton as Marshal.
2 Lieutenant Swabey was promoted 2nd Captain on 24th March, 1826,
3 Lieutenant James A, Macleod (Kane’s List, No, 1210), R,A.

SWABEY DIARY. 115

Ith December.—Got up to breakfast much mended, but still shaken.
I believe, however, I have cheated the eagles this time. Wrote to
Edwardes! and George Smyth. Mr. Crawley, our new Commissary,
at our request joined the Mess, viz.: Captain Dyneley, Lieutenants
Harding, Newland and Swabey. Dyneley rode over to Pero Vizeu to
Major Downman to-day to settle some diiferences with Captain
Macdonald respecting duty. The latter now employs us thus: all
subaltern officers at stables from the hours of 6 till half-past 8 o’clock,
from 10 till 1, and from 8 till 4, the officer on duty to walk a mile to
visit the Park guard. Such orders are useless and oppressive, and
coming from an officer who does little himself, and is not over well
acquainted with his duty, are scarcely tolerable. Major Downman saw
them in this light.

10th December.—This day our patron dined with us. I was up all
day, and much better, but take a quantity of bark.

L1th December.—Went out to shoot, and killed a partridge, a quail,
anda snipe. Rumour of Blake’s being defeated, and, as usual, being
ignorant of the real state of affairs and the necessity of watching the

_Tagus, he blames General Hill for not marching to his assistance.
12th December.—Shooting again, killed a couple of woodcocks. We
are now put to our wits end about forage, and the villages being all
exhausted, we have to look for it in the mountains, where it is so well
concealed that it requires much labour to find it, and is a very precari-
ous supply. Blachley dined.

13th December.—General Blake’s defeat confirmed. The national
enmity of the Portuguese to the Spaniards is so great that when we
told the disastrous account to our host and family, they were literally
ignorant and malicious enough to rejoice. I really begin to think a
knave more desirable in the world than a fool.

This was at the battle of Saguntum, fought on the 25th October,
1811, between the Spanish General Blake and Marshal Suchet.
The object was the possession of the city of Valencia on the
eastern coast of Spain, as that city could not be invested until
the town of Saguntum was taken and the Spanish army de-
feated. Blake, though superior in numbers and the attacking
party, was defeated by the French, with the logs of 1()00 men
killed and wounded, two generals, 5000 prisoners, and twelve
guns taken. Saguntum surrendered the same night. See
Napier, Vol. 4, page 287.

14th December.—Shooting again. Killed a rabbit and had the
Satisfaction to find my new dog excellent. James Macleod dined

15th December.—Letters from England, but I am still left with-
out those consoling little papers. I could not help wishing my
friends to take a trip a little while to some foreign land, that they might
learn to sympathize in the want of them ME 6) Sas | aS ee

L6th December.—Poor Frank Chambers so much beat he was
quite dispirited, and told me he feared he should die, he is truly very

1 Lieutenant D. J. Edwardes (Kane’s List, No. 1297), “«F” Troop, R.H.A.

116 SWABEY DIARY.

ill, but I could not help thinking how strikingly the difference between
men’s dispositions is illustrated in this situation ; despondence and
weakness are in him poor fellow almost as prejudicial as illness

17th December.—Shooting again, and killed another woodcock.
Blachley dined. 5

18th December.—Blachley Femefned <ftth us sell ane, and “gmesed
himself with my good shooting! . -

19th December.—W rote Henry (No. 8). ee of lee date avnived
from England. Reports of an intended change in the administration.
I cannot help here remarking how soon the interest people take in
politics is lost when they lose the means of ee ae informed of the
turns they take

20th December.—I found hie! thy 6 as vel as many af Tate! So little
worthy of being remembered, that I begin to think of curtailing my
plan of journal altogether, and am the more tempted to do so from the
habits that necessity imposes on us; for the weather is so cold and
there are so few whole panes in the windows, that writing or reading
become out of the question, and we have no fires to make sitting still
tolerable, so are obliged after dinner to go to bed eg

21st December.—Went out woodcock shooting, some of the party
were successful, but I suppose my shooting days are over, for I could
not touch a feather. I now shoot only for exercise, as an amusement
it has lost all its charms since last year

22nd December.—Sunday.

23rd December.—Great preparations making for the entertainment
of Captain Bull, etc. on Xmas Day. 5

24th December.—Xmas Hve. Nothing to amaneash ‘thie “ss iv om
the common run.

Xmas Day.—KKilled three snipe. Captain Bull did not come over,
the rest of the party dined and slept with us. I cannot say I
enjoyed my Christmas dinner, nor are these parties at all suited to my
taste. This is only the second time in my life that I have been absent
from our family party on this day, last han I felt more satisfaction in
being so than I do this.

26th December.—W ent with Sianthowe, 5 ake. 46 hog Tver lhe, game
in the country ; very little sport. They dined with us and our evening
went off with as lttle pleasure as before = tacit orgs

27th December.—Our visitors left us for Pero Nabe Letters from
head-quarters speak of Lord Wellington’s intention of besieging
Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather does not promise to make it a very
agreeable business, the snow on the top of the Hstrella is a forerunner
of a cold season.

The Engineers have orders to prepare gabions and fascines, etc.,
this looks like earnest; but if Lord W. means it for a feint, to
make the deception answer, preparations must be carried on, and he
must be the only man in the army undeceived. The French it is

1 Lieutenant Philip Stanhope (Kane’s List, No, 1159), “1” Troop, R.H.A.

SWABEY DIARY. 1

now evident cannot support their armies on the frontier of Portugal,
nor do I think our means of transport for provisions will enable us to
advance, and to live on the country would be more difficult to us
than to the French, for the Spaniards will not advance an inch of
supply without payment in specie.

28th December.—Harding and Captain Macdonald went to Pena
Macor to pay their respects to General Alten, he has not yet done him-
self the honour of requesting this homage from me.

2Ith December.—Captain Bull and Blachley came over and I was
persuaded to ride to Pero Vizeu with them, being rather late, Dr.
Wooldridge ! who was of the party, and I, not being able to ride so fast
as the others on account of the bad condition of our horses, were left
behind. I had never travelled this road before, and he, like many
others, had gone over it with his eyes shut. In this predicament
darkness overtook us, and after certain perambulations on the moun-
tains we came to a village. Not a soul nor an inhabited house could
we find for some time, till at last I dismounted with my gun in my
hand and discovered a light. On entering the casa two men were
sitting there who, as usual, declared that they did not know their way
to Pero Vizeu, though I was sure we were within at least three miles of
it. As Ihave had to do with these gents before, I asked no further
questions, but turned the youngest out by the collar and obliged him
to go with us, though he declared all the time he did not know
the way; he contrived however to take us by a short road, and having
been obliged to use him rather roughly, I dismissed him before we
got to our destination with some vintens,” which put him in a good
humour. Church bells and guns firing were commenced from the
town to tell us where we were, for it is very easy in these mountains to
wander all night close to the place you wish to get into without find-
ding exactly where it is. We were late for dinner of course, but glad
enough to getanyatall . . .. .

30th December.—A bad shooting day with Ramsay*® and Stanhope.

1 Assistant Surgeon John Wooldridge (Kane’s List, No. 145).
2 A small Portuguese coin worth 1,44.—F.4.W.

32nd Captain William Norman Ramsay (Kane’s List, No. 1019) served throughout the cam:
paigns in Holland, 1793-4, and Egypt, 1800-1.

In 1809, he accompanied ‘‘ I” Troop to the Peninsula, and served with much distinction in the
campaigns of 1811, 12 and 13, being on various occasions in command during the absence of
Captain Bull owing to wounds.

On the morning of the battle of Fuente de Honor, when on picket with two guns, he was cut off
by a rapid advance of the French cavalry, but in a very dashing and brilliant manner galloped
through them and escaped. For many years it has been believed that this exploit was performed
by the whole troop, but the contemporary evidence of Lieutenant Ingleby, R.A., who was present
at the battle (see his diary, p. 247, R.A.I. “Proceedings,” May 1893), and the “ Diary of a
Cavalry Officer,”” p. 100, as well as an account of the affair given in R.A.I. “ Proceedings,”
Vol. XIX., No. 12, clearly prove but two guns were concerned. It may also be noted that
the French General Marbot, who was a cavalry officer, and in his memoirs gives a long and
very detailed account of the battle, makes no mention of the affair, which is improbable had
the French cayalry but for the moment cut off a whole troop of Horse Artillery. The mistake
probably has arisen from Colonel Napier’s version of the affair. Vol. III., p. 513.

The day after the battle of Vitoria, Ramsay had the misfortune to incur the displeasure of Lord
Wellington (particulars hereafter). He served subsequently with distinction at Nivelle, Nive, be-
fore St. Jean de Luz, and the operations near Bayonne.

Major Ramsay when in command of ‘“‘H” Troop met a soldier’s death at Waterloo, univer-
sally regretted. —F'.4.W.

118 SWABEY DIARY.

Pero Vizeu stands under a precipice near the summit of a perpendicu-
lar mountain, and is little calculated to contain cavalry, at least not
more than two troops of dragoons should be quartered there: forage is
to be had, but at a considerable distance . . .. .

31st December.—An equally bad party with the gun.

Ist January, 1812,—Was again employed as yesterday, my dog
“Rough” has had so much to do lately in this way, that to-day he
fairly gave in, and I was obliged to carry him home at least two miles,
when so tired that my own weight would have been quite sufficient.
All our troop dined with Bull to-day. Colonel Hlley,1 Deputy-Adjutant-
General of the Ist division of cavalry was of the party ; he is a highly °
entertaining and intelligent character. A letter I saw from an English
officer at Cadiz spoke highly of the deserved reputation of the Spanish
General Ballesteros, and of his two late well-earned pieces of success.
The weakness of the Cortes and its bad and inefficient administration
has been lately conspicuous in their House of Assembly. It was sur-
rounded by a mob demanding the head of an unpopular member. He
was saved with great difficulty by some of the more popular ones
engaging to bring him to trial. One member, a priest, hearing his
own name mentioned by the populace fainted with fear, so much has
superstition and an oppressive government weakened the minds of men.
Ballesteros supports his army and plans his operations entirely inde-
pendently of the Cortes. As he is said to have influence and power
enough, it is much to be wished that he would establish a new govern-
ment on a better basis, or at least improve it by diminishing the numbers
of the Executive.

“Tn the autumn of 1811, General Ballesteros, by adopting a sys-
tem of warfare similar to that of the Guerrillas, manceuvred in
the south of Andalusia with much success against various
French detachments ; supported by Gibraltar and the strong
country of the Ronda, the inhabitants of which were ever in
arms. He appeared so formidable, that Soult deemed it neces-
sary to send a division of 8,000 or 10,000 men against him.
Ballesteros long avoided a general action by rapid marches ; at
last on the 14th October, being driven to the very extremity of
the Peninsula, he took refuge, and found security and support
under the guns of the British fortress To support his opera-
tions a detachment of British and Spanish troops were sent
to occupy Tarifa. Godinot at once turned his attention to
dislodging the invaders, but failed and retired, Ballesteros in
his turn became the assailant and gained considerable advan-

1 Colonel John Elley: this distinguished officer entered the army as a private soldier and rose by
his own merit. He served in the Corufia campaign and was present at the actions of Sahagun
and Benevente. He afterwards served under Lord Wellington in Spain, and was employed on
the staff from 1807 to 1819, when he returned to and commanded his old regiment the Horse
Guards. He commanded the rear-guard of cavalry at Talavera, was present at the battles of
Fuentes de Honor, Salamanca (wounded), Vitoria, Orthes and Toulouse.

At the battle of Waterloo he was severely wounded. For his services he was made a K.C.B.,
K.C.H., K.M.T., and received the gold cross and three clasps. He was Colonel-in-Chief of the
17th Lancers ; he represented Windsor in Parliament in Sir Robert Peel’s government. Lieut.-
General Sir John Elley died 23rd January, 1839; leaving large bequests to charities ; also money
to provide plate for the 7th Hussars and 17th Lancers.

SWABEY DIARY. 119

tages over Godinot in his retreat. The French however had
no idea of leaving Tarifa in possession of the allies, accord-
ingly General Laval with 10,000 men invested it on 20th
December, and assaulted it on the 31st, but failed. Colonel
Skerrett made such skilful arrangement by forming interior
retrenchments, that the French fearing a second repulse
retired on the night of the 4th of January, 1812.” “ War in
Spain and Portugal.” J.T. Jones, p. 192.

The English and Spaniards at Tarifa, commanded by a Spanish
officer, are justly condemned for not sufficiently assisting Ballesteros. I
cannot help wishing that we invariably refused to commit our troops
to the orders of Spaniards,! but I suppose it is necessary to humour them,
notwithstanding we suffered at Barossa by this system.

The failure of the Spanish General to support his ally at the battle
of Barrosa is referred to, it was thus :

“Tn the spring of 1811, it was resolved to make an offensive move-
ment to destroy the French works in front of the island of
Leon at Cadiz. With this object a force of 12,000 Spanish,
and 5000 English troops under General La Pina, General
Graham consenting to act under his orders, was formed at
Tarifa. From whence they marched along the coast on the
flank of the French to join the remainder of the garrison of
Cadiz that was to cross by a bridge thrown across the San
Pedro river, which separated the island of Leon from the
main land. On the 4th of March the combined force from
Tarifa reached Vejer, where it was planned that the Spaniards
leading should march on Conil, and the Hnglish following
should there unite with them at night and attack the French
nextday. On the march, General Graham, in compliance with
an order from La Pina, while moving from the heights of
Barossa to those of Bermesa to join his ally, discovered on his
right flank a French corps of about 8000 men under Marshal
Victor. Aware that if he continued his march the enemy
might attack him to the greatest advantage, General Graham
decided to become the assailant, and after a most severe action
of one and-a-half hours defeated the French with the loss of
3000 men, six gunsand aneagle. Although within three miles
and in sight of the battle, La Pina made no attempt to assist
his ally, and in consequence, General Graham, feeling he could
have no confidence in acting under a superior who had ex-
posed the British division to the hazard of destruction, with-
drew from his command, and retired with his force into the
island of Leon, and each army resumed its former attitude.”
(See “ War in Spain and Portugal.” J. T. Jones, p. 181,
et seq.

1<*To induce the Spaniards heartily to co-operate with the British and Portuguese, Lord
Wellington, in 1811, proposed that whenever the troops of the three nations should act together,
ee etter haying superior rank should command.” “War in Spain and Portugal,” J.T. Jones,
p. 163.

120 SWABEY DIARY.

Colonel Hlley, as well as the newspapers, might be unacquainted with
one of Bonaparte’s artifices not at all uncongenial to the French system
of warfare in Spain and this country.

Certain districts are given up from whence King Joseph supplies his
finances, these are of course where the army has the means of enforcing
the collection of his revenue, which is generally levied in corn and other
articles of subsistence for troops. The unfortunate Spaniards are then
obliged to re-purchase their own produce as means of support, when
they have done so, Marmont again seizes on their property as a supply
for his troops. This ruinous and perfidious conduct needs no comment.

2nd January.—This morning the mountains and valleys were covered
with snow which continued to fall most plentifully. I had to go back
however to Salgueiro not in a very good humour. I got there well
drenched at 5 o’clock, being unable to ride out of a walk, which indeed
was very fortunate in one respect, for my unfortunate mare was so ill
that she could go no faster. During my absence Brigadier-General
Borthwick, our new commandant, had passed a night at our quarter on
his way to the front. As an instance showing how highly such appen-
dages are estimated: When he landed at Lisbon he wrote to Lord
Wellington to announce his arrival, but Lord W. I suppose thought it
too much condescension to answer his letter, for the post seldom mis-
carries in this country.

Our Brigadier-General had insolence enough to turn my horses out
of the stable to make room for his cattle, an unnecessary proof of his
superior rank, which had I been at home would not have gone un-
remarked 5 Sy slit eas WES dink Ais eon fe

3rd January.—A miserable snowy day, too cold to sit still and
too wet to go out, the last alternative I found the best. A mail from
England bringing me no letters . . . .

4th January.—What is called the wet season regularly set in with a
vengeance, our horses up to their knees nearly in the water, little to eat
and much less inclined. ‘Twenty new ones joined from Coimbra. One
stable fell in altogether, fortunately no damage done. The men had a
fine opportunity of learning to swim in their quarters to-day. Last
night we had a pretty specimen of Portuguese presence of mind, the
house was on fire and nothing but wringing of hands and cries of jfogo
em casa were exercised to prevent its being destroyed ; fortunately our
cook and servants were in the way and we stopped its progress without
much damage being done ... . SV olen- -opllaers

5th Janwary.—Another terribly wet day. Major Downman and
Macleod came over on their way to head-quarters. Colonel Framing-
ham and Pascoe arrived unexpectedly on their way to the Alemtejo,
likewise Colonel Elley, Ramsay, and Stanhope on a shooting excursion,
so that where we used to sleep two and three in a room, now we are six,
there being no other accommodation in the town. I took refuge in the
commissary’s quarters; it rained much in the night, and the roof only
being tiled I was awakened and found the water dropping on my bed.
A tarpaulin spread over all soon sent me to sleep again . . ...

SWABEY DIARY. 121

6th January.—Colonel Framingham, etc. still with us. I being on
duty had little to do with the cock shooting.

On this night, having previously reconnoitred and invested Ciudad
Rodrigo, Lord W. caused a fort 400 yards from the place to be stormed
by two companies of the 95th, two of the 43rd, and two of the 52nd,
by whom it was carried in a most gallant manner, and with little loss,
not more than 150 killed and wounded. Things seem now to wear a
fighting aspect.

This was the redoubt of Francisco, it was stormed by Lieut.-
Colonel Colborne! with two companies of each of the British
regiments forming the light division. “This he did with such
fury, that the assailants appeared to be at one and the same
time, in the ditch, mounting the parapet, fighting on top of
the parapet, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, where the
explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate open.
Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remain-
der, about 40 in number, were made prisoners. The post was
thus taken with the loss of 24 officers and men.” Napier,
Vol. IV., pp. 377-8.

7th Janwory.—An order arrived permitting the removal of the troop
to better foraging quarters, the selection being left to ourselves

Sth Janwary.—Set off with the commissary to range the Sierra
d’ Estrella in pursuit of a suitable foraging district. The first adven-
ture was the mule that Sutton rode giving him the slip and escaping
entirely from us, which occasioned our being so late that we only got to
Belmonte, a place I have seen before. Our billet was at a priest’s and
given usasa great favour by the “Just,” whom we knew, but of all the
cold places I ever was in this is the worst. The night was frosty and
we got in so late that our fare was but indifferent, consisting of a tough
beef-steak we brought with us, and we had much difficulty in getting
bread to eat with it. It is always necessary to carry rations in this
country as there is no meat to be purchased. Very little, except some-
times pork, is eaten, probably this was not the case before the
oppression they at present labour under, but I believe they never knew
what comfort was.

9th January.—Rose with the lark this morning, too cold however for
his notes; crossed the Zezere, the most rapid river I have seen yet,
and being directed to Famalicio by Major Downman, took the only
road to it through Avilas in a ravine of the Hstrella where runs a
branch of the river. It is a tolerable town but the inhabitants so lazy
that they do not even carry the forage from the fields but stack it in
small bundles exposed to the rain. We found even at this distance,
four leagues, that the Hussars, who are the most industrious foragers,
had been from Covilh&o. The snow lies constantly so deep during the
winter months on these mountains that we found the road to Famalicio
inaccessible for artillery, and indeed difficult for our horses, which we

1 Afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Seaton, the distinguished Colonel of the 62nd Regiment, which

Napier described, “ As unsurpassed in arms since arms were borne by men.”—F'.4. WV.

122 SWABEY DIARY.

were obliged to lead. Finding no signs of forage in the town, and
having visited a convent whose fair inhabitants had fled the insolence -
of the invaders, and is now only tenanted by an old priest whose appear-
ance and sanctity well answers all the descriptions we find in romance,
we undertook, though dissuaded by the people, to go to Gonzalo over
the mountains. ‘The snow soon covered the track, for it was nothing
more, and Crawley and myself having previously dismissed a corporal
and two men who were of the party, were left to our wits; but as we
were pretty certain of the points of the compass, after two hours hard
labour, our horses being led all the while, we reached that place which
looks over the valley of the Zezere.

This is a fertile and highly advantageous foraging district, but ex-
cepted in my instructions as being destined to be occupied by Captain
Bull. We went from there to Avala and Seche Moulla and returned
just before dark to Aldeia de Moite where Sutton, who had been des-
patched in the morning, had prepared an excellent repast, viz.: sowpe
and bouills and bowllt and sowpe. We had a good billet and were well
housed, but at about 12 o’clock I was wakened by the clash of swords
in the street and lost no time in finding some of my men who were pur-
sued and outnumbered by the Portuguese; my interference was fortunate,
though being undressed and unknown it cost me a few stones at my
head. The men being in the wrong were confined. A sword was lost
but during the night it was thrust by a Portuguese into a door where
they were billeted. This day I wrote to Brigade-Major May requesting
HO Le CNED HOVE CHB IO. 5 9 4G 6 lo) G6 oe ol Bs

10th January.—Returned through Caria to Salgueiro, passing over
two bridges that had been carried away last year by the water in the
rainy season ; the report of my excursion was unfavourable to a move.

L1lih January.—Passed all day at Salgueiro. Major Downman and
his adjutant still with us Sige rel eee we bode creer,

12th Janwary.—At 1 o’clock last night came a route to move up to
the front halting at any place on our side of Sabugal. We fixed un-
luckily on Castaneros, distant only two short leagues. The road was
rocky and difficult. We marched at 9 o’clock leaving our store carts
behind, I remained on the road with the wheel car till 9 o’clock at
night, when it became so dark that I left a guard with it and got to
Castaneros where we all were without baggage, our servants having
reached another village where the troop was intended to halt. I gota
beef-steak, and being in this instance lucky enough to find a chimney,
we made a large wood fire and slept in our cloaks before it . . .

13th Januwary.—The road if possible worse to-day than yesterday.
I did not get to Sabugal with the wheel car till dark, and being left to
my discretion and not knowing how far we might march the next day,
I demolished several spare shafts and perches and ordered it to proceed
in the morning. I then set off without a guide to get to Quadrazaes
following the track of the wheels. To do this I was obliged to walk
and lead my horse, there being unluckily no moon, I crossed the track
where Bull had marched the same day and arrived at the wrong town

SWABEY DIARY. 123

at 9 o’clock. I missed my baggage terribly this night for I never was
in such a cold billet, nothing but tiles overhead and no fire or bed.
The people in this country appear to me only to build in the summer
time, at least if I can judge from the attention paid to thorough
draughts and a free circulation of air . . . . 5 oO

14th Janwary.—Luckily found my place of destination, Quadrazaes,
was only four miles off, and I reached it early, found myself in a house
formerly occupied by the Commander-in-Chief, but cannot boast of the
accommodation. We were fortunate enough to find two days forage, a
rare thing in these parts. This morning the firing at Ciudad Rodrigo
was to be heard in all directions . .. . 6 aa

15th January.—The batteries opened on Ciudad this night, and a
heavy fire was kept up.

[The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was undertaken very late in this
season, of course with our light part of the service we were in the
covering corps. I think it was during this time, the snow falling occa-
sionally, that the wolves came down so thick at night from the wild
mountains that the sentries over our guns applied to be doubled. I
remember well that I superintended the shooting of a horse as I went
to dinner about 6 o’clock, and passing by the camp about an hour after-
wards there was not a remnant of him, except his bones to be seen !

The arm of the service to which I belonged was then commanded by
a gallant old gentleman,! rather corpulent indeed, but of an indomitable
spirit. When the relief from the trenches and batteries takes place, as
all frequenters of such places can testify, the party relieved run off as
fast as they can to get under cover; this gallant old veteran, however,
neither could nor would run, so there he strode along in all his glory
with shot and shell, musket and rifle, blazing at him, which occasioned
Lord Wellington to designate him “ the walking target.”” Whilst those
engaged in the trenches employed themselves in shooting at nobler
game, I employed my leisure hours and my trusty “Joe Manton ” in
supplying the table with woodcock and snipe.

Cazilhas de Flores was the name of the village which we occupied.
How poetical are the names of Spanish and Portuguese villages,
Cazilhas de Flores, cottages of flowers, how can it be named without
the expectation that some fair nymph, emulous of Flora herself, must
rise up from behind every bush and shrub. Then close to this elysium
we have Arroyo de Molinos, the mill brook, here too must be the envi-
able locality which is gladdened by the presence of the maid of the mill.
I have been happy enough likewise to tread the ground where is
especially evidenced the natural taste of the inhabitants, somewhat, it
is true, obscured by the fumes of garlic and bucellas, but that is the
fault of their training and not of their nature].

L6th Januwary.—We received a letter from Major Downman to say

that Dyneley was permitted to be employed in the batteries, and that
half-an-hour after entering them his head was broke by a splinter ;

1 Brigadier-General William Borthwick (Kane’s List, No. 552), he was wounded in the siege and
returned to England.

124 SWABEY DIARY.

that General Borthwick, May, Dundas! and Holcombe? were all bruised
by the explosion of shells. Dyneley’s hurt was not sufficient to prevent
his services, he had it dressed and returned again to the charge.

17th Janwary.— Went out to shoot but met with no encouragement.
The wind changing we very much apprehended that the frost would
take its departure and increase the difficulty of the siege.

18th Janwary.—Moore? from Soita dined with us. Harding and the
Captain set off on their travels to take a distant view of the batteries.
The evening passed with me but heavily.

19th January.—This night at 7 o’clock there being two practicable
breaches, the larger one of sufficient size to admit a company abreast,
Lord Wellington ordered Ciudad to be stormed. I have as yet got no
further particulars than that the 38rd division attacked by escalade
whilst the light division went in at the breach. The enemy made a
desperate resistance. I have as yet only heard that General Robert
Craufurd was badly wounded, General Mackinnon blown up so that not
an atom of him could be found to identify. General Vandeleur and
Colonel Colborne were wounded, and Major Napier, 52nd, lost an arm,
the forlorn hope was led by Lieutenant Gurwood, 52nd, to whom Lord
W. presented the Governor’s sword. When driven from the ramparts
the French retreated to the square, planting their field pieces down the
streets.

20th January.—Lieutenant Stanhope dined with us, of course full of
OUTS UCC OSS esr uae sat Otel Sama Cah cee tia Te cabo ete. "6 state

21st January.—W ent out shooting.

Zend January.—This day 1800 French, of whom 60 were officers,
passed under an escort of a regiment of Cacadores for Lisbon; through
them we learnt that Ciudad was plundered during the whole of the 20th
by the troops. Never were there such wretched objects as these men,
nothing in their possession but the clothes on their backs, shockingly
emaciated, probably from the fatigues they had undergone in the bat-
teries ; except the artillery, by no means a fair specimen of the French
-troops.*

1 Captain William Boulden Dundas (Kane’s List, No. 1150) served at the siege of Flushing in

1809, and the following year joined the army in the Peninsula at Cadiz. At Ciudad Rodrigo he
was wounded in the right ankle, and afterwards at Badajos lost his left arm. Captain McCarthy,
in his recollections of the siege, says :—‘‘ Soon after I met some more artillerymen conveying in a
blanket from the same battery an artillery officer, Captain Dundas, very severely wounded, he was
‘a heavy man, and his left arm dreadfully shattered, his shirt and coat torn to rags, his arm was
bent and hung over the side, and the weight of his body swagged to the ground. I stopped to
assist in putting him in a better position, and laid his left arm straight by his side; his left thigh
and leg were also injured.”

For his Peninsular services Captain Dundas was made a C.B. In 1839, he was Inspector of
Artillery, (Gun Factories) and he died a Major-General in August, 1858.

2 Captain Harcourt Fort Holcombe (Kane’s List, No. 895) served in the Corufia campaign. In
1811, he again joined the army in the Peninsula, and served at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajos ; after the fall of the latter place he joined the army on the east coast of Spain, and was
present at the siege of Tarragona and the battle of Castella. He received the C.B. Lieut.-Colonel
‘Holcombe died 6th March, 1847.

3 Lieutenant George A. Moore (Kane’s List, No. 1410), R.A. He was killed at the passage of
the Gave de Meulon in the south of France on 15th February, 1814.

4° The garrison consisted of one weak regiment of French infantry, one German, one Italian ;

-the last as strong as the other two. The artillery, two companies, were the only good part of the
whole, and did all they could to prolong its defence.’ ‘ Cavalry Officer’s Diary,” p. 124.

SWABEY DIARY. 125

The escort marched them all like a flock of sheep into the church at
Sabugal. One could not help pitying their situation ; asa specimen, one
officer of Engineers was stripped of his boots and obliged to walk all
the way to Lisbon barefooted. Their cruelty to the Portuguese, and
in this instance, their having totally ruined the place, can alone justify
their being robbed. It is singular that many of them that had even
their coats torn from their backs had money.

The sick and wounded, making the whole amount up to 1600, have
gone by another route. The garrison, at the period of our investing it,
consisted of 2000 men. A courier passed for head-quarters, said to
have despatches announcing some signal success of General Hill’s,
reports go so far as to say that he has taken Badajos . . .. .

23rd January.—Heard further particulars of the events of the siege,
by which it appears that there were two breaches ; the main one was
stormed by the light and 3rd division, the 4th stormed the small one,
and some regiments entered by escalade. The resistance was not very
determined, and only at the large breach. The stormers had each a
sack of grass to throw into the ditch to break their fall. The most
resolute opponents were some deserters from the 52nd and 43rd, 40
rascals in all were found in the place, one villain stood in the breach
calling for Lord Wellington. Our troops, as soon as the breach was
gained, more eager for plunder than their duty, broke and ran, in de-
fiance of their officers, for plunder and committed shameful excesses,
disgraceful to the whole army, not a soul that was not rifled, and
the dead were scarcely cold when they were inhumanly stripped.
Let me say something for the English character: no intentional
murders were committed, though some of the men were so drunk
that they fired promiscuously in the streets and killed many of
their comrades! ‘The Governor,” instead of defending his charge
and setting an honourable example by being forward in the breach,
was taken by Lieutenant Gurwood eating his dinner. ‘The same officer
led the forlorn hope, and Lord Wellington presented him with the
Governor’s sword. The latter had the impudence to ask Lord Welling-
ton if he had not made a noble defence; Lord W. bowed in silence.
The Governor complained that it was contrary to the usage of war not
to have summoned the place before storming it, and went so far as
to talk in a very contemptuous manner of the Spaniards, till Lord
Wellington was obliged to silence him. As he was sent down to
Lisbon without horses or attendance, certainly no very honourable
opinion was entertained of his defence. I fear, likewise, that it was an
understood thing between Lord Wellington and Don Carlos d’Hspaiia
that the place was to be plundered on account of the perfidy of the
inhabitants who favoured the French. The Governor’s papers brought
much in this way to light, and a correspondence of Marmont’s at

1 The same characteristic is recorded of the soldiers at Badajos. ‘‘ Nor did the great loss the
troops sustained from the well prepared efforts of their antagonists render them vindictive ; on gain-
ing the ascendancy not a Frenchman implored mercy in vain. Scenes of plunder and drunkenness,
such as are inseparable from an assault prevailed to a great extent, but strong measures were
immediately adopted to restore order.” ‘‘ War in Spain and Portugal.” J.T. Jones, p. 239.

2 <« Baron Barrier, General de Brigade.

126 SWABEY DIARY.

Almeida was by this means discovered. Next morning 14 Spaniards,
all men of respectability, were hung

24th Januwary.—Dyneley returned with Fa ane whi alos fon mean
quarters, his wound proves to be a mere scratch . . .

oth January.—Heard complaints of our soldiers at Rodriwor “fhe
conduct appears to have been highly licentious.

The works are being restored and the 5th division holds the place
till it is fit to give up to the Spaniards.

“The duration of the siege was twelve days, or half the time
originally calculated upon by Iiord Wellington. The manner
in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence
had been in any way lessened, and before the counterscarp
had been blown in, were the true causes of its sudden fall.
Both the military and political state of affairs warranted this
neglect of rules. The assault was confined to the 3rd and
light divisions. ‘The great breach was cut off from the town
by a perpendicular descent of 16 feet, and the bottom was
planted with sharp spikes, and strewn with live shell; the
houses behind were all loop-holed and garnished with mus-
keteers, and on the flanks there were cuts, not indeed very
deep or wide, and the French had left the temporary bridges
over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully defended
that it was said that the 3rd division could never have carried
them had not the hght division from the smaller breach taken
the enemy in flank. The French fought bravely in the breach
and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were
bayonetted. The French lost 300 men, and 1500 prisoners
were taken. The loss of the allies was 2 generals, 90 officers
and about 1200 men.”

“The excesses committed by the allied troops were very disgrace-
ful, throwing off all the restraints of discipline the soldiers
were not to be controlled. The town was fired in three or
four places, the men menaced their officers, and shot each
other; many were killed in the market-place, intoxication
soon increased the tumult, disorder everwhere prevailed, and
at last the fury rising to absolute madness, a fire was wilfully
lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when the town
and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the
energetic courage of some officers, and a few soldiers who still
preserved their senses.1 The Spanish people were allies and

1 Captain William Jones (Jack Jones of Busaco celebrity) made himself remarkable immediately
after the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo. A French officer having surrendered to Jones, Jack made use
of him somewhat as Valentine is represented to have used Orson—to show quarters for his men—
and having placed some of them in a large store, the French officer led the way into the church, in
front of which Lord Wellington and some of the staff were collected. Some fire had been lighted
already (supposed by Portuguese soldiers) on the pavement, and the Frenchman entering and seeing
the fire, instantly started back, exclaiming ‘Sacré bleu!’ and ran out with looks of utmost horror.
Jones not understanding French did not catch the idea: Sacré bleu’ puzzled him, until going fur-
ther in,he saw powder “about the floor and powder barrels near the fire. ‘ Saeré bleu’ became at
once identified with powder, and he immediately got the help of two or three of his men (whose
names are not known), and carried with his own hands the powder barrels out of the way of
immediate danger. This deed passed unrequited at the time: let the memory of it now receive our
admiration.” Extract from Record of 52nd Light Infantry.

SWABEY DIARY. 127

friends, unarmed and helpless, yet all these claims were dis-
regarded.”

“ Many of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy: all these
people Carlos d’ Hspaiia slew without mercy, but of the English
deserters who were taken, some were executed, some par-
doned.” Napier, Vol. LV., p. 386, et seq.

26th Janwary.—Last night an order to have a day’s provisions and
three days’ bread delivered to the men and a route to Cazilhas de Flores
was received. We marched at 9 o’clock and arrived at our destination
at half-past 3 o’clock.

[It was very much the custom amongst the simple villagers to bring
us their sons at the age of from 15 to 17, begging us to take them as
servants, and most useful and intelligent these lads were after a little
training ; famous foragers and efficient interpreters. It is to be ob-
served that there was generally a deadly feud between the Spanish and
Portuguese lads of this sort. It was at Cazilhas de Flores that one of
these was brought to me by his mother, and faithfully and well did he
serve me, but he was never destined any more to be folded in the arms
and pressed to the bosom of this tender parent. He was superior in
hardihood to most boys, very handsome, and devoted to me as to a
father. He lost his life one day in a bivouac; one of my horses with
saddle and furniture on fancied he would roll, the boy to prevent injury
to the saddle imprudently struck him, and again as he rose, when lash-
ing out with both hind legs, the horse struck poor Manuel on the fore-
head and he never spoke again. As I never returned to the land from
whence he came, I had not the means of informing his mother of his
fate.

I resolved that as this had been the first so it should be the last boy
that I protected, but it was not so destined, for a Spanish lad attached
himself to me in a cantonment, and though I declined all engagement,
I found him one day with my baggage mules, where he would remain.
In the retreat from Salamanca he too perished, more naturally indeed
than the other, for he was worn out by ague and fatigue, and his bones
were left on the road not far from Ciudad Rodrigo, and viewed
perhaps by the French with as much indifference as their remains
would have been by us].

27th Janwary.—Captain Macdonald joined us at Cazilhas de Flores
to-day. The reports of the cause of our move are that the French have
appeared in force in front of Salamanca.

28th January.—We learnt to-day that Marmont was so much in want
of intelligence concerning Rodrigo that the cause of his appearance was
actually to endeavour to throw into ib 200 car loads of supplies, and the
first he knew of its being taken was on his advanced parties’ recon-
noitring the light division; he has now retired.

29th January.—General Craufurd is dead of his wound. Ag an
example of the thoughtlessness of soldiers, one was fortunate enough ~
to find in Rodrigo £300 in dollars and employed it in treating the
company he belongs to with a skin of wine every day as long as it lasted.
I should here explain that instead of casks the Spaniards and Portu-
guese sew the skin of a pig together and keep their liquor in it.

128 SWABEY DIARY.

50th January.—The frost gone and a most disagreeable wet day ; in
this country the most unpleasant of all calamities. Received a route
for Caria there to wait for orders as to where we are to be cantoned.
The Agueda is so swelled that the orderly bringing the order was
obliged to swim the river.

dist January.—Marched at 9 o’clock to Aldea de Ponte and
arrived there late, it having rained in torrents the whole time; by
keeping a fire in the quarters all night we were enabled to get our
things tolerably dry. The cause of our moving from Quadrazaes to
Cazilhas de Flores appears to have been that Marmont had shewn
himself in front of Salamanca with 200 cars laden with supplies for
Ciudad Rodrigo, so ignorant was he of the real state of affairs, and
even of the fall of that place.

Ist February.—Marched late into Sabugal. A terribly wet day, the
waters were so much out that at Alfyates the river was so rapid that it
carried one of our men away, horse and all, and it was not without con-
siderable exertion that he was saved by catching hold of him from the
bank when he was nearly exhausted and had been carried a great way
down the stream.

We found Sir Stapleton Cotton! and staff at Sabugal, and understood
that we were removed from the 7th division and attached to General
Lie Marchant’s brigade of the Ist division of cavalry

2nd February.—Rain all day, we found we were intended to a treh
to Gonzalo, halting a night at Asingias, at which place however, find-
ing Captain Bull’s troop halted, and unable to pass the river to
Belmonte we proceeded to Caria, leaving our guns at Valverde; the
guard over them passed the whole night in the open with incessant
rain. Last night Gunner Smalley, bearing orders to Captain Bull,
gallantly swam the river Caria. though it was running with inconceiv-
able rapidity, and not finding him as expected at Belmonte, re-crossed
to Asingias in the same manner :

rd February.—Rained all day, we were cmpleed a In sear chines the
very boxes of the inhabitants for eee very little of which could be
found 2) ee
4th February. a ee oe ceva Waste to Mr. Walcott.’ z

5th KFebruary.—tIncessant rain. Fortunately our houses are very
good, Caria being on the whole the best built and most opulent town
for its size I have seen in Portugal. It has been so often occupied by
cavalry that little forage is left in it at this season of the year

6th February.—Received orders to march to Belmonte instead ‘of
Gonzalo, and the rain having abated, I was able to pass the Caria, and
got there ready to arrange for the arrival of the troop. J went to my
own billet where the Prior and the ladies very courteously gave me
wine and pork chops for supper, having killed a pig in the morning.
It should be noticed that these Portuguese ladies, for the sake of warmth,
pass all their time in a smoky kitchen without a chimney, the fire-place

1 Afterward Field-Marshal Viscount Combermere.

2Mr. Walcott was a country gentleman living near Christchurch. From his constant and
favourite expression, ‘‘ Don’t ye know,” he was so called among the officers there.—F.4.W,

SWABEY DIARY. 129

in the room consisting merely of a paved excavation, two upright stones
against the wall forming the grate. How it would surprise them to see
a baron of beef turned by a smoke-jack !
7th February.—The troop marched into Belmonte. The stabling bad,
and our quarters for stationary ones indifferent
Sth February.— Went to examine the ruined castle a os place, but
am not antiquary or architect enough to judge of the date of its build-
ing, and there is very little to be learnt from the traditionary tales of
these indolent people, even the priest could give us no other account
than that it was “muito antigo.” There is on only one stone an in-
scription, which is too much defaced to give any information, conjecture
is the only ground for my thinking it to have been in part Moorish.
There is a Roman Catholic chapel, but it is apparently of later date
than the rest of the building. In this chapel many skeletons were dug
up by the French, who expected to find the riches of Belmonte reposing
with the ashes of its fathers. How far they succeeded I did not hear,
but there is an inhabitant who, when the French were here fled like the
rest to the mountains, previously burying his riches; but when'there,
he found himself so uneasy without them, that every night in the dark
he used to visit the place of their entombment to see if his darling
dollars were safe.
9th February.—Principally employed in foraging. By sending across
the Zezere to Aldea de Mato we find much hay. ‘This is the same town
where I was unable before to obtain an atom of forage. This proves
that much is concealed in the mountains; our late move on Ciudad was
I suppose the cause of its returning to rie town :
10th February.—The centre and left divisions were son to remain at
Aldea de Mato with a view of recruiting the horses with the good
forage. The cavalry brigade we are attached to consists of the 3rd and
4th Dragoons and 5th Dragoon Guards re
1th Febrwary.—Rode to Aldea de Mato to see oy agian, Much
hay had been found concealed in the houses in all the odd holes that
can be imagined. Captain Ramsay dined, and Mr. Bridges of the
Royals on his way from England to join General Slade as aide- de-camp.
12th February.—Went shooting without success
Lsth hE —Went to Consiello and dined and slept ai Coptein
“Ramsay’s 5
14th February. —Shet in ame
15th February.—A report received vid head-quarters that General
Lacy and the Spaniards had surprised the French in Tarragona, kill-
ing 2000 men, taking many prisoners, and possessing themselves of the
lace. }
i The Ist division marched through Caria for Abrantes to-day, which
is doubtless a preparatory movement to the siege of Badajos.
“Ciudad Rodrigo being taken, Wellington’s eyes were now turned
towards Badajos, which he was desirous to invest in the second
week of March; because then the flooding of the rivers in

1 This report was incorrect,—L,4.W,

130 SWABEY DIARY.

Beira would enable him to carry nearly all his forces to the
Alemtejo without risk, and the same rains would impede the
junction of the enemy’s force in Hstremadura. Green forage
was to be had in the last province considerably earlier than on
the Agueda, and the success of the contemplated campaign
in Andalusia depended upon the operations taking place before
the harvest upon the ground should ripen, which was the
enemy’s resource, and would happen much earlier than in
Leon, Having made his arrangements, Wellington set off
for Elvas which he reached on the 1ith March, but owing to
the vexatious delays of the Portuguese Regency causing the
the absence of the necessary transport, the investment was
put off till the 17th.” Napier, Vol. IV., p. 392, et seq.

16th February.—Returned to Belmonte, crossing the Zezere, which is
everywhere to be forded, unless after heavy rain.

(7th February.—Went by invitation of Sir Stapleton Cotton to a
ball given by him at Covilhio, which passed off well enough ; the want
of politeness in the manners of the Portuguese ladies, as might be ex-
pected, was more striking here than at Lisbon.

There was a supper, consisting of as many good things as the country
affords, but few elegancies. The ladies and gentlemen, notwithstand-
ing the solemnity of the fast of Lent, eat ham, etc. to an extent scarcely
credible. Some at first were staggered, but only waited for someone else
to begin to set Lent at defiance, and I really think from their perform-
ance that till then they had been good Catholics.

The ladies did not admire country dances, there was some waltzing
by two Portuguese officers. N.B.—Cannot boast of the beauty of my
partners. I dined with Major Downman and slept at Colonel Elley’s.

18th February.—Employed this morning in shopping. Cloth is
manufactured here, tolerably good, and sold at about 12s. a yard.
English manufacture is also to be purchased, this is one of the best
markets for English quarter-masters. Breakfasted at Colonel Hlley’s.
We returned to Belmonte. Captains Bull, Macdonald, and Ramsay
dined with me.

19th February.—Rode to witness the improvement of my horses at
Aldea de Mato.

20th February.—Lieutenant Blachley dined and slept. N.B.—Bom-
bardier King promoted Corporal.

21st February.—Being overpersuaded I went to dine at Gonzalo with
Lieutenant Moore; glad to get to bed and tired of the party.

22nd February.—Set off home early, having been visiting so much
lately and enjoying myself but little. Found Major Downman, etc.,
and an order to leave Belmonte to make room for the 6th division who
are expected to march through, this made me rather sulky.

23rd February.—Took up my quarters at Aldea de Mato at an indif-
ferent casa. Received letters from home dated 19th and 27th January.

(To be Continued).

anor
Pons

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EORCES ON EACH SIDE.

FRENCH.

XV, OX VINNIE ex X, ONG
Corps, Cremer’s Division. Rol
land’s 7th Military Division, all
under Bourbaki,about 150,000 men.
Garibaldi with a division at Dijon,

GERMANS.

Von Werder’s force consisted of
the XV. @orps:
Baden Field Division, a combined
Prussian Brigade, snd the 4th

including the

Reserve Division, with a detach-
ment under Debschitz, in all about
45,000.

Von Tresckow I. besieged Bel-

efort with about 15,000 men, but
out of these he sent detachments to
Von Werder.

The I] Corps (Fransecky’s) and
the VII (Zastrow’s) were about
50,000 strong and were both placed
under Von Manteuffel.

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Dates oF IMpoRTANT
EVENTS.

December 23rd.—Bourbaki’s army
begins to move from the Loire to
the Doubs.

January 1st.—Germans in no small
perplexity as to the French plan
of campaign.

January 5th-6th.—Germans clear as
to Bourbaki’s design; distinct
orders to II, VII, XIV Corps
in regard thereto.

January 5th.—Outpost actions be-
tween Werder’s troops and the
French in the neighbourhood of
Vesoul.

January 6th-7th.—Slight skirmishes.

January 8th.—Bourbaki proposes to
attack Werder’s left and rear and
to cut him off from Belfort.

January 9th.—Action at Villersexel.

January toth-11th.—Von Werder
moves from Villersexel to the
Lisaine.

January 12th-13th-14th.—Germans
strengthen their position on the
Lisaine. French inactive.

January 15th-16th-17th.—Battle of
the Lisaine. Siege of Belfort
continued,

18th.—French retreat,
followed slowly by Von Werder.

January 12th-18th—II and VII
Cross the Cote D’or to the
Valley of the Saone; Kettler
detached towards Dijon.

19th.—Manteuffel deter-

mines to cut off Bourbaki from

January

all his lines of retreat.
January 22nd—French

trated at Besancon.
January 22nd.—Von Werder on

concen-

the line Rougemont-L’'Isle sur
Doubs.
January 23rd.—French communi-
Besancon and
occupied by

cations between
Lons-le-Saunier
Germans.

January 24th—XIV Baume-les-
Dames, thence to Rioz to
Marnay and back to the Doubs,
ordered to press enemy vigor-
ously.

January 25th.—Bourbaki resolves
to retreat on Pontarlier.

January 26th.—Germans advance
into the Jura Mts. _

27th - 28th - 29th.— They

close in on the retreating French

January

from every possible road.

January 3oth.—II carries Frasne
while VII and XIV march on
Pontarlier. French pinned fast
at Pontarlier with back to Swiss
frontier.

February 1st.—Germans take Pon-
tarlier ; I] has a severe action at
La Cluse with part of French
rear. Garibaldi driven from
Dijon.

February 2nd.—Remnant of French
in a wretched condition enter

Switzerland.

THORN Wootwicn

‘so Kilometres,

1351

GENERAL BOURBAKI?’S CAMPAIGN
IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1871.

TM MEAG U ERE Hse) iD:

(Inns of Court Rifle Volunteers).

(A Lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich,
Thursday, December 18th, 1894).

Cononen C, C. Trencn, R.A., Director ARTILLERY COLLEGE, IN THE CHAIR.

THe Cuairman—Gentlemen it is not necessary for me to introduce Dr.
Maguire to you, he is so well known among us here (applause).

Dr. Macurre—Colonel Trench and gentlemen, I need scarcely say
that I consider it a very high honour indeed to be allowed to address the
officers of the Royal Artillery again, and that I feel as usual a con-
siderable amount of hesitation at venturing to address such an audience
on a military subject; but Major Abdy was kind enough to allow me,
some years ago, to givea general summary of the operations under-
taken by Gambetta to deliver France from the Germans after the
disaster of Sedan, and he thought it well to continue the treatment of
the subject, as thus: having first given a general sketch of Gambetta’s
schemes, going into more detail, and dealing with the several sections
of the operations directed by that very able lawyer and rhetorician,
and his staff.

The particular section which we treated of last time was Chanzy’s
operations from the Loire to the Sarthe. On this occasion we propose
to deal with Bourbaki’s operations. The last time it was Chanzy’s
operations from the Loire, across the smaller Loir to the river Huisne and
the river Sarthe. Against him was operating Prince Frederick Charles,
the Duke of Mecklenburg’s corps, and three corps that had been at
Metz. At the same time Faidherbe was moving from the northern
fortresses across the Somme down towards the north of Paris, and was
stopped by two corps of the 1st German army, which had been at
Metz, viz., the lst and 8th corps.

It is necessary, just for one minute, that I should recapitulate a little
before going on to the details of Bourbaki’s operations.

The results of Gravelotte and Sedan were these: that Bazaine was
shut up in Metz by the Ist and half the 2nd German army, now called
the 2nd German army; that the other half of the 2nd German army

3, VOL, XXII.

132 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

went to Sedan and thence to Paris, as the 4th army, or army of the
Meuse ; the 38rd German army was on the left of the 4th, and went
round Paris to the south, as the 4th army did to the north. Metz
was invested on the 19th of August, Paris was invested on the
19th of September. The investment of these two—of the great
fortress and of the vast metropolis—occupied four German armies; a
German division (the Baden) went down to Strasburg and invested it
under General Von Werder. Practically, therefore, by the end of
September all the German forces in France, with the exception of
Etappen troops, were around Metz, Paris and Strasburg. The capitu-
lation of Strasburg about the 27th of September set free Von Werder,
who went into the Vosges district towards Vesoul and Dijon, and
a reserve division joining him under Von Tresckow I. (there were
two 'resckows) invested Belfort. Now we come to October and
the beginning of November.

Gambetta, after the new Government had been formed in Paris, had
got out of Paris in a balloon, and after being wafted in different
directions in some serious danger from German bullets and otherwise,
got to Tours. He then organised armies behind the Loire, in the
Sologne district, under D’Anrelles de Paladines.

I need not tell you they were defeated between the 28th of November
and the 4th of December. A force of some 250,000 strong, was cut in
two by the 4th of December, part of it went between the Loire and the
Loir, south of the forest of Marchenoir, under Chanzy, and the other
part remained about Bourges and Nevers, under Bourbaki. It is the
latter part that we have to deal with.

But how came it that the Germans were able to cope with two
corps from the direction of Amiens, the 22nd and 23rd, and a variety
of corps along the Loire, the 15th, 16th, 18th, part of 19th, 20th and
21st? The reason why they were able to cope with these new levies
of Gambetta was that, in the meantime, Metz had capitulated, and the
corps investing that fortress were at the disposal of the German staff;
on the 27th of October. Nos. I. and VIII. went north-west; Nos. LIL.,
IX. and X.,7.e., the Brandenburg, the Hesse and the Hanoverian corps,
went tothe Loire; II. went towards Paris at first, VII. invested some
northern forts. III., 1X., X. and the Duke of Mecklenburg’s corps,
XITI., broke D’Aureiles de Paladines.

Now to come to the beginning of January, 1871. You will observe,
gentlemen, that the opportune surrender of Metz by Bazaine, enabled
the Germans to cope with the greatest levée en masse in history. The
levée en masse of 1871 was by no means as effective or so well organised
as the re-arrangement of the Federal forces in America after the first
battle on Bull Run, because it took McClellan from July, 1861,
to March, 1862, before he moved his newly organised army ; whereas
Gambetta did not leave Paris till early in October, and his army was
moving and fighting early in November. I must say that great credit
is due to Gambetta for puttimg some kind of soul into an inert mass,
and getting some kind of order among these hastily collected levies ;
credit must also be given to his subordinates, de Freycinet, D’ Aurelles
de Paladines and others. But for the opportune fall of Metz, it is

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 133

quite possible that the siege of Paris by the 3rd and 4th German
armies would have had to be raised. That is my opinion, of course if
any gentleman differs from me we can discuss his view later on.

Now here we have Nos. III., 1X. and X. and the Duke of Mecklen-
burg proposing to go in a western direction, or rather hesitating as to
what they were to do on the Ist of January. We have Nos. I. and
VIII. up at Rouen and Amiens, and all the others round Paris.

The only others available for any purpose were II., VII. and XIV.;
XIV. was the new corps, consisting of Von Werder’s Baden division,
of a combined Prussian brigade, and the 4th Landwehr division. Three
corps were available for the eastern theatre of operations: Von Werder’s
men, the II., the VII., and also the division investing Belfort, a reserve
division. Gentlemen, I ask you please to remember these data.

As against these three corps, their directing staff not knowing exactly
what the French proposed to do, there were available four French corps,
two French divisions and Garibaldi’s men. Four French corps, those
which had originally been part of D’Aurelles de Paladines’ army, to
wit: Nos. XV., XVIII., XX. and XXIV. (see appendix). A new corps
was formed at Lyons, Cremer’s division had already been engaged in
the direction of Dijon; Garibaldi’s men were about Autun, south of
Dijon.

Phe German staff were recently criticised in the columns of The
Times. Well, uncertainty is not confined to military operations, and
I do not really believe the German staff deserves the contumely
with which they are treated by people who are wise after the event.
Napoleon himself was supposed to be as good a soldier as any
other in modern times, and was almost the greatest man from an
intellectual point of view—since Bacon. Napoleon says that looking
back on his past he could see in regard to each campaign a great
variety of methods by which he could have improved his cam-
paigns ; but it is one thing to look back on the past, and another thing
to look forward with regard to the future ; anybody can draw up a plan of
campaign for people after those people have fought it for his instruction.
The critics say that this German staff ought to have known every
thing that was going on along the Loire. Well, there were 250,000
Frenchmen all round the district; there were some 63,000 or 70,000
Germans between Vendome and Orleans; and there was about Montargis
a corps and about Auxerrea corps.! At any rate, whether the German
staff ought to have known what the French were about to do or not, they
most decidedly did not know what the French were about to do until
the first few days of January had passed. ‘They thought that it was
extremely probable that General Bourbaki would move north of the
Loire ; that General Chanzy would move towards Paris from the Loir,
and that General Trochu would try to come out of Paris at the
same time. ‘They thought there would be a kind of concentrate move-
ment, the two sections of the French army moving on the outer flank
of the Germans in the Loire district towards Paris, whilst the Paris
people would come south-west towards Chanzy. Consequently they kept

1 The lecturer, in all cases, pointed out the exact position of divisions on the maps, but to repeat
all this would occupy an inordinate amount of space.
18

134 GENERAL BOURBAKVS CAMPAIGN,

Nos. IT. and VII. for some time about Montargis and Auxerre, 1.e.
in the main the exact positions varied every few days, and it were
tedious and utterly uninteresting to describe merely tentative operations,
as they could not know that Bourbaki might go east. IJ cannot see
anything very censurable in the Germans’ proceedings. In point of fact
Bourbaki did cross the Loire, and did go northwards. But why he
went east after a few days is explained by the man most responsible,
by Freycinet himself in his book, chapter VIII., of course I have not
time to read all these details, but some of them will appear in an
appendix should this lecture be published.

A new plan of campaign for the French, which we are about to follow
now for the rest of the evening, was drawn up by Colonel de Bigot,
who, after drawing it up, refused to fight. ‘To show the confusion which
existed at that time, the Colonel in question absolutely refused to
fight out his own plan because, we are told, he would not help a
Government based on revolutionary principles. There is not the
slightest doubt that the intrusion of Garibaldi into this business did
much more harm to the French than good. He was followed by a
miscellaneous assortment of international atoms who had nothing else
to do at the moment, and discharged themselves on France, as they would
on Poland, or wherever an oyster could be opened by the sword.

Now what was the plan? ‘The plan was to leave the 15th corps about
Bourges, to attract the attention of Nos. II. and VII.,! and to prevent
them from going east. At the same time they knew that Von Werder
had only about 50,000 men about Dijon and Vesoul and at Bel-
fort. He had not more than about 35,000 men about Dijon and
Vesoul. I quite admit that he had many more reserve men and a
few regular regiments near Belfort—perhaps at that time about 20,000
one way and another ; moreover there was a detachment coming down
from Strasburg under Debschitz; altogether there might be some
60,000 men, and a good number of those were investing Belfort. The
plan was for Bourbaki to leave for a short period, No. 15 to occupy
the Germans Nos. II. and VII., and to take Nos. 18 and 20 and to
go with those eastward to Besancon—from Bourges to Besangon is about
170 miles,—to concentrate with those at Besancon, No. 24, and to throw
out two wings, a right wing of the 7th military division, and a left wing
of Cremer’s division. it was supposed that this great movement of
150,000 men eastward must necessarily have the effect of overwhelming
Von Werder; that as a consequence the siege of Belfort would be
raised, they might then leave some behind, and might even make an
incursion into Germany by the gap of Belfort; and with the rest,
Bourbaki, having re-provisioned Belfort, could go north and cut the
line of communications between Paris and Germany-—the Paris and
Nancy railway, the railways leading across the Rhine to Germany ;—in
‘other words, that Bourbaki was to move from Bourges and. Nevers by
Chagny to Besangon, detrain and advance between the valley of the
Doubs and the valley of the Ognon, raise the siege of Belfort, either
take Von Werder prisoner or drive him north, send some forces into

1 French corps are given in Arabic and German in Roman letters.

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN, - 185

Germany, and marching northwards cut the German line of communi-
cations. ‘There was not the slightest doubt entertained in the mind of
any Frenchman, Freycinet, Gambetta, Bourbaki, that that plan must
necessarily succeed.!

Now, gentlemen, there is not the least doubt that the railway was a
vital matter. Requisitioning is all very well as long as armies are
marching and moving; but a system of requisition would not feed
250,000 men or so stationary round Paris. The requisitioning pro-
cess with regard to feeding them collapsed at an early period. ‘They
had to be fed from Germany, Hamley says by 16 trains a day. It
may be interesting to enter into the details of the feeding of the
Germans. Personally I am an advocate for the best possible feeding,
having regard to temperance, that a man can get, whether a soldier or
any other man, and I believe it is all nonsense to preach the doctrine that
a soldier would be all the better man if he spent a considerable portion
of his life on the verge of starvation. At any rate the Germans did
not try the starvation policy; they tried to get all they could; they
ate, drank and smoked like heroes ; this is what they had per diem, and
you can easily see that no amount of requisitioning could provide this
bill of fare, and that it was an elaborate business altogether. ‘‘ Ger-
many throughout the war was the main basis of supply for her armies,
whose enormous requirements may be conceived when we remember that
in the course of 24 hours each corps d’armée consumed 18,000 loaves
of 3 lbs. each, 120 ewt. of rice or pearl barley, either 60 oxen or 120
ewt. of bacon or a proportionate amount of prepared sausage, large
quantities of salt, coffee, and other minor details.” If there is any gentle-
man strongly addicted to teetotalism in the audience he will be shocked
at the next item—‘ 35,000 quarterns of spirits and 3500 ounces of
orange bitters.” But, gentlemen, I am appalled personally, as not being
a smoker, at the next item of the entertainment—“To this gigantic re-
past must be added 60 cwt. of tobacco, 1,100,000 ordinary cigars, and
50,000 officers’ cigars for every ten days.”” There then follows the num-
bers of letters that were delivered, the number of parcels from soldiers’
relatives, and the amount of money that had to be distributed ; and
it is very obvious that the German soldiers of all ranks were very
much interested in preventing this incursion of Bourbaki on their
line of supply from home to Paris.

It was not until the 3rd or 4th of January that Von Werder,
being at Vesoul, was quite clear that Bourbaki was moving eastward of
that place. It was evident from the number of reconnoitring parties
and skirmishes to the south, east and west of Vesoul, that very consider-
able bodies of Frenchmen were in that neighbourhood by the 5th, and
by the 6th the German head-quarters had come to the conclusion, partly
from information received from Switzerland, partly from their general
intelligence staff, and partly from the reports of the outpost engage-
ments as sent to them from Von Werder, that large bodies of
Frenchmen were going eastward. Then they issued definite orders,
which, by the way, did not reach Von Werder until four days after they
were drawn up. Manifestly there must be some science in war, it is not

1 See Appendix,

136 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

merely a fortuitous arrangement of circumstances, because Von Werder
himself, without any communication with the head-quarter staff, did
precisely what the head-quarter staff suggested that he should do, and
all that was necessary when he got his final orders was just to continue
the arrangements that he had already prepared. The orders were that
he was to fall back to some strong position west of the fortress of Bel-
fort, and that he was not to raise the siege of this fortress. With an
excitable population,—as some officers who were there at the time and
are now in this room could say better than I can,—with such a popu-
lation as the French strung to an extraordinary pitch of nervous tension,
and very properly strung to such a pitch and displaying the most
enthusiastic devotion to their country, which will redeem many of the
faults of the French character for ages,—standing out to the last piece
of bread or the last rat in Paris, and suffering no end of hardships
willingly if they could only deliver their country,—I say, among a
population excited to a degree, the raising of the siege of Belfort would
have produced a tremendous moral effect. Accordingly Von Werder
was ordered not to raise the siege of Belfort under any circumstances
whatever, but to stay there, and at the same time he was informed
definitely that No. VII. and No. II. would come to his aid, and that
calculating distances, and the time of the year, the bad weather and the
mountain district through which they had to pass, they might reach him
some time about the 19th of January. By this map! you will see now
No. II. and No. VII. going into the passes of Cote d’Or by three places
between Langres and Dijon, that is 40 miles. They could not pass by
Langres, it was occupied by the French ; they could not pass by Dijon,
it was occupied by Garibaldi; but they slidin between the two by three
passes, all marked on the map, Longueau, Pranthoy and Selongcy,
between Langres and Dijon.

A recent military critic says that no finer episode in military history
can be found than the manner in which Von Werder acted, between
two fortresses—Belfort and Besangon—50 miles apart. I will not
go into details, roughly he moved from Vesoul to Villersexel, and then
took up a position from Delle to Montbeliard and thence to Frahier.
When Von Werder got with the XIV. to the Lisaine, he was to stand on
the river till relieved by VII. and II. Meanwhile Bourbaki would
probably attack him, but Bourbaki moved in exactly the manner in
which it was suggested he should not move. It was suggested that he
should expand and move by several roads north of the Doubs and north-
west of the Doubs and south-east of the Doubs. It was suggested that he
should march in as broad a front as possible and hem in Von Werder on
all sides. In point of fact four of his corps came into the limited district
between the Ognon and the Doubs, a country full of defiles, as is to be
seen from this map, with plenty of woods and hills and dales and the
weather being severe in the extreme rendered logistics still more difficult.
From the very first evil followed Bourbaki. As Freycinet, p. 228, says:
«The campaign of the east therefore was opened under the most deplor-
able auspices,” ‘The first thing that went wrong was the railway

1 The lecture was illustrated by several large maps.

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 137

mobilisation business. A book has been written about that which no
doubt is in your library, and is interesting to all officers who have to
deal with the movement of troops by rail; it is written by a French
Engineer, who was employed by the Ministry of Public Works to in-
quire into the matter, M. Le Bleu; his report is also in Freycinet’s book.
He shows that the whole movement suffered a kind of physical and
moral paralysis from the very start. These four corps, the 18th, 20th,
24th and 15th (because the 15th came eastward after it had served as
a screen for the others) were tied to one line of railway, and that line
of railway was badly managed; the troops were standing for days at a
particular station, the officers were afraid to move them into the country
to get them food, the horses were half starved: there were 150,000
men ina most criticalcondition. Imust say that the cavalry was a very
small matter, made up of the débris of divers regiments, the proper
cavalry of France being at this moment in Germany as the result of the
capitulations of Sedan and of Metz. ‘The cavalry was nothing consider-
able, and I do not suppose if it had heen of real value it could have done
very much. Certainly the German cavalry in the south-western theatre
in the Le Mans campaign, four divisions of them, did not gain much
distinction, because they could not do much owing to the weather, the
state of the ground, and owing to the character of the country in which
they were employed. ‘Therefore I do not suppose that Bourbaki really
lost much by not having a good cavalry force. We do not find that
Von Werder did anything worth dwelling upon with his cavalry ; it
was Just as much as infantry could do to march on these frozen roads.
As I have said therefore, Bourbaki was in difficulties with regard to
mobility, even when he was moving by rail, and by road with such a
system of commissariat as he had—a hastily improvised commissariat—.
his difficulties were enormously increased.

I hope that our volunteers will not have a similar commissariat if
England is ever invaded, but I have reasons to believe that many
volunteer corps would not be perplexed to the last degree if called
upon to march and live in Kent. Let their authorities see the results
of improvised supply in Bourbaki’s army. This commissariat, thus
hastily improvised, could not bring the food from train to troops. Yet
plenty of food, plenty of ammunition, and plenty of money were at the
disposal of the French Government.

So Bourbaki gets along till about the 8th of January, when at
last Von Werder comes to the conclusion that it is nearly time to
move to his position on the Lisaine, or he would be intercepted.
The French were marching on the 8th to the south and east of
Vesoul, when Von Werder moved from Vesoul to Villersexel, sent
the 25th regiment and the reserve into the town, the Prussians to
the right, to a place called Marat, and the Baden folk to the north.
By most military writers,—in fact I think in General Clery’s book,
which we have most of us had to learn—Villersexel is given as an
admirable example of the manner in which troops may be stopped by
an attack on their flank. Von Werder wanted time. He thought he
had near him one French corps, the 18th, and he said, “1 will stop
you.” He attacked it and stopped it ; but during the course of the

138 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

action he found that he had to deal not merely with the 18th, but also
with two other corps, 20 and 24. He accordingly prolonged the action
of Villersexel the whole of the 9th, and street fighting occurred at one
o’clock in the morning of the 10th; he therefore fastened himself, as to
speak, on the French army like a bull-dog, and would not let go his
hold until it suited him. The result of that was that Bourbaki halted
his three corps and deployed them, and Von Werder calculated that
when once his antagonists had turned north and pivoted on their left, it
would be some time before they could move east pivoted on their right ;
he had rightly concluded that such an army had no mobility, that when
once it turned out of its direct course such an army as that would take
some time before it could resume its original direction. His judgment
was exact, his anticipations were realised to the fullest. On the morning
of the 10th he expected to be attacked, and Bourbaki expected to be
attacked. The German not being attacked simply left a rear-guard,
and drew off eastward at leisure, until he came to the Lisaine on
the llth. Ithink you will find, gentlemen, that the manner in which
Von Werder first stopped Bourbaki at Villersexel, and having stopped
him marched round his right, and, skilfully anticipating, him got between
him and Belfort, and then took up a strong position on the river
Lisaine, constitutes one of the most interesting and instructive opera-
tions by a small army, some 35,000 men, that is recorded at any rate in
modern history. It wasa good business-like transaction, a masterpiece
of military skill, no flurry about the matter, well conceived and well
executed (applause).

The space occupied by the German army of 45,000 men was about
14 miles long from left to right. Debschitz’s detachment was on the
left, the 4th Landwehr and the Prussian regulars in the centre, and the
Baden troops either on the.extreme right or in reserve, while Von
Treschow with the 1st Landwehr continued the investment of Belfort.

The 7th French military division was opposed to Debschitz, next from
right to left were 15, 24, 20 and 18. Cremev’s division was coming up.

Cremer deserves a word of well-earned praise; his division of 15,000
men deserved as high honour as they could get. They made a forced
march. under the most deplorable conditions conceivable. This division
had been detained at Dijon till the 9th of January by a piteous appeal
from General Garibaldi, who was as full of military nervousness at this
time as he had been previously full of political enthusiasm. He mistook
the appearance of afew Uhlans for the advance of the whole Prussian
army. In point of fact at no time was there more than a brigade detached
down towards Dijon, Kettlers’s, the 8th brigade, part of the 2nd corps,
but it was quite sufficient to frighten the very life out of Garibaldi’s
people, although Garibaldi, I believe, had 15,000, and de Freycinet says
he could have been reinforced to 30,000. Garibaldi delayed Cremer.
Then by forced marches Cremer went round to Lure. His troops
reached Lure on the 14th of January, wearied, as may well be imagined,
when it is remembered that the French soldier carried 60 lbs. weight, and
cold—the temperature was exceedingly low, some present may remem-
ber the winter, it was a very severe one indeed—and colder still because
shoe-leather had failed, and in many instances the men were barefooted,

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 139

“This gallant division reached the Lisaine battle-field on the 15th, and
opened fire on the Germans on that day. Neither officers nor men had
anything to eat from 7 a.m. on the 14th till 6 p.m. of the 15th, although
during that time they had marched over 40 miles, and had been for
several hours under the fire of the enemy.” Iam sure that no gentle-
man present will grudge credit to Cremer.

But, gentlemen, there was another forced march,—fortitude and
military spirit not being confined to any one race,—and that was the
march of No. VII. and No. II., under Manteuffel, who commanded both,
the II. corps being under Fransecky, and the VII. under Zastrow. Let
us see what the same writer says about this incident : “The march of
Manteuffel has scarcely had a parallel in modern war, and forms a most
striking proof of the perfection of the Prussian administration of
supplies upon the march. In 16 days his force, with all its trains of
necessaries and other impediments, crossed two ranges of mountains,
over by-roads, and having enemies at Langres and Dijon, plunged into
the heart of one poor district, plunged directly into another equally
poor, to intercept and finally to destroy an army numerically twice as
large.”

When Nos. VII. and II. were thus marching, a desperate combat
occurred at the Lisaine on the 15th, 16th and 17th December. First
the French tried by their right between Montbeliard and Héricourt ;
next they tried by their centre principally at a fortified position in
front of Héricourt, and finally they tried with their left, when Cremer
came up. If permitted, I propose to put in an appendix instances
of the different phases of the fight, such as artillery fire, and the
way in which the French, issuing from the woods, came under range,
features of particular combats, and other matters of interest, but I
am afraid that if I were to read any of these now, Colonel Trench, my
address would stretch past the legitimate hour.

Tue Caairman—We shall not object on that score.

Dr. Macuire—The French failed repeatedly, hour after hour their
attacks were repulsed easily, except on the German extreme right, which
indeed was the inner and dangerous flank. That Bourbaki did not
press them about Frahier from the first is prima facie extraordinary
but nob so very strange when you remember that the troops were
without food, or efficient officers, or thorough training, and were
really no soldiers at all; there were 150,000 of them, what Lord
Wolseley calls “men with muskets,’—men without boots, with-
out food, without officers to instruct them, without a staff, without
everything which is the differentia of an army as compared with a mob.
But there was no lack of bravery, and there was no lack of endurance.
On the German side endurance and valour were also displayed ; but the
German staff was wiser about the comfort of its men. I could have
gone on reading items about flannels, comforters and mittens sup-
plied to the soldiers. And the Germans used to withdraw as many
men as they could back to the rear each day and put them in villages
and houses to sleep ; whereas the French slept on the ground with the
thermometer abnormally low, even for a severe winter. The French

140 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

attacks were frequently repulsed by artillery alone. Here you have the
German artillery on the defensive playing almost as distinguished a part
as the German artillery on the offensive did at Sedan. On the evening
of the 16th the German right was broken at Chenebier, by the {8th
corps and Cremer’s division; but the Germans recovered themselves
about 12 o’clock, and they made a night attack. They did not recap-
ture the position, but they stopped the forward movement of the French.
On the 17th Bourbaki began to retreat, he ordered a retreat which was
continued on the 18th, i9th, 20th, 21st and 22nd, which day saw his
army back again at Besangon.

And then took place a fine display of strategic ability. Manteuffel’s
corps that had been marching to the aid of Von Werder found that he
did not require their assistance, on the contrary he sufficed to keep the
hindmost columns of the retreating enemy on the move. So Manteuffel
immediately came to the conclusion to interpose between Bourbaki’s
army and every possible avenue of escape to Lyons or elsewhere, to close
the line of retreat south,—in other words, to close the various roads be-
tween the Swiss frontier and the Doubs. The VII. corps joined in to the
right of No. XIV., and the II. corps madea sweep round towards Lons-
le-Saulnier. The wretched Bourbaki in a state of despair gave orders for
a movement backwards towards the Lower Saone and the Upper Rhone
on the 26th of January, but by the 26th of January one hostile corps
would be on his right flank, and another corps, the II., in his front.
‘What occurred on the 27th, 28th and 29th I need not detail, the
miserable retreating French, in a state of starvation and despair, were
driven towards the Swiss frontier by the XIV. corps and the VII.
corps, while the II. corps kept continually moving on towards its right
and upwards towards Pontarlier, where the final battle occurred, and
the French were obliged to lay down their arms in Switzerland in a
deplorable condition.

Now this, gentlemen, is merely a general outline of the condition of the
campaign; some details, as I said before, I will furnish, though they
‘would take too much time now. But we ought to read some evidence of
the awful state to which an army, starting in all the pride, pomp, circum-
stance and glory of war, can be reduced, in a very short time, generally
through the folly of the State, and partly through the incapacity of its
staff. 150,000 men, in their own country, started from Besancon about
the 8rd of January, were stopped by one-fifth of their force on the 9th
of January, beaten by one-fourth of their force on the 15th, 16th and
17th of January, driven to a most disastrous retreat, and pursued by a
fourth of their force, and then closed in upon and compelled to retreat
into another country than their own by another army one-third of their
force ; the whole thing not occupying one month, from the 8rd January
to the 2nd February. And in what condition did they present them-
selves to their neighbours after this tremendous enterprise, which was
to raise the siege of Belfort, which was to capture Von Werder, and
which was to reduce the 250,000 Germans about Paris to a state of
utter destitution; what became of them? ‘* Most of these unfortunate
men arrived in Switzerland in a state which defies description.

Some had bits of wood under their bare feet, others wore wooden sabots,

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S OAMPAIGN. 141

hundreds had no socks and no boots, and parts of their feet were
frozen. None had washed or changed their clothes for a long period.
For three days they had neither food nor fodder, and even prior to that
period of absolute famine one loaf was often shared between eight men.”
How can this be explained, and what lesson can we draw from it?
It is explained by General Vial in a very well written and truthful book.
The whole fault was the folly of trying to improvise an army at all in
the face of a trained, veteran, well-organised army, representing a nation
in arms—not conscripts, but a nation in arms. ‘The levée en masse of
1793 had to deal with armies recruited man by man, bought under the
old system; and a nation of armies rising like the fabulous dragon’s
teeth, of course, will wear out forces recruited by fragments. But this
time the French were rising, 600,000 of them, not against armies re-
cruited one by one from volunteers, but against a million of men (fora
million of men were in France) every one of whom had had a military
training, and every one of whose leaders knew the art of war. What
is the use of a man who is an officer for three weeks trying to compete
with a man who has been an officer for ten years? Here were colonels
who had been very respectable commercial agents only a few weeks
before! What was the German colonel? A very different kind of person.
The legitimate chiefs of French military life were in Germany, and
from a strategic point of view, the right thing for the French to have
done was to have bowed to adversity. They ought to have yielded to
fate and made the best terms that they could when their army was
thoroughly beaten at Sedan. Their latter levies were badly led, badly
organised, badly fed, and the whole thing proves that there is not
the shghtest use in any nation trying to become a military nation in the
middle of a war (applause). Gentlemen, there has been a great deal
recently written about the command of the sea, and about the
necessity for military preparedness, but certainly if the British race
is not in a state of splendid preparation for war, it is not because
the leading teachers of the British race have ever uttered any un-
certain sound on the matter. I quite recognise and am pleased here
to be able to recognise the splendid service done to the British race
by a celebrated American writer, and it would be well if many
Englishmen were infused with as much enthusiastic admiration for
the prowess of this country as is the American naval author, Captain
Mahan. But the wisdom of that great writer was anticipated word for
word by Lord Bacon in the time of Hlizabeth, when he indicated the
path that England must necessarily pursue if it was to have command
of the Indies, and the command of the sea. I do not care in the
slightest degree about all the cant of philosophical humanitarian
charlatans; there is only one thing that can possibly preserve a nation,
be it China, England, Germany, or any nation. “This is the most
certain oracle of time,” as Lord Bacon said, that if you want to preserve
your nation you must begin to study the art of war, not in the course
of a war, but long before awar. If the French had been, as General
Niel begged of them to be, organised like the Germans, Gambetta would
not have sent 600,000 poor starving wretches against leaders like Von
Goben, Prince Frederick Charles, the Duke of Mecklenburg, and Von

142 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

Werder to be ruined and disgraced, and discontented with their very
existence, without glory or profit. If he had had 600,000 men, all of
whom had served in the army and all of whom were directed by military
intellivence of the highest order, they would have told a very different
tale after the battle of Le Mans and the battle of the Lisaine. And
this fall of France, terrific as it was and costly as it was, costing, as Mr.
Giffen, the great authority on statistics, has proved, at least £700,000,000
of money to her people, for this appalling pecuniary sacrifice between the
19th July, 1870, and the 2nd February, 1871, what had France to show ?
The sacrifice of her capital and the loss of territory! Money, territory,
fame, and provinces gone in six months! Will money save a nation?
No, says Lord Bacon; and I think I ought to direct your attention to that
essay on “The true greatness of kingdoms and estates.” Money will
not save anation. As Lord Bacon says, “the man who has better iron
will take all your gold ;” and, as he says again, ‘“rumbers will not save a
nation.” What cares the wolf how many the sheep be? Nor will even
military weapons save a nation unless in hands well trained in their use
and nerved by discipline. The French had ample abundance of good
weapons. What-will savea nation? One thing, and one thing only,
a military spirit transfused amongst every section of the nation, from
the highest to the lowest. And Iam sorry to say that I believe that
in England that military spirit does not exist as it should, or the
volunteers would not be going about hunting everywhere for officers.
If the volunteers cannot get officers and efficient privates, I advocate in
the strongest possible manner, in the interest of every man in Hngland,
even in the moral and physical interests of the working classes as turning
them into men, and teaching them to walk erect, I advocate a system of
universal service of some kind. We must be ready at any cost. China
was not ready, and China is in a comtemptible state; 400,000,000 of
people with a civilisation 2000 years old, and protected from their adver-
_ sary by the sea, as we are protected by the sea, turned into the laughing-
stock of mankind by a population of less than one-tenth their number.
Why ? Because that population is at present relatively a military race,
and for no other reason. Gentlemen, this most certain oracle of time,
has had no more striking example than the proceedings of the army of
Bourbaki as against the army of Manteuffel and Von Werder.

I thank you very much indeed gentlemen for the attention with which
you have listened to me. You at any rate are not lacking in this
military spirit, your regiment has proved it in every part of the globe
for generations; but I wish its elevating influence, and its example could
be felt and followed by every section of British society,

“There is the moral of all human tales ;
? Tis but the same rehearsal of the past,
First freedom and then glory.”
(that is, what is better and more necessary than freedom, military
power).
“ First freedom, and then glory—when that fails,
Wealth, vice, corruption,— barbarism at last.”

(Loud and prolonged applause).

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 143

DISCUSSION.

THe CHarrmMaAn—After the lecture that we have heard, gentlemen, no words of
mine are necessary to lead you more fully to appreciate it; but Dr. Maguire has
kindly offered to reply to any remarks or questions that any gentlemen would like
to ask on the lecture.

With regard to the levée en masse of France, I think that France respects her-
self and the world respects her the more for it, although it was costly to a degree
as I need not say.

If any officer has any remarks to make or any questions to ask on the events of
the campaign, we shall be very pleased to hear them. Perhaps Mr. Poultney
Bigelow, whom we have the pleasure of welcoming this evening, will give us the
benefit of his experience.

Mr. Poutrnsy BienLow—Col. Trench, the reflection that I feel like making
at this moment is one of gratitude.for the kind words that were said in regard to .
Captain Mahan, who I am sure would have liked to have been present to hear
them. If there is anything that could strengthen what the lecturer has so
eloquently and forcibly said, it would be the knowledge that all the bad that he
has spoken of England is tenfold more bad in the United States. We too suffer
in our military administration from the reckless application of popular theories
regarding liberty. It would be most excellent for the United States as for Eng-
land to have short but universal service in the army. Every young man should
know how to defend his country’s honour, as he knows how to spar and to ride.

It looks now in America as though the time were near when those who repre-
sent decent government would have to once more step into the ranks, and exchange
cartridges with the mob. Such a contingency would bring forward the serious
question of a better military preparation than we have to-day. Butas Dr. Maguire
spoke of that horrible retreat of Bourbaki’s army, one’s mind instinctively, I think,
went back to the army of Napoleon I. returning from Moscow, when, starting off
with all the show and glitter of war, he came back with nothing to speak of except
disgrace. He even had his great reputation stained by the cowardice of leaving
his army in the darkest moment and hurrying home for his own safety and little
else. When I was in Kovno, which is one of the dirtiest cities I have ever seen,
the only thing I could find there to cheer me was a monument on which was in-
scribed—it was on the banks of the Memel or Niemen—“ Here there entered
Russia 600,000 Frenchmen, and there went back 60,000.” T can fancy a delight-
ful book from the pen of Dr. Maguire on winter campaigns in general, taking
Bourbaki’s campaign and taking that retreat from Moscow, and other notable
winter campaigns with a view to discussing the possibilities of winter campaigns.
Because I think it must be evident that it was not the winter alone that hurt
Bourbaki. ‘The few remarks that Dr. Maguire has given us illustrate that amply.
It was bad management, and I think that in Napoleon’s campaign there is a pretty
general concensus of opinion to-day, that the elements alone did not injure Napo-
leon ; that it was corruption, thievery amongst his officers or contractors—it was
thorough bad management. We all remember how, when the troops arrived in
Vilna, there was an abundance in the store-houses and still the troops were starving
—they could not get at it; those who could, got too much, and the rest got
nothing, and the matter is one of particular interest at this moment, because I
have noticed latterly, in conversation with officers in staff positions, an exceeding
nervousness with regard to a possible war with Russia on the score of winter cam-
paigns ; they are always faced by this spectre of the year 1812. I do not know of
any book that treats of winter campaigns in such a manner as to have a practical
bearing on the possibilities of an invasion of a great country during the winter

144, GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

season, which inevitably would have to be the case in Russia. And the conditions
of railway travel, of course, make the experiences of that war of 1812 almost
obsolete. One great German writer who signs himself “ Sarmaticus,” the very
able Colonel Liebert is in favour of a winter campaign as being the most favour
able for artillery movement in Russia. There have been some winter campaigns
that have not been studied. There was one for instance in the American war
against the mother country in 1775-6, when the revolutionary forces marched from
Boston, a distance of nearly 400 miles, all the way up through the State of
Maine to surprise Quebec. "They were unsuccessful, but I have never been able
to find a detailed military account of that expedition. Yet there is no reference
anywhere that I know of to any great suffering on account of the snow or cold,
or want of provisions. And amongst the American cavalry (and in England it
is more so still probably) there is a constant requirement of service in the “field in
winter in which there is no particular hardship on account of snow or ice, although
the temperature is infinitely lower than anything that it could have been in that
. winter in France, and probably even quite as severe as what Napoleon had in 1812.

Tue Cuairman—If nobody else has anything to say it remains for me, in your
name, to thank Dr. Maguire for the eloquent and spirited lecture that he has given
us, and to express to him how thankful we are to him for coming here to-night to
give us this treat.

Dr. Macurre—Colonel Trench and Gentlemen, I thank you very much indeed.
I shall not keep you more than a moment, because there was very little in the
criticisms with which one does not cordially agree. As regards the levée en masse, I
am at one with Colonel Trench; I madea kind of slip, but Iwas thinking more of
the military matter after Sedan than of the moral matter, I cer tainly agree with
Colonel Trench that, from a moral point of view, France did well in having the
courage ‘never to submit or yield, and what is more, not to be overcome” as long
as there was a rat in Paris (applause). Lam very g glad indeed that Colonel Trench
corrected me; I certainly blundered in expression. But from the military point
of view, looking at it coolly, it seems as if it would have been best to have
accepted the siamenton, as I said before, after Sedan, nevertheless the French
deserve our admiration which you, sir, have fittingly expressed for their
exalted, Miltonic patriotism and enthusiasm. JI was very glad indeed to
hear the remarks of our American cousin, whose name is well known in con-
nection with military strategy—clarum et venerabile nomen. Captain Mahan’s
books are one eulogy of our navy, and our method of securing maritime
supremacy from beginning to end. The importance of universal service, when
Mr. Bigelow was speaking, must have come home to the mind of every officer
present, and I will not dwell upon that further. We must look ahead, or we
shall meet with worse things than have been described in connection with
America by our distinguished visitor. And, certainly, we ought to wish every good
to America. Nothing appears to me more discreditable in the history of modern
times than the constant cavilling at Great Britian by certain Americans, and the
snobbish contempt of America by certain Englishmen; and Captain Mahan, in trying
to obliterate these evils has done further good, and I am always as delighted to
read his remarks, as I was to hear Mr. Big elow’ s. Again, every English ‘military
student occasionally feels himself bound to bow before the long line of successful
professors of the military art, who fought from 1861 to 1865. We could mention
scores of them; four or five will be eufticient : Lee, Sherman, Jackson, Sheridan,
Stewart, are as Milton says, “in fames eternal bede roll worthy to be filed.”’

The honourable visitor alluded to winter campaigns. I do not think there isa
book written on that subject ; but there were many winter campaigns. If a badly
organised army did badly in winter, pari passu, a well organised army.did well
against that badly organised army in the same winter, Von Werder did well

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 145

in spite of ice, so did Prince Frederick Charles, and indeed so to some extent did
Chanzy. But there was an illustrious winter campaign in which a nation was
forthwith overrun and conquered. On the 8th of November, 1808, Napoleon
spread himself over a map in a tavernat Vittoria. Onthe 4th of December, 1808,
Napoleon, after defeating four Spanish armies, who had the advantage of rivers
and ranges of mountains for their defence, was in Madrid. That was a short
and decisive winter campaign. Moreover, some of the principal events, in the
last Russo-Turkish war were in the midst of snow in the Balkans. And again it
just strikes me that the French conquered the Netherlands in a winter campaign
in 1794-5. In point of fact the Dutch fleet in the Texel was captured in the ice,
on the ice, and over the ice by a regiment of French Hussars (laughter).
T again thank you Colonel Trench and gentlemen for your kind reception.

APPENDIX.

GERMAN Forcrs, XIV. Corps.—Von Werder.

BADEN FIELD DIVISION—Von Gliimer.
1st Inf. Brigade.—Wechmar (Col. Bayer was in this Brigade).
2nd Inf. Brigade.—Degenfeld.
3rd Inf. Brigade.—Keller.
Cavalry Brigade.—Willisen.

COMBINED PRUSSIAN INF. BRIGADE.—Von Goltz.
30th Regt.—Nachtigal.
34th Regt.—Wahlert.
Cavalry. — Walther.

4th RESERVE DIV.—Von Schmeling.

25th Reet. (3 batts.)—Von Loos.

Ist Combined Hast Prus. Landwehr Regt. (4 batts)—Kvrane.
Osterode, Ortelsburg, Graudenz, Thorn.

East Prussian Landwehr Brigade.—Zimmerman.
Tilsit, Wehlau, Insterbure. Gumbinnen.

3rd Combined East Prussian Landwehr Reet.—Usedom.
Loetzen, Goldap, Dantzig, Marienbure.

4th Reserve Cav. Brigade.—Tresckow II.

DEBSCHITZ’S DETACHMENT reached Belfort, 29th and 30th
Dec.—Tth, 47th, 10th, 50th Landwehr, and 2nd Batt. 84th Regt.

Il. (FRANSECKY) and VII. (ZASTROW) Corps under Manteuffel,
about 50,000, came into the theatre of operations after Jan. 18th.

BEsEIGING BELFORT.
Ist RESERVE DIV.—Von Tresckow I.

Halberstadt, Preus, Stargardt, Gnesen, Pomeranian, Bromberg, Neulddeseben
Stendal, &c. Landwehr and 67th Regt., of which a portion, with the Konetz
Landwehr, was at Montbéliard with Bredow,

146 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

-Frenca Forces.
XV. ARMY CORPS.—35,000.

General Martineau des Chenez.
Ist Inf. Div.—Dastugue.
2nd Inf. Div.—Rébillard.
3rd Inf. Div.—Petyavin.
Cay. Div.—Garland.

Artillery.—114 Guns.

XVIII. ARMY CORPS.—30,000.
General Billot.
Ist Inf. Div.—Fiellet-Pilatrie.
2nd Inf. Div—Admiral Penhoat.
3rd Inf. Div.— Bonnet.
Cavalry.—De Bremond.
Artillery.—7 Batteries, about 42 guns.

XX. ARMY CORPS.—25,000.
Clinchant.
Ist Inf. Div.—De Polignac.
2nd Inf. Div.—Thornton.
3rd Inf. Div.——Ségard.
Artillery.—18 guns.

XXIV. ARMY CORPS.—25,000.
De Bressolles.
1st Inf. Div.—D’ Aries.
2nd Inf, Div.—Commagny.
3rd Inf. Div.—Carré de Busserolle.
Artillery—Unknown.

CREMER’S DIV.—15,000.
Brigadiers Millot and Tevis.

Army RrsERvE.—10,000.
Palas de la Barriére.

7th Militiary Division—Besancon.
General Rolland.

USE OF RAILWAYS.—Qvoration From M. LEBLEU.

“ Tout le monde est d’accord sur la cause du désastre de cette armée de ]’Est.
Son mouvement a d’abord été trop lent, ensuite c’est le défaut de ravitaillement
qui a empéché le général Bourbaki de poursuivre son succés apres avoir enlevé
Arcey, le 18 janvier; les 15, 16 et 17, nos malheureux soldats se sont bravement
battus maleré Ja faim, malgré la température extrémement rigoureuse; enfin le
18, quand le mouvement de retraite s’est opéré, les vivres ont commencé a arriver ;
mais les convois, accumulés sur la route que devait suivre ’armée en sens con-
traire, n’ont été pour celle-ci qu’ une cause de désordre.

On a vivement accusé la compagnie des chemins de fer de Paris-Lyon-Méditer-
yanée d’avoir occasionné, par sa négligence, le défaut de ravitaillement et par suite
le désastre de ’armée de ’ Est. Sans vouloir me faire le défenseur de cette com-
pagnie, je pense qu’ une accusation aussi grave et aussi exclusive est injuste. Les
employés du chemin de fer ont fait leur devoir, peut-¢ire sans beaucoup d’ardeur

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 147

et d’enthousiasme, cependant d’une manicére suflisante pour assuret le service, s’il
avait été convenablement organisé. Mais cette organisation méme péchait par la
base, et c’est uniquement dans ce vice qu’il faut chercher la cause d’un désordre qui
s’est manifesté dés le commencement de la guerre et quis’est propagé jusqu’ & ces
derniers temps. Ayant été appelé d’abord & Saarbruck dés le 3 aot 1870, puis
a Varmée des Vosges par le général Cambriels, et enfin a l’armée du général
Bourbaki, je crois pouvoir émettre un avis raisonné sur les causes de nos désastres.

Un chemin de fer est un outil puissant et docile, mais qui doit étre employé
avec intelligence. Un personnel nombreux et discipliné est habitué a obéir a des
ordres précis émanés d’une direction unique ; il est complétement dévoyé lorsque
des ordres, souvent contradictoires, lui arrivent de plusieurs cdtés a la fois. Le
défaut d’unité est donc le vice capital auquel il a été fait allusion, et il sera facile
de le démontrer en examinant successivement la question des chemins de fer au
point de vue des travaux d’art, des transport des troupes, et des transport de
vivres et de munitions.”

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN|}

On renoncerait, quant a présent, a marcher directement sur Paris. On sépare-
rait les 18° et 20° corps du 152, et on les porterait rapidement, en chemin de fer,
jusqu’ a Beaune. Ces deux corps, conjointement avec Garibaldi et Cremer,
seraient destinés a s’emparer de Dijon, ce qui semblait trés-réalisable puisqu’ on
ferait agir 70,000 hommes environ 35, 4 40,000 ennemis. Pendant ce temps,
Bressoles et son armée se porteraient par chemin de fer & Besancon, on ils ramas-
seraient les 15 a 20,000 hommes de garnison. Cette force totale de 45, & 50,000
hommes, opérant de concert avec les 70,000 victorieux de Dijon, n’aurait pas de
paine a faire lever, méme sans coup férir, le siége de Belfort et offrirait une masse
compacte de 110,000 hommes, capable de couper les communications dans 1]’Est,
malgré tous les efforts de l’ennemi. La seule présence de cette armée ferait lever
le siége de toutes les places fortes du nord et permettrait au besoin de combiner
plus tard une action avee Faidherbe. En tous cas, on aurait la certitude de
rompre definitivement la base de ravitaillement de l’ennemi.

Quant au 15° corps, séparé des 18¢ et 20°, il aurait pour mission essentielle de
couvrir Bourges et Nevers en se retranchant dans les positions de Vierzon et en
occupant solidement la forét. Plus tard, quand le 25° corps serait suffisamment
formé, il pourrait relever—comme il le fit en effet-—le 15° corps dans sa faction
et lui permettrait de grossir, s’il y avait lieu, ’armée de |’ Est.

Pour le moment, la présence du 15° corps a Vierzon devait avoir un autre avantage
e’était de dissimuler le mouvement 4 ’ennemi. lle le dissimula en effet si bien
que pendant une dizaine de jours, les troupes destindes & renforcer V’armée de
Werder (le corps Zastrow notamment) errérent & V’aventure, de Montargis a
Avallon et d’Avallon a Montargis, selon les renseignements contradictoires qui leur
parvenaient au sujet de notre armée.

EXAMPLES OF ARTILLERY ACTION.
rom the German Official Account, Part II., Vol. II,

BATTLE OF VILLERSEXEL.

The batteries were in a critical position. In an attempt to take up a more
effective position further in advance, the Ist Light Reserve Battery had been
suddenly overwhelmed with infantry fire from Les Brosses Wood. ‘T'wo guns broke
down, but with the greatest coolness were again made fit to move. Non-com-
missioned officer Schulz was shot through the breast, but would not quit his gun
until it had been brought back (page 316).

1 De Freycinet ‘‘ La Guerre en Province,” page 222,

148 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN.

ACTION AT CHAVANNE.

It was not until 2 o’clock, when the hostile turning movement gripped the left
flank through the wood, that Lieut.-Colonel Nachtigal proceeded through Le
Vernois into a new position, east of Champey, which he reached without molesta-
tion, as the shell fire of the battery prevented immediate pursuit by the French
(page 326).

Action at MonTBSLiArD.

At Ancienne Citadelle the Loetzen battalion received support from the Inster-
burg battalion and from the 4th Light Reserve battery, which directed their fire
with success against the vigorously advancing foe, as also upon his batteries opening
from Allondans (page 332).

On the heights west of Montbéliard eight batteries, at least, of the 15th French
Corps had come into action one after another, and these maintained a brisk fire
from half-past three until dark. In consequence of the long range the German
batteries husbanded theirammunition. The artillery of the chateau and the heavy
guns at La Grange Dame chiefly replied. They compelled the adversary to change
his position frequently. The artillery suffered no losses, while those of the
infantry were but slight (page 334).

AcTION av BUSSEREL.

A final attack made at four p.m. was aimed chiefly at the mill. It was
vigorously supported by the enemy’s artillery, already deployed at Vyans. But
the Ist Light Baden Battery from its last position at Bethoncourt, was also able
to take part in the struggle round Busserel. From Brevilliers two Baden
battalions with two batteries under Colonel Sachs had also come up from General
Von Werder’s main reserve. The batteries at once drew the fire of the enemy’s
artillery upon themselves, but directed their own after a short time upon the
enemy’s advancing infantry and the columns emerging from the issues of the wood,
throwing them into disorder. The 4th Baden Heavy Battery, which Captain Von
Froben worked with great effect, had considerable losses (page 335).

ACTION AT CHAGEY.

Altogether, therefore, in addition to Captain Schweder’s seven heavy guns, there
were nine batteries, making a total of sixty-one guns, on the 4000 paces of front
from Le Salomon to Luze (page 337).

Action at Luzu-Hfricourt.

Since noon five French batteries had been in action west and south-west of Luze,
but they were so little able to cope with those of the defenders, that after the lapse
of ashort time, there were on an average only two guns in several of the batteries
fit for action, although the Germans were husbanding their ammunition as much
as possible, in view of the difficulty of replacing it. Consequently an almost entire
cessation in the artillery engagement took place in the afternoon, until it again
burst forth with great vehemence at three o’clock owing to the participation of
freshly arriving French batteries.

Shortly after, part of the artillery of the 24th French Corps was turned from
Vyans against the position on the Salomon, so that the 3rd Light Battery of the
Ath Reserve Division, which had hitherto been in action on the Mougnot, was
brought up thither as reinforcement. As the setting sun impeded the Germans
very greatly in observing and directing their fire, they limited themselves here to
replying only at intervals (page 339).

AcTION AT MONTBSLIARD.

At 7.30 a.m. a French parlémentaire summoned the garrison of the chateau to
surrender. After repelling this challenge, Lieutenant Sauer opened fire upon the

GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 149

French artillery visible on the Ancienne Citadelle heights, with such good effect
that they evacuated their position about 10 o’clock. Two of their guns which
had lost their gunners and teams, had to be left behind.

From the houses arranged for defence the French infantry ensconced therein
fired into the chiteau most vigorously, rendering the serving of the guns difficult,
and caused some losses to the landwehr companies, who answered the fire with
much coolness; in other respects, however, the French achieved no result.

A new position which the French batteries, after being driven off by the guns
of the chateau, had taken up in the neighbourhood of Mont Chevis Farm, was also
brought under fire by the German artillery from LaGrange Dame. The cannonade
lasted with moderate strength until nearly 12 o’clock, but increased in vigour
when three more French batteries unlimbered at Mont Chevis. In spite of the
fact that they had succeeded in gaining cover against the flanking fire from the
chateau of the town and were in prepared emplacements, they were again com-
pelled to frequent changes of position. Thus continued the artillery struggle
until three p.m. at which time the adversary’s fire ceased for awhile, but then was
again resumed and continued until nightfall (page 343).

ACTION aT BUSSEREL.

At Busserel, the 24th French Corps threatened only to break through, without
attempting it seriously. There stood assembled at that place, in addition to the
Danzig Landwehr battalion as on the 15th, the lst and 2nd battalions 5th Baden
regiment, and two Baden batteries, but the latter were on the height north of the
place. Against these, five hostile batteries had deployed as early as 8 a.m. at
Vyans. In the clearings of the wood infantry detachments were seen to be form-
ing up, the strength of which was estimated at a division.

With the view of giving support at the apparently threatened point, the General
Commanding ordered in consequence General Keller to advance with the fusilier
battalions of the 4th and 5th Baden regiments from the main reserve at Brévil-
liers. The 5th Heavy Battery which hastened in advance unlimbered at a
quarter-past 10 o’clock, on the right flank of the batteries already in action. The
adversary’s fire visibly began at once to slacken. First the French artillery with-
drew and not long after the infantry as well (page 845).

ACTION AT CHENEBIER-FRAHIER.

With the numbers so disproportionate General Keller could not attempt, after
the failure of the morning surprise, to drive the enemy from his positions, but
only to prevent his advance towards Belfort. This object was completely achieved.
The French held in check by the four German batteries which General Keller had
assembled at Frahier made no sericus attempt to attack (page 354).

ActTIon at Luze.

Opposite Luze strong bodies of French skirmishers lay at the edges of the wood
in readiness to advance, but held in check by the German artillery, they did not
emerge to the attack of the French batteries, those at the Bois Communaux more
especially took part in the struggle at this place. There also once more appeared
the artillery of the army reserve, which had played an active part in the preceding
fighting days (page 355).

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COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. R. J. JOCELYN, R.A.

(A Lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, 8th November, 1894.)

Masor-Guengrat H. Lz G. Guary, C.B., R.A., In THE Crain.

Tue Caatrman—Gentlemen, I will ask Colonel Jocelyn to give us his
lecture.

GENERAL GEARY AND GentLEMEN—I propose this afternoon to draw
attention to certain technical details connected with the efficient working
of the guns of the Coast Artillery, but without any special reference to
the particular service those guns may be called upon to perform ; for
this, I consider, to be less a question of training, than of distribution
of materiel and personnel, which is, rightly, in the hands of superior
authorities, who are able to regard it, not only from an artillery, but also
from a naval and engineer standpoint ; and, in discussing training and
command, we may, | think, very well leave such questions alone. Nor
do I propose to touch on the vexed question of ships versus forts, or on
what a gallant enemy dare or dare not do. Considering the small data
we have before us, in view of modern progress, it will be wiser to ob-
serve the aphorism, “ Do not prophesy unless you know.”

TRAINING: AN ABSTRACT QUESTION.

It is our duty to train the Coast Artillery, so that it may be ready
for whatever it may be called upon to do; to make it into a machine,
which will work together harmoniously, in all its parts, with as little
friction as possible, and with no portion of it subjected to undue strain;
and whether its lot may be, to check the raids of torpedo-boats, or fight
fleet actions, I cannot see that its training can be effected thereby. No
one knows what the future may bring us, therefore let us seek to make
it resemble one of those steam hammers close by, which can forge the
breech-piece of a “ Woolwich Infant,” or crack a nut, if necessary, and
until the day of trial comes, bringing with it what it may, let us so
work, that we may then hope to justify the money and thought that has
been expended on it. ‘Training, of necessity, must be an abstract
question.

Tae Cuan or Commanp.

I propose first dealing with the new chain of command which has
been laid down by authority. It is familiar no doubt to most of you,
but in order to clear the ground, I will read two short extracts from
official documents :—“ A fortress section will be organised for artillery
purposes in one or more I'ire Commands, of which the size will be

4, VOL. XXII. Dil

152 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

governed by the character of the water areas to be defended, and by
the number of forts and batteries which it may be possible for one
officer to direct in action: under certain circumstances, it may be desir-
able to place a Section C.R.A. in command of several Fire Commands ;
but as a general rule, this officer will not be required, and the Section
Commander will then communicate directly with the Fire Commanders.
In this, as in all other questions connected with command, the utmost
latitude must be allowed to stations. The next link in the chain of
command will be the Battery Commander. His unit of command will
be decided by local conditions, being governed by the positions of the
guns and by the water areas to be defended; but it should in no case
exceed the number of guns, which can, under local conditions, be
efficiently supervised by one officer. Under the Battery Commander
will be a certain number of officers, or selected N.-C.O.’s, who will have
charge of the gun groups. ‘They are styled Gun Group Commanders.
The gun groups having been settled, with due regard to their efficient
supervision by their commanders, they should be collected into battery
commands, which should be arranged with respect to the sea areas to be
defended, and also to the siting of the gun groups, all of which should
either be visible from, or in direct communication with, the Battery Com-
manders ‘Command Post;’ the latter being a place selected in the
vicinity of the most important group, whither all orders from the Fire
Commander will be sent. When a gun has to be fought singly, the
Gun Captain will perform the duties of Gun Group Commander. When
a gun group is so far detached from other gun groups that it cannot
be conveniently included in any battery command, the Gun Group
Commander must be prepared to execute the duties of the Battery
Commander, in addition to his own, and no Battery Commander will
be appointed.” ‘The Fire Command will include such battery com-
mands and detached gun groups as can be worked in combination for a
definite tactical object; when a Battery Command is, owing to special
circumstances, of such a character that it cannot be allotted to any Fire
Command, the Battery Commander must be prepared to discharge the
duties of Fire Commander as well as his own, the communications
running direct from him to the Section Commander.”

PW LEXIBILITY.

In the above, the first point I would ask you to notice is the extreme
flexibility—the extreme latitude that is allowed to local authorities, who
should be in a position to judge how best to carry out the orders laid
down. We must have flexibility of procedure in the Garrison Artillery ;
we are of all arms in the service the most tied down; we fight, as it
were, in a strait-waistcoat; we work our guns where they happen to
be, not always where we should like to put them. This, of course,
cannot be helped ; the best intellect of the time is given to choosing
sites and designing fortifications ; but, unfortunately, permanent works
cannot always be altered so as to accommodate themselves to every
change in arms or ideas, so we must accept matters as they are and
make the best of them. Thus it is, that great flexibility must be per-
missible. We must observe principles, for if we do not, confusion will
result, but the utmost latitude in carrying out details is not only

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 153

permitted but encouraged by the present orders, which are designed to
put the Garrison Artillery on a tactical footing, to knit officers and
men together, as in the other arms, and to make it a fighting force,
rather than a concourse of scientific individuals, engaged in target
practice. Therefore our drill-books must be looked upon as sticks and
not as crutches, we must not hang on to them nor shirk responsibility
when circumstances arise which prevent the carrying out of the strict
letter of the law: we can always be pulled up if we have done wrong,
we can always remember we have done our best. It is now time to
walk boldly forward, not like children learning to toddle; perhaps a
little hesitation might have been justified when electricity first came in,
being such a mysterious force to all of us, nor can we altogether blame
those who looked upon the position-finder, on its first appearance, with
something of that consternation, with which the Mexicans, who had
never seen a horse, regarded the mounted followers of Cortez : but now
as we have become accustomed to these things, they should be treated
neither with misgiving nor idolatry, but be recognised, while always
servants, as our most faithful and useful friends.

Superion KNowLepGe Requirep BY Hacu Ranr.

The next point to notice is the superior knowledge which must be
demanded from each rank: thus it is laid down that Gun Group Com-
manders must, under certain circumstances, exercise the functions of
Battery Commanders, Battery Commanders, those of Fire Commanders,
and so on. ‘hose who have any experience of the manning of Coast
Artillery, know that it has long been recognised, that the Gun Captains
must be looked to very often, to take charge of groups; this is now
absolutely recognised: the new orders do not blink the facts; but it
will sometimes happen that we must go further, and allow Gun Captains
to exercise certain duties, which up to the present, have been among
the functions of Battery Commanders. An example will show what I
mean.

The battery at A, fig. 1, is not a very uncommon arrangement : there,

Fie, 1,

uv
4.10 R.M.LL.

154. COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

a 9-2" B.L. gun is placed between two 6” B.L., thus making 3 groups,
with a single gun in each, the drawbacks of which I need not point out ;
it will probably be impossible to assign an officer to each gun, and the
Gun Captains of the two 6” will have to take charge of them : also, it
is more than likely, that the centre gun alone will be provided with a
position-finder, which at most, can give an uncorrected range to the
lighter guns. The ranging of these guns will have to be carried out
by the Gun Captains, I see no other way out of it.

Then, as we know,a Gun Group Commander when in an isolated
position, must naturally take up the duties of Battery Commander ; this
would be the case at G, fig. 1, when the officer in charge of the two 9”
R.M.L. would have to be in direct communication with the Fire Com-
mander.

Now if we consider the whole armament shewn in fig. 1, we see that
it must be divided into two fire commands; the guns at A, G, C and
D, all bear more or less on the same water-way and can be handled for
tactical purposes by a Fire Commander at LZ. Were it not for the
rising ground close to this station, he could also include in his com-
mand the three guns at H and F, which we may consider as some three
or four hundred yards distant. But the configuration of the ground
removes them completely from his control, as far as action is con-
cerned. These three guns would form a battery command, and the
Battery Commander would have, in addition to his duties as such,
to exercise fire control as well. He would probably station himself at H,
where his most important gun is: it, no doubt, would have a position-
finder, but the two 7” R.M.l. would probably be fought by depression
range-finder, and their Gun Group Commander would have to range
them. At C and D are two normal battery, and four normal group
commands. It is evident that each rank must at times be prepared
to assume higher duties.

Locat MoprricaTIONS OF THE ABOVE.

At the same time it will sometimes be possible, and, in my opinion
desirable, for an officer to carry out a certain surveillance over portions
of his natural command, which, by force of circumstances, have to act
separately when fire opens. Thus, though the Fire Commander at D
cannot see the guns at H and F, nor how they are firing, he can very
well carry out all the other duties of his rank, with regard to them ;
as they are close at hand, he can inspect them, see that communications
and range-finding installations are in working order, for I think he
should do this by personal inspection, he can concert with the Battery
Commander how he is to act, under certain eventualities, and carry out
all his ordinary duties connected with ammunition supply, reliefs, &e.

Then, again, the Battery Commander at H, though perhaps he can-
not actually range the guns at Ff, is quite near enough to overlook
how they are beg worked. The Gun Group Commander at F, is
thus in a different position from the one at G, who is isolated, and
must in all respects fulfil the duties of a Battery Commander.

At A also, if there are one or two officers available as Gun Group
Commanders for the three guns, it is quite possible to carry on a certain
surveillance over the Gun Captain or Captains, who are acting inde-

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION, 155

pendently. Minutiae, such as these, cannot be included in a drill-book ;
it is for the common sense of the local authorities, to organise their
personnel to the best advantage.

With the exception of these considerations, I do not thik the
Gun Group Commanders and Gun Captains are much affected by the
new orders: their duties remain much as they were: the functions of
the Battery Commander have, however, been more closely defined, and
as hig command is perhaps the most important thing in Coast Defence,
it is worthy of special study.

Tur Barrery CoMMANDER.

A Battery Command is now defined, as the number of guns which
can be effectually supervised by one man: it is thus a true tactical unit,
and its method of fighting depends upon two things, the range-finding
installation and the class of work the guns are placed in,

RanGe-FINDERS.

With regard to range-finders, I yield to no one in enthusiastic admir-
ation of those we have got: the reputation of the position-finder has
been damaged, more by injudicious praise than by anything else, more by
those who imagined it would work miracles, than by those who knew the
true limits of its powers. When used as a range-finder, that 1s, when
the gun is laid over the sights, it is hard to imagine a more complete
and useful instrument, added to which, it has a unique value when
gun-sights are obscured or guns mounted for high-angle fire. To it
also we owe the fact, that the guns of a fortress are now knit together
and combined, in a way that was never dreamed of before, for I believe
Colonel Watkin was the first to propose and carry out electric com-
munications. It is possible, but not probable, that we may live to
see better instruments and better systems, but the first step was taken
by Colonel Watkin, and nothing can rob him of that glory. From the
introduction of electric communications dates the renaissance of the
Garrison Artillery.

The depression range-finder is, 1 think, a favourite with everyone,
and I have just heard that Colonel Watkin has further improved it ; he
has replaced the slider by a wheel, given a larger arc at the base and a
more powerful telescope, and has, in fact, turned out a stronger and a
better instrument; but excellent and handy as the depression range-
finder undoubtedly is, I need not tell you it cannot do all that the
position-finder can. The latter will, I believe, be given to all the more
important groups, while the former will be supplied at present, at the
rate of one a work. It is, of course, obvious that the nature of this
supply intimately affects the method of fighting a Battery Command.
Not less in its influence, is the nature of the work, in which the guns
are placed.

With regard to the Battery Commander, I wish to draw attention to
the three following points :—The targets he can engage, his position in
action, the responsibility of correcting fire.

TARGETS.
The number of targets that can be engaged simultaneously, will de-

156 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

pend on the range-finding installation ; if a depression range-finder is
employed, only one target can be dealt with, whereas, if there is a
position-finder per group, each group can fire on a separate one. For
my own part, I am somewhat afraid that this idea of engaging several
targets at a time by one Battery Command is liable to be pushed too far:
we must remember that if we want to lay guns over the sights, we must
have a clear view, and this, practically, independent group firing, may
lead to great interference from smoke, especially in casemates. Seeing
that a Battery Command does not comprise any great number of guns,
I should almost prefer to deal with one target first, and then get on to
another : for it is more important to absolutely crush one objective than
to partially damage two. Ido not mean to say that two targets ata
time should never be engaged, but when it is necessary, the question of
smoke must not be lost sight of, and groups controlled accordingly.

The next two points had better be considered, first in an open fort
and then in casemates.

Position oF Bartery ComMANDER IN ACTION IN AN Open Fort.

In a fort of any command, it should be an easy thing to establish the
command post in close vicinity to the guns, and also in a place, whence
the water-way would be visible, a depression range-finding pedestal
being also close at hand; for it would be well to always provide this
instrument. On a low site, this might not be so feasible. However
this may be, once action is imminent, the Battery Commander would
select a position from which he could see his water-way, leaving a
representative at his command post, if the same were not quite close at
hand, in reach of his voice. Such a position is an absolute necessity,
with one exception. Naval officers tell us that the best way to silence
a fort is to come in close and overwhelm it with fire: granting that
the ships have come in close, then the time for range-finding has passed
by, guns would have to be laid by aid of the sights alone, and fired as
quickly as possible, and the Battery Commander would be with his
men, beside them, close in touch with them, encouraging them in their
work and sharing their risks. On the whole, the question of the
Battery Commander’s position in an open fort is a fairly simple one.

CoRRECTION oF Frere In AN Open Tort.

Next we have the question, by whom shall corrections be applied to
the range, as found by the instrument? Now, when the position-
finder is employed I believe this matter can be left to the observers,
but even then, the Battery Commander should have the last word.
But with the depression range-finder this is impossible: the observer
is fully taken up, keeping his instrument on the target, and if the drum-
reader calls out its indications correctly, it is as much as we can ask of
him. In this case, I think, the Battery Commander must take charge
of the corrections, and, if he has to leave the vicinity of the instrument,
he must employ someone else to do it for him. Asa rule, I think the
method of fighting an open work is easily determined.

Tue Foregoine QUESTIONS IN CASEMATES.
In casemates, however, in considering the two foregoing questions,

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. iby

we are face to face with certain difficulties. A Battery Commander
can never be in touch with his men to the same extent, as in an open
work, and a position on the roof of the fort is almost forced upon him ;
for, were he even on the actual gun-floor, he could see, at most, two or
three detachments at a time. We must rest content with placing him
where he can see his water-way, and at the same time be in easy reach
of any place, where circumstances might demand his presence. ‘This
difficulty is emphasised, when we have two tiers to deal with, especially
if the fort is one, which must be divided into two battery commands,
which division should be vertical and not horizontal. The latter
arrangement is necessitated by the consideration that, the smoke of
one group should not interfere with the laying of another. Rigid
control of the group fire will have to be carried out, and rapidity be
sacrificed to the necessity of a clear field of view.

While the normal method of correcting fire must be the same as in
an open fort, there will be great difficulty in carrying it out, and the
position-finder will lose a good deal of its special advantages when
placed on the roof, a position which cannot always be avoided. When
opportunity arises, battery salvos should be employed.

Cases also will be found, where normal methods altogether fail and
special arrangements have to be made, such as firing at fixed points or
fixed trainings, average ranges to the fairway being taken. These
arrangements must be worked out locally, to suit the special difficulties
of the case.

Toe Fire CoMMANDER.

With regard to Fire Commanders, I would lay stress on their getting
a good hold of their commands, on their regarding if as a tactical body,
for whose training for action and general readiness for any emergency,
they are directly responsible. The important duties of organisation and
preparation are in their hands and should be thoroughly appreciated
by them. The limits of their command depend on local circumstances
entirely, and the wording of the order should be carefully considered
in each case, namely, “the size of a fire command will be governed by
the character of the water areas to be defended, and by the number of
forts and batteries which it may be possible for one officer to direct in
action.” ‘The control they can hope to exercise in action, will, also,
depend on locality, and its possible limits should be determined, as far
as possible, experimentally. It is a matter that we do not know much
about, and certainly wants working out.

Seorron C.R.A.

The Section C.R.A. will, “as a general rule, not be required,” the
necessity for one would depend, not on the number of the Fire Com-
mands, but on their distribution, the water-ways commanded, and the
possibility of concentration of fire.

Rance Correction.

I now wish to draw attention to certain points that require either
elaborating or working out. ‘The first of these is the “ corrections for
range.’ We areaccustomed to consider this, as depending on the three
factors—powder, tide and travel of target. Under the heading powder

158 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

we class the united effects of variation in powder, bad drill, temperature,
atmospheric conditions, age of gun, and “ personal factor” of gun, a
formidable array enough. If, however, we assume that the powder is
good, and eliminate such preventable disturbing causes as bad ramming
home, damp sponging, &c.,, we have what is called the “error of the
day” left, which of course, in any particular gun, will have a certain
effect on the muzzle velocity. It is useful to consider this effect by
itself: and here, let me say, that I know it is impossible to consider
these effects separately in actual action, but, as it is nob feasible, as I
shall attempt to show, to correct fire properly ‘‘shot by shot,” it is
proper that we should think out, before action, how the various dis-
turbing causes affect the shooting, try to eliminate them as far as we
can, and where this is impossible, to leave as little as may be to
individual judgment in war time.

In figs. 2 and 3 I have drawn the curves of range and elevation in

Fia. 2.

; I i in

9) 1000 2000 3000 4.000 3000

the cases of the 6” B.L. (80-pr.) and the 10” R.M.L., each with two
separate muzzle velocities. rom these curves it is seen how the muzzle
velocity affects their range, and, as a practical example, I may say that
two years ago, at Sandown, we constructed a range table from fig. 8,
which gave us very good results. We were firing with reduced charges,
but found that the indication of the published range table had always to

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 159

be very liberally corrected by the officer conducting the fire. Knowing”

Fie. 3.

|
1000 2000 3000 4000. 5000
the proper elevation for a certain range, at which a good number of rounds
had been fired, we had a fixed point on a new curve, which we sketched
in between the two others, and the results, as I have said, were very
satisfactory. But, as a rule, we are only provided with a range table
for one fixed muzzle velocity, so that, if we knew the elevation, different
from that laid down, due to a certain range, we would still be in doubt
as to other ranges. I think, however, it would be a good thing fora
Battery Commander to have the curves for range and elevation drawn
out for kis guns, not, of course, for use in action, but for study at
leisure. He should also note carefully every round he fires and seek to
determine any difference there may exist between guns of the same
nature.

The influence of tide is only at times important, but it may be very
serious: thus, with a B.l. gun on a site say 14 feet above mean tide,
the rise and fall of the latter being + 10 feet, it might be + 175 yards.

The correction for travel is seldom properly appreciated, as our
practice targets go so slow and keep at such slowly changing ranges ;
it may be very serious indeed, and amount to 200 yards or more on
service.

Now the net correction for all these things has to be applied to the
range, but if it is left to one person to account for all, how possibly can

160 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

he do so? Let us look at fig. 4, which is perhaps an extreme, but at

Fia. 4.

TARGET APPROACHING.

the same time quite a possible case: it is there seen that the disturb-
ing causes are not constant in their effect, and are sometimes cumulative,
sometimes conflicting. Even if we had to deal with “travel” only, I
do not think very good results would be obtained by correction shot by
shot: we have got to divorce ourselves from the idea, that rules applic-
able to target practice are any good on service.

I think that when the corrections for tide and powder are necessary
they should be dealt with in the elevation given to the gun ; that is, by
some mechanical means, either applied by clinometer or index plate:
the former can of course always be eliminated by using Case I., but I
should be loath to give up the many advantages of quadrant elevation.

General J. B. Richardson, Captain P. J. R. Crampton and, I believe,
others have written on this subject, which certainly wants working out.

The corrections for travel should be, if possible, embodied i the
range given to the guns. This can be done, I think, simply enough
when using the position-finder, but with the depression range-finder it
is not so easy. At one time we had “fighting books” with tables
drawn out for this purpose: these tables, accurately calculated on
assumptions which could hardly be made correctly, are things of the
past, and we have drums which at all events are logical in their work-
ing; the first idea of their principle was due, as far as I know, to Capt.
A. G. Scott, R.A.; but even these would be difficult to use in action, if
the targets had speed and there was much smoke about. A duty so
difficult, and for which no thoroughly satisfactory mechanical aid is

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 161

forthcoming, should certainly, when possible, be in the hands of an
officer of experience, and I have already stated my opinion, that the
Battery Commander should retain it in his own hands, but, as we have
seen, circumstances may arise where it will be practically in the hands
of a Gun Captain.

COMMUNICATIONS.

My next point is communications: I think, as far as range is con-
cerned, these are in a fairly satisfactory state, and that both clock and
electric dials, each in their place, work very well. The electric order
dial, also, has proved itself a most desirable adjunct in casemated
works, but the broad question of the interior communications of works
wants looking into. We want a good working telephone for what I
might call “ fighting lines.” The Ader transmitter, designed for busi-
ness offices, is not suitable for this purpose.

TARGETS.

My next point is targets: we have now reduced to an almost
machine-like nicety, practice with plugged shell at a single slow moving
target. Ihad the pleasure of showing at the Royal United Service
Institution, early in the year, the excellent effects of a season’s practice
in the Southern District on a record target, very small in comparison
with a service objective. The Commandant of the School of Instruction
at Plymouth has also shewn me, what I would call a magnificent record
of results, obtained this year at Picklecombe, which would not be
regarded as a very easy work to fight. ‘There is no doubt we can hit,
and hit often, a single slow moving target, but after all, what is that?
We have Jearnt our sword-drill, we must endeavour to acquire swords-
manship. ‘To do this, we want better targets and more practice. An
endeavour no doubt will be made to obtain the first ; the second can be
met by instructional batteries, from which the comparatively cheap
64-pr. ammunition can be fired.!

THREE Otuer Pornrs.

Three other points remain, but I will only indicate them, as I am
without any practical experience of any of them. ‘The first is shrapnel
shell fire, with time fuzes. I am a believer in the heavy shrapnel, even
at night, and I should be glad to see something done, to provide a
better time fuze, and to further test this projectile. ‘The second is
high-angle fire; this is in its infancy, and we all look forward to
extended trials; the third, and perhaps the most important, is the
ranging and control of quick-firing guns.

TRAINING.

Lastly, I would say a word as to training. I think each officer, each
link in the chain of command, should have definite opportunities for
training his own particular unit. Gun Group Commanders should take
their detachments in hand, as a subaltern of a field or horse battery

1T do not wish to be understood, as undervaluing the good effects of actually working and
firing the guns of the service armament: this should, ot course, never be discontinued: but
in addition, thereto, an allowance of 64-pr. ammunition, for instructional batteries, would be of
the greatest assistance, to efficient training.

162: COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

takes his section; he should train his gunners, through their Gun
Captains, in their own special work, pointing out the great num-
ber of mistakes that can be made, the adjustments that must be looked
to, the use of the clinometer in testing elevating gear, racers, &c.,
the effect on the shooting of bad drill or loss of time; he should
practice the various methods of laying and the easy transition from one
“Case” to another ; he should cultivate the intelligence of the men, by
explaining “ what it is all about,” and interest them by showing them
diagrams of the effect, on various supposed objectives, of the rounds
actually fired by them. He should especially train his Gun Captains,
and consequently himself, at the same time, in the observation and
correction of fire, taking advantage of the practice of other batteries
for this purpose. He should never forget that he himself, or his Gun
Captains, may be called upon to do this.

The Battery Commander should have opportunities, in an instruc-
tional battery, of seeing his detachments at work together, learning
smart and soldier-like drill, which will bear fruit when they are perhaps
scattered, by the necessities of a permanent work. It is very difficult
to inculcate real smartness in work, when men habitually drill in isolated
pits. He should teach his men to look on their gun-floor as a place of
parade, to be treated with all ceremony and decorum: in his own
particular command, he should practice complete manning, and if this
is impossible for want of men, he should weaken his detachments, so
that, while every gun may be supposed to be in action, range instal-
lations and communications should be fully manned. At drill, change
of system should be often practised, for it must never be forgotten that
smoke may, at any time, throw us back on Case III. He should see
that his subordinates understand the work of a higher grade, and occa-
sionally make them take the place of Battery Commander under his
observation, Seeing that rounds of service ammunition are so precious,
he should take care to get as much information and instruction,
from every shot, as possible: he should, especially, study the
results of his firing, and discuss with his officers the various faults that
are sure tocropup. There is not nearly as much discussion of practice
as there might be. Above all, he should himself lead in the study of
the water-way: officers and non-commissioned officers should know all
the channels under their guns, where the five fathom line runs, and the
ranges to any points, rocks, buoys, lights, &c. that are visible. Viva
Voce examination on the ground itself, as to this matter, would be very
useful.

It is especially necessary that Fire Commanders should often take
tactical charge of their commands; all command posts, communications,
range-finding stations, dials, &c. being put on a war footing, even if
the detachments can only be represented by Gun Captains; then the
smooth working of the whole can be tested. The coast defences of
the empire are now being told off into Fire Commands, and when this
ig accomplished, these tactical exercises should be constantly practised,
always with some definite object in view.

With regard to what I have said on training, I in no way wish to
pose as putting forward anything new: the points I have drawn atten-

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 1638

tion to, and others I have omitted, are, I doubt not, well known and
practised in some places, whilst in others, local circumstances entirely
prevent anything of the kind, except in a modified form. I only say,
when it is possible, it ought to be done.

In conclusion, there is one other matter, very germane to the present
subject, which I would beg permission to touch on: I think every
effort should be made to encourage esprit de corps amongst the younger
officers. A subaltern, for example, would be more happy and have
less of that feeling of unrest, if he had more, I will not say to interest
him, but more to do him credit, something to take a pride in. I know
there are many practical difficulties in the way, but if a certain portion
of a gun-floor was an officer’s own, so to speak, and if he were more
intimately associated with the training of a definite portion of the bat-
tery, we might hope to establish in the Garrison Artillery that healthy
emulation which exists amongst section officers in the mounted branches.
Drill that is not carried out smartly is worse than no drill, and this
smartness is very difficult, nay impossible, to obtain, when an officer is
in charge of squads 200 feet apart ; there can be no interest in the drill
and the men get into slovenly habits, while the officer often consults
his watch ; but, on the other hand, there are parades, which would con-
vince anyone, that there was no prouder command than a smart battery
of Garrison Artillery. When local circumstances permit, regard should
be taken of the place of parade.

There is also an idea that in the Garrison Artillery, there is little
chance of active service ; as to that, | think if we read the records of
the Regiment, and look back upon its story of honourable endeavour,
we shall have to admit, that the Garrison Artillery-—the sturdy trunk
from which the Regiment sprang—has, in comparison with its more
brilliant branches, borne a fair share of the heat and burden of the day,
and that it may claim to an equal heritage in that long record of
services, which is crystallised in our motto “ Ubique.”

DISCUSSION.

Tue CHarrmMaNn—After the very interesting and able lecture that Colonel Jocelyn
has given us, in one sense there hardly remains anything further to say, unless
it be that the subject is so vast that more than double the time might have been
spent upon it without tiring our attention.

I do not propose, to go over all the points that Colonel Jocelyn has touched upon,
but I think that one of the most important is the necessity for preserving flexibility.
There is great danger, in the fighting of Garrison Artillery, that we should become,
as it were, manacled by the necessary buildings and fixed communications with
which we cannot dispense. This flexibility should, in my judgment, extend not
only to the duties of the different officers, in giving them a very wide discretion,
but in adapting the principles, rather than the letter of the book, to the circum-
stances of the place they have to fight. I think the communications should be
put down in such a way that they could be very easily removed and changed
from time to time as our knowledge advances and the necessities of the problem

164 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

before us become more apparent. I cannot conceive anything that would bring
us back into a fossilised position more than not to be able to move these com-
munications from time to time. You will not get two generals in the field to fight
a battle precisely in the same way. Similarly, in fighting the guns of a garrison,
every man will have his own idea, and no two men will probably pursue precisely
the same tactics. Therefore, as I have said, all these communications ought to
be laid in such a way that they can be moved from time to time.

Now, as an instance of the flexibility which it is necessary for the officers to ob-
serve in carrying out their different duties, I may take that vexed question about
where the duty of the battery commander and where the gun-group officer’s
duty begins and ends. Circumstances must dictate that; it is impossible to lay
down a hard and fast line. Take, for instance, the case that Colonel Jocelyn
alluded to—a circular fort with two gun-floors, one above the other—those guns
are grouped vertically, not horizontally, and, therefore, the group officer practically
disappears. Hach gun on each tier—the one gun on one tier and the other on
the tier below it—are both actuated by the same position-finder; in point of fact
the guns are worked on each gun-floor independently of each other. The fort has
to be sub-divided verticaliy rather than horizontally. I mention that as a good
reason why we should not allow ourselves to be tied hand and foot to the mere
letter of an order.

With regard to what Colonel Jocelyn said about esprit de corps and smartening
up the officers, I am sure that we can have no difference of opinion at all. To
anybody who has seen Garrison Artillery in the last few years it must, I think,
be the greatest happiness and joy to see what a wonderful advance has been made.
I can only say, from my own experience, that | am no longer inundated with a
number of applications for immediate transfer from the Garrison Artillery. I do
not mean to say that some do not want to leave it to go to the field, but I mean
that they are less numerous than a few years ago; and I feel sure that as years
go on—every year bringing with it some fresh interest and something new—
the esprit de corps in the Garrison Artillery will go on increasing.

We shall be very glad to hear any gentleman who would like to take part in the
discussion.

Lrzeut.-Cotonen R. W. Rartnsrorp-Hannay— Colonel Jocelyn—in illus-
trating how, in the chain of command, each different commander might have to
exercise the functions of a higher grade, that is the gun-captain act as group
officer, the group officer as battery commander, and so on—made, I think, so far
as I could catch it, a slip of the tongue. In the first illustration that he gave I
think he said (at all events I so inferred it) that the gun-captain went up to
battery commander. I think that must have been a mistake.

Lrevt.-CoLtonet J. R. J. JocetyN—I meant that he might have to fulfil cer-
tain functions of a battery commander if there were no group officer. Take the
ease I mentioned where a single gun is left in sole charge of a gun-captain.
All he gets is his uncorrected range; he would be obliged to observe and correct
his fire and would thus exercise some of the most important functions of a
battery commander.

Lrevt.-CotoneL R, W. Rainsrorp-Hannay—You mean there that one gun
is a group.

Lrzut.-Cotonex J. R. J. Jocunyn—Yes.

Linvt.-Cotonet R. W. Ratnsrorp-Hannay—lI understand the point now,
but it seems a big jump from gun captain to battery commander,

Then with regard to firing at two targets, I quite think that with one depression
range-finder one target is all that you can manage; at the same time I do not see
why the smoke should interfere with your firing at two targets. I think that you

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 165

might often be able to fire at another target because one was obscured by smoke.
I agree with what Colonel Jocelyn said, but I do not think that his illustration
was quite a happy one.

Then with regard to the targets that we fire at, that target on the diagram, I
take it, is the section of a ship that is supposed to be approaching you ?

Lizvut.-Cotone. J. R. J. Jocenyn—Yes.

Lirut.-Cotonen R. W. Rarnsrorp-Hannay—And as you fired at it I think
you said that the range did not vary very much?

Lizvut.-CoLonge. J. R. J. Jocetyn—Yes.

Lirut.-Cotonen R. W. Rainsrorp-Hannay—But the ship if moving end-
on at a constant range must have been going sideways across the battery ?

Lrnut.-CotongEL J. R. J. Jocetyn—No, I did not say that we fired at the ship ;
we fired at the record target shewn on the diagram, and it moved at a slow rate.
I merely used this for the sake of comparison,to emphasize that, if we could
land two shots out of four in that small record target, we might possibly expect
to do the same thing, on active service, when firing at a real objective.

Lirut.-Cotonen R. W. Ratnsrorp-Hannay—I am glad that you have entered
upon the subject of targets, particularly an advancing and receding target, because
it is a thing that we very much want. Nobody has yet produced an advancing or
receding target, and, if anybody would do that, I think it would give an immense
lift to Garrison Artillery and to their practice. With the record targets that we
have hitherto fired at, the better the practice the more difficult it is to make a
target that will record it; but, at the same time it must not be considered that
the record targets are a failure, because they have taught us to shoot. There is
no doubt that the artillery did not know how well they could shoot, or take such
an interest in their shooting until the record targets were made. Therefore, how-
ever much they may be smashed up, it does not follow that they are to be done
away with, and that we are to go back to the old system of the Hong Kong.

About telephones and telegraphs, personally I hate the telephone. It is most
distracting to hear a man talking through the telephone—calling up his fellow,
and all that sort of thing. I defy anybody to keep his head witha telephone going
very near him, and, if we could by any possibility substitute the telesraph for the
telephone, I think it would be an advantage. Of course it would require a more
highly instructed individual, which it is harder to get; but that should be our aim.
And for that reason I think that the electric order-dial is a good invention, Cer-
tainly at Picklecombe, where you have a fort with two tiers, and where the battery
commander has no chance of seeing what his gun group commander is doing, [
think the electric order-dial has worked very well.

As to corrections, my friend on my right (Major Hansard) is too modest to
speak about what he has done himself, but I think he is now in the way to bring
forward corrections by slide rules which will work the corrections automatically.
I do not say that his is the best thing that can be made, but I think that some-
thing in that direction will be a great help to us in the future.

Colonel Jocelyn has also entered into the question of smartness of the Garrison
Artillery. Now a garrison company has to take charge of an armament that is
equivalent to that of about three ironclads ; about 100 men have to do what 1500
sailors and marines have to do on board ship—their work is hard work and rouch.
I only wish we could have the same bright gun floors and polish that you see On
board ship ; but when you think that one man has to do the work of somethine
like fifteen others on board ship, you can scarcely expect him to do it with the
same degree of finish. And with regard to the garrison gunner himself, I think
that everybody who comes from a Field Battery to Garrison Artillery is astonished
at the grand physique of the garrison gunner. Heisagrand fellow. He is ready

166 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

to adapt himself to almost anything that he is called upon to do. When you see
the way in which these men do their work, whether it is mounting heavy guns in
the narrow passages at Horsesand or Delimara Forts, or working ankle deep in
water on a steam tug in half a gale of wind off Fort Picklecombe—when you see
them march past without any sort of practice, and with officers whom they have
never seen, and shoulder to shoulder with men whom they never worked with—
you begin to appreciate what a grand fellow the garrison gunner is. He has of
necessity often to act on his own initiative, and this gives him a readiness of
resource and self-reliance that is possessed, I believe, by no other soldier in
the army.

Masor F. G. Stons—I think, sir, that as the subject of record targets has been
touched upon, it may be some satisfaction to know how the matter stands at pre-
sent. From what Colonel Rainsford-Hannay said, some of us might think that
possibly there was some idea of letting the record target go. But far from that ;
every effort has been made during the last year to secure one type of record
target which will please everybody—with the usual result, that it was found
quite impossible todo. The record targets which have been tried during the last
summer have, unfortunately, each of them been reported upon most favourably in
one district and most unfavourably in other districts; so that, although a very
thorough trial was made, the same class of target was not found to suit everybody’s
requirements. It may possibly end in two record targets having to be adopted ;
but certainly the record targets will not be allowed to go. We have improved
them year by year.

With regard to the question of a Fire Commander—which the lecturer brought
out at the beginning of his lecture—who was unable to exercise the functions of a
Fire Commander over an adjacent Battery Commander, removed by geographical
circumstances to the other side of the hill, or whatever it might be, the lecturer
suggested that it would be a good thing for him at all events to exercise a certain
amount of surveillance. I am inclined to agree with him to acertain extent ; but
I think that perhaps we ought to limit that by saying that he should only exercise
that surveillance provided that the water area, over which the Battery Commander
is carrying out his powers, is also easily seen by the Fire Commander of whom the
lecturer spoke, because, otherwise, I think that a Fire Commander coming in to a
Battery Commander who was really outside his immediate Fire Command, might
cause delay and confusion. I am not quite sure that I followed Colonel Jocelyn
correctly in what he said, but that was what I understood.

With regard to the practice of quick-firing guns, the latest experiments that
have been carried out were in the Isle of Wight this summer, and the report of the
practice led to the conclusion that it was quite impossible to group the quick-firing
guns under a Battery Commander, or anything of the sort, with the slightest
hope of getting quick-firing results ; and that the only thing that the Commanding
Officer could do (whether you call him the Battery Commander or something else)
would be to give the target and the range to start with, and that after that
the guns must be fired by the individual gun-captain, or whatever you like to call
him. The objection which, at first sight, would have appeared a short time ago,
as to smoke, drops at once when you consider the use of cordite cartridges. Further
experiments will be carried out on a more exhaustive scale at Shoeburyness as soon
as we have a satisfactory target on which to practice, but the Commandant does
not wish to carry out experiments until we have got a target which will travel
about 20 miles to the hour,—in which, doubtless, he is right.

With regard to a target which can approach or recede over a sea range, and be
fired at with safety, that question has also been taken up, but there are many
serious difficulties to be overcome.

Captain C. OrpE-BrowNre—lIs there any order to be followed in the adoption

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 167

of cordite cartridges, and is it within visible range of coming into more importance
with ordinary guns? What is being done with it? I suppose it comes with the
quick-firing guns, and you cannot expect the other for a long time; but is there
any exceptional reason why cordite should be more important for the one kind of
guns than for the other?

Maysor F. G. Stone—So far as my knowledge goes at present, I am afraid that
the reply would be that the Treasury would insist upon the existing store of powder
being used up—the usual thing.

Lirvt.-Cotonen A. A. SAuNDERS—With regard to the remarks made by Major
Stone on the subject of the record targets, I think perhaps I should say—as I have
had something to do with them this year—that of the three stations (I think it was
three) which sent in reports on the targets under trial, one at least—my own—
did not have one particular sort of target send to it. I allude to the Mitchell. I
do not know now what the Mitchell targets are like. But with regard to the
other targets mentioned by the General Officer Commanding R.A. at Gibraltar,
my own experience was a very short one; in fact the target only took one shot
and the whole target collapsed. That was the fate which was witnessed by many
officers who are here present. Therefore there was no alternative but to say that
the target was not a good one. But on meeting the Commandant from the school
at Plymouth, at Shoeburyness last week, he told me that he had been able to get
eight or ten shots into the target from one company alone. One salvo was fired
and the target collapsed, sat down on the water, so that there was no doubt as to
what sort of report had to be sent it.

But there are other considerations which govern these record targets ; that is to
say, the same record target can never be made to suit eachstation, I do not think
you can have one universal pattern target because there is such a thing as storing
the targets and keeping them, At Plymouth that big target was kept admirably
because it was brought alongside in the Dockyard and lifted bodily by a crane out
of the water and deposited high and dry. Down in the Isle of Wight there is no
means of keeping that target at all, except by mooring it where it would be very
able to be broken up; or else taking it to a very small harbour, Yarmouth har-
bour, and putting it on the mud. There is only room for one target there, and we
cannot beach it. Therefore the subject of storing targets is a very important one.
A target may be very applicable in one station which would not be applicable in
another.

Magsor I. G. Sronz—lI think the reports that have been received bear that out.

Lirut.-CotoneL A. A. Saunpers—I think it is hopeless therefore to have one
pattern record target everywhere. I donotsee how it can bedone. At present the
Ryder target seems, so far as keeping it and storing it, the most easily stored any-
where, because it is easily beached, and can very easily be taken to pieces as well
if you want to keep it out of the water.

Masor F, G. Srons—I think that is the conclusion we are obliged to arrive at.

Lrzvt.-Cotongen A. A. Saunpprs—But I think we shall never get a target
applicable to every station.

I am very glad to hear from Colonel Jocelyn the very good news that Colonel
Watkin is going to give us a larger depression range-finding instrument. I look
upon the depression range-finder as a most excellent friend to the regiment, and,
if it could be made a little bigger, it would be quite perfect, Iam therefore very
glad to hear that we are to have a larger instrument.

I am also glad to hear from Colonel Jocelyn that. he positively dislikes the Ader
telephone. My experience of it is that it is an instrument which is constantly
getting out of order. I think that any telephone which has a wooden sounding
board does not do for military purposes. These telephones are kept in damp places

168 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

very often and the boards split,—to say nothing of a gunner occasionally hammer-
ing at it, tapping it he calls it, which means giving it a good blow, by which means
he thinks he can make his friend hear better. And another thing about the tele-
phone is the telephonist. Not to put too fine a point on it there is no money in
it, and we get, as a rule, the third and fourth class men in companies to train as
telephonists. There is so much money now among all ranks, that what with gun-
layers, range-finding specialists, and other paid employments, the best men in the
company are not available for telephonists, and our experience this summer amongst
nine companies was that we got the third or fourth rate men sent us to be trained
as telephonists. I have even had men sent to me to train who could not read, so
that when I gave them a message they could not read it onthe paper. They were
rejected of course. Then again some men cannot hear through the telephone, al-
though they may be able to speak through it. I know some educated people who
cannot hear through the telephone, and dislike putting their ears toit. And again
other men’s voices are very bad. ‘Therefore when you come to take a company of
Garrison Artillery and say, send me ten men to train as telephonists, you frequently
have to reject numbers. I think that any other method of electric communication
would be better. Personally I have been able to get an A.B.C. telegraph instru-
ment lent by the Post Office Authorities, and it worked with great success. It is
very simple to send messages in the code, there are no electric batteries, no
shouting down through the instrument, and the men picked it up very well. I
hope to have further trials with it next year.

I think Colonel Jocelyn has given us a very good lecture to-night, and we are
very much obliged to him. I have heard it with a great deal of interest, as he had
taught me a good deal down in the Isle of Wight when I first went there.

Captain I. M. Lowe writes :—“ Being obliged to leave the lecture-room before
the conclusion of the discussion, I beg to forward a few remarks on Colonel
Jocelyn’s interesting lecture.

With regard to the effect of loss of M.V. upon range, it is not absolutely
necessary to have the second curve given in Fig. 3 provided for us, although no
doubt it simples matters.

If we determine the reduced M.V. that will cause the projectile to fall 10 yards
short, when the gun is elevated according to the range table for 1000 yards, and
calculate the “‘unders ” for that M.V. at each range, we obtain a series of figures
that form a useful addition to the range table.

For example an abridged range table for the 10” R.M.L. gun is given:

ang Ranges Correcting factors for
Elevation. | stv, 1979 fs, loss of M.V.
1° 28’ 1000 10:0
3° 14/ 2000 18°3
5° 18’ 3000 25:1
7° 39’ 4000 30'8

A Battery Commander, knowing his powder correction at 2000 yards to be 180,
can see at once from the above table that at 3000 yards it must be 250 yards.
_Or again firing with a reduced charge without a range table, it is found that with
3° 14! elevation the projectile falls 795 yards short of the range given for that eleva-
tion with the fullcharge. By means of the correcting factors, and the range table

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 169

for the full charge, the range table for the reduced charge can easily and accurately
be compiled.
Thus for 5° 18’ elevation :—
x 25°1=1090 short
3000—1090=1910.
For 7° 39’ elevation :—
x 80°8=1838 short
3000—13388=2662, &c., &e.
Tabulate these results in column A and compare them with the official range
table for M.V.=1028 fs. given in column B.

Elevation. A B
1° 287 665 570
8° 14’ 1205 1205
5° 18/ 1910 1925
7? Bey 2662 2660

With B.L. guns, in which the M.V. falls off sensibly as the bore wears, and with
cordite the want of some such addition to the range table as here given will be felt.

In speaking of sites chosen for permanent works by our forefathers, I am sure
that Colonel Jocelyn did not intend to disparage their knowledge, or discourage
the study of naval history in so far as it concerns us. History repeats itself and
a tactical position in the days of the arquebus is not unlikely to remain the same
in those times of Q.F. guns. It is not improbable that we shall return to the
wisdom of the ancients and re-arm with modern appliances, forts built centuries
ago and abandoned as useless for years. Whena mistake in coast fortification
does occur, it is usually due to a lack of study of the chart, or a proper appreciation
of naval matters. Fort Fisher in the American War is a notable instance of this
shortcoming, but badly placed as it was, it proved a hard nut to crack.

With regard to targets the first and most important consideration is speed. We
all want a target that records, but if in endeavouring to obtain it we get a thing
that will not tow at a fair rate we had better return to the Portsmouth, or other
target that will not appreciably take the way off the towing launch. At musketry
practice, conditions of range and size of target obtain now, that differ considerably
from those in the days of the Brown Bess. On the same principle it is surely
not right to provide the same sized target and conditions of range for the 9”
R.M.L. and 6" B.L., irrespective of their relative accuracy. The difference be-
tween these guns may not be exactly the same as between the old musket and the
Lee-Metford rifle, yet I venture to maintain that at the usual ranges the 12 foot
target is a great deal too low for the 9" R.M.L. and unnecessarily high for the 6”
B.L.

The shooting of the company in the Western District is referred to as extremely
good and reflects the greatest credit on the gun-layers and all concerned. Perhaps
its not least important point is, that if the cartridges used were the oldest on arm-
ament charge, and not made up expressly for the day’s firing, this practice should
go far to eradicate the want of faith in old armament ammunition.

I think we all. wish with Colonel Jocelyn that something could be done to stop
the emigration of subalterns from the Garrison Artillery, and are glad to hear from
other distinguished officers that things are better now than they were. The young
officer in the Coast Artillery sees with envy the submarine miners free to work at

170 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

their craft all day and every day, untrammelled by garrison fatigues and employ-
ments. He can rarely get hold of sufficient of his own men for gun drill, and yet
he knows that the gun is a more important factor in coast defence than the mine.
Is it to be wondered at, that he applies to be transferred as soon as possible to
the more favoured branch of the Regiment. Simplify Coast Artillery drill as
much as possible, remove from it all superfluous mathematics and let him have
his men to train and take a pride in, then will the Coast Artillery subaltern have
the interest and lose the unrest of which Colonel Jocelyn speaks.

Masor H. C. L. Hotpen, R.A., who was prevented from attending the lecture,
has sent the following for publication :—

There is one point in Colonel Jocelvn’s lecture that I would offer a few remarks
upon, and that point is the subject of electric communications, and my excuse for
these remarks must be first of all the great importance of the subject, and
secondly, the fact that the matériel of the great telegraph and telephone systems
of the world has been my special study for the past twenty years, during which
time I have had almost exceptional opportunities of judging of their efficiency and
suitability for the various purposes of the service.

Any system for electric communication between two or more points must
consist of —

(1) The conductors, whether they be lines, wires, or cables.
(2) The instruments, and their actuating source of electricity.

As to (1). The conductors should always consist of two wires and not one
wire and an earth returm; there are many reasons in favour of the two wires, and
but one against them, viz:—the expense; in the case of telephones being used it
is of prime importance that the best arrangements be made to prevent induction
from other wires.

(2). The instrument.

First of all there is the Morse telegraph, recording its message in dots and
dashes, and the sounder which is practically the Morse stripped of its recording
mechanism.

Secondly, there is the Wheatstone A.B.C. telegraph, in which a pointer moves
round a dial and spells out the message letter by letter. I do not forget the
various type-printing and writing telegraphs, but they are at present too costly
and complicated to be considered at all.

Thirdly, there is the telephone (either the simple magneto-telephone, acting
as a transmitter or receiver, or the magneto-telephone used as a receiver only
combined with a microphone transmitter) which transmits the actual message
spoken into it.

Let us consider the merits and demerits of these three classes of instruments
separately.

The Morse recorder has one great advantage in that it leaves an indisputable
written record of the message letter by letter, thus fixing responsibility in case of
a mistake, against it are the facts that it requires a specially trained operator to
work it, and that it is slow compared to a telephone if the message has not to be
written down. The sounder, which is in effect a Morse instrument without
recording mechanism, has all the disadvantages without the advantage of that
instrument.

Next in order comes the Wheatstone A.B.C. telegraph, this instrument, which
has been eulogised by one of the speakers, is quite unsuitable, to my mind, for our
coast defences ; it is not only extremely complicated and costly, but very delicate
and likely to get out of order, requiring when it does so not only an electrician
but a watchmaker to put it right again, since the introduction of the telephone it
has almost completely disappeared, except perhaps in places where it had been

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. ele zal

previously installed. It has only one point in its favour, and that is that it
transmits the message by letters and not words. It cannot be worked properly
without some practice. It does not require batteries to actuate it, it is true, but
on the other hand it is far more complicated than if it did, and besides this it
will be impossible to do away with batteries in a modern fortress, the probability
is rather that their number will go on steadily increasing until electricity is
supplied like water, gas, or air, might be from a central source.

Lastly comes the telephone. ‘This, if suitable instruments are used, properly
designed to meet the somewhat trying conditions under which they have to be
worked, is, I contend, the instrument ‘par excellence’ for service in coast defence
communication.

The pattern of instrument that has been in use hitherto, as the lecturer rightly
pointed out, is one that was originally designed for use in the subscribers offices
of the Paris Telephone Exchange, and for which purpose it answered admirably
for many years, though it has now been superseded by other forms. A great
mistake was made in introducing it into the forts around the coast, where it is
exposed to moisture, etc., and this I pointed out many years ago myself.

Another great mistake that has been made, and that there is still a tendency to
make, is, as pointed out by another speaker, that because the telephone repeats -
the voice, therefore it is supposed that everyone who can talk or hear can use the
instrument equally well, such is far from being the case, and therefore men ought
to be selected who, first of all, can talk clearly and hear well through a telephone
and secondly are suitable for the responsibility of the post they have to fill. As
regards the accuracy of messages through a telephone; if written down letter
for letter they would probably be found more accurate than the telegraph, but
such a course is obviously out of the question, it is however a good practice to
repeat the message to the sender.

I may as well preface my remarks on the subject of a suitable telephone by
saying, that the microphone and battery are a necessity to any system; there
being no magneto-telephone yet invented which will answer as a transmitter
loudly and clearly enough for our pnrpose.

Iam firmly of opinion, that if a good form of telephone were introduced, the
objections of many officers in whose hands it has failed would be heard no more,
and there would be an universal consensus of opinion in its favour: I consider
that each instrument should be complete in itself, with magneto, or other call-bell
and battery, and that it should be capable of use either at fixed stations or
temporary ones, there being no loose connections or wires beyond those connected
to the plug, for connecting to the line wires, which latter would be laid in the
ground or otherwise permanently, and brought up to terminal boxes at suitable.
places, in a somewhat similar manner to that which has been in use at the new
ranges at Shoeburyness since they were opened ; and furthermore I consider that
tbe instrument itself should fulfil the general conditions laid down in the following
specification,

(1) It shouid not be affected by damp or other atmospheric conditions.

(2) It should have a mouthpiece over the microphone to prevent it from
taking stray sounds, other than the message, readily,

(8) It should be dust proof.
(4) There should be no loose connecting wires.

(5) The receivers should be in duplicate, one for each ear, and so
connected that the failure of one does not interfere with the action
of the other; the use of flexible leads and receivers, separate from’
the instrument, should be avoided,

12 COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

(6) The automatic switches must be so arranged that it is impossible for
the line to be interrupted, as in the ordinary form, by a failure of
the switch to move, and whether the switch is moved or not, the
speaking or ringing of the call-bell should not be capable of being
entirely prevented by this failure of the switch in its action.

The ringing of the distant bell should be possible whether the switch
is on or off. It is most desirable that not more than two stations
should be connected on one line; lines that are used habitually for
inter-communication between several stations, are generally the
cause of delay, misunderstanding, and consequent mistakes.

Lieutenant A. 8. Bucky, R.A.—Having been unable to attend this lecture,
I have been allowed to offer, as part of the discussion thereon, some remarks on
practice with groups of quick-firing guns; and venture to put forward the
following, as the result of some experience lately gained at Shoeburyness in this
form of practice.

This experience, though limited, seems to lead to an opposite conclusion to
that arrived at by Major Stone in his remarks during this discussion, from the
results of practice in the Isle of Wight.

At Shoeburyness a group of four guns was generally used, two 6-prs. and two
3-prs., close together on a low site, and the target moved diagonally across the
front of the group. No range-finder was used, but ranging was done with one
gun, and rapid fire opened from all as soon as the range was found; the ranging
being repeated when rendered necsssary by the movement of the target.

The results obtained were satisfactory as regards accuracy, and were certainly
“quick-firing,’ though in this respect the rapidity of fire when using black
powder could not be compared with that obtained with cordite, except in a strong
wind. There is no doubt that to obtain the considerable results that should be
obtained with quick-firing guns, the ammunition mwst be smokeless.

It must be admitted that the conditions under which the practice was always
carried out, were very favourable: thus there was plenty of notice for preparation
for action; the shooting was in daylight; the target, though small, moved
comparatively slowly—certainly not more than nine or ten miles an hour; the
gunlayers (staff-sergeants of the School of Gunnery) were very highly trained
layers, and the men were well accustomed to the guns. No doubt the excellence
of the gun-detachments contributed very materially indeed to any good effect
obtained: but this merely shows the necessity for special and careful training of
the personnel for work with quick-firing guns—training of which actual firing
should form a large proportion.

Still, granting that the conditions were favourable, good results were obtained
from the group fire: and, given well-trained men, there seems no reason why
good results should not be obtainable when the other conditions are adverse. If
he can depend on his gun-layers, see his target, and observe his fire, the Group
Commander has a comparatively easy task: but he must correct on_ his
observations at once when necessary, and keep the fire of the group well in hand.

It seems impossible to hope that any accuracy of fire can be obtained by
leaving the gun-layers to do as they like, after being shown their target and given
an estimated range; though a large quantity of ammunition would probably be
expended.

As Major Stone says, experiments in this direction on a more exhaustive scale
are shortly to take place at Shoeburyness: the object I have in view in tendering
these remarks will be fully attained if judgment on the merits of quick-firing
guns fired in groups be deferred, until the results of those experiments are made
public.

COAST ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 1738

Lievt.-Cotonet J. R. J. Jocenyn—Well, Sir, I do not think there is much
to detain you with.

Colonel Rainsford-Hannay was not quite satisfied with my remarks about firing
at two targets. I entirely agree with what he himself said, so I must have
expressed myself indistinctly. What I meant was, that when two targets are
simultaneously engaged by one battery command, the question of smoke must be
carefully considered. My own procedure would be, salvos from the leeward
flank, first at one target and afterwards at the second.

With regard to our future practice targets, I do not know whether Colonel
Bingham told him that he has made a little step in advance this year by hauling
the target in with a pulley, which is distinctly interesting.

With regard to the telephone, I think there is a good deal to be said about the
poor telephone. I do not think it has quite had a fair trial. The Ader telephone
is a telephone for an office; the receiver is allright ; it is the wooden transmitter
that is the annoying thing, if you have the Ader telephone. The telegraph I am
a little doubtful of myself.

Tam glad that Major Hansard is working at the corrections. Iam sure that
we all ought to work at this subject. With the depression range-finder I do not
see how the corrections are going to be given, at present, in the case of a quick
target, but when we have a position-finder installed, it can, I think, be done.

I sympathise most fully with every word that Colonel Rainsford-Hannay has
said about the Garrison Gunner. It was not of him and his work that I spoke,
it was more a question of battery organization. Major Barron informed me of
some excellent results that he obtained at Malta, by the system I hinted at, and I
thought, if opportunity were allowed them, the Garrison Artillery might carry this
out elsewhere.

Lastly, with regard to Major Stone’s remarks about surveillance. I did not mean
that the Fire Commander at Z should go and interfere with the fire of the Battery
Commander at 7, he is not in a position to do so; I merely meant that, were it
not for the conformation of the ground the guns at H, and F would have formed
part of his command, so, though he cannot control them in action, he can and
should carry out the other functions of his office in regard to them Gig, I, I
have nothing further to say.2

THE CuarrmaNn—It only remains for me then to thank Colonel Jocelyn for
the lecture which he has so kindly and so ably given us.—(Applause).

1T have been permitted to see the remarks which Major Holden, Captain Lowe, and Lieutenant
Buckle have been good enough to add to the discussion, and I congratulate myself that such
valuable matter should be attached toa paper bearing my name; I think they contain special
information of very great interest, that in no way calls for comment from me.—J.R.J.J,

Ne eee
ee Fi

fo a

gs tenet aehance shearer

175

CAPTAIN THOMAS BROWN,
CHIEF FIRE-MASTER IN THE WEST INDIES, 1693.

CHARLES DALTON,
Liditor of English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714.

On 27th February, 168%, a Royal Warrant, signed by Wm. III. at
Whitehall, directed the Board of Ordnance to send 1,000 fire-arms, with
ammunition and appurtenances proportionable, to Liverpool to be de-
livered to the officer commanding the troops at said town. “And
you are also to send to the said Town of Liverpool” (so runs this
warrant) “6 gunners, 6 gun-smiths, 4 miners, an engineer and a store-
keeper to be employed in Our Service in our Kingdom of Ireland.”
In pursuance of the above warrant a master-gunner (Thos. Holman),
five gunners (one of whom was Wm. Bousfield who was destined to plant
his foot on the topmost rung of the artillery ladder in a later reign),
6 gun-smiths, 4 miners, an engineer (Captain Jacob Richards who had
served his apprenticeship at the siege of Buda), and a store-keeper were
sent to Liverpool. The commissions of all the above were dated 12th
March, 168$, and, with one exception, they each received 91 days’ pay
om advance. The exception was Capt. Jacob Richards, who received 102
days’ pay in advance. The King’s Warrant, quoted above, makes no
mention of a fire-master being sent to Liverpool with the artillery de-
tachment, but the “ List of officers sent to Liverpool” given in Vol. X.
of Ordnance Warrants gives the name of a fire-master, viz.: Thomas
Browne. The date of Brown’s commission is given in above list as
20th April, 1689, and his pay is stated to have been 4 shillings a day.
But, unlike the others, he received no pay in advance, and we may
safely presume he came off in the end worse than his companions in
this matter. No mention is made in the Ordnance Warrant Books of
the particular service in Ireland in which this detachment was to be
employed, but another source gives us the desired information—“ Cap-
tain Richards the engineer,” wrote Narcissus Luttrell in his Brief
Rotation of State Affairs, under date of 17th June, 1689, “ with several
others, that went a pretty while since for Londonderry, are returned,
having not been able to get into the town, very narrowly escaping the
losse of themselves and ship.” Judging from the date of Fire-master
Brown’s commission (20th April), it is evident he did not accom-
pany Richards’s party to Liverpool, in March, but was sent thither a
month later. ‘Turning to Military Entry Book No. 2 (Home Office
Series) we find, under date of 29th April, 1689 :— Instructions to
Piercy Kirk, Hsq., Maj-Gen. of the Forces, to go to Liverpool with all

AY VOL. Xx 24

176 CAPTAIN THOMAS BROWN, CHIEF FIRE-MASTER.

speed, to hire ships sufficient to carry the regiments commanded by
Col. Cunningham, Sir John Hanmer, Bart., and Col. Richards from
thence to Londonderry for its defence.”’? The above instructions to
Kirke were necessitated by the despicable conduct of Col. Robert
Lundy, Governor of Londonderry, who, after betraying his trust, had
deserted his post and left the citizens to shift for themselves. And
though Col. John Cunningham and Col. Solomon Richards, who had
been sent to Londonderry with their respective regiments (the 9th and
17th) in March, 1689, cannot be said to have been traitors, yet were
they strangely lacking in soldierly duty and zeal for the Protestant
cause when they turned their backs on the beleagured town and
returned to Hngland with their regiments. “For their perfidiousnesse
therein,” as Luttrell expresses it, they were removed from their com-
mands and were succeeded by two good men and true—Col. William
Stewart and Col. Sir George St. George.

On the 2Ist May, 1689, Kirke set sail from Liverpool with threo
regiments, provisions, ‘‘ and arms for above 10,000 more with ammuni-
tion proportionable” (Luttrell). It is very certain that if Fire-master
Brown did not sail with Kirke’s convoy to Londonderry, that both he
and Captain Jacob Richards joined the relieving forces soon after in
Lough Derry as will presently appear.

After being driven back by contrary winds to Liverpool, Kirke’s ships
arrived in Lough Derry early in June. The relieving forces found, on
arrival, that the besieging army had erected batteries on each side of
the river and had placed a boom, or barrier, across the mouth of the
river to obstruct the entrance. The result is well known. After
overcoming apparently insurmountable difficulties Kirke relieved Lon-
donderry, by water, on 30th July, and on ist August the enemy raised
the siege and retired. For some time past dogs, cats, and rats, with
starch as a farinaceous diet, had been the daily food of the beleagured
garrison, and they could not have held out more than two days longer
(Luttrell). By virtue of his commision, dated —— May, 1689, Kirke
took the command of the Londonderry and Enniskillen forees—reduced
some regiments and re-formed others. On 6th August, 1689, he ap-
pointed Captain Jacob Richards captain of a company of fusiliers to
attend the train of artillery, which had been raised for Ireland, and
Thomas Brown was given a commission as lieutenant to this newly
raised company on the same day.! Shortly after these events Kirke
joined forces with Schomberg’s army which had come to re-conquer
treland. We hear nothing further of Lieutenant Thomas Brown until
11th September, 1690, when he quitted the fusilier company and was
appointed lieutenant of the company of miners commanded by Captain
Jno. Pitt--an officer selected by Duke Schomberg for this command
8 months previously. The following extract from a letter of the great
Schomberg to the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, dated 10th
March, 16§$, gives the writer’s opinion of the importance of this com-
pany of miners and of the Artillery Train in particular :—

“And forasmuch as the said Company of Miners doe immediately

1 Report by Charles Fox to the Lords of the Treasury on Captain Thomas Brown’s petition,
19th September, 1692. Treaswry Papers.

CAPTAIN THOMAS BROWN, CHIEF FIRE-MASTER, 177

appertaine onto, and are, a part of the Trayne of Artillery

I desire the said Company may in the future be placed on the same
Establishment with the rest of the Trayne, it being onder the same
constitution, and would augment somewhat the Honour and Grandeur
thereof which I shall ever endeavour to promote.” In his double
capacity of fire-master and lieutenant of the miners, Thomas Brown did
good service at the second siege of Limerick. “On the 10th Septem-
ber (1691),” writes Colonel Walton in his graphic account of the siege
of Limerick, ‘two mortars were mounted in Ireton’s fort under the
superintendence of Lieutenant Brown, a very inventive and active
officer, and they did great execution.” On 8rd October, 1691, Limerick
surrendered and the war in Ireland was practically at an end.

The disbanding of several regiments in Ireland at the close of 1691,
and the contemplated reduction of the company of miners, caused
Lieutenant Brown to look about him in order to find fresh scope for his
energies. He soon found a new sphere of usefulness. Colonel John
Foulkes’ regiment of foot, which had served throughout the Irish cam-
paign, was ordered to be augmented prior to being sent to the West
Indies. Two new companies were raised for this regiment by Lieut.
Thomas Brown, and Godfrey Richards, late purveyor to the Irish Train
of Artillery. These two officers received commissions as captains, 18th
January, 1694. On 16th May, 1692, “Marie R.” signed a Royal
Warrant ordering arms to be given to Captain Thomas Brown’s and
Captain Godfrey Richards’ two new raised companies added to Colonel
John Foulkes’ Regiment of Foot. Four months later Captain Brown
was appointed chief fire-master of a train of artillery and mortars to
be employed in the West Indies. His commission was signed by
Queen Mary (who, as regards the business of the State, was something
more than a sleeping partner), and ran as follows :—

“ Marie R.

Whereas by Our Warrant, bearing date the 4th August
last, We did command that a Trayne of Artillery and Mortars be forth-
with provided for Our Service in the West Indies, and whereas We are
well satisfied of the loyalty, ability, and experience of Our Trusty and
Well Beloved Captain Thomas Browne to be Chiefe Fire-master of Our
said Trayne, We, &c.,&c. . . . dated Whitehall, 10th September,
1692. [

To Sir Henry Goodrick, Bart.,
Lit.-Gen. of Our Ordnance.”

After receiving his commission as chief fire-master, Captain Brown
proceeded to try and get the arrears of his pay, which amounted to
£170, from the Lords of the Treasury. With this idea in his mind he
sent a petition to the above-named lords stating his case, fairly and
squarely, and throwing out a gentle hint at the end of the petition that
he could not possibly equip himself for the coming voyage unless he
received his arrears. Brown’s case was referred to the Paymaster-
General, who did not deny that the petitioner’s claim was a just and
reasonable one, but added that “as the company of fusiliers raised by
General Kirke, on 6th August, 1689, had not been put on the English

178 CAPTAIN THOMAS BROWN, CHIEF FIRE-MASTER.

establishment till Ist June, 1690, the arrears due to Captain Brown
could only be calculated from latter date.” This, of course, was a mean
quibble, but money was scarce, creditors were pressing, and embark-
ation was imminent, so Brown took what he could get, which amounted
altogether to £142 15s. 83d., and set out for Portsmouth feeling him-
self done brown !

On 9th January, 169%, the West India fleet set sail from the Isle of
Wight with a convoy of 10 men-of-war. Sir Francis Wheeler was
Admiral of the Fleet, and Colonel John Foulkes was Commander-in-
Chief of all the land forces. The latter deserves special mention. He
had fought at Sedgemoor on Monmouth’s side and had returned to
England with William of Orange. Foulkes commanded his regiment
at the Boyne, and was made Governor of Dublin after the battle. His
regiment, in January 1693, had several officers of note in it, one of
whom was Captain Holcroft Blood (son of Colonel Blood, the great
jewel burglar), who lived to have the honour of commanding the
English Artillery Train at Blenheim. It is a curious coincidence that
a few days before Foulkes’ regiment sailed for the West Indies Captain
Holcroft Blood was accused of being the person who had lately robbed
the Portsmouth coach, and was clapped into Winchester gaol and not
allowed to sail with his regiment.

We are indebted to Sir Francis Wheeler’s interesting journal, lately
printed by the Historical MSS. Commission (Report on the Duke of
Portland’s MSS., Vol. III.), for ax account of the abortive attack on
Port St. Pierre, Martinique, which commenced on the 1/th April,
1693, by the combined British naval and military forces. “In this
afternoon’s service it was judged there were 1380 men killed and wounded
on our side,” wrote Sir Francis Wheeler, under date of 17th April,
“ among which several officers, viz.: Major Nott received a dangerous
wound in the groin. Captain Hawkins, Lieut.-Colonel of the sea
battalion, escaped very narrowly, a musket shot having grazed upon his
skull. Captains Delaval, Picket and Lyons of Colonel Lloyd’s regi-
ment. ‘The two first were shot in the arms and the other in the body.
Captain Brown, of Colonel Foulkes’ regiment, was shot on the thigh,
just above the pan of the knee, very dangerously, a great loss, being a
very good and the only bombardier and chief fire-master. Captain
Thorne of one of the Barbados regiments was killed, and several
subaltern officers of all the regiments were killed and wounded whose
names I do not know.” If Captain Brown did not die of his wound he
doubtless fell a victim to the ‘spotted fever,’ which broke out soon
after on board the fleet and carried off Colonel Foulkes and half the
officers in his regiment. “Six sea-captains and 700 out of 2000
seamen” died from the same fever. Well might Sir F. Wheeler say
in his journal anent the expedition :—“ We have made but a bad hand,
and it will doubtless make a noise in the world.”

179
TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS ON HARBOURS.

BY.

LIEUTENANT C. G. VEREKER, R.A.

Tue discussion opened by Captain Wray, and followed up in the
November issue of the R.A.I. “ Proceedings,” brings forward one of
the most important points for consideration of Officers of the Garrison
Artillery.

I notice, however, that none of the papers deal with any recognised
scheme of defence, and as this would lead officers not acquainted with
the subject to infer that no provision is made for meeting such an
attack, I venture to think that a few remarks, the result of what
information I have been able to obtain on the subject, will not be out
of place.

It is impossible to have one idea suitable to the various ports that
would be liable to attack, only some general lines for guidance can be
laid down, and a scheme would in every case have to be worked out
to suit local conditions.

OBSTACLES.

Booms are in course of construction, or let us hope soon will be, for
closing the entrances to our most important harbours, and this seems
the most effectual method, if not the only one, of keeping the enemy’s
torpedo-boats out.

The French seem to realise the importance of this, and stop at no
expense in making their harbours secure; at Cherbourg, one of their
strongest ports, they have lately connected their two island forts, Ile
Pelée and Fort Cavagnac, to the mainland by strong breakwaters,
thus completely closing these two passes to torpedo-boats.

If there is no boom, some class of obstacle should certainly be
constructed ; fixed posts built up near the channel in shallow waters
or boats moored at intervals have been suggested; these would carry
a few machine or Q.F’. guns, which could oppose an effective fire to the
advance of the enemy, sufficient probably to delay him and keep him
in the illuminated area, and under fire of the shore guns.

An attack by day should not be difficult to defeat, supposing we
have an adequate supply of quick-fire guns.

The heavy guns might also fire shrapnel, on the principle laid down
for meeting a “Running Past” attack, the fuzes being set at varying
lengths to give a wide area covered by bullets.

Service case shot would probably not be effective over 300 to 400
yards, and special case with heavy balls are necessary; even these
would not be effective much over 1000 yards.

Warning could be given of an enemy’s approach, and everything
would be ready to give him a warm reception.

We can look upon such an attack as highly improbable, so what we
must consider is a night raid, when torpedo-boats would attempt to
run in and do what damage they could, and get out again under
cover of darkness.

4, VOL. XXII.

180 TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS ON HARBOURS.

OurTrosts.

Just as a field army without outposts would expose itself to surprise,
so also would coast defences if they had no means of receiving timely
warning of an attack.

The garrison could not be constantly on the alert and standing at
their guns in anticipation of such an attack, or the men would soon get
worn out; they must be able to sleep with the feeling that the
outposts are there to give them notice of any approach of the enemy.

Sir George Clarke in his paper on “ Floating Defence” severely
criticises the employment of look-out vessels for this duty; but if
Coast Defences are to be of any use, and there is any object in their
existence, surely some method of allowing them time to prepare for
action 1s necessary.

In the majority of cases, the features of the coast-line would enable
a point to be chosen some distance in front of the main defensive
position, whence the approaches to the harbour or channel could be
observed, a search-light being perhaps provided for this purpose.

In still weather a torpedo-boat can be heard at some distance, and
on a dark night the sparks from the funnel may possibly be observ-
able as is the case, I believe, in our latest “ Destroyers.”

Having discovered the attack, the outpost could then alarm the
defenders by rockets or telegraph.

Should it be impossible to have such a point of observation the duty
would have to be carried out by boats, but this opens out a very
difficult question:—Would the navy ever co-operate to this extent ?
What should the boats do, having signalled the danger ?

A refuge might have to be prepared for them to run into for safety,
outside the general line of defence, and the “ examination anchorage”
would, in some cases, allow of this; however, as these points have no
doubt been thought out by those best informed, I will not further
venture an opinion.

It would certainly be hopeless for them to try and retire behind our
defences, as they would thereby mask our fire, and the artillery should
understand that they are to fire at everything; otherwise by the time
they have made up their minds whether friend or foe, the boats will
have slipped by.

Major-General Richardson, R.A., in his lecture on “ Defence of a
Coast Fortress” said:—“The artillery must ruthlessly sink every-
thing they see of the nature of a torpedo-boat, unless previously
warned that it is friendly.”

Captain May, R.N., in “Naval Attack on Fortifications” also
remarks :—‘‘If the weather is clear, I fancy the defence had better
trust to their guns and electric-lights, and sink or disable every boat
they see.”

Our own navy would have to understand this and take precautions
accordingly.

A boat of the “Havock” class would cover about half-a-mile a
minute, so we see, that even with warning, there would not be much
time for the men to stand to their guns and get ready to open fire, as
soon as the boat appeared in the area lighted up by electric-light.

I remember during the Naval Manceuvres in 1889, we had a false

TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS ON HARBOURS. 181

alarm at night, and got the men out and on the guns within 3 to 4
minutes of the bugle sounding. We thought it a pretty smart piece
of work, and this would be about as fast as could be expected even
with everything cut and dried as it was in this case.

But during these few minutes, a torpedo-boat of the present class
would have steamed 13 to 2 miles, and probably have been past the
defences before she could have been picked up and a round fired at
her, unless the warning had been given when she was still some miles
away, and this could only have been done by a system of outposts.

That such a system should be arranged appears to be of the first
importance.}

Eecrric-Lieuts.

As regards electric-lights, fixed beams would be placed crossing in
front of the boom or obstacles, and for this purpose dispersed beams
certainly appear desirable, as they would give a larger illuminated
zone through which the boats would have to pass and be under fire.
Of course the more lights there are the better.

The light being in their eyes they could not see the guns on shore
or on the fixed posts firing at them.

I have heard it suggested by an oflicer of great experience, that to
further light up this area, while the boats were delayed under fire, and
to prevent dependence being placed entirely on the electric-lights
which might get damaged, occasional magnesium parachute lights
should be fired from mortars. These would burn for about a minute
and would greatly assist in showing the whereabouts of the attacking
boats, and increasing the illuminated area, which with two lights only
in use, for instance, would be at best comparatively narrow.

Other electric-lights should be placed close to and behind the fixed
beams, and in the case of any boat getting through the lighted zone
they could get on to it and keep it illuminated ; for this purpose search-
lights with parallel beams might be the best.

By the above arrangement of lights in front of the obstacle, the
chances should be all in favour of the defence; but, in the case of there

1 Since writing, I notice the following in The Journal of the United Service Institution,
which shows the importance that others attach to this point.

“The Swedish Government intends to establish high watch-towers along the Baltic coast, on
suitable islands, which will be in telegraphic and telephonic communication with the mainland,
and from which all movements of hostile vessels can be immediately seen and reported. Prince
Oscar, in command of the gun-boat Ivenskund has been employed in selecting suitable positions
for the contemplated look-out stations.’—Die Reichswehr.

132 TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS ON HARBOURS.

being no obstacle to stop or delay them, there would be every
probability of one or more of the boats passing through safely, as they
would attack in numbers; they would then have to be dealt with by
the navy, or left to do what harm they could.

Our best, and perhaps only chance therefore is to sink or disable
them while in the illuminated area, that is in one minute’s firing if as
much, supposing only two lights to be employed.

Guns.

For this purpose undoubtedly quick-firing guns would be the best
and we must hope that before long an adequate number will be
supplied where necessary.

I believe that it has been substantially demonstrated that the 6-pr.
Q.F. at ranges of about 1500 yards, would be capable of penetrating
any part of a torpedo boat with destructive effect. The new 12-pr.
Q.F. would be a still more formidable weapon in this respect.

It is thus seen that even one lucky shot from these guns would
either sink or disable any torpedo-boat at present in use. Their rate
of fire would enable a good many rounds to be got off during the short
time the boat would be illuminated.

Heavy guns might fire case shot or shrapnel with fuzes set to
burst the shell at varying distances from the muzzle, and get a chance
hit ; with smokeless powder they would not inconvenience the quick-
firers much, but certainly for night work reliance should not be placed
in them to any great extent.

The warning given would probably be very short, and anyone who
has seen night manning, or a night alarm, knows the confusion that is
bound to occur however well prepared beforehand ; something always
goes wrong; how much more so would this be the case in war time,
especially when it is remembered that most of the guns would be
manned by militia and volunteers, who, however efficient, would only
have lately taken up their station in the batteries, and could not know
all the ins and outs of communications, ammunition supply, lighting
arrangements, etc., for we must remember that these attacks would
very likely take place shortly after, if not previous to, the declaration
of war and almost before the troops had been mobilized.

With quick-firing guns on the other hand only a very small number
of men are required, and these could be highly trained and permanently
told off to their posts. ‘hey could sleep in tents or shelters near
the guns, a responsible officer being with them who should use his
discretion and not wait for orders from higher authority. On
seeing the rocket or being otherwise alarmed, they could at once
stand to their guns without confusion and have time to collect their
thoughts, judge the range, and open a deliberate and probably effective
fire as soon as the objective appeared.

As regards the method of ranging it is difficult to say what would be
the best. If there were no obstruction a ranging gun would have to
be employed, the others opening fire as soon as possible; but in pro-
tecting a boom, a few buoys should be laid in the illuminated area and
the tangent scale elevation to hit them should be known, having been
tested by day. These buoys would be the marks by which the officer

TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS ON HARBOURS. 183

in charge would judge his ranges at night when the boats were hesita-
ting in front of the boom.

NeEcESSITY FOR RAINING.

A good deal more practice with quick-firing guns is however necessary
to train men as layers, and a fair amount of ammunition should be
allowed for the purpose.

We are now provided with excellent and most accurate weapons, but
unless we get men trained and capable of working them they are use-
less tous. There is a great difference between training a man to lay a
heavy gun and training him to be efficient with a quick-firing gun, this
latter above all things requiring a great amount of coolness and nerve,
which can only be obtained by actual firing ; no amount of drill will
ever do this.

I have lately seen a system of firing quick-firing guns with Morris
tubes at a moving target representing a torpedo-boat, which is simple
and realistic as far as possible, and would enable men to be trained at
very little cost to the National purse.

Captain Hawkins, R.A., has a most ingenious idea for firing the
heavier guns by electricity, having safety signals, etc. ; but would not
this be further complicating our already too complicated system ?

The present tendency seems to be to go back, and simplify every-
thing as much as possible, and in the case under discussion, none but
the simplest methods would ever enable us to be really efficient ; the
chain of command would have to be dropped, or by the time orders had
filtered through, the torpedo-boats would be far away.

Only a general connection between the Fire Commanders and the
Sub-Commanders in charge of quick-firing guns and electric-lights
would be possible, though there should be no need for even this if
orders have been given previously as to the course to be adopted in
case of attack.

Simplicity is what we require, and all such things as telephones,
speaking tubes, dials, correction cards and tables of all sorts would
have to be ignored for this class of night work if we ever wished to hit
anything.

A good lamp to replace the present “ tracing lamp” is badly wanted,
pending the introduction of a reliable night sight.

Summing up, it would appear that with fixed beams, a timely warn-
ing, a few quick-firing guns manned by trained gunners under a
cool-headed officer with a little common sense, and, if possible, a boom
or other obstacle to keep the boats under fire, there should be no great
difficulty in dealing with any attack by torpedo-boats on our harbours
if we only prepare for them and do not leave everything to be arranged
at the last moment.

I have purposely omitted any mention of submarine mines, dirigible
torpedoes, and the co-operation of the navy, though these should all
assist in simplifying the task of the artillery defence.

SHOEBURYNESS,
25th November, 1894,

ie ett ise one
Ga weeks

ae
‘ae

185

ID) aE IN, 1a SE
LIEUTENANT W. SWABEY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA.

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATEHS, late R.H.A.

(Continued from p. 130, No. 8, Vol. XXT1.),

Cuaprer V.

“H” Troop joms the covering army for the 3rd siege of Badajos. Affair
at Llerena. Siege and storm of Badajos. Return to Portugal.

24th February.—This morning came an order to march for the
Alemtejo which is much sooner than we expected, and I had no horses
to move my carriages with, all the old ones, of which I had many,
being dead. We contrived, however, without detachments, to get
horses enough, and march to Caria where I was well put up. Little
or no forage for the horses but corn.

The troop marched with the Ist, 6th and 7th divisions of infantry
and two brigades of cavalry, which, under the command of
Lieut.-General Graham, together with the force under Lieut.-
General Sir R. Hill, a total of 30,000 men, were to compose
the army to cover the siege of Badajos, and were stationed,
the former about Llerena, the latter in and about Almen-
dralejos (see Napier, Vol. IV., p. 399).

25th February.—Marched to Capinha,' part of the road being very
hilly, we got in, however, by 4 o’clock. Green forage was all we could
procure.

26th Hebruary.—Marched by a good route to Atalaya. Still green
forage. We halted on the road for about ten minutes by a rye-field,
the men were ordered to cut forage, and in that time filled sacks
enough for 160 horses.

_ ath February.—Marched to Alkains, which is the best town and
the least destroyed I have hitherto seen. Horses on rye. I must not
omit that Major Downman was here on the 26th and lost his grey-
hounds. I had the luck to find them, which I record because the
person in whose house they were shut up, though of some consideration
in the town, had the impudence, after having tried to make a prize of

1 The spelling of Spanish and Portuguese names in different maps and books varies so much
that it is difficult to be correct, but throughout these pages pains has been taken to be as accurate
as possible, in many cases a competent Spanish authority has been consulted,

4, VOL. XXII,

186 SWABEY DIARY.

the dogs, to want payment for their keep; besides which I am fully
persuaded that the feast they had had was only at Duke Humphrey’s !
table.

28th February.—Marched into Castel Branco where we found the
4th Dragoons and Sir Stapleton Cotton’s staff. We found almost
everything to purchase here.

29th February.-—Before marching this morning we were seen by Sir
S. Cotton, and during the parade I had the misfortune to lose my inval-
uable dog “ Rough,” Our route was to Sarnadas, but there not being
room for the cavalry and ourselves there, we proceeded to Villa Velha,
which I may call the most miserable place in Portugal, no doors to our
stables, and our billets hardly to be called covering, the night rainy,
and no forage, green or dry, for the horses. . . . I may literally
say that my feet as I lay touched the tiles of my apartment. ;
There is a hospital for Portuguese troops in a church here, which when
I was at this place before was ruined and empty. I was anxious to get
the horses in, and opened the door, when all the cowardly rascals lying
sick in their wretched beds, cried out to the sentry to bayonet me. I
had not time to draw my sword and did not like to run, so I caught
hold of his musket and grappled with him till I had explained that I
did not want to put in the horses; he then let me go out with his
bayonet close to my breast. I left him next morning, after threatening
to cane him, in custody of the militia captain who had charge, who
promised he should be punished. No doubt if I could have drawn my
sword the rascal would have made off, but being alone and having so
many about me, I did not dare to try the experiment.

1st March.—Marched by half brigades this morning at 7 o’clock for
Nisa, having the most terrible hill to pass in all Portugal. In crossing
. the Tagus over the bridge of boats, the river is seen rushing in the
grandest style through a cleft in the rocks, which are perpendicular on
each side; it is navigable to this spot, and occasionally a depot is estab-
lished here. There always has been a Portuguese Engineer in charge
of this bridge, with orders to destroy it as occasion may oblige him.
He told me that the river had risen so suddenly this year in two days
that he could not find boats enough to make the bridge sufficiently long
to reach from bank to bank, judging from which the water must have
increased at least 20 ft. This gentleman has not however improved the
road, so that the march from Villa Velha to Nisa, four leagues, took us
from 7 in the morning till 6 in the evening, and the brigade of foot
artillery that passed yesterday had their howitzer precipitated over a
rock and two wheel horses killed; we were obliged to use ten and
twelve horses to one carriage. ‘This is the worst march for artillery in

1 Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, son of Henry I1V., was renowned for his hospitality, and
was a great favourite with the citizens of London. At his murder in 1447, it was reported that a
monument would be erected to him in St. Paul’s, but he was buried at St. Albans. St. Paul’s in
those days was a great place of rendezvous. When the promenaders left for dinner, the poor who
had no dinner before them stayed behind, if asked by the gay sparks whether they were going to
dine, they replied, that they would stay a little longer and look for the monument of the good Duke.
Thus it became a saying “‘to dine at Duke Humphrey’s table, é.¢., to starve, or have no dinner at
all.’ See Halliwell’s Dictionary of Archaic and Provincial words, also Brewer’s Dictionary of
Phrase and Fable. -

SWABEY DIARY. 187.

Portugal, but being prepared it did not give us so much trouble as some.
we have had.

Bull having halted at Nisa, I dined with him, and met Colonel Hlley
and Lord H. Somerset.!

2nd March.—March to Alpalhio. The cultivation here assumes an
aspect more indicative of industry; so much so, that I am willing to ad-
mit, as an excuse for the country I have hitherto seen, the much greater
proportion in which it has suffered from the French. I must still call
this side of the Tagus the best cultivated. The town, where we had:
excellent houses, was different from the usual sort, cleanliness and con-
venience more consulted, chimneys in every house, and the floors,
upstairs and down, neatly paved with brick without any support but
the rafters, which are slight and without beams; the rooms are neatly
painted, though taste does not hold her reign in these performances.
This town will hold 1,000 cavalry.

3rd March.—Shot my way with Colonel Hlley to Altar de Chao which
was our roule. We had excellent quarters, the towns still improving
as we go. On our ride we saw several storks, which at Nisa are as
domestic as crows in a rookery and perch on the tops of the houses.
We passed Crato where there is an extensive pottery, the first manu-
factory I have seen in Portugal in which the ware is glazed. Crato is
calculated to hold 1,100 cavalry, Altar de Chao 1,500, Nisa 1,100,
Alkains 800.

4th March.—March to Fronteira, another commodious and clean
town, the people and their habitations considerably improved, shops
for the sale of linens, etc. Our horses got some chaft here, a seasonable
assistant to rye-grass.

5th March.—Marched to Estremoz, which is a spacious and well-
built town, with shops and trade of almost every description. Oranges.
in abundance, ripe and cheap, six and seven for I$d. This place has
been formerly fortified, the walls now stand, but the situation is of too
little importance for it to be repaired or garrisoned; the works are
weak and ill-constructed. here is a citadel placed in a commanding
situation, many convents, etc. It is no less true than remarkable that
in the dry weather no water is to be had between this place and Altar
de Chio. The cultivation is good, and country productive.

6th March.—Marched through Borba to Villa Vicosa, the end of our
long route. Both these towns justify the preference given to this part
of Portugal. The 5th Dragoon Guards and part of the 7th division
occupy the town with us. Our men and horses are lodged in the
palace. Captain Bull’s troop is in the castle, looking out of windows
up three pair of stairs. Last night some of the horses fell through the
ceiling, to the great astonishment of their fellow brutes in the storey
below them.

7th March.—Spent my day at the troop stables endeavouring to cure
the sore backs of which, in this march, we have more than our share.

Sth March.—Went in the morning to see Sir Stapleton Cotton inspect

1 Lieut.-Colonel 4th Dragoon Guards.

188 SWABEY DIARY.

the 5th Dragoon Guards. The condition of their horses far exceeds
anything I have seen. It must be observed, however, without wishing
to detract from their merits, that they have been lying in idleness at
Thomar all the winter, whilst we and others have been on short forage
and taking fatiguing marches, Their appointments and discipline,
however, sufficiently prove that this good fortune is not the only cause
of their present effective state.

9th March.—The two troops, so recently from their march, were to-
day drilled by Major Downman preparatory to being seen by Sir S.
Cotton; this is a new method of making troops of Horse Artillery
effective. After it was over I went to take a more minute view of the
castle, which stands asa citadel, and has regular bastions and ravelins,
but no guns are mounted. The works and foundations are hewn out of
a solid rock and would be difficult to breach, but the whole place is com-
manded by surrounding heights. From this castle are seen Jurumanha
and Olivenga, now dismantled, and the walls of the famous royal park
of Villa Vicosa, many leagues in circumference, abounding with wild
boar and venison, which are forbidden fruit to the army, Lord W.’s
orders being very severe on this subject.

10th March.—Dined with Major-General Charles Alten! Reports in
circulation of a small party of the enemy being seen by a picquet of
the 4th, at Jurumanha.

11th March.—We were reviewed by Major-General Sir Stapleton
Cotton, who was pleased to express himself satisfied with our appear-
ance. If he was as much so as I was displeased at our being lugged
out with fatigued and thin horses, much to our prejudice, his satisfaction
must have been infinite.

12th March.—Great firing supposed to have been heard by General
Alten, who rode towards Jurumanha, but could discover nothing.

13th March.—Went to take a more minute view of the castle,
anciently intended for the defence of this place but now in a ruinous
state; it is useless, being commanded in every direction, but its cells
and dungeons deserve to be in the annals of romance. There is an
ancient armoury here, but the armour is now lying in a promiscuous
heap. I could not help thinking of the Welsh gentleman who spent
£500 in establishing his family at the Herald’s office and afterwards
brought an action against the King-at-Arms for extortion. He might
here have procured suits enough for nothing with which to have
adorned all his halls in Wales, and established, beyond controversy,
the antiquity of his house.

14th March.—The 1st, 6th and 7th divisions marched for Elvas, and
farther.

15th March.—The dragoons marched for Olivenca, our route is not
yet come.

16th March.—Marched to Olivenga, five leagues, byabad road. We
crossed the Guadiana at Jurumanha; this place is high and strong and

1 Commanding 2nd brigade, 7th division.

SWABEY DIARY. 189

has a powerful fort for the defence of the passage of the river, which
is so deep that a little rain renders it impassable. As there has been a
military bridge here, on the opposite side looking over an extensive
plain, there is a téte-de-pont, but the work appears to be of little
strength and has no guns at present; the guns of Jurumanha
ranging over it. The fortifications at Olivenca have been breached
by us in several places, to prevent a recurrence of what took place
last year, when 800 French refused some regiments admission till
driven out.

This place might be strong but the situation is unimportant. We
expect to remain some days.

lvth March.—Received orders at 12 o’clock, when in bed, to be in
harness at 5, which is now about half-an-hour before daybreak. We
were paraded by that hour with Bull’s troop, the 3rd and 4th Dragoons
and 5th Dragoon Guards, and marched six leagues, halting at Alman-
dral for the night, having orders to march at daybreak ; the cavalry
went farther. Conjectures are various about our pushing on so fast.

We are now well in Spain, and the difference in courtesy and clean-
liness between the Portuguese and Spaniards is striking. The face of
the country too changes, there is more plain and less brushwood and
altogether a much better field for cavalry operations. Within a mile of
Almandral is the field of Albuera. I regretted that our time would
not permit of visiting it, and begin to find that a soldier has no busi-
ness to set up as able to describe a country.

We were obliged to cut green wheat here for the horses; after we
had taken our harness off, the men were in the fields cutting forage
when an order came for marching instantaneously, and we were actu-
ally only ten minutes before the horses were in the guns; then came a
counter order and we remained all night.

LSth March.—Marched at 5 o’clock, in a most tremendous rain, and
overtook the Dragoons at Santa Martha where only last night 3800
French were turned out. We here halted and bade adieu to the cavalry
who proceeded onwards, whilst we reported to the 7th division within
two leagues at Feria, and are waiting for orders. The second day the
horses have had no corn.

General Slade’s brigade, the Royals and 8rd Dragoon Guards, came
in, in the evening.

19th March.—The 7th division and the Dragoons marched. We re-
main for orders which we shall receive from General Graham,! who
commands this large detached force. . Some troops marched on to Villa
Franca, in the hopes of surprising a magazine there. A seasonable
supply of corn arrived.

20th March.—Rain all day. Our men having above a league to go
for forage, wheat was cut, no other eatable for the horses being found.
Occasional firing heard from Badajos, and various reports in circulation.

21st March.—To my inexpressible joy there arrived for our use this
day 17 horses, most of which come to my division; the number of

1 Afterwards General Lord Lynedoch,

190 SWABEY DIARY.

horses that have died in it sufficiently proves that it is absolutely use-
less to send old horses on this or any other service. Rainallday. The
service at Badajos must be exceedingly hard.

22nd March.—Rain all day. Many detachments of sick coming from
the front, and many marching to join their regiments. ‘There were at
least 300 applications for rations made to us by men who had had none
‘for some days. In this respect the commissariat management is very
defective, there being no intermediate place for supply between Badajos
and the front, and in these towns, as in all other places in Spain and
Portugal, nothing’ is to be purchased to furnish an Englishman with
food. We obliged the Alcalde or magistrate to kill some goats for their
use, but this was scarcely worth their acceptance.

23rd March.—Heavy rains. Dyneley’s goat was missing and traced
to a goatherd’s hut where the blood was seen at the door; the servants
went and burnt the hut, and carried away a flitch of bacon after giving
the man a very handsome castigation.

24th March.—Received a route for Villalva, but went to Azeuchal
in consequence of the former place being too full of troops to contain
us. Azeuchalis an excellent town, and has more business than any
other I have passed through ; there are even curtains in the windows,
tapestry on the walls, and matting on the floors. The bed I slept in
had a counterpane of green flowered satin with broad edging of silver
lace and fringe ; fleas turned out to be the luxurious inhabitants of it,
_and they tormented me all night.

25th March.—Karly in the morning a man came with an order to
march from Captain Macdonald, who had gone on to Villa Franca the
night before and with much difficulty persuaded General Graham to
allow us to come forward. We started at about 8 o’clock and got
to Villa Franca by 4. I regretted very much that my time would not
allow of examining the town; there is a fine church and tower, but our
_order was to proceed to Usagre, which we reached at 10 o’clock, and
there found orders to halt 2 hours and push on by the Llerena Road,
it being intended to surprise 8500 French in that town. At 12 o’clock,
leaving the howitzer and heavy carriages, we marched with only the
_ five six-pounders and overtook General Graham, with the Ist, 6th,
and 7th divisions, at half-past two o’clock.

26th March.—At half-past two the army was formed on the Llerena
" Road in three columns; the right, consisting of the 43rd regiment, was
to make a circuit to the right, round the place, and the 7th division light
_ troops were to take the same direction, but to form an inner circle; the
centre column, composed of the 1st and 6th divisions, was to enter the
town; the cavalry, viz., the 4th, 3rd and Ist Dragoons, and the 3rd and
’ 5th Dragoon Guards, with Bull’s troop, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, being
- on their left flank, whilst all baggage was ordered to stop at Usagre.
- We were attached to the Ist division and were to force the town and
- gates. - In this order we advanced just before daybreak, sanguine and
certain of success. Unfortunately, numbers of led horses and all the
staff got to the front, and the enemy’s patrol firing, they galloped back

SWABEY DIARY. 191

in great confusion, and in such numbers that they were taken for the
enemy’s cavalry charging and fired at accordingly, by which unfortunate
mistake an assistant-surgeon of the 31st, a sergeant, and two men were
lulled, and a heutenant and paymaster wounded ; but worse than all, the
enemy was alarmed and the enterprise frustrated. Our guns came
into action by General Graham’s order at a dark wall supposed to be
an enemy’s column; we fired nine rounds before the General would be
convinced of his mistake. The cavalry column might have been in
time, but the ground did not admit of their pursuing the enemy. . Bull
fired by order, two or three shots entirely out of range! It is ridiculous
that general officers should not be better informed on these subjects.
We remained in the fields till 11 o’clock, when we took up our quarters
in Llerena, and had the mortification to learn from the Spaniards that
the French had no notice of our rapid advance.

27th March.—Marched for Maguilla, where we lay with pickets in.
sight of the French, who are said to be in force at Guadacanal. Having
been two nights without a bed and much fatigued I hoped our baggage
would join us this evening, but in this was disappointed. I, however,
pulled my clothes off and wrapped myself in my blanket, having a
wretched billet. Much firing heard from Badajos, and reports in cir-
culation that General Hill had been engaged.

28th March.—Cavalry and 6th division pushed on in advance, much
skirmishing with the enemy, but no particular occurrence.

29th March.—I may call this the first day I have had a little time to
spare for thinking, and having my baggage up I wrote to Maurice.
Intelligence was received that La Pina, the Spaniard, was in force on
this side of Seville with 10,000 men, but the French are collecting their
troops, and it is supposed we shall retire.

30th March.—Was sent by order of General Graham to reconnoitre
the road from hence to Usagre and to report if there was one to that
place between Llera and Valencia de las Torres; this was a ten league
job. No new route was to be found, the route by Valencia being the
best ; there are, however, three, by Higuera, Valencia and Llera.

31st March.—Marched for Usagre in a north-east wind with terrible
rain, distance five leagues, which performed, we had to send the horses
a league for forage.

We understand here that a person from this place gave the French
at Llera intelligence of our rapid movement to surprise them.

ist April—Marched to Villa Franca. Our billets were to-day
splendid; some of the rooms were painted with great taste, chandeliers
were suspended in them, and the floors were matted, the style entirely
Italian. The beds had counterpanes of satin with lace borders and
fringe ornaments, but oh comfort where are you gone?
We saw Lord Wm. Russell” here, who had just been at Elvas. We

1 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham left the army in July, 1812, for six months, owing to
some disorder in his eyes, which threatened loss of vision of one of them; this circumstance may
account for his mistake.—Wellington Despatches, Vol. 9., pp. 267, 273.

~2 Captain Lord George Wm. Russell, 23rd Light Dragoons.
2 ~ x £ x 26

192 SWABEY DIARY.

hear from him that Philippon offered to capitulate at Badajos if
he could carry away his 5000 men; he was, however, refused. The
breaching batteries had opened, and a small hole big enough to admit
three men had been made. It is generally understood that the French
will not stand in the breach, but they have made the castle very strong.
Lord W., after carrying one of the strongest outposts, sent a flag of
truce to say that if a mine was sprung he would destroy the whole
garrison. How far this threat will prevent bloodshed I do not know.

2nd April—Marched to Villalba, a town, at this time of the year
more calculated for cavalry than any in Spain. ‘The green barley and
rye grow in the most luxuriant manner.

There is here the most picturesque castle 1 have ever seen, but the
Spaniards have not arrived at sufficient refinement to have a taste for
antiquity, therefore all enquiries as to its history were fruitless. I have
generally heard it remarked that the priesthood of this country was the
only portion of the population who had enjoyed the benefits of education,
but those who thus distinguish them should add—comparatively
speaking.

On the towers of the church the storks have built their nests, and
on the twigs composing them the sparrows have built theirs, so that a
stork’s nest is acomplete feathered colony, and they live in the greatest
amity. This is the first time I have met with anything to remind me of
a chimney sweeper, for the storks when inclined to be musical, make a
noise with their bills, precisely like that which our black gentry make
on May-day with their shovels. On every wall in the castle was written,
in French, evidently by Spaniards, “‘ Vive le Rov d’ Angleterre.”
I look on this little circumstance as a true criterion of the patriotic
feeling of the people of this place; but itis remarkable that no blessings
were invoked for the unfortunate Ferdinand.

3rd April.—Notwithstanding our fancying ourselves settled, a route
came for Santa Martha, whither we marched. No forage to be had
when we got in.

4th April.—To-day I resolved to give up the idea of being settled
even fora moment; for, whilst our horses were gone a league for forage,
an order came to march to Torre de Almendral, two leagues. We
arrived there in the evening not having an atom of forage. All the
infantry is falling back on Albuera, where I suppose we shall make a
stand.} ;

The house we left at Santa Martha belongs to a most interesting
family, a widow and two daughters, who, on seeing the troop retiring,
were in the utmost distress, uncertain whether they should go to the
mountains or wait the event of the approach of the French. I did all
I could to console them, and blushed for my own heart that it had be-
come so familiar with distress that it did not feel so much compassion
as it used to do. The old woman, near 80, must make her retreat on
foot. It is not usual with all Spaniards to leave the towns on the
French entering them.

We have General Graham’s orders to visit the position of Albuera,

1 Soult had approached from the south with a view to raise the siege of Badajos.

SWABEY DIARY, 193

and understand the probable points of attack, &c. Captain Macdonald
and Newland, with two guns, are gone to Villalba, General Graham’s
head-quarters.

5th April.—fSome of the infantry took up the position of Albuera,
some skirmishing having taken place with the cavalry in front; our
advance retired to Los Santos. ‘The fire on Badajos is rapid.

6th April_—This day Badajos fell, we took it by storm at 9 o’clock
at night, and lost many men.

7th April.—Marched to the camp at Albuera at 3 o’clock in the
evening, arriving there too late to choose very good ground; I slept,
however, very well in my tent.

Sth April.—Rode four leagues to see Badajos and the havoc that
had been made there. On the road we crossed the position where
Marshal Beresford opposed Soult. The ground which we occupied,
“the heights,” as they were called, gives very little to call a position,
and the rivulet which runs at the foot is likewise an insignificant de-
fence. There is a bridge near the town of Albuera where Soult! made
a false attack to conceal his real object of turning our line on the right.
On the whole I should think there never was a battle fought on more
equal terms.

At Albuera, “the allied position was occupied by 30,000 infantry,
about 2,000 cavalry, and 38 pieces of artillery, of which 18
were 9-prs., but, the brigade of the 4th division being still
absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength of the
battle did not amount to 7,000. The French had 50 guns,
and about 4,000 veteran cavalry, but only 19,000 chosen in-
fantry, yet being of one nation, obedient to discipline, and
animated by one spirit, their excellent composition amply
compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general’s
[Marshal Soult] talent was immeasurably greater than his
adversary’s [Marshal Beresford]. The loss of the allies was
nearly 7,000 men, of the French about 8,000.” Napier,
Vol. 3, pp. 532, 543.

The road to Badajos is the best I have seen and equal to any
turnpike in England. The city of Badajos commands the Guadiana,
and though its only natural strength is the river on one side and its
height on two others, yet it is made by art of considerable importance.
Its possession is of consequence to the party that holds it, as it forms
a depot which cannot be surprised. The strong Fort of St. Christoval
adds to the strength of the place, and there are two other considerable
outworks.

Badajos also commands the important country of Estremadura and
the Alemtejo: forming on this side together with Elvas, a barrier to
an advance into Portugal, since the two fortresses together contain
too many troops to admit of either being passed by an enemy.

The English and Portuguese troops stormed it the night before last,
having effected three large breaches from batteries erected under Fort

1 Duke of Dalmatia, created a marshal in 1804,

194. | SWABEY DIARY. .

Picurena, previously carried by assault. The obstacles to mounting.
these breaches were to one party the ditch, which is dry, and a piece of :
water about 4 ft. deep which was passed. ‘To the 4th division, a ravelin'
opposed itself, which they forced; the light and 4th divisions stormed

the breaches three times unsuccessfully ; never was so much art used to

render a breach formidable. The space on the parapet was filled with

chevaux-de-frise made of swords, and the ground was covered with a

platform of spikes. Within the breach was erected a false parapet

of sand bags, behind which were artillery and musketry. Had that:
been carried, three lines of entrenchments presented themselves on the

terrepleim, and all-along the walls and communications from bastion:
to bastion, trenches were dug and chevaux-de-frise planted. Hvery-
street. presented similar obstacles, and to prevent escalade, round the

whole circuit of the place (except at the castle which stands very high),”
the edge of the parapet had a trench to contain infantry supplied with

langrage,! grenades, and live shells. Things were in this state, and

many of the light and 4th divisions slaughtered when Lord Wellington

sent an order for the return of the troops; fortunately General Picton

had been sent to make a false attack on the castle side, and having con-

verted. it into a real one, he was actually in possession when he received

Lord W.’s orders, which he answered in pencil briefly, “ My Lord lam

in possession of the castle.”

As soon as it was known on the walls that the castle was scaled, the
enemy left their guns in consternation. Two thousand were at length
rallied by General Vieland, who attempted in vain to retake the citadel,
upon which they laid down their arms and the English troops entered
the breaches; part of the 5th division made good their entrance by
escalade on another side, but the success is attributed to General
Picton.
| An officer was sent to the Governor, Philippon,? who had retired to
Fort St. Christoval, and after some hesitation he surrendered. Another
fort was carried in great style by the Portuguese.’

_ During the siege our batteries were very little fired into as the enemy
wanted ammunition. In what was called the grand magazine, only 42
barrels of powder were found.* The slaughter of the officers and men at
the breaches was dreadful, nevertheless our fellows when they entered
would not kill a man. Two-hours plunder was allowed, but I believe
little found. One corporal of the 48th told me that he had got £50 in
money, but the fool took his jacket off to go to sleep and a comrade stole
itall. The sight of the killed and wounded, all of whom are not now
removed, is shocking in the extreme, and the whole air is tainted with
the smell. Fortunately the weather is not yet hot enough to produce

1 Langrage was akind of grape shot mostly in naval use, itis difficult to understand how it could
have been used by infantry unless thrown by hand.

2 General of Division, Baron Philippon, for his successful defence of Badajos in April and June,
1811, against Marshal Beresford and Lord Wellington, was promoted from General of Brigade.
On this occasion his garrison consisted of 5000 men. :

3 The bastion of San Vicente. —f.4.W.

4 Philippon’s store of powder was very inadequate to his wants, and he was'very scantily supplied
with shells. Napier, Vol. 4, p. 401. “Bale int ; 2

SWABEY «DIARY. 193

putridity so soon as it will do in’a month’s time, and yet to
judge from the shocking effluvia I should fear a sickness. Philippon is
said to have broken his parole from England, on which account Lord
Wellington would have no communication with him. A wounded
officer whom I saw in the French hospital, said that they felt’ so secure
in the art of their defence that they had no idea of our taking the place.
The point at which General Picton entered was 24 feet high, and had
it been properly defended we could not have taken it, but the best
troops were all at the breach, and those at the castle were few in num-
ber and irresolute. Ve ea ae:

““Five thousand men and officers fell during this siege, and of
these, including 700 Portuguese, 3500 had been ‘stricken in the
assault, 60 officers and more than 700 men were slain on the

“spot. The five generals, Kempt, Harvey, Bowes, Colville and
Picton were wounded, the first three severely ; about 600 men
and officers fell in the escalade of San Vincente, as many at
the castle, and more than 2000 at the breaches, each division
there losing 1200. And how deadly the strife was at that
point, may be gathered from this, the 43rd and 52nd Regi-
ments of the light division alone, lost more than the seven
regiments of the 3rd division engaged at the castle !

Let any man picture to himself this frightful carnage taking place
in a space of less than a hundred square yards. Let him con-
‘sider that the slain died not all suddenly, nor by one manner

~ ~* + of death; that some perished by steel, some by shot, some by

water, that some were crushed and mangled by heavy weights,

some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by fiery explo-

sions ; that for hours this destruction was endured without

shrinking, and that the town was won at last, let any man

consider this and he must admit that a British army bears

with it an awful power. And false would it-be to say that

the French were feeble men, for the garrison stood and

fought manfully, and with good discipline behaved worthily.

Shame there was none on either side. Yet who shall do

justice to the bravery of the soldiers? The noble emulation

of the officers? Who shall measure out the glory of Ridge,!

of Mcleod,’ of Nicholas,? or of O’Hara* of the 95th, who

? Major Henry Ridge, 5th Regiment, already distinguished for his conduct at El Boden, he was

killed after the escalade of the castle by the 3rd division. ;
"2 Lieutenant-Colonel Charles McLeod, commanding 43rd Regiment, he was killed.

3 The gallantry of Major Wm. Nicholas, R.E., an officer who had already highly distinguished
himself in Italy, in Egypt, and especially at the battle of Barossa, was so conspicuous at Badajos
that the particulars deserve to be here recorded. ;

In the dead of the night preceding that of the assault, he volunteered to reconnoitre the place,
and in spite of the risk of discovery by the sentinels and the difficulty of the task, he stripped and
forded the inundation of the Revillas brook, to ascertain the safest passage for our columns. The
following night he was detailed as Engincer to lead and shew the troops of the advance to the main
breach. There, after twice essaying to reach the top he fell, wounded in four places, but notwith-
standing the distress in which he lay from these wounds, when he saw.the fall of Licut.-Col. McLeod
and Captain James, who were two.of his. oldest friends and comrades, and when he heard ‘the
soldiers demand ‘‘ Who should lead them to the,third onset ?? he instantly ordered two of his men
to bear him up the breach in their arms. One of his brave supporters was killed, and the same
moment he himself received a musket ball, which}passed through his chest, breaking two ribs and
injuring the spine. This shock precipitated him from the top to the bottom of the breach; and

196 SWABEY DIARY.

perished on the breach, at the head of the stormers, and with
him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service? Who
shall describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grena-
dier who was killed, the foremost man at the Santa Maria ?
or the martial fury of that desperate soldier of the 95th, who,
in his resolution to win, thrust himself beneath the chained
sword-blades, and there suffered the enemy to dash his head
to pieces with the ends of their muskets? Who can sufti-
ciently honour the intrepidity of Walker,> of Shaw,® of Canch,’
or the resolution of Ferguson’ of the 48rd, who having in
former assaults received two deep wounds, was here, with his
hurts still open, leading the stormers of his regiment, the
third time a volunteer and the third time wounded? Nor
would I be understood to select these as prominent, many and
signal were the other examples of unbounded devotion, some
known, some that will never be known; for in such a tumult
much passed unobserved, and often the observers fell them-
selves ere they could bear testimony to what they saw; but no
age, no nation ever sent forth braver troops to battle than those
who stormed Badajos.

When the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to Lord
Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment,
and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief
for the loss of his gallant soldiers. . . ....2.~.

Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, which
tarnishes the lustre of the soldiers’ heroism. All indeed were
not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost their lives in
striving to stop the violence, but the madness generally pre-
vailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the
dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shame-
less rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and

there he was further injured by the surging multitude who passed over him ashe lay. At last he
was carried off, and after his wounds had been dressed he was able to write to his father. Fora
time it was thought he might survive his injuries, but he had lost so much blood and lain without
assistance so long in the terrible confusion of the breach, that it had never been found possible to re-
store warmth to his limbs, or to overcome the debility that supervened, and he died the eighth day
after receiving his wounds. He was buried close to the breach where he so nobly fell, and Lieut.-
Colonel Fletcher, his commanding officer, erected on the spot a monument to his memory.

General Sir Thomas Graham on whose staff Major Nicholas had served at Barossa, and to whom
he was much attached, in writing home on the occasion of his death, says, “If there can be any
consolation to his family and friends for the loss of so valuable a life, it is the reflexion that no
soldier ever distinguished himself more.’’—See Memoir of Major W. Nicholas, ‘‘ Royal Military
Chronicle,’ February, 1813.

4 Major Peter O’Hara.

5 General G. Townshend Walker, his wounds were of a most extraordinarily severe nature. “A
musket shot cut him across the stomach, grazing the main arteries, which continued oozing for
many weeks, hourly threatening hemorrhage. He had also several ribs detached from the breast
bone, the result of an explosion. After a long confinement in Badajos he was conveyed in his
pallet on mens’ shoulders to Lisbon, where he embarked for England and recovered. He rejoined
Lord Wellington’s army near Pamplona, and was again severely wounded.” “‘ Recollections of
Badajos,” Captain McCarthey, 50th Regiment.

5 Lieutenant James Shaw, 43rd Regiment, afterwards Sir James Shaw Kennedy, whose valuable
notes on the battle of Waterloo are well known.

7 Lieutenant Thomas Canch, 5th Regiment.
8 Captain James Ferguson, 43rd Regiment.

SWABEY DIARY. 197

murder, shrieks and pitious lamentations, groans, shouts, im-
precations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the
crushing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets
used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the
streets of Badajos! On the third, when the city was sacked,
when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the
tumult rather subsided than was quelled. The wounded men
were then looked to, the dead disposed of”! Napier, Vol. 4.,
p. 431, et seq.

Badajos was called by the Romans Pax Augusta,* by the Moors,
Badaxos. It was besieged in 1168, by Alfonse Henry, founder of the
Portuguese monarchy, to which it was even then considered one of the
best barriers, and has always, even in the time of the Romans, been an
object of importance, but more so than ever since the foundation of
the kingdom of Portugal. The English laid siege to it ineffectually in
the war of Succession.

9th April.—In camp.

10th April.—Soult having retired from Villa Franca as soon as he
ascertained the fall of Badajos, we advanced to Santa Martha, the cavalry
to Los Santos, Villa Franca, etc.

11th April.—Received a most unexpected route back to Olivenga.
After all our glorious projects I do not much relish it. Halted to-day
at Toro de Almendral.

12th April.—We received no orders to march to-day. The rest of
the army is breaking up to proceed to the north. Our cavalry having
advanced suddenly on the enemy as far as Llerena, the light brigade,
14th, 16th and 12th, being in front were opposed to a considerable
force of the enemy. A plan was formed for cutting them off from
Llerena, which did not entirely succeed ; they were, however, charged
while in column of half squadrons by the 5th Dragoon Guards. Our
fellows rode at the flanks of the column. Sir Stapleton Cotton, in
person, and Colonel Hlley, the Adjutant-General, led the regiment and
rode in front of the line. We lost 18 killed and 30 wounded, and took
150 prisoners. We killed and wounded great numbers.

Received a route for the north, Marmont having suddenly advanced
in that qnarter and threatened Ciudad Rodrigo. It rained all day, and
we did not get to Hlvas till past dark, the distance being very great.

1“ But the strong desire for glory was, in the British, dashed with a hatred of the citizens on an
old grudge, and recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many incredibly
savage.’ Napier, Vol. 4, p. 419.

“The people, on our passing through from the south, were in a most wretched state, and said
fee ee soldiers had killed 85 inhabitants. I believe 82 was the fact.” Cavalry Officer’s Diary,
p. 146.

? Corrupted by the Moors into Paxagusta, Baxagus, Badaxos. As one of the keys of Portugal,
Badajos has often been a place of importance in war. It was besieged in vain by the Portuguese in
1660, and again by the allies in the Spanish war of Successionin 1705. During the Peninsular war,
Badajos was besieged by the French in 1808 and in 1809, and again in 1811, when it surrendered
on March 11th to Soult. It was thrice besieged by the English under Wellington: first on the 17th
April, 1811, after the conquest of Olivenga, when the approach of Soult, to its relief, caused
the siege to be raised on the 14th May. Secondly, after the battle of Fuentes de Honor and
Albuera, the city was invested from the 27th May to the 10th June, but in vain; the third invest-
ment on the 17th March, 1812, ended in its capture on the 6th April—F..4.W.

198 SWABEY DIARY.

We found the 7th division encamped and we did the same. Doctor
Macdonald and I in the same tent; our men had not foraged their
horses till 10 o’clock, fortunately there was no rain in the night.

“ After the taking of Badajos, Wellington desired to fight Soult
in Andalusia, and his cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton over-
took and defeated the French horse near Usagre. But
obstacles arose which prevented Wellington’s following up this
success. Among them, the fact that Marshal Marmont, who
in obedience to the orders of Napoleon had made a diversion
into Northern Portugal on behalf of Badajos and had occupied

‘and ravaged the country in the neighbourhood of Sabugal
and Castel Branco, was on the Coa. This obliged the allies
to return from the vicinity of Badajos to the north. Marmont
was at first inclined to fight, but found it too dangerous from
the flooding of the rivers behind him, and finally crossing the
Agueda on the 24th April, retired to Salamanca. Napier,’
Vol. 4., p. 434, et seq.

L5th..April.—Marched to St. Olaia.- Reva all day. “We found the
Hat anata? encamped, but for the sake of our horses our indulgent General,
Alten, allowed us corn.

This i is a town of little importance.
~ Elvas appears to be strong, but as we were only encamped near I
could form no idea of it. I can easily conceive Fort La Lippe, of which
we had a nearer view, to be with reason termed the strongest fort in the
world. It stands very high and its guns look into all the approaches.
I hope to have some Opportunity of taking a nearer view.

14th April.—Rain all day and all last night. We passed on our road
to Arronches an unfortunate car-driver dead on the road, and according
to the inhuman practice of war stripped; no violence appear ed
about his body, and I conclude he failed from the inclemency of the
weather.

“Our men, who have not been dry these two days, and doing very hard
work, do not suffer much. Arronches has the remains of a wall, but
the place is insignificant and commanded.
15th April—We marched, still in the rain, to Portalegre, a city of
which I had heard so much, that I was disappointed in my expectation
of its grandeur ; it has this advantage, that the French have not been
there, and it is the mart for all commodities on their way to Hlvas,
imported wines and tea and sugar are to be had. ‘he town is remark-
able for its numerous convents. It is an episcopal see and has a
cathedral, in which some of the paintings on the altar-piece are very
highly coloured, but otherwise destitute of merit.

’ 16th April.—Halted to day and had continualrain. Our menin the
alcoves of a convent were little better than in the wet, and we had very
bad and scanty forage. Champagne, claret, &c., are to be had here,
lump sugar and all sutlers goods, bad linens ‘and ‘cloth ; the things are
cheaper here than in the north.

L7th April—tIn.a terrible. wet .day we marched to Alpalhao, into.

SWABEY DIARY. 199

which we were crammed with the 7th division, six of us with Major
Downman at the head in one house. We got good forage here, but
the rye is grown too ripe and dry and is of little use for horses; the
barley is nearly all used throughout the unfortunate seat of war, and
all the recompense given is an order or receipt, which I hope, for the
sake of the unfortunate people, will be paid some day or other.

18th April.—Marched to Nisa in the rain and were nearly without
forage. I found nothing new to remark here.

L9th April.—Halted at Nisa. The weather at length cleared up,
and we had time to think of drying ourselves, which I could not boast
of having done for some time, as all my jackets and pantaloons had
rung the changes, and in this despicable country there is no blazing
fire to dry things by, nothing but a wretched substitute of a few
embers.

My friends the storks were on the tower as usual.

Received a letter from Eliza, and wrote to Freeman and Walcott.

20th April.—Marched on a fine day to Sarnadas where we encamped,
having passed the T'agus as usual at Villa Velha.

The commandant of Castel Branco on his retreat from thence to Nisa,
after crossing, removed the bridge of boats and got away every man
from the hospital ; he put in the hands of the convalescents the muskets
of the Portuguese Militia rear-guard, who seemed little disposed to
behave well.

21st April—Marched to Castel Branco and contrary to expectation
found very little damage had been done; six or seven houses only were
burnt, belonging to people who were obnoxious to the French. They
now pursue a system according to the bloody policy of their master,
only one degree removed from wanton barbarity, which sooner or later
will have the desired effect. They destroy the houses of those who
desert the towns hitherto the whole populace, but to those who remain
they now hold out the promise of leaving their property untouched.

A week before the troop reached Castel Branco, parties of the
French force, under Marmont, had plundered the country in
its vicinity ; however, the Portuguese General, Le Cor, stood
fast with the militia, checked the enemy’s cavalry detach-
ments, removed the hospitals and some stores, and when
menaced by a strong force of infantry on the 12th, destroyed
the rest of the magazines, and fell back to Sarnadas, only one
short march on the road to Villa Velha, and the next day
when the French retired, he followed and harassed their rear.
See Napier, Vol. 4., p. 443,

(To be continued).

201

PROPOSED SLIDE RULES FOR CALCULATING |
BATTERY COMMANDER’S CORRECTIONS e222.

ag prt Oo F>
Ye vie

MAY 25

MAJOR A. C. HANSARD, R.A. \ p
ssssae KEE FATENT O%°-
ee “ae

Te corrections which have to be made by the Battery Commander to |
the range of a moving object as given by the depression range-finder
are i-—

(a) ‘ Hrror of the day” or “ powder error.”

(b) “Correction for length of target.”

using Case II. for laying).
(d) ‘Correction for travel of target.”

ics I

(a) As regards the “powder error” no method as yet proposed Powder error
will enable us to calculate the correction ; the error is partly due to age
and condition of the powder charge, which cause changes in the muzzle
velocity ; and partly to atmospheric causes such as varying tempera-
ture, barometric pressure, and direction and force of wind; which
influence the resistance offered to the passage of the projectile through
the air.

All that can be said about it is, that it increases with the range (but
not usually in any easily ascertained ratio) ; and if the force of wind is
great it may vary with the direction of the target.

(b) The correction for length is necessary from the fact that the corectiontor
depression range-finder takes the range to the bow water-line of an “aun”
advancing vessel, or stern water-line of a retiring one, and we usually
wish to hit the vessel about the centre; therefore something must be
added to the range, as given by depression range-finder, to carry the
shot to the point we wish to hit; no calculation is however necessary
for this. : ;

(c)and (¢) ‘These errors can be calculated, and in order to eliminate riaat error
as many causes of inaccurate shooting as possible it seems worth while for travel of
to calculate them accurately. Bee

At present tables are drawn up in which the corrections due to a present sys
given change of level, or rate of travel, at certain ranges are given, bub °™
if the actual range, state of tide or rate of travel do not coincide with
any given in the table, a guess has to be made; and it is impossible to
give, as it were, a sufficient number of accurately calculated points, in
a table of manageable size, to make this guess-work a matter of no
importance. urther the corrections are tabulated to the nearest mul-
tiple of 25 yards which ‘introduces another source of error; for if, for

5. Vou, XXIt. 28

Proposed
system.

Tide correc:
tion.

902 SLIDE RULES FOR BATTERY COMMANDER’S CORRECTIONS.

instance, in a given case each of the corrections ought to be 18 yards,
they would each be found in the tables given as 25 yards (13 being
nearer to 25 than to zero) ; and if they are both in the same direction,
using the tables a correction of + 50 yards would be given, the true
correction required being + 26 yards, an avoidable error of 24 yards.

By the application of the principle of the Slide Rule these corrections

can be made absolutely accurately, or with a margin of error so small
as to be practically negligeable, and the Slide Rule can be made of a
manageable size to give the same amount of information as a very vol-
uminous table. A-Slide Rule has already been introduced for Siege
Artillery in connection with the Hickman Plotter, and it is believed no
difficulty has been experienced in teaching its application to non-com-
missioned officers.

(c) The correction for alteration of tide level is due to the fact that
the index plates, multipliers, and hydro-clinometers, are graduated in
yards; and when elevation is given by their means to the gun, such
elevation refers to the mean tide level; so that if a gun is elevated to
a given range by their means the trajectory will pass through a plane
at mean tide level at the given range from the gun. (The trajectory
will actually pass through a point 7 feet above this level, the index
plates &c. being graduated to allow for this; but this does not affect
the question of corrections). If the sea level has risen or fallen from
the mean, the trajectory, with the same elevation as before, will cut
the new plane at a less or greater distance from the gun; and if it is
desired to hit an object at the same distance as before, it is obvious
that the trajectory and consequently the elevation must be raised or
lowered.

The angular difference in elevation is easily calculated but is of no
practical use, since the index plates &c. are graduated in yards. What
ig required is the elevation in yards on the index plate at which the
gun must be laid in order that the trajectory may cut the new plane at
the required range. This can be directly ascertained as follows :—

A table of (angular) quadrant elevations, corresponding to given
ranges is made out for the mean height; and a similar table for the
height at extreme change of tide level; then comparing the two the
range in yards at the mean height, which has the same angular eleva-
tion as the required range at the new height, can be ascertained.

For instance a 9-in. R.M.L. gun is at a mean height of 300 feet, the
tide has risen 20 feet, range to object 2000 yards.

The elevation (quadrant) fora range of 2000 yards at a height of
280 feet is 22°5 minutes and this elevation would give a range of
2059°5 yards at a height of 800 feet. ‘Therefore the gun must be ele-
vated to 2059°5 yards on the index plate to hit an object 2000 yards off
when the tide has risen 20 feet, in other words a correction of + 59°5
yards must be given.

For less changes of level the corrections are very nearly proportional,
so that for a rise of 10 feet the correction would be 29°5 yards. This
method however can only be applied with accuracy to voluminous
tables, probably quite unsuited to practical purposes. ‘There is how-
ever a simpler method, by which a formula can be used to Be the

SLIDE RULES FOR BATTERY COMMANDER’S CORRECTIONS. 2038.

correction, which formula is suitable to the construction of a Slide
Rule.

Fre. 1.

In the figure AB is the mean height, BC the change in tide level,
AD the range to the object and FDH is a tangent to the trajectory
at D.

The trajectory which passes through D may be taken as reaching
the mean level BH at H, since for the small distance DH it will not
vary sensibly from its tangent; therefore the problem is to ascertain
the range AH; for it is evident that a gun at A, laid by an index plate
graduated for the height AB, must be given the elevation for the range
A# if the trajectory is to pass through D.

Let AB=H, BC=h, AD=R, and AH=R +7; all these quantities
being measured in yards; 7 will then be the correction required.

Now the angle DEB= FDC (angle of arrival!) FDC=FDA (angle
of descent) + ADC (angle of depression).

Let angle of descent = w, and the angle of depression = B,, then

iDIgUs) sah 15 (8, esata

Now it is obvious that, practically, the error will be very small if we
take AH = AD + DH; since CB is usually very small compared to CD.
Therefore correction will equal DH.

Now DH = BC cosec DEB
v.e. 7 = h cosec (RB, + w)
also if the tide level has fallen to D'C’
r = — h cosec (By + w)
Peer
R

where 2 = sin

By taking a mean value for 6
Rag et Les
vine (2 = aa =

=: R
we obtain a mean value for either rise or fall of tide; and unless h is

1 The angle of arrival (a term first used I believe by Lieut.-Colonel Jocelyn, R.A.) is the angle
made by a tangent to the trajectory and the surface of the water; and is made up of the angle of
descent as given in the range table, and the angle of depression. This is the same thing as the
‘angle of descent”’ as defined in the drill-book, but there being no convenient term for the range
table angle of descent, I have preferred to use the term ‘ angle of arrival’’ as above, keeping angle
of descent to mean, range table angle of descent, i eta:

Description
of the rule.

204 SLIDE RULES FOR BATTERY COMMANDER’S CORRECTIONS.

very large in comparison with H this will not introduce any appreciable
error.

The formula for calculating the error then will be

y = + h cosec (8 + w)
This may be written

eae h
a (B + w)
and log r= + {log h — log sin (8 + w)}

and this is a form suitable for solution by means of a Slide Rule. (It
should be noted that there is a case where this formula is not suitable,
viz: where the mean height is small the rise of tide large and the angle
of descent great for under these conditions the assumption on which it is
founded viz: that AH = AD + DH is no longer approximately true).

On the left of the rule, above the slide, is a scale of logs of numbers
from 1°67 to 16°67, the figures however are multiplied by 3, so that
they read from 6 to 50, this being necessary as heights are always given
in feet. Below the slide is a similar scale of logarithms but numbered
naturally, as it is intended to read yards. Both these scales are mea-
sured from the same point so that 10 on the lower will be found directly
under 30 on the upper. On the centre of the slide is a scale of log
sines, commencing from the black arrow, but as the angle of arrival
will hardly ever fall outside the limits of 1° to 15°, only the divisions
between those limits are shown. This scale is not used for finding the
corrections, but is put on to enable the scale on the top edge of the
slide to be completed for each particular case, as of course it will vary
according to the nature of gun and mean height above sea level. ‘'T'o
complete this scale then, for a particular case, we have to ascertain the
angles of arrival for different ranges (at intervals of 500 yards would
usually be sufficient) ; this is done by taking the angles of descent from
the range table and adding to them tke angles of depression.

For example :—

Gun 9" R.M.L. Height above mean sea
M.Y. 1440 fis. level 100 feet.
Range Angle of Angle of Angle of -
yards. descent.* | depression. arrival.
1000 1° 35’ 1° 64/ 38° 29/
1500 2° 34/ 1° 16’ 3° 50’
2000 8° 45’ 57’ 4° 42/
2500 & 46! 5° 63/
3000 6° 35’ 38’ 7° 13!
3500 8° 10’ 33’ 8° 43’
4000 9° 50’ 29’ 10° 19’
4500 11° 40’ 26/ 12° 6’
5000 13° 41’ 23/ 14° 4/

* From range table.

Now to complete the scale, on the upper edge of the slide, opposite

SLIDE RULES FOR BATTERY COMMANDER’S CORRECTIONS, 205

3° 29' on the scale of log sines, make a mark and number it 1000;
against 3° 50’ put 1500 and so on; also filling in on the right end of
the slide the nature of gun, muzzle velocity, and height for which the
scale has been constructed.

To use the rule.

- Find by the depression range-finder how much the tide has risen or
fallen from the mean ; set the mark, corresponding to the range of the
target, on the upper edge of the slide against the number of feet rise
or fall; under the black arrow will be found the correction required.

- For instance if the tide has risen 15 feet, and the range is 2000 yards,
bring 2000 on slide under 15 on the rule and under the arrow will be
found 62, which is the required correction and must be added since the
tide has risen.

(d) Correction for travel.

This correction is the allowance that has to be made for the altera-
tion in range which takes place during the time that elapses between
the moment of reading out the range and the arrival of the shot at the
object. This time is made up of a constant “time of firing,” viz.:
the time from reading the range to firing the guns, and a variable time
of flight.

The amount of correction necessary is ascertained in the following
manner: the time in which the range alters by 50 yards is noted, then
since we know the range and consequently the time of flight, and the
time of firmg; we have the following proportion—

Mia+t:: 50:2
where 7 is the number of seconds the range takes to alter by 50 yards,
a is the constant time of firing, ¢ the time of flight, and w the required
correction,
__ 50 (a + 2)
Se
and log w = log 50 + log (a + t) — log n.

On the upper part of this rule in the centre.is a black arrow marked
00, representing log 50 measured from a point on the left 3 below the
slide is a scale of logs from 10 to 250, which scale starts from the
same point, so that the two fifties are exactly opposite one another.
On the top edge of the slide is a scale of logs from 2 to 25 marked
“seconds ;” and on the lower edge is a scale of ranges which must be
made out separately for each gun and for each time of firing. The
method of constructing it is as follows :—

Ascertain the constant “ time of firing” and add to it the times of
flight for the different ranges ; for example—

Gun 9-pr. R.M.L. M.V. 1440 fs.

hence a

Range. Time of flight.
1000 yards 2 seconds
1500 _,, By sy
2000, 1 an

&e, &e.

es ERY ae ee er) oe ao Ld
If the constant “time of firing ” has been found to be 3 seconds

Use of rule,

Correction for
travel of
object,

Description
of rule.

Use of the
rule.

206 SLIDE RULES FOR BATTERY COMMANDER'S CORRECTIONS.

when using Case II. for laying we have to allow for travel at

1000 yards 54 seconds
15007 Fy Oe),
2.00 On (ee, and so on.

Therefore under 54 seconds make a mark at the lower edge and
number it 1000, another under 64 numbered 1500 and so on.

To use the rule bring the division on the scale of seconds, which
corresponds with the number of seconds during which the range alters
by 50 yards, under the black arrow, then under the range will be found
the required correction.

For example, supposing the range to be increasing by 50 yards every
7% seconds and the range to the target to be 3500 yards. Bring 7}
on the scale of seconds under the black arrow, and under 3500 on the
scale of ranges, we find 84 which is the correction required.

When using Case I. for laying the “ time of firing” will be different
to that for Case IJ.; the slide is therefore made reversible so that the
scale for Case I. can be placed on one side and that for Case IT. on the
other.

RRECTION.

ae
|

4 Iide

\S#FO Fs

[7 PML |
2E/00 seek

y (

aes fo LTTE TT

60 70 C0 WH

Up leted according “& local VOGUE CHLEMLS.

See past |
TS

20
|sc00 6000 (
——
£00 250
deduct,

Sistpe Rue FOR CARL CALLA EIN.G TIDE CORRECTION.

FIC 4. (ULL SIZE)

a | a i

leet & 0 Ms 0 $0 Re oe Zee a4 Lide
ron. Mean Leve
PTT TCE tr |
3 | Cun F RUL
p- ae : a 3000 4000 5000 Range | (or we r |

SS reno ee
Ro Soe only | |
eee Oe of a Correcttor a: | + 1 + 4 : + Ly + * 10 + LH HI Wy WW - 230

Add Correction when lide Rises, Deduct Wher Ltdée Fatts.

NoTé— lhe heavy figures & Scale show that part of the slide which would have to be completed according & local reguiurements

SLvOe RULE. FOR -~TFRAVEL. CORRECTION.
FIG.3. (Fuihk SIZE) ae

Correctton for Travel of Large. =

5YO : i

LANGE wlters 80 yards : i] : ea =e [ Ey ~~ Z i
ns LE.
D { Cun I” Ml. MV 1440 rs. "hoo 2000 3000 4000 sca0 6000 (
Cassell. - lime af fering 3 secs. ae
om
Cee Bate ae eepmeed CAREER Pavano 7
10 20 IO #0 50 60 70 80 20 (00 450 ‘200 250

Add Correctton when Range Ilnoereasc¢tng. Decreasing deduct. i

THORN WootwicH

207

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

BY
MAJOR E. S. MAY, B.A.
(A Lecture! delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, 7th March, 1895).

Lrevut.-Generat Sir Evenryn Woop, V.C., G.C.B., Spectra Honorary Member R.A.1.,
IN THE CHAIR.

Tae Caatrman—lI need scarcely introduce Major May to you. I will
not say that you know him very much better than I do, because not
only do I know him very well but I have a great regard for him. But
if I do not know him better than you do Lam quite certain that he
knows the subject before us better than I do; and without saying more
I will ask him to deliver his lecture.

Mason HE. 8. May—Sir Evelyn Wood, My Lord, Sir Redvers Buller,
and Gentlemen, it will scarcely be possible for me, in the time at our
disposal this evening, to adequately deal with all the opportunities
which war may yield to guns and horsemen. The potentialities of the
two arms together in making long and rapid marches, in raids, pursuits,
or retreats have not long ago been dealt with in previous lectures,
and by no one more ably, if he will let me say so, than by the Inspector-
General of Cavalry? himself, who has done us the honour of coming
here to-night (applause). Great and important as they are I can per-
haps therefore now pass them lightly over, to dwell more fully on the
more difficult operations which the brigade or division of cavalry may
be called upon to undertake, either on the battlefield itself, or when
acting independently. Such operations too as we saw the other day
near Churn will probably most attract us just at present, and moreover
a special difficulty seems to me to cling round them in these latter
days which renders discussion desirable. Because now-a-days we are
especially tempted to try and combine and fuse together two great
principles of tactics which are more or less antagonistic the one to
the other. We endeavour to make what for the time being is one
unit act by both fire and shock at the same moment, yet can never
thus hope to reap the fullest effects from both methods. Nay more we
desire at one phase of the action to see men forgetful of the advantages
with which modern science has endowed them, and fight as in the days

1 The lecture was given extempore.
2 In a lecture before the Military Society of Ireland, on the 24th of April, 1893,
5, VOL. XXII.

208 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

of flint-locks, and at another earlier stage we may require them to
utilize almost to the utmost all the powers of the scientific weapons
with which they are equipped.

And our difficulties are further complicated by the fact that in the
decisive combat the capability of one part of our unit has not altered
very materially during the last hundred-and-twenty years, while that
the other portion has grown out of all recognition.

The lance and sword were the weapons of chivalry and are still those
on which a cavalry soldier relies when he flings the gauntlet down to
his foe for a combat a I’ owtrance.

They are no more deadly now than they ever were, nor are the men
who wield them presumably more powerful or skilful in handling them
than were those that Seydlitz or Ziethen led.. It is a very different
matter however where fire-arms are concerned. If Byng’s or Maitland’s.
Guards could be called upon to-day to fight the battalions Lord Methuen
commands in London we know to a certainty that a mere massacre would
ensue. If Ross’s troop of 1815 were to engage its successor, “the
Chestnut. troop”’. of our-own times, we have no doubt that it would be
swept away before it could get near enough to put in a round at all.
We could prove all this to demonstration, but here certainty ends; and,
although we believe, or at any rate I believe, that our cavalry now are
to-day, regiment for regiment the best in Hurope, I suggest to you that
if the Union Brigade, which swept down on D’EHrlon’s Corps on a cer-
tain 18th of June eighty years ago, had to charge the three magnificent
regiments which are in England now, the result would be by no means
the same foregone conclusion as in the other cases which I have cited.
Indeed I myself often doubt (and I know 1 am supported by opinion in
Germany) whether the highly trained squadrons of Seydlitz, “ jammed,”
as he loved to see them “ boot to boot,” would not be at least equal to any
cavalry which modern Europe can show. The principles which govern
shock tactics have in fact not altered since before the days of gunpowder,
and yet in close alliance with them we have to utilize weapons which would
astonish such comparatively modern Generals as Lord Raglan or Lee. I
use the word “have” because it is remarkable how strong a tendency
there is, and has always been, on the part of cavalry to avail themselves
of fire, even at the expense of velocity, and yet it is a fundamental truth
that its only hope lies in swift movement and cold steel (applause). From
Cromwell’s time to Frederick’s the tendency prevailed. The latter set
to work to stamp it out, and succeeded. But in spite of his teaching
the heresy seems still to smoulder. To mention a few examples that I
have come across while looking up this subject lately. I find the
French cavalry halting to receive our charge with pistol-fire at the
affair of Aroya-Molinos in 1811;! the Russian cavalry halting and
firing with a brigade moving straight against them in 1854.? The
Austrian horsemen, reputed to be the best in Hurope at that time,

2 At Balaclava.
3 Vide official.account of the war of 1866, pages 95 and 344.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 209

there is an even more remarkable example still. We all know how
splendidly the French cavalry fought on occasions in 1870, and what
devotion and courage they displayed when assailing infantry in par-
ticular, yet had they so little of the true cavalry spirit, that, when that
gallant and celebrated charge was delivered by Marguerittes division
on the Illy plateau at Sedan it was preceded by volleys of carbine fire.
So much was this the case—so much smoke and explosion of firearms
was there—that an eye-witness has told us that the German 5th Corps
at first supposed that they had infantry in front of them.!

British cavalry, gentlemen, have never been prone to such a fault, if
they have erred at all, they have done so on the side of a too headlong
valour, but nevertheless I say these chance examples remind us once more
of the need which cavalry feels for the support of fire, and of the truth of
Napoleon’s dictum “ Cavalry has more need of artillery than infantry,
because it cannot reply to fire but can fight only with the steel.”

But if artillery is to be the right arm, as it has been termed, of cavalry,
it must be trained weekly or even daily with it, and the two should, if
possible, learn to understand one another, not from the perfunctory
study of one another’s text-books, but from that personal familiarity
which is acquired to some extent at field days, but is fostered and de-
veloped in a far larger degree, by life together in camp and barracks.
(applause). And I dwell particularly on this point because owing to
the changes in the armament of artillery which I have alluded to, there
is an especial danger that Horse Artillery may now-a-days receive
an one-sided education only.

The power of the modern Horse Artillery gun is such that batteries
cannot be allowed to stand idle during a great battle, and therefore
modern Horse Artillery batteries, whatever may have been necessary
in the past, must be trained and utilized in precisely the same manner
as are field batteries; and they constitute in fact simply mobile Field
Artillery. If experse and forage considerations were of no moment it
would indeed be better to have all gunners mounted, and thus ease the
horses. Mobility is the most vital characteristic which artillery should
possess, and, leaving its use with the cavalry division altogether out
of sight for a moment, it is in this respect that Horse Artillery is
always valuable (loud applause). In a former lecture I spoke myself
on this part of the subject, and quoted modern instance in support of
what I said, and I do not wish to enlarge on it now—there is no time
for me to do so—for the truth is as old as the hills, but I cannot help
reminding you that at Dresden Napoleon had to double the teams
which could not draw his guns by taking horses from the com-
missariat wagons. At La Rothiere the artillery of Sacken’s Corps
could not be got forward, and one-half had to be left on the ridge of
Trannes, while all the horses took on the other half, and came back for
the remainder. After Montmirail the Russian artillery could only be
got off the field by harnessing 50 Hussars with long ropes to each gun.
At Vauchamps when Grouchy got across Blacker’s line of retreat with

\T found this statement in a series of ‘ Lectures on the three arms,” by Baron Seddeler of the
Russian General Staff, published in the ‘“ Militar Wochenblatt”’ in the year 1878.

210 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

his cuirassiers all the accounts tell us that not a man would have
escaped had the Horse Artillery not been delayed by the execrable
state of the roads. We have seen the same thing happen with us
not thirteen years ago in spite of these experiences, and of an hundred
similar ones, and we would do well to bear in mind that mobility is the
first essential to artillery, that we do not make war on grassy lawns,
or only in summer weather, that horses lose their strength when
underfed and overworked (loud applause). And, so far as we can
read the future, it seems probable that harder work than ever will
be asked for from Horse Artillery. Because, as I have said, it
now has to fulfil two réles; one as Horse Artillery with the cavalry,
Sometimes acting quite independently, and the other, a more frequent
one perhaps, when it takes its place with rest of the Field Artillery
in line of battle, what in fact for want of a better term we may call its
role as “ Corps Artillery.”

With the advanced cavalry, when merely feeling for the enemy, it will
not have to fight decisive actions, for its duty will be to furnish just
enough force to rend the hostile veil, and it can utilize its range often
here, yet will have to do a lot of hard work in moving rapidly over long
distances. But it may have severe fighting too even with the advanced
cavalry, for it may be sent to seize some important strategic point as
after Tel-el-kebir in 1882, or as when the 5th German Cavalry division
(Rheinhabens) went ahead to seize the passage across the Moselle in 1870;
to make a raid on the line of hostile communications, as when the Horse
Artillery and cavalry of the lst army—Prince Frederick Charles’s
dashed on and cut the line of rail at Lundenberg ;? or to fasten on and
hold fast an enemy endeavouring to escape, as ab Vionville. All this
may have to be done before the opposing bodies of infantry and Field
Artillery see one another at all, and, when a pitched battle is joined, the
labours of the cavalry and Horse Artillery will be by no means less-
ened. For these two must work together then with the other arms,
and must watch eagerly for every chance which may enable them
to operate for the common good. And while awaiting an opportun-
ity the Horse Artillery, be it remembered, will probably take the
same share in the action as do the other guns. TF imally the duties
of cavalry and Horse Artillery in retreat or pursuit will demand an
immense expense of energy, but we have no time now to do more
than just refer to them, or I would like to tell you of the wonderful re-
treat from Quatre Bras to Waterloo, “ the prettiest field day of cavalry
and Horse Artillery I ever saw in my life,” as Lord Anglesey termed it,
when the 7th Hussars greatly distinguished themselves. But I know
I may ask you to spare me a moment to say that the Captain Fraser,
who handled a troop of that regiment so well that day, was the father
of the Inspector-General of Cavalry, and of Sir Charles Fraser, whom
we all regard as perhaps the best friend the Horse Artillery ever had
(loud applause).

1“ Ti waurait pas sauvé un seul homme sile Général Couin, qui avait ordre de suivre le Comte
Grouchy, avait pu arriver assez tot avec deux batteries Vartillerie léegére ; de chemins presque
impracticables i’en enpécherent.” ‘* Victoires et conquétes,” Vol. XXIII, p. 97.

2 July 15th, 1866.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 211

There are indeed, as I have said, only two phases of this many sided
usefulness that I propose to speak of this evening, one when cavalry
and Horse Artillery are called upon to throw their weight suddenly
into the scale at some crisis in a pitched battle, and the other when a
cavalry brigade or division for the time being independent engages a
similar hostile body in a decisive combat.

The latter is the kind of fight that will perhaps most fascinate cavalry
soldiers, and there is certainly more room init for the display of those
peculiar qualities with which a leader of Horse should be endowed, but
the opportunities afforded on the battlefield itself, come, perhaps, more
frequently, and it is in them that cavalry and guns may show themselves
especially useful. We will all willingly do homage to the chivalrous
impatience which urges a fiery Hotspur against his natural foe irres-
pective of surrounding circumstances, but we will esteem him more, if
he intervenes only when the interests of the rest of the army call out
his skill or courage (applause).

So vastly important indeed does this co-operation of cavalry and guns
on the battlefield seem to me to be that I desire to give it the first
place in discussion this evening.

The actual tactics to be adopted depend so greatly on the conditions
of the moment, on the proximity or otherwise of infantry, on the state
of the hostile troops to be assailed, that I need not dwell just now
upon them, but will only say that the distinguishing characteristic of the
two arms is to be utilized as far as may be, and that the flanks and
communications of the enemy should be sought when possible.

Of modern instances of such co-operation there are not many; the
cavalry and artillery work in 1866 was not quite satisfactory, and
in 1870 the French squadrons were admittedly mismanaged. There
was a great cavalry combat certainly on the 16th of August, 1870,
at Ville Sur Yron to the north-west of Mars-la-Tour, but before it
took place the German Horse Artillery had been absorbed in the
general fight, and no guns supported Barby’s charges. There is also
a very good example of what Horse Artillery and cavalry can do in
modern war, even on the battlefield itself, to be found in the story of
the battle of Loigny-Poupry in December of the same year, but J
have dealt with that in previous lectures, and I don’t want to repeat
myself to-night. Andso, gentlemen, I will ask you to come back with
me all the way to 1811.

Some may despise my example as a shred of ancient history, but I
believe it is the spirit rather than the letter which we should dwell upon
with reference to the particular part of the subject in our immediate
view, and that the old wars may still be studied with advantage.

The special characteristics of cavalry and the mode of their appli-
cation have not altered at all since the stirring times when the century
was young, and guns must co-operate in the future and utilize their
mobility just as they did in the past. I say further that, if you want
to read of Horse Artillery and cavalry at their very best, you must refer
to what those arms did in that wonderful campaign of 1814 in France,
when Napoleon showed the world what genius may accomplish against

212 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

appalling odds. At Rheims!, to give one instance out of many, he turned
the left flank of the Russians, under St. Priest with 8000 cavalry and
30 Horse Artillery guns. But the allies retaliated in the most brilliant
manner at the second battle of Fere Champenoise,* when 20,000 of
their horsemen with 128 guns utterly defeated the corps of Marmont
and Mortier, 22,000 strong, of whom 17,000 were infantry, and with 84
guns. I think this is perhaps the most astonishing achievement of
guns and cavalry which history records, for not a musket was fired on
the allied side, and gunners and troopers worked entirely alone
(applause).

From India too may be gleaned splendid illustrations of the value of
Horse Artillery and cavalry, of their powers in covering long distances,
or carrying through gallant enterprises. India moreover, as I may re-
mind you, has even a claim to be regarded as the birthplace of the
former arm. However that may be, it is at any rate certain that we
cannot anywhere find mention of brighter exploits than those of which
our Indian Horse Artillery can boast, and I know my brother officers
will bear out my assertion, that, when future historians may undertake
- to collect the names, which have shed most lustre on our regiment, it
is to the muster rolls of the Bengal Artillery that they will most
frequently have to turn (loud applause).

But in India we have not had to fight an European foe with our
Horse Artillery, and I therefore resort this evening to one of the great
battles of the Peninsular war for an illustration. There no doubt have
been deeds accomplised on a larger scale, such as those I have mentioned
from 1814, but nowhere was the danger more imminent, or the crisis
sharper than at the battle of Albuera.

It will be impossible I fear to analyse it very closely for the records
on the subject are singularly baid. They did not publish official
accounts in those days and the great authority, Napier, was an infantry
soldier, and I think he has sometimes failed to do full justice to the
cavalry and artillery. We know from the glowing pages, which tell
the story of “the fatal hill,” “ with what a strength and majesty the
British soldier fights.” ‘“ That astonishing infantry” surely deserved
every word he said of them and more, but it is disappointing neverthe-
less to find the equally gallant efforts of the 38rd and 4th Dragoon
Guards, who with four guns of “D” troop held our right flank against
the efforts of the powerful French cavalry, but comparatively briefly
referred to (applause).

Let us stay for a moment to see what they did; but 1 will only speak
very generally of the operations except in so far as they affected the
cavalry and Horse Artillery.

Beresford on the 16th of May had taken up a position at Albuera to
receive Soult who was marching to the relief of Badajoz. The Spani-
ards were on his right, the English in the centre, the Portuguese on
his left. The cavalry and Horse Artillery were extended along his
front, their left appuyed on the village of Albuera. On the high

1 March 15th, 1814.
2 March 24th, 1814.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 213

ground above the village the four guns of “ D” troop!, R.H.A., under
the command of Captain Lefebure were in action.

The whole force under Beresford amounted to about 27,000 infantry,
of whom only about 7500 however were British, 2000 cavalry, and 88
guns. Against these Soult brought some 20,000 veteran infantry,
4500 cavalry, and 52 guns, authorities differ as to the exact numbers
but these are near the mark. Beresford had neglected to occupy a
wooded hill on his right front between the Ferdia and Albuera rivers.
Behind this hill Soult accordingly massed his heavy cavalry under
Latour Maubourg, and his 5th Corps, while he made a feint of attacking
the bridge leading across the stream to Albuera with the remainder.
Between 8 and 9 o’clock Alten’s Light Infantry Brigade of the King’s
German Legion, which was holding the village and bridge of Albuera,
was assailed, and a sharp contest ensued. But it was soon evident that
the real attack was to be on our right, for two-thirds of the French
infantry were seen to counter-march to their left, while their light
cavalry wheeled about too, and galloped rapidly up the left bank of the
Albuera to join the remainder of their horse in an attempt to outflank
and overwhelm our right.

The Spaniards were ordered to change front to the right, the second
division was moved to their support, while the Portuguese were carried
to the centre, with the exception of one brigade which was sent to sup-
port Alten. The 18th Light Dragoons were left above the bridge, but
Lumley’s heavy brigade, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Dragoon Guards
and the Horse Artillery battery, was hurried as fast as possible to the
extreme right to cover our flank, which was much exposed, and was
being threatened by heavy masses of French cavalry and artillery.

The Spanish General was both obstinate and incapable, his troops failed
to carry out the orders they had received as promptly as they should
have done, and the French were upon them ere they had completed
the necessary movements. In half-an-hour Beresford’s position was a
desperate one, and defeat or victory hung in the balance till the very
end of the battle. The complete story of that fight must be studied
elsewhere. Itis enough to say now that the duties which were thrust on
the cavalry and guns on the right, where some very hard fighting took
place, were as arduous as perhaps fell to the lot of any of the troops.
Again and again did Soult throw squadron after squadron upon them,
and often were they all but overwhelmed. “D” troop was ridden
through several times by the enemy’s horsemen and for a short period
they gained possession of one of its guns. It was however soon
recovered and Lumley was able to hold the inundation back until
Hardinge’s inspiration saved the day, and the celebrated charge of the
Fusiliers pushed Soult’s columns down “ the fatal hill” (applause).

But before that crowning stroke, let me remind you that the fate of
the day had already been snatched out of the fire by Lumley’s prompt-
ness, and the courage and devotion of four of his heavy squadrons, who
fell on the French Hussars and Polish Lancers in the moment of their
triumph. Four of these regiments had suddenly caught Colborne’s Bri-

1 Two guns had been left behind at Lisbon, and had not yet joined.

214, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

gade and Cleeve’s and Hawker’s guns ata disadvantage in the rain and
mist, had taken them in flank and rear, had slain or captured two-thirds
of the brigade and six of the guns, and had penetrated through to every
part of our position. Beresford himself had a hand-to-hand encounter
with a Polish Lancer, and owed his life to his great personal strength
and courage.

One of Colborne’s battalions however stood firmly on the heights,
and our cavalry were at hand in the hour of need. Never in fact did
the three arms more loyally co-operate than at this crisis. There have
been bigger battles, but none I think more glorious to our soldiers
(applause).

I wish I could give closer details, but I have found that to try and
find particulars of some of these glorious actions of the great wars is a
most hopeless and disappointing task. The regimental records of the
8rd and 4th Dragoon Guards dismiss deeds that should be cherished
by every man in their ranks in a few niggardly lines. The artillery
despatch was lost, and we have only some private letters from some
of the officers engaged to go upon. But the good service done by the
cavalry and guns is recognised handsomely, if too briefly for the
students’ needs, by everyone who has written of that day. Marshal
Beresford’s despatch was most flattering to the artillery, and so was that
of General Lumley, while Brigadier-General Long! who commanded our
light cavalry writes in a private letter :—“ The dispersion of our cavalry
scarcely left us 400 or 500 British at any point, and these with two
regiments of Spaniards, were all we had to offer by way of resistance to
their numerous and overwhelming columns. ‘he ground however
favoured us, and the Horse Artillery did its duty with brilliant effect.
The enemy lost a great number of men, and from 400 to 500 horses by
the operation of this arm alone.” Consider what a loss of 400 or 500
horses means to a cavalry division on active service! I think you will
agree with me that to inflict such a loss as that under the circumstances
argues well for the coolness and courage of the gunners (loud applause).

And now, gentlemen, is there no lesson to be drawn from this ancient
history? May not guns and cavalry be called upon in the future to
play just the same part in which their predecessors distinguished
themselves in those far off days? Can we ensure genius on the part
of our generals now any more than we could then, and under similar
conditions of leadership and atmosphere might not precisely the same
incidents once more recur? A dull man and a rainy day! Is the com-
bination an absolutely remote contingency even in this nineteenth
century? If not, then I say, a weak flank may once more have to be
protected against the inroad of an overbearing foe, British infantry
and guns may again be surprised and ridden over by an active cavalry,
and the vigilance and readiness of the same arm may again be indis-
pensable if disaster is to be retrieved (loud applause).

Nine days afterwards there was a brilliant little cavalry fight at
Usagre when Lumley with his two fine regiments, Madden’s Portuguese,

1 Extract from a letter of Brigadier-General R. B, Long, from “ Biyouac near Vicente,’’ dated
the 26th June, 1811.

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Arroya River

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Battle of
ALBUERA

MAY IGT? 1811.

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One Enauise Mice.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 215

and “D” troop, was attacked by Latour Maubourg with the whole of
his cavalry division and some guns. The French were driven off with a
loss of 200 men for, as a letter from an officer engaged says cheerfully,
“the instant our jolly fellows came near them, they turned and were
sabred in good style.” I cannot pause now to tell you more of that
fight however, nor of Ribera,! where the services of “ D” troop were
again especially brilliant, and probably no man ever received a higher
tribute than did Captain H. C. Whinyates who was its second captain.
But I may just mention that during a communication after the action
under a flag of truce the French leader, General Lallemand, made
particular enquiries for the name of the officer who had commanded
the guns near the river, and on learning it sent the following message
to Captain Whinyates. “Tell that brave man that, if it had not been
for him, I should have beaten your cavalry, but that meeting me in every
movement with his fire, he never would allow me to form for attack.
Say that I shall mention his name in my orders as having been the
cause of our defeat, and not your cavalry. Be sure you tell him this.
Promise to give him my message” ? (applause).

There are other actions too gentlemen, of which I could tell you, in
which our cavalry and guns loyally played into one another’s hands, but
I must leave myself time to dwell on perhaps the most splendid deed of
all as far as cavalry is concerned, and one of which I have found it
possible to get minute details. It is very far indeed from being an ideal
cavalry and artillery battle planned and fought out according as theory
directs and with odds on both sides equal. I can assure you it is
almost impossible to find such. There is nearly always something
abnormal which spoils the symmetry of the fight. One side or other
is supported by infantry, or fights with smooth-bored cannon against
rifled ones, or there are no guns present, or one party declines the
combat just at the interesting moment. However I believe there is
more than one lesson in the story I am going to tell you, and so I will
ask you to bear with me even if I relate a drama played out, as in
war is nearly always the case, scarcely in a way to satisfy rigid and
exacting critics.

But before I go any further into this the most difficult and important
portion of the subject I want to put it to you with all the cogency I can
command, that now Horse Artillery and cavalry leaders alike must for-
get some of the lessons they have acquired when studying the Corps
Artillery side of Horse Artillery training. There is no time now for
deliberation, every shot must tell; the artillery leader will often have
to act on his own responsibility ; there must be the most complete and
thorough understanding between the two arms. Owing to the natural
wish to get the most out of their armament I believe we have trained
our Horse Artillery batteries too much lately with a view only to the
Corps Artillery side of their usefulness. On the other hand they have
done so well at Okehampton that cavalry soldiers are fascinated by the
accounts of their destructive powers ab comparatively long ranges. I

124th July, 1812.
2 Vide History of ** C” Battery, p. 64.

216 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

venture to think that matters want clearing up a little, and therefore
before I say any more I will be bold enough to put one or two pro-
positions before you which I regard as vital.

When guns and cavalry are engaging one another in decisive
combats—

(a) Ranges should be decisive. That is to say of not more than
1500 yards, if possible, and on an emergency considerably
less (applause).

(5) Speaking generally, but recognising the principle that the
arm at the moment most dangerous is the one to attack,
the objective of both cavalry and guns is the hostile
cavalry.

(c) Changes of position are to be avoided, and asa rule one
decisive position only is to be taken up until the cavalry
combat has been decided.

(d) The officer commanding the artillery is on occasions to take
the initiative, should be separated from the cavalry leader,
and not hang back waiting for orders (applause).

It may sound startling to some ears to hear a doctrine as to ranges
advanced which sacrifices so completely the powers of the gun. For a
short time other views held the field, but now I think the pendulum is
tending to swing the other way, and almost all authorities recognise
the fact that decisive ranges must be sought, otherwise at a critical
moment the fire of the guns may be masked, their moral effect
will not be so great as it otherwise might be, and the two arms
will not work so completely together as they ought. Moreover the
cavalry fight developes with such rapidity that we want every round to
be effective, and finally considerations as to the supply of ammunition
make us chary of wasting even one. Under such circumstances, and
when we do not intend to enter into a protracted contest with guns at
all, cover is to be left out of our calculation and we should think only
of so placing ourselves that we may have the best chance of quickly
injuring our opponents, and may move off again rapidly if necessary.!
It is for these reasons that the limbers are put close behind the guns,
and that we place them so without misgivings in the face of all we know
as to the deadliness of the modern shrapnel shell.

Changes of position are to be avoided because they waste precious
moments.

Let us now see, gentlemen, how matters are likely to work outa little
in detail.

Two divisions or brigades each accompanied in the former case by
two or three batteries, and in the latter by one, are in contact and mean
to fight. The country is one suitable for the working of the arms, and

1 A note from the Diary of Lieutenant Swabey in the Peninsula throws an interesting light on
this subject :-—

“ Apropos of Captain Lefebure, remember in coming into action, when cavalry is likely to come
up unperceived, not to let the limbers of the guns turn, or drive farther from the trail than to admit
of the gun being worked without the handspike.” See R.A.I. “ Proceedings,” p. 93, Vol. XXII.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 217

for the moment infantry may be left out of our calculations. What is
the first thing that will occur after the news that the enemy is close by
has been received? The cavalry will be formed in a formation pre-
paratory to attack. How long willit be before the division is ready to
move forward? I suppose perhaps sometimes as much as twenty
minutes, but I speak with diffidence in the presence of so many high
authorities on cavalry. Now during that time it may well happen that
the hostile batteries will come into action, and will try and cannonade
the squadrons while more or less stationary. Isaid just now that Horse
Artillery were to go to decisive ranges, but the hostile cavalry are pro-
bably not in sight, as yet we are only in a preliminary stage of the
combat, and the guns must cover the deployment of their friends if
it is interfered with by fire. Therefore they will usually now have to
engage the hostile batteries. But remember they are not to do so in
the same spirit in which they act when they are working as Corps
Artillery. They are to be prepared to move off rapidly again when
their friends are ready, and are never to be drawn into a protracted
artillery duel. And the same rule, it may be as well to point out,
applies to any other occasions during the earlier part of the action when
collisions between advanced or rear-guards—little squalls that skim
before the storm—may draw fire from the guns (applause).

By the time the three lines are formed the hostile cavalry will pro-
bably be in view, our leader will move forward to reconnoitre, the
officer commanding the artillery will accompany him, and the guns will
be left on the protected flank moving a little in rear of the first line.

All the guns should be held usually together in one mass. They will
thus accomplish most by their fire, and will interfere least with the free
movement of the cavalry.

Bear in mind, gentlemen, that events now are rushing on with be-
wildering variation and rapidity. The two hostile bodies are closing on
one another as active cavalry only in an opencountry canmove. There
is not much time to think, and none for alteration of plans. Our leader
will quickly form his decision, choose the position for the guns (aided
in his choice by the artillery commander), and will send him to take
command of his arm either at once or at any rate when the trails touch
the ground. In very many cases the position selected will be the rising
ground from which the reconnaissance is made. Often it will be a
favourable site nearer to the foe. I have heard the question as to
whether the guns should advance straight forward or move slightly to
a flank hotly argued. Let us waste no time over such contentions or
pedantries. In nine cases out of ten on the actual field there is only
one place which is obviously the best for artillery, and the guns will go
to that place whether it be a little on the flank or not. But the ideal
move for them is nevertheless straight to the front, because thus they
will get to work quickest, and never forget that in combats such as we
are now discussing the artillery have at first to make a race of it to
forestall that of the enemy.

Again however I must add a saving clause such as all rules in war
demand. The cavalry is the principal arm, the predominant partner in
the union of which I am now speaking, and the artillery must not for-

218 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

get that it is purely an auxiliary. Therefore the worst fault a gunner
could commit would be to interfere with the free movement of the
squadrons, or hamper their effective action. If circumstances demand
that the cavalry go straight to the front, then the guns must get out of
their way to a flank, and they must always be careful that by no
chance should they incline towards the cavalry during their advance.
The bias if any should be in the other direction (applause).

Moreover another reason for guns going straight ahead is that nothing
decisive is ever accomplished in a cavalry action except by flank attacks.

The squadrons work away from the guns therefore to gain the
enemy’s flank. He changes front to face them, and in doing so not
only offers a chance of enfilade fire to our batteries, but at the same
time masks his own.

‘“That is all very well,” some one will say, “but what are the enemy
about all this time ?”’ Certainly, gentlemen, I am only spinning a pretty
theory. Nevertheless such is the consummation we hope to reach by our
manoeuvre, and all we can ever do in war is to try and act correctly
ourselves and trust that our foe will make more errors that we will. It
is only a question of who makes the most numerous and gross blunders
after all, and in seeking perfection for ourselves we need not seek it for
the foe also (applause).

When the guns do move into the decisive position they are to go at
their best pace.

If more than one battery is engaged it will be best to place the
batteries in échelon, the one furthest from the fight being in advance.
Hach battery can thus change front on a central gun easily, and fire be
turned quickly in the different directions which a moving target may
necessitate.

How far to the front can they go without undue rashness ?

‘The general rule says that they should advance one-third of the
distance which separates the opposing forces. They ought however
almost always to have an escort and then they are safe enough as long
as they keep nearer to their friends than to their foes.

An escort will protect them from enterprises on the part of small
hostile bodies, and, if the main body of the enemy fall upon them, it
will be doing the very thing I have said it should not do. Its cohesion
will be broken up, and it will pay dearly for its blunder, if our cavalry
are at all decently handled.

Meanwhile the batteries, even if they are ridden through, will be
comparatively little injured.

I think the text-books have exhausted the subject of fire discipline.

But now after the first collision there comes a phase of the fight when
I think the guns most often in actual war have got their chance.

When we read the story of cavalry combats we find that they have
often ended in but “a lame and impotent conclusion.” The first lines
meet, there is some cutting and hacking, one side begins to yield, then
the second lines come up, the fight sways back again, and so on, what
Lord Anglesey in one of his letters calls a “ see-saw ” supervenes, and
finally perhaps both sides end by finding themselves much in the

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 219

positions from which they started. What give really decisive re-
sults are flank attacks, or artillery fire into squadrons which are
attempting to rally. It is therefore to shatter a foe finally who other-
wise might recover himself that guns must strive, and it is by doing so
that they will frequently be of great service. They did good work thus
at Benevente in 1808, and again, as I shall presently show you in 1854,
Therefore during the combat of the cavalry the officer commanding the
artillery should keep a watchful eye on the course of events, and be
ready to send his guns, or, if he has three batteries in hand, a portion
of them, galloping boldly on after the enemy’s squadrons, to give them
that knock down blow that will prevent their showing a front again
that day. If the success is a very pronounced one he will also go
rapidly on with all his force, to pursue with fire the flying enemy.

In the event of a defeat he must act as circumstances dictate, but it
will almost always be best to remain doggedly in position, and fight his
guns to the very last. To limber up and try and get away before a
pursuing cavalry is I believe an hopeless effort. I have read an account
by a foreign officer who says no one who has never had actual experi-
ence can realize what a panic is apt to seize men then, how quickly the
avenging horsemen seem to gain upon you, and how helpless you feel
with your back turned to them.

On the other hand you will find an account of how a Prussian battery
breasted the torrent, and turned it by its fire, in the story of the fight
at Rossbrunn during the campaign in Western Germany in 1866
(applause).

And as a concluding word on tactics I want further to lay it down as
a general principle that, though the Horse Artillery are to assist in every
way the cavalry, still the latter is to attack when that one golden
moment, which occurs once only in a fight, and once lost is never per-
haps regained, offers an opportunity, whether the guns have prepared
the way or not. Here in fact the relations between guns and cavalry,
differs absolutely from those between them and infantry. Ihave heard,
I am sorry to say, bigoted artillerymen propound other views, and
assert that the cavalry must wait for the batteries to produce their effect.
Never! If the guns can act, all the better, but never miss a chance
through any pedantic scruple as to waiting for them to do so (applause).

And now, gentlemen, I will tell you something of the charge of our
heavy brigade at Balaclava, and try and get a few practical lessons out
of it.

It is rash of me I know to speak of the Crimea to this audience. Sir
Hvelyn saw this fight, and so did Sir William Stirling, and moreover Sir
William served shortly afterwards in this very troop of which Iam going
to speak, and he knows more of Horse Artillery on actice service
than any man in our army now living (loud applause). But rash ag it
is, I want to speak of this fight to-night.

I desire before I say anything however to make my intention perfectly
clear. I have not come here to glorify my arm, nor to write a glowing
epitaph for a man whom I never saw, and who died indeed, poor fellow,

220 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

a few years after the Crimean war was over.!_ The glory of the heavy
charge at Balaclava belongs to our cavalry alone. Nota shot, not a
shell, was fired by any Horse Artillery gun,? until the Russians were
fairly in retreat, they were beaten by the pluck and dash of our Dragoons,
and by nothing else, and I in no sense wish to claim any share of one of
the most brilliant feats of history for the Horse Artillerymen (loud
applause). But after the foe was first turned back, they did some
service too, and we can learn something from their conduct. The
reason however why I selected this as an example to discuss was be-
cause I have been able to get close information with regard to it from
two absolutely reliable sources. I regret I cannot further indicate
them. One from Russia, for obvious reasons, it is better to keep secret.
The other is supplied by a man who is as modest as he was brave and
capable when in the service and he wishes his name not to appear
(applause).

Now I will briefly tell you so much of the story of the day as concerns
us this evening.

Seeing the Turks giving way in the Gorge of Kadikoi, here (pointing
to the diagram) Lord Raglan sent 8 squadrons of our heavy brigade to
their assistance. General Scarlett was in the act of executing this
mission and had with him the 5th Dragoon Guards, the Scots Greys, and
the Inniskilling Dragoons, in all six squadrons, while two squadrons
of the 4th Dragoon Guards were following him, and two of the Royals
joined him later. The six squadrons in front had got into two columns
owing to an obstruction in their path, and of these the right hand
column was led by the Ist squadron of the Inniskillings and closed by
the two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards, and the one on the
left hand by the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings and closed by two
squadrons of the Greys. No patrols or scouts covered the march of
these troops. Suddenly the head of an immense Russian column of
cavalry, composed of probably not less than 2000 men, is seen crown-
ing the causeway heights on our left flank not more than seven or
eight hundred yards away. Scarlett on the left flank of our left column
determined at once to attack them, and wheeled the three squadrons
beside him into line to the left, the other three forming the right
hand column were wheeled to face the enemy too, and constituted
what was practically a second line. The 1st squadron of the Innis-
killings had gained on the others during the march, and was formed
therefore to their right rear.

1 Captain Brandling died of consumption at Leeds, 16th April, 1860.

2 TI somewhat accentuated the fact that ** a” Troop did not fire on the Russian cavalry until
they were in retreat, because I did not Wish it to be supposed that I at all wanted to minimise the
splendid achievement of our Dragoons. Since I gave the lecture I have had evidence before me,
and especially letters from General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.M.G., C.B., R.A., who was with
Barker’s Battery near Kadikoi on the day in question, which shows clearly that that battery did
fire at the Russian cavalry column, which attacked Scarlett, before the collision took place. As
to the value of that fire [need not now open a discussion; for it does not affect my point, which
is to show that it was Brandling’s clear insight and decision which prevented the Russians from
rallying or making a second charge, nor my contention that, had arrangements andZequipment
been better considered, the Horse Artillery would have been in their proper place in sufficient
time to have had a glorious chance at the huge target the Russian column would haye offered.
them just before our_men fell upon it,

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 221

The three squadrons in front numbered some 800 men, those in rear
not quite as many more. The two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon
Guards, and of the Royal Dragoons were meanwhile moving on to sup-
port. Now there is nothing more gallant, or more creditable in the
whole of military history than the manner in which this handful of men
behind Scarlett dauntlessly faced and attacked an enemy immensely
superior to them in numbers, and moving against them with all the ad-
vantage of the ground in their favour. But we cannot pause to dwell
on the details even of so gloriousa feat. We want to look into the
artillery side of the action, and a battery was hurrying up to try and
find a place in the impending combat.

“C” Troop had been quartered with and attached to the light divi-
sion, and had that morning been called from its camp, five-and-a-half
miles away. Why, you will ask, was not the troop with the cavalry ?
Why indeed! Hxcept that during the Peninsular war Ross’s troop—
The Chestnut Troop—had been and made its reputation, not with
cavalry, but with Craufurd’s celebrated light division, There were only
two troops of Horse Artillery in the Crimea, “I” and “C;” of these,
“T” had been allotted to the cavalry, and was now with the light bri-
gade, and “C,” as I have said, was with the light division. Far better
had it been had another Peninsular precedent been followed; for Lord
Paget, as he then was, had command of a cavalry division of five regi-
ments and two Horse Artillery batteries during Sir John Moore’s
campaign in 1808.1

But the fault of not keeping the Horse Artillery with the cavalry was
in 1854 further aggravated in spite of what experience taught by
arming “C” Troop with four 9-prs. and two 24-pr. howitzers. An
equipment too heavy for Horse Artillery. A rough road and an un-
wieldy equipment destroyed the chance the guns had of effectively
co-operating. As an eye-witness tells us, the horses “reeled and
trembled,” when they haited after the excessive strain, and after all
the troop arrived a few minutes too late.

As it came down from the upland past the Col, this way (pointing to
the map) the troop was met about here by a staff officer with a message
from General Fox Strangways (remember him, gentlemen, he had
fought with the Rocket Troop at Leipzig, was wounded at Waterloo
and was killed at Inkerman), calling it to a certain spot on the left of
the heavies. “C” Troop was then commanded by Captain John Brand-
ling, a man who seems to me, from what I have heard of his behaviour

1 The 7th, 10th, and 18th Hussars, the 15th Light Dragoons, and the 8rd Light Dragoons of the
the K.G.L., with “B” and “*C” Troops, R.H.A.

2 The 9-pr. equipment armament of ‘C0 ”’ Troop in 1854, weighed, gun, 38 cwt. 29 qrs., Waggon,
(without spare wheel), 84. cwt. 1 qr. 17 lbs.

6-pr. equipment armament of “1”? Troop 28 ewt. 23 lbs., waggon, 33 ewt. 3 qrs. 8 Ibs.

24-pr. Howitzers for 9-pr. equipment, 39 ewt. 1 qr. 11 lbs., waggon, 35 ewt. 1 qr. 20 lbs.

12-pr. Howitzers for 6-pr. equipment, 29 ewt. 17bs., waggon, 31 ewt. 2 qrs. 13 lbs.

No men on limbers or elsewhere have been included in these weights which have been kindly ob-
tained for me by Col. F. A. Whinyates.

The weight of the 12 pr. B.L. and limber is 39 ewt. 3qrs. 9 Ibs, “ with personal equipment and
detachment.’? Vide Handbook of 1893, 2 ’

222 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

on this day, to have had a readiness, resolution, and coolness in action
such as mark him out as a man endowed with something akin to genius
for war. I don’t want to spatter him with indiscriminate praise, as one
wise after the event might possible do. Some of you who study art
will remember how when Turner was informed of the subtleties and
meanings, which most people failed to appreciate, that Ruskin had dis-
covered in his pictures, he laughed and said, “ Ruskin sees a good deal
more in them than ever I put there!” Brandling similarly may have
acted as much by good luck as good guidance; but it is fair at any
rate to give him credit for the latter. And he saw that since the
order for him had been given the situation had materially altered. ‘The
Russian column was now moving on and seconds were precious. He
saw at once that he could not possibly reach the position suggested
in time tobeof any use. Therefore without any hesitation or delay he
shouted “‘ No, I cannot get there in time,” or words to that effect, and
he drove straight on this way by the rear of the Dragoons. Now I say
he acted then with the independence that a Horse Artilleryman should
show, and he decided moreover most judiciously. Because in order to
get the fullest effect, both from fire and shock, it is best to strike the
hostile cavalry on the flank furthest from the guns. The enemy, if he
then faces your onset, exposes a flank to the artillery, which is able to
fire upon him not only up to the very moment of collision, but is able
to pursue him with shells as he retreats. Now there were two squadrons
of the Royals and two of the 4th Dragoon Guards which might fall on
the Russian right. Therefore when Brandling went where he did, he
seized a position from whence his fire was not likely to be masked, from
whence he might hope to assail most effectively his objective during the
combat, and from whence he might pursue it most vigorously with fire
should it fall back towards its base. But above all, and that was the
consideration we may be sure which most influenced him, he went
where he could most quickly get into action (applause).

So he drove along with his left shoulder turned to the backs of our
Dragoons. But all the time watching closely, mark you, the state of
the situation. When in rear of our line (somewhere about here) he
saw the huge column rolling on down the slope, and he noted what
might look something like hesitation and delay in our first line, for the
1st squadron of the Greys was advancing alone to the attack. It seemed
to him that in all probability the mere inertia of the Russian mass would
bear our men back. He determined therefore to go somewhat to the
rear so as to cover our retreat. So he called out “ sub-divisions right
wheel,” but he himself remained where he was with his eyes turned on
the impending collision. Thus he saw the devoted charge of the Ist
squadron, and the rest of the three hundred moving off too, and their
inroad into the enemy’s ranks. He saw from the way the Russians bore
themselves at that supreme moment that they were not going to ride us
down, and then he determined to throw his lot in decisively, not to avert
defeat, but to achieve victory (applause). He shouted ‘‘ sub-divisions left
wheel,” and brought his troop up on the right rear of our squadrons.
But ere he could get in a round his front was masked by the first
squadron of the Inniskillings which now crossed him to dash in on the

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 993

Russian left. On the other flank the 4th Dragoon Guards, and the
Royals were now no less vigorously pressing, while the 5th Dragoon
Guards were storming in to the left rear of the Greys. What takes some
time to tell was in reality but a matter of minutes, and soon the
monstrous column was more or less disintegrated, and retired up the
slope.

And now Brandling at last got his chance.

The moment he saw which way the tide of battle was setting he
sprang forward, and even while a few red-coats were still tinging with
colour the dull grey mass, he was at work. The column was so large
that its very weight held it together and its rear and left rear could not
be reached by ourswordsmen. It was not therefore completely scattered,
but rather rolled itself sullenly back, and on the high ground behind
the Russian officers were soon seen holding up their swords and rallying
theirmen. Kinglake says that the troop of Horse Artillery now “fired a
few rounds.” Gentlemen, I can tell you exactly what it fired. From the
first position it fired five rounds per gun, and four per howitzer into the
Russians, and from the échelon position twenty-one rounds more. The
first range was about 800 yards, and the fire was most effective, not
only morally, but physically. General Godman, who was adjutant to
the 5th Dragoon Guards on that day, writes, “I well remember the
troop of Horse Artillery firing into the retreating mass almost be-
fore some of the red-coats were clear of them, and going over the
ground next day I saw they did good work.”

And from a Russian source testimony as to the effect of the shells has
also reached me through the kindness of Colonel F'. A. Whinyates, whose
loss to the regiment we still deplore, and who has devoted so much time
and trouble to the history of the troop, which he commanded for ten
years with such marked distinction (loud applause).

The artillery fire effectually put an end to any chance of rallying
which the Russians may have ever had, and they now quickly retired.
A Russian driver and a pair of horses were found killed at this time by
the explosion of a shell on the ground over which the great mass had
moved, and this has given rise to the notion that there may have been
some guns with our opponents. The driver may however have belonged
to something else than a gun, and certainly no artillery worked with the
cavalry on the Russian side.

The troop now limbered up, went ahead again, then changed front
to the right, and came under fire from some guns near No. 2 Redoubt.
It then advanced by échelon of half batteries in the direction of
some Russian squadrons which were pushed out against it. The left
half troop came into action against these, and its fire was most effective,
visibly so indeed, and compelled them quickly to withdraw. The heavy
brigade were covering the troop three or four hundred yards in rear
of it during this time. We cannot to-day, gentlemen, follow Brandling’s
movements further, and his work with the heavy brigade now practically
came to an end, but I hope I have said enough to show that he acted in
a way in which we would wish gunners to act when assisting cavalry,
that he utilized all the chances he got, that he showed himself quick,

224, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

resolute, knowledgeable and bold, that in one word, he behaved like a
good soldier! (applause).

1 With reference to my remarks as to the good service done by Brandling’s battery I think the
following letter which I received from Lieut.-General Sir Charles Craufurd Fraser, K\C.B., will be
of interest :—~

Cavalry Club, London,
22nd March, 1898.

Sir—Had the opportunity occurred of my entering into discussion after your lecture, I should
have supported your account of the good work done by the Royal Horse Artillery at Balaclava, by
quoting the following words from a letter that I received, at the time of the reduction of the Horse
Artillery, from Colonel Frank Forster, who took part in the successful charge of the heavy cavalry
as a captain in the 4th R.I. Dragoon Guards :—‘‘ If there are any officers alive who were in John
Brandling’s troop of Horse Artillery at Balaclava, they would tell you how his opportune arrival
with his guns after the heavy brigade charge, saved them from a fresh attack, from a very strong
force of Russian cavalry. If your Horse Artillery is reduced, your cavalry becomes more feeble than
CviClnns

Further on March 18th, 1895, he writes :—-‘‘John Brandling’s troop was not attached to the
heavy brigade and was sent down from the front (on the hill opposite Sebastopol) to assist the
cavalry, when it was seen that an engagement with the Russians was imminent. _

The distance he had to come was about six miles—he did it as fast as he could go—and only
arrived in time to open fire on a supporting force of Russian cavalry.

He told me that the horses in his troop were so beat from the pace he had come, he could not
have got them much further.

They had been worked hard and badly fed ever since they had landed in the Crimea.

I see they are going to increase the Royal Horse Artillery again, what a triumph to you and the
others who opposed their reduction.” ;

Yours faithfully,
To CHARLES CRAUFURD FRASER,
Masor E. S. May, Lieut.-General.
Professor of Military Topography,
Royal Military Academy, Woolwich..

Colonel F. A. Whinyates has since my lecture kindly sent me the following reminiscences of
Captain John Brandling, supplied by one who served as a non-commissioned officer with him in
**C” Troop during the Crimean war, which I publish as they may interest some of his old friends :—

At the Alma the first retirement was at a rapid pace, and Brandling, who remained well behind
next the Russians, swore lustily, “‘ D—-n it! where are you leading to, keep this shoulder up, the
other shoulder up, etc., ete.’’ At the second retirement the troop had lost aman, and Colonel Lake
his horse, and Baddeley, who had surrendered his to the Colonel, was running about. with a saddle
in his arms, Brandling joking him, though things looked very warm. Just before wheeling about
again to advance, Captain Strange came down, and asked Brandling where he was to take the
waggons to. Brandling roared out at the top of his voice smiling all the while, ‘* wherever you
like Captain Strange ;’’ repeating it three times; he then ordered the Trumpeter to sound “ About”
and ‘ Gallop,”’ looking as happy as if he were going in at football. There was many a laugh over
this afterwards, and together with the swearing at the previous retirement, and his remaining in
the open under fire after putting all he could under cover at the river side, gave the men a great
opinion of his coolness in battle ; but there was a strong feeling with all ranks that as the troop
was actually in the field before the enemy, the command as the fortune of war, ought to have been
allowed to devolve on the senior Lieutenant (the late Major-General E. J. Michell) who was a -
highly efficient officer, instead of handing it over to one who was not a bond fide Horse Artillery-
man. (Brandling had been transferred from the siege train).

Brandling was a north countryman and after explaining things frequently used the expression
“You know.’ On the morning of quitting the Alma he called the Nos. 1 to the front and told
them to impress on the men not to get out of the way of the shot when in action, or to use the words
‘look-out ” to each other when the shot were coming at them, adding in his own style, and with a
touch of drollery in his eye, ‘if a shot is coming to take your head off, you know, it is not a d—-d
bit of use trying to get out of its way, you know, now I saw that the other day andI don’t want to
see it again.”’ This sort of thing went down with the men and helped to enliven them in their sub-
sequent hardships. It had reference to the Bulganac, when the mounted detachments received
their Baptéme de feu as cavalry, and found how trying it is to sit still in one long rank and be shot
at by artillery ; there was a little easing off and opening of the files, and thus many shots passed
through harmlessly. At the Alma the shots were far too numerous to admit of being seen.

At page 138 ‘* Higtory of ‘C’ Troop ”’ mention is made of a shot coming close over his shoulder,
his back was toward the Russians at the moment, and the guns were in the act of wheeling towards
him in column of sub-divisions. A N.-C. officer called ‘‘ Look out Sir,’’ as the shot seemed to be

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CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 225

And what lessons can we draw from this, as far as artillery is con-
cerned, comparatively imperfect action ?

We have in the first place an illustration of cavalry acting wisely in
not waiting for the guns, for it was Scarlett’s bold and prompt conduct
in at once facing and charging his huge antagonist, that gave us the
victory.

i saly we learn next that guns should always be quartered or encamped
with the brigade or division of cavalry with which they are to act in the
field (applause).

We learn that burthens which may not be excessive for horses in
peace time, or when the guns are acting with infantry, are too great
when the strain of rapid work with cavalry on active service is
encountered (applause).

I say too that the guns and cavalry must be within easy reach of one
another when the crisis of the fight arrives, and that the artillery leader
must have his eye on the combat, and his finger on its pulse, and must
act decisively and rapidly on his own responsibility, according as cir-
cumstances dictate (applause).

And now in conclusion I want to say a word as to the attack of guns
by cavalry.

T admit frankly that squadrons can often charge batteries in action
successtully. There are plenty of such instances, and plenty too
showing a different result for the matter of that. But deliberately to
gallop at guns when they see you coming is not the way to set to work.
The game is rarely then worth the candle. You will certainly lose
heavily, and unless you are supported strongly, even if you get among
the guns, you will not be able to do sufficient harm to compensate for
the crippled state your squadrons will be in.! If in extended order on a

coming fair for his back, but he did not take the slightest notice, and merely remarked afterwards to
the N.-C. officer ‘I believe I had a narrow shave that time.”

In October at the Right Attack when great vigilance was necessary, he addressed the men thus:
“Oh, good G=d if we are going to let the Russians catch us asleep we had a d—d sight better have
remained in England, you know;”’ and he warned us that, if he caught any night sentry not actively
on the alert, he would have him tried by Court-Martial. A night or two afterwards he did confine
a sentry for not challenging him though the twilight was barely passed, notwithstanding the man
was alert, walking up and down by the horses, and knew the Captain was present, but thought it
unnecessarily early to challenge. The man was however tried by Court-Martial and suffered
corporal punishment. Brandling, though hard in many respects, never spared himself—with pick
and spade and blistered hands he worked well with the men when they tried to hut themselves on
the plateau in November, but he had not the sustaining power of Captain Fraser, and he used to
say to him ‘“ David, I don’t know how the Devil you manage to get over the ground.” He kept
cheery and light-hearted under the most adverse circumstances, and with his merry laugh was often
heard from the tent at night chafling the other officers.

Sir George Brown did not care much for the mounted arms or gay dress, but he began to take a
great pride and interest in the Troop, and he seemed to think there was no one like Brandling. A
kindly recollection of Captain Brandling as Commanding Officer at a memorable time has prompted
these remarks. After the war he changed much in character and became a serious and devout man.

1 Cavalry even when they get amongst guns are often comparatively helpness. The permanent
capture of the 18 guns at Tobitschau remains almost, if not quite, an unique experience. Bredow
could carry off or disable none of the French pieces through which he rode at Vionville, neither
could our light cavalry at Balaclava. I have seen it stated that in 1849 the drivers of a Prussian
battery drove off the Danish Dragoons who had got into the battery with their whips! (Mil: Wochen-
blatt 61 of 1886).

In an interesting account too of a ‘‘ Prussian gunner’s adventures in 1815”? published some
four years ago. Lieutenant Von Reuter in describing his grandfather’s exploits gives a curious ex~
ample of how little may disconcert cavalry amongst guns.

At the battle of Ligny the flank of the Prussian battle in question was surprised and taken in rear
by fifty French horsemen under a staff officer. ‘As these rushed upon us the officer shouted to me

926 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

very wide front, and all the men in the ranks ride home like heroes, and
if there is no escort to the artillery, I dare say some men will always
get into the batteries ; but escorts ought always to be with guns at all
open to a rush, and I cannot help thinking that men will not keep ex-
tended if their flanks are threatened even by comparatively weak bodies.
Moreover to turn enough cavalry to do real mischief on to the guns is
to commit a tactical error, for it is a first principle in war that you
cannot be too strong at the decisive point, and that point in a
cavalry combat is where the main bodies meet. If you win there you
will have the guns too. If you are beaten there you will have to
relinquish the batteries even if you capture them (applause).

But favoured by ground, especially if artillery is made to co-operate
with it, cavalry can take artillery or infantry by surprise, and can then
accomplish much at but little expense, just as those French regiments
did at Albuera, or Von Bredow did at Vionville. Sir Evelyn Wood has
told you the latter story in its completeness, and I need only sum it up
by saying that on that day with but six squadrons that brilliant cavalry
leader succeeded in wrecking six batteries and four battalions, and in
the actual attack on them lost comparatively few of his men, for it was
after they had passed their immediate objective, and had got out of
hand, that they were so cut up. But the aim of the French batteries
was disturbed by the German artillery near Vionville, which as Bredow
advanced poured a sudden and rapid storm of shell on the guns he was
about to charge.

Tobitschau also gives us a valuable example of cavalry attacking
artillery, and there too guns co-operated with the squadrons. We find
a lesson even in the terse curt phrases of the official account. When
that same Bredow, of whom we have just been speaking, stole
away suddenly to his left to make a dash at the Austrian batteries,
which he had noted were exposed without an escort, the two Horse
Artillery batteries with the cavalry division to which he belonged, were
turned swiftly on to the hostile guns, and occupied their attention in
front while he was making for their flank.

There is a whole lecture, I think, in one little word in the official
account, that little word is “guessing.” “ Guessing his motive, General
Hartman planted the two Horse Artillery batteries on the bank of
the Blatta southward of Klopotowitz from whence they could engage
the enemy, draw his attention from the Cuirassiers, and assist their
attack,’

Bredow only lost 10 privates and 6 horses wounded and 12 horses

in German ”’ (says Von Reuter’s grandfather), ‘‘ Surrender, gunners, for you are all prisoners !”’
with these words he charged down with his men on the flank gun on my left, and dealt a vicious cut
at my wheel driver, Borchardt, who dodged it however by flinging himself over on his dead horse.
The blow was delivered with such goodwill that the sabre cut deep into the saddle, and stuck there
fast. Gunner Sieberg however, availing himself of the chance the momentry delay afforded,
snatched up the handspike of one of the 12-prs, and with the words ‘‘I’ll soon show him how to
take prisoners,’’ dealt the officer such a blow on his bearskin that he rolled with a broken skull from
the back of his grey charger, which galloped away into the line of skirmishers in our front.
The fifty horsemen, unable to control their horses, which bounded after their companion, followed
his lead in a moment, rode over the prostrate marksmen, and carried the utmost confusion into the
enemy’s ranks. I seized the opportunity to limber-up all my guns except the unfortunate one on my
left, and to retire on two of our cavalry regiments, etc., etc.

1 Official account p. 339.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 227

killed in this enterprise, and captured 18 guns, 15 limbers, 7 ammuni-
tion wagons, 2 officers and 168 gunners, 230 men of other corps,
and 157 horses. Truly, gentlemen, a noble prize for 3 squadrons !! and
gained, let us remember, by guns being made to co-operate sym-
pathetically with the cavalry (applause).

But that such genial co-operation will be secured by lectures or dis-
cussions I do not however believe; I am exceedingly obliged to you,
gentlemen, for the patience with which you have listened to me to-day,
but I do not for a moment flatter myself that I have by any feeble words
of mine advanced the object which I am sure every one in this theatre
has at heart. Neither lectures, nor text-books, nor maxims, nor
formularies, nor examinations will ever replace practical work together
in the field (prolonged applause). ‘There is no royal road to efficiency,
no way to perfection save one, and that is the more difficult path which
is smoothed by hard work, by frequent practice, and by personal experi-
ence of one another’s needs.

That is what we must strive somehow to arrive at, and there is no use
in blinking the fact that to ensure co-operation we must have frequent
drill together, and that we can never hope to attain the one if we neglect
the other (loud applause).

DISCUSSION.

Tue CHarrman—l should like to say that I have had great pleasure in being
here and seeing you all to-night, and I may perhaps say now in case I might forget it
if I get too deeply interested, that Iam very much obliged to you for having elected
me an honorary member of this Institution two or three years ago. I assure you
that it is a compliment which I appreciate immensely, for a reason which I will
tell you presently. I do not want now to speak more than I can help; per-
haps you will think it is rather cowardly of me, but one reason for my not being
ready to speak is that I feel there are so many officers present who know more
about the subject than I do, and at all events I have a good excuse in a bad throat ;
but I will ask the lecturer presently if he will tell us exactly what his authority
was about the artillery not having helped the heavy brigade of English cavalry in
attacking that mass at Balaclava ; because Hamley says distinctly that the rear of
the column was hit by shell before our cavalry got near it, and the rear had begun
to waver. Kinglake says that very distinctly too, and I think that Dr. Russell who
saw it says the same, but I am not certain about that.

But what will interest gentlemen of the regiment more is this. I was talking
on this subject last November to Sir Robert Biddulph and he told me that he was
in action firing on the Russian column before our heavies charged. I asked him
how many were hit, and he said he certainly saw eleven or twelve shot strike the
Russian mass before our cavalry got near them; and he said “I ran to a No. 1 of
my sub-division because I saw that he would drop the shot, as I thought, into
the right-hand squadron of the Inniskillings.”” It is not a matter of much im-
portance except to artillerymen, to whom it is always interesting to know these
things. There you have an artilleryman who was present, and he says that he was
afraid he had an Inniskilling down—but the shot went very close to him, without

1 Strength about 400 sabres.

228 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

hitting him—there was no Inniskilling on the spot afterwards—although he went
anxiously to see.

There is a burning point opened by the lecturer, but the Adjutant-General is
here, and, if he were not, I hope that we all feel as he does on the subject of orders,
and as we have an order now as to the much vexed question of the position of the
Officer Commanding Royal Artillery attached to Horse Artillery, 1 suggest that
we do not discuss that ; but it may be of interest to you to know that within the
last four-and-twenty hours I was speaking to two men upon the subject, if I were
to mention there names, which I am not at liberty to do, the cavalryman would
certainly be considered here as a representative active man, a man of the nineteenth
century, a leading man; and I spoke to a man in the regiment who would equally
command your suffrages. I said, “Are you satisfied on that point now?” What
was the answer ? The artilleryman said “ Yes, quite;”? and the cavalryman said
* 1 should like to have seen it shoved a little more on to the cavalryman to decide
for himself.” I say it is an interesting question, but we cannot discuss it, because
there is an order at present; but the same time it is interesting to know that the
two opposite poles have agreed, I do not say throughout the service, but two men
on the opposite sides have agreed, that the thing is what is calculated to bring
about the best results for the service, which is what we all want, to whichever arm
we belong.

Now as an artilleryman has been talking, and to my great pleasure! we will
ask Colonel French first of all whether he will give us the benefit of some obser-
vations. I must tell you that 1 have set three names down here, and after them I
will ask Lord Roberts and the Adjutant-General if they will speak; we will ask
them last, going on the principle of asking the juniors first, so that we may
not be daunted by the opinion of any one senior to ourselves.

CotoneL J. D. P. Fruncu—lI cannot help thinking, sir, that as cavalry officers
we ought to be very grateful to Major May for the instances which he has given
us of the combined action of cavalry and Horse Artillery. I think it must alto-
gether dissipate the idea, if it ever existed, that historical examples of such action
do not exist. Wesee that they do. But whatever lessons such historical examples
gleaned from former campaigns may teach, I am quite convinced that we do not
yet fully realize the value in modern war under existing conditions of a force of
cayalry and Horse Artillery working together when they once thoroughly under-
stand one another and are able to play into one another’s hands. I quite agree
with the lecturer in what he said. I think the first thing we want is a closer
mutual understanding between the two arms. Ido not think we understand Horse
Artillery perhaps as well as we might, and I do not think they altogether under-
stand us. Up to the present it has been impossible I know to bring us very much
together; but it is to be hoped in future we may have more opportunities, and I
am sure this will prove of great advantage to both.

The lecturer has touched on one or two points with regard to the combined action
of cavalry and Horse Artillery. He talked of the artillery position, and described
the details of an action from its commencement, 7.¢., from the time when the hostile
cavalry is first discovered. He talked about the artillery galloping out some dis-
tance to the front, or some distance to the flank. Ihave often heard that question
discussed, and I feel sure that officers of far more experience than I have had will
give us their opinion presently ; but in my humble opinion it is not a question of
galloping out to front or flank, but the ground must decide the artillery position
and it must be chosen not only because it is good from an artillery point of view
but also by reason of the existence of good and extensive cavalry manceuvring
ground on one or both flanks, and I also think that you must look at the possible
positions which the enemy’s artillery can occupy. As Major May says, it all has
to be done very rapidly, so that to be efficient leaders we require immense practice ;

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 229

T even believe that sometimes in the very first phase of the action circumstances
may necessitate the cavalry moving rapidly away to a flank rather than the artillery.

Then another point the lecturer touched upon was the time we take to deploy
into preparatory formation. I think he cannot quite have meant what he said.
He said it took twenty minutes. I do not think he can have meant that, because
we take a great deal shorter time to effect this, as every cavalry officer knows.
That preparatory formation of course is one which we may use, it is laid down
for our use if we like; but itis not in my opinion always necessary, and I think
that very often you are better in a more concentrated formation from which you
can quite as easily and quickly assume the formation in time for manceuyre and
attack.

I do not wish to take up any more of your time when so many better officers
than myself are ready to speak.

Coronet G. H. Marsnati—lI find that Major May in his lecture has said every
thing in agreement with my views, therefore I have no questions to ask him. He
has told us that the direction of the actual cavalry fight will be short, and that the
artillery must get at once to a decisive range. I think that a rapid rate of fire is
of the greatest importance, and that we should try by every means to increase our
rapidity of fire. It becomes a question of the number of rounds which can be fired
into the enemy’s cavalry in about a couple of minutes. It may interest you if I
give you some recent figures of rates of fire against cavalry targets,

In 1892 at Okehampton the average time for 18 rounds of shrapnel was two
minutes: the dest record was 18 shrapnel and two case in one minute fifty
seconds.

In 1893 at Okehampton, a battery on the march attacked by a surprise target
fired 25 case in two minutes three seconds. A battery fired 46 shrapnel and two
case during two cavalry attacks at the average rate of 184 rounds a minute.

The figures taken from some of the practice in India last year are also very
interesting.

Horse Artillery Camp, Gurgaon: average of six series: ranges from 1300 to
1700 yards: time 33 minutes: 18 shrapnel fired: hits 10 per shell (one battery
made over 500 hits). ‘Targets—screens representing four squadrons,

Average time for 12 case, 45 seconds—average hits on screens at 250 yards,
400.

I mention the above details to show how much importance we attach to rapidity
of fire and how anxious we are to increase it.

Masor-GuneraL Boycs Comsz, C.B.—I should naturally hesitate when called
upon in the presence of so many war-worn veterans, but as General Officer Com-
manding the Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot, it is supposed that I have or ought to
have some ideas on the subject, and anyhow having been called upon by the chair-
man, I feel bound to say something.

Tam sorry to begin by differing essentially from Major May in his concluding
remarks, to the effect that he had no hope that anything which he said here this
evening could possibly lead to any amelioration or improvement. On the contrary,
I think that he ought to feel very much flattered by the audience that he has had,
and the great attention which has been paid to his interesting lecture; and I, for
one, sincerely hope that the remarks which he has made will lead officers to study
past history, which is really all that we have to trust to for guidance as to our
action in the future.

I know that there have been a great many attacks made on the cavalry lately by
more or less friendly critics, and I always feel strongly that we have not a fair
chance. At field manceuvres, [have heard it said over and over again, and it is
quite true, that nothing is so unlike real war as sham war ; and this I think applies
more particularly to cavalry than to any other branch of the service, as for instance on

230 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

the field of battle when the cavalry and Horse Artillery are performing what Major
May spoke of as the corps duties, there, our opportunities, as you all know, lie
almost entirely in fleeting moments when the enemy’s infantry, or whatever it is,
is more or less disorganized, half beaten and demoralized, or flushed with success
and pressing boldy on. Then comes or would come our opportunity in real war.

But when do we ever get those opportunities at manceuvres ? We simply cannot
get them, or cannot take advantage of them. We often have a rainy day and we
often flatter ourselves that we have a dull man in front, but we cannot always get
the umpires to admit that much even, and in deprecation of the severe remarks
which have been made I must repeat that the cavalry do not have a fair chance at
sham-fights, and that they certainly do not have the opportunities that they would
have on the actual field of battle, of which I hope we should be found prepared,
as we have ever been before, to take advantage.

There are one or two minor points upon which I differ from Major May. One
is about escorts for the Horse Artillery, He seemed to attach importance to
Horse Artillery having a more prominent escort.

Masor E. 8. May—Not a strong one.

Masor-GEneRaL Compe—They hardly want any at all; they practically want .

a very small escort just to furnish scouts and to prevent their being taken by sur-
prise, because the duty of the nearest body of cavalry is to support them, and to
turn to the protection of their artillery ; and they must trust to that. Then again,
in the action, when once the attacking force, the two lines, are in the van of
operations, the artillery must cease fire; and then I think they ought to limber-
up and move up to the front as fast as they can; it is no good thinking of retreat ;
their whole fate depends upon the cavalry. If the cavalry is beaten the artillery
is lost; it is no question then of limbering-up and getting away—the guns are
gone.

Lrsut.-GaneraL Sir Wriii1am Stirring, K.C.B.—Sir Evelyn Wood, and
gentlemen. It seems to me that in order to have effective co-operation between guns
and cavalry we must come to some more definite understanding than we have yet
arrived at as to the weight behind the team. It is a curious thing that we should
have got nearly to the end of the 19th century and that there should still be un-
certainty upon this point. This evening reference has been made to a 6-pr. troop
and a 9-pr. troop working with cavalry. Ido not know whether any gentleman
here holds that guns can co-operate with cavalry with a weight behind the team
of 40 cwt. I maintain that they cannot (applause). Guns have altered in the last
fifty years, but horses have not, and I do not think that we can get more out of
our teams now than we did in the Peninsula; and if so we are surely not justified
in setting aside the experience then gained, and in overweighting our teams as the
tendency is in the present day.

The wonderful things that were done in the Peninsula by Horse Artillery co-
operating with cavalry, and the wonderful things that were done in India by
Horse Artillery co-operating with cavalry were I believe in every case with a
weight behind the team of under 30 cwt. It is true that before Waterloo certain
Horse Artillery batteries took over 9-pr. equipments, and the results showed that
this was a very wise arrangement; but there is nothing in that campaign, as it
seems to me, to warrant the conclusion that because those Horse Artillery
batteries had 9-prs. in this memorable action and did good service with them that
therefore it was possible for a gun of this weight to co-operate effectively with
cavalry. And I think that that must also have been the opinion of those in
authority ; for when the expedition was fitted out for the Crimea the battery which
was told off to co-operate with the cavalry was “I” Troop, R.H.A., with a 6-pr.
equipment. “C” Troop R.H.A., was sent out at the same time, with a 9-pr.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 231

equipment, but it was not attached to the cavalry but to the infantry. Hach
infantry division had two batteries, and those two batteries of the light division
were made up of ‘‘C” Troop, R.H.A., and a field battery. Up to the 25th of
October, 1854, ““C ” Troop remained with the light division up in the front, as
the lecturer has pointed out. On that morning when Balaclava was threatened an
order came for the artillery of the light division—the 4th division and I think the
83rd division—to move down to Balaclava. The distance from the light division
to the heavy cavalry camp in the plain before Balaclava was five miles and “C0”
Troop covered this distance much quicker than the field batteries and arrived in
time to take part in the heavy cavalry action as already described.

After the 25th of October, 1854, “‘C”’ Troop never returned to its old camp
with the light division; but remained with the cavalry, and was with the cavalry
on the heights on the 5th November covering Inkerman.

Again at the Tchernaya on the 16th of August, 1855, ““C”’ Troop was with the
British cavalry and Horse Artillery in reserve. After the fall of Sebastopol on
the 8th September, 1855, a cavalry division of 40 squadrons was formed at Eupa-
toria to the north of Sebastopol to threaten the Russian communication to which
three Horse Artillery batteries were attached. There was a Turkish Horse Artillery
battery with comparatively light pieces and only four horses in the team I think ;
there was a French Horse Artillery battery with six horses in the team, armed with
the piece that had been an 8-pr. and was now bored up to throw a 12-pr. projectile,
and considered to be good up to a mile ; and then there was “‘C” Troop, R.H.A.,
with its 9-prs. of 39 and 40 cwt., with 8 horses in the team and 10 mounted men
in the detachments.

During the five weeks in October and November, 1855, that this force remained
at Hupatoria there were three reconnaissances in which the whole cavalry took part
supported by a strong Franco-Turkish infantry division. There were also several
smaller reconnaissances made by portions of the forces. The country was quite
perfect for cavalry and Horse Artillery to work over, an undulating grassy steppe,
but water was scarce and very bad and the force could not on this account remain
out beyond the third day on either occasion.

The experience gained by “‘C”’ Troop even working over this very favourable
ground and with excellent horses in good condition was that the weight behind
the teams was quite excessive and that both the extra pair of horses in the team
and the great weight of the equipment would effectually bar co-operation with
cavalry under normal circumstances.

Gentlemen, we do not want guns that can just be rolled up into position and
there stand and blaze away at long ranges ; we want to come to short ranges and
to be able to keep up with the cavalry; and I think, sir, that the whole question
of the co-operation of guns with cavalry turns upon the weight that we put behind
the teams (loud applause).

Lrnvt.-Ginprat Kerra Fraser, C.M.G.—Sir Evelyn Wood, and gentlemen.
I must first say a few words of thanks to the lecturer for the kind way in which he
spoke about myself and the interest that I have taken in Horse Artillery acting with
cavalry ; for I have always been led to look wpon Horse Artillery as the right-arm
of the cavalry. Major May has spoken of my father’s services at Waterloo. Ihave
always been told that my father’s greatest friend was Sir Augustus Frazer, who
was no relation but whose name is I think pretty well-known here as having com-
Bp nacd the Horse Artillery in that battle (applause). My father named a son after

im.

Gentlemen, I must say that nothing can be a greater satisfaction to a cavalry
soldier than to see such an audience as there is here to-day assembled to listen to
such a lecture as we have had. I look upon the last three or four years as a time
of revival of the association between Horse Artillery and cavalry.

932 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

To the lecturer I think much is due. I have heard him lecture before admirably
in London on this ‘subject. Other lectures have taken place; and much greater
attention has been paid to the subject of late than was formerly the case.

It is I believe true—perhaps it may be partly the fault of some among ourselves
——the cavalry—that we have not taken advantage of the opportunities that we have
had of working with the Horse Artillery as much as we might. Although in
England we have few grounds large enough for tactics of cavalry and Horse
Artillery, and we know on the highest authority that the best tactician if he had
to mancuvre cavalry with Horse Artillery on ground only a mile and three-
quarters square would be at his wits end; still I think we have certain places
where we might do more than we have done. Look at the Curragh where I have
held command myself and at Aldershot. There are opportunities of teaching at
both those stations, the “principles” upon which cavalry can work with Horse
Artillery, and we might teach the “principles” of it though there is not much
space for its “practice.” I hope that in future more advantage will be taken of
those grounds and that cavalry and Horse Artillery will be stationed together and
work together as much as possible. I wish that in England there were more
places where it could be done; but we know what the difficulties are that stand in
the way. Of course in India they have grand opportunities, which I feel sure are
taken advantage of, and certainly our cavalry leaders, when they come home ought
to be well able to command both arms. That such practice is wanted we cavalry-
men and Horse Artillerymen all know. I have personally had the great advantage of
having had for some years even as long ago as 1877, the command of a brigade of
cavalry on many occasions and my batteries were officered by men of whom I
have the very highest opinion (if I told you their names you would agree with
me). Both they and I saw at once, I think, when we began to work together,
that we had a great deal to learn. I must say that I have always felt most grate-
ful to them for the way that they tried to meet my views and to help me on every
occasion.

I have had a good deal of opportunity of seeing and hearing abroad the opinions
of great authorities on this subject. One of the most brilliant artillery officers,
the Archduke William of Austria (the son of the great Archduke Charles), who
met his death by a sad accident last year, the man who commanded the artillery
at Sadowa and covered that retreat with his 160 guns which, with the lst and
8rd divisions of cavalry saved the Austrian army from entire destruction, spoke
to me a good deal about Horse Artillery. He said that he had always had a great
prejudice against it, partly because of the great mass which it shows as a mark
for the fire of the enemy, and partly because of its great expense; but he said
that he had come to the conclusion that it was well worth the expense and the
risk due to the great mark that it shows to the enemy. “I have entirely changed
my views,” he said, “and I would have as much Horse Artillery as I could
possibly get.” The Emperor of Austria himself told me at the time “ It is merely
a question of money with us; we should have much more if we could afford it.”

The lecturer has exceedingly well described that battle of Albuera in which the
Horse Artillery and the cavalry did so well. Oné thing that I was thinking all
the time was, what a pity it was that we had there as usual so few cavalry. It
has always been the same with us. We had half the strength of the French at
best—had we had more we might have saved many of the gallant men’s lives who
fell on that day. The French with their masses of cavalry overpowered us.

There were some remarks which the lecturer made with regard to tactics, which
T hardly like to touch upon. The drill-~book is a book to be obeyed, and I would
not say a word against it. I have no doubt that everything has been well con-
sidered and carefully laid down in that book, and, at all events, it is not for me to
discuss it. But one thing that he said was what Colonel French has already
mentioned, and that is, as to the time that it takes for a division of cavalry to get

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. DES}

into the normal preparatory formation. Well, a normal formation, to begin with,
is only given as a sort of guide. There is no time for asking for instructions in
the cavalry and a normal formation is of great use to a commander of a line who
has received no instruction as may be the case; at the same time preparatory and
fighting formations admit of many variations. But as to the time that it takes ;
why, to deploy with attack formation takes no time at all, it is done during the
advance. Iam afraid there is no twenty minutes to spare. If we could have a
nice twenty minutes for our artillery to fire I should be very glad, but I think if
you have five minutes you would be extraordinarily lucky.

With regard to the fire of Horse Artillery being entirely against the enemy’s
cavalry, I do not know that the Regulations lay that down so clearly. It says
that it is to be against the cavalry because the cavalry is a dangerous arm at that
time; but I do not think it forbids what the highest authorities on the Continent
insist upon, namely, that the enemy’s artillery should first, if possible, be crushed.
And from what Colonel Marshall tells us it seems that you have only got to fire
one or two shrapnel at an enemy’s battery and you have done with it—your cavalry
will be perfectly free, because it will have no enemy’s guns to fear—with such
power of destruction as Colonel Marshall has described you will have destroyed
everything for a space of 200 yards at least round the battery.

With regard to Horse Artillery going straight to the front or to the flank, I
agree with Colonel French that there is probably only one position for the artillery
and which that is the Cavalry Commander taking counsel with the Horse Artillery
Commander will have to decide. It is all the better if that position lies to the
front, and if he can manceuvre round the enemy’s flank so much the better; but
that flank movement of the cavalry takes up time it must be remembered, and will
the enemy give you time? I think it must depend upon circumstances whether
you go to the front or to the flank ; it must depend upon the best position for the
guns and upon the nature of the country; and on the principal factor, the enemy.

With regard to an escort some seem to think that a cavalry escort is necessary
for guns. I must say that I do not agree with that. If the enemy sends out a
regiment and you have a squadron as escort the latter will be of no good as
protection.

A sufficient number of scouts well out to the front and flanks watching carefully
against surprise should be sufficient for them.

With regard to the opinion expressed that an attack on artillery is useless. T
think that if the artillery is firing heavily on you it is a good thing to make a feint
or even an attack with a squadron or two, or even more, to draw the fire away
from the cavalry, for the moment any portion of the enemy’s cavalry threatens a
battery you may be sure the fire will be turned on the former, which, if in extended
order will suffer little. I have seen in Germany a large force of cavalry attack a
line of guns. It is a thing that is constantly practised—a whole brigade or divi-
sion will be taken to doit. Captain Grierson well describes how it is done, in
the accounts of last year’s manceuvres in Germany. The first lines are being widely
extended, the second lines less widely, and then some échelons on the flank, and
then reserves, riding right up to, round and through the guns and going on beyond,
attacking any troops that may be behind the guns. I am afraid I have kept you
a long time. [ can only say further in the words of one of our greatest artillery-
men, the loss of whom we all regret—a great authority indeed—-General Hamley,
“let it be granted that cavalry properly trained and led, may play as great a part
as ever on the stage of war; combined with new and larger proportion of artillery
its action may be decisive to the fate of battles, and launched in pursuit of a broken

1Prince Frederick Charles, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe and all modern authorities deprecate de«
taching squadrons as escort to Horse Artillery. Home’s “ Précis of Modern Tactics” gives reasons
clearly for this. j
32

234 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

foe, it may finish a campaign which would else wade through carnage to its woeful
end” (applause).

GENERAL Lorp Ropurts, V.C., &c., &c.—Gentlemen, I had no idea of
speaking when I came into this room this evening, but as Sir Evelyn Wood has
expressed a wish that I should say a few words I will tell you what has struck
me with regard to the lecture.

In the first place I would express the pleasure it has afforded me to hear Major
May’s lecture and the interesting accounts that he has given of instances where
cavalry and Horse Artillery have worked together. Some of them I had never
heard before. I have always had the strongest opinion of the advantage of cavalry
and Horse Artillery working together, for although my opportunities on service
have not been many, I haye seen how much they assist each other; and 1 have
been with cavalry in positions where it wold have been at a great loss without
Horse Artillery.

The value of a lecture of this sort to my mind is that it not only gives instances
but brings to our recollection events which we may have forgotten in past history.
Moreover, it removes that feeling of disappointment which I have often myself
felt, and which I should think probably other officers may have fell, at peace
manceuvres, when we find how difficult it is to judge how cavalry and Horse
Artillery can assist each other; because, as General Combe said just now, ina
sham-fight the reality of battle is wanting, and without that reality you cannot
tell the time, the instant, when Horse Artillery and cavalry can each do so much
for each other.

As regards the first preliminary movement I have often been puzzled when
thinking how artillery could most advantageously take up its position for attack,
so as to bring an effective fire upon the enemy without interfering with the cavalry ;
but on one point I have no doubt, and that is as to the necessity for Horse
Artillery being mobile. My friend Sir William Stirling has already touched upon
this. I consider it most essential and nobody has striven more than I have for
years past to have the weight behind the Horse Artillery team reduced as much
as is possible consistent with efficiency. I think that 30 cwt. is about the
right thing, and Iam very pleased indeed to hear that this new gun, which I
believe is now in use at Aldershot, has been reduced to that weight; L have been
told by the officer commanding the battery that the gun shoots well and is in all
respects satisfactory.

Another most desirable point is one that was mentioned just now by Colonel
Marshall, namely, rapidity of firing, which to my mind is as important as mobility.
If the fire cannot be rapid there is but little use for Horse Artillery when acting
with cavalry, because in an attack its opportunity is too fleeting to admit of delay.
With all due deference to Sir William Stirling, I think that the cavalry is what
the artillery should aim at in the first instance; the cavalry is the enemy with
which you are chiefly dealing, and it is the business of the Horse Artillery to do
them all the damage it can before the collision of the two cavalry forces takes
place. The Battery Commander should select a position where he is able to see
the enemy’s cavalry and give them as many rounds as is possible in the very short
time he may be able to direct his fire upon them. With mobility and rapidity
and accuracy of fire Horse Artillery can do wonders, and my hope and belief are
that in future wars our cavalry and our Horse Artillery will do as much, if not
more for each other than they have ever done in the past.

T am delighted to have come here this evening, it has been a very great pleasure
to me, and I hope that the Adjutant-General will now say a few words.

GuneRAL Str Repvers Burier, V.C., G.C.B.—Sir Evelyn Wood and gentle-
men, I came here to-day to learn, and not with the least intention of speaking ;
but as I am told that I am to say something I will try to do so.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 235

One thing especially impressed me in the lecture (General Boyce Combe men-
tioned it) and that is that the lecturer was under a great mistake in thinking that
a lecture of this sort does not do good. I am satisfied that nothing can do more
good than this sort of discussion. An able man looks out facts from ancient
history and puts them before us; many of them we have not heard before; and we
apply our own ideas and practice to them and we are at once impelled to think,
and out of that thinking good must come.

And I should think that there is nothing that requires more thought than this
very question of the co-operation of cavalry and Horse Artillery. For as I was
listening to the lecturer it seemed to me that, dealing with the question merely as
a question of combined action of cavalry and Horse Artillery, the one important
factor is that of “ time”’—you must arrange to save time. When an operation is
about to occur and the hostile forces are in sight of one another, they both move
so fast that there can be very little time indeed for mancewvres or for a decision to
be taken as to the nature of the attack that is going to be made. That being so
it seems to me that it is eminently necessary to settle definitely beforehand who is
then to decide upon the policy to be taken up. It was rather suggested by
Colonel French, I thought, that the artillery were to set the policy of the attack ;
with that I cannot agree. It seems to me that the enemy’s cavalry are really the
objective; that is what you have to destroy and it is by your cavalry that you
have to destroy it ; therefore it must be the cavalry leader who is to decide what
is the best way for his arm to attack the enemy’s cavalry. ‘That being so the first
action of the artillery, it seems to me, must be subsidiary to that of the cavalry
leader. I agree that whether it goes right, left, flank or front is immaterial, but
the one thing that seems to me absolutely essential is that the artillery must be
guided everywhere by the cavalry—it must not hamper the cavalry—(applause).
It is necessary, therefore, I think that the artillery leader should be thoroughly
in touch with the cavalry leader and should not only know what he is going to do
but should know him well enough to be able to thoroughly appreciate his inten-
tions ; not only know what he is going to do but should know it in such a way
as to be able to realize how he is going to do it. If the artillery look to that I
believe you will see what you so seldom see in history so far as we have any account
of it, the artillery and cavalry acting well together.

For that reason I must say that I personally most cordially endorse the
necessity for, and would in every way that I could encourage, all possible practice
together for cavalry and Horse Artillery; they are the two most expensive arms
that we have; they are the arms which require the longest training and they are
the arms certainly which require the greatest practice in working together—and
therefore they ought to have it.

I should not really be justified, from lack of experience, in remarking upon any
other matter, but two points have been raised which I may perhaps touch upon.
General Stirling and the lecturer both raised the question of mobility ; but with
the Horse Artillery the question of mobility in our service has always largely hung
upon that other fact which has not been mentioned to-day, namely, the question of
fire effect. No doubt rapidity of fixe is an element of fire effect, but the weight
and velocity of the projectile is also important and the question of the weight of
the projectile has had a great deal to do with the weight of the gun. In the new
gun there has been a certain amount of the power of the gun given up, and the
Horse Artillery have now a gun of 30 ewt. behind the team; I believe it has given
satisfaction, and I hope it will meet their wishes. But of course it is not as
powerful a gun as was originally asked for. Iam told by the manufacturers that
hitherto mobility has always been asked for, but at the same time a fire effect has
been asked for which it was impossible to give with the desired mobility. I am
glad to say that this year although the Army Estimates show but one more of

236 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

these new batteries, I believe we are going to have three, and they will also show
I believe an increase of seven batteries to the Field Artillery (applause).

The only other point to which I would allude is the question of escort. Per-
sonally I must say that I attach great importance to the advantage of an escort.
I cannot believe myself that an officer in the position of Commander of Horse
Artillery in action ought to be expected to have the least regard to his own safety.
He has to watch the course of the fight, and we have just been shown by examples
from history how important it is for him todo that. He has to consider the range
and effect of his fire and all that sort of thing, and it is impossible for him to do
that properly if at the same time he is looking after the safety of his battery.
Anybody who has ever seen a cavalry engagement at manceuvres—-the dust, the
general confusion, and the speed at which the horses go—will I think agree with
me that if the battery is left to the chance of the nearest cavalry officer protecting
it its protection will be a very bad one. For that reason I certainly advocate an
escort, though a small one. In conclusion I have to thank the lecturer for his
most interesting and most instructive lecture.

Tun CiarirMAN.—The Adjutant-General touched just now on a point which
is of very great interest to me, about the greater training that is required. I do
not know that we shall ever get the best results until all three branches of the
service go back to something which in this regiment you used to do; I am afraid
it is now only done in certain batteries. You used to give a subaltern a very
thorough instruction in what every driver and every gunner has to do. I will not say
what I think of you now, because you all know that I think very highly of you;
but 30 years ago I thought a great deal of your superiority over the two other
branches, which arose from the same system. It was a great point too in the
navy, 7.¢., that every subaltern had to do everything that has to be done by a
second class boy, a first class boy, an ordinary seaman and an able seaman ; and I
should like to see you go back (and I am going to say the same about the infantry
and the cavalry) to what you did when probably General Stirling joined—that
every subaltern before dismissal from drill should ride in the lead, in the centre,
in the wheel, and go downhill, he will then appreciate exactly what 39 cwt. is
behind. him, and especially on a straight-shouldered horse! In the same way I
should like to see every cavalry officer ride in the rear-rank, and in the dustiest
part of the Long Valley, and then he will appreciate really what a trial a rear-rank
man undergoes. In the time I have been at Aldershot I have seen a most
enthusiastic subaltern in the infantry drive a man into insubordination, and we
should have had a very bad case but that a sergeant stepped up and put his hand
on the man’s mouth, because the boy was trying to insist on this man doubling in
marching-order, on a very hot day. .

Of course the Adjutant-General was speaking in a higher sense just now of
trying to get a more thorough training and a more thorough appreciation on the
part of the cavalry of what artillery can and ought to do, and a more thorough
appreciation on the part of gunners than they really have, not so much of the
cavalry but of the object in view, that they are not there to fire off their own guns
at all, unless those guns are going really to help the cavalry to gain the victory.

Unfortunately for myself I look back a good many years, but it is a very great
pleasure to me when I think what the feeling is amongst you all here to-night.
Ihave fortunately had the happiness of knowing a great many of you from my
having been at Aldershot. When I look back to the time when I began my
service, the only book that existed for a boy who wanted to know anything about
his work was a morocco-covered brown-backed book, which no doubt you know—
“ Lefroy’s Handbook for Field Service.” I remember having to do a report on
the enemy’s position ; I did not know at all how to do it, and I turned to the book
in my first trouble to try and gain, on service, what I ought to have learnt, of

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 237

course, at home. But that is not the only point, and that is not the most valuable
point, perhaps, of the change that we have seen. It is only 15 or 20 years ago
that I asked an artillery officer, ‘““ What do you think of So-and-So ?’” ‘* Oh,” he
said, “he is the sort of fellow that you do not see at Woolwich; he goes to India
and the Colonies, and that sort of thing!’? Gentlemen, there has been a vast
change in this regiment since then! You realize now that Woolwich is not the
only place (applause), and in realizing that, it is an advantage not only to the
regiment but to the whole Service. You have learnt to appreciate the other
branches and now I am glad to say the other branches are learning to appreciate
you. Yours is not a sealed book at all! It would be absurd for us of course
outside the regiment to try and learn all the small details of guns, especially as
they are now so complicated; but we can learn to catch the broad principles,
especially where your work runs into that of the other two branches.

I have been talking in rather a high strain so now I will tell you a story which
may interest you, which occured to me after having seen the synopsis of the lecture
as regards Albuera. Napier tells the story, and tells it very well—that Colonel
Hardinge sent back those troops which had retired from there, i.e., the bridge
(pointing to the map) and ordered up the Fusilier brigade. I asked Arthur
Hardinge (I was there in 1888, going thence straight to Gibraltar) “is that true 2”
“Oh no,” he said “nota bit of it, my father often talked to me about it. But
he was trying to persuade Beresford to hold on,” Beresford was a very brave man,
and I should not tell you the story except that it is very well known; but he had
been greatly “hustled ;” a Polish lancer had got behind him and he very nearly
got his spear into the general who caught the lance and turned it away. There
were three or four others trying to kill him at the moment, and Beresford, seeing
so many men down, had his head inclined backwards, when Hardinge rode up to
him and said “I think, sir, I ought to tell you that you have a peerage in one
hand and a court-martial in the other.” Beresford waited a moment or two and
then turned round and said “I will go for the peerage.” That is really what oc-
curred.

And I am tempted to tell you one more thing, that I came upon only a day or
twoago. ‘This is only a small point—the lecturer brought into my head in talking
of Waterloo—but it gives a great example which brings home to us the great
qualities of some of those gunners who have gone before us. Coming away from
Genappes it rained very heavily. (I am alluding to the 17th of June, 1815.) The
rear battery were being pressed. It had no cavalry behind it, but the ground was
so heavy that the enemy could not move off the road. A wheel-horse cast a shoe,
and the officer in command of the battery stopped there and then, sent some gun
detachments back to keep back the French, who were skirmishing, stopped till
he got his shoe tacked on, and then trotted on again. I have always thought
that that must have been a very good man indeed.

Just now I was speaking of the change of tone in the service, but if I may say
so as an outsider, I am very anxious to see something more. I have put you
gentlemen out of my mind for the moment, do not think that I am alluding to the
lecturer only, but I am anxious to see a greater joining together of artillery officers,
and not only artillery officers but of the army officer who writes, and the army
officer who only rides to hounds, is a very fine fellow and plays polo—because
until we get that we shall not get the best results. When I went to Aldershot
that system was never acted upon, in other words the mingling of theory and
practice. [am not speaking of course of any particular person. We happened to
have a General there who is a great friend of mine, General Williams; and I have
to read you a letter from him saying that he regrets he is not able to come here ;
and he urges what Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller and all of us agree with,
a greater intimacy between cavalry and Horse Artillery. He urges their living

238 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY.

together and being quartered together; but he says something more which I think
you would care to hear, as it is interesting: “drill and mancuvres of Horse
Artillery and cavalry together is made much more difficult by exaggerating the
cavalry’s first line. If officers learn to drill and manceuvre cavalry and Horse
Artillery as one command, they will not be inclined to come into action with their
guns at other than shortranges. In most cases of finding, I maintain that nobody
should begin at long ranges.” There are not many of us here probably who
would accept everything that our friend General Williams says; but he has got the
great true cardinal principle that artillery live, or are paid not to live but to kill
people. If consistently with killing people they can live that is all very well ;
but he was never tired of dinning into my head the drill-book which (whether he
gave it the impress or not I do not care) as it stands, bears that ereat truth on it,
that it is a good thing to save your skin if you can, but that artillery are not to
regard any loss of themselves of any nature, whether it is of personnel or the guns
themselves, but that they should go into action regardless of all that in order to
win the action. Well, General Williams often says, what perhaps sometimes we
cannot all agree with, but everyone who thinks about it will realise, that that is
doing the work for which we are paid, and doing it in reality as we should all like
to do it.

There is one point upon which someone, Sir William Stirling I think, rather
startled me, in saying that he did not want an escort for guns. Well, if we were
all as good cavalry soldiers or gunners as a great many of you people here are, I
should not mind so much; but if I were an opponent I should very much like
to see you do without an escort. or if something occurs, some one charges you
and you then withdraw very suddenly, then will arise an opportunity for cavalry.
Perhaps I have this a little on the brain, because I have been studying cavalry
achievements, and I have read of 21 guns taken with not one man wounded,
and that was because the artillery had no escort ; they thought they were quite
safe; they were going along a safe route. A very bold man saw that they had no
escort, and got them! And that may be our fate if we have no escort I am afraid.
I once said to the major of a battery who had just got a brigade-division—“ Are
you happy?” he said “ No I am not happy ;” I asked, why “I have been hating
my Colonel now” he said ‘‘for five years and now that 1 am going to be ‘one I
shall have three fellows hating me.” You suffer from that no doubt; but you
scarcely suffer so much as the cavalry did 80 yearsago. One of the most remark-
able things at Waterloo, and to a certain extent in the Crimea, was that no
cavalry General would ever allow his colonel to do anything; there were four
cavalry brigades actively employed at Waterloo, but no colonel ever got a chance
with his own regiment. General Vandeleur led one regiment and Lord Uxbridge
led a squadron; but General Vivian, who is my climax, had three regiments in
action. He halted two; he led one and told it to rally, and then he came back
and took up the next one, and it was only night-fall which prevented his charging
with the third regiment.

I have kept you twice the time that I meant to do.

Have you anything to say, Major May? I think we have agreed with you
altogether.

Mayor E. S. May—Gentlemen, I really think that I was very bold to give a
lecture on this subject now that I see all these distinguished cavalry officers pres-
ent, and indeed I feared when I looked at them that I might possibly be devoured.
I am very relieved that you have let me down so gently, and am much obliged
for your moderation. I don’t want to detain you longer, and I think there is
only one thing that I seem to have made a mistake about—when I said that the
cavalry would take 20 minutes to get into a preparatory formation. I want to tell
you why I said that, You willremember in the first place that I said that I spoke

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 239

with great diffidence before so many cavalry officers, and I confess I have had
no close personal experience on that point; but I was looking up this subject for
my lecture, and I found in a certain text-book that it was laid down that they
might take—I think it said from a quarter of an hour to half an hour!—at any
rate some enormous time. It struck meat the time as exceptionally long, and [
therefore steered a middle course. I suppose the time taken depends largely on
the march formation and the nature of the country, but all I meant to dwell upon
was that, if the cavalry were delayed while getting into the preparatory formation,
and the enemy’s artillery opened upon them, when the squadrons were stationary,
our guns, in spite of what I said as to decisive ranges, must unlimber and engage
the hostile artillery—I wanted to lay stress upon that point too, because I had
said just before that they were only to fire as much as possible at the enemy’s
cavalry. Jam very glad to hear that [am wrong about the time, and that our
cavalry will be so much quicker than I gave them credit for.

With reference to what Sir Evelyn said as to artillery having fired on the
Russian cavalry | must admit I was under the impression that the victory was
entirely due to the good swords of our dragoons, and I was prepared to give them
all the credit.

As regards an escort I am afraid I am still strongly of opinion that we ought
to have an escort ; because, if you do not, I think that the officer commanding the
artillery will hardly act with the same vigour and decision that he would show if
he had one. If he is continually thinking about his flanks and so on he will not
have his mind free to attend to his proper business. I want to say this, however,
that if you keep cavalry and Horse Artillery close together, as they were at
Balaclava, you could get on, perhaps, without one, though I would rather have
one even then; but from what I have seen at manceuvres, the Horse Artillery are
often perhaps nearly a mile away, or occasionally even more, from the cavalry ;
and on such occasions it has struck me, that when without an escort a clever
cavalry leader might with a small force paralyze their action. In fact I have seen
the very thing happen. Isaw one day a squadron detached from the main combat
and go for the hostile battery at extended files, and it was a great question whether
it would have got in or not; I think myself, and I was an umpire, that it would.
Supposing it had. It might not, certainly I think would not, have captured the
guns, but it might have killed a good many horses and some men and it would
certainly have disorganized the battery and neutralized itfor atime. And it seems
to me that it might pay to thus detach a squadron, if guns were left isolated in
the way I have in mind. I think myself that sometimes our artillery perhaps
forget and don’t follow the cavalry, or that the cavalry perhaps forget the artillery,
and so it happens that the guns are exposed. I say that the strongest example
that you can have of the need for an escort was at the fight I have quoted of
Tobitschau where you had those 20 Austrian guns charged by only three squadrons,
and the three squadrons did not lose a single man killed, yet captured all but
the whole of the guns, decause the guns had not an escort. If they had had an
escort that would have prevented Von Bredow from making that successful
charge.

I am very much obliged to you, geutlemen, for your kind reception of my
lecture, and I thank you.

1 <3 to } an hour” are the words,

241

ID) dE AS Ee SE VY

LIEUTENANT W. SWABRY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA.

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATHS, late R.H.A.

(Continued from p. 199, No. 4, Vol. XXTI1.).

Tea Wi

Tue CAMPAIGN From Aprit to November 1812.

Summary of the Peninsular Campaign from April to November 1812.

The capture of the important fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajos was a great gain to the allies, and a severe blow to the French
hopes of being able to force the English to evacuate the Peninsula, as
recorded in Part I. of the diary. Lord Wellington was now no longer
bound to Lisbon, but had acquired new bases of operations on the
Guadiana, the Aqueda, and the Douro, and he could choose his own
field of battle in Spain. Nevertheless the strength of the French
armies in May 1812, was very formidable, amounting to 170,000 men
distributed in Andalusia, in Leon, in Old Castile, in Aragon and the
eastern provinces, whilst Madrid was held by a force under King
Joseph and Marshal Jourdan.

The allied British and Portuguese army though much inferior in
numbers had attained great efficiency ; Lord Wellington, therefore un-
willing to allow the Spaniards to sink into apathy, decided to continue
the offensive, and by operating in the north of Spain to liberate if
possible the southern provinces where the best spirit prevailed, and
which offered a suitable field for the Spaniards to renew their exertions.

In accordance with this plan the force under Sir Rowland Hill which
covered Badajos and held Soult in check at Seville, sent in May a
detachment which seized and destroyed on the 19th the bridge of

9
5. VoL. XXII. 39

242 SWABEY DIARY.

boats at Almaraz, the best and shortest line of communication between
the French armies north and south of the Tagus. This important
design accomplished, Lord Wellington on June 17th, crossed the
Tormes near Salamanca, and by July 2nd, succeeded in driving
Marmont from that neighbourhood towards the Douro; a series of
manceuvres ensued between that date and July 22nd, upon which day
the French were defeated at the battle of Salamanca, and then pursued
to Valladolid, and as they still continued to retire northward, Wel-
lington re-crossed the Douro, marched on Madrid, drove the King with
his troops from the place, and entered it on August 12th.

The allies had thus defeated a powerful army and driven King
Joseph from the capital, bub as Soult still remained in Andalusia, the
main object of the campaign—to draw the French armies from the
southern provinces, so far had not been attained.

On that account, Lord Wellington directed the troops at Cadiz to
manoeuvre against Soult’s force, while Sir Rowland Hill, who during
the period between May and September had been constantly skirmish-
ing and manceuvring against a portion of the same army under Count
D’Erlon, took post on the Tagus and marched towards Aranjuez and
Madrid. At the same time (September Ist) leaving a small garrison
in the latter place, himself marched northward against the army of
Portugal now commanded by Clausel. The French fell slowly back on
Burgos, the siege of which was begun by the allies on the 17th.

Soult meanwhile finding the war steadily progressing in the north,
on August 25th, raised the siege of Cadiz and concentrated at Granada,
where hearing of the movement on Burgos, he marched northward and
on September 29th, at Albacete, united with the King’s army.

The approach of these combined armies on Madrid, and the failure
to carry by storm the castle of Burgos, compelled Wellington on
October 21st to raise the siege, and in conjunction with Sir Rowland
Hill’s force to retire on Salamanca, in front of which place they took
up a position. On November 10th, the French concentrated on the
right bank of the Torrnes, a force nearly double that of the allies; but
as the latter were much worn and exhausted by incessant marching and
constant exposure, Wellington preferred retiring into Portugal to the
risk of fighting a general action.

On November 15th, the army therefore broke up from Salamanca, and
during the three followimg days owing to inclement weather, bad roads,
and irregular supply of food, the distress of the army was extreme.
The French light troops pursued them closely for two days causing much
inconvenience and loss. On November 18th, kead-quarters entered
Ciudad Rodrigo, and when it was ascertained that the French had re-
tired from the Tormes, the army was put into winter cantonments.

In reading the foregoing summary it should be borne in mind that
«}” troop was with the army under Lord Wellington, while “D”
troop, to which Lieutenant Swabey was attached, was with that under
the command of Sir Rowland Hill.

SWABEY DIARY. 243

JS) JE Assy SOG

Cuarter I.

Ineutenant Swabey is attached to, and joins “D” Troop. Skirmishes.
Defeat of General Slade’s Brigade. Flag of Truce. Gallant affair of

TIneut. Strenowttz.

eend April.—This morning in consequence of an order received last
night, I set off alone to retrace my steps to Spanish Hstremadura, to
do duty with Captain Lefebure whose subalterns are all absent. I had
a gunner to take to his troop, who, the moment he got out of my
sight, got on my horse’s back, which was terribly sore, and was riding
with the greatest sangfroid; I was so provoked with the ingratitude
of the rascal, for I had already allowed him to put his kit with my
baggage, that I took a stick and basted him in good earnest and sent
him back to Captain Macdonald. I then proceeded to Villa Velha
where I found Bull’s troop encamped and dined and slept with them.

[It was on my route to join Sir Rowland Hill’s corps that I traversed
a good part of Portugal, from Guarda over the Tagus, at Villa Velha
by Hlvas, in sight of Badajos into Spanish Hstremadura. I had only
my servant and the extent of country travelled rendered our march
difficult and our reception at different places by no means always of
the same character. It was in the desolate yet beautiful route between
Villa Velha and Nisa that we met with a startling and rather alarming
rencontre; full on our route, luxuriating on the carcase of a dead
horse, stood in solemn festival 30 or 40 vultures of the tribe called
by naturalists, Vultwr fulvus, each of which when erect might be
between three and four feet high. Whether satiated with their meal
and gorged into quiescence, or totally regardless of the human pre-
sence I could not decide, but there they sat, seemingly in defiance.
We were afraid for our animals if not for ourselves, and having loaded
a brace of pistols and a double barreled gun which I always had at
hand, we made a most respectful detour, leaving the high-road to the
birds, who it is probable would have made an attack on our horses and
mules, not then in the most robust condition, had they not already
revelled too deeply in the same food. It is to be observed that this
was a rare occurrence, for unless congregated by the keenness of their
scent for prey, these birds are not in the habit of assembling together
in numbers. They did not take the smallest notice of us or our pre-
parations, and we were not altogether sorry to get clear of them
without a closer intimacy ; but I felt the dignity of the human charac-
ter somewhat compromised, and could not help thinking how likely it
was that many a battlefield had been subject to their visitations, nay
even that the flesh I carried on my bones might in the future be a dainty
with the taste of which they would not be altogether unacquainted.

The route we were then pursuing was certainly one of the wild-
est yet most beautiful of natures pathways. The precipitous hill and

2.44, SWABEY DIARY.

rock, the declivities of which as well as the plain on the summit were
covered by an uninterrupted mantle of Gum Cistus which perfumed
the whole atmosphere and the gushing torrent forcing here and there its
silvery way formed, particularly in combination with the view from
one beautiful acclivity, an assemblage of natural beauty of a description
and extent that no art or cultivation could ever hope to imitate. I have
often since reflected on the internal condition of the Portuguese nation.
All its provinces, except the Alemtejo, have yet to be submitted to the
hand of cultivation. In spite of a beautiful climate, endless means of
irrigation, a soil producing every species of grain and Indian corn,
vegetables and fruits, a population more destitute of the means of
comfortable subsistence cannot well be imagined. I leave it to philo-
sophical speculation to unravel the causes why this country has not yet
assumed the position in the agricultural world which providence might
seem to have assigned it. I will however hazard two conjectures, the
one that its social and political institutions are not favourable to the
development of individual energy, and the other, that its fame and
predilections have always rather led it in the pursuit of distant dis-
covery and, for a time, of colonization, whereby its own inexhaustible
resources have become neglected.

The Portuguese are by no means ignorant of agriculture, as is
testified by the cultivation of the vicinities of various large towns and
villages in all its provinces, and particularly in the Alemtejo. But
the extent of the land under cultivation in so old a country is particu-
larly small, its rocky and mountainous surface only in part accounting’
for the fact. I was soon however to pass into Andalusia where the
well built towns stood as it were isolated in the midst of unenclosed
plains vast and gorgeous with the waving corn; justifying the Poet?s
epithet “the golden harvest,” and here too the proportion of cultivation
is bounded by the comparative numerical weakness of the population.
But the plains and valleys teem with natural fertility, and so great
is their extent in proportion to the number of inhabitants, that but
little pains are taken to do more than resort continually to new ground.
Having taken a crop the land is left and new ground is turned up, so
that nature will here produce two white crops! without cultivation, and
the soil is continually renewing its powers of production after a temp-
orary exhaustion. Most of these grounds are cultivated by the hand,
not with a spade, but an instrument used by two men who pass it under
the surface and turn the soil completely over. When the crop is
gathered it is carried to the neighbourhood of the town, where, on cir-
cular stone pavements sometimes natural or else constructed, it is laid
to be threshed or rather trodden out by horses or mules driven round
in a circle, and thus the straw is cut to pieces and turned into a very
valuable kind of chaff ready without cutting, bruised and nutritious. ]

23rd April.—Made my march to Alpah&o. At this place I was struck
with the difference in the manners of the inhabitants, who when the
town was filled with troops the other day were extremely condescending,
but now that we had no power to intimidate them, were barely civil,

1 Any corn crop, such as wheat, barley, oats, rye, or maize—F.A.W,

SWABHY DIARY. 945

not even those with whom I laid out my money for bread and what.
few eatables I could purchase.

24th April.—Determining not to go by the vile towns of Arronches,
St. Olaia, etc., I went to-day to Altar de Chio where I found the sick.
and wounded from Badajos filling the town. At this place the face of
the country begins to alter, and the Portuguese here havea word for
cleanliness, sweetness, etc., but of this there are different degrees of
comparison.

25th April—From Altar de Chio with the view of seeing a new
place, I bent my steps to Monforte, which is another good town.
There was not a single Englishman besides myself and Sutton in the
place so that I could not look big. I was obliged to purchase forage
as a favour.

26th April.—Went to Hlvas in the rain, and after some difficulty
from the Corregedor,' this being the capital of a Corregedoria, I got a
billet, when I presented it at the house, the landlord or patron, with
very great politeness told me he could allow me no wood for my fire, so
I with equal good breeding informed him that I thanked him for his
extreme civility, in such terms that it even reached his dark Portuguese
heart, and he blushed for his want of gratitude and generosity.

I was obliged to buy forage for my horses at a great price as none is
allowed to be cut here near the town.

I dined with Fitzpatrick? and passed the evening with Major Macleod
of the Engineers and his brother.

27th April.Remained at Hivas, which is well fortified and rendered
strong by having above it La Lippe, a fortress supposed to be impreg-
nable. ‘he possession of Hlvas is highly advantageous, and was the
only useful article gained by the Convention of Cintra, by which, in
common with all Portugal, it was evacuated, having been previously.
given up by the treachery or undetermined policy of the governor. It
has the best market I have seen, all kinds of vegetables, which are
rare articles in Portugal, fowls and game. There are many good
drapers’ shops and many articles of British manufacture to be pur-
chased. The town, like all garrison ones, is close, hot and disagreeable,
though the interior of the houses is tolerably good.

2th April.—Set out with a view of getting to Albuera, relying on
my knowledge of the country. At the Guadiana I attempted the same
ford we had lately passed with the guns, but found it very deep and
dangerous from the rapidity of the stream. It was with difficulty the
mule and baggage got over; but a donkey that I had bought at Altar
de Chao to carry my corn being tied to my mule was dragged through
the river, and either drowned or strangled. I missed Albuera and did
not get to Almendral until it was dark, and was obliged to bribe some
Spaniards to bring me forage, having no corn. At the house where I
stopped and where I was well-known and well received by the people,
was a Spanish sergeant, a very intelligent fellow, who had been in 18

1 Mayor or Justice of the Peace. Corregedoria, his office.
? Assistant Surgeon Nicholas Fitzpatrick, R.A, (Kanc’s List No, 64).

246 SWABEY DIARY.

engagements. He was enthusiastic in his gratitude towards the English,
and expressed it as the common wish of their army that Lord Welling-
ton and English officers should command them, drawing comparisons
between the conduct of some of their regiments under English Colonels
and those commanded by Spaniards.

2Ith April—Got to Villa Franca, where I found Captain Lefebure’s
troop in high order, but things at a stand-still in this army for the
present, Soult having retired on Cordova, and General Hill being
joined by 5000 Spaniards.

As we now follow the fortunes of this troop until November 10th,
it is not out of place here to say a few words about it.

“D” troop was formed November ist, 1793. In February 1810
it embarked at Portsmouth for the Peninsula to relieve “A”
troop, which had been so reduced by the severe sickness
prevalent in the army at Merida after the retreat in 1809,
that it was unfit to take the field. The disastrous voyage
of a transport carrying one of the divisions of “ D” troop,
however, caused this plan to be abandoned, and in conse-
quence the troop found drafts for the Horse Artillery with
the army and did not itself take the field until April 1811,
when it joined the cavalry of Lieut.-General Hill’s corps,
temporarily commanded by Marshal Beresford. ‘The officers
belonging to the troop.in April 1812, were, Captain G.
Lefebure, 2nd Captain EH. C. Whinyates, Licutenants H.
Mallet, T. Carter, W. Dunn, with Assistant-Surgeon W.
Ambrose.—F.A. W.

30th April.—tIn an empty house in which I had taken refuge from
a storm to-day, after dinner, though let it not be insinuated that
Bacchus had any share in making the night dark, I fell into one of
the jar-shaped pits with narrow neck and aperture used in this country
for storing grain. I was considerably bruised, and at first thought a rib
was broken. My situation in the hole was ludicrous enough, for it was
quite dark, and 1 could not get out. At last a Spaniard brought by
my cries came with a light to ascertain what had happened; he then
got a rope, which being fastened to my body, I was hauled out, to the
no small amusement of the bystanders and I myself joined in the laugh
most heartily. ‘To escape so little hurt was most fortunate as the fall
was 12 feet.

1st May.—We have in our neighbourhood 5000 Spanish infantry
under Morillo, and cavalry under the Conde du Penne Villamur.

2nd May.—Rain again set in. Lord: Wellington, it is understood, is
on his return from the north with 4 divisions, Marmont having fled
before him.

3rd May.—I have begun to hope my time is not unprofitably passed,
as I now employ myself daily in the study of Spanish, and in reading some
book or other, but books are articles which compose so small a part of
baggage in this country that I cannot hope to improve myself much.

SWABEY DIARY. 24.7

4th May.—I pasted one of Fadens maps,' which my idleness has long
neglected. The enemy it appears is breaking up from Seville, at least
report speaks of his being actually employed in moving his stores from
thence. I cannot help being sanguine in the idea that the taking of
Badajos was the signal for the evacuation of the Southern Provinces
of Spain, and since all other schemes of my life are deferred though
never to be lost sight of, I feel some military ardour in the prospect of
the probable events of the campaign.

5th May.—Spent the day in endeavouring to hit a bustard. One
was shot by an officer a few days ago weighing 22]bs., and measuring
6 feet from the extremities of its wings; it is excellent to eat and re-
sembles a turkey of which it is denominated the wild species. It is not
however at all like it in plumage.

6th May.—A wet disagreeable day, the summer season has not yet
made its appearance, nothing can however be finer than the prospect
of the harvest here, the crops of wheat, rye and barley all nearly of the
same age are luxuriant; little pains is bestowed on the ground which
independent of good soil has the advantage of scarcely ever being
cultivated more than once in 4 years, as there is such a wide range
that the farmers shift their ground. Ploughing is performed by oxen
or in some places by mules with one man only: here it is to be obser-
ved that the soil is light as well as the instrument so that the labour is
easily gone through by one person, and the plough drawn without
difficulty by one beast. There are beautiful crops of beans now in
blossom, some few peas, but no potatoes, though I should judge the
soil to be most congenial to their cultivation. I have not yet seen
harrows or rollers, and do not believe them to be made use of. There
are large flocks of beautiful sheep on the hills, and from their resem-
blance to what is called the merino breed in England, I cannot but
think that half the sheep imported under that description are counter-
feits.

In Portugal they have winter turnips. Their sheep, much inferior to
the Spanish breed, do not profit much by this article of husbandry ; but
the weather is too severe for them to hope to find on the moun-
tains subsistence in sufficient quantity to keep them in condition.
Possibly the turnips have become necessary for the support of the oxen,
because the cavalry have eaten the hay and straw, but the Portuguese
know little how to turn their soil to advantage or their advantages to
use. <A letter from Hdwardes reached me to-day, and one from Doctor
Macdonald; the latter states that the French had been in our winter
cantonments at Salgueiro, where to use his own expression, “ they
ground Don Oliviera’s corn in his own mill, and carried away all that
they could lay their hands on.”

Sth May.—The army is on its move from the barren climate of the
north and hopes are all alive as to our advancing into the heart
of Spain and driving its invaders before us. Time will prove.

10th May.—During this last week we have frequently had company

} The best of Spain and Portugal of that day, in which all places mentioned in this diary, except
a few insignificant ones, will be found.—F..4. 1,

248 SWABEY DIARY.

to dinner, but generally they have been so little to my taste that I
have not noticed them much.

Lith May.—Wrote to K., and to Harry Forster. I wish to inspire
the latter with a wish to come out here, and thereby inoculate him with
military ideas, which, though I do not possess many of them, would
‘shine in his possession.

2th May.—lLieut.-Colonel Waller! just arrived from England to
command our little train in Sir RK. Hill’s army, dined with us to-day,
_and what was worse came over at 11 o’clock, so that we had to entertain
him or rather assist him to pass the weary hours until 4 o’clock. Imay
‘be pardoned for predicting that his plans for the improvement of the
corps here will not be attended with success, and I think him a little
presumptuous in forming any, especially as they are directly opposed
to what experience points out in this country. They are the more
objectionable as being in direct opposition to Lord Wellington’s, to
conciliate whom is the only road to popularity, and by no means
incompatible with independence of thought and feeling.

15th May.—1 wrote some days of this journal, and having read them
over, I ain inclined to think my pen has not been guided by the most
lively view of existing circumstances.

_ 14th May.—My time did not long hang heavily on my hands to-day
as I was resolute to read “ Carleton’s Memoirs,” recommended to me
asa book very well adapted for perusal by all officers in Spain, being
partly an account of Lord Peterborough’s campaign in Valencia,
Murcia, etc., in which Captain Carleton served. I found it little
calculated to instruct, and as to its historical merits, I could not agree
_with the praises bestowed on them by the reviewer,” whose eulogy of
the book was of course prefixed. Carleton’s account of the bigotry of
the Spaniards forms a contrast with their present condition, which
is now fast approaching emancipation from bigotry and prejudice.
In reading it 1 was forcibly impressed with the benefit some countries
derive from revolution, at least, if the effect on the minds of men is
considered and the miseries of transient anarchy thought worth
“enduring for the sake of the light they shed on the national mind. In
the persons of Lord Peterborough and Carleton I had a striking
instance of the ingratitude of the world, and a proof, not however
wanted, to convince me of the unwise choice men make when they
launch into the vortex of ambition in preference to sailing in the placid
“streams of humble and domestic life. ‘his conviction is the more
forcible, when we so often find those whose ambition has been laudable,
and whose worth has been pre-eminent, doomed to see the untimely
end of disappointed hopes, while fools and profligates are guided by
fortune to power and affluence.

15th May.—Reading still the page of the hour, viz., “ Pasley’s

1 Lieut.-Colonel Charles Waller, R.A. (Kane’s List No. 696).

2 This remark is creditable to the acumen of Lieutenant Swabey. ‘‘The memoirs of Captain
George Carleten are now generally believed to be spurious, and perfect specimens of modern myth
in which fact and fiction are so interweaved as to produce narratives which are imposed upon the
whole world as authentic.”’? ‘* Quarterly Review,’ January, 1894.

SWABEY DIARY. 949

Military policy of Great Britain.” I claim however some excuse for
so transgressing on military rules owing to the total impossibility of
being out in the heat with any safety from 11 till 5 o’clock.

The author of this book has, in plain though philosophical argument,
sufficiently demonstrated to me the fatal truth that Hngland’s only
hope is in war, I should say conquest. It is the peculiar character of
his book to excite the pride and awaken the ambition of Mnglishmen,
and by thus touching on man’s weakest or next to weakest passion,
he tunes his understanding so as to be delighted with the glorious and
I may say reasonable plans that he proposes for adoption.

16th May.—Read part of a French work on Tacitus. The style, as
far as I went, has like that of most authors of that nation too much
vanity and egotism with unpoetic attempt at ornament, so that I have
scarcely patience to read it. These attempts are the more ungraceful
when made on a subject which should be plainly and concisely treated ;
repetition is likewise an error too prevalent in French writers. I must
admit however the inadequacy of an Hnglishman’s judgment on a
French production.

This day was the anniversary of Albuera, and all the regiments here,
viz., the 57th, or “‘ Die-hards,” 31st, or young Buffs, 3rd, or old Buffs,
etc., paid due honour to the occasion by getting what they term Royal
rental? of their different exploits, which was as unintelligible as the
confusion of tongues.

Apropos of this celebration it should be stated that “ D” troop,
the only one present at Albuera, played a distinguished part
in the battle. On that hard-fought day it was engaged
both on “the heights” and in the plain with the cavalry
on the right of the position, where owing to the persistent
efforts of Marshal Soult to turn that flank some of the severest
fighting took place. The troop wasin the very thick of the
melée, the guns were repeatedly ridden through, and many of
the gunners charged over by the French Dragoons; indeed
for a time one gun was in the hands of the enemy, who how-
ever suffered very heavy losses both in men and horses from
the destructive fire of the troop. In a letter describing the
action dated June 26th, 1811, the cavalry Brigadier-General
Long says: “the dispersion of our cavalry scarcely left us
more than 400 or 500 British at any point, which with two
regiments of Spaniards, that could not be depended upon, was
all we had to offer by way of resistance to their numerous
and overwhelming columns. ‘he ground, however, favoured
us, and the Horse Artillery did its duty with brilliant effect.
The enemy lost a great number of men, and from 400 to 500
horses, by the operation of this arm alone.”—FA. |V.

1 There appears to have been no real connexion between the two regiments. A legend exists, of
' questionable authenticity, that at the battle of Dettingen in 1743, George the II. mistook the 31st
regiment for the 3rd Buffs, and when the mistake was pointed out, he said, “‘ then they shall be the
young Buffs.’—F.4.W.
Bees probably means they all got excessively drunk, as was usual on similar occasions,—
34

250 SWABEY DIARY.

17th May.—Threatened with a march to-day, an occurrence I shall
not regret, for I am apt to be desponding when too quiet and
unemployed.

18th May.—Marched to Fuente del Maestro an excellent town.
From a conversation I had with my landlord he gave me proof enough
that many of the inhabitants favoured the French, or rather thought it
wise to appear to do so when they were nigh, for he pointed out to me
several names of places favoured considerably in the raising of contri-
butions, and when I reminded him of the mild character of the French
General who had commanded in some of them, he cleared my doubts
by instancing the oppression of the same officer in other places, so
that their plans are systematic. Speaking in these remarkable words
he decried the imbecility and local tyranny of the Junta, “Hs la
Junta que es la perdiciose de Espaiia.”* I never got such a lesson in
Spanish politics. ;

19th May.—At 12 o’clock last night we received an unexpected order
to march two hours before daybreak to Azauchal, and there to await
orders. We arrived there by 6 o’clock finding the baggage of the
Royals and 3rd Dragoon Guards on its way to the rear, the idea was that
a squadron of the enemy’s cavalry had turned them out of Ribera.

20th May.—Advanced to Torremexia a desolated village with
nothing worthy the name of a house. We had a ground floor swept
out where horses had been standing, but there were no windows or
doors. It seems the force that appeared yesterday was exaggerated
by General Slade’s account, they having chased his picket from Llera,
and absolutely run down 3 horses and taken their riders prisoners.
This proves to me that light cavalry are the only people for outposts.
I will not commit to paper my ideas on the subject of General Slade’s
leaving Ribera; it is now again occupied. Close to this town runs a
roa, or rather the remains of one, made by the Romans and formerly
reaching from Merida to Lisbon, these relics of which there are many
in Spain are called Calhada.

21st May.—Whinyates? and Bent® went forward to Zafra with two
guns as the enemy with an unknown force threatens that outpost.
We received intelligence of General Hill’s complete success in
carrying the works and destroying the bridge at Almaraz one of the
roads to Plasencia over the Tagus; hisloss, men killed 80, and 100

i Tt is the Government which is the ruin of Spain.

2 Second Captain Edward Charles Whinyates (Kane’s List No. 1002), accompanied Sir Ralph
Abercrombie’s expedition to the Helder in 1799. Afterwards joined the army under the Duke of
York, and served in the campaign in North Holland. He was present at the capture of Madeira
in 1801. He was adjutant to the R.A. in the expedition under Lord Cathcart against Copenhagen
in 1807.

He served with “‘D’”’ Troop in the Peninsula from 1810 to 1813, and was at the battles of Busaco
and Albuera, the affairs of Usagre, Aldea de Ponte, Ribera, San Mufos, with many other minor
combats.

In the campaign of 1815, he commanded the 2nd Rocket Troop, and was engaged in the retreat
from Quatre Bras and at Waterloo, where he was severely wounded. He received for his services
the C.B. and K.H., the Peninsular medal and two clasps and the Waterloo medal. In 1852, he
was appointed Director-General of Artillery, and the same year Commandant at Woolwich. General
Sir Edward Whinyates, Colonel Commandant, R.H.A., died December 25th, 1865.

3 Lieutenant Wm. Henry Bent, R.A. (Kane’s List No. 1449).

SWABEY DIARY. 251

wounded; of the enemy 250 taken, 300 killed, 200 with the General
and his wife drowned in attempting to cross. This movement will
embarrass Marmont.

22nd May.—Sir William Erskine! sent a patrol of the 3rd Dragoon
Guards, our support at this place, to Palomas to learn the truth about
the enemy’s being in force, the commanding officer of the 9th Dragoons
having seen a report of 3000 infantry and cavalry. Sir Granby Calcraft?
found their force to be only about 500, and that they had evacuated
our line. Had we found them we had orders to move and drive them
from the face of the earth, which I felt eager to do, as I was indignant
at the idea of alittle flying force keeping our outposts in continual and
ridiculous alarm.

23rd May.—Received a route to Almendralejo where we were well
put up. Colonel Waller dined.

24th May.—Marched to Villa Franca once more, I felt ashamed of
showing my face there. We have now no bread, but such as we can
press, which is hard on the inhabitants, but I see plainly that if we do
not adopt the plan of taking for the use of the troops whatever we can
get, we never can advance into Spain. War and charity are two
things truly incompatible with each other.

xdth May.—At Villa Franca, a terribly hot day, without books or
anything for it but sleep and a little contemplation.

26th May.—No intelligence from Whinyates or news stirring to-day.

e7th May.—Heard the particulars of the attack on Almaraz.
Through various mistakes in the roads owing to the sickness of Colonel
Offeney the Quarter-Master-General, the troops did not arrive near
the Castle of Mirabete until two hours after daylight, and General Hill
supposing that there would be no surprise refreshed his troops on that
and the following day.

he next day Mirabete being deemed impracticable by assault, a
false attack only was made. In the interim Fort Napoleon was entered
by escalade; Lieutenant Love® of the artillery immediately turned
the guns on the fugitives who by an unaccountable oversight cut the
bridge of boats on the side to which they retreated and left it to
swing round to the other by which means our passage was not inter-
rupted and we crossed over and took possession of Fort Ragusa which
with the ordnance, Fort Napoleon and the bridge were all destroyed.
N.B.—To destroy ordnance place muzzle to muzzle, or one gun at right
angles to the muzzle of another, this is the French system.

“The siege of Badajos having terminated by the capture of that
powerful fortress, with all its garrison stores etc., the divisions
of the enemy’s army retired from the Alemtejo and Spanish
Estremadura ; the next object of the Harl of Wellington, was to
destroy a considerable fortification forming the grand pass at

? Lieut.-General Sir Wm. Erskine, commanding the cavalry with Lieut.-General Sir Rowland
Hill’s corps.

2 Commanding 3rd Dragoon Guards.
3 Lieutenant James Loye (Kane’s List No. 1489).

252 SWABEY DIARY.

Almaraz, midway between Badajos and Madrid, 80 miles from
the former, 96 miles from the latter, 30 miles from Truxillo, and
60 miles from Merida, situated on the right bank of the Tagus.
This, consisting of Fort Napoleon, strongly fortified, with
double ditch, and armed with 18 twenty-four pounders, and
other ordnance, and connected by a floating bridge with a
battery of 6 guns on the opposite side of the river, possessing
a numerous garrison well supplied with all kinds of stores,
and being in the general route from the grand arsenal at
Seville, via Badajos, Truxillo, and Toledo to Madrid, was an
obstacle of immediate consideration, the destruction of which
was confided to Lieut.-General Sir R. Hill who marched his
division from Almandralejo, and issued orders for his 1st
brigade to attack fort Napoleon by storm on the night of
the 18th or before daylight on the 19th of May 1812.”
“Storming of Fort Napoleon, Almaraz,” by Capt. McCarthy,
late 50th Regiment.

25th May.—Wrote away part of the morning. The heat here being
excessive, ague and fever begin to make their appearance among the
men.

Whilst we were sitting after dinner a man with a musket came run-
ning in requesting the help of mounted men to catch some Banditti who
had it appeared had escaped from him and 20 Spanish soldiers. Seeing
Major Macdonald! and Wemys the aide-de-camp? mounted, I got on
my horse and joined in the pursuit with 7 or 8 Dragoons. We fairly
rode them down after a chase of three miles, one of them firing at and
wounding a Spaniard; they did not dare to fire on us but surrendered
and were brought into the town. On investigating the matter we
found they had regular passports and cargoes on their mules, and it
appeared to me that the soldiers who came for assistance had attacked
them, but they not choosing to give up their property, had fired and
gone off; we set them at liberty.

The abuses committed by the Spanish soldiers are from their manner
of obtaining supplies very great, and the civil authority is so inefficient
that without soldiery they cannot collect the required rations. They
dread the French, who, in case of defalcation on the part of an in-
dividual, when a requisition is made, post a sentry at his door obliging
him to pay a dollar an hour till his quota is made good, and to
feed the whole guard thus let loose on him. In consequence of the
difficulty with which the supply of the Spanish forces is attended, they
are obliged, to the great inconvenience and danger of the service, to
divide armies into small bodies and quarter them in numerous canton-
ments. ‘The soldiers, deserted by more than the nominal authority of
the civil government, enforce their requisitions with the bayonet, and
seize on what they can get, by which means more is often levied on the
poor than the rich, or at all events no just proportion can be observed.
The men employed in pressing mules and transport have frequently

1 Major D. Macdonald, 92nd Regiment.
2 To Lieut,-General Sir Wm. Erskine,

SWABEY DIARY. 253

been known, when unauthorized, to press animals for the sake of being
bribed to release them, and I have often myself seen them do so. Ihave
never yet known a public-spirited Spaniard come forward to exert
himself for the supply of the army, and they are so blind as to prefer
the chance of their bread, flour, etc., being embargoed, and themselves
reduced to waut, to a general submission to the necessity by which
they would all equally contribute. It is notorious that in the trifling
circumstance of cutting a field of barley for the horses, the Alcalde, or
magistrate, is bribed by the rich to spare their lands in the selection.

29th May.—Whinyates and Bent returned from Zafra and General
Hill re-crossed the Guadiana.

30th May.—Rode to Almendralejo to get money, in which I failed,
and am again penniless! Colonel Waller slept. Maxwell returned
with me to dinner.

dist May.—Nicosunir passed through for General Hill. Supposed
to convey intelligence that Ballesteros had taken Soult’s military chest
containing contributions and money from France.

Ist June.—To-day exceedingly sultry.

end June.—In consequence of a report coming from General Slade
of a squadron of the Royals being attacked at Llera two leagues in
our front, we were ordered out with the 8rd Dragoon Guards to sup-
port them, and marched two leagues; but the enemy would not let us
get to him so that we returned in the evening to our quarters.

drd June-—Marched to Fuente del Maestro to be cantoned there—
got excellent quarters.

4th June—tThe first time in my life that the King’s birthday
(George III.) passed without some celebration. The Spaniards have it
I believe from good authority that Ballesteros has defeated Soult in a
general engagement. He is retiring from Seville.

5th June.—The heat very great, and sick list increasing.

6th June.—Still at Fuente del Maestro.

7th June.—Yead-quarters moved to this place. No confirmation
appears to be received of the news about Ballesteros.

Ballesteros had gained no success but on the contrary had been
defeated. “ Having obtained money and supplies from Gib-
raltar to replace the expenditure of his former expedition
against Seville, he marched with 8000 men against Conroux,
and that Frenchman, aware of his attention, induced him, by
an appearance of fear, to attack an entrenched camp in a
disorderly manner. On the Ist of June the battle took place,
and Conroux issuing forth unexpectedly killed or took 1500
Spaniards, and drove the rest to the hills, from whence they
retreated to San Roque. This defeat of Ballesteros at Bornoz,
enabled Soult to reinforce D’Hrlon, and caused the allies to
fall back gradually towards Albuera.” Napier, Vol. V
pp. 61 and 63,

of)

254, SWABEY DIARY.

Sth June.—Morillo and the Conde Penne Villamur advanced by -
Usagre to Maguilla and Llerena.

Ith June.—I read Spanish to-day and kept as much as possible
indoors, the heat being terribly oppressive.

10th June.—-Spent this day much the same as yesterday.

11th June.—Marched at 6 o’clock in the morning to Sancho Perez
by Los Santos, they are both very good towns. I rode from Sancho
Perez in the evening to the famous town of Zafra, the centre of trade
in these parts. When I mention trade I do not mean anything but
domestic trade; here are jewellers’ shops, and every article is to be
purchased. In the church at Zafva there is a very tolerable picture of
the crucifixion. The convent has been rendered fit for defence by the
French, probably against the Guerrillas, since it is pierced all round
with loop-holes for musquetry, if assailed by Gannon and regular troops
if must soon fall.

There is an order to-day, to register for each brigade a certain
number of Lemonade! (sic). These fellows are Galicians, and perhaps
the most extraordinary pedestrians in the world. From the rapidity
of their journeys we suspect them to be spies for which reason a certain
number are registered and allowed, all exceeding that number are taken
up.

12th June.—Marched at 3 o’clock in the morning for Bienvenida
where we learnt the unwelcome intelligence that General Slade and his
brigade, the Royals and the 8rd Dragoon Guards, had been beaten
by an inferior force of French Cavalry under Lallemand. The affair
took place on the banks of a ravine running between Maguilla and
Valencia de Torres and was principally owing to the following circum-
stances: the Conde de Penne and General Slade were to move in
concert on Azagua to drive in the French Cavalry; Lallemand was on
the road making a reconnaissance. General Slade’s advanced Squadron
charged by order; the enemy’s advance however did not wait to re-
ceive them, and in an unprecedented and shameful manner every man of
our brigade broke to pursue. Lallemand saw the confusion and im-
mediately came on with a small reserve when the consternation was
so general that our brigade did not rally as it ought to have done, but took
to its heels, and lost 164 in prisoners instead of annihilating the whole
of the French whom they nearly surprised for they found them on the
edge of a ravine which can only be passed by files. his is the first
instance of English cavalry being defeated. In consequence we re-
mained in harness all day and at 3 o’clock marched to Usagre where
we encamped in the open plain in the sun and remained all night.

[When I was with Sir Rowland Hill’s corps in the summer of 1812,
a Brigade of Cavalry commanded by Major-General Slade was very
much compromised with some French Dragoon Regiments at a spot
between Maguilla and Valencia de la Torres; their meeting was nearly

1 The word should probably be either Lamonados meaning inhabitants of a plain without stones,
essentially a Galician word, or Limonados used locally for bullock drivers.—F.A. 1,

SWABEY DIARY. 255

accidental, and both immediately forming charged. The result of the
onset was entirely in favour of the British, but the more cautious
Frenchmen had kept a squadron in reserve, whose aid not only
retrieved the fortune of the day, but turned the tables against the
seeming victors. Several prisoners were taken. I was sent the next
day with a light dragoon officer, who afterwards fell at Waterloo, to
enquire the fate of some of the parties, for this isolated affair had made
no change in the general disposition of either army. Not many days
before we had been driven out of the place whither we now repaired
with a flag of truce, and I was well-known amongst the inhabitants.
When we arrived at the outposts, handkerchiefs were tied over our
eyes, a ceremony which, though performed with the greatest civility,
was totally unnecessary on this occasion. We were carried to the
General Officer’s quarters, ascertained that all due care was taken of
some wounded men and officers, and set on foot their exchange which
was afterwards completed. By the time this was done it was nearly
sunset and we were persuaded to remained to dine and sleep. There
was nothing very extraordinary in this for there was always great
rivalry in generous civility between this part of the French army under
Count d’Hrlon, Drouet, and Sir Rowland Hill, and the exchange of
prisoners was carried on between these officers when it was not in any
other part of the Peninsula. But the circumstance gave me an oppor-
tunity of witnessing the different manner in which we and the French
comported ourselves towardsthe Spaniards. True it is that we did not
stand to them in the same relative position, but be that as it may, we
paid for all we wanted with the most scrupulous punctuality, were im-
posed upon and quietly submitted ; but what said my French General
when he sat down to dinner? He found fault with the quality of the
wine which I soon perceived was supplied by requisition on the Alcalde,
which righteous functionary was immediately apprised by an aide-de-
camp that the safest thing he could do would be to send some better, a
piece of advice with which he forthwith complied. A good under-
standing being thus restored, it was next proposed that messages should
be sent through the small town to propose a dance to its fair inhabitants,
this however was done not inthe form of an invitation but as a requisition.
The ladies came indeed but were grievously incensed, and for a long
time positively refused to dance with any but the two English officers.
This was a dilemma the probable consequences of which I did not like
much to think of, but firm they remained in their resolution, till at last
we persuaded an old lady to make a request. on our behalf that they
would comply, which some but not all of them did. They had possibly
nothing to fear from the French officers, but we were extremely glad to
get away at an early hour in the morning; the fair ladies themselves
probably experienced individually no ill treatment, yet I was told after-
wards when the place again fell into our hands, that the inhabitants
were ever after viewed with little favour. It was a place so unfortun-
ately situated that the slightest change of position laid it open to being
alternately occupied by either party, and I have no doubt that after a
time the inhabitants were as tired of the one as of the other, though
the ladies always exhibited a preference for us. |

256 SWABEY DIARY.

13th June.—Was ordered with two guns on picket duty on the road
from Usagre to Villa Garcia. General Long! took compassion and gave
me a dinner. A squadron of the 13th under Major Boyce went to
Maguilla and brought in 12 of the wounded of the heavy brigade
left there by the enemy. We took an aide-de-camp and the French
took two of our officers. Ferrier of the 3rd Dragoon Guards lost his
horse, and a man of his troop in the most noble manner gave him his,
saying “ your presence Captain is of more consequence than mine,” and
he was by that means able to ride off; the man was taken prisoner.
The Count d’Hrlon treated our people with the greatest kindness and
every assistance was given to the wounded; he gave the two officers
money, and they both are to be exchanged for the aide-de-camp.

14th June-—We marched to Bienvenida one of the best towns I have
entered, I was so pleased with the people in whose house I was, that I
stayed talking to them till 12 o’clock. he Spaniards keep very late
hours and always are gay in the evening, sleeping in the middle of the
day and rising very early.

15th June.—At 2 o'clock this morning I was turned out in conse-
quence of the Spanish cavalry falling back and retiring on us. Sir
W. Hrskine wanted to fight to-day with the enemy’s cavalry, but after
standing till 3 o’clock we were ordered to proceed to Los Santos,
where with much difficulty the 9th, 13th, ourselves and a brigade of
infantry gotin. Yesterday Strenowitz Sir William Erskine’s aide-de-
camp being out with 50 men on the same errand on which Major Boyce
went, fell in with 70 of the enemy’s cavalry and charged them with 15
men, therest beinginreserve. He gallantly putthem tothe rout, bringing
in 18 men and another of Lallemand’s aides-de-camp. Our men con-
sisting of the Royals and 3rd were glad to revenge themselves; one of
them left the ranks as on the former occasion, and Strenowitz cut him
down, or he might have been in the same scrape as Slade.

16th June.—The Enemy advanced by Villa Garcia.

17th June.—At Los Santos, the enemy still collecting in our front.

18th June.—Retired to Fuente del Maestro, the infantry having
already retired to the wood at Albuera. The inhabitants are every-
where employed in carrying their valuable effects to the houses that
are usually occupied by the French general officers where it is protected;
this circumstance proves, if any proof were wanting, the rapacity of
the French soldiery. I saw one woman carrying a door to a neigh-
bouring house fearing it might be taken for firewood.

At Fuente I had my old billet. The people were in great distress ;
they said they would not care what privations they endured, if we
would beat the enemy, but they are now certain of losing their harvest.
Though most reasonable accounts speak of the enemy’s having 3000.
cavalry and from 15,000 to 16,000 infantry, our force is nearly—

British infantry 5500 British cavalry 1500
Spanish infantry 3000 Spanish cavalry 500
Portuguese infantry 500 Portuguese cavalry 200

9000 2200

This perhaps will turn out incorrect.

1 Brigade-General R. B. Long commanded a brigade composed of the 9th and 13th Light Dra-
goons and the 2nd Hussars, K.G.L.

SWABEY DIARY. 257

The French force is composed of Soult’s and Drouet’s corps and
perhaps part of Suchet’s;! they are said to have a considerable quan-
tity of artillery. We have 4 brigades, Captain Maxwell’s 9 pounders,
our troop, and 2 Portuguese brigades with 2 Spanish guns.

L9th June—Marched at daylight through Azeuchal and encamped
at Corte de Pelas. The enemy still pressing on.

It seems probable the following occurrences took place while
Lieut. Swabey was with “ D” troop, we therefore insert the
account here.—/.A. W.

[I cannot tell whether all Military Doctors are the roguish fellows
that some I have met are, nor do I know whether it is a general practice
for soldiers to hold Courts Martial on each other; there are some
crimes however which they deem dishonourable ; biting for instance,
when a man ought to stand up in a ring for a fair fight like a Briton, and
the punishment of these by such sentences I have sometimes known
winked at, while such a Lynch law has not always been without its uses.
A fellow who used his teeth in this way was sentenced by his comrades
to lose four of his front ones, two above and two below, and the Farrier
who was not contemptible in the art of dentistry was to carry out
the decree. He however got shy and the Doctor was applied to, who
very improperly varied the sentence by taking all the teeth out in a
row from one jaw, a method which he said would render the culprit far
more powerless for mischief than if the offending teeth had been
extracted as it was proposed. The matter somehow was not known at
the time and the Doctor escaped the punishment he would infallibly
have met with had he been reported. The love of mischief is so great
in some cases that no fear of consequences seems sufficient to prevent
its indulgence.

I remember once when I was in the face of the enemy, and the Doctor
probably with the baggage, though he loved a skirmish next to extract-
ing a ball or amputating a limb, that I was so afflicted with the
toothache that I could not satisfactorily to myself perform my duty.
The son of Vulcan however was there, who certainly ought to rank
higher than the son of Aisculapius, so I called for his assistance, and
being laid on my back the offender was extracted, whether by hammer
and tongs or whether by the key instrument now long repudiated by all
skilful dentists I cannot tell, but the disease which was very likely
occasioned by a certain nervous irritation, which the smell of a French-
man might have occasioned in a person of extreme sensibility, was
removed, and “ Richard’s himself again.”’|

? For his successful campaign in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia in 1811, Suchet was created a
Marshal and duke of Albuféra.—F.4. 1.

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WITH THE MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES
OF FRANCE AND ITALY =e:

MAJOR H. C. C. D. SIMPSON, R.

Ta1s paper is an account of a visit I paid this last summer to the
French and Italian Alps, with a view if possible, of comparing the
merits of some Huropean Mountain Artilleries with our own.

By substituting Russia for France, and Great Britain for Italy, the
military problem in the N.W. of the Italian Peninsula is not altogether
unlike that in the N.W. of the Hindostan Peninsula.

The principal routes through the Alps on both French and Italian
frontiers are commanded by well armed hill forts. The French posi-
tions are artificially and naturally the stronger of the two Passes; and
whereas the passes from France all converge on one objective—Turin—
the routes from Italy to France lead to numerous and in many cases
unimportant points.

The slopes of the Alps are steeper and more abrupt on the Italian,
than on the French side. I proceeded first to Modane, and afterwards
to Oulx, Cesana and Bousson.! I received the greatest kindness and
civility from all the French and Italian Officers with whom I came in
contact, who assisted me in every way in the object of my trips.

My thanks are especially due to the Officer Commanding the 138th
(bis) French Alpine Group, and to the General Officer Commanding
the Ist Italian Army Corps, but for whom I should have seen nothing
in each case.

I wish some of my brother officers would also avail themselves of
any opportunity of seeing the Mountain Artilleries of other European
Powers. ‘Their fixed ideas like mine on these matters, would be rudely
shaken. I never saw a greater number of what to us, are golden rules
more violated, and yet withal such satisfactory results accrued from
the sacrilege.

FRENCH MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

On the Sth August at Modane, I obtained permission from the Officer
Commanding the III. (bis) Alpine Group there to attach myself for
two days to the Mountain Battery (the 16th Battery of 2nd Regiment
Artillery, Head-quarters Grenoble) of his Group.

1 All places in the neighbourhood of Mt, Cenis,
6. VoL. XX. 86

260 MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY.

ALPINE GROUP.

The other units of the Group consisted of the XIT. Regiment Chas-
seurs-i-pied (Alpine), and a detachment of Engineers, and Medical and
Veterinary sections.

There are 14 of these Groups at present on the strength of the
French Army, stationed on the Franco-Italian frontier, their duty being
in the Alps, to carry out that which in the plains is usually performed by
the Cavalry Division, the screening on mobilization of the main bodies
concentrating in rear, and in this case advancing by the main valleys
on Turin.

On the first day I inspected the camp and billets of the Battery,
together with the regimental transport of the Chasseurs.

APPEARANCE AND Dress or Mun.

The men of the Battery were housed in one long building, the floor of
which was thickly covered with straw and actedasabed. They seemed
according to their ideas comfortable and contented. They are a fine
body of men, physique quite as good as our Mountain Gunners, the
majority of them mountaineers selected with great care. Their uni-
form is a sort of loose serge stable jacket, blue with red piping, a
light blue cummerbund, khaki trousers, dark blue putties, ankle boots
and beret cap (a cap resembling a Tam o’Shanter).

Orrtcers’ Dress.

_ The Officers wear the usual French artillery dolman, breeches cut
like our Mountain Battery pattern, boots ankle, and gaiters of black
leather, the latter shaped to the leg and fastened with laces, and hunting
spurs, the ordinary sword belt, but on the hillsides sword attached to
the saddle, short alpen-stock (like an ordinary stout walking stick with
long spike) carried in the hand, beret cap with gold grenade on left side,
and binoculars and aneroid (for ascertaining heights) slung over the
shoulder.

Camp.

_ The mules were picketted in rear of the guns, which with the ammu-
nition boxes are always packed at close interval. They were a very
strong-and level lot averaging I should say about 15 hands with propor-
tionate girth measurement. The government price varied from £35 to
£40 IT wasinformed. The Battery mules were picketted by means of the
head chain attached to a broad stout leather throat lash, the other end
of chain being attached to a long picketting rope, to which the whole
of the mules of one section were attached.

ANIMALS.

The regimental transport mules of the Chasseurs were on the other
hand picketted like our Battery mules, by the fore-foot picketting
arrangement, which everyone seemed to prefer for mules. Unlike the
Ttalian Mountain Artillery which is formed into a distinct regiment the
French Mountain Batteries are attached for administration purposes
half to each of two regiments of field artillery. The tendency is
therefore to assimilate them as closely as possible to all field

MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE. AND - ITALY. 261

artillery arrangements and methods, whether always suitable or other-
wise. The above was an example of ‘ otherwise” they considered. I
saw no signs of galls, although the Battery had been undergoing some
rough work and long marches for six weeks.

The officers’ and mounted men’s cobs are the most serviceable chargers
for warfare of a mountainous or irregular nature I have seen-and much
superior to any in our. Mountain Batteries whether in India or at. home.

SADDLERY.

The pack-saddlery is very roughly finished and dirty, somewhat re-
sembling that of hired transport mules in India in condition. The
pads are serge-lined, stuffed with horse-hair.. A leather lining instead
of serge was being experimented with. There are practically only
three different pattern cradles in the Battery. One for the gun and
wheel mules, one for the carriage mule, and a third for the ammunition
mule, slightly modified for baggage, &c. The side pieces, front to
rear arches are deeper and are continued right down to the bottom of
the pads, making the cradle much heavier, but doubtless necessary as
the loads are heavier than in our Mountain Batteriés.

The girth is a single broad leather band passing under the stomach
—not girth-—and fastened to metre straps on either side like our body
rollers with a strip of raw hide to a D on either side with a Hungarian
knot. ‘The breast pieces and breechings are similar in pattern to ours,
but there are no adjusting chains, and the supporting strap breast-piece
is attached to D’son either side of front arch of cradle. All top-loaded
mules have a crupper pad provided. The saddles were stacked under
tarpaulins in rear of the mules as with us. Blinkers are worn on head
collar. Riding saddles were of good pattern and clean.

Forace AND STABLE MANAGEMENT.

The forage was good and ration plentiful, similar in quantity to our
home ration for 15 hand mules. The mules were clipped and manes
hogged, forelocks left and tails not squared. They wereallshod. They
appeared quiet and well-broken, but were badly groomed. In fact the
grooming at stable hour both with French and Italian drivers was for
slackness and want of elbow grease quite on a par with that of the very

_worst native driver I have ever seen. And yet the animals were un-
doubtedly in good condition.

Gun Park AND AMMUNITION.

The 6 guns and their ammunition boxes, entrenching tools, &c., con-
stituting the Gun Park were neatly stacked but no tarpaulins are
provided for it. The gun is a 12-pr. B.L. on the De Bange principle
weighing 220 lbs., muzzle velocity 842 f.s., 8-149” calibre. Height
of axis of trunnions from ground about 24 ft. when mounted. The
carriage is divided into two portions at the trail to permit of high-angle
firmg. A pair of detachable folding-up shaftsis provided. The weight
of the carriage is about 405 lbs. including wheels. The ammunition
boxes are of wood and contain each, 7 shrapnel shell, a projectile
weighing with fuze, which is always fixed, but without detonator about
133 lbs. When necessary a melinite shell of weight slightly less than

262 MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY.

the shrapnel is carried in “ first boxes.” There are 8 cartridges each
of 170 grammes of smokeless powder and 10 grammes as primer of
black powder, and 10 friction tubes. Highty-four rounds per sub-divi-
sion are carried by six mules.

There are 3 sets of wooden racks (1 per section) containing entrench-
ing tools. ‘he racks are as heavy and cumbersome as those just
rejected by us in our Batteries in India in favour of the leather rack.

Fizup Day.

On the 6th I accompanied the Battery in a reconnaissance made by
the Group on the Col de Frejus to Croin near the Italian Frontier.
The troops marched off uf 5 a.m. The order of march of a Group is
somewhat as under :—

Point—+# section.

From 150 to 160 yards in rear
2 section.
Aaland ‘Erend Wate nmaent of Sappers.
Guar °ac- (2 Engineer mules with tools, dynamite, &c.
1 Company.
, From 150 yards to 800 yards in rear

Mai 3 sections (throws out also a few flanking files).
B AV. 1 mule with cacolet.
°°Y* (8 mules with tools.

From 500 yards to 3000 yards in rear

(1 Company.

! 2 mules with entrenching tools.
Main It Company.
Body. 1 6 Batterie de Combat” (i.e. fighting line of Mountain
| Battery).
L3 Companies less ¢ section for rear-guard.

Baggage preceded by remaining Battery mules, 100 yards
in rear.

Rear Guard—ti section.
This order of march was not strictly observed on day in question.

The ascent from Modane (3575 ft.) to Croin (8350 ft.) was a steady
grind the whole way but not a difficult path for a Battery. The men
all wore knapsacks and carried sling carbines and a portion of tente
@abris. In one hand they carried a short alpen-stock. An August
sun in South Hastern France is sufficiently trying, but neither men, nor
mules for whom there is no relief appeared unduly fatigued on return
to Camp at 4 p.m. after only a lengthened halt of two hours from 11 to
1 when breakfasts were eaten, and mules unsaddled and fed.

In all reconnaissances only that portion of the Battery styled the
“ Batterie de Combat” corresponding to our “ gun or fighting line ”
takes a part. It consists of 31 mules made up as follows:

To each sub-division 4 mules in the following order in “ Column of
route.”

MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY. 263

Carriage mule, carrying the body of the carriage which includes axle
and elevating gear permanently fixed, drag ropes and
on the cradle near side in sling a lantern.

Wheels mule, carrying the wheels, the trail portion, a pair of folding
shafts on top of trail. A carriage bearer across the
cradle supports the wheels. ‘T'his load necessitates a
certain amount of lashing and a very awkward one,
especially when moving through a woody country.

Gun mule, carrying the gun with breech and muzzle caps and lifter,
a leather wallet containing small gun stores and a
slung case shot.

Ammunition mule, carrying two wooden boxes of ammunition (con-
tents already given).

One mule per section carries entrenching tools.

One mule per section, spare, bare-backed.

One mule per Battery, cacolet.

All mules carry their own stable gear and nose bags, and the blanket

is under the saddle. All the loads seemed to have alot of unnecessary
lashing about them.

DRaAvuGuHt.

I was anxious to know the French opinion on the subject of draught
in Mountain Batteries. I was informed that draught was required only
as a relief when marching on the highroads, where from no variety in
the “ going,” and the hardness and dust of the highway, men and mules
suffered considerably more from blistered feet and galls respectively, than
in the mountains. It also enabled them when making forced marches
in the plains to carry the mens’ packs on the unladen mules. Their
draught system consists of a pair of shafts one end of which is attached
to the trail, the other end (points of shafts) being attached to the gun
mule with the carriage mule hooked on in front of the former, tandem
fashion. Then follows the ammunition mule carrying the boxes, and
in rear again, the wheel mule laden if ordered with the mens’ knap-
sacks, otherwise without load. In action, at drill—which took 2
minutes to come into—the guns were at 7 metres distance from trail
to trail, and 15 metres in rear were the first pair of ammunition
boxes per sub-division on the ground, and one metre in front of the
ammunition mules, the remaining mules of each sub-division were in
column in rear of the ammunition mule. The detachment consisted
of 1 “Chef de piece””—Gun Captain—and six gunners, one of whom
is the layer selected after a 8 months’ course and wearing a red
grenade on the left arm.

Fire Discreiine.

The fire discipline is that laid down for the field artillery and not
nearly as thorough as our own. Their rates of fire vary from one round
a minute slow fire to ten or twelve rounds a minute quick fire. The
number of rounds per minute is given by the Battery Commander as a
rule. Sometimes when firing with indirect laying if the Commander
wishes to assure himself that the direction is correct he orders a gun to
fire with time fuze set to 7th second longer than is correct for the

264: MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY.

range. ‘The other guns loaded with percussion shrapnel lay on the
burst of the shell fired with time fuze.

Words of command were rarely used, everything in routine, being
carried out by the blast of the Battery Commander’s whistle when not
actually manoeuvring or fighting the Battery in action.

The detachments both in French and Italian Mountain Batteries with
the exception of layer, who alone kneels, work standing.

What struck me as much as anything was the small amount of
ammunition carried by the Battery, that is 14 rounds per gun with the
“fighting line” as against our 32 rounds per gun. Their idea is that
in mountain or irregular warfare of any kind, the amount of ammunition
required, compared to that for warfare of the plains is as 2: 1.

There are 14 Batteries in the Alps, 8 in Algeria and 2 in Tonkin.

The war strength of a Battery in the Alps is 4 officers, 156 N.-C.0’s
and men, 34 horses and 60 mules. In the Batteries in Algeria there
are 82 more men and 73 more animals. The 34 horses of the Batteries
in the Alps are partially for the carts which convey along the high
road the baggage, rations &c. of the battery, and for mounting a few
mounted N.-C.0’s. The trumpeters are however not mounted, the
farrier acting as mounted orderly when required to the Battery Com-
mander. In the mountains neither officers nor mounted men are
mounted as a rule, their horses being led in rear.’

The Battery worked well on the hillside but very slowly in handling
the loads and coming into action, much behind the Italians in this re-
spect. Drag ropes were put on the top loads by the detachment on
ground where it seemed to me quite unnecessary to use them.

When the Battery returned to camp, saddles were taken off at once
instead of as with us being left on for at least 2 hour. I saw several
stomach swellings from the girth being placed so far back. One officer
superintended the stacking of the saddles and another the stable duties
which were of a very light order.

I was told that with four field days like this at least, every week,
there was no time to devote to long stable or harness cleaning duties,
and that the mules and harness were cared for in the same manner as
they are in Commerce in France.

With the exception of the Batteries in Algeria against their old foes
the Kabyles, and the Batteries in Tonkin, in fighting somewhat similar
to our experiences in Burmah, the French Mountain Artillery of the
Alps has not yet had the benefit of war experience.

A new edition of the French Manual of Mountain Artillery deals very
fully with the subject; it is published in two volumes, the first of which
is just issued, and the second, dealing with the organisation and tactics
of Mountain Artillery, is expected in the autumn.

ITALIAN MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

On August 10th and 11th I was permitted to attend the practice of
the 7, 8 and 9 Batteries of Mountain Artillery, on the mountains be-
tween Bousson and the Franco-Italian Frontier. These three Batteries
formed a Brigade-division under the command of a Major, and at the
time of my visit were being inspected by the Lieut.-Colonel in command

MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY. 265

of the Regiment of Mountain Artillery, head-quarters Turin.

The Batteries, which had no reservists present, varied slightly in
strength but averaged about 100 rank and file and 50 mules. All the
9 regular Mountain Batteries have 6 guns on the peace establishment.
The two transformable Batteries have only 4.

The physique of the men was extremely fine; their average height was
at least 5’ 9”, and they were, almost without exception, powerfully
built. They wore loose cloth tunics, khaki trousers, and Alpine boots,
and were invariably in complete marching order (knapsack, havresack,
water-bottle, &c.), throughout the operations. The only weapon
carried by the men was the short artillery sword resembling that of a
drummer. 24 men per Battery carry a carbine. Under officers carry
a long artillery sword and revolver.

The most distinctive feature in their equipment was the aforesaid
“Alpine boot,” which resembles a short, heavily-nailed “ Field ”? boot!
and laces in front up to about 8” above the ankle. Similar boots were
very generally worn by the inhabitants of the district, and officers and
men alike declared that, if well made and fitting tightly round the
ankle, it was the best form of foot-gear for mountain work.

The practice took place among the highest ridges between Mont
Chaberton and Pointe Rascia, and involved each day a climb of over
3000 feet from Bousson. Both men and mules however stood the work
admirably and there were absolutely no signs of distress. As an in-
stance of the physical power of the gunners I may mention that, on the
second day’s practice, a Battery having taken up its preparatory posi-
tion at the foot of a knifelike ridge, on the top of which it was coming
into action, it was found that the slope was in places too steep and
narrow to allow of the guns and carriages being carried into position
by three men to each load, as is usually done. Wherever this was the
case the gun was promptly shouldered by one man and the trail by
another and so carried into action 20 or 30 feet up a steep slope. Each
of these loads weighed over 200 pounds, and was carried by a man in
fuli marching order who had just climbed over 3000 feet in two hours.

The mules were of an extremely fine stamp, many over 15 hands high
and in excellent condition. ‘The saddlery was in serviceable order
though with no attempt at polish of any sort. Four mules go to make
up a gun-team, and march in the following order and with the following
loads.

(1) Gun-carriage.

(2) Gun.

(3) ‘Two wheels, a pair of shafts,? and a box containing gun im-
plements and small stores.

(4) Two wooden boxes of ammunition, ten rounds in each.

The remaining ammunition mules march in rear of the six gun-teams,
each mule carrying 20 rounds.’

1 It is very similar in pattern to that worn by officers of some of our Mountain Batterics in the
Afghan War.

2 A very awkward and unnecessary load projecting over the mule’s back.

® Constituting the “ammunition line” as in our Batteries; there was no “relief line” of mules,
nor did it appear necessary.

266 MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY,

Two sorts of saddles are used, one with an iron cradle on the top,
carried by the first three mules of the gun-team as above described, and
the other, without the cradle, adapted for slinging the ammunition
boxes.!' ‘The panels are stuffed with straw, with a layer of horse-hair
next the mule’s back ; split leather girths are used and are generally,
to Hnglish eyes, too far back under the stomach. ‘he gun isa 7com.
(24") bronze breech-loader by Krupp. Weight 214 lbs. Length 39”,
Muzzle velocity 840f.s. Weight of shrapnel 93 lbs. Charge 104 ozs.
The fuze is a combined time and percussion and is always carried in
the shell, the detonator being carried separately and fixed in the fuze
when the gun is loaded.
sae average weight carried per mule throughout the Battery is
O74: Ss.

Shrapnel is almost exclusively used, with percussion fuze for ranging
and time fuze for subsequent effect. The number of rounds carried in
the “fiehting line” of the Battery is 14 common, 56 shrapnel, and 4
case shot per Sub-division.

Owing to the low muzzle velocity of the gun, it is necessary to burst
the shell close up to the target, otherwise the effect is lost.

The bronze guns are considered to be fairly good weapons when new,
but are said to wear out rapidly. The fuzesalso are said to deteriorate
considerably after being some time in store. In the batteries now de-
scribed both guns and fuzes were old, which may to some extent account
for the inferior practice made by them. I was told that experiments
were being made with a new gun (Nordenfeldt) and that its adoption
was shortly expected.

Hach Battery had a range-finder, somewhat similar in principle to,
but rather more elaborate than, the Weldon instrument. They were
however seldom used, as the ground on which the Batteries came into
action rarely allowed of a sufficiently long or level base being obtained.
There were no men specially classed as range-finders, and on the only
occasion on which I saw the instrument used the Battery Commander
himself took the range with an error of 600 yards.

An Italian Mountain Battery on service is divided into three
units: Ist the “ Battery of Manceuvre” (referred to above as “ fight-
ing line”’) of 6 guns, and 74 rounds of ammunition per gun, &c.,
carried on 4 ammunition mules odd sub-divisions, 3 ammunition mules
even sub-divisions; 2nd “ammunition column” of 33 mules carrying
amongst other stores, 60 rounds of ammunition per gun; 8rd “ section
of Park,” of 52 mules carrying 150 rounds per gun, 126,400 rounds of
small gun ammunition and 1080 rounds of revolver ammunition.

In action the latter is always left on a carriage road, and a mile or
two in rear of the Battery. The “ Battery of manceuvre” in action
has 6 ammunition mules close to the guns, and the remainder 50 to
100 yards in rear. The “ammunition column”’ if with the “ Battery
of manceuvre”’ forms a second échelon 500 yards in rear of the guns.

When on the march and changing camp every day, the mules are
picketted ina circle, by simply fastening each animal’s collar chain to

1 The principle of having only one saddle adapted for the carriage of either gun, carriages and
wheels appears an adyantage over our system of a different pattern cradle for each nature of load.

MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY. 267

the head-collar of the animal on its right, so as to leave about 18” be-
tween their heads. By this method they are of course prevented from
lying down at night, but this is not considered much of a disadvantage;
at least, not so much so as to counterbalance the saving of weight in
picketting-gear, &e. When however a Battery was stationary for some
days the Commanding Officer made arrangements to picket the animals
separately.!

Officers and men slept in tents, those of the men being carried on
their backs and those of the officers on two mules allowed to each
Battery for officers’ baggage. The poles of the mens’ tents, both in the
mountain artillery and Alpini, are not jointed but are in one piece and
are used as alpen-stocks.

The practice was conducted under service conditions, and the nature
and position of the targets (which were placed by the Major command-
ing the Brigade-division) were unknown to the Battery Commanders.
On arriving near the place where it was to come into action, the battery
was halted and the Commander called up by the Major, who pointed
out the target and indicated the position for the Battery. The Battery
Commander then took up his preparatory position, as near as possible
and under cover, and pointed out the target to the officers and Nos. |
(who are invariably the gun-layers) during which the Battery came into
action and loaded. ‘he guns were then run up by hand or by the
shafts to the firing position ; the whole system in fact closely resembling
our own. After each practice, the officers and N.-C. officers were
called up by the Lieut.-Colonel. The Battery Commander then de-
scribed his performance in detail, giving his reasons for each step.
The N.-C.O.’s then withdrew and the Major criticised or commended,
as the case might be, and finally the Colonel criticised both the Major’s
remarks and the Battery Commander’s action.

In addition to the above, range reports (of which I was unable to
obtain a copy) were made out, both by the Battery and the range party,
but these, 1 was informed, were intended chiefly for the information of
higher authority.

An observer was always employed to assist the Battery Commander.
He was placed about 20 to 50 yards to a flank, and considerable reliance
(which was not always justified) seemed to be placed on his reports.

PRACTICE.

The first practice witnessed was that of the 7th Battery on August
10th. The target, about twenty full-length wooden dummies, repre-
sented a section of infantry in line at about one yard interval. The
range was rather over 1000 yards, light good, and observation easy.

On coming into action (with percussion shrapnel) the right, centre,
and left sections laid with elevations of 1000, 1200, and 1400 metres
respectively, and fired rapidly from the right. One shot from the
centre section gave a direct hit and time shrapnel was at once pro-
ceeded with, without any further verification. About 18 rounds were
fired with considerable rapidity, which were all too long and burst much
too high, but no attempt to alter the fuze was made.

The 8th Battery practised next, at a similar target but at rather a

1 By passing head-chains along a long picketting rope, somewhat similar to our method for horses,

268 MOUNTAIN ARTILLERIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY.

longer range. The procedure in this case was different, and elevation
given for each gun separately, as with us. A good bracket, of 200
metres, was obtained with the first two shots, but the third shot (laid
on the mean of the bracket) which was palpably long, was reported by
the observerasa hit. Time shrapnel was at once commenced at that
range, without verification, and twelve were fired which were all long
though the fuze was reduced twice.

The 7th Battery then fired again, the target representing two guns
inaction. Petards, intended to represent the enemy’s fire, were let off
at intervals by the range party, but being placed too much to leeward
of the line of fire, they did not obstruct view or observation. In this
case the range-finder could be used, and the range, as found therewith,
was 2600 metres. Fire was opened with this elevation but the first two
shots could not be seen. The range party was then communicated with
by signalling and reported that both shots had fallen in a valley, far
beyond the target. A bracket was finally obtained after several shots
at about 1800 metres. ‘The time shrapnel was however ineffective.

On the second day the practice at a moving target was good. Generally
speaking there seemed to be a knowledge of the rules of fire discipline
in each Battery, but there seemed to be an invincible repugnance to
putting them into practice. This was the more curious as the allow-
ance of practice ammunition (400 rounds per Battery per annum) was
quite sufficient to have allowed of a high standard of efficiency being
attained. ‘The tactical ideas throughout were sound.

Comparing the Batteries generally with our Mountain Batteries, I
think they cannot be classed in any way as equalling our own in equip-
ment, smartness of turn out, rapidity of drill, or artillery knowledge
generally, but from being born and bred mountaineers, they excel in
hill climbing and capability for lifting heavy weights over our men.
The weights carried by the mules exceed those carried in India by our
Batteries with the smaller mules. The ground in the Alps was quite
as difficult as those portions of the Himalayas in which our Batteries
are accustomed to work.

The drivers are all the older soldiers who have gone through the
gunners training in a previous year.

“Gun” and “ammunition” lines attend all parades.

There are no separate mules for the carriage of pioneer tools as with
the French and our Mountain Artillery, the necessary entrenching tools
being divided amongst the mules generally, excluding gun mules. The
detachment consisted of 7 men who brought the gun into action in
45 seconds.

Only the officers are mounted, and they rarely use their chargers on
the hillside.

The saddlery and turn out generally resembled much in detail that of
the French described herewith, and one must have copied much from
the other it would appear.

The October number of the journal of the “‘ United Service Institu-
tion ” gives a very interesting description of the action of the 2 Italian
Mountain Batteries (native) in the engagement at Agordat. The guns
were too weak to be of much use, and were kept in action too long,
whereby they were temporarily taken by the enemy after all the mules
had been shot.

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE,

MAJOR P. A. MACMAHON, R.A., F.R.S.

(A Lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, 7th February, 1895.)

Cotonen C. Trencnu, R.A., In THE CHAIR.

Tue Cuarrman—Major MacMahon is kind enough to give us a lecture
to-night ; itis not necessary for me to introduce him to you (applause).

Masor P. A. MacManoy, F.R.S.—Colonel Trench and gentlemen,
the reason why I undertook this short investigation into Terrestrial Re-
fraction was that a number of inquiries had reached me in regard to the
effect which terrestrial refraction might have upon artillery fire. I
think, on the whole, the result of the investigation is to show that the
facts which are available are of a distinctly reassuring character and
this I hope will appear as I proceed.

For the benefit of those who are not very familiar with the subject I will
give a short definition of refraction. When a ray of light passes from
point to point of a medium which is everywhere similarly constituted
its path is a straight line; but if it passes from one medium to another
which is differently constituted or is of a different nature, then,
in general, the ray of ght will be bent at the surface common to the
two media; and this bending is termed the refraction of light. There are
many familiar examples; one of the most familiar is the bent appearance
of an oar in water. If we take the common surface of air and water we
have a ray of light, which is incident at a certain angle to the normal
entering the water and passing through it closer to the normal,
—it, in fact, approaches the normal on entering the water. If we have
a rod (see Fig. 1) placed in the water the lower portion of the rod H is

Fie. 1.

SS = ae =
seen by the eye placed at C' by the path CD, DH, there being a bending

6, VOL, XXII,

270 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

at the point D and the point H is in fact seen by the eye at C in
the direction CD in which the ray enters the eye ; it thus appears in
the position H,. On the whole the rod appears bent into the form
KH). The property possessed by different media, which causes the
tay to be bent in passing from one medium to another, is termed
the refractive power of the medium, and in passing from one medium
to another whose refractive power or refractive index is greater
the bending of the ray is always towards the normal; but in passing
from one medium to another which is less refracting, the bending
of the ray is always away from the normal. In particular if a ray
passes from a vacuum into air of a certain density then the ray is bent
towards the normal, and is thus bent to an extent which depends upon
the density of the air; and if a ray passes from air of one density to air
of greater density then again the bending is towards the normal, where-
as if the path of the ray is from air of a certain density to air of less
density, then the bending of the ray is away from the normal. It
happens that the earth is surrounded by a spherical envelope of air
which is not all of the same density. There are two principal causes
which militate against the uniform density of this air; one is barometric
pressure and the other is temperature ; there are other possible causes
that we will touch upon later. The barometric pressure diminishes
from the surface of the earth upwards, and if the question of tempera-
ture did not enter at all, there would be a gradual diminution of the
density of the air from the surface of the earth upwards. Asa matter
of fact the temperature largely modifies the state of the air in many
cases. As a general rule—thatis to say under normal circumstances—
the temperature diminishes as we rise from the surface of the earth and
this has the effect, to a certain extent, of diminishing the variation in
density, but it has nota sufficiently counteracting effect to cause the
density to be anything like uniform. The density of a given volume
of air depends upon the pressure to which it is subjected and upon its
temperature, and any work on heat shows how the density may be de-
termined when once the pressure and the temperature are known. The
refractive power of the air, or the refractive index, can be shown to be
sensibly proportional to the excess of the number expressing its density
over unity; if the letter p represent the density of air, the refractive
power can be shown to be proportional to p—1.

We may consider the air to be stratified in horizontal layers; it is in
reality, of course, stratified in spherical layers, but it will suffice for our
present purpose to consider it to be stratified in horizontal layers, be-
cause the sphericity of the earth is not at all the principal cause of the
terrestrial refraction ; terrestrial refraction would still exist if the earth
had no sphericity, or if its surface were perfectly plane. What we may
regard as being the normal state of the atmosphere in Great Britain is
a gradual diminution of temperature upwards at the rate of about
34> degree Fahr. per foot, and under those circumstances the density of
the air gradually diminishes as we rise from the surface of the earth.
The diagram (Fig. 2) may represent, roughly, by the closeness of the
lines which indicate density, the normal state of the atmosphere.
When a ray of light passes from one point of such an atmosphere to

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 271

another point, horizontally distant from it, it takes a curved path as
Fie. 2.

shown, much exaggerated, in the figure. The reason is this: suppos-
inga ray of light to pass ina slightly oblique direction from this point,
it 1s passing from dense air to air which is less dense, and accordingly
the ray is bent away from the normal up to a certain point, and then on
the downward path when the passage is from a less dense to a more dense
air the ray is bent towards the normal; and that brings it down as shown.
The ray does not take a path similar to that of a straight line bent intoa
number of angles, but it takes a curvilinear path corresponding io the
continuous change in the density of the medium. It may also be viewed
in another manner by having regard to the velocity of light, and to the
circumstance that light usually travels in the path that it can accomp-
lish in the least time. In certain cases light travels in the path that it
would take the longest time to traverse, 7.e. in the maximum time path ;
but those cases do not occur in this particular portion of the subject.
In terrestrial refraction light travels in the minimum path, and time is
saved in passing from one point to another by curving up into
strata of air through which it can pass with greater velocity—the
velocity of air being greater in the less dense medium. Accordingly
the time of description of this curvilinear path may be and is in fact less
than the time that it would take to accomplish the straight path. It
will be observed in this case that the path of the ray is curved with the
concavity of the ray towards the denser layers, and that is a general
principle in this subject. When a ray takes a curvilinear path the
concavity is always presented towards the denser side. There is also
another principle which guides us, and that is that the amount of cur-
vature of the ray, as measured by the change of direction for a given
length of ray, is directly proportional to the rate at which the density
of the air changes along the normal. or instance supposing a vertical
ray coming down through the strata, the normal is horizontal and there
is no change of density horizontally ; accordingly there will be no cur-
vature, and the ray will pass in a straight line. But if we take a ray,
the general direction of which is horizontal, the normal is very nearly
vertical, and that is the direction alone which there is the maximum
rate of change of density ; and accordingly we get the maximum degree
of curvature. We get the minimum curvature for vertical rays, the
maximum curvature for horizontal rays, and intermediate amounts of
curvature for oblique rays.

The way that the refraction is found is as follows: supposing Fig. 3
to represent the earth, and A and B to represent two places on the sur-
face of the earth, and 4 B a straight line joining them, then A P B will

272 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

be the path of the ray of light passing from A to B. A T'and B Tare
Fie. 3.

Refraction =} (180°+ Z ACB—ZZAT— Z Z'BT)

K ZACB
Mean value of K for Great Britain = :078
Minimum valuein summer ,., =:05
Maximum value in winter coo | SS ONS

tangents to this curve at A and B respectively ; ZAC and Z' BC are
the verticals at the two places. The point B, as seen by the eye at A,
is seen in the direction of the tangent of the curved ray A PB at A—
that is to say, in the direction A 7, the point B appears in the direction
AT. The angle 7A B, the angle between the true direction and the
apparent direction, is termed the refraction or the angle of refraction ;
similarly the angle 7’B A would be termed the refraction or the angle
of refraction from Bto 4. Theangles ZA and Z'B 7 are the apparent
zenith distances of Band A from A and B respectively. In order to
determine this angle of refraction at the point A the apparent zenith
distance of the point B is taken; that is to say, Z being the zenith at
A,the angle ZA T' is measured by an astronomical instrument; the
angle Z' B Tis also measured, and then by a formula, which is attached
to the figure, the refraction is computed. We merely wanta knowledge
of those two zenith distances and of the angle subtended by the line
AB atthe centre of the earth in order to express this angle of refraction.

This angle of refraction is found, as the result of a great many ex-
periments, to be expressible as a simple multiple of this angle 4C B;
that is to say of the arc between the points 4 and B; we may represent
the refraction as K times the angle 4C B. This coefficient, which
multiplies the angle 4 CB, has in Great Britain a mean value of 078
which is very nearly +5; it has a minimum value in summer of about
zy, and a maximum value in winter of about 35. According to one
authority, exceptionally in Great Britain, this coefficient may be as large
as 4; thatis to say the refraction may, exceptionally, be half as large
as the arc between the two points. Taking a mean value of the co-
efficient K say z's, this means that the curvature of the ray of hight
between the points 4 and B is only about 3% or from 3% to +; of the
curvature of the earth. This fact may also be expressed by saying
that the curved ray isa portion of a circle whose radius is 54 or 64
times the radius of the earth. Its effect in the normal /atmosphere
in Great Britain is very small.

I propose now to examine into the effect this refraction would be
likely to have upon artillery fire. A mile on the earth’s surface subtends
at the centre of the earth an angle of about 52”. Accordingly, per
mile, the refraction will have a mean value of about 4", a minimum

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. DS

value of about 24", and a maximum value of about 8”; and taking a
range of 3 miles these values of the refraction would become 12", about
8, and abont 24" respectively ; and very exceptionally the refraction
would amount to about 1’ 18". The meaning of this is that if we had
a range of 3 miles (we will take the exceptional case of refraction of
1’ 18") and if we were to lay tangent sights upon an object at that
distance, a straight line joining the sights would not pass through the
point aimed at but would have to be depressed through an angle of
1’ 18" in order to do so. The curvature of the ray in fact would result
in the straight line joining the sights passing over the object, and we
would have to depress the gun in order to counteract the effect of re-
fraction. As this correction only amounts to lL’ 18” it is not a matter
of great importance.

There is of course another question besides that of laying a gun by
means of tangent sights upon an object; I refer to the use of the de-
pression range-finder. If we take the range of an object by means of
this instrument the result will be that the apparent angle of depression
will be less than the real angle of depression, and accordingly the de-
pression range-finder would lead to a slight over estimation of the
range, and the range as found would have to be diminished in order to
get the true range. Of course in the present case with which we are
concerned, namely a range of three miles with 1’ 18" of refraction, that
would not be a matter of great importance; but if it were necessary
absolutely to eliminate refraction for all practical purposes (and it might
be necessary out of Great Britain in tropical climates where the refrac
tion was very much greater than that I have specified) the
proper plan would seem “to be to employ not a vertical base range-
finder, but one with a horizontal base, because lateral refraction | 18
almost non- existent ; there are one or two examples of lateral refraction
that I will mention presently, but itis almost non-existent. If we were
to take our range by means of an horizontal base range-finder, and
then to lay the gun not by means of tangent sights but by means of
straight-edged sights and quadrant elevation, then, for all practical
purposes, we would I think eliminate refraction even if the refraction
were very much greater than in any case have mentioned ; and it is
for that reason that I do not think this subject of refraction need cause
us very much apprehension. ‘The general effect of refraction in Great
Britain is to cause a slight over estimation of the range, and, in the case
of taking the angle of elevation of the object, is to cause the object to
appear rather higher than it really is; but that is not a matter which
very much affects us in artillery fire.

One effect of refraction which I will just mention (it does not concern
us in artillery fire) is the recession of the visible horizon. Taking a
point 4 on the surface of the earth (see Fig. 4) just outside the surface,

Fie. 4.

274 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

the real horizon is found by drawing a tangent to the surface, which
would be in fact to the point P, but by reason of the curvature of the
ray with the concavity presented downwards the point Q appears
upon the horizon and very often the horizon in this way recedes 10, 15
or 20 miles and even more.

I now come to other cases that may present themsclves in the density
of the air. The case that we have considered already is that in which
there is a diminution of temperature upwards at the rate of 345 degree
Fahr. for every foot of ascent. In Great Britain the diminution is very
seldom more than about 45 degree or less than 4, degree Fahr.,
but in other climates it is different. If the temperature were to fall at
a more rapid rate, the air would be very much more nearly of uniform
density, and that would result in a smaller curvature of the ray. If
the fall were at the rate of about 345 degree Fahr. for every foot of
ascent, it would result in the density of the air being uniform, and there
would be no terrestrial refraction at all. This state of the atmosphere
we might represent by lines drawn at equal distances apart. A more
rapid fall of temperature still would cause arise of air density upwards,
and that would cause a curved ray with the concavity presented upwards
as shewn in Fig.5. In sucha case, where the density increases upwards

Fre. 5. .

and the concavity is presented upwards, the refraction is said to be
negative, whereas in the case that we had formerly the refraction is
said to be positive. On the other hand a rise of temperature upwards
causes a rapid diminution in air density in ascending, and this causes
the ray with the concavity presented downwards to be more curved
and, in the extreme case in which the rise of temperature upwards is at
the rate of z'5 degree Wahr. for every foot the curvature of the ray would
be the same as that of the earth, and in that case (which of course would
never actually present itself) we would be able to see completely round
the globe simply because the ray would encircle it.

Again climatic conditions may lead to another distribution of the
density. We might get a gradual rise in density upwards to a certain
stratum of maximum density and then a diminution of density upwards;
in which case you might represent the state of the atmosphere as in
Fig. 6, then the ray of light would pass in a curious sinuous path with

Fria. 6.

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 275

the concavities. presented towards the denser layers.

Some of these cases of extraordinary refraction appear when we
come to study terrestrial refraction in the plains of India. I have taken
a great deal of pains to obtain correct information in regard to this
matter. I have been in communication, written and verbal, with
General J. T. Walker, R.E., lately Superintendent of the Great Trigo-
nometrical Survey of India, who has given me much information
which I have drawn upon for this lecture in case ib might be useful to
those serving in India. I have also had assistance from General
Tennant, R.H., who was employed for many years on the Great Trigo-
nometrical Survey of India. He has written me some interesting
letters giving me his experience of refraction both vertical and lateral.

General Walker carried out some experiments in India in the Plains
of the Punjab for the express purpose of determining the extent of terre-
strial refraction. He selected stations from about 9 to 13 miles apart ;
at those stations he erected towers, and on the towers he placed the
theodolites and heliostats, he determined the zenith distances and then
computed the refractions at various hours of the day and times of the
year. ‘The observations were very good as observations, because all
the collateral circumstances were noted ; the indications of the baro-
meter and of the dry and wet bulb thermometers at the stations, and all
the climatic conditions were duly noted, so that the results were ex-
tremely valuable. The circumstances that were found mainly to affect
terrestrial refraction were in order of importance the following :—

(1) The time of the day.

(2) The temperature.

(3) The aspect of the sky—whether cloudy or sunshine; and
(4) The humidity of the air.

The time of the year was late Autumn and Winter, that is'to say, the
time of year in which there is much artillery practice in India. In
these experiments the average height of the rays above the ground
varied from 19 to 40 feet. From General Walker’s tables which are
found in the account of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India I
have gathered the following indications :—

(1) Negative refraction—that is to say, with the concavity pre-
sented upwards—was only met with between the hours of
1p.m. and 3.30p.m.; and the maximum negative refraction met
with was ‘09, that is +25 of the contained arc between the two
points, so that the maximum negative refraction met with was
not of very great importance.

(2) Positive refraction was met with from 3.30 p.m., and through
the night to 10 o’clock in the morning ; it was greater during
the night than in the day time, and the maximum was about
sths of the contained arc ; that is much larger than anything
we consider possible in the case of Great Britain, and that
maximum positive refraction occurred at 7 a.m. After this
hour of 7a.m. the refraction rapidly diminishes until at
10 a.m. it amounts to only about 35 of the contained are.

276 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

(3) Between 10 in the morning and 1 p.m. no observations were
taken, but it may be gathered that refraction is likely to be
either positive or negative but not as a rule exceeding about
goth of the contained arc.

(4) During the afternoon the refraction passes through zero from
negative to positive, the average time of this phenomenon
being about 2.80 p.m.; that is to say about 2.30 p.m. there
was a state of the atmosphere in which there was practically
no refraction—refraction was on the point of passing from
positive to negative. This time of zero refraction occurred
earliest on cloudy days and when there was much moisture in
the atmosphere, and latest on days of bright sunshine and
little humidity.

(5) I gather that absence of cloud has a tendency to diminish
positive refraction, and frequently to convert it into negative.
Supposing a cloudy sky and considerable positive refraction,
and if the clouds clear away and the sun comes out, the effect
generally is to enormously diminish the positive refraction,
and frequently to change it to negative. Thus in General
Walker’s observations in a certain instance on a cloudy day
the mean decimal of the contained are was +:046 ; but under
otherwise identical conditions on a cloudless day this decimal
was changed to —‘01. On another occasion at 1.30 p.m. the
disappearance of cloud instantaneously changed the decimal
from +°'042 to —:036.

(6) As the humidity of the atmosphere increases the negative
refraction diminishes, and positive refraction increases.
Humidity in fact seems to have the exactly opposite effect to
the sudden appearance of sunshine.

(7) Lateral refraction is negligible except under very excep-
tional circumstances.

I received a very interesting letter from General Tennant, R.E., he
writes : “ When the ray passed over damp or marshy ground or water,
the case was worse, and often especially in the morning the distortion
and fluctuation of images both horizontally and vertically was enormous.
I have seen an image wander several minutes with an intermittent
motion to one side, and then return, till after long watching we were
compelled to give up hope of obtaining trustworthy angles.” And
again he writes: “I have a vivid recollection of trying to observe a
heliostat over part of the Runn of Kutch one morning when my recol-
lection is that I saw it move out of the field and the wanderings were
quite 30' horizontally.” Such cases however are quite extraordinary,
and not likely to be encountered by artillerymen.

The seven indications drawn from General Walker’s tables, and in part
quoted from his report, are likely to be accentuated in artillery practice
on a plain when the average height of the ray is less than the 19’ to 40’
mentioned.

I finally draw the following conclusions in regard to terrestrial re-

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 277

fraction in the plains of India as bearing upon artillery fire :-—

(a) That the best time for shooting is between the hours of 1
and 8 o’clock p.m. when the refraction whether positive or
negative is small.

(b) Taking the extreme decimals of the contained are to be
+1°5 and —-2, and a range of 2’ of arc, say 24 miles, the
angular refractions will range from +3' to —24'. In these
two cases it would be necessary to depress the gun 3’ and
elevate it 24”, in regard to the line of sight, respectively.

(c) Therefore I gather thirdly, as my last conclusion, that the
consideration of terrestrial refraction in the plains of India is
not of urgent importance, because 3’ is not a very serious
matter in artillery fire.

Greater complication and uncertainty arises when we have to fire out
to sea from a high cliff ina tropical climate. We might well there have
a state of affairs such as is depicted in fig. 6 with the stratum of max-
imum density at some distance above the surface of the ground, and
the observer himself above the stratum. In such a case the path
of the ray: would be somewhat sinuous, and the effect might be
rather serious. JI have had great difficulty in obtaining data in
regard to tropical climates or indeed in regard to the Mediterranean,
Gibraltar, Malta, and such places. I have no satisfactory data to work
upon, and it is greatly to be wished that one had more facts to speak
about; but it seems to me that in cases where the refraction is
likely to be serious, it would be desirable to abandon the vertical
base depression range-finder or any vertical base range-finder, and to
adopt a horizontal base range-finder, and then to lay the gun, not by
tangent sights, but by means of straight-edged sights and quadrant
elevation.

I pass on now to consider other effects of extraordinary refraction.
We have the effect which is termed mirage. The conditions favourable
to mirage are generally a very hot sun and a sandy soil which becomes
very hot under the influence of the sun, and an almost total absence of
wind. Under these circumstances we have a state of affairs such as is
depicted in Fig. 5 and we get quite an extraordinary amount of negative
refraction ; that is to say, the rays are very much curved and the con-
cavity is presented upwards. We may take Fig. 7 which is no doubt

Fie. 7,

very familiar to everybody because it occurs in nearly every book

278 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

that I have seen on physics. The observer sees the top of the tree (say
A) by means of a negatively curved ray, and accordingly it appears to
him to be in the direction of the tangent to the ray where it enters the
eye; he sees it in the direction shewn. ‘The other points in the tree he
sees in other directions, and altogether the tree appears with an in-
verted image below it. He also sees the tree erect in very nearly its
true position, because the point 4 is seen by two rays, one ray which
curves down and another ray, which is traversed in an equal time, which
passes up through the denser layers and thus escapes this extraordinary
refraction. or this reason mirage is not extremely important from a
gunnery point of view. We not only see the inverted image below the
object, but also the object itself in very nearly its true position. Now
supposing this tree to be standing out against the blue sky, we not only
see an inverted image of the tree, but also by curved rays a sky image
on the ground in front of the tree, that is to say, nearer to the observer
than the tree; and the tree itself appears to be reflected in this sky
image, which has very much the appearance of water. This illusion of
water is very much increased for the reason, that the surface of the
ground being extremely hot there is great convection of heated air up-
wards from the surface of the ground which gives a trembling appear-
ance to the air, and this causes the sky image which is seen through
this trembling air to have the appearance of being ruffled by light waves
and ripples. Another circumstance also increases the illusion. The
curved rays very nearly follow the path of rays reflected at a plane
mirror placed along the surface of the ground, so that objects appear
as if they really were reflected at the surface, in what appears to be
water, but is really an image of the sky. ‘This phenomenon is very
common in Hgypt. In Heypt you very often have a great quantity of
sand with villages dotted about, and raised to a certain elevation in
order to escape the periodical inundations of the Nile; the effect to an
observer then is of a number of raised villages in the midst of a huge
lake, the lake beginning at a certain distance in front of the observer,
say 300 or 400 yards, and then appearing to extend in all directions.
It is also common in Australia and inthe Plains of India; aud in many
parts of England in the low lying fen districts, and on the shingle
ranges at Lydd.

One very curious thing about mirage is that its depends very much
upon the position of the eye; afew inches in the height of the eye may
often make all the difference. J remember distinctly at the artillery
practice ground at Mooltan in the Punjab ata place called Meeran-
ki-Serai there was a very fine mirage; the bushes that were on the
plain all appearing like small islands in a lake, and this could only be
seen on slightly stooping; by stooping about 6 inches you could see it,
but if you did not stoop there appeared to be no mirage. Inthe fen dis-
tricts also there is a beautiful mirage, and the other day I understand
it could only be seen from the top of a particular wall. It depends upon
the position of the eye with respect to the stratum of maximum density
whether the phenomenon is very accentuated ornot. J was very much
interested too in hearing the other day of a very extraordinary effect
of refraction from my friend Professor Boys, and I hope he will give

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 279

us a description of it presently (hear, hear). There was a very curious
effect of mirage also observed at Lydd in the summer by Captain Osborn,
R.A. He had been firing with the Maxim machine gun at a target,
and during the firing, he observed a wedge-shaped gap in the target,
as if a portion of the target had been removed by the hail of bullets,
but in a very short time after the firing ceased the target appeared
quite whole and undamaged. He communicated this to me, and I
think there can be no doubt of the reason of it—it was in fact an arti-
ficially produced mirage. The heated gases rise from the muzzle, and
form a medium in which the density increases upwards ; he was ob-
serving the upper portion of the target through this medium and I have
no doubt that that caused negative refraction ; it caused the bending
of the rays so that the sky above the target was seen in the shape of a
wedge, something like the shape of the vertical section of the rising
gases (see Fig. 8). That is a very interesting case of an artificially

Fre. 8.

SS <<iCT WW ,rT'”?™F7—>é"[.F"Vn9

produced mirage, and I think it says a great deal for Captain Osborn’s
powers of observation.

I have to say a few words about another part of the subject which
is called “looming.” Distant objects are said to loom when they appear
considerably above their true positions, that is to say, when images of
them appear considerably raised above their true positions; and the
phenomenon is usually accompanied by a great apparent proximity of
the objects. The effects of looming are really quite extraordinary, and
I have had some diagrams constructed in order to show some of the
effects that may be observed. A diligent search has convinced me that
the best examples are those recorded by Commander William Scoresby
who went on his third voyage in his ship the “ Baffin ” to the Green-
land Whale Fishery in the spring of 1822. He made many obser-
vations, and took many sketches of these extraordinary looming
appearances. Before describing, much in his own words, these
appearances, I will give you his views of the climatic conditions which
are favourable to these wonderful phenomena. These are :—

(1) A rapid evaporation which takes place in a hot sun from the
surface of the sea.

(2) The unequal density occasioned by partial condensations,
when the moist air becomes chilled by passing over consider-
able surfaces of ice. The question is very much complicated
by the presence of large irregularly shaped icebergs such as

280

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE

are shewn in Fig, 9, which must cause very extraordinary dis-
Fig. 9,

tributions of air density, and give rise to quite remarkable
vertical and lateral refractions.

(3) Unequal and changeable density of the air, which of course
bution of ice; and

results in the main from the extraordinary irregular distri-

refracted objects are seen.

(4) In the case of multiple images, alternations of parallel
strata of different densities in the medium through which the

The diagram (Fig. 10) I have copied from Commander Scoresby’s
Fie. 10.

}
Hi

Hg ie

TLL

book on the subjecteehis book on West Greenland. The appearances

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 281

shewn are the images of distant ice—ice which in the main was quite
out of sight or quite beyond the horizon. There was extraordinary
vertical magnification ; small hummocks of ice were drawn out into
Spires sometimes of a castellated shape, and sometimes having the
appearance of naked trees ; sometimes there appeared to be an ice city
with public edifices, churches, spires, and so forth, and he notes that
these effects were constantly changing ; they were never the same for two
minutes together. There is no ship present here; it is merely a very
extraordinary effect of the refracted ice. In Fig. 9 wesee his ship the
“ Baffin,” and his look-out man at the top of the mainmast; he saw a
curious inverted image of a ship in the sky raised considerably above
the horizon. Now that ship was so distant that it was not even in
sight, a powerful telescope showed no ship ; its mainmast was entirely
below the horizon, and yet he observed this extraordinary appearance.
These pictures represent only what was actually seen througha power-
ful telescope. ‘The image would appear to an ordinary eye simply as a
speck in the sky. Commander Scoresby particularly states in his book
upon this matter that you get these beautiful appearances mainly when
you search the horizon with a telescope. Fig. 11 depicts a remark-

Fie. 11.

able case in which there was much shipping near the horizon, and
beyond that a great deal of irregularly distributed ice, and he ob-
served a great multiplicity of images. One ship is represented with
three images above it, all three inverted, and with images of ice
corresponding to each.

Other observations that are very interesting were made by Dr. Vince
of Cambridge at the beginning of the century at Ramsgate; he ob-
served with a telescope from a point raised 30 or 40 feet above the sea,
from the top of a cliff in fact, and he searched the horizon with the
telescope, and this is what he found and recorded. There was a ship

282 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

(Fig. 12) almost out of sight with its mainmast appearing above the

Fig. 12.

MUN

PANT

horizon. Above in the sky he saw first of all an inverted image of the
complete ship; and then an image of some sea, and above that an
erect image of the ship. As the ship sailed along these images sailed
along with it, and as the ship gradually got further and further off, the
mainmast gradually sank still more, and as it sank the images rose ;
but, as he writes, the ship did not disappear absolutely from sight, and
he did not observe in what manner the images finally disappeared.
These effects were observed through a telescope magnifying about 80
or 40 times, so that they could not have been observable by the unaided
eye. Then again he saw a ship on the horizon with an inverted spectre
of a ship above it, with the mainmasts joined in the manner shewn in
Fig. 13.
TG ye gs

Win
i
I

SOrEE

In Fig. 14 the real ship seems to have been completely out of
sight, and he saw the inverted ship with a portion of the image, as it
were, below the horizon; the top of the mainmast was not visible; and
then above this an erect image of the ship. This is one of the most

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 983

curious cases of looming that I have ever heard of. In another instance
(Fig. 15) the hulls of the two images were joined; there was no sea
Fie. 15.

image between them.
In another remarkable case he saw a ship (Fig. 16) with its hull
Fie. 16.

below the horizon, and above it fragments of the sails which were con-

284, TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

stantly changing, as he says, like the beams shooting out of the Aurora
Borealis; the images sometimes ran up, and a number of sails appeared,
and then vanished, and only one or two would be seen; and he says
that it was very entertaining watching this very curious image above
the ship through the telescope, it was never the same one second after
another. Another case mentioned by Dr. Vince is very extraordinary.
Dover Castle is only visible from Ramsgate in respect of the top of
its turrets; you cannot see the whole of it. Between Ramsgate and
Dover there is about 6 miles of sea, and then 6 miles of land rising up
to a hill which usually obscures the Keep of Dover Castle with the
exception of the four turrets. On one occasion he saw the castle on
the near side of the hill; the castle seemed to have been brought from —
the remote side of the hill, and was seen presented on its near side as
in Fig. 17; and he explains this by Fig. 18 which however is not very

Fig. 17.

convincing tome. Hesupposes 4 B to be the castle which is concealed
from the point H# ordinarily by the hill, and he supposes the rays from
the top and bottom of the castle to take the curvilinear paths shewn,
and the top of the hill to be seen by means of a ray which passes so as
to be between the other two; and he says that you should see really an
image of the top of the hill in front of the image of the castle, but that
as a matter of fact the image at the top of the hill was so faint that you
could only see the image of the castle.

There is only one instance more which I will mention of the abnor-
mal effects of refraction, and that is the most curious case of lateral
refraction that I have been able to discover. It was observed in
Geneva in 1818. A barque near Bellerive at a distance of 4000 toises
(a toise is about the same length as a pace) was seen approaching
Geneva on the left bank of the lake, and at the same time an image of
the sails was observed above the water which, instead of following the
direction of the barque, separated from it, and appeared to approach
Geneva by the right bank of the lake, the image moving from east to
west while the barque moved from north to south. At first the image
was of the same size as the barque but it gradually diminished in size
to about one-half when the phenomenon ceased. I think that is very

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 285:

remarkable: a ship actually coming up on one bank of the lake, and
being accompanied by a spectre ship on the other bank.

In conclusion I will only say that I think the result of my investiga-
tion into this matter as affecting artillery fire is distinctly reassuring.
I think that under normal conditions we have nothing to fear, and I
think that under abnormal conditions when we have to fire from the
top of a cliff and are uncertain altogether of the distribution of density
of the air between the cliff and the object, the difficulties can be
entirely overcome by having horizontal instead of vertical base instru-
ments, and by laying the guns with straight-edged sights and quadrant
elevation instead of tangent sights.

DISCUSSION.

Tue CHatrman—lI suppose we all know more about this subject now than we
did an hour ago, and I am sure we are very grateful to Major MacMahon for what
he has told us and the way he has told it. I dare say some of us have experiences
to bring forward, but I think it is very gratifying to know that the Battery Com-
mander of either Field or Garrison Artillery has not to make yet another correction
to those he is already saddled with, and that we need not as artillerymen look
upon refraction as a serious complication. I do not know whether any gentleman
present will give us the benefit of their experiehces in the same line. Perhaps,
Professor Boys whom we have the pleasure of welcoming will kindly do so.

Proressor C. V. Boys, F.R.8.—Colonel Trench and gentlemen, I need hardly
say how much pleasure it has given me to hear this brilliant lecture by Major
MacMahon. ‘The first part of the lecture which dealt with the theoretical branch
was given with a degree of clearness and precision which I wish we could more
often meet with in London (applause).

Major MacMahon was good enough to mention my name in connection with a
mirage phenomenon which was observed in England. I think he made a slight
mistake however; for he was told of it in my house the other day by a fellow
guest, not by myself. The phenomenon was this: Some people were in a boat at
Oxford on the Cherwell on a very hot day Jast year or the year before, when the
grass in the flat meadowland was exceptionally heated and was producing the
familiar rippling appearance. A lady in the boat, in the ordinary way seeing
nothing peculiar, noticed that on dipping her head almost to the level of the grass
—within an inch or two—the cows in the field appeared to rise up in the air
while their legs drew out to an enormous length so as to reach the ground. The
rest of the party saw the same thing when they put their eyes down within a few
inches of the ground, but on raising them the cows became ordinary cows again.

The phenomenon to which Major MacMahon referred as seen over the Maxim
gun—the apparent cutting out of the top of the target—was described to me some
time ago I think by Professor Greenhill, who as he is here, will correct me if I
am wrong. ‘The question arose whether it was not possibly due to those conical”
shells of compressed air which surround the bullets when their speed is greater
than that of sound—photographs of which I had the honour of showing at this
Institution some time ago. 1 do not quite see how those conical shells of air
could produce the effect; but it must be remembered that if the target were
a considerable distance away, and the gun were firing at the highest rate at which
it can fire, some ten shots a second say, there might be several bullets between the
observer and the target at the same time, and the eye being probably just about
level with the top of the trajectory would be in such a position in fact as to cause
the stream of bullets to produce the greatest possible effect,

286 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

In connection with the more theoretical part of the lecture, that is to say, that
part which dealt with the curvature of light rays in passing through air, in which
the refractive power gradually changes, we are able under ordinary conditions in
England to observe a very similar phenomenon, one which physically is identically
the same, in the case of sound.

When the air is under ordinary conditions, it is well known that it is very
difficult to be heard well when speaking out of doors. Now in the case of sound
a rise of temperature irrespective of the density is the analogue of greater rarifi-
cation in the case of light ; each causes the velocity of propagation to rise. Under
ordinary conditions the air on the ground is warmer than the air above, and the
result is that sound rays near the ground travel more quickly than those higher
up; and so sound rays are formed with the concavity upwards, so that when
a person is speaking on level ground the rays of sound which ought to go to
the listener curl up and go over his head, in other words the flat ground between
casts an acoustical shadow. On the other hand under extraordinary conditions,
that is to say, on a clear quiet night when cooling by radiation is especially
effective, the air on the ground may be colder than the air above, and then the
rays of sound which start in a slightly upward direction travel more quickly
than those going horizontally, curl round, and come down again, while those that
go along near the ground bend downwards to the ground are reflected and go up
again; so that you have on such occasions a concentration of sound, not only
the sound that started in the right direction reaching the listener but other sound
that ought to have passed over his head coming down again and reinforcing
the other. Then again when there is an excessively gentle wind, so gentle as
not to give rise to any turmoil, so that the motion of the air is that of a viscous
fluid, the upper regions are moving more rapidly than the lower; and then even
if the whole of the air were of the same temperature the upper regions in moving
would carry the sound with them more than the lower, and therefore produce the
same effect as a higher velocity of sound in the upper regions ; and thus it is that
on these occasions sound can be heard clearly to the leeward at an enormous dis-
tance, whereas to the windward it can hardly be heard at all.

Lirut.-Cotonen J. R. J. Jocptyx—lI should like to say a word on behalf of the
garrison artillery. I do not know that I quite share that feeling of reassurance,
that the Lecturer gave us, because we have vertical bases in use all over the
world, and most of our firing, if we ever have the honour to fire at an enemy, will
probably be in the Mediterranean or in a tropical climate, and I cannot admit
that the horizontal base instrument is the best way out of the matter. Of course
the horizontal base position-finder is an excellent thing, if you cannot use a vertical
base; but as you know, it entails more observers and more complication; and
also our organisation (I am speaking of garrison artillery) is better suited to
vertical base instruments.

At the same time I think that the Lecturer has done very good service indeed,
in drawing attention to this matter, in the way he has, because, beyond doubt,
the lecture we have just heard should not be allowed to drop; it is much too
good a lecture to be allowed to drop; and I hope that it will receive attention.

I may say that a friend of mine who is known to most men here, Major Rarlow,
when he came back from Rangoon, told me that there was some difficulty
there in range-finding, and I believe there was a proposition to build towers all
round the estuary in order to put depression range-finders up; and there was a
great deal of discussion about the effect of refraction there.

I think Major MacMahon said, he himself is absolutely in the dark, as to what
may be the condition of affairs in tropical climates.

Of course with regard to the plains of India that is a question for field artillery,
and I hope that I do not cffend, when I say, that accuracy of fire is not so impor-
tant for that branch, as it is for the garrison artillery, seeing that their normal
projectile is time shrapnel, at comparatively speaking large targets, while the

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 287

Coast gunner as a rule, would fire percussion common, at a comparatively small
target, and, being provided with a fixed platform and accurate instruments, every
25 yards is worth considering.

I think Sir we ought not to let this matter stay where it is, but that we should
investigate, whether, in tropical places any correction is due for refraction or not.
This, 1 think, could be done, by taking a certain number of observations, with
the instruments that we have now, at the datum point; and if records were kept
of these observations, we might form some sort of conclusion, as to the effect of
refraction. I hope this effect is negligible, but it is no use blinking the matter,
if it ought to be taken into account.

With regard to what Major MacMahon said of the quadrant elevation, garrison
artillery would always use it unless they were driven to use tangent sights.

I should like to mention one case of refraction that was told us in the Channel
Islands, in July last. There is a well defined rock, I regret I have forgot-
ten its name, which was known to be in a certain direction. One day, as seen
from Elizabeth Castle, it appeared to be, I am afraid to say, how many degrees to
the right or left; [ would suggest that reference should be made to Major H. A.
Scott, R.A., who observed the phenomenon, because, after the experiences that
Major MacMahon has given us I think that that case, of lateral refraction, if it
can be substantiated, might be very interesting to record.

Ligvr.-Cotonni R. W. RatnsrorD-Hannay—lI have some diffidence in saying
anything after the very scientific lecture that we have had, and after the remarks
of Professor Boys; but it might interest you to know something of the practical
experience of mirage at Lydd which has been mentioned once or twice. At Lydd
there is at times a good deal of mirage. I tried the experiment of having a gun
laid on a target at a time of day when the mirage was at its worst. The gun was
laid by clinometer and the training and height of the tangent scales were marked.
The gun was afterwards laid on the same target with the same elevation and
training when there was no mirage and there was no apparent difference. ‘That is
explained by the fact, as Major MacMahon told us, that the extent of refraction
at home is not more than 1’ 16". But there are other things with regard to mir-
age which make it exceedingly hard to lay when there is much of it. At Lydd
last year three field batteries were practising ; they began at 6.30 in the morning,
and the mirage increases gradually from morning to mid-day. The battery that
shot best was the battery that shot when there was the least mirage, while the
battery that shot worst was the battery that shot when there was the most mirage.

Another thing about mirage is that the stronger the telescope the more exagger-
ated is the mirage. The dummies appear like ghosts, a battery using Scott’s
sights can scarcely see them at all, much less lay on them.

With regard to the experience of Captain Osborn I was myself at Lydd at the
tine. The range, so far as I recollect, was about 600 yards, and Captain Osborn
was trying the Maxim gun and firing as fast as possible. I should say that the
height of the eye above the ground was about 34 feet.

Cotoner R. D. HE. Locknart—Colonel Trench and gentlemen, it must be very
satisfactory to the artillery to know that they need not be anxious about the effect
of mirage as regards the laying of field guns; but there is no doubt that it is
disturbing as Colonel Rainsford-Hannay remarks, to see these images, and it
disarranges the firing very much, But another thing which is a practical
ditheulty is the rippling of the atmosphere, whether it is to us as gunners upon
the plains of Hindostan, or as sportsmen on the highlands of Thibet, so that
although there may not be any important obstacle before us there are undoubtedly
difficulties that arise in connection with these atmospheric disturbances.

Prorzssor A. G. GREENHILL, F.R.S.—I feel some diffidence in joining in the
discussion on this interesting lecture, more especially as my experience of the
subject arises only from the astronomical applications, and not from the point of

288 TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

view of military requirements. For instance it was a novelty to me to find
refraction measured as so many minutes per mile; but the Lecturer made it quite
clear why that mode of measurement was requisite for artillery purposes. When
we look at the setting sun, and see it just touching the horizon, the sun is really
well below the horizon; so that the effect of refraction is to raise the sun up toa
distance of something more than its angular diameter; but in that case it would
never do to measure the refraction in the military manner by dividing that
amount by some 90 millions of miles, the distance between us and the sun.

I had forgotten the conversation that Professor Boys alluded to, but we are
very much indebted to him for his beautiful photographs, and for directing our
attention to the instantaneous mirage which accompanies the bullet in its flight.
This can now be seen, I am informed, when the bullet is flying parallel to a line
of palings or towards a clump of trees. It is very noticeable I am told when the
bullet is watched through a telescope pointed on the target.

Lreut.-Cotonen H. 8. 8. Warkin, C.B., writes—I much regret that I was
unable to be present at the interesting lecture on refraction by Major MacMahon,
so I should be glad to be allowed to add a few remarks on its bearing on practical
artillery fire, more especially as regards my particular subject range-finding.

The ordinary refraction, and even the extraordinary refraction mentioned by the
lecturer, as far as artillery fire either on sea or land is concerned is quite
insignificant ; the variations of powder, or even of cordite being so much greater.
But I can quite imagine that over the heated plains of India, especially when
there is a variation of surface, the refraction caused by the numerous heated
layers of air will give trouble in laying. This effect can easily be seen on looking
at an object through a telescope over a hot water pipe or gas jet. The image
moves about and is distorted, I believe owing to the varying refracted rays
following one another so rapidly, that the image is seen blurred. I have noticed
this at Okehampton and the marshes here, objects seen perfectly clearly when the
sun was obscured by a cloud, were quite unrecognisable when the sun shone out
and heated the layers of air close to the surface of the ground. I do not believe
this blurring will take place, at all events to anything to the same extent over the
sea when the surface is uniform. As mentioned by Lieut.-Colonel Jocelyn garrison
artillery are not affected, as elevation is almost entirely given by mechanical
appliances.

Now as regards the effect of refraction on depression range-finding ; it does
not seem to be generally known that the D.R.I’. is corrected for normal refraction.
‘The amount I took from the text-books on surveying at ,% that of curvature.
That being the case the only errors arising from this cause, would be the difference
between the refraction allowed for and the actual refraction at the time an obser-
vation was taken. ‘This as seen from the figures given in the lecture would be
very small. But abroad as hinted by Major MacMahon possibly this error might
be of some consequence. Are the results obtained by the D.R.F. therefore to be
considered unreliable? I think not, for this simple reason that every time the
instrument is set up, this very error is discounted, by laying on the datum point.
The datum post as you all know is placed at a considerable known distance from
the battery ; now whatever effect refraction (normal or abnormal) has when taking
observations on to the target, it will equally have when setting on the datum post.
In this way I believe the effect of refraction is practically discounted.

THe CuarrmMan—lIf there is no other gentleman who desires to join in the dis-
cussion it only remains for me to thank Major MacMahon in your name for his very
able lecture, and at the same time those gentlemen who have made remarks on the
lecture which have been most interesting. As Colonel Jocelyn says, the subject
must not be allowed to drop, but must be threshed out, and we shall have great
pleasure to help in doing so. In your name I beg to thank Major MacMahon for
his very brilliant interesting lecture (applause).

289

ROYAL ARTILLERY BAND.

As it is considered that the following letter will prove very satisfactory
to the officers of the Regiment ; permission has been obtained for its
publication.

“ Horse Guards,
War Office,
29th April, 1895.

SIR,

I have the Command of His Royal Highness the Commander-
in-Chief to inform you that His Royal Highness was present at the
Concert given by the Royal Regiment of Artillery on the 26th April
at the Queen’s Hall, and was much pleased with the excellent taste dis-
played in the selection of the programme and still more with the
magnificent execution of the various pieces.

His Royal Highness is satisfied that the high merit attained by the
Band of the Royal Artillery is due alike to the interest taken in it by
the Regiment at large and to the talents and energy possessed by
Cavaliére Zavertal and the members of the Band.

His Royal Highness commands me to express his great pleasure in
having been present on this occasion, and desires that you will be good
enough to convey this expression of approval to the President of the
Band Committee and to Cavaliére Zavertal.

Iam, &c.,
(Signed) F. T. Luoyn,

To D.-A.-G.”
G.O.C. Woolwich.

6. VOL. XXII.

tae

Shite

291

AD) AE AS JES) SE

LIBUTENANT W. SWABRY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA. \

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATEHS, late R.H.A.

(Continued from p. 257, No. 5, Vol. XXTTI.).

levalagal! IO.

Cuarrer II.

The troops take wp position at Albuera. French and Spanish Cavalry.
Constant skirmishes. Affair at Ribera. Battle of Salamanca. Sickness.
Affair at Majalahonda.

20th June.—Marched to and encamped at Albuera, where we found
a position was taken up, having three redoubts, one on the left, one on
the centre and one on the left flank of our line. JI rode to see them,
the position is not very strong but exceedingly judicious, as it is so
situated that the nature of the enemy’s attack cannot be concealed, and
the redoubts, particularly on the right flank, lool into all the approaches
and I think on the whole cannot be easily turned. There is besides a
retiro line on the same ground occupied by Marshal Beresford last year.
The rivulet ranning in front can scarcely be termed an obstacle to the
attack, but in case of the enemy’s being followed it will impede his
retreat considerably.

Lord Wellington having moved in the North, great doubts are
entertained of Soult’s attacking our position, as it appears useless even
to beat us unless he does it with a view of securing his retreat. He
gives out that he will retake Badajos. We were last year deceived in
the amount of the French force which we had undervalued ; the same
circumstance may again take place, but we can have no considerable
odds against us. Keceived Hneglish letters of 19th May, and Ist of
June.

21st June.—Still at Albuera, the Spanish cavalry patrolling to Santa
Martha, the enemy occupying Azeuchal, Villalba ete. Visited the
position again. I find if our right is turned we have a retreat on
Albuera, and if the left is outflanked we may march on Olivenca. On
a nearer examination of the rivulet I findit of more consequence than I
at first supposed, many parts being impassable and others broad enough

6. VOL. XXII. 40

292 SWABEY DIARY.

to occasion filing and occupy the enemy’s time in formation, whilst
our artillery has beautiful situations for annoying them. I should —
mention that the town on our left flank forms a strong defence, stand-
ing on a perpendicular declivity and every means is being taken to
strengthen it.

22nd June.—W ent on picket to the edge of the wood on the Albuera
road, and at one o’clock marched with the heavy brigade, now strength-
ened by the 4th Dragoon Guards, and encamped near Santa Martha
having two miles to send to that place for water ; we got nothing to
eat till very late. The light brigade was skirmishing all night with
the enemy’s cavalry. It now appears that Soult has not brought up
the whole of his force to Azeuchal and no battle is expected. Thus we
shall probably advance again into a country where we shall be despised
for retreating, yet not deservedly so, because of course our plans are
dependent on Lord Wellington’s, and we have good reasons for our
conduct which are not likely to be known to or understood by the
people.

23rd June.—Exposed to the torrid heat of the sun without water and
in harness all day and twice called on to move. It was at last deter-
mined that we should move to the wood near Albuera, where we
encamped by the side of a beautiful river with excellent shade ; we were
quite in luxury in comparison with the night before.

24th June.—Still in our delightful bivouac; the men falling sick, and
Whinyates agueish from the effect of the sun.

25th June.—This day passed with little variation from yesterday.

To enliven us we had indeed a fire in our camp, owing to some sparks
falling on the dry grass which immediately kindled and spread and
threatened our horses, baggage, etc. ‘This is an accident very common
in these woods where everything is parched up and there is scarcely
any dew to keep vegetation alive.

26th June.—Still without means of discovering why with a superior
force we should give up so fine a country as that we have retired from
to the enemy, who are daily employed in collecting the harvest; the
natives will of course be left to all the horrors of want.

27th June.—The French to-day made a reconnaissance in force: we
were turned out but nothing occurred. We sent forage parties to
Almendral occupied by the Spanish infantry, when Morillo refused
to allow our foraging though in a regular manner, and turned out his men
to resist ours; fortunately our men were unarmed. The Spanish General
behaved with great and unjustifiable impropriety in striking and ill-
using our fellows who acted with the strictest decorum and discipline.
Nevertheless Lieut.-General Sir William Hrskine was guilty of a gross
dereliction of duty and of acting contrary to the proper feelings of a
British officer in listening only to the history given by Morillo, and in
censuring our conduct without even hearing what we had to say,
though the ill-usage experienced by the men under his command would
one would suppose naturally have made him their advocate.

At 6 o’clock this evening I went to relieve Carter on picket with the
light brigade of cavalry and supped with General Long.

SWABEY DIARY. 293

28th June.—After breakfasting with General Long, who likewise
asked me to dinner, I rode by his order to investigate the possibility
of guns passing from the picket ground to the Solano road, which I
found easy to accomplish. I dined with Handley of the 9th and was
relieved, and returned here in the evening after passing last night in
my cloak.

I find from my ride this morning that the three roads approaching
Albuera are easily watched and that there are excellent look-out stations.
The Portuguese and Spaniards take this duty. It appears that Soult
has never moved from Seville and that the detachment from his corps
is put under Drouet’s orders. Ballesteros has again fought with Soult
near Seville.

29th June.—Still shadowed by the venerable oaks of Albuera.

30th June.—An account was received of Ballesteros having again
been engaged with Soult.

Ist July—The French made a reconnaissance to-day on the Solano
and Santa Martha roads, which occasioned a smart skirmish with the
Portuguese cavalry. After everything was supposed to be quiet, at
about 8 o’clock, the Spanish cavalry to the number of 600 came gallop-
ing into the wood pursued by about 3800 French who took 200. The
whole cavalry turned out. ‘The French were so flushed by their success
that they had the insolence to come into the wood. The picket of the
3rd Dragoon Guards saved the honour of our camp by gallantly attack-
ing and charging the enemy with 14 files only. Iieutenant Hilis was
killed and Captain Watts the other officer severely wounded. My
guns were first out of the camp, and I was posted with them for the
night at the cross-roads; of course no clothes taken off, and nothing to
eat till midnight. In the course of the evening a Spanish dragoon
came past my post with a Frenchman, who had been shot through the
breast, on his horse. Less cruel than other Spaniards he was conveying
him to our camp, but as the man could no longer sit on the horse he
asked me what he should do with him as he was repeatedly begging
to be killed. I stopped the first surgeon I could find and got his
wound dressed, and after refreshing him with brandy and water, put
him again on the Spaniard’s horse, who promised faithfully to carry
the poor wretch to Albuera about a mile and a half distant. An hour
after an officer passing told me that he had seen the man lying on the
roadside about a mile off, and requested I would send him some assistance.
I never was so unhappily situated; my post in front of the enemy I
could neither leave nor weaken, and was actually obliged to refuse the
least help. I lay down but could not get the Frenchman out of my
head and at last resolved to run all risks, so took a horse and man and
wandered about for a long time to try and find him and carry him to
my guns, where at least the poor wretch could get water. This satis-
faction however I could not enjoy as I could not find him. I was
made happy afterwards by learning he had found some compassionate
creature to take him on a mule to the camp.

"1 At Ossuma near Seville. Ballesteros surprised Colonel Beauyais, took 800 prisoners and des-
troyed the French depdt at that place. Napier, Vol. 5, p. 188,

294: - SWABEY DIARY.

end July—When on picket last night the army advanced at 2
o’clock taking me upon its way. At about 7 we passed through Santa
Martha and stopped for the day, without a Icaf to shade us, and nothing
to eat till dark, and of course no baggage.

3rd July.—We left our ground at Santa Martha at 3 o’clock.
Geneial Hill with the main body marching on Los Santos. Sir
William Erskine with the brigade of light cavalry including our troop
under General Long, and Colonel Campbell’s brigade of Portuguese
cavalry and 2 brigades of light infantry moving on Villalba where
there were some French cavalry. We advanced with the light cavalry
rapidly on the place; they however escaped us. We had a great deal
of sharp skirmishing with their Hussars and Lancers, and our guns had
a few shots at them; one of my shots killed 2 of the enemy but the
General officers would not let us go near enough to do much damage.
After much manceuvring the whole French cavalry having shewn itself,
we marched (still without anything to eat) along the banks of the river
Grandajira which passes Villalba till we came to a position in front of
Feria, the enemy still mancouvring on our left. We then took up astrong
position. Atabout 4 o’clock some guns fired on the Portuguese brigade,
and we with our guns took up a position to oppose them, our howitzer
only being able to reach them. We killed seven horses and some men,
how many was not ascertained as they were carried off. We fired
only four shots, and the infantry that we moved to protect being
moved under cover, the enemy withdrew their artillery. One shot
only came amongst us, which knocked down a man and horse but was
so spent that neither were materially wounded. We did not get off
‘our horses from 2 this morning, or eat till dark. We then retired into
a wood and I slept soundly in my cloak.

4th July.—At 3 o’clock was out with two guns on the plain till 4,
when all our force marched to join General Hill at Los Santos the
enemy having moved on Usagre. We got to the army at 9 o’clock,
when I went with the troop to water at Los Santos and was not off my
horse or at dinner till 11 at night.

5th July.—At 3 o’clock the army advanced on the Bienvenida road,
the light cavalry and horse artillery in advance; coming to a wood on
the road a picket of the enemy’s skirmished and fled before us. Sir
William Hrskine’s corps now moved to the left on Usagre, where we
found a large force of the enemy’s cavalry, whom we drove through
the town after a sharp skirmish. Had the ground been anything but
very stony, we could have passed the town and cut off many prisoners.
The troop fired a few shots, and had we beer well placed or permitted
to use our own discretion we might bave done much execution. The
enemy retired on Llera, and when we had thrown out pickets, we went
through Usagre and encamped between that place and Bienvenida at
about 6 o’clock, after which we had to cook before anything was to be
had to eat.

6th July.—Turned out at 3 but did not move. This day we had
leave to forage and for the first time to take off our harness.

7th July—The enemy haying retired on La Granja and Azuaga,

SWABEY DIARY. 295

General Hill’s column marched to Llerena and got possession of that
pass over the mountains to Seville. We with General Long’s brigade
encamped for the first time in quiet, and slept in our beds, which was
a luxury of such value as only those who have experienced great
fatigues and hot suns without rest can appreciate. The hard work
and exposure has done much to weaken us by sickness.

Sth July.—Shaded in the woods of Villa Garcia. We received the
particulars of Lord Wellington’s attack on the forts at Salamanca in
which Captain Hligé! of the Royal Artillery was killed and Lieutenant
Love was wounded.

9th July.—Rode in the evening to Llerena where I was admitted by
a priest to the private Chapel of the Cathedral; here he showed us
with the most ridiculous reverence the relics of Nossa Senhora de
Granada the patroness of all Spain.

>»

10th July.—This morning at 3 o’clock our column advanced on
Maguilla. On our route we heard General Hill’s column engaged
towards Berlanga, we hastened to his assistance, but before we ar-
rived he had gained his object by driving the French cavalry out of the
place. As they did not retire out of sight we manceuvred some time
and did not get off our horses till 7 o’clock. After this our men to
their great credit, as they were without orders, foraged for their
horses.

1th July.—We retired by Ayllones to our camp at Villa Garcia, but
not till we had remained a long time underarms. We got in by 5
o'clock.

12th July.—tIn consequence of the enemy’s cavalry having occupied
Berlanga, on our leaving it, yesterday we made a feint of retiring to
bring him on, and a design was formed to surprise and attack him.
We marched accordingly at 2 o’clock in the morning, but owing to Sir
William Erskine’s halting us for two hours on the road, General Slade
with the “heavies” arrived and waited for us near Berlanga. The
heavy brigade was sufficiently strong to have beaten the enemy but were
as usual restrained and dispirited. It scems to be the system to do
everything to make our fine fellows afraid of their enemy. We are
daily harassed in the sun and our ardour is imprudently restrained.
We remained in the fields till 1 o’clock when we went into cover at
Ayllones for a few hours which we enjoyed in shaving and cleaning
ourselves. At 8 o’clock we were turned out to return to our camp at
- Villa Garcia, where through the darkness and mistakes of the guides
we did not arrive till 2 o’clock in the morning.

13th July.—I was agreeably surprised by a letter from Mr. Walcott,
and another from the Captain. I was fatigued and knocked up but
their receipt reanimated me, and I felt more pleasure and happiness
than has been my share since I entered the Peninsula. I immediately
set my writing desk on the ground and answered Mr. Walcott’s, and
wrote to Maurice. No news from the enemy. A letter from Newland

1 Captain John P. Hligé (Kane’s List No. 978) killed 19th June, 1812,

296 SWABEY DIARY.

in the North informed me of their howitzer having been employed in
battery against the forts at Salamanca! when tkey had three men
wounded, viz :-Varley, Clayton junior, and Tyrrell; they have likewise
been engaged in the field.

Lord W’s head-quarters are at Medina del Campo where he has
suspended his advance, It is rumoured that this delay is because
Castafios will not co-operate, and turn the passes through the mountains
to Madrid, by marching on the enemy’s flank.

14th July.—Glad to dedicate the day to rest. I lay in my hut and
amused myself with pleasing speculations. I wrote to Yeamans
Walcott thanking him for the contents of his letter.

L5th July.—There came to-day to Llerena nine deserters from the
Poles. It appears that they have taken some general disgust to the
service, seven of them were non-commissioned officers. I hear that ten
who had been caught were shot by the French for desertion. It is
remarkable that last year they served with the greatest fidelity. These
Lancers are armed with a long and sharp spike or spear which has a
rest by the stirrup. It has a loose sling that passes over the arm and
secures it if ib gets out of the hand. It is adorned with a flag, anda
body of these men makes a very pretty tournament appearance, which
effect is quite lost when they are single. They owe their reputation
to having destroyed a great many of our infantry when their ranks were
broken at Albuera, but as to their being formidable to formed troops
it is quite ridiculous; a dragoon with his broadsword is worth two
of them. They are very fine men individually, dressed in large loose
Mameluke trowsers, anda Polonais cap. Hxact representations of them
are in the London shops.

16th July.—The 13th and 9th went into quarters at Villa Garcia,
but we preferred remaining in our shady camp to being crammed into
a crowded unwholesome town, and were consequently permitted to do
so. Rode to Llerena in the evening.

17th July.—Had company to dinner whose riot and noise was very
disagreeable.

18th July.— Having for some time assumed the high dignity of caterer
and this day settled my accounts, I find it is a very wearing office. It
will teach me to be more regular in accounts for the future, the loss of
about £3 per month is no very good speculation.

L9th July.—FPassed a dull day in the camp a prey to ennwi and the
terrible rays of the sun.

20th July.—Hotter perhaps than ever. Some of the infantry retired
this morning from Llerena to Zafra, in consequence of an application
made from the inhabitants to lessen their burden.

A courier was intercepted with many letters written from ladies of
the best families in Llerena begging their French lovers to drive the
English out of the town. ‘These letters ridiculed us and our manners
in the most contemptuous terms. ‘This exposure was followed by no

w Those of ‘‘ A”’ and “1”? troops were also employed. They were no doubt the heavy iron how-
itzers given the H.A. in 1813.

SWABEY DIARY. 297

arrests as it ought to have been, but General Hill merely published the
letters. The circumstance of a correspondence between a lady and her
admirer is considered as unworthy of remark in this country, where
intrigue is the order of the day.!

Apropos of Spanish ladies, the following account of an incident
which probably occurred at Villa Franca, where the troop was
on and off for upwards of two months is appropriate here.
—F.A.W.

[When I was with Sir Rowland Hill’s corps the warfare we carried
on consisted chiefly in manceuvring, though not so constantly as to
prevent our time being spent very agreeably. But the frequency with
which places on the arc of the semi-circle in which we moved changed
hands must have been trying to the inhabitants whose fidelity how-
ever remained unshaken.

I was at different times for some weeks in the same quarters, and in
the idleness of the time, of course, like others formed acquaintance
with as many fair ladies as would permit or encourage an intimacy.
If my readers knew as much of the Spanish character, female as well
as male, as I do, they would, which I fear they will scarcely otherwise
do, acquit me of all vanity when I recite the following as a character-
istic tale. A certain fair girl not more than 16 years of age gladdened
the house in which I had several times resided, her name was not
poetical, if was Johanna, but to live in the same house and not to have
a tenderness for this fair one would indeed have argued an insensibility
which no officer of my age could have been guilty of. { doubt not
that habited as an Hussar she would have mounted one of my horses
and ridden off, as these Spanish girls have done, provided I could have
brought myself to swear never to desert her, but I was not for various
reasons in that frame of mind nor could I deceive her, All this was
distressing enough, but the last visit I made to the place a cousin of
hers, “ La traidora,’® surpassingly beautiful, and whom I used to call
Azulia though that was not her real name, was her frequent visitor.
This girl was a being not to be viewed with safety or indifference, and
Johanna on very shght grounds became ungovernably jealous. One
day rushing into the room where I was engaged in innocent conversation
with her consin, she stabbed her, fortunately not mortally, and but for
my prompt action would have struck the fatal knife (it was not a
stilletto) into her own heart. Here was a scene! Soon the fathers,

1 Captain E. C, Whinyates writing from camp near Villa Garcia, July 20th, 1812, thus speaks
of this incident.

“The greater part of General Hill’s corps has been for some time in Llerena, a large and popu-
lous town. There are a great many ‘Senoritas,’ ¢.e. young ladies, in it, and these (most wonderful
to relate) have retained so much constancy for their French lovers, that although the English have
oceupied the town a fortnight and have given almost every night balls to amuse them, they still
remember their first attachments. A peasant was taken bearing the bédlets-douw of seventeen of
these Penclopes to their lovers. These epistles afforded much amusement being written with all
the warmth of Spanish passion. How long these fair ones may continue such unheard of fidelity is
very uncertain.”

2 <The traitress.’”

298 SWABEY DIARY.

mothers, uncles, and aunts were congregated, and vengeance vowed
against me, the guiltless cause of this catastrophe; the bleeding Azulia
however had the most of their compassion, and they became shortly so
incensed against each other, that I was overlooked, and in a few days
contrived to march off without either fair creature seated astride, as
was the custom, on one of my led horses].

21st July.—Marched out of our camp this morning at 3 o’clock for
Usagre, where we encamped for the night. We had a heavy thunder-
storm to-day.

22nd July.—Marched at 2 o’clock this morning to our old quarters
at Villa Franca, I was the first Englishman that got into the place.
As it had been much plundered and impoverished by contributions on
the advance of the French, I expected to meet no very cordial reception
the people however seemed to feel the same indifference as usual.

23rd July.—Have been obliged to return to my old billet, one of
the meanest order. I met with the usual kindness from the patrona
Isabella, and the rest of the family, but the devil take all houses at this
time of the year, the fleas and the mosquitos entirely prevented my
sleeping the whole night though very tired.

24th July.—At about 9 o’clock in the morning a report came in
from Colonel Campbell commanding the Portuguese cavalry that the
enemy’s cavalry in force had driven him out of Rivera. Weim mediately
turned out, and after amusing the enemy till about 1 o’clock, we moved
to attack them, the Portuguese on the left, the 9th and Hussars on the
right, and the 13th on the road in the centre. I who had been left
behind with the left half brigade at Villa Franca arrived just as the
column advanced and riding forward moved my guns into a position
looking over the town on one of the French columns; I immediately
came into action, and fired with great precision, rapidity, and effect,
owing to the steadiness of the men, and soon moved them from their
position, when they seemed to wait for the Portuguese, whose
skirmishers behaved gallantly. In the meantime the 13th with our
other three guns joined the right column and did much execution on a
column that moved out of the town. The villains however would not
wait for our charge but moved off in the greatest regularity; we
followed them at a trot along the Llera road for about a league, the
guns several times coming into action with effect. One of my guns
falling to the rear on account of a wheel’s being disabled, I led the
charge with the other, but from the nature of the ground I never got
a shot.

The result of this exploit is the capture of a number of horses and
men, all their rations, and some baggage; the road was strewn with
rum, bread, and biscuit, and my men got two large sacks of new bread.
The most valuable acquisition however is the entire restoration of our
confidence. From what I saw in front of the miserable condition of
the French horses, I believe had we pushed on we might have made
many prisoners. I think on a moderate calculation the enemy’s loss
may be estimated at 50 horses and about 50 men, of which full 30 were

SWABEY DIARY, 299

killed by our shot, or dismounted so as to cause their being made
prisoners.

In the evening we returned and got to Villa Franca about } past 9,
horses fresh and ready for them again. Our loss was a few wounded
and three Portuguese killed.

25th July.—Much prouder than I ever felt before in this place,
which we have so often left to the enemy. I held my head up and
received the compliments of the people.

26th July.—This evening at 8 o’clock we went out on picket which
I understand is to be the system pursued: as it is useless at a distance
from the enemy, I consider it a harassing order.

27th July.—Returned to Villa Franca at 6 o’clock after passing the
night, which was terribly cold, in my cloak, and at 8 o’clock returned
as before to the olive grove.

28th July.—Started off to picket as usual having returned as yester-
day at 6 in the morning. Reports from Ribera speak of the enemy’s
being in force at Llera.

259th TFuly.—Received the pleasing intelligence of Lord Wellington’s
having completely beaten Marmont on the 22nd near Salamanca, ‘under
the following circumstances. Marmont had been marching on his
flank some days toward Rodrigo, when Lord Wellington took up a
position with his left resting on the Tormes, neglecting however to
occupy a hill commanding the left of his position. On this Marmont
then brought up artillery, and commenced a cannonade, without any
intention of bringing ona general action, but to boast of having driven
the English back from Salamanca. ‘I'he enemy’s left rather outflanked
Lord Wellington, who moved the 5th division, which formed his left,
round the rear to his right, and supported by General Le Marchant’s
heavy cavalry brigade, ordered it to attack the enemy’s left flank, and
sweep the whole of the height occupied by him, which was done
completely. At the same time the 4th and Oth divisions advanced in
column on the centre, while the 6th attacked the very rocky height on
the right. It was gained by the Fusiher brigade of the 4th division
attached to the 6th, but a French regiment formed steadily at the
bottom, and advancing upon the brigade, the greatest exertions on the
part of ‘the officers could not prevent the Fusiliers falling back without
receiving the attack ; but supported by two brigades of the 6th division
they afterwards rallied, and had the honour of carrying the height.

The enemy were then obliged to quit their position, taking up
another in rear, which was likewise carried by the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and
6th divisions with the heavy brigade of cavalry. The brunt of this
attack was borne by the 3rd division but it was unable to force the
enemy’s left. The heavy brigade of cavalry then charged them in
hollow square, they being previously much disordered by artillery.

Marmont then retired to a third position his right resting on the
Tormes. This was carried and the rout became general, night only
preventing the total destruction of the army, 4000 dead were counted
on the field besides wounded, 6000 prisoners and 19 pieces of artillery

300 SWABEY DIARY.

taken. Marmont lost an arm! and Bonnet and another general were
wounded. Our loss is estimated at between 3000 and 4000 men.
General Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade, General
Victor Alten of the cavalry, Marshal Beresford, and Sir Stapleton
Cotton are wounded.

The charge on a solid square of infantry of the enemy’s rear guard
on the 24th, was one of the most gallant actions of the war.2 The

prisoners say the French army is dispirited and discontented.

30th July.—A General Salute was fired in honour of Lord Welling-
ton’s success, and we have intelligence of 3000 more prisoners being
taken making 9000.

Joseph’s army coming up to re-inforee Marmont, had its advanced
guard driven in, and when this account came away, he was in full
retreat.

We all remained in camp this night, General Hill having ordered a
double ration of spirits to be issued to the men to drink Lord Welling-
ton’s health. We gave him repeated cheers, but every individual
accompanied them by wishing a parallel opportunity to occur to us.

Ist August.—We were permitted to return into quarters this morning
a change very agreeable to us all.

2nd August.—Confound all dilatory and spiritless Generals! We
were this morning under arms at 3 o’clock and having returned to
quarters and unharnessed, about 9 when I was in bed, came an alarm
and turn out. This was occasioned by the Hussars being attacked in
Ribera, into which place though occupied by us, the French had
actually sent and ordered rations, promising to come for them.

The Alcalde had consequently prepared them, for which piece of
service had I my will I should certainly hang him for not giving us
information, notwithstanding that the French whenever they had
possession of the place, which is one that must change masters every
day, would undoubtedly serve him the same way had he done so, yet
justice should be vigorous and the Alcalde is at liberty to fly whenever
the enemy advances, then his house and property are burnt, neverthe-
less I would hang him to intimidate others.

1 Marmont in his memoirs tome 7, page 116 describes as follows mecting with the Non-Commis-
sioned Officer, then Quartermaster Sergeant J. Wightman, who caused his wound. “ Before leaving
Ghent in 1815, previous to Waterloo, { wished to sce a company of English horse artillery which
was there. The English material is so different from what we used formerly, that the comparison
was curious. I therefore examined it in detail, and I admired the simplicity of the construction,
since adoptedin France. This visit caused a singular incident, they presented to me the Maréchal
des logis, who, on the 22nd July 1812, had laid the gun whose discharge had broken my arm an
hour before the battle of Salamanca. There could be no mistake; this fatal wound had been caused
by asingle gunshot, fired at a certain time at a known spot.’’ I gave this under officer a good recep-
tion. Since then I saw the same man at Woolwich where he was-a store keeper, [ Lieut. Invalid
Artillery] when I was there in 1830, to visit that magnificent arsenal. Then however he had only
one arm, having lost the other at Waterloo. In condoling with him I said, “my good fellow each
has his turn.”

2 The charge was made by the heavy cavalry of the K. G. Legion under Major-General Bock.
“ Bock was near sighted, and not being aware of the proximity of the enemy, when Lieut.-Colonel
May, R.A., brought him the order to charge, added, after expressing his readiness to comply ; but
you will be good enough to show us the enemy.” ‘To this request Colonel May readily assented,
and gallantly accompanied the first squadron in the charge, where he was severely wounded. When
afterwards relating the circumstance, the gallant Colonel was wont jestingly to add: “That is what
I got by playing the dragoon, and leading the Germans.’’ History of King’s German Legion,
Vol. II, page 82.

SWABEY DIARY. 301

On the approach of the enemy who had four squadrons and 400
infantry, the Hussars who had only two squadrons behaved most gallant-
ly charging them three times. Major Bussche repeatedly sent to Sir
William Erskine for support, who instead of pushing on, unwarrant-
ably delayed the troops, and left him to retire as well as he could with
the loss of an officer and 20 men killed, wounded, and taken prisoners,
besides about ten of the 9th likewise killed and wounded, and he
actually halted whilst 4 squadrons of cavalry and 400 infantry were
doing what they pleased in Ribera, though he had the Hussars, the
9th and 13th Dragoons, 3rd Dragoon Guards, with our guns; and he
might have had the 71st regiment 700 strong. As it was the 71st
regiment did not arrive till after the enemy had retired, but the force
was adequate without, and no danger could be apprehended from their
infantry. If we had advanced and looked into the town, in case of the
enemy’s retiring, we should have killed half their infantry with our
guns, and if they had not thought proper to retire in face of them we
should have delayed till the 71st gave an account of them.

The transaction is altogether calculated to dispirit the soldier,
discontent the officer, and take away all confidence in the General,
whose conduct must be generally ridiculed and despised.

The Portuguese infantry under General Campbell behaved very
differently the day before yesterday at Zafra, where a similar attempt
was made with about the same force by the enemy, General C. placed
his men in a wood, so as to allow them to pass and get the rations,
and on their return he fell upon and made prize of them all killing,
wounding, and taking prisoners about 60.

drd August.—Diseracefully abandoning our post at Ribera, we now
only keep our outpost in the wood on the road.

5th August.—Ambrose and Lefebure being already seriously attacked
by typhus fever, and Whinyates ill with the ague, and Carter with a
bilious complaint, I fell sick with the fever, which by timely remedies
I thank God I got rid of before night, as its consequences are very
alarming. I was extremely fortunate in knowing what it was and
arresting its progress. No news.

6th August.—Sutton sickened to-day with the fever, which likewise
threatened me again towards evening.

7th August.—I woke this morning with the most violent and
insupportable pain in my head I ever felt, which having endured for
some hours, at last turned into a fit of the ague, which I was extremely
glad to change for the apprehensions that an alarming fever occasions.
Mr. Peach of the 9th Dragoons who attended me, made me immediately
get into water during the hot fit, and repeat this operation several
times. The getting into water in a fever makes one shudder almost as
much as if told to get into a furnace. One of the worst of my com-
plaints was the total want of money, so that I could not even get fruit
and wine, that were particularly recommended. When the fit left me
after 8 hours, I began to feel a wish to be quietly reposing in some cool
spot in Hngland, and it brought to my remembrance every tender re-
collection and regret. Sickness is at any time bad, but under all my

302 SWABEY DIARY.

circumstances and with the probability of the army’s moving, in which
case I could not have stirred, it put me in mind of French prisons,
Bayonne and all its horrors.

Sth August.—I employed an interval of comparative health, only to
wait the coming of the fever to-morrow.

Ith August.—I lay the greater part of the day in indescribable
agony from pain in head and eyes, but rallied, and by order of the
surgeon, rode out in the evening, though scarcely able to sit on my
horse.

10th August.—The fever did not return to the charge again to-day,
and I swallowed oceans of bark to prevent its effects to-morrow, as I
was already much weakened.

11th August.—My attack to-day was so much slighter, that I made
up my mind to go to Zafra to-morrow for change of air.

[It was previous to the Salamanca retreat in 1812 that owing to the
extensive sickness which prevailed in Sir Rowland Hill’s division, I was
detached from my own people to assist the reduced number of officers
in another troop. Ague degenerating into typhus was the prevailing
malady. ‘The Spaniards are scarcely ever free from the former. ‘La
calentura,” which I suppose might mean any fever, was a daily visitor
in every house large or small, none escaped its visitations, and this
appears always to be the case and not a peculiarity of the time or
circumstances. With us, unless when a man was attacked on the march,
and in that case it often turned to typhus, it was easily cured by Peru-
vian bark with which the medicine chests were largely supplied. The
natives seemed to consider it as a component part of their constitutions
and shivered and burnt alternately with the most laudable resignation,
and except when we gave it them seldom employed any antidote. Years
after however when my military days were at an end, I had a footman
who had been a soldier in the 8rd Dragoon Guards, and who had a recipe
for ague given him by a Spanish priest. This effectually distanced in
its effects all the medical skill in the neighbourhood where I lived during
a prevalence of this lingering complaint, which is very frequent in
English country parishes, and though not often immediately fatal dis-
poses the sufferer to dropsy, typhus, and many other serious disorders].

12th August.—In the cool of the evening I left Villa Franca, Lefebure
and Ambrose to cure themselves, and rode over to Zafra, where I had
previously sent to secure a billet, and accomplished the ride with
tolerable ease.

13th August.—My disorder to-day was so slight that I congratulated
myself on having so soon got rid of a bad business.

14th August.—Being much strengthened, I rode this evening with
Captain Maxwell into the mountains, when all on a sudden, in the
valley between two large sierras, we came to an immense lake, on which
the moon was shining, the whole forming the finest night scene I had
ever beheld, I was at a loss to account for such an accumulation

SWABEY DIARY. 303

of water at this time of the year, when scarcely a brook is to be found
between the Guadiana and the Mediterranean. Upon enquiring of the
inhabitants, an immense stone dam was pointed out to me, built across
the bottom of the valley and confining the water, which was let off by
flood gates to different mills, which, | was informed, grind the whole
corn of this part of the province, and I thus had a riddle explained which
I never before could understand, for I had often wondered how the wheat
was ground in a country where there was no water, or wind to turn a
mill, or other machinery to supply the defect. They were now hard at
work to get all the corn ground before the water evaporated as they
could not even spare what was daily sucked up by the sun. It is need-
less to add that the water is thus collected in the rainy season.

15th August.—To my great joy this, which was the returning day of
my fever, passed without its making its appearance.

16th August.—Continuing to amend, I ventured to write to Catherine
an account of my illness.

17th August.—General Hill reviewed the troops here this evening.
Intelligence was received of Lord Wellington’s entering Madrid,
amidst the acclamations of the people. The Retiro and the Plaza de
Toros had been fortified, but capitulated and two thousand prisoners
were taken.

Sth August.—Intelligence was received of Colonel Skerrett’s brigade
consisting of three British regiments and some Spaniards and Port-
uguese having landed at Ayamonte.

An expedition was fitted out consisting of 3500 Spanish troops
under General Crux, and 1590 British and Portuguese under
Colonel Skerrett wlth a view to attack Niebla. The troops
landed at Huelva, on the coast not far from Ayamonte, at
the mouth of the Guadiana, on 14th and 15th of August, but
the French evacuated and destroyed the castle on the 12th.
Wellington Despatches, Vol. [X., page 380.

19th August.—It appears undoubted that General Maitland! is in
Murcia or Valencia with 10,000 British and Spanish troops, his object
is Barcelona which is very strong.

Lord Wellington has established an extensive magazine at Cartha-
gena.

20th August.—No extraordinary occurrence happened to record;
this day like many others.

21st August.—Feeling myself sufficiently recovered I rode over this
evening to Fuente Cantos, whither part of the troop had removed.
The French made a strong recognisance of our outposts from Ribera
to Almendralejo. Two deserters came in and three Jwramentado
officers ; these rascals are Spaniards that have sworn to fight for King
Joseph. Their oaths do not seem to be very burdensome when they
find their cause diminishing in popularity.

1 Landed at Alicante on the 3rd August.

304, SWABEY DIARY.

22nd August.—I received to-day the unwelcome intelligence of the
misfortunes of my poor troop in the North. It appears that the 7th
division, Macdonald’s troop, and some Portuguese cavalry superior in
number to the enemy’s cavalry that skirmished with them, were to
enter Madrid. The cavalry and horse artillery were in front, and the
French Dragoons formed to charge, when the rascally Portuguese
though nearly double the French turned tail and ran back on Mac-
donald’s guns, and so mixed with them that he could neither fire nor
retire, and lost 3 of his guns, the carriages of which the enemy burned
and the guns were spiked. Dyneley was taken prisoner and many men,
their behaviour was excellent and received the just reward of praise
from their General. In sympathizing in their misfortunes, I conld not
help envying them the glory they acquired, and the opportunity of
conducting themselves nobly.

Brereton ' joined the troop from Cadiz to-day.

The disaster to “HM” troop referred to occurred the day before
Lord Wellington’s troops entered Madrid. he following
extract” from a letter written by Captain Dyneley on returning
to Madrid after his capture and escape elucidates this affair.
—F.A.W.

“Very shortly after I sent off my letter of August 9th, we
received orders to march at 2 inthe morning. The troop
accordingly moved forward about 2 leagues on the Madrid
road and halted.

At the request of the German Colonel Commanding,’ I accompanied
him about a league to the front for the purpose of reconnoit-
ring the enemy. As soon as their rear guard opened fire
upon us, we retired upon our advance and remained waiting
further orders which arrived at 3 p.m. directing us to advance
immediately as far as ib was safe; we did so until our
vedettes were driven in, and then halted in the road for the
night.

1 Lieutenant William Brereton (Kane’s List No. 1258) served in the Peninsula, France, and Flanders
from December 1809, to June 1815, including the sieges of Matagorda, Cadiz, (wounded) and St.
Sebastian ; battles of Barrosa (wounded), Vitoria, the Pyrences, Orthes, Toulouse, Quatre Bras and
Waterloo (severely wounded); at the affairs of San Munos, Helette, St. Palais, Sauveterre, Aire,
and Tarbes.

He was second in command of the expedition under Major-General D’ Aguilar in 1847, which
captured the forts of the Bocca Tigris in the Canton river, those of Staked Barrier and at Canton,
spiking 879 pieces of ordnance. }

He was on board the flag-ship Brittania during the naval action of the allied fleets with the de-
fences of Sevastapol, 17th October 1854, and directed the rockets fired from that ship against the
forts and city. Lieutenant-General Sir William Brereton, x.c.B., K.1m. received the Peninsular
medal with 6 clasps, the Waterloo, China, and Crimean medals. He died July 27th 1864. By his
will he left a handsome legacy of £1000, to the Royal Artillery, «the interest upon which fo be
expended in maintaining the game of cricket, to be played by the N.C. officers and privates of
the Royal Artillery at Woolwich.”

2This extract is froma very long and amusing letter which with others it is hoped to give in
extenso in the “ Proceedings” at some future date.

3 Colonel de Jonquiéres: in the absence of Major-General Bock commanding the allied cavalry
vice Sir Stapleton Cotton wounded at Salamanca, he commanded the German Legion heavy cayalry

brigade.

SWABEY DIARY. 305

At daylight next morning, the 11th, we discovered the enemy’s
cavalry drawn up about half a league in front of us. We
advanced and they retired over nearly two leagues of ground,
the Colonel constantly asking me if they were within range,
to which I replied ‘no, no, no sir” At length I asked him
if he would allow one of his Regiments to accompany my
guns to the top of a hill down which the enemy’s cavalry
was then going, and to this he immediately agreed. Off we
set at a trot, from that to a gallop, then to speed, and reached
the hilltop just as they got to the bottom, opened fire and put
them to flight in style; they made for the town of Las Rozas
and drew up to make a stand, but we advanced and drove
them through the town.

Soon after Macdonald with two guns came up and took command
of the whole troop. We then again advanced and drove the
enemy for nearly half a league before us, when they made
another stand. I went on with 2 guns and moved them from
their position, and after firme 6 or 8 rounds they retired
altogether, leaving us about half a leaeue beyond the town of
Majalahonda. We remained here about 2 hours. and then
received orders to go into the town and make ourselves com-
fortable.t

Harding and I soon founda house, got breakfast, lay down and had
had nearly 3 hours sleep, and were half dressed again when
our Commissary came into the room and said, ‘they say the
French are coming on again.’ I took this very quietly,
but rather hurried my dressing. In a short time a Portu-
guese officer put his head into the window, frightened out
of his hfe, and stuttered out, ‘Muito grande e feroz cavaleria
franceza—vega, vega pela janella, Senhor Capitio—com os
swos canoes, muito brava, brava, brava’ As soon as he had
taken his departure, I put my head out of the window and
sent a man to tell the Trumpeter to ‘sound out’ immediately.
All the horses were in the stables; some of the men drawing
rations, others getting their horses shod etc., however, con-
sidering everything, they got to the alarm post astonishingly
soon.

Not a soul knew Macdonald’s house, nor could he be heard of
in any direction ; so as soon as 2 guns were ready, my friend
Harding and I went away with them at score to the front,
and directed the rest to follow. Just as we got clear of the
town Macdonald joined us, he had been asleep in his quarters
and by great luck the noise awoke him. He gave directions
for the other guns to take the right road and we took the
left, the Portuguese cavalry being drawn up between. We had
no sooner gained the ground from whence we opened our fire
than I saw how the thing was to go withus. The Portuguese
wavered, and [ turned to Harding and said, ‘ The French will

1The German cavalry went back again to Las Rosas leaving a picket of 40 dragoons in front of
the 3 Portuguese cavalry regiments under Major-General D’ Urban.

306

SWABEY DIARY.

most certainly turn ourright flank, I hope the guns there will be
able to get away.’

By this time the French cavalry had gained much upon us

and the cowardly scoundrels of Portuguese put about and
set off as hard as they could go, leaving only 20 of the
German cavalry to protect us. We of course limbered up
and away we went at speed; by the time we had galloped
300 or 400 yards the confusion became very great, the Portu-
guese had given way in every direction and were flying before
the enemy who were close upon our heels. At this time I
was galloping about a dozen yards in rear of the last gun, and
had continued abouta quarter of a mile further, when, whether
my horse made a trip, or whether one of the cowardly scoun-
drels in crossing me upset him, I know not, but certain it is
that we came head over heels together, and away he went
leaving me upon the ground. I was hurt a little by the fall
and had one of my shoes nearly torn off my foot. How I
escaped being ridden over I know not for the dust was so
great it was impossible to see a yard before one, however, as
soon as I got upon my feet and had run about 50 yards, I found
the enemy had got in upon one of our right guns, and I saw
them cut the drivers from their horses. I thought I had no
business there and so ran on and came upon the second right
gun which the French had been at; the three drivers were
lying dead by their horses’ side. I then ran away to the
right, when I discovered the gun I had left was not in the
hands of the enemy but had been upset, and our poor fellows,
my friend Bombardier Morgan at their head, had dismounted
to right it. I returned towards them, but before I had gone
many yards, I heard a terrible shriek of ‘ Avanti, Avanti, ah
traditor inglese, I looked behind me and discovered about 4
squadrons not more than 50 yards in my rear. The officer
commanding them rode and made a cut at me but I made my
bow and escaped. As soon as he could pull up his horse he
came at me again. When I saw this I sang out ‘ Ufficiale
inglese prigiomere, he then came up brandishing his sword
over my head saying ‘Mi dia la sua spada, Mia dia la sua
spada, all I had to say on this subject was ‘st, si si.

A staff officer then rode up and asked me what country I came

from? ‘Hngland,’ says I, ‘Signor,’ which seemed to please
him mightily, and he took me off to a General officer who
was near at the time, who addressed me in English, at least
ib was nearer our language than any other. He asked me
what cavalry we had in the field, I said 8000, he told me I
told a lie and desired I would speak the truth. I said Lord
Wellington had that number with him, but that perhaps he
had not at the moment more than 8000 in the field, (though
I knew his Lordship had not more than the latter number
altogether with this part of the army). The General then
rode away shaking his fingers ab me and saying I was a bad
one.

SWABEY DIARY. 307

I was then given in charge to one of his orderlies to be marched
to the rear. He had not taken me above a hundred yards
before he desired me to give up my spurs, a very favourite
pair Bertie Cator gave me many years ago at Malta, by the
time I had got then off, up came all the poor fellows belong-
ing to our guns, some of them most dreadfully mangled.
Though we were all sorry to find ourselves in such a situation,
yet we were naturally happy to be together. At this
moment a General rode across near me, and I called to him
to allow his surgeon to dress my wounded, which he instantly
consented to do and I got them bound up as comfortably as
I could expect; one poor fellow, a corporal, had nine wounds.
I had him dressed first and laid aside, and was attending
to another, when the corporal called to me to say he was
dying and that a Frenchman was stripping him, I looked
round and there the fellow was pulling his boots off; he paid
no attention to what 1 said, and I suppose if I had said much
more he would soon have had mineoff. . . ... .
The next morning, the 12th, at daylight I got up and looked
out of the window. I saw the gun horses going past with
the French scoundrels on their backs. From a French officer
I learnt with no small delight that they had burnt the three
guns they had taken from us, for I knew we should soon be
able to replace the carriages.

About an hour after this I was sent for with all the prisoners to
the general’s house. He selected all those very badly wound-
ed, about 5, and put them into a house that the English
might fetch them away when the French retired. Those
with only one cut or stab they obliged to march on
without once having had their wounds dressed, but when
I left them they were all getting quite well. Just as we
were marching off, who should I see brought into the ring
but my friend the German Colonel; ke had been taken
poor fellow, after having made three or four most des-
perate charges. Oh how the poor fellows of his regiment
who were left behind to protect us behaved! There were
certainly not more than 20 of the Germans, but the instant
they saw the scrape the guns were in they formed up in sup-
port, which was no sooner done than down came at least 150
cavalry and lancers, and though they fought like men were
soon overpowered and every soul of them cut to pieces.’’!

Apropos of this affair we have a good story. Captain Dyneley in
after years used to say that his last recollection before being
upset was as follows.

“Tieutenant Swabey being temporarily absent, Lieutenant Robe
was doing duty in his place. The latter had a sword which

1 Lord Wellington in his despatch from Madrid, August 13th, says, ‘The conduct of the brave
German cayalry was, I understand, excellent, as well as that of Captain Macdonald’s troop of
Horse Artillery.”

The casualties were, killed 53, wounded 98, missing 44,

308 SWABEY DIARY.

had attracted some notice from an inscription of which he
appeared to be somewhat shy, and which ran to the effect
that the weapon was ‘the gift of his affectionate father in
approbation of his good conduct.’ This was a standing
joke. Whilst the officers were engaged in the rear trying
to check the Portuguese flight which not only left them
exposed but prevented their retiring, Lieutenant Newland
perceiving the French close on them, while he drew his own
sword, shouted to Robe, ‘Now then Robe,' out with your
approbation.”

_Theservices of Lieutenant Wm. Livingstone Robe, R.H.A., (Kane’s List No. 1390), son of Colonel
Sir William Robe, K.C.B., R.A., were so numerous and he was so distinguished a young officer
that it is not out of place here to give them in some detail. He obtained his first commission
October 3rd, 1807, and went that year under Sir John Moore to Gottenburg. In August 1808
under the same officer he went to Portugal, and in October advanced with his army to Salamanca
and Astorya, and was present in the retreat from thence to Corufia. Engaged at Lugo.

From Gibraltar he joined Lord Wellington’s army on March 11th, 1811, at Pombal while engag-
ed with the French then in retreat, and he was in all the daily actions of that pursuit of Masséna,
particularly at Sabugal, April 8rd, at Fuentes de Honor, May 3rd, 4th, and 5th. He served at the
Ist siege of Badajos, June Ist to 10th, and at the repulse of Marshal Marmont’s attack at El] Boden,
September 25th.

At this time he was recalled to Gibraltar, but on the way he threw himself into Tarifa, and
served during the siege by General Laval, December 19th, to January 4th, 1812. He was com-
manded for his able defence from the Island.

He afterwards joined Lord Wellington’s army, and was attached to “1” troop R.H.A., served
at the action on the heights of Salamanca, June 16th, 1812, at the siege of the forts June 17th, to
27th. At the operations prior to, and at the battle of Salamanca, Jul y 22nd, on which day he was
in charge of the two pieces of <*E” troop from one of which a shell wounded Marshal Marmont
just before the battle, this was known afterwards through the prisoners. He was engaged at Maj-
alahonda, August 11th, against the troops of Joseph Bonaparte, at the capture of Madrid and
surrender of the Retiro, August 13th and 14th. He seryed at the siege of Burgos, September 18th
to October 18th. In the retreat from Burgos, his father being wounded near Valladolid, he
attended him to Lisbon and thence to England.

In 1813, he rejoined the army on the Bidassoa. The Marquis of Wellington having given him the
command of a brigade of mountain guns carried on mules, he was with them at the battles of Niv-
elles and Nive in November and December, when he had the honour of being mentioned and
recommended for the gold medal for Nivelles and clasp for Nive, being the only subaltern officer so
noticed. On the advance of the army into France he was employed af the investment of Bayonne,
and was instrumental in obstructing the conveyance of supplies for that place by destroying the
boats, one of which he foreed to run on shore, and then burnt by hot shot from his small guns.

On the reassembling of the army under the Duke of Wellington in Belgium in 1815, he joined it
with Captain Norman Ramsay’s ‘‘H” troop R.H.A. He was engagedin the retreat from Quatre Bras
on the 17th June, and in the memorable battle of Waterloo concluded his short but active carcer in
his countries service, being shot at the close of the day by arifleman while directing his guns
against the enemy’s columns.

Some particulars of his death and of his character are given in the following letters. Writing to
Sir William Robe from Amiens 7th August 1815, 2nd Captain and brevet Major A. Macdonald
says, “‘I should have written you long ere this had not a wound which deprived me of the use of
my arm prevented me. As to the fall of your lamented son and my esteemed friend, I can only
say that few young men have left this life more sincerely regretted, and his exertions on the 18th will
ever endear his memory to all who witnessed his noble conduct on that day. Major Ramsay’s last
words to me were as follows, ‘ did you ever witness such conduct as that of Brereton and Robe?”......
About 5 o’clock on the 18th your son reccived a mortal wound, and about the same time the follow-
ing day he died at the village of Waterloo, after twice having taken leaye of me in the most
friendly and affectionate manner......... His remains were interred in a beautiful spot in the
village of Waterloo, where I intend to raise a monument to his memory.”

Writing to his father on the 8th July 1815 from Paris, Lieutenant Robe, R.H., says,........
** Major Macdonald, and the surgeon that formerly belonged to Bean’s troop at Chatham, I forget
his name, [Ambrose] were with him when he expired, both of whom were his particular friends.
The former was with him when he received his wound, he says he called to him immediately for
assistance and thought he could walk off the field, but on attempting to rise from the ground he
found he was unable. Macdonald then ordered some men to carry him to a house in Waterloo,
and he accompanied him and saw every possible care taken of him. Upon the surgeon examining
the wound he found the ball had entered his groin and settled in the intestines, which caused an
inflammation which proved fatal. When the surgeon toldhim it was impossible to save him, he
appeared quite calm, and said there was no help for it, shook hand with him and Macdonald, and
did not seem the least to regret his fate. When they asked him if he had anything to say to his
friends, he said, ‘No, only give my love to my father and mother, and all my friends at home and

SWABEY DIARY. 309

To return to the diary and “ D ” troop.

24th August.—Rode in the evening to Villa Franca and called on
General Long; whilst there Stenowitz, Sir William Erskine’s aide-de-
camp, who was taken whilst reconnoitring a few days ago, was sent in by
the count d’Hrlon, even without being exchanged. This handsome con-
duct excites universal applause which is the due of our courteous and
liberalenemy. Instead of expecting to have him restored everyone be-
lieved he would be hung asa deserter from the French, for, having been
taken from the Austrians in the battle of Wagram, he had entered
their service, but on their entering Spain had deserted and enlisted in
our Ist Hussars, where his story and his merit soon brought him a
commission. Huis exploits since are well known; certainly with all
justice he might have been hung.

goth August.—I was fortunate enough to find in my landlord’s house
an old edition of Don Quixote and commenced reading, but found the
early Spanish language as difficult to understand as the work of
Chaucer would be to a Spaniard instructed recently in our modern
English.

My priest was one of the few well-informed of this country, and had
a very fair collection of books. This exception is not as generally
supposed peculiar to priests, for in most of their houses I have generally
in vain tried to find any other than religious books. These usually are
the lives of different saints, alias a compendium of ecclesiastical imposi-
tions.

26th August.—Received an order to march at 2 o’clock in the

say to them I hope I have behaved like a soldier.’ He soon after became insensible and remained
so for some time,when he recovered the doctor saw it was his last moments, went up to him but
found him speechless. On perceiving him, William stretched out his hand, and when he gave him
his, he squeezed it and expired.

Macdonald at this time was suffering so much from his own wound that he could not see him.
Tt is impossible to say how much we owe to these two gentlemen for their kindness and attention
to him, as well as the regard we must all feel for the kind manner in which they speak of him,
indeed he was beloved by all his brother officers as much for his virtues as his bravery. Macdonald
says had he and poor Cromie* lived they would have been particularly mentioned, and every interest
made for their promotion, that before poor Ramsay was killed, he came up to him and expressed
his astonishment at their cool and gallant behaviour when the fire was so hot that it was impossible
to imagine that anyone could escape. He expressed himself nearly in this manner. ‘ Those two
fellows, Cromie and Robe, are invaluable officers, did you ever see anything to equal such behaviour.’
The man who shot him was quite close, and took deliberate aim at him, indeed the enemy were so
near that the guns were nearly surrounded, and still the men remained firm to them.”

In the church at Waterloo there is a monument to Lieutenant Robe’s memory with the following
inscription.

Erected by his brother officers
to the memory of
Lieutenant William Livingstone Robe
of the British Royal Horse Artillery
Son of Colonel Sir William Robe
K.C.B., and K.T.S.
He fell nobly at Waterloo, 18th June, 1815,
aged 24 years
being the 83rd time he had faced his country’ foes.
He was known and distinguished by
Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

From Record of Service and letters in possession of the late Miss Vimiera Robe.

* Lieutenant Cromie was in “D”’ Troop, and died from the loss of both legs; both troops were on
the right of the Charleroi road and contiguous to one another,

310 SWABEY DIARY.

morning to Villa Franca where we remained and bivyouacked. I went
and hid my diminished head in the town not thinking it a match for
the rays of the sun.

27th August.—Marched at 2 o’clock to Usagre where we bivouacked
in the old place near Bienvenida.

28th August.—Marched into quarters at Villa Garcia for the day.
For the first time since my illness I did the whole of the duty.

<Ith August.—Marched at 3 o’clock for Berlanga where we got into
houses. The Spaniards have quite changed their tone in all their
towns since we were here before. They have suffered the next extreme
to total ruin. The French have robbed them of all their property,
carts, mules etc., corn and everything they had time to take away.

Speaking of the character of these practical oppressions I cannot
omit a circumstance which sets them out in all their bloody colours.
At Villa Garcia whilst sitting in my house after dark one of the men
brought a Spaniard to me declaring he had stolen his jacket, I was
conversing with a priest who seemed quite lost in surprise because as
he expressed it, the man did not tremble before me, saying, if I had
been a French officer he would have been shaking from head to foot
and most likely would have been hung. When I found no direct proof
against the man I ordered him to be liberated which still more aston-
ished the divine who upon enquiry I found out to be a member of the
Santa Hermandad! or inquisition.

1“ Holy Brotherhood,”’ associations of cities of Castile and Aragon to defend their liberties,
began about the middle of the 18th century. The brotherhood was disorganised in 1498, order
having been firmly established. It is said to have been continued as a voluntary “police.”
Haydn Dictionary of Dates.

(To be Continued).

dll

ABSTRACT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

PIPTY-BIGHTH ANNUAL GENERAL MBBRING
ROYAL Een eea ee Been oie Ae g e
“eS He N <a

N04 ENT Fe
THE Meeting was held in the Lecture Theatre, Royal United~Service- i
Institution, Whitehall, at 3 p.m., Friday, 7th June, 1895.

Lieut.-General E. F, Chapman, O.B., Director of Military Intelligence,

took the Chair at 3 p.m., and asked the Secretary to read the Report ;
as follows :—

The number of Members joining is one more than in the preceding Annual Report
year.

The Library continues to increase, and soon the Committee will have
to face the question of further extension.

During the Winter Season there were nine Lectures, and the attendance _ Lectures.
at all of these was excellent. This season, as last, the Committee have
twice been ‘At Home,’ at 4 p.m., and on each occasion the reception was
succeeded by a Lecture; that in November given by Professor
C. V. Boys, F.R.S., on “ Quartz Fibres,” and that in March by Doctor
Bowdler Sharpe, F.R.S., LL.D., on “ Curiosities of Bird Life ;” each was
thoroughly appreciated by a crowded audience. The latter Lecture has
drawn attention to the fine Ornithological Collections and Library
belonging to the Institution. The Lecture by Major E. 8. May, R.A.,
on the 7th March, on the “Co-operation of Guns with Cavalry,”
secured a large attendance; the Lecture and discussion have been
published in a recent number of the ‘Proceedings,’ and the Com-
mittee think it should prove interesting to each service.

The other Lecturers were Major A. J. Hughes, R.A., on “ Oke-
hampton, 1894;” Lt.-Col. J. R. J. Jocelyn, R.A., on “Coast
Artillery in Action ;” T. M. Maguire, Esq., LL.D., on “General
Bourbaki’s Campaign ;” Major P. A. MacMahon, F.R.S., R.A., on
“Terrestrial Refraction and Mirage ;” Victor Horsley, Esq., F.R.S.,
on “Bullet Wounds of High Velocity Small Bore Rifles ;” Captain

M. Horace Hayes, F.R.C.V.S., on “The Horse from a Military Point of
View.”

Among the Gifts received, the most valuable is the Collection of Gifts.
Dickson Manuscripts, notes and papers ; these consist of diaries, note
books, commentaries, and correspondence of the late Major-General Sir
Alexander Dickson, G.C.B., K.C.H., R.A., and of his son General Sir
Collingwood Dickson, Q),€., G.C.B., R.A., by whom they were presented
to the Institution. They are contained in four large chests which are
deposited in the Instrument Room, and the Committee have authorised

7. VOL, XXII, 43

Honorary
Members.

Publications

Rotunda
Museum

312 ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95.

the Secretary to undertake a descriptive catalogue of the entire collection.
When this is completed it will be easier to judge how the information
can be best used for the benefit of the Regiment and to the honour of

_ the Dickson family.

The Committee have elected the following gentlemen connected with
military arts and sciences Honorary Members, viz. :—
J.C. Ropes, Esq., Author of “ Life of Napoleon,” “ Waterloo,”
“The Story of the Civil War in America,” &e.
Victor Horsley, Esq., F.R.S., M.B.

A Sub-committee was appointed last July to consider the question of
re-publishing Kane’s List, and how the valuable information collected
by General W. H. Askwith, Col. Commandant, might be used to the great-
est advantage. ‘They received a small grant of money from the Committee
and now report that General Askwith’s notes have all been copied out
into a form most convenient for reproduction ; these notes when added
to Kane’s List as now printed will considerably increase its bulk, and
will give the foreign and war services of every officer who has served
in the Regiment. ‘The Committee are still engaged in completing the
MSS. of the revised Kane’s List, and they recommend that when ready,
it shall be sent to a printer for an estimate of the suni required to
print and publish the work.

During the year grants were made to two officers formerly in the
Regiment, to assist them in the production of works of regimental
historical interest ; and the Committee are glad to be able to announce
that they are about to publish Col. N. L. Walford’s translation of
Von Hoenig’s valuable work, “24 Hours of Moltke’s Strategy,’’a graphically
detailed story of the battle of Gravelotte and St. Privat. This work is
issued gratis to every Member of the Institution, much in the same
form as Col. Walford’s translations of Prince Kraft’s letters.

Thanks to the kind help of Capt. C. Orde-Browne, the Committee
have been able to make a very characteristic display in the Rotunda
Museum of the men in armour, among others the suit of armour,
generally believed to have been Bayard’s, has been fitted on a model
and mounted on a horse in a central position.

H.R.H. the Colonel of the Regiment has been pleased to allow of the
inscription on the Rotunda Pillar, among ‘the names memorable in the
service of the Artillery,’ of that of Lieutenant-General Sir John Macleod,
G.C.H., the first D.A.G., R.A., and afterwards Director-General of
Artillery.

The Committee, with the sanction of the Trustees of the Lefroy Gold
Medal Trust, have adopted as the Seal of the Institution, a device
of Britannia seated studying a chart with a heavy B.L. gun on iron
carriage close behind her, and the sea with cliffs rising from it in the
background, bearing on it the motto ‘Arte et Marte,’ and have provided
for the use of Members a design of the Regimental Arms, mottos and
device correctly painted for them by the Heralds’ College.

Among the deaths are to be noted the names of the following
Officers :—

Gen. R. F. Copland-Crawford, Col. Commdt.; Gen. Sir D. E. Wood,
G.C.B., Col. Commdt. ; Lt.-Gen. H. P. Goodenough ; Major-Gen. J. H.
P. Anderson; Major-Gen. R. Curtis; Major-Gen. F. G. Ravenhill ;

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95. 313

Major-Gen. W. L. Yonge; Col. Sir G. A. Maude, K.C.B.; Col. G. C.
H. Parlby ; Lt.-Col. 8. G. Fairtlough ; Surg. Col. A. C. Gaye; Lieut.
C. Kenny.

Accounts—

Appendices A and B show the previous year’s charges before each
item.

The General Credit is £4256, as against £4096 last year.
The Accounts, as submitted, were passed by the meeting.

The subject of the essays for the Duncan Gold Medal, 1895, was
“The most suitable system applicable for training together in peace
time the Garrison Artillery forces of the Empire, including Regular,
Militia, Volunteer, and Colonial Artillery, with a view to their duties
in war time in Coast Fortresses being more clearly defined.”

Major-Gen. H. LeG. Geary, C.B., Col. R. McG. Stewart, C.B., A.D.C.,
and Col. H. H. Goodeve, A.A.G., kindly consented to act as Judges.

Thirteen Essays were submitted for competition, and the Judges
recommend that the writer of the essay bearing the motto “In medio
tutissimus ibis” be awarded a Silver Medal; that the writers of the
essays bearing the mottos “Pro aris et focis” and “Mens sana in
corpore sano” be commended.

The Secretary opened the sealed envelopes and announced that
Captain E. G. Nicolls, R.A., is the winner of the Silver Medal, and
that Lt.-Cols. R. F. Williams, R.A., and A. W. White, R.A., are com-
mended.

Rewards for Papers—Col. G. J. Burgmann, Lt.-Col. R. A. Montgomery,
R.A., and Capt. J. M. Grierson, R.A., kindly consented to act as Judges.

The sum of £50 is awarded in proportions as below for the papers as
follows—

Colonel F. A. Whinyates ... «- “Swabey’s Diary” ... doo 280
Major R. H. Murdoch, R.A. .. ‘Brome-Walton Family” ... £6
Hay R. ay G. 8. Clarke, K.C.M.G., | « Floating Defence”... sa A)
Major F. G. Stone: Rae .. ‘Artillery Mobilisation” .., £4
Major H. P. Hickman, R. wu .. “Attack of Land Fortress ” £4
Major R. M. Kelly, R. eee ... “Coast Defence Fire ” 500 Ae
Captain C. E, Calwell, R.A. .. “Some Sites of Battle” ... £3
: “Several translations from
Major E. A. Lambart, R.A. ae Teisaiank? i sou OB
Major-General F. W, Stubbs sco, O Sanlolosys Dewey econ ee oe
Major J. Hotham, R.H.A. ... ... Care of Troop Horse” .., £2
Major J. Manifold, R.A. ... .. “German Manoeuvres” ... £2
Major A. J. Hughes, R.A.... .. “Okehampton Experiences” £2
. q “ Mountain Artillery Estab-
Major H. C. C. D. Simpson, R.A.... | eh ane” . £3
Captain S. P. Oliver Ue ae Centenar y Hcole Poly.” sel eS
Lieutenant-General T. Nicholl a “ Saugor” £2
Better aiming of Volunteer
Captain C. P. Martel, R.A. bs { Artillery ” ie . £2

“Duncan”
Gold Medal
1895.

Rewards for
Papers.

a14 ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95.

Lt.-Col. J. C. Dalton, R.A., moved : “That the thanks of this meeting
be given to the Judges of Prize Essays and Judges of Rewards for kindly
undertaking these tasks.” He said, “I think that anybody who knows
the work involved in adjudicating upon Thirteen Prize Essays of a tech-
nical character, and upon the many and varied subjects discussed in a
year’s ‘ Proceedings,’ will agree with me that the Judges are deserving
of our best thanks.” Lt.-Col. J. K. Trotter, R.A. seconded the motion,
which was carried unanimously. é

COMMITTEE.
Changes during the past year.
Lt.-Col. E. Blaksley Vice Col. C. H. Spragge
Lieut. L. R. Kenyon » Capt. J. M. Grierson

It is now constituted as follows :
PATRON AND PRESIDENT.
Field Marshal H.R.H. The DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G.
VICE-PRESIDENTS.
The Director of Artillery.
The Deputy-Adjutant-General, R.A.
The General Officer Commanding Woolwich District.
MEMBERS.
The Assistant-Adjutant-General, R.A.
The Director, Artillery College.
The Assistant-Adjutant-General, Woolwich.
The Secretary, Ordnance Committee.

Col. G. J. Burgmann Major H. C. Sclater
» RR. D. HE. Lockhart » db Sy WleKy
Lt.-Col. J. C. Dalton Capt. H. J. DuCane
» E.M. Baker » A. Crawford
» #. T. Browell » G.R. Darley
» . Blaksley Lieut, A. 8. Buckle
Major C. F. Hadden » L. R. Kenyon
,» A.C. Hansard
Bankers.
Messrs. Cox & Co., and London & County Bank.
Solicitor.
HK. W. Sampson, Esq., Woolwich.
TRUSTEES.

General Sir C. Dickson, @.€., G.C.B.
» Sir H. A. Smyth, K.C.M.G.
Lieut.-General R. P. Radcliffe.

Secretary—Major A. J. Abdy.

The Report was adopted, and the constitution of the Committee was
confirmed.

Two subjects were then chosen for submission to H.R.H. the
Commander-in-Chief, the one selected by him will be announced as
that for the Duncan Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1896.

After a few remarks, the Meeting proceeded to the consideration of
the R.A. Charities.

BIG C OWI As,

1893-94. EXPENDITURE.

127 , Wages—Compositors, &c. gle ooo,
Printing Accounts, Including Grants

63! pas Publications

114 Eng, ‘| Folding, Stitching, &c..

217 Cea Printing Materials ... Beis :
165 \ Wood Engraving and Lithography oxo
688

40 Classes...

11 Lectures .. ohn _
452 Library and Books for Sale at

41 Museum one

11 Observatory ...

23 Wages
46 Carpentry and Ronan , Wat
70

10 Stationery...
74 Postage and Parcels box a00
138 Wages

B Clerks and Orderlies stare
151

4 Auditors

5 Subscriptions to ‘Societies
31 Fire Insurance ... :
26 Washing and Cleaning
9 Subscriptions refunded
4 Collecting Woolwich Bills and Xmas Boxes .
78 Medals, Honoraria and Rewards ond
17 Arrears of Subscriptions written off
Grant { Repair of
5 Crimean Graves

292 Balance—Being Surplus of Income for the year ending 31

2028
CE

1894. Dr. LIABILITIES, &C.

( Accounts for Goods, Printing,

i by the Institution, and in
238 To Sundry Creditors, 4 Expenditure for the year 18:

viz.: Amount to Credit of Members o
8 Accounts :
15
Roda |
Reprs.
262

16 To Members’ Subscriptions paid in advance

To Balance, being Surplus of Assets in this Balance She
March, 1895, viz:
8804 Surplus at 31st March, 1894 .
Add.—Surplus of Income for the Year ‘ending ast M
292 as per Expenditure and Income Account . a

409
N.B.—This Surplus is in addition to the value of the «
the Museum and Library, Instruments, Furniture, Fix
belonging to the Institution, which the Committee have
at fu, ooo, and which are insured for that sum in the Sun
4375

We have compared the foregoing Balance Sheet, of the 31st
Committee, and with the Books of the Institution, and we Certi
of the Cash and Ledger Accounts, with the Daily Cash Book, th
received from the Bank of England,

Lonpon, 13th May, 1895.

eA oh ie?

ACCOUNTS OF WIS IR OYA AIR IG IL 18 IX $e

APPENDIX A.
GENERAL ABSTRAGT

OF THE

INSTITUTION,

For the year ending, 31st March, 1895.

Bde)

1461 2 6

£1931 6 11

Cr.
G Gc, £ & Gh

483 19 7

£4410 0 9

EXPENDITURE AND INCOME.
1893-94. EXPENDITURE. 1893-94. INCOME.
ee iP & Gh £ eo ra a Vag sumed
127 , Wages—Compositors, &c. ... 0 so | oc, om ES ID G 1f3 (Books Or Ir 4
Printing Accounts, Including Grants in aid of £61 Amounts charged to } Books, &c. 30 op 205 7 10
63 Printing Publications Ba m. oe ann 128 xr 8 26 Members for es and Parcels 2212 2
114 $0 ® ‘| Folding, Stitching, &c.... 139 I 4 4 Carpentry Ss 8 6
217 ‘ | Printing Materials ... aes ot oot bho 259 18 8 —=
165 \ Wood Engraving and Lithography ae 144 1 8 407 : s —
Entrance Fees—
688 es 809 2 9 6 Received ... 79 9 0
8 Entrance Fees
40 Classes... 35 17 x and Subscriptions < Subscriptions—
Ir Lectures... we ose nee ae Sit Ae 1409 for 1894-95. Received 1430 I 0
452 Library and Books for Sale coo 34 Oe 37 Outstanding He a 6
41 Museum ans i one 34 4 0 <
11 Observatory ... 286 ba he oth es ms oF 306 1 1 Y 144 et
23 ‘ . Wages ... nee bee as es od | ©—« BS 115} © a ; iz.i—
Carpentry and Repairs ohn 2 Dividends on Consols at 2? per cent. less Income Tax, viz. :
46 Pp y 2 seeateriate 34 12 0 86 { For }{ of a year on £3240 13 Ir | ;
= 8 For $ of a year on £3739 I 9 )
70 5°. 5 11 Interest on Bank Deposit Account ...
10 Stationery... as Io I 3
74 Postage and Parcels Sy, ade , 68 18 o
138 . ae Wages oS he eet ono dha apo GEE
73 Clerks and Orderlies {(1fting 7. 7 ae ae 8 16 9
151 SS SS 161 17 6
4 Auditors a ee 4 4 0
5 Subscriptions to Societies a) SP
31 Fire Insurance ... at 3118 6
26 Washing and Cleaning AS gp
9 Subscriptions refunded Ses ths oe a 16 6 0
4 Collecting Woolwich Bills and Xmas Boxes ... 4 7 6
78 Medals, Honoraria and Rewards one ba 118 13 6
17 Arrears of Subscriptions written off Gy yp
Grant { Repair of
5 Crimean Graves
1736 179i 17 If
292 Balance—Being Surplus of Income for the year ending 31st March, 1895 139 9 O
2028 £1931 6 11 2028
esses ee eee
BALANCE SHEET—SIist March, 1895.
1894. Dr. LIABILITIES, &C. 1894. ASSETS.
£ ee #8 & : tye
( Accounts for Goods, Printing, &c., owing By Cash in.hand, and at Bankers, including £300 on Deposit
by the Institution, and included in 927 Account at Interest ... te ne ae Es aoa oe ee
238 To Sundry Creditors, j Expenditure for the year 1894-95 138 9 5 Amount owing by Members on Current
viz.: ; Amount to Credit of Members on Current 140 p Srinath DERYOR ) Accounts, included in Income oid ORLL OMS MEET
8 \e Accounts ie 4; ! ite HO Yeon. A S. »< Amount owing by Members for Subscrip-
15 63 MA tions, includedinIncome... ... a... 57 I O
Rotda. pate
Reprs. 203 a
a 19 By Stocks on hand, {ane Paper 31 6 9
262 SS 149 14 5 32 VA8 Books for Sale By\ 3e $3
16 To Members’ Subscriptions paid in advance Oh 2 © 51 Ws einen k
pan 192 By Investment, viz.:—£3739 Is. 9d. Consols at dos Bas
173 16 5 3 yi d i
To Balance, being Surplus of Assets in this Balance Sheet, at 31st Including £498 7s. 10d. Consols purchased
March, 1895, viz: in May, 1894, at a cost of £500. ‘
8804 Surplus at 31st March, 1894 ... nod ado nate oe oat --» 4096 15 4
Add.—Surplus of Income for the Year ending 31st March, 1895,
292 as per Expenditure and Income Account ... Bo Ae ee 112%9) 0) ©
4096 J 7 beg <== fey 2 A
N.B.—This Surplus is in addition to the value of the contents of
the Museum and Library, Instruments, Furniture, Fixtures, &c.,
belonging to the Institution, which the Committee have estimated
at £11,000, and which are insured for that sum in the Sun Fire Office
4375 £4410 0 9 4375
AUDITORS’ CERTIFICATE.

We have compared the foregoing Balance Sheet, of the 31st March, 1895, and the Expenditure and Income Account for the year ending at that date, with the Monthly Cash Accounts, audited by the

Committee, and with the Books of the Institution, and we Certify the same to be correct statements of the affairs of the Institution, as recorded in the said Books and Accounts.
of the Cash and Ledger Accounts, with the Daily Cash Book, the Bank Pass Books, and the Vouchers, and have found them in order.

received from the Bank of England,
Lonpon, 13th May, 1895.

We have tested portions
We have verified the Investment in Consols, with the Certificate

AGAR, BATES & Co., Chartered Accountants.

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95. 315
APPENDIX C.
Increase and Decrease of Members 1894-95.
Increase, Decrease. Balance.
. oO cc
Z elel 2 ae 4 7m
RANKS. = |B) a lail es ies 5 5 oii altos
me is | ei © i & iss | ei all & “| 2 a
SSeS (eye llela lie el ape
e |2lelb| 2 leselele] = sls] 2
ea ee a I) iS ee Le PSP Te LS WS)
EFFECTIVE LIST:
General and Field
Officers 00 455 | 15 | — | — 15 —|3 — + 39 24 | — 431
Captains ... 445 | 18 | — 2 20 U5) 3) — 21 1) — 444
Lieutenants 603 | — | — | 75 | 75 18 —| 4] 23 | —| 47] 650
Medical Officers 1}—/]—|]—7} — J|—|—/]—] 1 1 1}—] —
Vet. Surgeons 1 —_— it
Quarter-Masters T}—}—/]—]7 — J—|]—}]—!—] — J—-|] — 1
RETIRED LIST.
General and Field
Officers... ‘ 182 | — | 28} —]} 28 | —]|]—/17]/ 10] 27 |—| 1 183
Captains .. 76 |---| 2|— 2 7—}—}]—|]--}| — J—|]} 2 7
Lieutenants 19}—} 1} — 1 —}—] 1j— 1 —|— 19
Paymasters 2};—}—|—y] — J[— 2
Riding Masters ... 1Tj/—}|—|]—] — — | — il
Medical Officers .. 2);—|]—)j— — | — 2
Chaplains T}—}—|]—] — J—!|—!/—}]—] — J -|] — il
Honorary Members 383 | —|—] 1 1 —|/—] 2) — 2 1| — 32
Totals... 1822 | 33 | 31 | 78 | 142 33 | 44 | 23 | 19 | 119 27 | 50 | 1845
APPENDIX D.
Presentations to the Library.
R.L., Nos. 218 to 222 7
Lithographs [{R.G.F., Nos. 151 to 155
(Coloured) (R.C.D., Nos. 184a, 206,

Report of the Committee appointed to

208, 211, 212, 214 & 215

enquire into the Entrance Examina-
tions (in non-military subjects), of
Candidates for Commissions in the

Army, 1894

rSecretary of State for War.

316 ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95.

Highteenth Annual Report of H.M. In-
spectors of Explosives, 1893 ...

Instructionsfor Horse,Field and Mountain 5
Artillery Practice, 1894.. ie

Musketry Instruction, M.H. Rifle and
Carbine, and M.M. Carbine, 1894

Cee for ee Medical Services,
1894 e aa ts

Pay Warrant, 1894 ..

Manual of Military Engineering, 1893.

Manual of Saddles and Sorebacks, 1894

Dress Regulations for the Army, 1894 ...

Regulations for Magazines, Ainmunition
Stores, Laboratories, &c., 1894..

Regulations respecting the Senior Class
of the Artillery College, 1894 . :

Handbook for the R.M.L. 17-72” 100 ton
gun, Land Service, 1894 e

Rules for the Conduct of Field Man-
CSUDVRES coo |

Handbook of the “Military Forces of
Russia, 1894 ae

Annual Report of the Army Veterinary
Department, for the year ending, 31st
March, 1894 aoe

Extracts from the Annual Report of the
President, Ordnance Committee, 1893

: Secretary of State for War.

Regulations for a Course of Instruction | Deputy Adjutant General,

in Submarine Mining, at all Stations,
except the School of Hae Engi-
neering

Regulations for the Supply of “Clothing
and necessaries to the Regular Forces,
1894 G0

Report upon the Fourteenth Senior Class
at the Artillery College a

Manual of Military Law, 1894...

Queen’s Regulations, 1894 ue

Handbook for the 16 inch R.M.L. Gun,
1894 a

Regulations for the “Army Veterinary
Department, 1894 ...

Regulations for Mobilization, Home
Defence, Regular Forces, 1894, 2 copies

Regulations for the Volunteer Force, 1894

Allowance Regulations, 1894 ...

Regulations for Military Savings Bank
and Regimental Charitable Funds, 1894

Approved arrangements for Siege Practice
at Lydd, 1895 :

Arrangements for the Supply of Ammu-
nition Targets, &c., for the Practice of
Royal Horse and Field Pe in
Great Britain, for 1895 ss os,

Royal Artillery.

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95.

Instructions for Siege Artillery Practice, |
1895

Annual Report of tig Sidlaell ae Comm ene
Horse and Field Artillery Practice at
Home, 1894 on
Annual Retaont of the School of Cimmeny,

1894, Part I. Coast, Part II. Siege

Annual Report on “ihe Instruction carried
on at the School of Musketry, Hythe,
during the year ending 3lst, March,
1893 ea

Manual of Military Codisins:, Bignell
at the School of Cookery, 1895

Instructions for Practice, ‘Blonse, Field,
and Mountain Artillery, 1895 3

Text Book for Military Small Arms and
Ammunition, 1894, 2 copies.. we

Regulations for the Militia, 1895 rit)

Recruitment of Officers of the Active )
Army in Germany, 1894...

Accessions to the War Office Library,
IN@, IO, ove

Sketch Map of Korea, Tntell. Div. W.O.,
INO, $85, Ist, Bel, and 4th editions

Map cf countries adjoining Korea, Intell.
Div. W.O., No. 1045, Ist & 2nd editions

Handbook of the Military Forces of
Russia, 1894 i

A description of the Method of Execu-
ting Rapid or Reconnaissance Triangu-
lation, by Major Hon. M. G. Talbot, RE.

Suggestions as to the best Method of
teaching Small Scale Topography, by }
Major Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E. i

Map of Part of British and German East
Africa, including the British Protec-
torate of Uganda. Intell: Div. W.O.,
No. 1012 ...

Map of the Countr y Round Suakin.
Intell : Div. W.O., No. 1052.. ob

Map of the Nile Valley, between Wadi
Halfaand Ambugol. Intell : Div. W.O.,
No. 1067 ...

Report on Horse Breeding in 1 Hrngary,
1894 2

Map of Uganda and Adjoining ilestions ies,
Intell. Div., W.O., No. 1075 ..

6 copies —..

Report of the Small “Arms Peneimation
Committee, 1893 and 1894 ...

Report upon the 14th Senior Class at the
Artillery College. 2 copies ..

Particulars Of Rifled Guns and Hlowitaans, q

317

Deputy Adjutant General,

Royal Artillery.

Director of Military

Intelligence.

Director of Artillery

Dir.

General of Military
Education.

318 ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95,

The Internal Work of the Wind, by )
S. P. Langley

Annual Report of the Smithsonian Tnstic
tution, 1891, 1892 and 1893 .

Tenth Asarmaell Report of the puread of ! The Council, Smithsonian
Ethnology f Institution.

The Pamunkey TindFame of Wanting, by
J. G. Pollard

Bibliography of the Wakashan Tangages,
by J. C. Pilling

The Maya Year, by Cyrus Thome ae

Proceedings of the Institution of Civil ) The Council, Institution of
Engineers. Vols. 116,117,118 and 119 Civil Engineers.

Record of Transactions of the Junior
Engineering Society. Vol. 3

Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute.
Nos. I. and II. 1894 Kis t

Notes on the Construction of Ordnance. |

} The Council, Jr. Eng.Society

The Council, Iron and Steel
Institute.

No. 64...

Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance,
U.S. Ord. Dept., 1893

Life-sized Portrait of General Lord
Roberts, Q.€., G.C.B., &c., in Massive
Frame.

Regimental Orders of the Bengal Antillery, {
from August, 1827, to December, 1846 |

A Collection of (37) eclien Ordnance
Survey Maps a |

Examination Papers, RB. M. “Academy, |

)

The Chief of Ordnance, U.S.
Ordnance Department.

Count Ostrorog (late) R.A.

Maj.-General F. W. Stubbs
(late) R.A.

February and August, 1894 . Governor R.M. Academy
Report of the Astronomer Royal, 1894 .
Results of the Magnetical and Meteoro-
logical Observations, made at the Royal
Observatory, Greenwich, in the year
1891 ae
Netherlands Artillery. Atlas, Plates Nos.
210 to 221, 88 to 100 and 222 to 227... | Netherlands Government
Report of the Meteorological Service of ) Canadian Meteorological
the Dominion of Canada for 1889 } Office
The Bombardier and Pocket. Gunner, by }
Captain R. W. Adye, R.A., 6th edition,
d. 1809 :
Field Exercises and “Evolutions of the
Army, d. 1833 i
Standing Orders and Regulations for the |
Royal Regiment of Artillery at Home
and Abroad, d. 1828 ? ; H. G. Slade, Esq.
Addenda to the General Regulations and
Orders for the Army, d. 1840 ie
Regulations for the Provision of Clothing,
etc., for the Royal Regiment of Artillery
and Corps of prone pe poIe a! and ] eer
d. 1824 ue

The Astronomer Royal

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95. 319

Interior Ballistics, by Lt. J. H. Glennon, Thais dheldie@lerarnern
U.S. Navy... a :

History of the 1st Banelion Iseeeill and
Sutherland Highlands, 91st Foot, by
Lt.-Col. J. P. Groves .. >Lieut.-Col. J. P. Groves

History of the 21st Royal Sais TMaiilfiens,

' by Lt.-Col. J. P. Groves Ks

Photograph of the late Commissary ne ;
Chaat S Tibbs Captain W. J. Tibbs

Journal de Bord du Bailli de Suffren dans
L’Indie, 1781-84, par Henri Moris tM. Blominh Ikons

Map of Sea of Operations of the alan Venies H. C. C. D. Simpson,

Alpine Manceuvres, 1894 R.A.

Regulations Respecting the Senior lass “
at the ‘Antillery College, 1894 } Director Artillery College

Map of “Les Grandes MEnermeR, era S. P. Oliver (late)
1894” Bh: Bee 325 we R.A.

Water-color painting, framed in Oak, | Tt..Col. W. H. M. Duthie
“ Drowned Lands, Canada,” by Lt.-Col. (late) R.A.

W. H. M. Duthie, (late) R.A.

Catalogue of Maps and Books in the
Library of the Egyptian War Office,
Compiled by aah Ty 18, Wingate,
DES: Os

Royal ‘intial. Sania “Traatitiaiiem Tote
nal, Vols. 28 to date.. Ace

Goceneninicall Tomaail, Aspnl, “1886, to
December, 1893... Hes ees

Geological Journal, May, 1886, to date

Extracts from Annual Report of the
Director of Artillery, Vols. 24 & 25,

Austrian Account of the Hungarian
Insurrection, 1848-49

Sundry Parliamentary Blue Books and
Foreign Journals and Periodicals

Reprint of “Preparatory General Orders
issued at Newport, Isle of Wight,
akin Wiley, UGS” 7 coc

The Story of the Civil War, a Concise
account of the War in the Uuited
States of America, between 1861 and
1865, by J. C. Ropes

Water-color painting “Royal “Artillery

Major F. R. Wingate, D.S.0.,
R.A.

Lieut.-General W. H. Good-
enough, C.B.

Maj.-General H.T.eG. Geary,
C.B.

J. C. Ropes, Esq.

Surg. Lt.-Col. S. H. Carter,

in Canada” Jak oWittSh
The Franco-German War, 1870-71, if: a
translated from the German, by Major Weyer dle A aay D.8.0.,

J. A. Ferrier, D.S.0., R.E. ..
The Principles of Stratecy, by Captain
J. Bigelow, 10th U.S. Cavalry
Calcul des Probabilité’s Applique au
tir des Projectiles, par J. Didion,
Col. D’Artillerie oe 32

Poultney Bigelow, Esq.

Lieut.- Col. H. W. L. Hime
(late), R.A.

Se eet ce ce ee ee ee ee. os

320 ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95.

Sur tb Dispersion Naturelle des Pro- }
jectiles et la Loi des Erreurs, par
A. Van Muyden, Capt. D’Artillerie

Beitrag yur Schiesstheorie Angewendet Lieut.-Col. H. W. L. Hime

auf das Schiessen mit den ener EB) Mins
erischen Handfluerwaffen, von H.
Siegfried . a4

Note Book, formerly | ‘the property of WEE HSMorsic

|
the late General T. A. Shore, R.A.

Photograph of the late Capt. Thomas
Scott, R.A., great uncle of Colonel | Cot C. E. Hi Scott (late),
©. E. 8. Scott @ate) REAR ee. R.A.

Notice Historique sur la Bataille de
Waterloo ...

Plan du Champ de Bataille de Waterloo

Partie du Plan du Champ de Bataille
de Waterloo

Information from Abroad — Notes on | U.S. Naval Intelligence
the year’s Naval Progress, July, 1894 a Office

The late Maj.-General W. L.
Yonge, (late), R.A.

Key Map to the Engraving, ‘“‘ Wreck of
of the Birkenhead” e } Major A. D. Seton
The Frontiers of the British Empire

| T. M. Maguire, Esq., LL.D.
Captain P. J. R. Crampton,
R.A.

in India ...
Developments of Field Artillery Fire,
by Capt. P. J. R. Crampton, R.A. 2
Two photographs of German Field
Artillery crossing the river Moselle | Capiain R. Maunsell, R.A.
on Rafts ...
Distribution of HLM. Forces, ‘at Home
and on Foreign Service, 1767, formerly
the property of George Morrison, Q.M.G.
Regulations and Instructions for the )
Infantry Sword Exercise, d. 1819 [
Professional Papers of the i acl
Royal Engineers. Vol. 20 .
Notes on Suitable Stations in Norway :

Captain J.A. Labalmondiere
R.A.

R.E. Institute

for viewing the Total Eclipse of the
Sun, on 8th August, 1896, by Col.
A. Burton-Brown Cae) Avera Aes is
WIRES — os

Col. A. a eee Brown (late),
R.A.

APPENDIX E.

Books, &c., Purchased.
Monograph of the Paradiseidce or Birds of Paradise, and Ptilonorhyn-
chidce or Bower Birds. Parts 3 and 4.

Forms of Attack, with Plans and Sketches. By Brig.-General Kinloch.
Hakluyt Society’s Publications. “Voyages of Captains Foxe and James,
to the North West.” 2 Vols. ‘“ Letters of Amerigo Vespucci.”
Einzeldarstellungen von Schlachten ans dem Kriege Deutschlands
gegen die Franzésische Republick.
Schlachten Atlas. Parts 38, 39, 42 and 43.

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95. Spall

English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714. Vol. 2.
By Charles Dalton, F.R.G.S.

Gall’s Modern Tactics, 3rd edition.

Historie de la Campaign de 1815—Waterloo. Par Lieut.-Colonel
Charras. 2 Vols. and Atlas.

The Life of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. By Field Marshal
Vicount Wolseley, K.P., &e. 2 Vols.

Biologia Centrali—Americana Zoology. Parts 116-120.

Atlas of India. By Sir W. W. Hunter, K.C.S.1.

Applications de la Fortification Passagere. Par V. Deguise.

Korea and the Sacred White Mountain. By KE. J. Cavendish and
Captain H. E. F. Goold-Adams, R.A.

The Letters and Despatches of John, First Duke of Marlborough, from
1702-1712. By General Sir G. Murray. 5 Vols.

Prattica Manuale Dell Artiglieria, da Luigi Colliardo d. 1606.

Military Essays of the Ancient Grecian, Roman, and Modern Art of
War. By Sir J. Turner, d. 1581.

History of the Life and Reign of Her late Majesty Queen Anne, d. 1740.

Arundel Society’s Publications. ‘“ The Nativity of Our Lord,” after the
fresco, by Pinturricchio, in the Church of St. Maria del Popolo,
Rome.

Journal d’un officier D’Artillerie, Pingot et Moi.

Reglement sur le Service des Batteries de Montagne. Vol. 1.

Dictionary of National Biography. Vols. 39-42.

Hints on Driving.. By Captain C. Morley Knight (late) R.A.

Russia’s March towards India, by an Indian Officer. 2 Vols.

Dislokationskarte der Heere EHuropas. Parts 1, 2 and 3.

The Gunner’s Guide, or a Pocket Companion for N.C. Officers and
Privates in the Artillery and Marines, d. 1806.

The Franco-German War, 1870-71. Translated from the German.
By Major J. A. Ferrier, R.E., D.S.O.

Batailles Gagnées, par le Serenissime Prince F. Eugene de Savoy, sur
les Ennemis de la Foi. d. 1725.

The History of the Wars Occasioned by the French Revolution,
including a Sketch of the early History of France, d. 1816.

Transactions of the Navy Records Society, 1894. “Defeat of the Spanish
Armada.” 2 Vols.

Naval and Military Magazine, 1827-1828. 4 Vols.

History of the British Expedition to Egypt in 1803. By Lieut.-Colonel
R. T. Wilson.

Coloured prints of “Royal Artillery Repository Exercise,” 1844, “Rocket
Practice in the Marshes,” and “ Royal Horse Artillery, 1843.”

Coloured print of two figures in early Artillery Uniform.

Chance and Luck. By R. A. Proctor.

Periods of Huropean History.—Period I. 476-918. By C, Oman, M.A.

The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaign,
1809-1815. By the late Lieut.-Colonel Tomkinson.

Acts of the Privy Council of England. By J. R. Desant.

The Life and Inventions of T. A. Edison. By W. K. L. & A. Dickson.

Histoire des Revolutions D’Angleterre, sous le Regne de Jaques 2,
Jusqu au Couronnement de Guillaume III., d. 1689.

Moltke ; a Biographical and Critical Study. By W. 0’C. Morris.

The Soldier’s Companion or Martial Recorder.

322 ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95.

Our Asiatic Neighbours. By S. 8. Thorburn.

Coloured print of “ Mortar Battery at Woolwich.”

Steel engraving of “ The Battle of Minden.”

Forest Birds, their Haunts and Habits. By H. F. Witherby.

Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich, des Général Carl von Clausewitz.

Two Water-color Paintings “The Camel Corps.”

Wood Carving. By C. G. Leland, F.R.L.S.

Chromo-Litho print, ‘“ Well Earned Rest.” By W. B. Wollen.

La Défense des Cotes D’Europe, par Carl Didelot.

Precis de l’Art de la Guerre ou Nouveau Tableau Analytique, par le
Baron de Jomini.

Uniformenkunde, Lose Blatter zur Geschichte der Entwicklung der
Militarischen Tracht. Part 5.

Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. Parts 17 and 18.

The Military Medley. By Thomas Simes, d. 1768. .

Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the High-
landers of Scotland. By Colonel David Stewart. 2 Vols.

Carte de la Répartition et de L’Emplacement des Troupes de L’Armee
Francaise 1895.

Lithograph picture ‘“‘ Le Due de Montpensier a L’Arsenal de Woolwich,
1846.”

The Map of Africa by Treaty. By Sir E. Hertslet, K.C.B. 2 Vols.

The Battle of Leipzig. By Frederic Shoberl, d. 1814.

A Complete History of the Campaign in the year 1708.

Notes on the French Infantry and Memoranda on the Review of the
Army in Paris in May, 1852. By Colonel A. W. Torrens.

A Naturalist’s Calendar, with Observations in Various Branches of
Natural History. By the Rev. Gilbert White, M.A., d. 1795.

The History of Guernsey and its Bailiwick. By F. B. Tupper.

Grundritz der Taktik, von J. Meckel.

Die Deutsche Reiterei in den Schlachten und Gefechten des Krieges
von 1870-71, von A. D. Kunz.

Balistique des Nouvelles Poudres, par EK. Vallier.

APPENDIX F.

Presentations to the Museum.

Part of a Sledge found on the Shores of
Grennell Land, Lat. 81°, 55’ N. By | hs. Watts, Esq.
Paymaster H. W. Feilden. ...

Bengal Horse Artillery Officer’s Sheep-
skin, formerly the property of the late
Col. Pasley Dirom, Bengal Horse
Artillery 90

A specimen of the Eeo of the Great sicua, Lieut.-Col. H. W. L. Hime
from the Shetland Islands 7 (late) R.A.

Two cowhide Cartouches from Sikkim.. Capt. H. de T. Phillips, R.A.

A piece of the bark of a tree, at the foot
of which two Indiana Indians were
killed at the battle of Fish Creek, Lieut. G. G. Traherne, R.A.
during the Riel Rebellion, 1885

Captain A. Crawford, R.A.

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95. 323

A Suit of Madhist clothing, removed from
the body of a Dervish, after the battle + Lieut. G. G. Traherne, R.A.
of Suakin .. j

Silk Banner, ‘with bullion tassels, Com-
memorative of the Naval and Military
Services of the family of the late Col. (

P. P. Faddy, R.A., C.B., and of himself. |

A Collection of Butterflies and Beetles
from India and Malta }

A Charm worn by Soudanese Soldiers 2
under their uniform in action, picked sie W. 8. Churchward,
up at the battle of Tel-el- Kebir : R.A.

A Collection of Specimens of Mineral 1 | Maj -General J. F. Owen,
Ores from Queensland Bs R.A.

D. A. General, R.A.

Noel Hunter, Esq.

APPENDIX G.

List of Papers published in the ‘‘ Proceedings” during the Year.

The French Soudan up to date—January, 1894. Compiled from the
French Accounts in “Le Temps” (with permission). By Capt.
S. P. Oliver, late R.A. (Continued from No. 2, Vol. X XI, p. 54).
Part II.

The Adjutancy of a Militia Artillery Unit. By an Adjutant. Com-
municated by the Secretary.

The Necessity for a Firing Test to Prove Preliminary Training Complete.
By Major O. S. Smyth, D.S.O., R.A.

Supply of Ammunition in the Field. By Major E. C. Hawkshaw, R.A.

Saugor, C.P.—A Story, of 1857. By Lieut.-General T. Nicholl, R.A.

The Centenary of Ecole Polytechnique, Celebrated in Paris on the 11th
March, 1894, under the auspices of Francois Sadi Carnot, President
of the Republic, and an old Cadet of the School. By Captain
S. P. Oliver, date R.A.

The Sanitary Care of the Soldier by his Officer. By Brigade-Surgeon
Lieut.-Colonel G. J. H. Evatt, M.D., A.M.S. (A Lecture delivered at
the R.A. Institution, Woolwich, 29th January, 1894).

Clipping Battery Horses. By Major A. H. C. Phillpotts, R.A.

Memoirs Historical and Biographical. The Brome-Walton Family.
Chapter V. By Major and Quartermaster R. H. Murdoch, ie
Assistant Superintendent of Records. (Continued from No.
Vol. XXTI,, p. 39).

Notes on our Mountain Artillery Establishments, their Training and
Personal Equipment. By Major H.C. C. D. Simpson, R.A.

Artillery Mobilisation. By Major F.G. Stone, R.A. Chapters I., IL,
and ITI.

The Artillery Branch of the Honourable Artillery Company of London.
By aes J. A. Labalmondiere, R.A. and Lieut. A. L. Morant,
H.A.C.

The “Outlines of Quaternions,” by Lieut.-Colonel H. W. L. Hime,
late R.A. A Review. Communicated by the Secretary.

General Sir Charles Napier on Artillery Draught. Communicated by
Captain H. A. Bethell, R.A.

Jk,

324 ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95.

Abstract of the Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Annual General
Meeting of the Royal Artillery Institution.

What is the Best Tactical Organisation and System of Training Massed
Batteries of Horse and Field Artillery? (‘Duncan ” Gold Medal
Prize Essay, 1894). By Major J. L. Keir, R.A.

What is the Best Tactical Organisation and System of Training Massed
Batteries of Horse and Field Artillery ? (Silver Medal Prize Essay,
1894). By Major A. M. Murray, R.A.

What is the Best Tactical Organisation and System of Training Massed
Batteries of Horse and Field Artillery? (Commended Essay,
1894). By Major H.S. May, R.A.

The Breeding Stud of an Indian Prince. By Colonel T. B. Tyler, R.A.

A Scheme for the Better Training of the Volunteer Artillery. By
Captain C. P. Martel, R.A.

Stable Management. By Veterinary Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Walters, C.B.,
F.R.C.V.S., late A.V.D. (A Lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery.
Institution, 12th February, 1894).

The French Soudan. Sequel. By Captain 8S. P. Oliver, late R.A.

The Sanitary Care of the Soldier by his Officer. A Reply. By
Brigade-Surgeon Lieut.-Colonel HE. Nicholson.

Clipping Battery Horses. By Colonel T. B. Tyler, R.A.

Attack of a Modern Land Fortress. By Major H. P. Hickman, R.A.

Gift of Dickson Manuscripts and Notes to the R.A. Institution.

Floating Defence. By Lieut.-Col. Sir G.S. Clarke, K.C.M.G., R.E.

An Episode in the Life of Major-General G. H. Vesey, R.A. By Colonel
T. B. Tyler, R.A.

Saddlery, and the Causes, Prevention, and Treatment of Sore Backs.
By Veterinary Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Walters, C.B., F.R.C.V.S., late
i894), (A Lecture delivered at the R.A. Institution, 15th February,
1894).

Notes on the Naval Manceuvres of 1894. By Captain R. A. K. Mont-
gomery, R.A.

Defence of Estuaries, Harbours, etc., against Torpedo-Boat Attack.
Replies. By Lieut. G. G. Traherne, Captains H. C. Williams-Wynn
and H. T. Hawking, R.A.

Coast Defence in Relation to War. (The first Lecture delivered at the
Malia Naval and Military Society, 28th December, 1893). By
Major Sir G. 8. Clarke, K.C.M.G., R.E.

Extracts from the Diary of Lieut. F. W. Stubbs, Bengal Artillery, in
1857-58. By Major-General F. W. Stubbs, late R.A.
Notes on places of Military interest in the United States. By Captain

J. F. Manifold, R.A.

Some Sites of Battle. By Captain C. E. Callwell, R.A.

On the Revision of Kane’s List of Officers Royal Artillery. By Lieut.-
Colonel J. C. Dalton (h.p.), R.A.

Brief Considerations on Coast Defence. By Major-General H. le G.
Geary, C.B., R.A.

Short Notes on the Care of the Troop Horse: for Young Officers and
N.-C. Officers. By Major J. Hotham, R.H.A.

Employment of Ground Scouts, Combat Patrols, and Orderlies of

Artillery. Compiled by Major HE. A: Lambart, R.A.

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894-95. 320

Okehampton Experiences, 1894. By Major A. J. Hughes, R.A. (A
Lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, 11th October,
1894).

Ancient “id Ordnance now in the Artillery Museum, Madrid. By
Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Dalton (h.p.), R.A.

Record Targets; Being a short description of those now in use and a
comparison of their merits. By Captain P. E. Gray, R.A.

Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H.A.,in the Peninsula. Hdited by

‘Colonel F. A. Whinyates, /ate R.H.A. Chapter I.

A Method of calculating the Probability of Coast Defence Fire. By
Major R. M. B. F. Kelly, R.A.

A Plea for Heavy Guns in Fortress Defence. By Capt. G. Tyacke, R.A.

Notes on German Manceuvres. By Major J. F. Manifold, R.A.

The Story of the Civil Warin America. A Review. By Major E.S.
May, R.A.

General Bourbaki’s Campaign in January and February, 1871. By
T. M. Maguire, Esq., LL.D. (A Lecture delivered at the R.A.
Institution, Woolwich, December 13th, 1894).

APPENDIX H.

!
Precis and Translations Published during the Year.

( Hlectro-Metallurgy.—Aluminium. By Capitaine D’Artil-
| lerie J. Rousseau. Precis of a paper published in the
FRENCH. .../ Revue D’ Artillerie. By F. EB. B. L. late R.A.
“Revue Militaire de L’Etranger.” The New Firing
Manual of the German Field Artillery. Precis by
Lieut.-Colonel J. H. G. Browne, late R.A.

“Russian Artillery Journal.” The resistance of the Air
at High Velocities. By Captain Zabtidski, Russian
Artillery. Translated by Major G. T. Kelaart, R.A.
Russian Artillery Journal.” ‘The Military Training of
| Field Artillery. Translated by Major E. A. Lambart,
| R.A. (Continued from No. 11, Vol. X XT.)
A Russian opinion of the Chinese Army. Translated by
L Lieut. E. A. Campbell, R.A,

| ce

RUSSIAN..

326

ANNUAL REPORT, 1894

APPENDIX I.

-95.

FOREIGN MAGAZINES AND JOURNALS

WITH THE

TAKEN IN BY THE

R.A.

INSTITUTION ;

NAMES OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPLY

PRECIS AND REVIEWS OF THEIR CONTENTS FROM TIME TO TIME.

COUNTRY.

a aS

France
Spain
Germany
Austria 4

L
Italy... {
f

Russia ...

L
Sweden ...

.... Memorial de Artilleria ...

| Russki Invalid

NAME OF JOURNAL, ETC.

Spectateur Militaire ...
Journal des Sciences Militaires
Revue d’Artillerie aS i

Revue Militaire de l’Etranger

Neue Militérische Blatter
Archiv fiir die Artillerie-und-
Ingenieur-Officiere .
Militar-W ochenblatt
Ourzem der Militar-Wissenschaft-

lichen Vereine
Militirische Zeitschrift...

Mittheilungen,&c.,des Artillerie-
und Genie-Wesens 5
Giornali di Artigleria e Genia..
Rivista *

99 99

Journal of Artillery

Oruzhennii Sbornik
Artilleri-Tidskritt

TRANSLATOR.

Major J. F. Manifold

Lt.-Col. F. E. B. Loraine,
late R.A.

Lt.-Col. J. H.G. Browne,
late R.A., and Capt.
E. J. Granet.

.| Lt.-Col. J. C. Dalton

.| Major R. M. B. F. Kelly.
-| Major E. S. May.

.| Major L. C. M. Blacker.

.| Capt. H. de T. Phillips.

Major R.M.B.F. Keily.

Capt. A. Samut, R.
Malta A.

Major H. A. Lambart.

Major G. T. Kelaart.

.| Lieut. E. G. Cheke.

Lieut. E. A. Campbell.

327

THE TRAINING TOGETHER IN PEACE TIME THE GARRISON
ARTILLERY FORCES OF THE EMPIRE, INCLUDING REGULAR,
MILITIA, VOLUNTEER, & COLONIAL ARTILLERY.

CAPTAIN HE. G. NICOLLS, R.A.

“IN MEDIO TUTISSIMUS IBIS.”

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

In the last ten years great progress has been made throughout the mtroauetion,
Army in the organization and training necessary for the proper conduct
of war, and nowhere perhaps has this progress been more marked than
in the Royal Regiment of Artillery. In both branches, definite methods,
which though not altogether new had remained unrecognized, and un-
tried for many years, have gradually been evolved, for fighting, and
training for fighting the different units, until a working, and workable
system has at length been elaborated. Most of us no doubt were in
hopes that our present system of training was approaching finality, and
possibly it is, but in the Garrison Artillery, at any rate, we have evi-
dently not yet reached that end, or else we should not now be asked
once more to consider this question. We have now however the great
advantage of starting from a good forward position. The necessity for
fire discipline, and a regular system of organization and training is no
longer disputed. The question no longer is, “Is a system of training...
necessary,’ but what system is most applicable to certain requirements? + ~
This is the question we have to answer, and to furnish a satisfactory
reply we must carefully inquire into the conditions that give rise to
these requirements, and the nature of the requirements themselves, be-
fore we can say what system of training is best suited to meet them.

As the particular subject of this Essay deals with the training of aE os
Artillery Garrisons in Coast Fortresses, I propose to consider it under
the following heads :—

Chapter I. ‘The general forms that attacks on Coast Fortresses take.

Chapter II. The particular forms of attack that our Coast For-
tresses at home, and abroad will most probably be
called upon to meet.

Chapter III. The kind of defence necessary, and the general duties
of the Artillery defenders in meeting these attacks.

Chapter IV. The system of training that will best fit the defenders
to carry out these duties.

The remarks made hereafter apply only to the Artillery portion of

@ VO, XXIt. AD5

328 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

the Garrison of a Coast Fortress, no attempt has been made to deal
with the other portions, and where the word “ Garrison ” occurs by it-
self it must be understood to refer only to the Artillery defenders.

Cuarrer J. Tae Generat Forms tuat Arracks on Coast
FORTRESSES TAKE.

The subject of the Prize Hssay in 1893 was ‘‘ The attack of a Coast
Fortress.” In the July number of the “ Proceedings” of that year are
published the three Hssays adjudged the best. Hach Hssay approaches
the question from a somewhat different point of view, and treats mainly
of some one particular form of attack. Written as they are with great
ability, and combining as they do evidence past and present, and the
contemporary opinion of the best writers who have studied the subjects
bearing on this question with the well reasoned conclusions of their
own authors, they present, taken together, a very valuable exposition
of the whole subject, and one that may be considered in many ways
authoritative. I propose therefore to extract from these essays much
of the information required for this chapter and to put it forward with-
out any attempt at argument, for which and for fuller information on
the subject, the essays themselves should be consulted.

A Coast Fortress is defined as consisting of “an area of land and
sea provided at certain important points or along tactically selected
lines with an Artillery armament partly fixed, partly movable. The
area is usually defined by the extent of land or water within range of
its guns.”* Whatever its area may be, the effective value of any Coast
Fortress as such, is limited by the range of its guns over that area.
Outside this limit, the Fortress is incapable of affording any protection
whatever, unless indeed its Garrison is strong enough to, and provided
with, the means of taking the field against an enemy, in which case the
operations cease to be those within the réle of a Coast Fortress.
use ot coast The réle of the Coast Fortress may be said to be to afford protection
“ome* from molestation to everything within its defences, it can best effect this

by denying the use of the selected area of land and water it protects, to
those whom at the time it may be expedient or necessary to exclude.
The specially selected localities protected by Coast Fortresses may be:
(1.) Harbours and dockyards required for the use of the Navy.
(2.) Harbours and ports which are required for the use of the
~ Mercantile Marine, and which generally form the approach
to important cities or towns.

(3.) Harbours and ports abroad which can act as temporary
refuges, or at least furnish supplies, particularly coal, to
the Navy, and to the Mercantile Marine.

(4.) Harbours abroad which are required as bases of operation
for the Fleet, or for Expeditions.

(5.) Positions guarding narrow water-ways, leading to more open
waters which it is desired to deny to all comers.

Coast
Fortresses

1 See *‘ Proceedings,” R.A.I., Vol. XX., pp. 345 to 391.
2G.A.D., Vol I., p. 409.

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 329

An attack on a Coast Fortress may be made by :—
(1.) Naval forces alone.
(2.) Miltary forces covered and supported by ships.
The object of the attack may be any of the following :—
(1.) Conquest and occupation.
(2.) Passage to some objective beyond.

(3.) Destruction of the forts, or the ships, stores, and other
material that they protect.

(4.) To cover other operations, for moral effect, or without any
very definite object but in hopes of obtaining some ad-
vantage.

The first two may be considered as attacks proper.

The last two rather in the light of raids made with a more or less
definite object.

The raids naval, or military, onterritory adjacent to Coast Fortresses,
but outside the range of their guns, which were so common during the
wars of the 17th and 18th centuries, and which are undertaken
purely for ravage, and destruction need not be considered, as they do
not properly come within the meaning of an attack on a Coast Fortress.

Navat ATTACKS.

(1.) With a view to conquest and occupation.
These may be undertaken :—

(a.) By bombardment.
(b.) By regular attack.

(a.) Bombardment. The ships employed would probably be at long
range and under weigh: if after a bombardment landing parties are
sent in, the ships would of course have to stand into closer ranges.
There are but few historical instances of this method of attack, and it
can only be successful against a weak or demoralized garrison.

(b.) Regular Attack. By this term is meant engagements between
individual ships, and forts when the object is to silence the fire of the
forts, by bringing a superior fire to bear against them previous to the
landing of parties to capture them. The term cannonade would seem
to be preferable to that of bombardment, to denote the ship’s fire
action under these circumstances. The engagement would be begun
at long, and medium ranges with the ships under weigh, but the final
cannonade to be effective must take place at close ranges, and with the
ships anchored in the most suitable positions close to the forts ; landing
parties would probably be employed at thisstage. This form of attack
is very rare in history, the most notable instance being the capture of
Gibraltar by Sir G. Rooke’s Fleet in 1704. It is possible that the
gallantry displayed in, and the success of this operation has tended to
make us over estimate the value of this method of attack.

(2.) To force a passage. This isa very feasible operation for ships,
provided that the water-way is clear, for it is an axiom that guns alone

Attacks on

0as
Fortresses,

Naval
Attacks.

For Capture.

To force a
Passage,

330. SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895,

are powerless to stop ships running past. A fleet so employed would

- keep as far from the guns of the forts as possible, but the distance, and

Bombard-
ment.

ROWE boat
ttacks.

Desultory
Bombard-
ment.

Military
Attacks.

formation, of the attack must depend upon local conditions such as,
state and extent of the channel, &c. There are very few places in the
world where opportunity is afforded for this kind of attack, which is
not intended to include such an operation as steaming past the forts at
the entrance to a harbour only to come under the fire of the inner chain
of forts. This method of attack therefore can be attempted only very
occasionally as a definite operation, though to some degree it may enter
into the operations of acombined Naval and Military attack on a Coast
Fortress.

-(3.). For the purpose of ravage and destruction. Attacks of this de-
scription would take the form of:

(a.) Bombardment.

-(b.) Sudden inroads into harbours by small eraft, and torpedo
boats.

_ (a.) Bombardment. As the chief object is to inflict damage, not on
the forts but on the property they defend, the fire must be at long
range, and accurate, it seems likely therefore that specially constructed
vessels carrying mortars, or howitzers, or long range ordnance of some
description, will be employed rather than war vessels, and that they will
be anchored in positions as far as possible from the forts and clear of
their fire also, when possible.

History gives frequent instances of this kind of attack. If ordinary
war vessels are employed, the attack would be as already explained in

(La.)

(0.) The essence of this attack is surprise, and rapidity, torpedo
boats, two or three together would appear suddenly before a coast fort-
ress and proceed to run in, as rapidly as possible, past the defences
into the inner waters, when they would be able to destroy with their
torpedoes any ships lying at anchor, or in dock. Actual experience of
this form of attack has necessarily not been extensive, but the little
already known tends to show the ease with which such attacks can be
carried out, and their extremely formidable nature.

_ (4.) ‘To cover other operations, for moral effect ete. We might call
this kind of attack desultory bombardment. It may be undertaken as
an operation in itself, for moral effect, or to draw off attention to a
distant part of the theatre of war, or it may be part of a regular attack,
the object being to divert the defender’s attention from the main attack;
but whatever the object, the action of the ships would be very similar
and would consist of a long range bombardment under weigh.

Minirary Attacks CoveRED AND Supportep sy SHIPs.

(1.) With a view to conquest and occupation. These can only be
conducted against the land defences of a fortress; if these latter are
weak or badly manned they may be captured by assault, otherwise they
will have to be beseiged in regular form. The covering Naval force
would generally assist by bombarding the sea fronts at long ranges.

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. B31

This form of attack is proved by history and generally acknowledged
to be the best and most certain method of capturing a Coast Fortress.
On this point Admiral Colomb says “ We have seen that the methods
“ of attack by expeditions over sea had long been established, and that
“the idea of capturing ports or islands by Naval force alone was almost
“entirely out of view. The experience of a century marked by only
“one or two successes, and many failures of ships against works and
‘almost uniform success of troops, covered and supplied by ships, when
“numerically sufficient and properly handled had quite settled the plan
“ of attack.’?}

(2 and 3.) To force a passage and for ravage. “Troops have been pres a
“used in the past in conjunction with ships for attacks with either of
“these objects, and may be so employed in the future, especially in the
“former case, for the development of submarine mines may make the
“clearing of a channel such a difficult operation that it may be advis-
“able to land troops to take the Batteries of the Fortress in rear, and
“if possible silence them before the ships attempt to clear their way
“through.’”’? The landing of troops merely to ravage territory is not
as we have already agreed an attack on a Coast Fortress, and therefore
need not be considered.
Conditions

Before concluding this part it would be advisable to briefly consider Sovemime
the general conditions under which the different forms of attack, “““**
enumerated above, would probably take place.

All operations into which the state of the sea enters as one of the
conditions, must depend upon the command of the sea, and in this
respect it may be noted that, ‘the command of the sea must be fought
for if it is not admitted, and territorial attacks must cease while this
process goes on. ‘They cannot be undertaken at all whilst the com-
mand is in abeyance; but after it is settled, the side that holds it,
inevitably pushes on to the attack of territory”’’ and that on the
‘State’ of the sea at any given time depends the probability and
nature of any attack on hostile territory. These ‘ States’ of
the sea have been classed by Admiral Colomb as that of ‘ indiff-
erence’ ‘when neither side attempts to hold command of particular
waters and therefore which neither side threatens’ of ‘ disputed
command’ and of ‘assured command,’ ‘and evidently these must
be a continual passing from one state into a higher and back again’ ’”?
so that we get states of temporary command lasting for longer or shorter
intervals. Further ‘if we take these three states of the sea into our
contemplation as conditions under which expeditions across it succeed
or fail, we may note, that over a commanded sea no such expedition
can be put in force at all by the inferior Naval Power, except by
evasion, else must we admit a sea which is of disputed command or one

1“ Naval Warfare,”’ p. 877, by Rear-Admiral P. H. Colomb.
> RAT. “ Proceedings,” Vol. XX., p. 394. Commended Essay.
3“ Naval Warfare,” by Rear-Admiral P. H, Colomh, p. 309.
4 Thid p. 207. See
5 Ibid p. 212.

Value of
Command of
the Sea.

For Capture.

Nayal
Attacks

332 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE Essay, 1895,

that is indifferent ; on the other side the Power in command of the sea
ought never to fail in any attack it undertakes so long as it does not
cut itself off from its sea communications.”!

If therefore we have a Navy powerful enough toassure the command
of the sea, we need not fear attacks in force on our Coast Fortresses ;
but, as to command the whole seas requires an immense, and vigilant
fleet, and as it 1s in the power even of an inferior fleet, or of an expedi-
tionary force to evade a superior hostile fleet, we may have to be pre-
pared even under the most favourable circumstances to meet some
forms of attack, especially in distant waters where owing to their re-
moteness our command of the sea may not at the time exist in fact, or
may have been temporarily lost. Here however such attacks can only
be successful where there is sufficient time for their completion, if the
capture of the place can be delayed sufficiently long, relief must come,
and the failure of the expedition be certain, as witness the reliefs of
Gibraltar in 1704-5. Now more than ever when the movement of ships
and the duration of voyages are no longer dependent on fickle and
variable winds, the power of relieving distant fortresses seems to be
more firmly assured than heretofore, to that side which has command of
the sea. As Admiral Colomb says “The general result of improved
Marine Architecture therefore must be to put a check on all territorial
attacks which depend upon an indifferent sea; as the same cause must
tend to make a doubtful command of the sea more doubtful, and a com-
mand of the seamore assured, the general result would appear to be rarer
opportunities for territorial attack across a sea which is not commanded
but much more certainty in the results of expeditions carried on by the
Power which holds a command of the sea that cannot be challenged.’”?

The introduction of a time element into the conditions of successful
defence under certain circumstances would point to the conclusion that
the value of a Coast Fortress may often lie rather in its capacity to de-
lay capture, than in its ability to resist it altogether.

It may be presumed that as a general rule no attack on a Coast
Fortress will be attempted unless there is some reasonable probability
of success attending the attempt. It remains therefore for us to ascer-
tain under what conditions success is likely to attend the different forms
of attack already enumerated. We will take them in the order in which
they have been considered above.

Nava. Atrracxs.

(la.) Bombardment for Capture. This implies the existence of a
temporarily commanded, or at least an inditferent sea, for no ships
would waste their ammunition in bombarding a fortress with an enemy’s
fleet near enough to attack them before they can replenish their
ammunition.

(1b.) Regular Attack by ships is out of the question except command
of the sea is assured for a sufficiently long time, not only to permit

1 “Naval Warfare,” by Rear-Admiral P. H. Colomb, p. 212,
* Ibid p. 216.

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 333

of the ships making up the ammunition they had expended, but also to
allow them to repair the damages they must receive, even in a success-
ful attack, before they may be called upon to meet a hostile fleet.

(2.) Forcing a passage. There seems no reason why this should
not be attempted in any “State” of the sea, provided that the ships
undertaking this attack are not being actually watched by an enemy’s
fleet, which bring them to battle, and that when they enter the waters
beyond they will be free from attack.

(3a.) Bombardment for destructive purposes. To place a flotilla of
specially designed vessels (probably in no sense sea going) ina position
to shell a fortress, and to keep them there long enough to effect their
object, would seem to imply a fairly assured command of the sea;
bombardment by war vessels for this purpose under any other conditions
than this could only be of a desultory nature.

(3b.) Raids by torpedo boats. From the very nature of this attack
it would not be unreasonable to assume that no “ State”? of the sea
could prevent its being attempted.

(4.) Desultory bombardment. When this is undertaken to support
a military attack it is necessary that there should be at least a temporary
command of the Sea assured for a sufficient time to afford reasonable
prospect of success. If this is attempted for any other purposes, a
temporary command of the Sea at least is necessary, unless the ships so
engaged are prepared to sacrifice themselves, if required, to attain their
object, or unless the places attacked are near enough to their bases to
allow the ships a reasonable chance of retreating, and refitting there ;
otherwise they render themselves liable to defeat, and capture at the
hands of an inferior Naval Force. In these exceptional cases, the
attempt may be made in any “‘ State”’ of the sea.

Military Attacks. It may be taken for granted that no form of
military attack whatever, will be undertaken unless there isa command
of the sea sufficiently assured to afford reasonable prospect of success.
The only possible exception to this is the case of a force which succeeds
in effecting a landing on territory by evasion, but unless the territory
invaded is likely to be friendly to the invaders they will find themselves
cut off from their supplies, and reinforcements except they have the
command of the sea.

CHaprer II, Tue Particurar Forms or ATrAck THAT OUR Coast
Fortresses at Home AnD ABROAD WILL MOST PROBABLY BE
CALLED UPON TO MEET.

It can hardly be expected that with Coast Fortresses situated all over
the world, some close to a possible enemy’s Naval Stations, some in
mid ocean, some guarding important Naval dockyards, others protecting
coaling stations, é&c., that all will be liable to the same form of attack.
Mauritius might be captured by a force that would not attempt to
attack Bombay, and Portsmouth might be the object of a form of attack,
that would be impossible, or thrown away against St. Helena. Hach
Coast Fortress will be liable to some forms of attack rather than others.

Forcing a
Passage.

Ravage and
Destruction,

Desultory
Bombard-
ment,

Military
Attacks.

General Con-
siderations.

Division of
Subject.

In space.

In time.

334 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895:

it must be our endeavour to ascertain as far as possible the forms this
hability will take in different cases. This can only be done very
generally, for to attempt to classify all our Coast Fortresses with their
differences of importance, locality, armament, types of fort, ete., would
be, even if capable of satisfactory accomplishment, a task quite beyond
the limits of this essay. There appears however to be one broad dis-
tinction which for the purpose of this essay would seem particularly
suitable, because it is largely based upon the nature of the garrisons
that will be employed to defend different fortresses. To all our home
fortresses are allotted in addition to the R.A. Companies serving in the
district certain units of Militia and Volunteer Artillery, to whom a share
in the defence of the fortress is confided, while those abroad can only
count on their existing garrisons, which as far as India and the Crown
Colonies are concerned are composed of the R.A. while the self-governing
Colonies find troops of their own, to take up the work of the Defence.
This distribution of the Garrison gives us a division of the subject into

(1.) The defence of Coast Fortresses at home.

(2.) The defence of Coast Fortresses abroad, 7.c. outside the
United Kingdom.

It may be noted that this method of separating the subject practi-
cally puts into one class all the most important Fortresses, viz :—Those
at home, while it leaves those classified as “ abroad ” as descriptive with
one, or two exceptions, such as Malta, Bombay, &c., of the less impor-
tant ones. These exceptions if they approximate closely in importance
to the one class, approach from their geographical position still
closer to the second, in their lability to particular forms of attack,
and it seems probable that the principles of their defence should
be conducted with slight additional modifications on the same general
lines.

But as we thus have a division of the subject in space depending
practically upon the geographical position of each Fortress, so it will
be convenient to formulate a division in time depending upon the stage
hostilities have reached at the time an attack is made. This division
can most easily, and appropriately be made into :—

(a.) On the outbreak of hostilities including the period when they
are imminent.

(b.) During the progress of the war, when the Command of the
Sea is held by ourselves.

(c.) During the progress of the war when the Command of the
Sea is doubtful, or only temporary, in certain seas.

(d.) During the progress of the war, when the enemy has
obtained an assured command of the Sea.

I think it will be apparent that some such division of the subject as
this is needed, and will tend to a clearer understanding of what may be
expected to happen under varying conditions. I propose therefore to
examine the question of probability of attack from a combined view of
the conditions due to difference in time and place.

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 335

(a.) At Home. Hvery effect will be made by each Naval Power
when hostilities are imminent, to place every available ship that is fit
for the line of battle at sea, in order to assure the supremacy of its own
Navy and to obtain as early as possible the Command of the Sea. At
the outbreak of hostilities therefore, it may be expected that no attacks
by ships on Coast Fortresses are likely to be attempted. As has been
pointed out, however, by Major Hlmslie, R.A.,! the individual value of
a war vessel to the Power to which it belongs is now so very much
greater than it use to be, owing to the time, and money required for its
construction, and the impossibility of building new ships to replace
those put out of action during the probable continuance of a modern
war, that it is very decidedly to the interest and advantage of both sides
(and of the probably weaker Naval Force in particular) to endeavour,
while fitting out their own fleets, to harass the enemy engaged ina
similar operation, and if possible destroy his battle-ships in their own
ports. That this is quite feasible, and that the best way of effecting it
now, is by a torpedo boat attack, a perusal of the Prize Hssay 1893
makes sufficiently plain. Torpedo boat attack then, is a form of attack
extremely likely to be experienced by all our home fortresses, within
whose defences ships of war are to be found, but it does not appear
that any other serious form of attack is to be apprehended at this stage
of the war.

Abroad. Those of our Fortresses abroad which were situated within
striking distance of an enemy’s Naval base, and within whose defences
ships of war are to be found would also be liable to attacks by torpedo
boats, and must be prepared to meet them, but with our smaller
fortresses, and defended coaling stations in distant waters, such attacks
need not be feared. At the most bombardment either with the idea of
capture, or of the nature I have termed desultory, is all that need be
apprehended.

(b.) At Home. When during the progress of a war the assured
command of the Sea has been obtained by our own Navy, the threat to
our Coast Fortresses at home will cease almost entirely if not alto-
gether. But unless the enemy has been very badly beaten, or is
unusually wanting in daring and enterprise, it seems probable that he
will still from time to time attempt raids by torpedo boats on our ports,
and against these we must still be prepared. Any other threat to the
home fortresses is out of the question, and therefore the Garrisons that
have been allotted to them can with safety be considerably reduced
and will be available for employment elsewhere. In what manner they
will then be employed is a question of war policy which is not for us to
decide, and which has probably been already considered and settled by
the proper authorities. But asin the words of the late General Hamley
“it does not follow because an army is defending a territory, it must
confine itself to the defensive; on the contrary it will best effect its
purpose by actively threatening its adversary, and by taking the lead
wherever the opportunity offers,’’? so it is not unreasonable to antici-

1R,A.I, “ Proceedings,” Vol. XX., p. 346. Gold Medal Prize Essay.
2 The operations of war, p. 48. ;

Outbreak of
Hostilities at
Home.

When Com:
mand of
the sea is
assured.

Command of
ng

the sea be
doubtiu

336 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESsAy, 1895.

pate that the forces thus freed from the Coast Fortresses will probably
be employed in expeditions against the enemy’s territory. Further, it
would be quite legitimate to expect that, as any Huropean Power with
which we might find ourselves at war, possesses an Army to defend its

~ own home territory, many times larger than our available force, and as

ir
J.

it would be folly to place ourselves in a position where we could hardly
help being beaten by a much superior force, any attacks we might con-
template on this Power’s territory would be directed against its outlying
possessions and Colonies, and would be of the nature of those Military
expeditions so common in the History of the Naval Wars of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries.

Abroad. With the Command of the Sea assured, our Fortresses
abroad would probably be exempt from any attack, for as Admiral
Colomb says, speaking of the French raids in the West Indies during
1710 and 1711, “These attacks where the force employed is small,
where the distance to be passed over the sea is short, and where if a
successful landing is effected, capture of the whole territory may follow,
constitute perhaps the limit within which there is any chance at all of
a successful attack on territory by the inferior Naval Force.”! When
the command of the Sea is lost to any Power, its Naval Force in distant
waters is likely to be very inferior, especially in the face of our own
Naval strength, and unless the above conditions are existing, even this
form of attack cannot take place, much less any on a greater scale re-
quiring scrious defensive measures to resist it.

(c.) At Home. As long as the Command of the Sea remains
doubtful the Fleets in the home waters on both sides will be too much
occupied with each othe’s movements to pay any attention to the attack
of Coast Fortresses, and no expedition against them, that will be liable
to interruption from the Sea will be possible. As long as this state
lasts therefore our home fortresses will not probably be liable to
any other attack than that of torpedo boats and perhaps desultory
bombardment by occasional cruisers. If the enemy obtain a temporary
command, invasion may be possible, but this will not affect Coast
Fortresses as such.

Abroad. ‘The case however with our Fortresses abroad may under
these circumstances be quite different. The greater part of our Fleets
will be employed in their legitimate work of trying to obtain the com-
mand of the Sea. Itis possible therefore that in distant waters the
enemy may have a command which, though perhaps only temporary,
will be his long enough to enable him to attempt the conquest of
territory lying in those seas. In this case it seems probable that ex-
peditions will be attempted against those places likely to be most easily
captured and held, and which like our small coaling stations will be of
value to him when taken, proportionate to the loss that their transfer
will be to ourselves. These attacks may be made in any of the ways
before mentioned, but the only form of attack that can be really success-
ful against a properly armed, and manned fortress is that, which is

1“ Naval Warfare,” p. 821.

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 337

delivered by a sufficiently strong Military Expedition. The chances
of the fortress attacked making a successful defence, depend therefore
upon its power to meet an attack from the land side, and its ability to
prolong its defence for a time sufficient to allow of relief arriving.
Large fortresses requiring a very considerable force to capture them
are not likely to be so attacked, but may expect to have to meet de-
sultory bombardment, or even one carried out by special vessels for
destructive purposes, if their nearness to an enemy’s Naval base per-
mits of this being attempted without interruption, and with a reasonable
chance of success.

(d.) At Home. The day which sees the Command of the Sea held
by our enemy will indeed bea distressful one for England. hen is
made the first certain step to an invasion of these Isles, the consequences
of which it is not pleasant to contemplate. Assuming this condition
of things to occur, it is not clear how onr Coast Fortresses could play
any sufficient part in helping to ward off an invasion. For the in-
vading force would probably be landed on some convenient part of our
open Coast line, and would be under no necessity to approach any of
our Coast Fortresses unless it was found that its presence threatened
their base and communications, in which case a determined assault on
the land front would probably give the place into their hands. For it
seems highly improbable from political reasons arising out of the panic
that would be created by an invasion, that the very large garrisons that
would be required to defend the land fronts of our large fortresses, like
Plymouth or Portsmouth, would be permitted to remain to do so, while
London was threatened; but rather that a considerable portion of them
would be withdrawn to assist the Mield Army in resisting the advance
of the invading forces, if only to reassure the panic-stricken inhabitants
of the capital. But assuming that this would not be done, and that the
necessary garrisons were left in the Coast Fortresses to hold them, the
chief part they would have to undertake in the event of attack would
be the defence of their land fronts; for though no doubt whenever it
was considered imperative to reduce such a fortress, the land attack
would be assisted by naval operations on the sea front, still these latter
will have a less chance than ever of being successful by themselves for
it will be in the power of the defenders to completely obstruct their
own waters with mines, torpedoes, &c., without fear of injuring their
own shipping (which must anyhow fall an easy prey to the enemy), and
thus to keep the enemy’s ships at long ranges from their forts ; so that
if the speedy capture of the place is desired, as it will be, the real attack
must be made against the land defences.

It has not been thought necessary to consider the question of in-
vasion under any other conditions than that of the assured command of
the Sea, to the enemy. The only other possible condition is invasion
by evasion, that is by eluding our Fleet, and throwing a force on to our
shores, that must take its chance of making its own footing and being
able to obtain supports, and reinforcements as required, after it has
landed. ‘This is such a very risky operation that it can be only under-
taken when the invading force is likely to receive assistance from the

The command
of the sew
being lost.

088 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

people of the country it invades, as in the instance of William III.
landing at Torbay, or Hoche’s expedition to Bantry Bay. Where this
assistance is not forthcoming, we have only to recall the inaction of the
French after the battle of Beachy Head, and the failure of the enormous
expeditions that from 1797 to 1805 Napoleon collected for the invasion
of our shores, even to put out from their own ports, to show that while
there is a fleet in being on the other side, the hazard is so great as to
be prohibitive.
Abroad. As regards the position of our Coast Fortresses abroad,
when owing to the command of the Sea being lost, they can no longer
look for, or expect relief when attacked. All that can be said is, that
their fall into the enemy’s hands is certain, provided that he attacks
them with sufficient force, and in the proper manner, that is by military
expeditions. All that the Garrisons can do (and probably will do) is to
delay the day of capture in the hopes of something turning up, but to
do this they must be prepared to meet the main attack on land which
should be really the only formidable one.

Cuaprer II]. Tue Kiyo or Derence Necessary, AND THE GENERAL
Duties or tut Derenpers 1n Mrrrine tHese ATTACKS.

The preceding chapter has served to show the forms of attack to
which our Coast Fortresses will be most liable under different conditions.
In Chapter I. we sketched the general lines on which each attack is
likely to be carried out. It is not difficult then by combining the two
to arrive at the kind of defence that will be most suitable for each case,
and the work that will therefore be required from the Artillery Garrison
to meet them. Keeping to the same division of the subject as was made
in the previous Chapter it will be seen that—

Nature of (a.) At Home. For the purpose of repelling torpedo boat attacks
and as far as the Artillery defence only is concerned, quick-firine guns
are likely to be the most useful!, other guns might be employed attimes
with advantage, but whatever nature of ordnance may be used it seems
certain that it must be capable of being fired rapidly, and that smoke-
less powder, laying over the sights, and a system of rapid ranging must
be employed; extraneous aids in the way of range-finders, &c., will
generally be impossible. If desultory bombardment is attempted it
would be carried out at long range by ships under weigh and could be
effectively replied to by most of the heavy guns mounted in our Coast
Fortresses.

Duties of The general duties of the defenders will be the manning of the quick-
Defence. x a t
firing and other guns employed against torpedo boats (a system of
fighting which has yet to be adopted) and possibly the manning of the
heavy guns in the manner explained in the Drill-book.
Abroad. Fortresses that are liable to torpedo boat attacks require
the same means of defence, and the same duties from the defenders as
those at home. But in addition they, with the other smaller fortresses,

1 See R.A.I, “ Proceedings,’ Vol. XX, Gold Medal Prize Essay.

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 339

will be liable to bombardment either with a view to capture, or of a
desultory nature; the former is only lhkely to be attempted against
small fortresses, and differs from the latter only in that being under-
taken with a definite object it may be expected that it will not be
abandoned without an effort being made to land storming parties from
boats.

Against bombardment the heavy guns will be required, for the boat
attacks the light guns supplied for general defence will be chiefly used.

The duties of the defenders will then be :—

(1.) To man the heavy guns which will be fought by depression
range-finder or position-finder according to the means
available.

(2.) To man the light guns for general defence which must
usually be fought without the aid of these adjuncts.

(b.) At Home. The portion of the Artillery Garrison that would
be left in our home fortresses must be sufficient to man the guns for
defence against torpedo-boats, and perhaps a few of the heavy guns for
general purposes. The remainder of the men who are to be employed
in expeditions abroad will be required to make up the Siege Train which
must accompany every such expedition if its success is to be insured.

The duties of the larger part therefore will be to man the Siege Train.

Abroad. The fortresses abroad must remain in a state of prepared-
ness to meet any possible attack, but no serious attack need be antici-
pated.

(c.) At Home. The defence will be as indicated in (a) but the heavy
guns required for engaging bombarding vessels may have to be more
frequently employed, and consequently this form of defence may assume
a greater importance.

Abroad. Fortresses abroad according to their situation, strength,
and the local conditions, influencing the enemy at the time, may be
subjected to any form of attack ; all purely Naval Attacks on its sea
faces alone, a properly armed and commanded fortress should be
capable of repelling, and no really serious danger should threaten it
until the enemy has landed troops to attack it from the land side. This
is the point on which the defender’s attention must be concentrated,
and against such an attack the guns for general defence will not alone
be sufficient, they must be supplemented by howitzers and siege guns
of sufficient calibre to cope with the ordnance that the enemy would
employ, for what virtually become siege operations.

The defenders therefore will be required to man the different guns
they possess according to the nature of the attack, but principally to
fight the ordnance employed to resist attacks from the land side.

(d.) At Home or Abroad. When the command of the Sea is lost,
Coast Fortresses wherever situated must if attacked make the best de-
fence possible. To meet attacks, which are not likely to be made except

in sufficient force, the whole armament and all the energies of the de-

Duties of
Defenders.

Means of
Detence.

Duties of
Defenders.

Means of
Defence.

Duties of
Defenders.

Distribution
of Garrisons.

Defence
Scheme.

340 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

fence will be required, but here again attention must be chiefly turned
to the defence of the land fronts on which the main attack will be made,
and for this purpose siege ordnance are required. If bombardment by
specially prepared vessels is attempted, either by itself, or in conjunction
with aregular attack, it can best be met by high angle fire guns adapted
for long range shooting in any direction, and some of these should be
supphed, at any rate to all our most important fortresses.

Before proceeding to consider the question of how the Artillery
Garrisons can best be trained to carry out the general duties here in-
dicated, something must be said regarding the manner in which the
distribution of the garrisons to these duties should be carried out.
Some such distribution it will be admitted is necessary especially in
our home fortresses where Militia and Volunteer Artillery are called
upon to take their share of work with the Royal Artillery. It may be
laid down as an axiom from which no general dissent will be made,
that when a variety of work has to be done, as in the manning and de-
fending of our Coast Fortresses, it will be more efficiently performed,
if the same men are always told off, and kept to the same work, and
that when the nature of the work varies, the most important should be
allotted to the most efficient men. A Coast Fortress therefore should
be divided into a number of commands, and a portion of the garrison
of it should be permanently allotted to each command, and kept entirely
to its own command. In the home fortresses where the garrisons are
composed partly of companies R.A. and partly of Auxiliary Artillery,
the companies should be allotted to the most important works as far as
they will go, and the Auxiliary Artillery to the remainder. Abroad
where Colonial troops are found, who have to work with the R.A., a
similar distribution should be made. Where only Royal Artillery
Garrisons are found, it is immaterial how the distribution is made, ag
also in those fortresses manned entirely by the Colonial Artillery, but
the distribution once made, should not be altered unless absolutely
necessary. ‘This distribution should be embodied in the Defence
Scheme of each Fortress, which as far as this question is concerned
should be drawn up, on the following general lines.

(1.) A distribution in time. It must be recognised that after the
order for mobilisation has been given, some appreciable time must
elapse, before the different units can assemble at their place of concen-
tration, and that while they are assembling, the forces told off to each
Fortress, and that are on the spot, willalone be available; these will con-
sist of the R.A. Companies stationed in the Fortress, and probably a
considerable number of the local Volunteers. As soon as the Militia
are mobilised, and reach their place of concentration they will relieve
the Volunteers. Thus two periods must be provided for, viz :—

1st period, Royal Artillery and Volunteers available.
2nd period, Royal Artillery and Militia allocated to the Fortress.

(2.) These forces should be told off into Battery commands, a definite
portion of the armament being allotted to each command. As many
Battery commands as may be convenient will constitute a Fire command,

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 341

Hach Battery command must consist of Royal Artillery only, or of
Militia or Volunteer Artillery only (according to the period of mobili-
sation) each corps being under its own officers. Fire commands should
be arranged in the same manner, if possible.

(3.) The apportionment of these commands should be on the prin-
ciple already advocated of allotting the most important to the R.A.

(4.) In allotting the details required for any command allowance
should be made for two reliefs at least.

(5.) Fire Commanders and Officers holding higher posts should be
specially selected, and appointed by name, being commissioned as such
if necessary.

(6.) All specialists required for range-finding, hydraulic mountings,
&c., must be found by the R.A., and will be in addition to the battery

details. These must be provided for the Auxiliary Artillery as well, —

and only to this extent is a mixture of corps permissible. Some of
these provisions are applicable only to the home fortresses, or with
sheht modifications to those abroad which may be manned by mixed
garrisons, but the principles on which they are based are of universal
application.

A distribution of the Artillery Garrisons made on these lines would
much simplify the question of training for it would provide :—

(1.) That Battery commands should be kept separate, thus allowing
the men of each corps to be trained and worked under their own
officers.

(2.) That each Battery command was told off to a specific portion
of the armament, thus admitting of the duties of the different units
being more clearly defined and separated.

(3.) In our home fortresses that generally speaking, the dividing
line of duties between the Royal Artillery and the Auxiliary Artillery
can be more clearly marked.

This is important as it affects the question of the training of the
different corps.

The actual distribution of duties between the R.A. and the rest
of the Artillery Garrison in home fortresses can only be settled locally,
with due consideration to the requirements of each Fortress. But
bearmg in mind that the most important portions of the defence
must be given to the R.A. Companies, and also that these latter are
liable to foreign service and with it varying duties in different localities,
ib should be the endeavour when distributing them at home to appor-
tion them as faras possible to those means of defence which will be of
most value under all circumstances. The distribution at home then
should generally speaking be as follows :—

The Royal Artillery to—

_(1.) The quick-firing guns and other ordnance intended to repel
torpedo boat attacks.

(2.) ‘The movable armament or guns for general defence, which will

Advantages

0
distribution.

The actual
distribution.

Gen2ral_Con-

siderations.

Value of
heiwvy guns.

System of
‘ralning,

342 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE Essay, 1895.

be required against landing parties, and which must play an important
part in the defence of fortress abroad.

(3.) The most important heavy B.L. guns, and long range guns,
&c., as far in each case as the available strength of the companies will
permit.

The Auxiliary Artillery to—

The general fixed armament which will for the most part be composed
of heavy R.M.L. guns, commencing where the R.A. have left off (at
the most important), and working down to the less important as far as
the available strength permits.

CHarten IV. THe System or Trarnina taat witt Best Fir tHe
DerenpDers to Carry Out Tarse Durtizs.

If the views put forward in the preceding pages with regard to the
probable forms of attack on our Coast Fortresses, and the nature of
the defence required to meet them be accepted, it must be admitted
that the duties of the Artillery Garrisons will not be confined to the
fighting of the heavy guns mounted in fixed emplacements, but must
include the service, and ranging of many descriptions of light and
medium ordnance, and that this class of ordnance will if anything be
in more constant use, aud of greater relative value, to the defence than
the heavy guns. It will not therefore be sufficient to train our gunners
only in the system of fire discipline, and organisation explained in the
drill-book, as applicable to the working of heavy guns, they must also
be taught the best method of working and fighting, the guns they will
be required to man under the varying conditions of actual warfare. It
cannot be said with truth that the drill-book contains no information
regarding the method of employment of the lighter guns, but I think
it must be admitted that the chapters on Cons. Defence deal so, almost
exclusively with the system of fighting heavy guns against ships, that
it has come to bea matter of general acceptance that this kind of action
will constitute if not the whole, at least the most important part of the
Garrison gunner’s duties in war-time. The system of training accord-
ingly, has been largely based on this implied assumption, and drill and
training with the lighter guns, that make up the movable armament
of a fortress, has been considered of only secondary importance.

It has been my endeavour in the preceding pages to show that the
occasions on which the garrison gunner will be called upon to man his
heavy guns will be few, compared to those when the movable guns
will be wanted, and that when these latter are wanted they will always
be required to repel an important attack, while the former may fre-
quently only be employed, when they are required, in what will be little
more than interesting practice.

If this view is correct, it is clear that a system of training to be
complete, and satisfactory must be based upon the requirements of the
movable natures of guns, though it should admit of adaptation without
difficulty to the special requirements of the heavy guns, our present
system has been evolved on exactly the opposite principle and in some
points is not well adapted to the working of lighter guns on travelling

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 343

mountings, which have to be fought in different positions and under
varying circumstances. Are we then to abandon the system of fire
discipline, &c., under which our Garrison Artillery has been trained
for the last several years? I trust not; for it is a system that has done
much good service, and undoubtedly gave, when it was first started, a
much desired impetus to the training of the Garrison Artillery. But
I think we ought to recognise now that we have hitherto taken a some-
what exclusive view with regard to the réle of Coast Fortresses, and
be prepared to modify our system as necessary, to bring it more in
accordance with the probability of things. ‘This we can do the more
readily because the system being in itself a sound one no very great
changes are necessary: violent changes seldom lead to immediate
beneficial results, and gradual modification to suit new circumstances
is the law of healthy change. Let us see then what kind of system of
_ training is required, and how far the present system as given in the
Garrison Artillery drill-book needs modification.

In the first place it will be observed that as all Garrison Artil-
lery Companies are liable to foreign service and with it different
duties in different stations, while the Militia and Volunteers are only
required for home defence, it is probable that the former will requirea
wider, and more general training than the latter; for while the training
of the one must be such as to fit all Companies to perform the different
duties they may be called upon to undertake in different places, the
training of the other need only be such as to best fit them for those
particular duties to which they are allotted in the fortresses they
garrison. It will, therefore, be advisable to consider the method of
training each corps separately before we come to the question of how
they can best be trained together.

This liability to foreign service will always be the great difficulty in
the way of organising, and training the Garrison Artillery Companies
in the manner which otherwise might theoretically be the best. We
cannot. say that such, and such companies shall be permanently trained
to fight heavy guns against ships, such, and such others as Siege Train
Companies, and others again to quick-firing guns &ec.; for to do so
means, that some companies will not be liable to service abroad
or lable only to service in certain places abroad, some companies
thus always getting the good stations, while others have to be
satisfied with the less desirable ones, some companies getting long
periods of home service, whilst others cannot expect more than
a brief spell at home between two long tours of foreign ser-
vice. Desirable therefore as it doubtless would be, to have the
different kinds of Garrison Artillery work permanently specialised, it
does not seem that this is likely to be feasible with due regard to the
exigencies of the service, and the training of Companies therefore must
be conducted on the principle of general foreign service, and consequent
lability to different duties at different times and places. To meet then
the various demands that may be made on Garrison Companies their
training should be of two kinds.

(1.). A general training, embodying the simplest applications of the
A7

Difference of
Conditions

Royal
Artillery,

Training.

General

Training.

844: SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

principles that underly the successful fighting of all guns.

(2.) A special training, in the particular application of these prin-
ciples to the fighting of those guns, to which each company is for the
time being allotted.

Before going further it will pethaps be of advantage to explain what
is meant by the term “‘T'raining,”’ which must not “ys confused with
the word instruction. Thus, training is the term applied to that special
form of instruction, which is employed to fit a soldier for the specific
duties he will be called upon to perform in time of war; while instruc-
tion denotes the imparting to him of knowledge that may often be of
great service to him, but is not absolutely necessary to the performance
of his specific duties. An Infantry soldier is trained to use his rifle,
but he may be instructed alsoin gundrill. Training therefore includes
instruction of a definite description, while instruction does not neces-
sarily mean training.

The principles which underly the successful fighting of all guns in-
clude, and may be divided into :—

(1.) The correct service of the individual gun.
(2.) The method of laying.

(3.) The service of the combined pieces, t.e. the fire discipline of
the battery.

(4.) The method of ranging, which includes observation of fire.

(5.) The chain of command, and means of communicating orders
from the commanding officer to his subordinates.

The simplest and most general application of these principles is :—

(1.) Service of the piece. To be simple this must be as uniform as
possible for all types of guns B.L. or M.L. An endeavour has been
made of late years to obtain this, by keeping as far as possible the same
numbers to the same duties with all guns. Nomenclature should also
be uniform, and either the term “ Gun Captain” or the term “ No. 1”
universally adopted, and not as at present, the N.C.O. in charge of a
detachment called a Gun Captain when in charge of a 9-in. R.M.L. gun
anda No. 1 when working an 8in. Howitzer. ‘These little differences
tend to confusion, and tothe idea that the drill of different guns must
necessarily be wholly different.

(2.) Laying. ‘The most universally useful method of laying is over
the sights by aligning them on the target. Great importance has
rightly been attached to this method, as itis the foundation of all laying,
and every encouragement has been given to men to make themselves
good layers.

(3.) Fire Discipline. This must be of the most simple, and general
description; the groups should consist of two guns each, the working
of them should be carried out quietly, and rapidly, orders should be by
word of command or signal, and the rates, and orders of fire should be
as simple as possible. Here again uniformity in nomenclature would
tend to simplicity, and either the term Group Commander or Group

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 345

Officer should be universally adopted, similarly the Group command for
all guns should be either “ commence firing” or fire No. —— gun.

The method of fighting guns up to this point concerns chiefly the
N.C.O.’s and gunners, and comprises the essential part of their general
training, the remaining portions, viz. the ranging and communication
of orders, as far as the rank and file are concerned constitute merely an
amplification of fire discipline, but their methods should be equally
simple and capable of comprehension by all.

(4.) Ranging and observation of fire. All ranging rests on the
bracket system, and every method of observation of fire is merely an
extension of the method of visual observation aided by field glasses or
telescopes. These are the fundamental and necessary methods.

(5.) The chain of command, &c. This must always be the same,
viz. from the commanding officer through his subordinate officers to
the gun captains, and detachments, and the simplest means of communi-
cation is by word of command, or signal between each link in the chain,
all being in positions where this can easily be applied.

These are the principles on which the general training of all ranks,
officers and men, should be conducted, and the simplest practical appli-
cation of them is to the working of 4 or 6 light guns on travelling
carriages, divided into groups of 2 guns each, and placed in open battery
and close enough together to be all under the eye of the commanding
officer, and within reach of his voice, so that the means of communication
may also be simple ; the method of ranging can be made equally simple
by employing standing targets at medium ranges where visual obser-
vation of fire is possible, and easy. These are in fact the conditions of
Field Artillery fire-action in their simplest form, and they are equally
applicable, and necessary to the general training of the Garrison gunner.
Instead however of using field guns, the guns composing the movable
armaments of fortresses should be employed for this purpose. This
would have the great additional advantage of basing the general training,
of the Garrison Artillery on the service, and method of working that
class of gun which they will most frequently be called upon to man in
time of war. These guns are already supplied in sufficient numbers as
“ movable armaments ”’ to be available for purposes of general training
but where they are not conveniently parked for the use of companies,
there seems no reason why other guns should not be issued for this pur-
pose, especially as there must be numbers of them in store, and as it is
nota matter of importance that they should be all of the same calibre or
type. On the contrary seeing the different types of guns we have in the
service, and the necessity for training the men in the use of them all, the
ideal instructional battery for general training should consist of six guns
made up, say of two 40-pr. R.M.L., two 40-pr. R.B.L., and two 4-in.
B.L. guns; the actual calibre supplied is not of importance, provided
that, the guns used belong to that class which are now issued as the
movable armaments of Coast Fortresses. The general training carried
out on these lines having being completed each Company will pass on
to its special training, but should annually as a preliminary to the drill
season, be regularly put through the course of general training.

Practical
Training,

Special
Training

Specialist
Training.

346 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895,

The special training will consist in the particular application of the
principles learnt in the general training, to the working of those guns
to which each company is specially allotted, and generally speaking will
include :—

(1.) Service of the Gun. This will be modified according as the
guns are B.L., M.L., quick-firing, or siege ordnance, and will include
instruction in the special mountings belonging to them.

(2.) Laying. The methods best adapted to the particular guns will
form the subject of training.

(3.) Fire Discipline. What modifications of the general system are
necessary for most effectively fighting these guns must be taught. The
number of guns in a group may be varied to suit local requirements.

(4.) The method of ranging may be modified by, the means of range-
finding, or observation of fire, that is most suitable.

(5.) Communications, &c. The means employed depend upon the
relative positions of the various units in the chain of command, and the
appliances to hand, and must form the subject of training.

By following this plan each Company will receive a general training
on the same lines, and on such lines ag will enable it without much
difficulty to pass on to, its special training, which will be solely accor-
ding to its special requirements, thus a Company told off to fight a
battery of heavy guns against ship attacks would be specially trained
in the method of so doing, while another detailed for duty with the
howitzers of the general defence must be specially trained in siege
work, and neither need for the time being have any particular know-
ledge of other branches of Coast defence; as scon however as they
move on to other fortresses and have new duties assigned to them,
their special training in these must recommence. Beyond this point,
training ceases and instruction commences, and how far this should
be carried on cannot here be decided.

To the complete performance of the fighting duties of the Garrison
Artillery a further training which we may call “Specialist” is necessary.
By this term is meant instruction in the use of the many adjuncts that
are now employed in both Coast and Siege Artillery practice, and which
includes such items as depression range-finder, and position-finder
specialists, observers for siege artillery fire, specialists for electrical
communications, artificers for complicated mountings, &c. For these
special duties which require special instruction, and which will not,
according to the views I have put forward, in the preceding pages be
of general use, specially selected, and trained men are required, and
should alone be employed. This has been recognised by the appoint-
ment of such men as specialists, but in addition to the District special-
ists others have been allowed to companies both for range-finding and
as gun layers. As regards the latter they should not be considered as
specialists in this meaning of the term; laying must be considered as
an important part of the general training, and though it is right, that
men who show a particular aptitude for laying, should be selected as

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 347

gun layers, and paid as such, they belong essentially to the Company
and to the Company only, and therefore should not be given a designa-
tion which is apt to be misleading. Outside the Companies there should
be no gun layers recognised. ‘The district establishment of range-
finders should be sufficient to supply all wants, and do away with the
need for any Company specialists. So that all specialists should belong
to the district establishments, which are distinct from the Companies,
and all gun layers to the Companies only.

A reference to Chapter II. will show that the Garrison Artillery may
in time of war be not infrequently called upon either to form a siege
train, or to man siege ordnance in defence of their fortresses from land
attacks, it seems clear therefore, that a sufficient portion of each Com-
pany’s special training should at times be devoted to this work. At
present only three or four Companies are trained in siege work ; their
number might well be increased, and if it 1s not possible as is most cer-
tainly desirable, that the siege train should be permanent as such, it is at
any rate possible to put more Companies through this training annually.
Each Company should in turn go through a three years’ course, and
there should be at any one time, three Companies at least from each
Garrison Artillery division going through this course, each Company
being in a different stage of instruction. By shortening the course at
Lydd to 6 weeks, and by arranging the Companies so that one from each
Division attended each course, three siege divisions of three companies
each could annually be trained at Lydd, without interfering to any
great extent with the armament work of districts. There would thus
be each year a fresh Company learning siege work. All such Companies
when not at Lydd should be told off as far as possible to the movable
armaments in their districts. The other Companies in the division
which are at home being trained for the time either in the working of
quick-firmge guns, or of the heavy guns for the attack of ships as re-
quired. But special attention must be paid to the means of repelling
torpedo boat attacks, and for this purpose some practical system of
ranging and working quick-firing guns is specially needed.

In fortresses abroad the same system of general and special training
will be necessary, while in the Colonies again the training should be
carried out on the same lines, but as siege work is not likely to form an
important part of their duties, the general training should be sufficient
to meet and repel possible landings, while those portions of the force
told off for the Coast Defence proper should be specially trained to the
duties pertaining thereto.

When we come to consider the duties of the Auxiliary Artillery at
home we are met with a different state of requirements. Brigades are
permanently told off to certain Fortresses, the men are not liable for
service abroad, and therefore the whole duty of each unit consists in the
proper handling, and fighting of those guns to which they are
allotted in the scheme of defence. ‘heir training therefore requires
to be only to this end, and the general and special training are merged
into one particular system of fighting special guns. But to ensure
sound and efficient training this should be conducted as with the com-

Distribution
of Companies.

Abroad and in
the Colonies.

Training of
Auxiliary
Artillery.

The Militia.

Volunteers.

Combined
Training,

348 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE Essay, 1895,

panies R.A. on the basis of the battery command being the unit for
training. On the views put forward in Chapter III. the Auxilary |
Artillery will be restricted to the manning of the heavy guns in fixed
emplacements, and to them therefore only does the system explained in
the drill-book apply in its entirety. They must be prepared to work
these guns when wanted, and will not be required to man any others.
Hach company then need be trained only in the method of fighting those
guns to which it is allotted, and the system of training will follow that
already described for the special training of Garrison Companies. As
the time, and opportunity of training these forces is considerably less
than that available for the regular forces, this restriction of necessary
duties is a distinct advantage, and the limits of the training required
should admit of efficiency in the comparatively little that is asked for.

In the Militia the Officers have as a rule to go through a regular
course of instruction, and each unit is regularly called out annually for
its month’s training, so that with systematic training, and proper
insistance that Officers attain the-required standard, the Militia Artil-
lery should with the assistance of their Adjutants, and Gunnery
Instructors, be qualified to perform the duties that are demanded of
them, especially if, as has been done lately, they are sent for their
annual training to the Fortresses which in time of war they are called
upon to man.

But the Volunteers do not enjoy the same advantages. Though it
may be possible in the limited time at disposal for instruction, to train
the gun detachments to the useful handling of the guns to which they
may be allotted, the present instruction of Volunteer Officers is not
altogether satisfactory. ‘hey are as a rule eager and willing to learn,
but the opportunities for satisfactory instruction are not as frequent as
could be desired. On the distribution advocated in Chapter IIL,
Volunteer Officers may be required to act as Fire Commanders, or in
any of the grades subordinate to this appointment, they should there-
fore be thoroughly trained in the duties of all commands from that of
Fire Commander down to Gun Group Commander. As a rule many
of these Officers cannot find time to attend regular courses of instruction,
they are not below the average standard of intelligence, and would
soon pick up their duties if opportunities were given for learning
them. ‘To each Volunteer Brigade is allotted an Adjutant, who is an
Officer Royal Artillery, and it should be part of his duties to hold, at
least at Head Quarters of the Brigade, evening, or afternoon Classes
as most convenient, for the instruction of Officers in the duties relating

.to Coast Defence. He should, moreover, pay visits to outlying Com-

panies from time to time with a view to giving similar instruction to
the Officers of the Company, and where such outlying Companies are
found, a Gunnery-Instructor, who should be a Volunteer Officer who
has been through a special course, and obtained a Certificate, should be
appointed to assist in the proper training of all ranks.

The general sketch given above of the kind of training required for
the separate units of an Artillery Garrison leads us to the question of
how the combined training together of these units can best be carried

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 349

out. One of the points already advocated is that the training should
be on the basis of making the Battery Command the unit. If this is
done, so far as the men are concerned, when they are trained to their
duties in this command, they are trained to all that is required of them.
Such Commands work much more independently of one another in
Garrison Artillery work than in other Military operations, and their
combined action consists merely in the direction by one mind of their
independent actions to one definite object. The grouping of Battery
Commands under a Fire Commander, so far as it adds to, or alters the
duties of such Commands, affects only the Officers. If the men know
their duties connected with the Battery Command, and can work their
guns efficiently they will do so equally well, whether their guns form a
separate command, or are being fought under the direction of a superior
officer as parts of a larger Command; therefore to train the Garri-
son to work the ‘Chain of Command” smoothly and efficiently, all
that is required is to train the various officers to take up rapidly and
intelligently their positions, and duties, when the chain extends from
the Section Commander down to the Gun Group Commander. It is
only to this extent then that the training together of the various units
of the Artillery garrison is necessary or desirable.

As far as the R.A. are concerned opportunities can generally be
found in the ordinary course of training for instruction in these duties.

Militia officers too have an opportunity of being exercised in the
duties and working of a Fire Command when called out for their train-
ing, particularly if this takes place as it should whenever possible at
the Forts which they will be called upon to man in time of war.

Volunteer Officers are generally placed at a great disadvantage in
this respect for as has been pointed out their instruction is not as
complete as it should be, and often they have but few opportunities of
becoming practically acquainted with their duties. It might however
surely be arranged that once or twice a year such portions of the
Artillery Garrison of a Home Fortress as is represented by the R.A.
Companies therein stationed, and the Volunteers available at short
notice should be brought together to work the different Forts to which
they are allotted under the conditions most resembling Service condi-
tions: but for this to be of practical benefit such an assembling should
include practice from all the guns manned wherever possible, even if
only two or three rounds are fired from each gun. This means an
expenditure of ammunition and consequent expense for which it is
always difficult to obtain sanction. But such a combined fire-action
might be arranged, if the present allotment of ammunition to Station
practice were utilized for this purpose. At present it can hardly be
claimed that this ammunition is used to the best purposes, indeed it
seems often to be fired away simply because it has to be expended, and
it would therefore surely be much better to utilize it to test to some
extent the value of the chain of command in each fortress, and to dis-
cover where the weak links lie. Moreover, on the distribution of the
Garrison advocated here, this ammunition, or at any rate as much of it
as belongs to the guns that are to be manned by the Volunteers, should

Royal Artil-
lJery.

Militia.

Volunteers.

Summary and

Conclusion.

350 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

be expended by them. Such combined practice where feasible would
be of great benefit to the Volunteers, and invaluable to the Comman-
ders of the higher units as giving them an opportunity of practically
testing their Commands.

It may perhaps appear somewhat strange, that when asked what is
the most suitable system of training together the Garrison Artillery
forces, we reply that the best system seems to be not to train these
forces together, but to train each unit separately; and yet the consider-
ations given above point to this. If we emphasise the intention
already expressed that the Company drill and training should be
wherever possible with the very guns that they will be called upon to
man in time of war, and that this is intended to apply as much to the
Militia and Volunteers as to the Royal Artillery I think it will be seen
that the work of the Battery Commands should be satisfactorily and
efficiently carried out, and that this is really all that is required from
the ordinary rank and file. ‘The kind of co-operative action required
to work the units of a Fire Command together does not necessitate
more than individual action of the units guided by one master mind.
To work a gun all the men in the detachment must work in unison, to
work a group of guns, the gun detachments must work in combination,
while to fight a Battery Command the guns must be worked not only
in combination but in harmony. But where several Battery Commands
are fought under a Fire Commander, each Battery Command works
independently though it may be in support of the others: each has its
particular portion of the work to be done allotted to it, and the actual
doing of this depends on its own training and efficiency, not on previous
training with the other commands, it is less concerted than combined
action. Where then is the necessity for training these forces together,
beyond that already mentioned of affording the officers an opportunity
of learning their duties and positions? but this can be done without
elaborating a system of training which is not required and which
would be difficult to arrange so as to be of practical value. Under the
system here advocated no difficulty should be experienced in training
each unit at the times, and places most convenient to it; no unit will
have to wait in order to complete or perfect its training till a time or
place suitable or convenient to other units can be arranged. This is
certainly a practical advantage gained.

The adoption of some such system of training as here advocated
would entail but little alteration in the existing methods of drill and
organisation. In fact the only alteration required is the recognition of
the use and importance of the lighter guns of Coast Fortress Armament
in carrying out the work of defence that will most usually be necessary,
and the consequent desirability of having the elementary system of
training based on their requirements: the need for a further special
training is due to the multitorm character of Garrison Artillery duties.
And here it is curious to note how easily the proper signification of a
term may be lost, and how much there really is in a name if the mean-
ing it connotes is not allowed to drop out of sight. We call that
portion of the Royal Regiment of Artillery which has no mounted

SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 351

duties to perform “Garrison Artillery,’ and we do so presumably to

denote in a general way what its duties are. If we enquire what is
meant by the term Garrison Artillery we must perhaps admit that it
necessarily has a somewhat indefinite meaning; but if it is difficult to
attach an exact meaning to this term, it is not less easy to predicate of
it, that it cannot and does not mean merely ‘ Coast Artillery,” that is
Artillery employed on sea fronts, whose sole business is the attack of
war vessels; and yet with the exception of a few Companies which are
detailed as Siege train or Heavy batteries, the whole of the so-called
Garrison Artillery is at present trained only to fight guns on sea fronts,
and thus becomes a Coast Artillery and ceases to be a Garrison Artil-
lery. The word Garrison certainly connotes a Fortress and with it the
idea of general duties varying with the locality and importance of the
Fortress. But the duties of any Fortress including Coast Fortresses
are not confined to defeating an attack by ships’ guns and yet Garrison
Artillery Drill, Vol. I., is devoted almost entirely to this one object.
This is either a confusion of terms or a misapprehension of their mean-
ing, if the former let us call our Companies Coast Artillery Companies
if the latter let us train our Companies so that they may be able to
perform Garrison duties. Garrison is the term we use, and ought to
keep to, but we must understand that it is synonymous with Fortress,
and connotes certain general duties that are necessarily indefinite, and
therefore by implication denies the existence of only special duties.

It has been my endeavour in this essay by enumerating the different
forms of attacks on Coast Fortresses, and examining the probability of
their occurrence, under various circumstances, to ascertain what the
duties of Artillery Garrisons in war time are likely to be, and hence to
formulate a system of training that will be suitable to the requirements
of all cases. This examination has led to the following conclusions.

1. That the attack by war ships on Coast Fortresses is by no means
the most general, or the most important form of attack to be expected.

2. That therefore our present system of training which deals
almost exclusively with this aspect of war, is a too particular one, and
requires generalisation and simplification to meet the other more
frequent, and important needs of Coast Defence.

3. That in modifying this system of training care should be had
to the requirements of the different units composing the Artillery
Garrison, their training being in accordance with the duties that are
expected from them, and that therefore R.A. Companies whose duties
at different times cannot be particularly defined, must receive a
different training from that sufficient for the Auxiliary Artillery whose
duties being always the same are clearly marked and quite definite.

4, ‘That the training for the R.A. should be, (a) General in the
application of the broad principles that underly the fighting of all guns.
(0) Special in the particular adaptation of these principles to the
working of those guns which each Company may at the time being be
called upon to fight.

o. ‘That the training for the Auxiliary Artillery need only be with
A8

Conclusion

302 SILVER MEDAL PRIZH ESSAY, 1895.

reference to those guns to which each Company is allotted in the
scheme of defence.

6. That the training of all should be carried out on the basis of the
Battery Command being the tactical unit.

7. This leads us to the final conclusion that it is nob necessary to
train the N.C.O’s. and men of different units together in order to obtain
efficient work, but that it is very desirable that all officers should have
frequent opportunities of practically carrying out the duties connected
with the tactical working as a whole, of the command to which they
belong.

I have endeavoured as far as possible to avoid any suggestions of a
radical or revolutionary nature, these seldom meet with much consider-
ation, are generally of theoretical rather than practical value, and
indeed as regards this question are in no way necessary. As in my
opinion our system of Coast Defence has hitherto inclined altogether
too much in one direction, so I am anxious now that the swing of the
pendulum should not carry us too far in the opposite direction, but
that our progress in the future should follow the sounder and more
even course which is indicated by the motto of this essay—

“IN MEDIO TUTISSIMUS IBIS.”

3538

THE TRAINING TOGETHER IN PEACE TIME THE GARRISON
ARTILLERY FORCES OF THE EMPIRE, INCLUDING REGULAR,
MILITIA, VOLUNTEER, & COLONIAL ARTILLERY.

LIEUT.-COLONEL R. F. WILLIAMS, R.A.

“PRO ARIS ET FOCIS.”’

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

BrroreE considering in detail the question of the training together of
the Regular and Auxiliary Artillery belonging to the garrison of a
Coast Fortress 1b is necessary to determine how often

(1) The whole of the Artillery Garrison of the fortress,

(2) The Corps constituting each group of Batteries under a Fire
Commander,

(3) Those manning the guns of each separate Battery,

should be assembled respectively; and further to as-
certain how far this would be practicable in each case.

(1) A rehearsal by the whole of the Artillery of a fortress of its
part in war, as nearly as such could be carried out in time of peace,
would be valuable principally as a test of the arrangements for mobil-
ization, of those for transport and supply and for the accommodation
of the Garrisons as well as for medical and sanitary purposes, &c., and
of organization generally. Such occasions would also doubtless be
seized upon as opportunities for operations on a large scale in
conjunction with the other arms and with the Navy when the defence
of the fortress would be regarded as a whole. Their chief value would
in fact lie in the experience which they would afford to Officers in the
higher commands and on the Staff. For the rest, equal, if not greater
benefit would probably be derived from assemblies on a smaller
scale.

It might be sufficient to keep pace with the changes in armament
and with the progress in Coast Artillery tactics if the whole of the
Artillery of a fortress were mobilized once in every 5 years. This
period would moreover seem to be a suitable one in being in most
cases that of the tenure of command and of posts on the Staff, so that
each of the Officers filling these positions would, if this term were
fixed upon, be afforded an opportunity of gaining experience at an
occasion of a mobilization on this large scale. The difficulty indeed
of arranging for the simultaneous training of so many Corps as consti-
tute the Artillery garrison of a large fortress, and the expense of

7. VOL, XXII.

854. COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

bringing the more distant ones there, would probably be prohibitive
of a more frequent recurrence than this of such large assemblies.

Whether, however, at such intervals as those mentioned, or, if that
were found to be impracticable, at longer ones, it is certain that the
complete manning of the guns of a fortress is periodically necessary if
the arrangements for the defence are to be tested, and their weak
points detected, before, and not when, an enemy’s ships appear in
front of the forts.

(2) The. group of forts under a Fire Commander constitutes the
largest fighting unit of a fortress; and he would require much more
frequent opportunities of exercising his command than would be
allowed by the occasional assemblies of the whole of the Artillery of
the fortress. It is true that a Fire Commander’s duties are to a great
extent of a preparatory nature, and that during an engagement his
part would as a rule be confined to the earlier stages, when the enemy
was stillat along range: but although his action would be thus limited,
the subsequent conduct of the engagement by the Battery Commanders
would entirely depend on it. ‘The rapid choice of an objective,
the transmission of the necessary orders to the Battery Commanders,
and their instant action on them, and finally the decision as to the
right moment for handing over the control of fire to the Battery
Commanders are all matters which require experience on the part of
all concerned, the want of which might entail serious consequences in
action. Skeleton drill could no doubt be profitably carried out in the
absence of the bulk of the garrisons of the forts; but, for a rehearsal
to be at all satisfactory, it is necessary that not only the Fire and
Battery Commanders, but all those occupying posts of any importance
should be the identical persons who would fill them in time of war; and
this condition could not of course be fulfilled unless the whole of the
Corps included in the Fire Command were present. No arrangement
indeed could be considered wholly satisfactory which did not provide
for the Fire Commanders of the more important groups of forts at all
events having an opportunity of exercising their commands every
year. There should be no difficulty in carrying this ont, as the most
important guns would naturally be manned by the men closest at
hand, that is to say by the Regulars stationed in the fortress, and by
the local Auxiliaries. As it would be out of the question for Militia
Artillery Regiments at a distance, which might be allotted to the
fortress, to train there every year, they would doubtless be told off to
the forts of lesser importance. It would probably be sufficient,
especially as the guns in these latter forts would be likely to be of a
simple nature, if they were manned every 2nd or 8rd year. The Fire
Commanders of the groups of forts of minor importance would there-
fore only be able to exercise their batteries together at these longer
intervals, though perhaps a partial manning could be effected
oftener.

(3) Want of experience on the part of a Fire Commander in
working together the Batteries under him might be partially remedied
by his allowing independent action to the Battery Commanders under

COMMENDED Essay, 1895. 855

him, but there is no remedy for insufficient practice in the manning of
the individual Battery, which could only in action result in a reversion
to the old order of things before such terms as “ Fire direction,”
“Fire control” and “Fire discipline” had been heard of. The
Battery is indeed the real fighting unit of a Coast Fortress, and the
necessity for the correction of any imperfections in the machinery
for fighting it is of such vital importance that it 1s not an exaggeration
to say that it cannot be manned by its garrison too often. Unfortun-
ately the few days that the Volunteers can spare for camp in each
year do not admit of their Batteries being manned with such frequency
as is desirable: and even in the case of the local Milhtia Regiments,
which carry out their training at the fortress every year, there is
so much else to be done during the month that hardly enough time
can be devoted to this very important part of it. All that can be
done therefore is to make the most of the time available in each case,
to ensure which two things are necessary; first, that a judicious
programme of work should be arranged; and secondly, that the
preparatory training carried out beforehand should have been as
complete as circumstances may have permitted, so that when the
course commences no time need be wasted in elementary details, and
thus that the fullest possible benefit may be derived from it.

Before a programme for such a course can be drawn up it is
necessary to know (1) how the Artillery of the 3 branches (Regulars,
Militia, and Volunteers) are to be distributed ; and (2) also, in the
case of the Auxiliaries, whether they are to be prepared to man the
Batteries allotted to them independently of any assistance from the
Regulars; or, if not, to what extent this assistance is required.

(1) The advantages of associating Corps with particular localities
are well known; and, m order to encourage the various Artillery
Corps of a garrison to identify themselves with the Batteries which
they have been told off to man, every endeavour should be made to
avoid shifting them to other localities, even when changes in armament
or in the scheme of defence take place.

As to the way in which they should be distributed, the Regulars
and the local auxiliaries would, as already stated, as a matter of course
man the most important forts, as being the nearest at hand in case of
sudden attack, The local auxiliaries too would have had more oppor-
tunities than those at a distance of drilling with the guns of the
fortress: and, if another reason were required for this method of
distribution, cne not altogether to be disregarded, though perhaps to
some extent a sentimental one, is to be found in the fact that local
corps would be those most deeply interested in the defence of their
own port, and that to them therefore would seem rightly to belong
both the duty and privilege of occupying the post of danger. It
would be a matter for decision according to circumstances whether in
these more important forts the guns to be manned by the Regulars
would be those in the most important positions or any which might be
too complicated in themselves or their mountings for the Auxiliary
Artillery. The forts to be manned by the more distant Corps would

306 COMMENDED Essay, 1895.

be those probably in the inner line of defence and on the land front.
It would fall to them also to man the movable armament, for which
they would be able to prepare themselves at their own stations if
provided with similar guns there.

In detailing garrisons to the different forts the necessity for
providing for reliefs should not be lost sight of. A detail which only
allowed for one relief, though sufficient for peace operations, would of
course break down at once in time of war. If then the strength of the
Artillery of a fortress were insufficient to allow of reliefs being
provided, some of the guns would have to be left unmanned. Wither
each work might, in such a case, be only partially manned, or the
most important ones might be fully manned, the others being neglected
altogether. It would depend on circumstances which would be the
best course. As a rule it would probably be best to fully man the
more important forts. As a Corps would furnish its own reliefs, on
the principal of avoiding the mixture of units, it would be necessary
that not more guns should be allotted to it than it was capable, when
at its full strength, of providing reliefs for.

The quick-firing gun of small calibre, a considerable number of
which are now being introduced into the armament of most Coast
fortresses, seem to be marked out as specially suitable for the Volunteer
Artillery. Except in the matter of laying, the service of these guns ig
so simple as to be easily carried out even by those members of a Corps
who are often unable to attend drill. The ammunition is moreover
cheap in comparison with that of heavy guns, thus allowing of a
considerable amount of practice, which is always an attraction to
Volunteers, whilst the drill would be reduced to a minimum. The
post of layer of one of these guns, on the other hand, would not be so
easily filled, as it would require a man of exceptional skill and in
constant practice to be able at once, and almost instinctively to judge
the range of a small target moving at the highest rate of speed and to
lay correctly on it. There would be keen competition amongst the
more active members of a Corps for these posts, which would no doubt
result eventually in the production of experts, as has been the case in
rifle-shooting. An expert is indeed required as the layer of a quick-
firing gun, and he should be allowed enough ammunition for practice.
It is hardly overstating the case to say that a man placed at
hap-hazard in this position at the last moment would have no better
chance of hitting an enemy’s torpedo-boat moving at 20 knots than
a novice in the use of a rifle would have of hitting a running deer.
The companies to man these guns should be selected from those of
outlying stations, and unable therefore to drill throughout the year
at the guns of the fortress. All that would be necessary would be to
provide each of such companies at their own stations with a quick-
firmg gun of small calibre and with enough ammunition to afford
practice to the requisite number of layers. These companies would no
longer feel themselves at a disadvantage as compared with those at
Head-Quarters, for on their arrival at the fortress they would be
prepared at once to take their places and to play an important part in
its defence.

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 357

It is a question whether in the case of the Auxiliaries, and especially
in that of the Volunteers, whose course of training is so short, the
principle of localization should not be carried a step further by
assigning groups of guns to particular companies. This would be
decided by the Commanding Officer according to circumstances. If
some of his companies had greater facilities for drilling at their station
than others, the more important groups should no doubt be handed
over to them. When too the guns varied in type, it would certainly
seem best to assign them permanently to particular companies. It
would be a mistake to attempt to go still further in this direction and
to assign to every man a particular place, except of course in special
cases, as such an arrangement would make no allowance for casualties
or unforeseen circumstances. Hyery man should be trained to take
any place in his gun detachment or ammunition detail.

(2) Though it has been found necessary to create a permanent
staff of Specialists for the performance of certain special duties in each
Battery, it does not follow that in the programme for the training of -a
Corps manning a Battery these special duties may be entirely neglected,
for it should not be forgotten that the District Establishment only
provides for one relief of such Specialists, and that it makes no allow-
ance for casualties amongst them. If no provision were made for this,
what would probably happen in action would be that, to supply the
want, Specialists would be withdrawn from the permanent Staffs of
other Batteries which were less immediately threatened. This would
be a most objectionable plan, as the permanent staff of a battery is the
nucleus of its Garrison and should therefore never be removed from it.
Clearly then it would fall on the Corps itself to provide for these
contingencies; and it is necessary therefore that it should prepare
itself in time of peace to do so.

The plan that suggests itself is that from amongst the N.C. Officers
and trained gunners of the Corps “ Understudies” should be selected
for each post in the permanent staff, who during the training should be
employed exclusively in practising their own special work. Selected
as they would be from amongst the trained men, they would at any
time be ready to return to their places at the guns if required, all that
would be needed being an occasional re-drilling to enable them to learn
any changes in drill.

It is true of course that these special duties cannot be adequately
performed by men who can only give them an intermittent attention, and
that these “understudies” could not be expected to reach the perfec-
tion which is attainable only by long and constant practice. As
position-finding operators especially they would no doubt fall short of
the requisite standard; but if the same men were trained at the work
every year, they might hope in time to become competent operators.
There is no reason at all events why the Auxiliary Artillery should not
be able to provide itself with efficient Depression Range-finding
operators. As regards the duties now performed by Gunners of the
District Establishment, a Corps manning the same work year by year

308 COMMENDED Essay, 1895.

would have no difficulty in providing men with a sufficient knowledge
of the locality and of the duties to act as Magazine and Lamp men.
Even the Armament artificers might find useful assistants amongst the
artizans in the ranks of the Corps. It must be admitted however that
it would be hard to replace the Master-Gunner or the R.A. Storeman.
It should be the aim of a Corps to make itself independent in every
particular, so as to be prepared in case it should be thrown on its own
resources at any time. ‘The necessity for this will be better realized by
the auxiliaries if the principle of localization is rigidly adhered to. A
corps if assured that certain Batteries are permanently handed over to
its charge, will not be satisfied till it has mastered every detail
connected with their defence.

In accordance with what has been said above a Corps should be
prepared to provide Battery Commanders for the Batteries manned by
it. The introduction of a Battery Commander from elsewhere would
be contrary to the recognized rule that men should be commanded by
their own Officers. In the ordinary course therefore the Senior Officer
of that portion of a Corps manning a Battery would be its Battery Com-
mander. ‘The senior officers of the Auxiliary Artillery have of late years
received instruction in the duties of a Battery Commander, and many
of them have had opportunities of acting as such; and no doubt the
number of qualified Battery Commanders amongst them will increase
as time goes on. So much depends on the Battery Commander that
it is imperative that he should be thoroughly up to his work. Now,
although the Officers of the Auxiliary Artillery avail themselves gladly
as a rule of the opportunities afforded them of learning their work, it
must be admitted that there is a considerable minority whose attend-
ance at drill and at the periodical trainings is irregular, and whom it
would be imprudent to place, at all events unchecked, in these re-
sponsible positions. Hyen if such a course were desirable, the number
of Senior Officers of the Regular Artillery in a fortress would as a rule
be insufficient to allow of their superseding such Officers as Battery
Commanders. Such cases as this might be provided for, and at the
same time the objectionable expedient avoided of placing a Senior
Officer of Auxiliaries under one junior to him of the Regulars, if a
Fire Commander were empowered to attach to a Battery Commander
under such circumstances a competent Officer of the Regular Artillery,
though possibly of junior rank, as adviser, fully impressing on the
former at the same time the grave responsibility he would incur in
declining without sufficient grounds to be guided by the advice of such

Officer.

The post of Fire Commander would also occasionally fall to an
Officer of Auxiliary Artillery, many of whom would doubtless fill it
efficiently, if they had had the opportunities of learning and practising
its duties. Inexperienced Officers would however require, and to a
still greater extent of course, similar assistance to that alluded to
above in the case of the Battery Commander.

Whatever plan may be adopted, the fact should not at all events be
overlooked that by far the greater number of guns in a Home fortress

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 359

would be manned by Auxiliary Artillery, the Senior Officers of which
will naturally become the Fire and Battery Commanders, as they
cannot well be set aside in favour of junior Officers, though possibly of
greater experience, of the Regular Artillery. The question is no
doubt a somewhat invidious one, but ib is not one that can be safely
postponed for decision till the last moment. Fortunately the difficulty
is one which is likely to decrease as the Auxihary Officers become
better acquainted with Coast Defence work, and qualify themselves to
act independently in the highest positions which they may be called
upon to fill.

INSTRUCTORS.

The instruction of the Auxiliaries during their training would be
carried out of course by the Regular Artillery. In the case of a Corps
new to Coast Defence work the instructional staff would necessarily be
large. The Superintending Officer would require 2 or 3 Officers of
Regulars under him as Assistants and some N.C. Officers in addition
to those of the Permanent Staff of the Corps, as at this stage thorough
supervision would be required over every portion of the work. At
first also a few Gunners would be required from the regulars to take
some of the more difficult duties until these were thoroughly under-
stood by the men of the Corps. As time went on however the Staff
of instructors should be gradually diminished, the Officers and N.C.
Officers of the Corps taking up the work of instruction themselves.
It is indeed of the highest importance that they should qualify
themselves to do this at the earliest possible moment, and should not
be content to remain under tutelage year after year, for it cannot be
expected that the rank and file will have that confidence, which it is
essential to discipline that they should have, in Officers and N.C.
Officers who never take their proper places as instructors of their men,

The principle then on which the instruction should be carried out by
the instructors of the Regular Artillery is that, although in the first
instance every assistance should be given, support should be gradually
withdrawn till eventually their intervention would be confined to the
framing of the programme, the communication of any new points in
drill or in Coast defence tactics, and beyond this merely to supervision.
It is important that this last should always be maintained to ensure the
work being done in conformity with the recognized system.

Programme or Work.

The principle on which the distribution of the Artillery corps of a
fortress should be made being determined and it being understood
what is expected of them in manning the Batteries to which they are
allotted, we are now in a better position to draw up a programme for
a course of training to fit them successively to man a Battery, to take
part in the manning of the forts under the Fire Commander and
finally in the general manning of the whole fortress.

— Time available-—As the Militia training lasts for 28 days, whereas

the Volunteers cannot be depended upon to be able to come out for

more than a week, it is evident that when Corps from these two
49

360 COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

branches form part of the same “Fire Command” the week of the
Volunteer training must be made to coincide with the last week of
that of the Militia if the Fire Commander is to have an opportunity of
working them together at the end of their training.

During the first three weeks the Militia would be engaged in
preliminary drills, which in the case of the Volunteers would have
been going on during the whole year. It is necessary in the first
place to see on how many days the Volunteers are actually available
for work; how many of those days would be taken up by them in
preparatory drills to bring them up to the point of manning a Battery
efficiently ; and finally how much time is left to the Fire Commander
in which to exercise his batteries together. 8 days must be deducted
on account of Sunday and of the days of arrival and departure, for
although some little work might be done on the 2 latter days, they
cannot be reckoned on with certainty; so that there remain only 4
days for work. As has been said, drills would have been carried on
throughout the year, but only those Companies in the neighbourhood
of the fortress would have been able to drill in their own Batteries. 2
days would therefore seem to be the minimum for this preparatory
drill in the case of a Volunteer Corps, which would leave the remaining
2 days at the disposal of the Fire Commander. The time being so
limited, it is important that none of it should be diverted from its
intended purpose, that of instruction in Coast Defence work ; and on
this ground it may be urged that any inspections should be confined to
the Corps being seen at work during its course of instruction, any
interruption to which is strongly to be deprecated.

Regulars.—Asregards preparatory training on the part of the Regulars,
who would of course take part in the combined operations at the end,
it might be taken for granted that the Permanent Staff would be in
constant practice and therefore always in a state of readiness. The
same might perhaps be assumed in the case of the Companies of the
Regular Artillery if it were not for the fact that there is always in
their ranks in these days of short service a considerable number of
recruits. On this account therefore it would be as well if the annual
courses of these Companies were completed before the time for work-
ing the 3 branches together. This of course is not always practicable,
especially if the Auxiliaries come out early in the season. It might
however possibly be arranged that even under these circumstances
the recruits might have had sufficient drill to enable them to take
their places in the gun detachments. As the Auxiliary Artillery
naturally model themselves on the Regulars, no effort should be spared
to bring the drill of the latter up to the highest pitch of precision and
smartness.

Militia.—During the 28 days that the Militia are out many other
things besides Coast Defence have to be attended to. In the first
place the Officer Commanding requires a day or two to enable him to
get his Regiment into shape. The inspection by the Officer Command-
ing Militia and Volunteer Artillery takes place during the training, if
not other inspections also. ‘Time for preparation for these, including

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 361

a certain amount of Battalion drill, must be allowed to give the
Regiment a chance of making a creditable turn-out. Certainly minor
drills, such as physical training, marching and carbine drills can be
carried out at early morning parades, so as not to interfere with the
Coast Defence course. Further deductions must be made for Sundays,
Saturday half-holidays and Camp fatigues : and finally, at least one
whole day in addition to that of departure is required by the Officer
Commanding preparatory to breaking up Camp.

Summing up the days to be deducted on these accounts :
Regiment at disposal of Officer Commanding at begin-

ning of training i rancncays
Regiment at disposal of Officer Commanding at end of
training ont
Inspection and preparation for it . at | gays ABRs itthes ines Meth
Sundays and Saturday half- holidays ee Peach ee. GRO Ii
Camp fatigues &e. my Med temGyssrmatat Us Al
Motaley yas. 14 days

This leaves 14 days available for a Coast Defence course; and
further deducting 2 days for the combined manning of the forts at the
end under the Fire Commander, 12 days remain for training the regi-
ment in all the work connected with the manning of a Battery,
including practice.

As weather is so uncertain a factor, the programme must be drawn
up on the assumption of fine weather, or, what is practically the same
thing, of the work being in casemates. In the event of bad weather
and open Batteries the programme would of course have io be
condensed accordingly.

In addition to an early morning parade of about three-quarters of
an hour under the Commanding Officer of the Regiment 5 hours a day
would be as much as could profitably be devoted to the course. With
longer hours interest in the work would begin to fiag.

Each morning all ranks should fall in on.the manning’ parade, and
these opportunities should be made use of for publishing any important
orders or for imparting information that is required to be generally
known. At this time on the first morning the plan of the fort should be
explained, especially as regards the locality of the different groups of
guns, the shell and cartridges and R.A. Stores. In subsequent years
this would only apply to new-comers. Hxtracts from the Magazine
Regulations should be read out, aud any special local orders. The object
of each day’s drill should be explained on parade beforehand. Before
practice the “‘ General Idea” should be made known, orders relating
to the practice read, as well as the precautions to be taken. To
prevent the possibility of mistakes the bugle sounds most commonly
used at practice should be sounded before the parade and made known.
On the morning following the practice the criticisms on it should be
published,

362 COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895,

After these preliminaries on each day drills and lectures would be
commenced, the latter for Officers and a few of the senior N.C.
Officers. At first, in the absence of the Officers attending the lectures,
the drill would be carried out under the N.C. Officers of the Perman-
ent Staff of the Corps assisted by others lent by the Regulars, the
whole being under the supervision of Officers of the Regular Artillery.

Tt will facilitate explanation of the following programme of drills
and lectures if the different stages of the former are lettered A, B, C,
D, and those of the latter a, b, c.

An endeavour has been made so to arrange the courses of drills and
lectures that the senior N.C. officers and the officers should, beginning
with the juniors, successively leave the lectures to join the drill at the
earliest possible moment.

The programme does not enter into much detail, as it is thought
that the absence of this will make it more generally applicable.

DRILLs.

Single gun-drill, with such explanations of construction of gun
and mounting as is practically necessary.

Similar instruction in ammunition.

Service of ammunition, and its preparation.

B Laying of every description.
C Drill by groups.
D Manning the Battery.
LEcTURES.

( Extracts from Fort Book.

| Range-finding—Depression Range-finding or Position-finding, or
as both as the case might be.

| Duties of Gun Group Officer.

{ Duties of Amunition Officer

b Duties of Battery Commander.

ce Duties of Fire Commander.

It is proposed that of the 12 days available 4 stage of drill should
occupy 3, B stage 2, C stage 3, and D stage 4 (including 1 or perhaps
2 days’ practice).

All the Officers and senior N.C. Officers would attend stage (a) of
the lectures, which would be carried on simultaneously with 4 drills.
On the termination of the former the subalterns and senior N.C.
Officers would fall in with their men for stage B of drill. Field
Officers and Captains would attend lectures (b), which would be simul-
taneous with B drills, the Captains joining their groups for C stage of
drill. The final stage (c) of lectures would be for Field Officers only,
who would in their turn fall in for drill in stage D, so that all ranks
would be in their proper places for the full manning of the Battery.

It has been assumed above that all Officers would be acquainted with
stage A of drills, as even the last Joined subalterns would probably

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 363

have been through a preliminary course with the Regular Artillery.
Tf however there were any Officers of whom this could not be said
they would have to forego the lectures during their first year and
to attend drill exclusively.

Tt has been thought best to include the senior N.C. Officers with
the Officers for the earlier lectures, as in action they would be hable
at any time to be called upon to take the place of Officers, and further
because it is necessary that they should be acquainted with the principles
of Range-finding.

The above programme provides for all Officers being instructed in
the duties of any post which they would be likely to fill, as it could
only be very exceptionally that a Lieutenant would have to act as
Battery Commander, or a Captain as Fire Commander.

No mention has been made of the Range Group Officer, as this post
would have to be filled by an Officer of the Regular Artillery, unless
one of the Corps manning the Battery had qualified himself for it by
going through a special course.

The duties for which the Gunners lent by the Regulars toa Militia
Regiment would be wanted would be not only those of specialists
properly so called, but also others of a simpler nature, but such as the
Regiment could not at first undertake itself. Position-finding dial
readers, Depression Range-finding drum-readers and _ telephonists
come under this head. When stage B of drill had been completed
men should be selected to learn the work of each of these posts from the
Regulars acting in them. When they undertook the work themselves
supervision would be exercised over them, to prevent mistakes, till
they had shewn themselves to be fully competent, and then assistance
entirely withdrawn. Although these duties are easily learnt, the
posts are ones of great responsibility, as any mistakes made by the
men filling them would be likely to have serious consequences. It
would be necessary therefore to select only intelligent and thoroughly
reliable men; and such men having been once found and taught, it
would obviously be the best plan to employ them permanently in their
respective capacities.

If the men selected as “understudies” to the specialists spoken of
before were kept exclusively at their special work, a Militia Regiment
should be in a position to furnish its own Depression Range-finding
operators during its 2nd year of Coast Defence training. This would
of course be out of the question in the case of the ‘ understudies”’ to
the Position-finding operators ; but they would improve each year till
eventually they would become specialists themselves.

Although communication in Coast fortresses is generally by tele-
phone or speaking tube, signalling is occasionally called for, and for
practice it is always wanted. A Militia Regiment therefore cannot
consider itself to be thoroughly equipped unless it has its complement
of Signallers. Instructors would of course at first be provided by the
Regulars till the Regiment was able to carry out its own instruction.
It is possible too that amongst the many old soldiers in a Militia Regi-

364 COMMENDED Essay, 1895.

ment some might be found with a knowledge of signalling.
VOLUNTEERS.

The Volunteers being only able to count on 4 whole working days
during their week of training, and the last 2 of these being required
by the Fire Commander, there remain only 2 days in which to bring
themselves up to the point reached by the Militia on the completion of
the programme sketched above. For this to be possible a great part
of the programme, that is to say stages A and B of it, must have been
completed beforehand. Facilities for doing so would no doubt have
been given to companies quartered: near the fortress, but it could
hardly be expected of the more distant ones, which would as a rule be
provided at their stations with nothing more modern, to carry out
their preparatory training, than 64-prs. (or possibly. 8.B. guns) on
standing carriages. ‘he time would be more profitably spent indeed
by these latter companies if the whole week were devoted to the above
mentioned programme, at all events during the first year of their
training at the fortress.

For the Companies more fortunately situated for carrying out their
preparatory drill there would be one day for working by groups and
one day for manning the Battery before they would be required by the
Fire Commander.

It is difficult to see how any practice can be included in the
programme without sacrificing some essential part of it, in the case of
a Corps new to the work. Subsequently no doubt, when it had made
sufficient progress, practice would be the best shape in which instruc-
tion in the manning of a Battery could be given.

As the Officers would be required on parade with their men, the
could not receive separate instruction, as in the case of the Militia
Officers, unless extra time were given to it. The best plan would seem
to be for them to fall in half or three-quarters of an hour before
their men on each occasion for a lecture to be delivered to them on the
work to be done during that parade.

The same course should be pursued by the Volunteers as by the
Militia to provide assistants to specialists and to make the Corps
independent in all respects as far as possible. As it is now intended
to furnish each Volunteer Corps with a Depression Range-finding
instrument for instructional purposes, operators can be trained during
the year, if a knowledge of the instrument is made a compulsory
qualification for appomtment to the Permanent Staff. But little
progress could be made in a week in Position-finding ; but perhaps
men might be found in a Volunteer Corps with sufficient leisure, and
at the same time with an aptitude for the work, who would be willing
to give the necessary time for going through a special course of
Position-finding for the sake of supplying this want in their Corps.

If some of the N.C. Officers of the Permanent Staff understood
signalling, there would be no difficulty in a Brigade of Volunteer
Artillery providing itself with the requisite number of signallers, who

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 365

could be trained at their own stations. This again might be considered
as a recommendation in a candidate for the Permanent Staff.

It must not be forgotten that places will have to be found in time of
war for a certain number of Volunteers who have been irregular in
their attendance at drill, but who will no doubt join the ranks then.
It is hardly necessary to say that they should be placed in positions of
the least responsibility. There are places which require little or no
knowledge of drill (such as those of Nos. manning winches, orderlies,
&c.), by occupying which even an inefficient man may become of value,
as thereby freeing an efficient Gunner for more important duties.

ACCOMMODATION.

A course of training for the Coast Artillery would be incomplete
which took no notice of the accommodation of the garrisons of the
different Batteries, whether in barracks, camp or casemates, the
arrangements for which are indissolubly connected with those for
fighting. The Volunteers during the whole of their week of training,
and the Militia during the last week of theirs, should be accommodated
exactly as they would be in time of war, the Regulars of course
similarly occupying the forts manned by them. This would be with
the double object of testing the arrangements and of affording experi-
ience to the troops. Tor lessons of real practical value to be derived
from these rehearsals the conditions should be made to resemble in
every detail as far as possible those of an occupation in time of war;
and a point should be made of making every garrison carry out its
camp duties without any assistance except in the way of instruction.
Every Corps should in the first instance be thoroughly instructed in
such matters as the laying out of camps, sanitary arrangements, the
system of cooking, the stowing of kits, hammocks, provisions, &c., the
arrangements for the water supply, and generally in the establishment
of a good system of interior economy; and careful supervision should
be exercised over these matters afterwards. Too much stress cannot
be laid on the importance of this part of the training, as in time of war
the efficiency of the soldier depends in no small measure on the
arrangements for his health and comfort.

Tue Mannine or tae “ Firz Commanp.”

The point has now been reached when, the separate manning of
each Battery having been thoroughly rehearsed, the Fire Commander
works his Batteries together. The object of his programme should be
to practise himself in “ Fire- direction,” to initiate his Battery
Commanders in his way of working, to test the chain of command
from himself down to the Gun Captains, and to test the communications.
It would add much to the reality of the operations if the co-operation
of the Navy could be obtained; and this would moreover enable the
Fire Commander to practise one of his most important functions, viz;
the identification of the various types of war-vessels from his post of
vantage whilst they were still out of range, and the passing of this
information to the Battery Commanders in sufficient time to allow them
to prepare for their reception, and it would also afford practice to the

366 COMMENDED Essay, 1895.

Battery Commanders themselves in the selection of projectiles suitable
for different objectives and in choosing the portion to be aimed at.
Except for these purposes steam-launches would be fairly satisfactory
substitutes.

Nothing would be learnt from these operations unless the results
were tested, that is to say unless it could be ascertained what action
was taken consequent on the orders issued by the Fire Commander,
and whether there was any unnecessary delay in their execution.
Blank ammunition will to some extent shew this, but not sufficiently.
io satisfy himself on this point the Fire Commander would require
officers as assistants on the gun-floor of each Battery who would record
the action taken there on the receipt of each order and would note the
time of its receipt, a comparison of watches with that of the Fire
Commander having of course been made beforehand. In this way it
might be possible to trace the point in the chain of command at which
any failure had occurred either in interpreting correctly or in carrying
out the Fire Commander’s order, or where there had been any
unnecessary delay.

Not the least important result of this drill would be the opportunity
it would give the Fire Commander of gauging the capacity of his
Battery Commanders, and them too of becoming acquainted with his
way of working; a further consequence again of this better mutual
understanding being probably a reduction in the number of orders
which the lire Commander would find it necessary to give, as also in
the chance of their being misunderstood. The Fire Commander’s
programme ought certainly to include a manning of the Batteries by
night both to give practice in laying with the aid of the electric light,
and to accustom the men to fall into their places without noise and
confusion.

Care should be taken that during the operations the defenders should
be kept in ignorance, if possible, of the nature of attack to be made on
the forts, the time of its delivery, or the constitution of the attacking
squadron. There would be no difficulty in ensuring secrecy on these
points if the attack were in the hands of the Royal Navy. Keeping
the garrisons of the Batteries in ignorance of the enemy’s plans would
have the advantage of obliging them to keep a proper look-out by day
and night, of necessitating regular reliefs and attention being paid to
the rule that a larger proportion of the garrison should not be kept on
the alert than is compatable with the men having a proper amount of
rest. It would also accustom Fire and Battery Commanders to dealing
with situations requiring prompt decision, and those under them to
acting according to circumstances instead of necessarily in accordance
with a pre-arranged programme.

Tae Mannine or toe Forrress.

It may probably be assumed that if, as has been suggested, the

complete manning of the fortress took place at intervals of 5 years,

each Fire Commander would during that time have had sufficient
opportunities of exercising his forts together, that he would have

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 367

acquainted himself with their capabilities, and would have determined
on his course of action under any circumstances likely to occur, and
that therefore he would be ready to take part in a manning of the
whole fortress.

The value to be derived from these occasions from a fighting point
of view, would depend on whether the co-operation of the Navy could
be secured as well as that of the Royal Engineers and of the Infantry
in the garrison, so that the programme might include attacks both by
sea and land. If this were granted, much useful work might be done
and valuable lessons learnt. It would be a matter for regret indeed if
such an opportunity were not made the most of, for only when all the
Batteries were manned would an attack on the fortress with any
semblance of reality im it be possible.

If however there were no other result than that the whole of the
Artillery of the fortress was posted for once exactly as it would be in
time of war, this alone would be sufficient to justify its being mobilized.

CotontaL ARTILLERY.

There is no reason for dealing separately with the case of the
Colonial Artillery, as it all comes under the head of either Regular,
Militia or Volunteer Artillery, and to which therefore a system of
training for the Coast Artillery in Hngland would be equally applicable.
Certainly in the self-governing colonies there is no force of Imperial
Artillery to form a nucleus and to provide a permanent staff of special-
ists. Its place would therefore have to be taken in this respect by the
Colonial Artillery itself; and as its numbers are in all cases small, and
would have to be largely increased on the outbreak of war, there is all
the more need for this small body to be made thoroughly efficient.

The Coast Artillery in all the colonies exists, it is believed, only in the
immediate neighbourhood of the guns which it has been raised to man;
so that in the facilities which it would enjoy for carrying out its train-
ing it would have a great advantage over a large proportion of the
Auxiliary Artillery in England. It should have no difficulty indeed
under these circumstances in providing itself with a staff of specialists,
if assisted in the first instance by instructors from Home.

In the Crown Colonies, where Imperial troops are stationed, the
circumstances are similar to those in England, and therefore call for no
special arrangements. In some of the colonies the attempt has been
made to make Artillery act in the double capacity of Field and Garrison
Artillery. This arrangement may have been a practical one when it
was first made, but it is certainly so no longer in these days of guns
and mountings of complicated construction and of an elaborate system
of Coast Defence, when the work of Coast Artillery claims an
undivided attention.

SUMMARY.

The main conclusions arrived at are:

(1) That the more important Batteries should be manned by their
garrisons every year, and that the times of training of the different

368 COMMENDED EssAy, 1895.

corps should be arranged so as to allow of the Fire Commander of

each of the more important groups of forts exercising his Command
annually.

That it would be sufficient in the case of the other: Batteries and
“Fire Commands” if they were manned every second or third year.

That the whole of the Artillery of the fortress should be mobilized
periodically at such intervals as may be found practicable.

(2) That in the allotment of garrisons to Batteries the Corps
stationed nearest to the fortress, and therefore having the greater

facilities for drill, should as a rule be those to man the more important
guns.

(3) That quick-firing guns are specially suitable for Volunteers.

(4) That, to avoid mixing units, a corps should furnish its own
reliefs, and that this should be borne in mind when computing the
number of guns that it is capable of manning.

(5) That a Corps manning a work must also be prepared to provide
reliefs for the specialists.

(6) That the aim of the instruction should be to qualify a Corps to
man its Batteries independently in every detail; but that this principle
should not be carried so far in practice as to trust inexperienced men
uncontrolled in positions of responsibility.

(7) That in training a Corps new to Coast Defence work the
Regulars should afford it every assistance, but that it should gradually
be placed in a position to carry out its own training. That the
drawing up of the programme of work however should remain in the
hands of the Regular Artillery, who would also take up the instruction
again in case of any changes in drill or in the armament, and would
always continue to exercise a strict supervision over the work.

369

THE TRAINING TOGETHER IN PEACE TIME THE GARRISON
ARTILLERY FORCES OF THE EMPIRE, INCLUDING REGULAR,
MILITIA, VOLUNTEER & COLONIAL ARTILLERY.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. W. WHITH, R.A.

“ WIENS SANS IN CORPORE SANO.””

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

GENERAL REMARKS.

Minirary training is the means to an end. Unlike the pursuit of liter- mnitary
5 On 18 O ° 5 5 Training

ature and art, it has no merit in itself; it affords no cultivation to the generally.

intellect, nor does it help to swell those powers by which civilization

wrings subsistence from the crude forces of nature. Let us therefore

approach the subject in a purely utilitarian spirit, endeavour to recu-

late supply to demand, and seek our wares in the cheapest market,

Our demand is military efficiency ; the means of supply is military

training, and this, according to the principle just enunciated, we would

fain minimise to the utmost compatable with the complete satisfaction

of our requirements.

With this idea as a starting point, we may now proceed to consider The training
the question of the training of that portion of our military forces whose Artillery.
function is the defence of the great maritime fortresses of the empire,
and of those docks and coaling stations upon the secure possession of

which our naval supremacy depends.

Let us here glance at the constitution of the force with which we are garrison
concerned. its composi-
Our GARRISON ARTILLERY is made up of three component “sitieieney.*
parts.
Ist. The Professional.
By this is meant the embodied units, including the Regular Artillery,
and certain local companies in permanent military employ.
2nd. The Semi-Professional.
Under this heading is included the Militia of the British Isles, and
those companies in the Colonies which, though not permanently em-
bodied, are brought under military discipline at stated periods.
3rd. The Non-Professional.
_ This includes all Garrison Artillery that is under training, but not
embodied and subject to military discipline in time of peace. In this
category must be placed the Volunteer Garrison Artillery of the United
Kingdom, and the great bulk of the Colonial Artillery.

7. VOU. XXII,

370 COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

What we have to determine is how to bring it about that, when on
the outbreak of war, these diverse elements are suddenly assembled,
they shall at once amalgamate to form an efficient working organiza-
tion.

But what, we may ask ourselves, is the meaning of the term efficient
when applied to Garrison Artillery ? and to this question we may fairly
reply, that looking to the purposes for which the Garrison Artillery is
maintained, we may Judge the force to be efficient, if it is capable of
supplying all the known wants of the fortified places, and of making
the best possible application of their armament in actual warfare.

Organisation Now it is evident from this point of view, that before we can venture
tousining. an opinion on the system of training best suited to the force, we must
have a clear understanding of the organic principles upon which the de-
fence of coast fortresses is to be conducted ; if instead of beating the
air, we are to direct our training to definite ends.
Angosiesm At this stage of the enquiry, it may not be unprofitable to see how
' problems of an analagous kind are habitually disposed of in every day
life.

If we look into the working of our great corporate institutions ; our
railway companies, our gas companies, and our great mercantile firms,
we shall see two great principles invariably in operation, viz.: “ unity
of management,” and “ division of labour.”

And we shall further see that the division of labour is carried out by
a minute classification of work.

For differences of kind ;—By departments.
Hor differences of quality ;—By gradations of responsibility.

It is certain moreover that the tendency of the period is increasingly
in the direction of sub-division. In every industry the departments
become daily more numerous, while individual labour is at once more
circumscribed in its range, and intensified in its technical character.
To put the matter simply the world has recognised that the “ Jack of
all Trades is the master of none;” hence ‘‘ one man one work” is now
the order of the day.

There is yet another point which we must not overlook as character-
istic of all associations for corporate labour in civil life; it is that no
one man, however capable he may be, is ever permitted to be indis-
pensable. A process of instruction is always silently at work, and every
man’s possible successor is to be found in his immediate subordinate.
Thus the principle of stage management enters into the national life,
and in the Drama of Labour there is an understudy for every rdéle.

Fundamental Tjaying these things to heart and assured that laws which have
proved successful in the industrial world may be advantageously applied
to military life, we propose to see if it be not possible by their aid to
satisfy the needs of our fortresses, and yet vastly simplify the training
of their personnel.
Pacis Our Coast Fortresses,' as we all know, differ widely in the character

Coast For- 7 p :
tresses gener of their works and armaments. In considering the duties of the per-

ally similar

gmige train. Sonmel however, what applies to one may be said to apply to all; the

Similar train-
ing

1 The term Fortress here and elsewhere in this Essay is used to cover all Coast Fortifications.

COMMENDED Essay, 1895. 371

constituents of the garrison may indeed vary, but the duties which it
will have to perform in time of war are pretty much the same, where-
ever there is a water area to be guarded, and batteries to defend it.

If, therefore, we consider broadly the typical requirements of a Coast
Fortress, and can show how by a suitable training, in connection with
a suitable organisation, it iy possible to provide for those requirements,
we shall have done all that 1s necessary.

Now the first point to note in this sequence is that in every fortress
the character and position of the works and armament determine abso-
lutly what the garrison owght to be, not only in numbers, but also in
kind.

To begin with, there must be a gun detachment to every gun that
is to be worked, and a Gun Captain to every gun detachment. ‘I'o every
group of guns, there must be a Gun Group Commander (as we now call
him) to supervise the group in action, and make the group corrections
according’ to the rules of gunnery. Tor every fort or collection of gun
groups, there must be a superior officer in immediate command, and in
every work there must be a subordinate staff of specialists to do the
skilled service, and manipulate those adjuncts in gunnery with which
we are all acquainted. Again, for every independent group of works
covering a distinct water area, there must be an officer for general con-
trol, whether we call him a Section C.R.A., as we did a little while
ago, or a Fire Commander as we shall doin future. It is besides neces-
sary to provide that every group of guns in action shall have the atten-
tion of an officer (or qualified person doing officer’s work) whose business
will be to maintain the fire of the group upon the hostile target. The
methods employed we need not here describe ; suffice it to say that con-
siderable presence of mind, considerable practice, and a large amount
of technical information must be forthcoming in whoever undertakes
this duty.

Thus it happens that :—the number of guns determine the number
of gun detachments, and the number of groups the number of Gun
Group and Range Group Commanders. The number of the batteries,
or collections of groups, determine the number of Battery Commanders,
while the number of sets of batteries associated for separate command
determines the number of Fire Commanders.

It should be observed that these arrangements of the armament of a
fortress into groups, batteries and fire commands are very seldom
matters of choice. They are generally dictated by the imperative
necessity of grouping guns together which are of the same nature and
have similar areas of fire; of making battery commands wherever the
groups are too far apart to be under the immediate control of a single
officer, and of creating separate fire commands wherever the situation
of the works is such that they cannot be conveniently associated for
tactical employment.

_ We are thus brought face to face with the fact that in every Coast
Fortress there is always a normal Artillery Garrison, and if the actual
Garrison differs from the normal one, either in quantity or quality, it

Requirements
of Coast
Fortresses in
general,

372 COMMENDED uHssayY, 1895,

does so at the expense of the fighting power of the place.

dztitey Now we know very well that the actual Artillery Garrisons of our

nommat« Coast Fortresses, as laid down in the Schemes for Mobilisation, do in
very rare instances conform to the normal or theoretical proportions.
As a matter of fact the numbers are generally insufficient, especially if
we consider the necessity for reliefs, and of provision for casualties. It
is not, however, in deficiency of numbers that the matter is most
serious. ‘The worst discrepancy is, as a rule, in the matter of quality
so to speak.

The supply of unskilled labour may in most cases be supplemented
in time of war by drafts upon the local labour market, but the skilled
labour, in proportion to its technical character will be less and less
possible to extemporise. Moreover no super-abundance in one depart-
ment of skilled labour will in any way make up for a deficiency in
another.

Skitedand By skilled labour, using a certain freedom in applying the term to

duties. the duties of Garrison Artillery is meant—

(a.) Officers’ duties, that is to say the higher technical duties in-
volving discretionary powers.
(0.) Specialists’ duties, that is technical duties requiring very
_ skilful manipulation and a certain amount of local know-
ledge—as for example the duties of artificers, electricians,
telegraphists, position-finding and depression range-find-
ing operators, to which may be added certain minor
employments such as those of magazine and store-men
entailing peculiar responsibilities and requiring intimate
acquaintance with the batteries.

With respect to officers’ duties, there are many difficulties all more
or less embarrassing. In the first place the officers and superior non-
commissioned officers available on the outbreak of war will generally be
an hetrogeneous body taken in part from the regular forces, and from
the auxiliary branches. Many of them will have been non-resident in
times of peace, and their qualifications will have been difficult to
ascertain. Secondly, the relative proportions of each rank will hardly
ever tally with the posts which have to be filled according to the
Defence Scheme. Thirdly, the proportion of officers to men according
to the regimental establishments may prove very unsuitable when
officers and men are distributed according to armament requirements.

All this difficulty is plainly due to the fact that inthe Garrison Artil-
lery, the organisation by companies and divisions is for purposes of
administration and has little to do with the requirements of war. In
this respect a Garrison Company is altogether different from a Field
Battery, which is not only an administrative but also a fighting unit.

As regards the specialists, there are also many obstacles to satisfac-
tory working, and these unfortunately are more in practice than in
theory. In theory we know that with the exception of officers, the
entire fighting staff of every fortress should be found by the Regular

COMMENDED Essay, 1895. 3873

Artillery and be maintained at war strength in the district to which it
belongs. The recognition of this principle! is perhaps the greatest of
all the advances made by the Garrison Artillery since the close of the
Crimean War. ‘The idea is that, in every district, the Commanding
Officer of Artillery should be responsible that, whether the companies
in his command, be few or many, he should always have the skilled
personnel, in full strength and proper proportions ready to his hand in
case of war. It is assumed by regulation that a Commanding Officer
can at a moment’s notice call into existence a living chain ready to
transmit his orders from his command cell to the remotest outpost, and
to execute them by pre-arranged and often rehearsed co-operation.
Now, without doubt the more energetic the Commanding Officer, the
more nearly will affairs approach to this ideal condition. But alas!
there is no picture without a blemish. Excellent as is the theory of the
District Hstablishments, it is subject to sundry drawbacks in practice.
There is in the first place a want of elasticity in the whole plan. For
example:—The establishment of a given district may have been fixed
before all the works belonging to it were completed, and before the
position-finding, electric lighting, and the telephone system belonging
to it bad been installed. According to theory, no doubt, the specialist
staff should have been augmented step by step as these adjuncts were
brought into play, but we all know that such a course is practically
impossible where affairs are concerned which depend upon annual
estimates and Parliamentary votes. Somehow matters have a tendency
to crystalise, and it may easily happen that a very modern fortification
has already a very obsolete District Establishment.

Another difficulty in connection with the District Establishment is
the want of a completely satisfactory method of recruiting them, and of
an exact standard of qualification for every one of their grades. Certain
specialists are supplied from the Woolwich Arsenal and from the
Schools of Instruction, but there is, to say the least of it, an element of
vagueness in the mode of their selection, which makes it impossible for
a Commanding Officer to place any great reliance upon their technical
skill until he has had personal knowledge of what they can individually
do, and what they cannot. On the other hand the majority of the
specialists are drawn from the service companies quartered in the
district, and are trained locally ; a system which works well only where
the number of companies is in fair proportion to the number of
specialists they have to find.

Drawbacks of this kind are serious in proportion as the skilled labour
is important, for just as one weak link in a chain enfeebles the whole,
so the absence or incapacity of a single specialist may go far to
depreciate the fighting value of the strongest combination of works and
armament. An excitable or ill-taught position-finding operator would
in action nullify the best manned group of the most powerful of our

modern guns, and a bungling artificer might do incalculable mischief
in half an hour.

i No change in this respect has been made by recent orders associating D.E. men with Com-
panies, since they remain localised.

Distribution
of personnel.

374, COMMENDED EssAy, 1895.

A Fortress ORGANISATION WHICH witL Facruivare TRrArnina.

Now the question arises how we are to maintain in every fortress a
complete organisation for war and adapt to it a satisfactory system of
training the several components of the Artillery Garrison.

How best to apply an Artillery Garrison which has been selected by
administrative units to a fortress, the duties of which must be classified
in fighting departments, is a problem to which no general solution can
be dogmatically insisted upon. What ought to be done exactly is
difficult to say; what ought not to be done is very certain. For
example, any Defence Scheme which disposes of the manning. details
of the Artillery by the assignment to forts and batteries of regimental
units and arbitrary complements of specialists, is not merely absolutely
worthless but positively harmful.

Probably the best way to deal with the artillery portion of a Defence
Scheme is to draw up a schedule of a typical or a normal garrison for
a fortress, assuming that the fixed armament, movable armament, and
auxiliary appliances are all to be brought into simultaneous operation,
and that the Personnel is to work in one relief with a suitable propor-
tion of each department in reserve. Side by side with this may then
be placed the schedule of the actual artillery garrison according to the
mobilisation scheme, due allowance being made for casualties, especially
those caused by deficiencies in the numbers of the auxiliary units. It
will then be seen what the possibilities of the defence are, and how the
distribution of the Garrison must be actually made. Asarulea limited
number of Battery Commands will have to be selected in each Fire
Command, to be brought into activity at the outbreak of war, and in
the same way, in each Battery Command so selected, there will be a
limited number of groups chosen for activity :—the principle being to
attend to the essential points first, leaving certain portions of the
defence to be dealt with as opportunities occur. It will have, kowever,
to be always remembered that whatever works are selected for activity,
they must be completely garrisoned, that is to say, for every duty,
however trifling, there must be a qualified man, and deliberate provision
must be made to replace him by a man of similar qualifications in case
of accidents. In thus fitting the Garrison, so to speak, to the fortress
which has been made for it, a good many more or less conflicting
conditions will have to be satisfied.

For instance, the most important groups should obviously be
assigned to the regimental units most certainly able to man them
properly, nevertheless the sentiment of esprit de corps in these several
branches should be respected, or trouble will ensue.

The task will be no easy one, but its worst difficulties will be escaped
wherever a complete and efficient District Hstablishment has been kept
up in time of peace.

Beyond this, the most serious and certainly the most delicate matter
to be faced, is the distribution of the officers, but here the observance

-of certain general rules will probably smooth the way. It should

clearly be laid down that under no circumstances should any person be

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 375

appointed to a post in the chain of command for which he has not
shewn himself, not merely presumably, but actually fitted, and that
therefore in every case where an officer, be he of the Regular, Militia,
or Volunteer services, is not efficient in respect to those duties for
which his rank renders him otherwise suitable, he must be set aside as
a dead-head for fighting purposes, and relegated to general adminis-
trative duties exclusively. By this expedient will be avoided the
troublesome dilemma of having to reverse the order of precedence, and
place juniors practically in command of their seniors or else of permit-
ting inefficiency during peace where it would be ruinous in time of
war. In all probability if the system here advocated were to be
strictly carried out general satisfaction would be the result. In the
regular service the setting aside of any officer in a local Defence
Scheme would be felt as such an extreme disgrace that it would never
happen twice to the same individual, and if would in all probability
very seldom happen at all. The same may be said of the Militia; and
as to the Volunteers, especially the Volunteer portion of the Colonial
Artillery, the rule would probably be acceptable, as it would afford to
each officer the opportunity either of placing himself in the category of
effective soldiers or of electing to retain a position applicable only to
time of peace and which would soon come to be recognised as an
honorary and social distinction and nothing more.

Where the officers’ commands cannot be filled by efficient. officers
the only course open to the organiser will be to fall back on non-com-
missioned officers, and these should thereupon be given the opportunity
of learning the duties they have been selected to perform.

A TRAINING To Suit THE ORGANISATION.

When we consider the existing system of training of our military
forces in general, and of the Garrison Artillery in particular, it must
be confessed that though many beneficial changes have been introduced
of late years, there is still some room for improvement. The idea that
all training should be for a definite end, and that the average progress
made should bear a reasonable proportion to the time occupied, has
taken root but slowly. We have indeed recognised the distinction be-
tween essential and non-essential training in the separation of ceremonial
and service drills, and of skilled and unskilled duties; we have also
given way to the necessity of advanced courses of technical instruction
in particular directions. But there is still a want of clear perception
as to the purposes of training, and much confusion between training for
war, and other classes of instruction. ‘There are many survivals in our
military routine of the opinions and habits of a past age when the
soldier enlisted for life, and the weapons and appliances of war were so
simple that time would have hung heavy on his hands, but for a thou-
sand pendantries invented expressly for his benefit, and hedged about
with extraordinary pomp.

Those were days when every officer of equal rank was assumed to be
equally capable, and the private soldier had no individuality, but was
a strictly interchangeable factor, for ever under instruction, yet never
proficient. The application of advanced science to the art of war, and

System of
training—
past and
present,

Means of
Instruction.

Drill.

Barrack-
room instruc:
tion.

376 _ COMMENDED Essay, 1895.

the adoption of short service in the army has made this system impos-
sible any longer. We must henceforward perforce make up our minds
what each soldier has got to learn, and teach it him as quickly as
possible, for time is short and needs are pressing.

Laying aside special courses of instruction outside the routine of
regimental life, which are for the most part applicable to officers, non-
commissioned officers, and specialists only, the means of training in the
Garrison Artillery are :—

Drill.

Barrack-room Instruction.
Gun Practice.

Mannings for Exercise.

As regards drill, no remark seems necessary except that it would be
well if the difference between learning a drill for the first time, and
going through it afterwards as an exercise, was always kept fully in
view. It should also be observed perhaps that where a unit is told off
to a particular fortress, but is non-resident, all its drills should be with
the class of ordnance mounted in that fortress, and have a systematic
reference to the duties to be performed there.

With respect to Barrack-room Instruction, there isa great deal more
to be said than is generally supposed. In a properly fitted-up instruc-
tion-room, and even with no other appliances than a black-board and
a piece of chalk nearly every duty can be taught part by part if not as
a whole, and there are many elementary processes which can be far
better explained this way than in any other manner. Even the higher
duties which officers have to perform in the chain of fortresses command
can be tanght up to an advanced stage by indoor work. Take for ex-
ample the duties of a Fire Commander. A very simpie exercise can
be carried out, which if properly conducted will be of the greatest
assistance to him in his duties of identification, and classification of
foreign ships.

Some particular navy having been selected for the occasion, the
officer who takes the part of Fire Commander will in the first instance
be supplied with the regulation idenification cards, such as he would
have at his command post. Another officer acting as umpire will show
him one by one the photographs of certain ships belonging to that navy,
the margins showing names, class, &c., being carefully covered up.
The Fire Commander will then identify the ships to the best of his
ability, and the umpire will note down the result, carefully recording
the time taken in each case. The exercise may be made more difficult
by dispensing with the identification card, and it may be extended by
requiring the ire Commander to predict the square on his Fire Com-
mander’s chart which each ship will have reached at the moment when
his (the Fire Commander’s message) to the Battery Commander de-
puted to deal with that ship, will have reached its destination ; certain
conyentions as to time, speed, and ship’s course, based on actual ex-
perience, being agrecd upon for this purpose.

COMMENDED Essay, 1895, 377

The Fire Commander can be further required to frame a proper
message for each Battery Commander in the time allowed him for iden-
tification, and his work may be tested by sending these messages in
their proper order to officers in another room representing the several
Battery Commanders concerned, and requiring them each to show, on
his own chart, the square towards which he would turn his depression
range-finder or his gun of direction in order to pick up the vessel re-
ferred to in the Fire Commander’s message. In each case the umpire
(always noting the expenditure of time) will be able to say where the
ship ought actually to be at the moment in question, and its relative
position to the other vessels of the fleet and from this he can decide
whether any mistake or confusion of objectives will have occurred, and
be able to show whether the Fire Commander has done his work satis-
factorily or otherwise.

_ _ An almost endless variety of exercises of this nature may be easily
devised for the benefit of those holding postsin any chain of command
from the Fire Commander to the Gun Group Commander, not even for-
getting the humble but necessary dial numbers. In many instances,
especially in the case of non-resident units, working models of the
Forts and their appliances will be found of immense use for instruction.
If kept under lock and key when not required for instruction there
could be scarcely any objection to their employment. Drawings and
photographs too, though in a less degree will be found beneficial.

Concerning practice, there area good many erroneous ideas in the
air. On the one hand gun practice is expected to do for us what it
can never do, and on the other hand, its true uses are scarcely under-
stood. Some officers are under the impression that practice can be
conducted so as to really show what takes place in actual warfare, but
this is not the case. Garrison Artillery practice is, it is true, incom-
parably nearer the real thing than is that of the Field Artillery, because
the Garrison Artillery alone employs moving targets bearing compari-
son in size, speed, &c., to the vessels of war, and alone is obliged to do
without those misleading aids to accuracy of fire with a knowledge of
the practice ground, and of the approximate distances of the targets,
invariably furnishes to those practising over land ranges. Neverthe-
less, although Garrison Artillery practice may embrace some of the
important features of actual service, it can never be carried out under
true service conditions, on account of the many precautions for safety
which must be observed, even in the lcast frequented waters.

The real value of gun practice is, first, that it accustoms the gun de-
tachments, to actual fire, with its attendent conditions of noise and
smoke. Next that it is an exercise for the officers, and a test for the
accuracy and uniformity of the work done by the Gunnery Specialists.
Thirdly, that it affords a useful opportunity of trying the mountings,
and all the appliances connected with the guns made use of.

Now as the first of these uses, nothing particular need be said, but
for the rest, we must remember that the most careful notes are needed
to be taken, moment by moment, if full value is to be got out of the
ammunition expended. From this point of view all practice except
just enough of the elementary sort to accustom the detachments to

Gun practice.

Manning
Exercises.

Obstacles to
Instruction,

378 COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

work quickly, should be treated as an experiment, and the programme
should be so arranged that the conclusions come to may not be confused
by too many variable factors. Thus, if it is desired to test the personnel,
the conduct of the gun must be beyond suspicion, or means taken, such
as clmometer readings, and careful air-spacing to make sure that its
shortcomings are not put down to the layers or to range-takers. Again,
it is obvious that to bring home the errors made at practice with cer-
tainty to the individuals who have caused them, means must be taken of
registering what each man’s contribution has been to the sum total of
the operations performed, hence the necessity for a great deal, which
could never by any possibility be done in battle.

It must always be remembered that practice is a costly thing, and
that there is no excuse for throwing away ammunition for the sake of
apparent smartness.

Nor ought practice ever to be carried out with a higher nature of
gun than the requirements of the occasion demand. If, for instance it
be only desired to exhibit the service method of ranging upon a fired
target without the help ofa range-finder, why make use of a 9-in. gun
when a 38-pr. quick-firing would do just as well?

Manning exercises, besides being useful to show the completeness or
otherwise of the manning tables, are an excellent mode of instruction in
the combined duties of specialists and non-specialists.

It may be now and again a good thing to man an entire Fire Com-
mand both by day and night; on which occasion the Fire Commander
and his under-study should take the opportunity of making themselves
thoroughly at home in their command posts. As a rule, however, the
manning of a Battery Command or even of a single group will answer
all purposes of instruction, and it will be by no means necessary that
every non-specialist should be present. The detail may often with ad-
vantage be limited to the officers, specialists, and the Gun Captains
and layers of each gun, a few men being told off to run the guns up
and back, when occasion required.

All mannings for exercise should include the use of two or three
moving targets (fast steam launches from choice) which are quite as
useful when friction tubes only are employed as when actual practice
is carried out. If, with each gun, an umpire looks over the left hand
sight set without deflection, while the layer works on the right, he can
by making an allowance for the time of flight, and looking along the
sight at the expiration of such time after the tube has been fired, sce
exactly where the shot was due to strike, and thus judge the effect of
the imaginary round.

In this exercise, the action of wind cannot be considered, and the
precision of the range-finding must be independently tested, but all the
other stages of gunnery which lhe between the Range Group Com-
mander and the gun layer can be thoroughly overhauled. In manning
exercises, a8 well asin actual practice, the presence of selected instructors
as umpires will be found advantageous, especially when the Militia and
Volunteers are employed.

At the present time, the means of training are ample, but there are
sundry obstacles to the best use being made of them.

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 379

In the Regular Artillery, as in the army generally, instruction is
woefully hampered by the inordinate demands of administrative duty,
and if is positively startling to think of the enormous proportion of
officers, N.-O.C.’s and men who are employed every day in merely
conducting their own house keeping, so to speak.

In the Militia the shortness of the annual trainings and the constant
changes in the muster roll are the chief enemies to advanced instruction,
and in the Volunteers and Colonial forces, any limpness there may be,
is due, as a rule, to want of the knowledge of what would be really
expected of them in the presence of an enemy.

Putting aside instruction other than what is distinctly for war, we
may consider the training of the Garrison Artillery in two parts.

Ist. The separate training of the units.
2nd. The combined trainings of the Fortress Garrisons.

The training of Regular Artillery has to be carried beyond the point
of what is required locally. The Service Companies, we must remem-
ber, are available for duty in any part of the world. They are training
schools for their own reserve, and have to provide a sufficient number
of specialists to supply the wants of the other branches as well as their
own, when mobilised for war.

In training the Regular Artilleryman therefore, we have first to make
him a soldier, and by the aid of precise exercises instil into him those
habits of implicit obedience without which a soldier is worse than use-
less. ‘This we do at a depot or other place of instruction for recruits
before he joins a Service Company. Having made him a soldier, we
have to make him a gunner, that is to say a soldier who has become so
intimate with guns and their adjuncts that he will afterwards instinc-
tively fall into his proper placein any drill or other Artillery duty he
may be called to, although the precise detail may be new to him.

Company training, further includes the sorting of the gunners
according to the military aptitudes of each individual, with a view to
the making of specialists and the selection of N.-C.O.’s, both matters of
the utmost importance.

But concurrently with this general training should come the pre-
paration of each man for his particular duties of the local scheme of
defence. The duties of the company men (with the exception of Gun
Captains and gun layers) will itis true be generally unskilled, still some
education of hand and eye is needed for their due performance. A
soldier may, for instance, be told off as No. 5 ina 9:2-in. B.L. Gun De-
tachment. His duty will be merely to stand on the left of the gun,
attend to hoisting tackle, raise projectile, ram home, run wp and elevate,
but it is surely the business of the Officer Commanding his company to
see that whatever other accomplishments he may happen to possess he
can at least do that duty and do it perfectly ; also that he is able at a
pinch to do the work of the other man at the same gun, whose place he
may have to take. Thus while the main object of company training is
to carry out preliminary instruction and select probationers for the
district establishment it should also include the preparation of a certain

In the Regu-
lay Artillery.

In the
Militia and
Volunteers.

Aspects of
Training in
the Garrison

Artillery.

Separate
Training of
the Regular
Artillery.

Company
Training.

Regimental
Training.

Training of
Specialists.

Militia Train-
ing.

380 COMMENDED Essay, 1895,

number of Gun Captains, gun layers and handspike numbers for their
own particular duties in the scheme of defence, always remembering
that each man should himself know what those precise duties are, and
where they are to be performed, in order that he may take some
interest in them.

Regimental training, in contrast to company training should comprise
the advanced training and regular exercise of the specialists, and the
working together at drill and at gun practice of the specialists and of
the Service Companies.

If this is done and with sufficient thoroughness, it will be found that
in all cases where the Regulars are combined for exercise with other
branches of the Garrison Artillery there will be little in reality for
them to learn but they will, as it is only right they should, be agents
of instruction to the non-professionals associated with them.

As regards the training of the specialists, including that practice
without which no adequate level of expertness can be kept up, it can-
not be too often insisted upon that no amount of attention is too great
to bestow it. It is the business of Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels to very
jealously protect the specialists as a body from being called upon, on
pretences of emergency, to perform fatigues and duties which are the
proper function of the ordinary unskilled company men. A Commanding
Officer who wishes to see good work done should be active in stimu-
lating the zeal of the Officer Instructors responsible for technical
training, and in trying to create emulation among the operators.

Nothing will conduce better to this end than for the Commanding
Officer to keep a list of every class of specialist showing the capabilities
of each man in order of merit.

It is suggested that specialists (position-finders and depression range-
finders) should as far as possible be identified with particular posts and
particular instruments. Under these conditions they will be more
likely to take a pride in their work than they otherwise would, for
there is a vast difference we must recollect between what any man is in
general, and what he is in particular. To follow once morean analogy
of civil life, it is one thing to be an engine-driver on the Midland Rail-
way, and quite another to be the engine-driver of the Manchester
Express.

The separate training of Militia must follow the same lines as that of
the Regular Artillery, but it is immensely simplified by the circum-
tance that the Militia are not liable for foreign service, and are as a
rule more distinctly localised ; also that they have no specialities to think
of, and no skilled details to furnish (laying aside what officers may do)
except Gun Captains and gun layers for particular guns in particular
fortresses. It would seem therefore very possible to considerably reduce,
and at the same time systematise the preparatory drills of this branch.
The Militia soldier having learned a few parade movements and the art
of marching past—a tribute to custom and regimental esprit de corps—
need scarcely be troubled with any general artillery training, but simply
set to work to learn his particular duty in the gun detachment to which
he has been told off, and it would be a good plan, perhaps, if these

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 381

duties were made generally to correspond with the number of trainings
received, always provided that the special aptitudes of individuals were
duly taken stock of.

Assuming that the separate training of the Artillery Militia could be
advantageously shortened as here suggested, there would be more time
left for practice and practical exercise in combination with the Regulars
to which we shall presently refer.

The members of the Volunteer Artillery at home and in the Colonies
are not soldiers, nor does it seem desirable that any attempt should be
made to make them so. They are merely citizens who have agreed to
perform in time of war certain duties in aid of the Regular Artillery, and
learn those duties in time of peace. As the Volunteers are an unpaid
force, it is neither right nor expedient to throw more work upon them
than is absolutely necessary. We may therefore assume that in every

scheme of defence the Volunteer Artillery will be told off to those works
which are of the least importance, and provided with the simplest
armaments.

The Volunteer Garrison Artillery being strictly localised, there is no
question of their services being required elsewhere than in the works
with which they are thus associated. There should be, therefore, very
little difficulty in reducing their company training to such a minimum
that the busiest of these citizen gunners should not be able to complain
of the tax levied on his time and attention. A certain amount of drill
for the purposes of military display would no doubt be advisable, but
this need not occupy much time, nor need we consider it here. As to
drill for disciplinary purposes, that is out of the question ina force which
passes under military law only in time of war, and in which the senti-
ment of patriotism and the pressure of public opinion must take the
place of that unquestioning obedience which is second nature to the
professional soldier. The training of Volunteer Officers and higher
N.-C.0.’s, that is of those who aspire to take their place with regular
officers in the chain of fortress command, is a subject distinct from
the training of the men and will be noticed in considering the training
of officers generally.

There is obviously no maximum limit to what we desire in the Artil-
lery Officer of the Regular Army. He cannot possibly possess too much
general knowledge, or too many technical acquirements. He is at once
a leader, an instructor, and an administrator, and he is responsible for
doing his share to keep up the general standard of efficiency among the
officers of his own and other branches. For him there is no short en-
listment, his services are given for life, and his duties range over an
extended sphere, embracing the possibility of service in the field and at
sieges, as well as in the defence of coast fortifications.

There is for him besides the chance of at any time being called to
staff employment, and in the future, the prospect of higher command
requiring a knowledge of every arm of the service.

For this reason it is difficult to say to what branches of military study
he ought most especially to devote himself, so long as he keeps himself
abreast of the times. Happily the Artillery Officer of to-day is no-
where behindhand in this respect. He begins with an excellent general

Volunteer
‘Artillery.

The Training
cers—
Regulars.

382 COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

and military education, and he finds ample opportunities in the service
of advanced study, with many openings for special instruction such as
the classes at the Artillery College and in the various branches of the
School of Gunnery. So far good, but granted a very high general level
of proficiency, it may be doubted if the education of Artillery Officers
is sufficiently wniform, sufficiently controlled, and directed with sufficient
precision towards definite ends. In particular it is very questionable if
enough attention is paid to the local technical duties which after all
constitute for the time being the one thing positively necessary especi-
ally in the Garrison Artillery. Stirred by a spirit of adventure, or it
may be love of change, officers are apt to regard their residence in any
one district as so very temporary an episode, that they are tempted to
neglect to study as carefully as is desirable the part they would have to
play in local defence should war break out (as war generally does break
out) at a moment’s notice. It is very well to be a smart parade officer,
good at games and sports, a linguist, a fin dw siecle tactician, and to
have it may be the letters G., P.A.C., P.S.C., and so forth annexed to
one’s name in the army list, but if being Range Group Commander of
a certain group an officer has never practised his special duties as such,
and is unacquainted with the water area seen from his command post,
can he say that he is really in that state of readiness for active service
which the true professional soldier should be ?

Fortunately, we are dealing with a body eager to accept the smallest
hint in the direction of improvement, and a short coming of this kind
has therefore only to be detected in order to disappear forthwith.

dihitia and In the Militia, and still more in the Volunteer forces, it is plainly
out of question to demand from Officers anything more than the mini-
mum knowledge which is necessary to enable them to discharge the
duties they have undertaken. More than this, if forthcoming, should
of course be thankfully recognised. There are at the present time, and
there willno doubt always be officers of Auxiliary Artillery possessing
great scientific attainments, who find something more than recreation
in military pursuits.

It is not however the exceptional officers that we are concerned with.
What we want to establish is a certain minimum level of capability
associated with each step in rank, and which is absolutely insisted upon
as a qualification for that rank. ‘To meet this requirement Militia and
Volunteer officers might perhaps with advantage be given greater
facilities for training i company with regular officers in the fortresses
to which they belong. ‘l'here seems no reason also why officers in the
Colonial Artillery should not be affilated for instruction to the Service
Companies which form part of the garrisons of the Colonial Ports, nor
why Colonels of Artillery should not everywhere be made responsible
to a certain extent for the average proficiency arrived at by the
Volunteer officers in their districts. A little energy and management
will go far in this respect, and if the Volunteer officer had clearly put
before him, that he was not asked to pursue an indefinite curriculm,
but only to fit himself for a responsible post, he would in all probability
rise to the occasion, and readily meet half way any arrangements
suggested for his benefit. Again during Militia training, it might be

COMMENDED Essay, 1895. 383

made the duty of the Royal Artillery to give each officer a certain
number of hours exercise in his special defence duties, with the assis-
tance of parties of non-commissioned officers and men belonging to the
district. It might also perhaps be arranged that Militia officers
requiring more teaching than they were able to get during their annual
training should stay on in the district for a short period of special
instruction after their camp had been broken up. On the same prin-
ciple it might be conceded that officers of non-resident units wishing
to acquaint themselves with the details of the fortress to which they
nominally belong, should be allowed to come there for stated periods ;
all or part of their expenses being paid by the country.

Such arrangements in addition to the other classes and regulation
means of instruction would, if systematically carried out, probably do
all that is really required for Militia and Volunteer Artillery officers,
- and what has been said of officers might be made, with modifications,
to apply also to the higher non-commissioned officers, especially those
told off to officer’s positions in any defence or scheme.

If the separate trainings of the units have been properly carried out,
combined trainings should pass off without a hitch, and very few
should be necessary. It will not be very often possible to assemble all
branches for simultaneous training, but it will be fairly easy, as oppor-
tunity occurs, to combine the regular artillery with each of the other
branches separately. Combined trainings are likely to be most useful
in the form of

Barrack-room Instruction for officers and non-commissioned
officers.

Combined manning exercises.

Combined gun practice.

In Barrack-room instruction the method most likely to be found
successful would be to combine a few Militia or Volunteer officers at a
time, with a tolerably large number of regular officers who are already
expert at the exercise to be followed up.

In combined manning exercises the scheme of defence should
certainly be strictly followed, but it may be advisable to substitute
regular officers and regular non-commissioned officers for auxiliaries in
certain posts during the instruction of novices. ‘Thus for instance, if
the Gun Captains, and Gun layers of a group were unusually shaky, it
might be as well to give them for the time being the help of a Gun
Group Commander from the Regulars.

By combined gun practice is here meant, not gun practice where the
detachments are mixed, but either gun practice by regulars under their
best officers, with the Auxiliary officers and superior non-commissioned
officers in attendance to watch the proceedings under the guidance of
a specially selected instructor, or else, gun practice by the Auxiliary
Artillery with selected Regular officers as umpires; the proceedings in
either case being followed next day by a lecture and discussion.

There should not be any difficulty in carrying out this idea: probably
52.

Oombined
training of
Regulars and
Auxiliaries.

Barrack
room.

Combined
manning
exercises,

Gun practice,

Rotrospect.

384 COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895.

the war department would be willing to assist, but in any case there
need be no obstacle to the attendance of Regular officers at Militia and
Volunteer practice, nor should it be found impossible to time the
practice of the Regulars so as to suit the convenience of the Militia and
the Volunteers.

Conotupine REMARKS.

And now we have come to the end of our inquiry into the question
of a training intended to meet the general requirements of the Garrison
Artillery, and the exact needs of its three branches in respect to their
local duties, it would be well to glance briefly at the ground over
which we have travelled. We began with the proposition that military
training was valuable only as far as it produced military efficiency.
We saw that efficiency in the Garrison Artillery might be considered
to be attained when it was capable of completely fulfilling the needs of
our coast fortresses and fortified harbours. We then saw that in order
that this might be brought about by a suitable system of training
there must needs be a suitable fortress organisation to which that
training might conveniently adapt itself. We next came to the con-
clusion that the principles which govern the associations for collective
industry in civil life might with advantage be applied to the organisa-
tion we were in search of, and that if we desired to have an efficient
Artillery Garrison in an effective fortress, we must accept the motto
“one man one work” as our guiding principle. After this we saw
how that principle coupled with another almost as important, namely “to
every man an under-study” could be turned to account in the difficult
task of making our somewhat incongruous garrisons adjust themselves
to the requirements of the fortresses, and we went at some length into
certain difficulties inseparable from that undertaking. We next set
ourselves to ascertain how best in time of peace we could train the
various branches of the Garrison Artillery in all parts of the world, so
that each man might when called upon be able to perform the work
which in the process of organisation, we had narrowed to the utmost,
and relegated to him individually.

Following up the enquiry we ultimately concluded that the existing
means of instruction modified by a definite local bias would answer all
purposes.

Finally we saw that by carefully training each branch separately and
testing that training by small combinations of the Regular and Auxil-
iary branches, following the lines of the local Defence Schemes, we
could without operations on any extravagant scale, prove satisfactorily
that the great machine for war had beeen made perfect in detail and
capable of immediate assembly as a whole.

Throughout our investigations we have carefully abstained from dis-
cussing the peculiarities of particular fortresses or of special armaments,
nor have we entered into the minutiz of management in particular
corps.

The requirements of particular fortresses are the affairs of the officers
located in them, and the circumstances of particular corps vary only in

COMMENDED ESSAY, 1895. 385

minor details which can be best adjusted by the officers that belong to
them. Nor have we touched with the idea of suggesting improvements
upon the rules and regulations which at present govern Military
instruction in the several branches of the Artillery. Hxcellent articles
on this subject have appeared from time to time in the pages of the
R.A.I. “ Proceedings,” and the R.U.S.I. “Journal”; also in various
miscellaneous periodicals to which those interested may refer. The
great point we have aimed at has been to arrive at some general basis
of action, knowing that when men are agreed on general principles they
seldom differ seriously as to details.

The idea we have had in view from first to last has been to remove
the process of mobilization for war from the catagory of catastrophies,
into something which will resemble the daily assembly of labourers in
a great workshop, to the ringing of the office bell, and all we have
_ asked is common sense, and an high feeling of duty in all concerned.

If our conclusions are correct, we shall thus have shewn how when
the cry “To Arms” shall go forth throughout the length and breadth
of the empire, and the order to mobilise be given at home and abroad,
every man of the Garrison Artillery, be he Regular, Militia, or Volun-
teer will be able to make a fair estimate of what he will be doing hour
by hour from that moment to the time when he may lie down in his
own bed in his own proper tent or barrack room, with a knowledge
that to-morrow morning he will rise to the performance of definite
duties, in his proper position in his own gun emplacement, in his own
Battery in his own Coast Fortress.

If this can but be realised for each individual, we need have but
little anxiety for the arrangements as a whole.

Our defence may indeed prove unequal to the power of the enemy,
but we may be sure that it will have been vigorous to the utmost of
human capability, and that we shall have for ever more the proud satis-
faction of remembering that from first to last, there was a duty for
every man, and that every man did his duty.

387

CENTENARY CUP.

COMMUNICATED BY

THE SHCRETARY.

THE cup presented to the Regiment for annual competition by the
Deputy-Adjutant-General, in commemoration of the centenary of
General Sir John Macleod, a.c.u., first Deputy-Adjutant-General in
1795, was exhibited at the annual dinner on the 7th June.

_ It was manufactured by Messrs. Lambert of Coventry Street, and
takes the form of an early Hanap, or double Gourd, Cup, of the 16th
century, the stem being embellished with a mural crown, chased and
pierced, and four chased reliefs.

These reliefs are oval medallions in répoussé work representing
Horse, Field, Siege, and Garrison Artillery respectively, from designs
by Captain G. D’A. Alexander, Royal Artillery.

The cup is 23 inches in height, and is provided with a cover sur-
mounted by a figure of an Officer of the Royal Artillery in the uniform
of 1795, from a design by Lieutenant R. J. Macdonald, Royal Artillery.

Round the foot of the cup is engraved the following inscription :—

“To the Royal Regiment of Artillery, in commemoration of the
“centenary of the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel John Macleod,
“as first Deputy-Adjutant-General Royal Artillery, 1795, this cup is
“dedicated by Major-General F. T, Lloyd, ¢.8., Deputy-Adjutant-
‘*General Royal Artillery, 1895.”

The plinth is provided with a recess in which is placed an illuminated
scroll of parchment containing a short history of the services of Sir
John Macleod, as follows :—

Lieutenant-General Sir John Macleod, a.c.u., of the Raaza Clan, was
grandson of Colonel Eneas Macleod, who served with great distinction
in the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough. He was born in
January 1752 and joined the Royal Artillery Academy on the 15th
March, 1771.

In 1775 he joined the force collected for the suppression of the
Colonial Rebellion in North America, and in 1781 proceeded with the
Army under Harl Cornwallis into North Carolina, a march of more than
600 miles in very inclement weather. He commanded the artillery in
the signal victory of Guildford on the 15th March, over the combined
Continental and American forces. On the return of the Army to Eng-
land, he was specially presented to the King, and in the same year was
appointed Captain on the Staff of Lord George Lennox at Portsmouth.
In 1790 Captain Macleod was placed at the head of the Regimental
Staff of the Royal Artillery, which had been increased during the
American War to four Battalions and an Invalid Battalion.

7, VOL. XXII.

388 CENTENARY CUP.

In 1792-83 the Field Batteries, then called Brigades, had been
equipped in a manner to give them increased mobility, and in 1793.
Captain Macleod obtained permission to raise and equip two troops of
Royal Horse Artillery, of which he personally commanded one. Two
more troops were raised later in the year, and others added as necessity
arose. In 1725 the artillery had been increased to 25,000 men, and the
Master-General of the Ordnance, in concurrence with the Commander-
in-Chief, the Duke of York, was authorized to appoint Lieut.-Colonel
John Macleod, Deputy-Adjutant-General Royal Artillery, to which
appointment he was gazetted 27th March, 1795, and on the 21st August,
1797 was promoted Regimental Lieut.-Colonel, and on the 29th April,
1802 to be Colonel. In the year 1808 Colonel Macleod was ordered to
raise the 10th Battalion.

Harly in 1809 a large force was organised under the Harl of Chatham,
Master-General of the Ordnance, to proceed to Holland, and Colonel
Macleod accompanied it as Brigadier-General in command of the Royal
Artillery. He directed the artillery operations at the siege and capture
of Middleburg and Flushing, and returned with the Army to England
in September to resume his work as Deputy-Adjutant-General. In the
same year he was promoted Major-General.

The duties of the appointment became during the year 1809 more and
more onerous and important, owing to the return of Sir Arthur
Wellesley to the Peninsula, and steadily increased during the Welling-
ton campaigns, which finally ended in the victory of Waterloo and the
Occupation of Paris, by which time the strength of the artillery had
increased to 26,000 men and 14,000 horses.

Major-General Macleod was promoted Lieut.-General in 1814 and
received from the King the Grand Cross of the Guelph in consideration
of his eminent services. He had married in 1783 the Lady Emily
Kerr, daughter of the fourth Marquis of Lothian, and at one time all
his four sons were serving under Lord Wellington in Spain. The
eldest, Charles, was killed at Badajoz, while commanding the 43rd
Light Infantry, and his epitaph in Westminster Abbey is extracted
from Lord Wellington’s despatch on that occasion. His eldest
daughter became the wife of Genl. Sir Robert Gardiner, 4.¢.B., K.c.H.,
Royal Artillery.

In 1827 Lieut.-General Sir John Macleod resigned his appointment
and was subsequently appointed Director-General of Artillery, the
duties of which office he discharged till his death in 1833, when he was
Senior Officer of the Royal Artillery and Colonel-Commandant Royal
Horse Artillery. He died at Woolwich on 26th of January in his 82nd
year, sincerely regretted and deeply loved by the corps whose welfare
and interest he had so faithfully served throughout his long and dis-
tinguished career.

INSTRUMENTS FOR LOOKING THROUGH THICK WALBS? ory)...
WITH SMALL APERTURES. eee

A. H. RUSSELL, Caprarn or Orpnancz, U.S. Army.

COMMUNICATED BY

THE SHCRETARY.

In this paper, where a lens is spoken of, any combination of lenses is
meant between two conjugate foci. Jor instance, the arrangement
shown in figure 7 constitutes one lens in the sense in which the term
is used, and by such a combination a greater range of vision can be
obtained for equal distances between apertures than by a single lens of
the same size.

Armine Guns THrover Tick Watts or Forts anp TURRETS.

The instruments here described afford means of sighting through
the thick walls of a fort or gun turret without the use of a wide open-
ing, exposed to shots from the enemy. The outer aperture in the wall
may be a mere pinhole or an extremely narrow slit.

Those mentioned in Part I., are purely optical, employing fixed
lenses or fixed mirrors; while those in Part II. are mechanical as well
as optical, employing parallel plane mirrors, one or both being movable.

The mechanical contrivance allows also modifications which result in
a measuring instrument having four times the accuracy of the sextant;
while the optical trisection of angles can also be made with ease.

PART T.
Instruments with stationary lenses or mirrors, giving a wide angle of
vision through small apertures.
Ist. Refracting Instrument.
By setting a lens Z (Figure 1) before a thin diaphragm having a
Fre. 1.

pinhole perforation P, and placing the eye at the point J where rays

SJ, \/Olo SxSatit, 53

390 VISION THROUGH SMALL APERTURES IN WALLS.

from P come to a focus, the observer will be able to see objects, as at
O beyond the hole P.

_ The image appears inverted, but by using two lenses, DZ and DL’ as
indicated in figure 2, the image appears erect.

Fie. 2.

Sometimes assistance is derived from placing a second lens, shown
in dotted lines in figure 1, close to the eye, and it is more convenient
for adjusting the position of the eye to have a diaphragm at the eye end
with a small hole near the focus J. :

The eye-piece can be moved back and forth to focus the image of P
on the point J for any position of Z. If Lis then nearer to L than P
is, the object O will appear magnified.

The observer has his eye im the image of the outer pinhole, and
therefore looks through it freely.

2nd. Reflecting Instrwment.
Two mirrors M and M’, figure 3, are substituted for the one lens L

Wits Sh

of figure 1. If these mirrors are elliptical, and placed so that the point
C (where rays cross) and the point P are foci of the ellipse correspond-
ing to M', and if the foci of the other ellipse (either equal or unequal
to the first) are at the points C and J, the image will doubtless be
clearer than with spherical mirrors. Difficulties of construction have
interfered with making the mirror instrument.

A single piece of glass silvered at M and M' might be substituted for
the two mirrors, as shown in figure 4. The refractions at the two
plane surfaces would compensate each other.

Such instruments give the means of looking through thick walls, as
on the turret of an armoured ship or fort, and of obtaining a wide field

VISION THROUGH SMALL APERTURES IN WALLS. 3891

of vision without having a large opening in the front face exposed to
fire.
Figure 5 shows at A the horizontal section of such a wall. At B

Fie. 5.

and C are shown sections of usual construction, with the peep-hole
_ flaring towards the enemy, or the reverse, the latter construction
requiring the observer to keep moving his eye from point to point
for observation.

With the instrument described the same effect is obtained without
moving the eye.

Figure 6 shows that with a double reflection of the rays by two

Fria. 6.

additional, stationary, plane mirrors, N and N’, the eye can be protected
from shots through the outer opening.

The same arrangement would allow of sending a divergent beam of
light through thick walls from within, without a wide opening in the
walls.

Such an arrangement could be used also for making enlarged images
in the pinhole camera-obscura without great increase of depth. By
placing a “dark box” inside the wall of a turret, the image of a sight
outside could be made to coincide with the image of the target, seen
erect as at fin figure 1.

Use might be made of the telescope for inspecting the bore of
cannon, and also whenever the observer needs to remain concealed

from view.
Fig. 7.

3892 VISION. THROUGH SMALL. APERTURES IN WALLS,

PARI ILil

Mechanical devices for obtaining an extended view through a small hole
or slit by means of two parallel plane mirrors.

First Form.
Two plane mirrors, Mand M’' (figures 1 and 2) are placed on a

186, Al,

Fie. 2.

revolving plate S and perpendicular to it.

They are at equal distances from the centre C, and placed sym-
metrically with reference to it at opposite ends and sides of the
diameter perpendicular to them.

As the mirrors revolve, the rays from the object at O cross at the
aperture slit at P, and are successively reflected to the eye at J for
different positions of the mirrors, P and J being in line with the point
C and at equal distances from it. A round hole will answer at J.

All the rays which reach [ must evidently pass over the point C.

Revolving the plate rapidly gives a continuous image within the
range of the instrument,

VISION THROUGH SMALL APERTURES IN WALLS. 893

Part of the side of the box shown in this figure is cut away to show
the shaft on which the plate revolves. It can project below the box, to
be turned by hand, or it can be revolved by a small electric engine or
other mechanical contrivance. ‘The space over the centre of the plate
should be unobstructed.

If a diaphragm perpendicular to the two mirrors is set up between
them, having a slit over the axis, the walls for apertures P and J may
be dispensed with. ‘The eye may then be placed at any distance from
the axis for observation. The position of the diaphragm is indicated
in dotted lines in the perspective view, figure I.

Figure 2 represents the device in plan. ‘The course of the rays is
shown in broken lines. A. second position of the mirrors is shown in
outline. ‘The broken and dotted line shows the course of direct vision
through the apertures.

With this arrangement of mirrors the apparent horizontal size of
the object seen from J is the same as if the eye were at P.

A revolving prism, silvered at MZ and M’ (figure 3), might be substi-

Fie. 3.

‘

: Zo
1 pe M

aV; :
T

tuted for the mirrors. The cross-section of the prism would be a
parallelogram, and the refractions at the two unsilvered surfaces would
compensate each other.

This contrivance also allows observation through thick walls, with
but a small aperture in the front face, but the wall will have to be
hollowed out more than for the instrumeut with fixed mirrors or
lenses.

Higure 4, representing a section of the wall, shows that the eye can

Fig. 4.

be readily protected from shots through the outer opening, Compare
figures 5 and 6 of Part I.

394 VISION THROUGH SMALL APERTURES IN WALLS.

By having the whole apparatus revolve around the line [ P while
the mirrors also rotate around the axis C, a round hole might be
substituted for the slit at Pand an “all-round” image be obtained,
as with the telescope.

The same arrangement of mirrors can be used for delicate measure-
ment of angles, and by its use an angle can be trisected optically in
the field.

When the instrument is used for measuring angles, a large aperture
with cross-hairs at the point P can be substituted for the slit.

Ist. Use of Instrument for delicate measurement of angles.

If the line J P (in figure 5) is set in any direction, the mirrors can

Fia. 5.

be turned to view an object in some other direction, and the angle
between the two lines of direction will be less than the angular
displacement of the mirrors from positions perpendicular to the line
I P, where the image coincides in direction with the line of direct
vision through the slits.

Let R represent C [=C P, and r represent C d=C d’.

Let a represent the angular displacement P C d of the mirrors from
positions perpendicular to P J, and 2 the angular deviation P I m,
from the direction I P, of the image seen from J.

The angle d C m=t I m=a—x,

VISION THROUGH SMALL APERTURES IN WALLS. 395

The perpendicular distance, [¢, of J from the mirror M is equal to
R.cosa+r7, The distance dt is equal to R sin a.

Tan @=) = et ii Gt A Sin. @
: Ti” Cd” Lt+Cd~ Ros a+ 2r
. = ie AR GN SD.
ss as fa eae) ~ Reosat+2R cosa+2
1h n
Therefore, «= a—tan-!_S"% _.
cos a + 2
n
Ike (0 = 2p
tan (a—a) =" © tan 4a. (See note below).

cos a+ 1 a
Therefore, d C m=a—a#=4 a=a, or a=22.

Note.—-Illustration of trigonometrical relation between the sine of
an angle and the tangent of half the angle (figure 6)

Fia. 6.

ALC = 1, Sia @== ID IB ;
——— cosa= CBs tan G)= ee See
DADS a 2 14+CB 1+40cosa

Hence, if the distance of the apertures from the axis is twice the
distance of the mirrors from the axis, the angular displacement of the
mirrors is twice the angle measured, instead of half of it as in other
reflecting instruments, and this gives four times the precision of
observation obtained by the ordinary sextant.

Other ratios of r and R apparently give varying relations hetween
a and w as a increases, and this would make it difficult to graduate the
instrument except for the above proportions.

At G in figure 1, graduations are shown on the edge of the plate S,
which is made to project through the side of the box. A mark on the
side indicates the proper reading, the scale being so placed that it
reads zero when the mirrors are perpendicular to the line joining the
apertures.

Maximum Laur or Anat Measure wirn Revotvina Mirrors.

The plane of the mirror, in revolving, passes the aperture when

cosa= (= )= _" and the mirror may reach a distance R from the

centre C; that is, to the slit. In this case when n=2; cos a=-h,
a=120; and a=60°,

396 VISION THROUGH SMALL APERTPURES IN WALLS.

If the mirror is shorter, the reflections cease sooner, and assuming
the mirror to be equal in length to r=4 R, the limit would be reached
for a=90°, e=45°. The mirrors will here be parallel to the line I P,
when the point of reflection reaches their outer edges.

If n ig greater than 2, the maximum deviation will be less; and if 1
is less than 2 the maximum deviation will be greater, to a certain limit
of the value of n, dependent on the length of mirror that can be used.

For the measuring instrument, the value of n=2 need alone be con
sidered.

For use in a turret for obtaining a wide angle of vision, the extent
would be limited by the cavity that could be allowed for the apparatus
leaving strength enough to the wall. (See figure 4). Fifteen to
twenty degrees might probably be obtained.

end. Trisection of an angle with the instrument.

PC m=a+d C m=a+ (a—a) =2 a—«@

When n=2, 2=1 a=d C m,

Therefore, P C m=3 2=3 x (d Cm).

Hence, if an observer at C lays off any angle P C K, and turns the
mirrors until he sees the reflection of J from the direction of K, the
angle « will be one third the angle P C K, and this can be laid off
from the direction C K by sighting from C along the line C d perpen-
dicular to the mirror. Tor this process, but one mirror is needed.

With two mirrors this angle can be laid off from the direction I P,
by sighting from J along the line J m, when the change of position
from C to J will not be appreciable in comparison with the distance of
objects sighted on.

, Seconp Form.
Two plane mirrors Mf and M' (figure 7) are made to revolve about
Fie. 7.

separate centres, C and C’, but keep always parallel. If P and Lare at
equal distances from C, midway between the centres of revolution, the
rays from P reflected to [ will cross at C.

This arrangement would answer, like the first method, either for
obtaining a continuous image, or for measurement, but the exact values
of the deviation for different inclinations of the mirrors to the line J P
have not been worked out. a3

VISION THROUGH SMALL APERTURES IN WALLS. 897

Tuirp Form.
In this, one mirror M’ is fixed, and the second one is movable, the
latter remaining, as before, always parallel to the former. See figures
8 and 9.

Fie. 8.

In figure 8 the motion of the mirror M is perpendicular to itself, and
in figure 9 it is on a line inclined to its face, the inclination, however
not exceeding that of the line JP to the mirrors. A second position
of the movable mirror is shown in outline. The mirror oscillates back
and forth from a position continuous with the fixed mirror.

By having a succession of movable parallel mirrors their motion can
be made continuous instead of oscillating, giving greater uniformity of
illumination to the image.

When the fixed mirror is midway between the apertures, the point
of reflection on the movable mirror will be constant, and its position
will be in a line passing through the middle of the line P J, and
perpendicular to the mirrors.

54:

399

AN ACCOUNT

RELIEF OF CHITRAL FORT FROM GILGIT
THE SIEGE OF CHITRAL,

IGS ODO BRI IN INTE rg era SSID AR TRU BRIAN

INTRODUCTION.

Ir will interest readers of the following article to note that the special
correspondent of the Times writing from Camp Dir on May 6, 1895
says :—

ae Gupis, 65 miles from Gilgit, where there is a small fort, built
last year by the Government of India as an advance post in the direction
of Chitral, Lieutenant Stewart, R.A. was picked up (on Colonel Kelly’s
march) to take command of the two guns brought from Gilgit. This,
as it proved, was a most valuable addition to the force, for Lieutenant
Stewart is not only a highly scientific artilleryman and one who took
the highest places in professional examinations, but also a man of un-
bounded energy and determination.—d4.J.A.

On January 5th, 1895 the first news reached Gilgit of the murder of
the Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk of Chitral by his brother Amir-ul-Mulk.
Lieutenant Gurdon, Political officer, was then in Chitral with 8 men
of 14th Sikhs. 50 men 14th Sikhs were at once ordered to join him
from Mastuj under Soubadar Gurmukh Singh. This they did
forthwith. Mr. Robertson, c.s.1., British Agent at Gilgit, arrived at
Chitral ou 81st January with 40 rifles 14th Sikhs under Lieutenant
Harley, and 100 rifles of 4th Kashmir Imperial Infantry, with Captains
Campbell and Townshend. 100 men 4th Kashmir Rifles followed on
2nd February, and on 20th February Captain Baird reinforced Chitral
with another 100 men of 4th Kashmir Rifles. The garrison occupied
the fort and numbered :—

100 rifles 14th Sikhs under Lieutenant Harley.
300 rifles 4th Kashmir Rifles, with Captains Campbell, Towns-
hend and Baird.

On March 8rd Chitral fort was surrounded, and all communication
ceased with Gilgit. Lieutenants Fowler, R.E, and Edwardes, Indian

Sy Win FAH,

400 RELIEF OF CHITRAL FORT AND SIEGE OF CHITRAL.

Staff Corps left Mastuj with some 60 men with a convoy of ammunition
to open up communications. They were surrounded in a house in
Réshan, and fought desparately for 7 days, having to make sorties for
water; Lieutenant Fowler was wounded. The enemy then told them
peace had been arranged, sent them provisions, and two or three days
later invited them to see a game of polo. The officers, probably fear-
ing to jeopardise the only chance of escape of their party, accepted.
On a signal from Mahomed Isa, the leader of the Chitralis in Réshan,
they were set on suddenly, taken prisoners with the escort they had
brought, and bound. ‘The house in which their party was, was rushed,
and all sepoys not Mahomedans murdered in cold blood.

Harly in March Lieutenant Moberley, D.S.O., Political officer at
Mastuj, having heard some disquieting rumours, arranged for Captain
Ross, with Lieutenant Jones and 100 rifles 14th Sikhs, to leave Mastuj
and reinforce Lieutenant Fowler ; he proceeded as far as Buni, some 17
miles from Mastuj, left a party of 40 men there, intending to make a dash
to reach Fowler and Hdwardes, and return with them. On the way he
was set on ina defile by men rolling stones down the mountain sides
from a height of 2,000 ft., lost many men and tried to return; his retreat
over the river was cut by the bridge being broken, and a long line of
stone entrenchments (sangars), opened fire on them; the survivors
reached some caves in the hills, and remained there two nights and
days; an attempt was made to scale the mountains, and turn out the
enemy, but a precipice was reached and return became necessary, one man
being killed by falling in the attempt to scale the precipice. The only
alternative now left was forthe party to cut their way back at any cost.
This was done, but only Lieutenant Jones and 14 men, of whom 10 were
wounded, got through to Buni. Captain Ross was shot through the
head, storming a sangar, after he had killed several of the enemy himself.
Lieutenant Jones and his men rejoined their 40 men in Buni, and
resisted successfully till Lieutenant Moberly relieved them 6 days later
with 150 men from Mastnj. He escorted them, followed by enemy
in large numbers to Mastuj, having done 34 miles over a mountain
road without halting, his men carrying their kits and 120 rounds each.
Mastuj was surrounded on March 22nd and all communication ceased
with Gilgit and Chitral.

On March 22nd, great alarm being felt in Gilgit at non-receipt of
any post from Chitral, a column was collected at Gilgit under command
of Colonel Kelly, 82nd Pioneers, consisting of 400 rifles 82nd Pioneers
under Captain Borradaile, and 2 guns No.1 Kashmir Mountain Battery
under Lieutenant Stewart, R.A. Colonel Kelly’s orders were to
advance towards Chitral, and if possible relieve it and Mastuj. We
arrived at Ghizar, about 120 miles from Gilgit on 81st March.
Here our difficulties began, there being a hitch as to transport, and
Ghizar being at an elevation of 10,000 feet, snow was lying about
8 inches deep. The road from Ghizar lies for 13 miles along the
Ghizar valley, over more or less level ground to Langar, which is at
the Gilgit side of the Shandour Pass. ‘The road rises here gradually
for some 4 miles to the Shandour lake, 12,500 feet, passes over the
lake at this season of the year, and descends rapidly some 5 miles

RELIEF OF CHITRAL FORT AND SIEGE OF CHITRAL. 401

on to Laspur, a large village at an elevation of 10,000 feet.

On leaving Ghizar on lst April the column proceeded for about 5
miles, when deep snow was encountered, so that the battery mules and
transport ponies went in over their shoulders, and it was found
impossible to proceed with them, even unloaded. ‘The column returned,
200 Pioneers with all cooly transport were left at Tera, a small village
3 miles from Ghizar, with orders to proceed when possible. The
remainder returned to Ghizar. On 2nd Aprilheavy snow fell. Sledges
and toboggans were made and tried for guns and ammunition in
Ghizar, and appeared to answer fairly well. On 3rd April the guns
joined the Pioneers at Tera, and proceeded as far as the mules could
go, all Battery men carrying their own kits. They were then placed
on the sledges. It had now however become very hot, the track made
was not broad enough for the sledges, and snow was soft. The labour
of dragging was excessive so the guns and ammunition were slung on
poles and carried by gunners and sepoys. Owing to deep snow and
the narrow track this was most arduous work, as when a man’s foot
got off the track, he went in up to his waist. We proceeded at about
half mile an hour till 8.30 p.m., when we were about 3 miles from
Langar; here darkness came on, men could not see where to place
their feet, and were utterly done. All loads were stacked in the snow,
upright poles being left to mark the spot in case of more snow falling,
which appeared likely. The last men got into camp at ]1 p.m., and
had to bivouac on the snow with a bitter wind, and severe cold, no tents
having been brought from Gilgit. The next day, the 200 Pioneers
under Captain Borradaile crossed the pass to Laspur, which they
reached with great difficulty at 7.30 p.m. The gunners and 50 men
of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, and 38 coolics returned to fetch the guns and
ammunition, which reached Langar by 4 p.m. and the men bivouacked
again, At 6 a.m. on 5th April, the guns started over the pass, 40 relief
coolies met us half way, and the guns arrived in Laspur at 4.30 p.m.,
nearly all the men being snow blind, and very done up. On Gth April,
a reconnaissance took place 10 miles down Mastuj valley and back,
guus being carried by coolies. ‘The enemy were discovered in position
at Chakalwat. On 7th April, troops halted to recruit and Colonel
Kelly jommedus. On 8th April, the force moved to Gusht 2 miles from
Chakalwat and 8 miles from Mastuj. The enemy were observed
strengthening their sangars. They were attackcd on 9th April, and
driven out after an hour’s fighting, losing some 20 or so killed. The
column marched into Mastuj, which had been shut up for 18 days, but
was all correct.

200 more Pioneers joined here on 11th April, and the gun, carriago
and wheel saddles having been got over the pass, the guns and
ammunition were packed on country ponies about 13 hands high
which seemed to act fairly well. On 13th April, the column con-
sisting now of 400 Pioneers, 2 guns, 100 4th Kashmir Rifles, 40
Kashmir Sappers and Miners and 150 levies advanced to attack the
enemy at Nisha Gol, a very strong position, on the far side of a deep pre-
cipitous nullah. The enemy had a line of sangars along the far edge of
nullah right across the valley with sangars at intervals up the steep

4.02 RELIEF OF CHITRAL FORT AND SIEGE OF CHITRAL.

mountains on either side into the snows, and occupied, as far as
we could guess, by some 2,000 men. The nullah above mentioned
bisected a large, undulating, fan-shaped delta, inclining up from the
Chitral river to a short rugged nullah into the mountains on our right.
The cliff over the river was sheer for 200 feet and into the water course
of the nullah for 250 to 300 feet.

The only way of crossing the nullah appeared by the road, which had
been cut away on either side of the nullah, and was blocked on the far
side by some large sangars occupied by about 1,000 men. On the other
side of the river, precipices rose which were quite impassable and
studded with many sangars.

The column having advanced by right bank of river, debouched into
the plain and deployed to attack enemy’s left. The guns came into
action at 500 yards, the first point from which the lower sangar was
visible. After this was silenced, the guns advanced to within 150 yards
of the large sangar,a most formidable one. This was necessary owing
to undulating ground but it had luckily been evacuated. The guns
came into action at 275 yards on another sangar and fired common shell
into it, and just before retiring 2 rounds of case. This sangar also
being silenced, the guns retired, and came into action at 1,050 yards,
and 850 yards on large sangars on enemy’s right. Levies were sent to
turn enemy’s left flank high up the nullah, the 32nd Pioneers keeping
sangar fire down by well directed vollies. Light ladders with ropes were
let down into the nullah, and men crossed slowly, there being a goat
track up the far side. When the enemy saw that the levies had turned
their flank, and sepoys were crossing the nullah, they retired from all
their sangars and fled towards Chitral. Vollies were fired at them, and
some rounds of shrapnel. ‘The main body crossed by the road and
bivouacked about one mile beyond the scene of action. Our losses
were 6 killed and 16 wounded, of which the guns lost 3 killed and
3 wounded. The enemy were seen carrying away their dead and
wounded ; we found some 20 dead, and computed their losses at 50
killed and 100 wounded; this was more or less confirmed by native
intelligence.

The enemy were armed with many Martini and Snider rifles, and
had lots of ammunition and made wonderfully good shooting. Had not
the ground been undulating, our losses must have been much greater.

The wounded were returned to Mastuj, and on 14th the column
marched to Kila Drasan, a most arduous march. There had been a
hitch in Commissariat and Transport arrangements beyond Ghizar, the
people having fled. The roads and bridges were broken in many
places on the road to Chitral, and we did not arrive till 20th. ‘The
enemy were not again met with, and evacuated Chitral on night of
18th to 19th. We arrived just in time, as the Garrison said they did
not think they could have held out another week.

Great credit was due to all ranks for the way they performed this most
arduous march ; carrying the guns was very hard work. There was
only one case of falling out in the section; this was due to severe
snow blindness, and altogether there were 30 cases of snow blindness
and 26 of frost bite. We were all very pleased in Chitral to receive

RELIEF OF CHITRAL FORT AND SIEGE OF CHITRAL. 408

two congratulatory telegrams from Sir George White, praising the
resolution shewn in getting over the snow and the conduct of the
troops in action.

The following account of the siege of Chitral Fort is deduced from
notes kindly lent by Captain Campbell, Central India Horse.

Chitral Fort is a square erection, having a high square tower at each
corner, made of stone, wood and mud. ‘The walls are about 20 feet
the towers from 380 feet to 45 feet high. The fort lies near the river,
that is, low down and can be seen into and commanded from all sides.
A covered way had been made to reach the river, there being no other
water supply. ‘Trees grew quite close up to the walls on three sides, and
owing to suddenness of investment, there was no time to cut them
down. Although a bad position, the fort was the only place offering a
chance of resisting the large numbers of the enemy for any time. A
large quantity of grain had been stored, and the men had 800 rounds
per rifle.

On Sunday, 3rd March, news was received that Sher Afzul with a
numerous following had arrived at the southern extremity of Chitral
plain, about 4 miles from the fort. Captains Campbell, Townshend
and Baird proceeded to make a reconnaissance with 200 Kashmir
sepoys. The enemy not showing up in great numbers at first, an
attempt was made to dislodge them from a hamlet called Koka Sand.
On becoming closely engaged, the enemy appeared in great numbers,
and many were seen descending the high hills on our right, whither
Captain Baird had been sent with some men.

An attempt was made to clear the village with the bayonet, but
failed. Captain Campbell was shot in the knee just prior to the rush,
Captain Baird was mortally wounded almost at once, Captain Towns-
hend led the rush on the village, and on either side of him were General
Baj Singh and Major Bikhan Singh of the Kashmir Army. These were
both shot dead. It appeared impossible to do anything but retire, so
the men were placed behind a wall and waited for darkness. At
6.30 p.m. the order to retire by alternate half companies was given.
The steadiness of the movement was interfered with by an overwhelm-
ing fire from front and flanks. Every bit of cover was made use of to
check the enemy, and the troops reached the fort at 7.30 p-m., having
lost 22 killed and 84 wounded. The final retirement was covered by
00 men of 14th Sikhs. Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch, I.M.S., had pro-
ceeded at once under a very hot fire to assist Captain Baird. He
carried him down the hill, and placed him in a dooly, but two of the
bearers were at once shot, and Whitchurch with one sepoy, and
escorted by four others, carried Baird about half mile till they reached a
deep nullah running across the Chitral plain towards the river. They did
this under a most severe fire, and three or four times were obliged to
place Baird on the ground and with the bayonet clear the enemy from
stone walls in their front. On reaching the nullah they found it im-
possible to proceed straight, and had to make a long detour by the river
and under fire, arriving at the fort with nearly every one of the party
hit. Captain Baird was again hit quite close to the fort. Surgeon-
Captain Whitchurch has been recommended for the Victoria Cross for

4.04, RELIEF OF CHITRAL FORT AND SIEGE OF CHITRAL.

this very gallant deed and the sepoys for the Order of Merit. From
3rd March to 19th April the fort was closely invested on all sides by
the enemy. They built fascine entrenchments at 40 yards distance, and
kept up a fire night and day. They were armed with many breech-
loading rifles and lots of ammunition, and the losses in the fort
amounted to 17 killed and 380 wounded. The conduct of the 14th
Sikhs under Lieutenant Harley was beyond praise, they never got a
night off the walls, and the greater the danger became the more cheerful
they appeared. ‘The garrison were rationed from 3rd March on 1 lb.
of gritty flour only daily, and the only meat obtainable was the officer’s
ponies. Several attempts were made to fire the fort, one of which fired
a tower largely made of wood, and in attempting to put this out the
British agent, Mr. Robertson, was severely wounded in left shoulder.

The enemy also mined to within 2 yards of one tower and when this
was discovered, on 18th April, Lieutenant Harley with 40 Sikhs and
60 Kashmir sepoys made a brilliant sortie, caught the enemy in the mine,
killed 46 of them, and blew in the mine. His party lost 8 killed and
14 wounded.

Great preparations had been made for a grand assault on 19th April,
but the enemy fled on the approach of the Gilgit column on the night
of the 18th to 19th. The whole garrison were never off the walls at
night, and endured their privations cheerfully. The bhisties should
not be forgotten ; two of them were killed and one wounded. :

405

AB AL VS. dsu eS)

LIEUTENANT W. SWABEY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA.

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATHS, late R.H.A.

(Continued from p. 810, No. 6, Vol. XXII).

PART IL.
Cuapter III.

“D” Troop march to the North. Bull-fights. Truaillo. Cordial
reception on the march. Toledo. Aranjuez.

50th August.—Our destination appears now pretty certainly north-
ward by Medellin!

The infantry in our rear passed us to-day and marched to Campillo,
thereby turning us, who were the advance, into the rear guard, as we
are now marching away from the enemy.

The news of Colonel Skerrett’s having taken Seville and of the
raising of the siege of Cadiz is confirmed. d’Hrlon’s corps is to-day
at Cordova forming a rear guard to the concentrated force of Soult,
who it appears is bending his course to Valencia if not La Mancha.

31st August.—Rode out to Azuaga, which we were attracted to visit
by its always having been the point to which the French head-quarters
went when we were in this district. There are some fine specimens
of the early mixture of Moorish and Gothic architecture, and a castle,
probably Roman.

The Spanish cavalry were in the place, and to prove the universal
passion for bull-figbts they had tied one to a stake and were teasing
him. We had to pass the street and it was agreed that it would not
look well for English officers to turn, though the Spaniards went no-
where within his reach. Our danger consisted in being charged,
which in fact we were, by the furious beast, but still more in having
our horses thrown down by the cord to which he was fastened. We
put spurs to our horses and passed him amidst shouts of Vivan los
Ingleses.

1 A glance at maps I. and IIT. will shew the line of this march. From Berlanga vid Maguilla to
Medellin. At that place cross the Guadiana, and then by Truxillo and Javaicejo to Almaraz,
then cross the Tagus and by the right bank to Talavera. Then recrossing that river, by Toledo
to the neighbourhood of Aranjuez.i—F.4.W,

So Olio SII 55

405 SWABEY DIARY.

- d’Hrlon’s head-quarters were at Cordova yesterday, he having joined
Soult. Seville is certainly taken by Skerrett and the siege of Cadiz
raised.

On August 27th, an attack was made by the allies under General
Lia Crux on the enemy’s rear guard at Seville, in which
attack the allied British and Portuguese troops under Colonel
Skerrett. distinguished themselves. The bridge of Seville
was thereby saved, and the enemy prevented from destroying
many guns and valuable stores which the town contained.—
Wellington Despatches, Vol. IX., p. 429.

Ist September.—Instead of getting up early to kill partridges, I rose
at 4 o’clock and marched to Maguilla where the light brigade was
badly accommodated. allemand made this a favourite post at which
I am not surprised as it is very well protected by ravines against
any sudden attack.

2nd September.—We marched to Corteja de Frayles the name of
two or three cottages about a mile distant from each other, and
encamped. ‘The cavalry went to El Campillo, another bad place to
which we were ordered by the Quarter-Master-General, but being
-better informed than he, we learnt the road was impassable and
General Long permitted us to go round.

3rd September.—Marched to Zalamca. This place was for 9 months
-d’Hrlon’s head-quarters, notwithstanding which the expressions of
loyalty and the readiness of the authorities to assist us, were new traits
in the Spanish character which in our old track we never met.

4th September.—Remained at Zalamca and there being a castle T
went antiquity hunting. With some difficulty I climbed up one of the
towers there being no other means of ascent. From its top I had an
interesting view of the country and found my map very accurately
-drawn. I saw Benalcazar, a castle into which last year we made some
fruitless attempts to get. It was the magazine of the French in this
quarter and they retired with such precipitation that they left quantities
of stores.

The news of the day is that at the passage of the Guadalquiver,
d’Hrlon has thrown some artillery he could not take on into the river.
It appears too that General Maitland has been successful against
- Suchet. The town of Zalamca shows many remains of Moorish build-
ing, and part of the castle is decidedly of their constructing. I
believe it from situation to have been a valuable town to them.

General Maitland with a Sicilian division of troops under his
command landed at Alicante on the 10th of August. With
the Spanish troops under Generals Whittingham and Roche
he advanced to Hida, but on the approach of the King to join

. Marshal Suchet he retired to Alicante, where he was directed
by Lord Wellington to maintain himself as the place was of
importance. He does not appear to have been engaged with
the enemy.—See Wellington Despatches, Vol. IX., pp. 265,
300; Goon eens

SWABEY DIARY. 407

5th September.—I remained among the Moorish relics pleased with
the change in the manners of the people.

It is remarkable that this is the first time that the Hnglish have
more than patrolled to this place.

I wrote to Harding and Mr. Walcott.

6th September.—Marched to Campanario into which we were cheered
with vivas and handkerchiefs. If loyalty existed in Zalamca, here it
was most conspicuous.

The structure of the houses is by no means better than hitherto, but
worse, for the body of the house is taken up by the passage or kitchen
and there is an apartment in the corner to sleep in, without window or
air.

7th September.—For the first time we experienced the civility of
Spaniards in the very rarely shown form of a bottle of wine and a
melon being placed on the table, which seldom shows itself in that
way ; there was likewise a dish of stewed pork which being seasoned
with garlic and oil, I could not find politeness enough to eat. Some
of us not being quite so delicate saved us from the dilemma of sending
it out untouched.

To my great disappointment we halted here to-day, forin my mind
I had already overtaken, killed, and eaten Le pawvre Monsieur Soult.

Sth September.—This evening a bull-fight was given in honour of
our highnesses. There is no regular Plaza de Toros but all the
avenues leading to the square being closed and secured the animals
were baited there. ;

I have no right to form an opinion from a “rustic feast”? (for they
still preserve the title the Romans gave to their sports), but certainly
this afforded little amusement, and gave few specimens of courage
and address.

The nature of the thing consisted in a savage bull being let loose in
an enclosure, the people goading him with long sticks headed with iron
and still more by a noise peculiar to this sport by which they irritate
him. He fixes his eye occasionally with astonishing quickness and
charges one of his cruel tormentors. In the height of his career,
cloak, hat, or handkerchief turns his attention, so that when well
played the grand art is to have a cloth, allow the bull to charge, and
merely throw it on one side at his approach, when his butt will invari-
ably be directed at it and the Torero or Bull-fighter escapes. It ts
remarkable that when he gets a blow at a man he aims with the middle
of his forehead and seems quite ignorant of the use of his horns, so
that several English as well as Spaniards who were the ‘boldest in the
ring were thrown down, but were invariably unhurt by the horns.
When he gets a man down he begins to poke sideways and is then
dangerous ; it is then that courage is conspicuous for there were some
who ran out to rescue and literally pinned the animal by catching fast
hold of the horns behind his head. This several Hnglish as well as
Spaniards performed with uncommon courage. :

I can fancy the bull-fight in a regular circus where only a certain
number of assistants were admitted, with regular Toreros and proper

408 SWABEY DIARY.

lances to dart, in place of goading the unfortunate beast, being a
sight worthy the admirers of tilt and tournament to which it must
bear a great resemblance.

I met to-day with an anecdote worth remembering. Joseph Bona-
parte on leaving Madrid sold the books of the Royal Library, a very
curious collection, at 43d. perlb., showing as much respect for literature
here as at Salamanca.

9th September.—The bull-fights were continued to-day ; without the
attraction of novelty they had ceased to please; and having seen the
tameness of the sport I ventured inside the barrier, where I felt quite
safe though obliged to use my legs frequently.

10th September.—More Corridas de Toro, affording us little amuse-
ment. I find that the Alcades, or magistrates make requisitions on
the people for cars and wood etc. to enclose the arena for this sacred
purpose, so much the passion of the Spaniards ; that the people who can
see the sport from their windows, throw open their houses to all comers,
and seem to consent with pleasure to the tiles on the tops being com-
pletely ruined.

11th September.—For the first time since the 6th of April, rain fell
accompanied with dreadful thunder and lightning, which made old and
young cross themselves, but caused with me the greatest demonstration
of joy, much to the surprise of some priests who seemed to think
purgatory too good for me.

12th September.—More rain and a great change in the air, thunder
and lightning still accompanying.

13th September.—To our great satisfaction came a route to Don
Benito, a town which the highly coloured epithets of the Spaniards
had made me think at least asecond London. Iwas much disappointed.
It is however a mart for the few commodities that since the siege of
Cadiz find their way to this part of Estremadura.

14th September.—We crossed the Guadiana above Medellin by a
ford. I was anxious to see the bridge which is unique, being built in
a curve to accommodate (as I consider) its shape to the soil in the bed
of the river. The river is fordable almost anywhere above Merida be-
fore the rainy season. We reached a miserable town called Miajadas,
where part of the infantry column treated us as usual very illiberally
in the distribution of the town. Part of our march was in the rain.

15th September.—Marched in the rain to La Puesta de S'* Crux, and
after a long quarrel with an infantry Brigade-Major, I succeeded in
getting some quarters; nothing is so much against cavalry as being
quartered with infantry. Perhaps in the house with one horse are 80
men, who never let him rest or feed, and all the infantry staff take a
pleasure in mortifying and rendering the cavalry ineffective.

Near this place is an immense hermitage and some aqueducts, which
the bad weather, and even more the difficulty of quartering the men,
prevented me from seeing.

16th September.—Marched still in the rain to Truxillo. On arriving
there, though it is a large town, the Quarter-Master-General of the

SWABEY DIARY. 409

2nd division (not General Hill’s Quarter-Master-General who would
have known better), gave us no division of the town. I think I never
was in such a rage in my life.

17th September.—I employed myself in examining the remains of this
famous city, once the seat of all the nobility of Hstremadura, all whose
palaces are now destroyed by the French.

The first object of my search was the tomb of Pizarro, which stands
in a chapel belonging to his family in the castle church ; it was robbed
by the French who bore the relics to France. These artful conquerors
know that the first blow to conquer the spirit of a people, is to destroy
all the monuments of traditionary greatness that have been used to
inspire them with a desire of emulating the deeds of their ancestry.

There are two houses of a superior style of grandeur in the square
which they tell you both belonged to their admired hero, one before
his conquests, the other built by him after his fame was established.
I did not credit their accounts as I detected the difference in the coats
of arms by which they were adorned. One indeed might have been
Pizarro’s being covered with trophies, amongst others, captive kings
with chains about their necks.

In the city church was a striking monument to the memory of a
hero whose name was defaced, who had fallen in the wars with the
Moors, date 1530, this story, which is that of a priest, is incorrect.
The Moors were expelled in the 15th century.!

The castle, containing six convents now destroyed by the French, is
built on an high rock, and was evidently constructed on Moorish ruins.
One of the convents I examined most minutely all over, and was able
to trace through its apartments the habits of the unfortunate victims
of superstition. Underground dungeons and places for solitary pen-
nance, secret stairs and various chapels were numerous, well selected
religious texts were inscribed on the walls, with a separate cell for
every nun. Bats and owls and every inhabitant but comfort seemed
to have taken refuge there from the world, the approach to even a
view of which, was on one side obstructed by a rocky precipice, and on
the other by the castle wall.

I had only time to examine one of the six convents, the inhabitants
of which are now crowded into one house, and having been robbed
of all their riches and endowments, subsist precariously by the sale
of stockings and other work ; they indeed kept a pastry cook’s shop
during our stay, but I could not indulge myself in being a purchaser,
or enquiring into their history for want of money.

Truxillo has some fine houses in the square and castle which have
singularly ornamented windows, cut in the angles in the form of
segments of circles, and having a very pleasing appearance.

There is more here of the grandeur of antiquity which you look for
amongst these proud people than I have seen before. All the Hidalgos
have fled to Cadiz, and the Spaniards at the coming of the French,
having deserted all the country this side of the Tagus; the towns we
have since passed are nearly destroyed.

1 The Moors were expelled from Spain in 1492,

4.10 SWABEY DIARY.

18th September.—My time amply employed in antiquity hunting.
In the church I found the tomb of Paredes,! said by Michael Cervantes
to have been the strongest man in Spain, and a priest showed me an
immense font which he presented to his mother in one hand, at the
door of the church, she having left it without crossing herself with
holy water.

I need not add that to read the epitaph on his tomb describing him
as a church benefactor was useless after the priest’s story.

La Borde® says that according to Spanish writers, Truxillo was in
existence before the dominion of the Romans under the name of
Sealabis ; according to Pliny, Castra Julia; Les gens du pays attribuent
sa fondation & Hercule. It changed masters frequently in the Moorish
wars. Paredes.(mentioned in my journal) returning from wars against
the Turks died at Boulogne and his body was carried 15 years after to
Truxillo, which history the defaced state of the inscription on his tomb
prevented my understanding at the time, though I call it perfectly to
mind from the little that was intelligible. The story about his
strength I had from a priest.

This church of Santa Maria I remember to be an addition to a tower
of considerable date, which La Borde says is supposed to be Turris
Julia and built by Julius Cesar, I do not think it likely that the
Romans would have built a tower where only part and one side of the
surrounding country can be seen from it, when so many situations
were at hand that would have answered the purpose better; and again
the register of the town (still preserved, but probably containing many
improbable traditions) speaks of the castle which is higher, as the most
ancient building of the city. It would be impossible to say who built
this castle, as from its singular construction adapted to the shape of
the rock, out of which its walls are hewn and blasted, there is no trace
of any particular system of building. ‘The castle so constructed within
the walls is doubtless Roman, so that the tower of the church can hardly
be so too, and I look upon it as a Spanish church grafted on a Moorish
ruin, as indeed are many of the houses in the square. The construction
both as to date and architecture being very evident, and in some of the
more recently built, the Spaniards have evidently copied the Moorish
ornaments, perhaps that they might not destroy the architectural
uniformity ; at the same time they have afforded by an inevitable con-
trast a lasting proof of the Moorish superiority.

I wonder La Borde has overlooked Pizarro’s tomb, as he wrote just
before his countrymen had removed his bones, and done their best to
destroy the castles and convents.

As an instance of the rascality and treason of some of the civil
authorities, I need only instance the following case: six pieces of
French artillery were found here concealed under some wood ; that the
Alcade might not be taken by surprise, a note intimating that it was

1 Garcia de Paredes, the Spanish Sampson. —F.4.W.

2 Jean Benjamin La Borde was a French writer on history, geography, chronology, and music.
He wrote ‘‘ Itineraire descriptive de L’ Espagne,” a useful guide-book to that country. La Borde
who had been the premier valet de chambre to Louis the XV., and after his death one of the Fan-
ners General, was guillotined during the French Reyolution, July 22nd, 1794,—Encyclopedia
Britannica. ;

SWABEY DIARY. 411

reported there were some was written to him, to which he replied
positively denying there were any, though he himself had provided
transport to bring them from Almaraz. I wish I had the hanging of
him as an example.

19th September.—Marched to Javaicejo a place totally destroyed; no
forage to be had, and nothing but the barren face of a deserted
country to be seen.

20th September.—To-day we crossed the mountains overhanging
the Tagus through the truly grand pass of Miravete. A fort and the
castle of Miravete command the approach. The fort was destroyed by
General Hill, when he took the works at Almaraz, and the castle and
depot subsequently were dismantled by the enemy. The road, the work
of Engineers, descends in a zig-zag to the river, the passage of which is
defended first by the famous fort Napoleon, constructed by the French
and stormed in the summer by General Hill. On examining it I did
not think the exploit deserved the fame it acquired ; it is ready for the
Spaniards. On the opposite side is fort Ragusa commanded by Napoleon
on which Lieutenant Love, R.A., very judiciously turned the guns.

The pontoon bridge had been laid the day before for our reception.
As it was necessary to take our horses out to cross, General Howard,
much to his disgrace, ordered us to halt and put the infantry over first
notwithstanding the representation of Colonel Tulloch, who had orders
to press one of his brigades of Portuguese artillery on to Talavera.
General Howard was not satisfied with this arbitary unmilitary pro-
ceeding, but even ordered the baggage (which took two hours to pass
the bridge) over before us, which delayed us till it was near dark and
we got to Saucedilla a ruined village by 8 o’clock having no forage.
General Howard will be surprised to find his conduct reported to
General Hill.

21st September.—Found ourselves as soon as it was light in a valley
full of towns, once populous but now dismantled, and their fields
uncultivated ; we had indeed to our satisfaction joined General Slade,
being heartily sick of the infantry, whomI never wish again to see
except in the field of battle.

With great difficulty one day’s forage was raised.

22nd September.—To-day partly from curiosity and partly on duty I
rode to look for forage. Nothing can exceed the desolation that reigns
in this once fertile region. The mountains which skirt the edges of the
valleys, formerly looked at with admiration because of their rude unculti-
vated tops, now present the only object of cultivation, being hung with
vineyards, at this season luxuriant and beautiful, and wherever there
remains a roof in the neighbourhood it covers a wine-press; all these
inhabited places could only produce one day’s hay for the cattle.

23rd September.—Still in the regions of desolation and want, there
being, however, a remnant of population in a village near, I was sent
to reconnoitre it with a view of removing there. I was sorry to find
none of the requisites for forage so necessary to us, for a more romantic
hamlet I never beheld. I use the expression hamlet, because it was so

4\2 SWABEY DIARY.

truly like an English village embosomed in woods and deeply secluded
in a beautiful valley. It almost seems to have escaped the notice of
the savage Marmont, as if bearing a semblance to our land of liberty,
there was a spell that protected it.

24th September.-—This tract of country owed its ruin to the battle of
Talavera. After the French advanced from thence they spared nothing
that came in their way, and as we now draw all our supplies from the
country, we sent to-day as far as Plasencia for corn; and the prospect
of want was so great that Lefebure wrote to represent the barrenness
of our cantonments. ;

zoth September.—A route to Calsada de Oropesa, six leagues of a
tolerable pull. I went on to search for quarters and took care that a
requisition I made for a day’s corn and bread was complied with,
not without some wry faces from the Alcalde. Our friend Captain
Thorn being Quarter-Master-General at this place, he took good care
we should have no occasion to boast of our quarters. We shall to-mor-
row leave the clutches of these infantry harpies, whom I hope never to
see again till the day of battle. We passed on our road Oropesa,
where is a beautiful and perfect Moorish castle, the property of the
Knights of Oropesa, an order that was established after some heroic
achievement performed at this place by the Spaniards against the
Moors, but which is now like all other monuments of their chivalry,
little attended to, though the order is not extinct.

This order like many others of the Spanish military ones, is now
embodied with the Knights of Calatrava! During the struggle
against the Moors, in conjunction with others they supported armies,
and finding them generally serving with the troops of the Bishop of
Plasencia, I conclude this country was the scene of action. La Borde
does not mention the castle.

26th September.—After a march of eight leagues through a devas-
tated country, we arrived at Talavera de la Reyna, famous for the action
fought there. That was a memorable day for the British army, for
they only were attacked though the Spanish force was in position; the
French had at least 40,000 men and Sir Arthur Wellesley but 18,000.
Owing to the length of the march I had only time to take a distant
view of the position. I examined the principal height which was
attacked and carried by the enemy, but retaken by General Hill’s
brigade.

The city of Talavera de la Reyna is larger, better built, and has
more trade than any I have yet met with, the bridge over the Tagus,
destroyed by Cuesta’ is a fine ruin and is so repaired as to be passable,
one arch only being cut away.

1 Knights of Calatrava, a Spanish military order, instituted by Sancho III. King of Spain, about
the year 1157 4.D., to commemorate the gallant defence of the city of Calatrava against the Moors.
The statutes of the order, framed by the chapter-general of the Cistercian monks, were sanctioned
by the Bishop of Toledo in 1164, and afterwards by the Pope.—Chambers’ Encyclopedia.

2 General Don Gregorio Cuesta, commanded the Spanish armies associated with Wellington in
the earlier part of the Peninsular War, he resigned the command in August 1809, in consequence
of a paralytic stroke which deprived him of the use of his left leg.—See Wellington’s Despatches,
Vol. V., p. 42.

SWABEY DIARY. 413

The battle of Talavera was fought on 28th July, 1809. The allies
under Lieut.-General Sir A. Wellesley and General Cuesta,
the French under King Joseph Bonaparte.

“The victory of Talavera was in reality won by the British troops
which did not number more than 22,000 men of all ranks.
The Spaniards, nearly equal in number, were worse than
useless, as thousands of them fled without attempting to
fight, and spread the news of defeat miles and miles in the
rear. The victory, dearly gained by the loss of 6000 of our
men killed and wounded, was due to the courage of our own
troops, those of Cuesta, which stood their ground, contribut-
ing but little to the result. But now came the report that
Soult was in force in the allied rear, and that the French,
somewhat reinforced were preparing to again advance.
Wellesley decided to divide his army and give the choice to
Cuesta of remaining to defend Talavera or move against
Soult. He chose the former, and promised, if defeated, to
rescue the wounded who were crowded there. Wellesley
marched in search of Soult. Hardly had he left when news
arrived that Cuesta, afraid to fight, had deserted his position
and followed the British, leaving 2000 wounded to the mercy
of the advancing enemy. Happily they had fallen into the
hands of a brave and good man. Victor on reaching Talavera
forced the Spaniards to receive the Hnglish and French
wounded in their houses in equal numbers, and to attend to
the English first.””—“ Wellington” by Lathom Browne, p.
23. Casualties, French 7389, English 54.23, Spanish 1200.

27th September.—What shall I, the enemy of Spanish sentiment,
and, though not a hopeless actor in the war for Spanish independence,
yet totally without trust in Spanish patriotism, say, when [ found in
passing through a village in a populous and highly cultivated country,
where we halted for the sake of water, the people coming out en masse
to greet us not only with vivas, but with pitchers of wine and baskets
of grapes, the old in tears and the young mad with exultation.

From this village I was sent dreading the conflict I was to undergo
from similar civilities, to mark the cantonments at our destination,
Domingo Perez, but I had not expected to be stifled by the embraces
of old, young, fair, ugly, man, woman, and child, and to be nearly torn
in pieces by every pair of respectable people who were ready to fight
for the honour of haying me in their houses. The bells rang, the
authorities went out to meet the troop, and gratitude, a word I never
yet heard sally from the nasty proud habitation of a Spanish mouth,
was, they said, the universal debt they werecometo pay. The Alcalde,
never before accustomed to English soldiers, immediately asked when
I would have the meat killed and the rations prepared ; a fair indication
of what might be done in districts never oppressed by troops moving
without a commissariat. We contented ourselves with three days’ corn,
wine, and bread, with a promise of more to-morrow. After these
things were arranged I hoped to have been allowed to be quiet, but

414, SWABEY DIARY.

not till midnight would my patron, the Alcalde, or his friends quit me
and I heartily wished myself in the wilds of America.

The distance from hence to Madrid is eight leagues, and I mention
it as a proof of the indolence, want of curiosity, and consequent lack of
information on the part of the Spaniards, that few of the inhabitants
had ever been there. As to Domingo Perez itself, it was a perfect
specimen of what happy Spain was before the revolution. ‘The houses
were neat and comfortable, the inhabitants respectable and cleanly.
In the Alcalde’s house was a portrait of Lord Wellington, his bust
emblematically supported by a figure of Time whose wings were
restrained by the genius of Spain. Mercury representing the tutelary
deity of England, was presenting him to Minerva and Mars, Hercules
was in the group, and the whole was surrounded by a snake, “la
culebra sin fino”’* with his tail in his mouth, avery favourite figure in
Spanish poetry and emblems intended to represent the imperishable
nature of fame.

[It was on the route to Madrid from the country in advance of
Badajos by Truxillo, Talavera la Reyna, and Toledo that we now
marched. Till we arrived at Aranjuez we had nothing to do with the
enemy, and though our march could not be called a triumphal one, it
was of a very agreeable nature. We usually marched before daylight,
supplies were plentiful, for the most part the country was fertile, and
the inhabitants extremely well disposed towards us. It was the season
of the vintage, and we had the good fortune to pass through some
places where soldiers were actually a novelty, and not unfrequently as
we passed did the whole population meet us with pitchers of wine and
baskets of grapes. At a small place where we halted for a day called
Domingo Perez, these civilities were renewed even to suffocation and
the Alcalde insisted on entertaining the officers.

We stayed one day with our hospitable friends, and then proceeded
en route for Toledo: the kindness however of the inhabitants still
pervaded the whole of this district and we fared sumptuously every day,
that is in their estimation, but I cannot say that the Spanish cuisine is
exactly according to my taste, and when Senor Gil Blas de Santillane
boasted of its luxuries he forgot to tell you that at Madrid, and indeed
everywhere where there is anything fit to eat, the French method of
pandering to the dainty appetite is in vogue. I will leave the Span-
iards to settle the dispute as to the authorship of Gil Blas, whether it
was truly written by Le Sage, or by a Spaniard, on condition that
they will not attempt to set up to be their own cooks.

This reminds me of a very worthy man, gone long ago I trust, to his
place of rest, who commanded for some time the particular branch of
the service to which I belonged. He was every inch a soldicr, neither
was he by nature the least inhospitable, but he had an utter contempt
for what I will term the amenities of a campaign. With this man I
was invited sometimes to dine; good living was not so plentiful the
first time I had that honour as to allow me to think with indifference

} The endless snake.

SWABEY DIARY. 415

upon what might be within reach of his more extended means of cookery
than could be looked for at a troop mess, and great was my dis-
appointment, when with little pomp a boiled shoulder of mutton was
introduced; whether my hungry countenance betrayed my inward
chagrin at this unpromising entrée I cannot tell, but I remember well
his rubbing his hands with a kind of heroic satisfaction and exclaiming
“ dinner fora king! dinner for a king!” though there was nothing but
a soldier’s fare. Whenever I[ think of him, these words from an inimit-
able French poem entitled “ Gastronomie”’ rush on my mind, “ Si par-
fois on nous prie”’ ete. <A. soldier’s stomach ought always to be ready
for coarse and indifferent fare, but it strikes me that an occasional
supply of the good things of this life has an incalculably good effect
in fitting it for the digestion of a more indifferent selection. J had been
very jealous of this officer’s adjutant, but I own the shoulder of mutton
bowllt reconciled me very much to my more humble destiny].

28th September.—Shall I say that I enjoyed the paradise I was in ?
No. I had here no leisure to write or think, or to enjoy any of the
pleasures on which my imagination indulges, the gaiety of the scene
only made me melancholy, and I sighed again for the march.

29th September.—We marched to Villamiel, where, if we did not
receive so much attention as at Domingo Perez, we were treated with
great cordiality, well lodged and readily supplied with corn and bread.

On the road to this place is along line of Moorish fortifications,
better preserved than the remains of Roman camps in England. Its
centre is formed by the castle and town of Barciense, the property of
the Duque del Infantado. The plan of the fortification is too exten-
sive to be defended in these times without 500,000 men; its right
rests on a mountain, and its left on the bridge over the river
Guadarrama.

30th September.—We marched to the archiepiscopal city of Toledo,
famous for having been the imperial residence of Charles the V. and
also of Ferdinand and Isabella, by whose marriage the kingdoms of
Castile and Aragon were united,' and in whose reign the Moors were
finally expelled from the Peninsula, the first step towards the consolid-
ation of the several Gothic Kingdoms of Spain. The Tagus forms a
barrier on three sides, and the height on which the city stands is for-
midable to the approach. On the fourth side it is surrounded by an
irregular wall, and though not fortified there are perhaps few open
places so well capable of defence; it is the second city in Spain, and
was once the first.

1st October.—We happily halted to-day and had leisure to examine
the wonders of Toledo. First the famous sword manufactory, the
materials for which are now concealed underground and have escaped
all the Gallican vigilance. The next object of curiosity is the alcazar
or palace of Ferdinand and Isabella, famous certainly from the lustre

1 Tn the year 1479,
The conquest of the city of Navarre in 1512, by Ferdinand, after the death of Isabella, made
him sovereign of Spain from Gibraltar to the Pyrenees.—Chambers’ Encyclopedia.

416 SWABEY DIARY.

of its inhabitants, for it was likewise the residence of Charles V., but.
now for the second time a ruin. It was first burnt in the war of
Succession by some of Lord Peterborough’s Spanish friends, and
secondly so completely destroyed by the French, that nothing but the
front remains, which, though grand, is certainly no specimen of the
taste that is so conspicuous in the churches of this city.

The things that most attracted my attention were two statues with
descriptive inscriptions in Spanish, one to a Moorish chief who in 1215,
renounced the Moors in the first grand council of Toledo and embraced
christianity ; the second to San Ildefonso, who is said to have cut a
fragment from the garments of Santa Leocadia! when she rose from
the grave to assist and encourage the exertions made by the Spaniards
for their liberty. Strange as it may appear the few here who have
any knowledge of antiquity, actually give credit to the tradition, and
there is a chapel dedicated to the Santa, raised over the spot where the
circumstance took place. The true history is that San Ildefonso
greatly distinguished himself against the Moors and certainly dug up
and built a chapel over the remains of Santa Leocadia, a Moorish
princess, whose charities to the Christian captives were well known.
This I was told by a priest, one of those now daily increasing in
number whose minds seem to reject all the ridiculous bigotry of
Roman Catholic imposition, without any deviation from the tenets of
their faith. ‘These will become more numerous now that the new
constitution,” ratified and published, has abolished that diabolical
Synod, the Inquisition, and given an opening for instruction and
liberty of opinion. Its plan is entirely English with a few deviations
as to form, aud the duration of the Cortes, and the method of election
is I think less liable to corruption. On the whole it is a limited mon-
archy, and is embraced by all with enthusiastic hope, a national
failing too well understood and too often the preventative of exertion.
The feature of the new law, that which prescribes a system of general
education, is novel, at least, unpractised since the Roman and Grecian
schools.

We now pass to the Cathedral, in endowments and in ornaments
certainly richer than any other in the world. ‘To draw a comparison
between it and Westminster Abbey would be misplaced so different
are they one from the other. The one at Toledo wants the silent and
solitary gloom that bespeaks the mansion of the illustrious dead, in
the same proportion that the abbey wants the rich and curious orna-
ments, the beautiful sculpture and painting that render this the first
Cathedral in the world. On entering, it is not so silent and impressive

! These two saints are the tutelars of Toledo. Santa Leocadia was cast down from the rocks
above the city, on the site of her fall a chapel was raised where councils were held. She is said on
one of these occasions to have appeared to the President, San Ildefonso Primate of Toledo (where
he died in 617), and told him ‘her mistress lived through him.’ San Ildefonso was buried at the
feet of Santa Leocadia, his body was carried off at the Moorish invasion, but miraculously discoy-
ered in, or about 1720.—Murray’s Guide to Spain.

2 The constitution promulgated by the Cortes in 1812, was very democratic. It was abrogated by
Ferdinand VII. on his return to Spain in 1814, and he then adopted a very reactionary policy.
The Monastic orders, the Inquisition, and the rack were restored, and any public impression of
liberal opinion vigorously repressed. This resulted in a revolution in 1820, when he was forced to
restore the constitution of 1812, This was again overthrown in 1823 through French influence.—
Chambers’ Encyclopeedia. ;

SWABEY DIARY. 47

as the abbey, though on examination it is infinitely more worth seeing,
and interested me so much that I even preferred it to my dinner.
The architecture is florid Gothic, and the external part is beyond
measure beautiful; it has a lofty spire elegantly adorned with a
profusion of simple ornamental sculpture. The internal architecture
does not attract so much as the beautiful altar-pieces, chapels, choirs,
ete., with which it is filled; there is nobody to show the place so that
you can only glean a little information from a priest here and there.

The first object of attention are the cloisters, each panel! of which
is adorned by a large historical painting on the stucco by Francisco
Bayeu especially representing the sufferings of Christian captives
among the Moors. The St. Cecilia of Spain, so dubbed by my priestly
cicerone, a Moorish princess whose charities to the Christians caused
her banishment from her father’s court, is the principal subject in these
paintings ; one tradition is beautifully delineated by the painter; it
represents her at the moment when accused of assisting the prisoners,
and in all the dread of conviction she is obliged to show the bread she
has in her apron. By a miracle the bread is turned into flowers which
she is showing unconscious of the change. The general effect and
high colouring of these remarkable fresco paintings is such that unless
the sun be very bright, they are not to be known from those on canvas.
The evening is the time to see them in the galleries and chapelries
etc., then you find, instead of silent gloom, elegant apartments contain-
ing a very excellent collection of paintings of the Italian, Dutch,
Spanish and Flemish schools. Generally the subjects are religious,
and there is a full-length portrait of St. John which I could have
sworn, if it had been cut off at the middle, was stolen from my father
at Langley.

The specimens of sculpture are equally admirable, and the finest I
ever beheld. ‘These are not lavished on ugly tombs with lengthy
epitaphs but form beautiful altar-pieces, etc. The carving of the
wooden parts is likewise to be admired and the painting on the ceilings
superior. I cannot dismiss the Cathedral without saying that it, as
well as the rest of the city, was illuminated at night, and the spire was
covered with lamps which had a beautiful effect. The Spanish illumina-
tions generally however only consist of a few lamps, which give an obscure
light. There was a ball given by the inhabitants at night in the palace
formerly belonging to the Archbishop, who however has now joined the
French. Our bands played, and as General Hill wished it we all
attended. It is to be noticed there is no supper in these Spanish
“ let-offs.”

The dress and manners of the ladies and their beauty exceeds
anything I have before seen in the country, but the nasty waltzyfied
country dances made me sigh for Hnglish beauty, Humby’s Hotel,
and Paddy O’Rafferty. It was curious that I danced with an Irish

1 These panels, originally painted in frescoes in the style of Giotto, extraordinary and almost
unique specimens of art in the 14th century, were unfortunately effaced in 1775, by the Chapter,
who employed Francisco Bayeu, a pupil of Velasquez to repaint them about the end of the 18th
century, but the cathedral has lost much by the change, the modern tone of the present frescoes
being out of keeping with their surroundings.~—Murray’s Guide to Spain.

2 An hotel at Christchurch.-2.4. 17,

418 SWABEY DIARY.

orphan educated in an orphans’ college here, who spoke English,
French, Italian, and German, all of which we tried, except Italian.
The company separated at a late hour. Mr. Townsend! did not
attend.

[Many who have related their Peninsular adventures have given an
account of the ball which was given to General Hill at Toledo, and
none have forgotten to paint, however indifferently, the beauty of the
Irish refugee sisters of an establishment appropriated for their accom-
modation which then existed and does still I suppose remain in Toledo.
There is a lay as well as an ecclesiastical establishment so that though
some of the fair descendants of the Emerald Isle may have taken the
veil the greater part are still at liberty to tread the mazy dance and
make a weary soldier happy. One of these has been much celebrated
not for her beauty only but for the elegance and simplicity with which
she spoke several modern languages.

To this fair creature I made several attempts to convey my admiration
in set phrases in several modern tongues to her very great amusement,
for though I had a share of knowledge of several, yet was I master
but of few].

end October.—Marched to Villa Minoya, a place neither remarkable
for the reception we met with nor the goodness of its houses. It ig
one of the wine countries of La Mancha and the vintage was going on.
The best road from Toledo to Consuegra is by this town and Man-
saneque.

drd October.—Marched as usual at 3 o’clock, two hours before day-
light to Mansaneque, a place where we met with every demonstration
of joy, and as the Spaniards have so few methods of showing their
regard, I will state that in this place they offered ug chocolate etc., and
dinner, but the warmth of the Domingo Perez people was wanting.
Near this is Almonacid where the foolish people fought with the
French. It is singular that common sense could not teach them that
a plain was the very worst place to fight brave troops.

This is their common practice, their insufferable arrogance makes
them imagine themselves brave enough to fight anywhere, and as soon
as the enemy shows himself they run away, and boast of having beaten
him.

The battle of Almonacid was fought on the 11th August, 1809.
“A Spanish army of 25,000 men, the most efficient that had
yet taken the field, composed of the best regiments of Spain
and commanded by efficient officers, was routed by some
28,000 French troops under Generals Sebastian and Dessolles
the King being present at the end of the action.””—Napier,
Vol. IL., p. 427.

4th October.--Marched to Consuegra where there is a small fort,

1 One of the English civil agents accredited to the Spanish Government.—F'.4.W.

SWABEY DIARY. 419

in some respects a monument of the French activity in making them-
selves retreats from the Guerrillas. Had they been the original
builders I should have condemned them for making a place of defence
that is overlooked.

It surrendered by capitulation to the Spaniards after Madrid was
taken ; it ought now to be destroyed. ‘These places, so common near
Spanish towns, enable the enemy to command the population, whereas
in the hands of the Spaniards they could never resist the attack of
artillery, but their ignorance and presumption is beyond belief. ‘T'o
show the disposition of this province, I need only say that merely to
protect them whilst transacting business, besides having this castle
they have in the town barricaded streets and many strongholds.

dth October.—Still at Consuegra neither pleased nor happy.

6th October.—Marched all day in pelting rain to Lillo.

It was a distance of seven leagues and I was three hours in advance
of the troop searching for quarters. I was the first Briton there just
as ab Domingo ; the bells rang, and three hundred people stood in the

rain to welcome in Su Majestad, who wished them @ los infernos.
Ambrose down with ague.

7th October—Marched to Villa Tobas to cover the grand Madrid
and Valencia road, it being reported that Soult’s advance guard was
now at Minaya, 27 leagues from Madrid, the main body of his army,
counting Suchet and Joseph, being 65,000 to 70,000 men. We are
shortly to be joined by troops from Cadiz under Colonel Skerrett,}
with Ballesteros, General Maitland! and Roche! with the Spaniards at
Alicante.

Lord Wellington invested Burgos on the 19th September, and
the same night with the Portuguese brigade of General Pack, and
the flank companies of the 42nd, 79th, and 97th regiments, took by
storm the hornwork on the hill of St. Miguel. The French have made
the castle very strong, and two batteries have been made against it
but being commanded have not yet been opened. On the 29th a mine
was sprung, which madea breach in the wallin front of the castle ; it was
stormed, but the supports losing their way in the darkness of the night
the advanced party were driven off. Already we have lost 40 officers
and 800 men.

The remains of Marmont’s army under Clausel have passed the Ebro
and it is said their heavy baggage is gone to Bayonne.

October Sth.—Wrote up this book from the beginning. Ambrose
goes to the rear to-morrow.

[After quitting Toledo some movements of light troops were made
towards La Mancha probably with the object of observing the direction
of the march of Soult’s troops.

The victory of Salamanca and the siege of Burgos afforded the French
Marshals proof that they could no longer maintain themselves in the

Fs! Tied acnerel Maiend a ae commanded the allied troops on the eastern coast of Spain.
neut.-General Roche commanded a Spanish division there. Only a brigade under Colonel Sk
joined General Hill —7.4.W. i : Saree

4.2.0 SWABEY DIARY.

south of Spain, Cadiz must be left, and Madrid abandoned and all
the French forces must be concentrated to secure Aragon, Catalonia,
and Valencia, and thus the wisdom of Lord Wellington’s movement
was exemplified. ‘Those unaccustomed to reason on military under-
takings and their results were not wanting in their censures for the
investment of Burgos. An Engineer officer of deserved reputation!
and celebrity has written a book in vindication of the distinguished
service to which he belongs, throwing the blame of the failure of the
siege on the inadequacy of the material at the command of his and the
artillery corps. But I venture to believe that the object of the
Commander-in-Chief was not so much the possession of the place as the
drawing the enemy from the south, and setting free that large portion
of the Spanish Peninsula.

So far from the Salamanca campaign being a failure as some short-
sighted officers venture to call it, it was in its results an undoubted
success. It is probable, had the city of Burgos fallen to our arms, that
we should have blown up its defences as the French did the following
year. We could hardly have hoped to maintain ourselves in advance
of Ciudad Rodrigo in the winter of 1812-13, and I have always asserted
that the objects of the campaign of 1812, were entirely carried out].

9th October.—In the evening we received the intelligence that the
garrison of Burgos having made a successful sortie, retook their out-
posts and destroyed about 24 hours of our work, but were soon driven
in with the loss of all they had regained. It appears they knew of a
mine we had ready to spring, and so they destroyed it.

10th October.—Soult seems to have arrested his further advance, if
he ever means to act an offensive part it will be now. Much rain.

11th October.-—Dined with Sir William Hrskine who is certainly a
more gentlemanly man at his table than I had formed an idea of.
Rain all day.

12th October.—The French again making movements on our front,
some Spaniards seem to think they are inclined to pass the Ebro.

13th October.—I rode to Aranjuez. It is certainly a beautiful spot;
the palace, gardens, parks, and shady boulevards are close to the city,
which like Versailles was designed entirely for ornament and pleasure.
It is the favourite resort of the King and the Spanish Court, and differs
so completely from any other Spanish town I have seen, that I must
fly to my beloved Hngland to steal a comparison. The houses, of two
stories only, are laid out in regular streets, but are constructed in so
slight a manner as to look like temporary barracks. They are faced
with a kind of plaster or stucco now fast decaying, the window frames
and door posts are painted on the outside, and at a distance have a
very pleasing effect, but there are so few fine houses that the town
could only have contained the dependents of the royal family and its
instability reminds me forcibly of an English watering place.

The King’s palace is well worth seeing; it is a handsome brick

1 Colonel Six John Jones, R.E.

SWABEY DIARY. 421

building with suites of apartments opening one into another, the floors

are brick, the walls and ceilings are profusely painted and gilded in
the Portuguese and Spanish fashion, the furniture so far as chairs and
tables are concerned is generally bad, but the magnificent scarlet
curtains, the varied damasks, and the beautiful paintings arranged
according to their artists give the whole a style of very appropriate
grandeur. Itis to be lamented that there is no one in the palace to
give a description of the paintings which would then be a greater treat
to an admirer of art. The Spaniards in their magnificence are very
fond of clocks, of which there are some very costly specimens here.
The gardens, or more properly the pleasure grounds, contain a sump-
tuous display of statues, fountains, avenues, and other evidences of
questionable taste; still, these are so blended with the fine timber
which skirts the river each way for some miles, and some occasional
good bits of architecture that the effect on the whole is very picturesque
and affords the greatest delight to the eye of an Englishman, who
can here trace the sylvan beauties of his native land without which
no scene in nature can entirely please, though it may excite admiration.
By means of a simple fall, the waters of the Tagus have been brought
into the grounds, but as the stream only runs through the edges of the
wood, it adds little to the beauty of the place, though millions have
been expended on this improvement. The bridges over the Jarama
which runs between Aranjuez and Madrid were destroyed by Hl Rey
José when he left Madrid to prevent our pursuit.

After riding the ten leagues I got back to Villa Tobas to dinner. I
had resolved to desert the cause of the south, and my intention was to
procure money to enable me to undertake the journey, but in this I
could not succeed.

14th October.—Received a letter from the North, the capture of
Burgos still seems dubious.

L5th October.—We lost this week one Bombardier and three gunners
who died from a fever brought on by sheer weakness. I read the
funeral service over some of them, and was surprised to see with what
little reverence or awe the superstitious, ignorant Spaniards witnessed
the ceremony, and with what little decency they behaved.

I dined again with Sir William Erskine who was even more polite
than before.

[Not long before we began our retreat from Madrid in 1812, the
Captain, the 2nd Captain and the senior Lieutenant of the troop were
sent to the rear sick, where they were soon followed by the surgeon ill
with typhus fever. Sir William Erskine the general officer of cavalry
under whose orders we were went to the rear soon afterward and neither
he nor my commanding officer ever returned. I was therefore though a
very young officer left in command of the troop, with a younger subal-
tern under me.” Nearly half the men were in hospital with typhus

1 He probably wished to join his own troop, which was with Lord Wellington’s force before
Burgos.—F.4.W.

~ 2 Lieutenant Brereton.

429, ‘SWABEY DIARY.

»fever, and I had no medical attendant. My brother officer and I
therefore turned surgeons; the sickness was so severe that unless we
had spent most of our time in the hospital we could hardly have got
the patients attended to; I well remember the devoted character of my
brother officer and how insignificant everything but this duty appeared
in his eyes.

There were so many cases of raging delirium that double attendance
was required, where we could not supply half: the only medical

-assistant we had, was a Spanish medico whose school was of the true
Sangrado type, but I-took on myself to say who should and who should

-not be bled, and we shaved the patients’ heads and bathed them

constantly with vinegar. What more could the Doctor have done?

“Some poor fellows died. We were close to the enemy and this

‘made the Spaniards a little presumptuous and they refused to
let me bury the dead in their burying ground as they were heretics.

‘I took on myself however to do this by force, but I have often since
thought I was wrong, for who can say after we were gone whether

.these superstitious people dug up my poor comrades and gave their
bodies to the wild birds of the wilderness ?

Our Sangrado however was my staunch supporter ; when calenturas
were scarce he could exercise the kindred occupation of a barber, and
so he was doubly useful in being able to shave heads, as well as bleed

‘arms. ‘This man’s egotism was even ahead of that characteristic of
his nationality and many a harangue did he launch at me to prove
that the medical practice of the British Army and nation was altogether
erroneous.

I remained in this uncomfortable predicament threatened with the
advance of the enemy for some time, and it was fortunate it was so,
for though I was not free fromthe ambition of being forone day in
action my own commanding officer, yet our state of inefficiency was
such that had the French pushed us, I. must have left many of our
‘men behind. As it was some had time to recover, and before we

‘marched towards Madrid from Aranguez, I was superseded in my
glory by the return of my 2nd Captain]. 2

_ - 16th October.—Whinyates having. been some days at Madrid, and
Lefebure very ill in bed, I was under the necessity of putting in
execution the sentence of a Court Martial on a man who merited
his punishment. Though I contrived to have it in a yard and the
gates shut, still a priest succeeded in getting-in, and putting himself
in the way begged and prayed my forgiveness for the man, this, as
he was a thief, could not be granted. Then he threw down his cloak, a
proceeding which I understand in this country of priestcraft, is
enough to stop the execution of justice. No wonder that vice should
predominate over virtue in such a country.

L7th October.—Tired and disgusted with the priest of my house,
who is always attempting to draw me into disputes about religion, and
rain coming every day, I was not very happy. a

18th October.—Marched into Aranjuez where as usual we were ill-

SWABEY DIARY. 423

used by Captain Thorn, the Quarter-Master-General and our men got
bad quarters, ourselves none.

19th October.—Poor Lefebure,! having gone to Madrid in a very
bad way and Whinyates having rejoined us, I condescended to do
subaltern’s duty and I was all day employed in making up the
accounts of the troop and settling with the men, who were in con-
sequence all drunk. I really think a soldier with money is a worse
fool than a sailor.

20th October.—A repetition of yesterday’s work. Being obliged to
quarter myself with poor Baldock? of Captain Maxwell’s® brigade, who
has gone mad, I was allowed of course no rest all night, and nothing
contented him but strutting about in my pelisse, and overturning all
the apples etc. that he met with in the streets.

21st October.—The cavalry return to Villa Tobas to-day in con-
sequence of Soult moving to our left.

e2nd October.—The enemy approachiug, we consequently to-day
destroyed one of the bridges here, the 9-pounders first passing it. The
bridges as far down as Talavera are already destroyed.

23rd October.—Preparations appear to go on for the passage of the
Tagus and the destruction of the bridges as far as Toledo.

25th October.—Still in the same dull scene at Aranjuez.

26th October.—Went to see Casa del Labrador, a bijou of its kind,
replete with everything that art could supply to pamper luxury. It
is to Aranjuez what le petit Trianon is to Versailles, haying however
greatly the advantage of the latter in natural grace. It was built
by the unfortunate Ferdinand and intended to unite all the rich
materials of the universe; they have succeeded completely in making
it a show place, but have entirely lost sight of elegance and taste; the
variety of choice marbles, the sculpture, and silk-worked hangings
instead of paper, inlaid with every precious metal, and enriched with
every precious stone, could not failto remind one of the weakness of
their master, and showed one a true characteristic of an ignorant
Prince: I passed much of my time in the cool cellars of the palace
of Aranjuez, dry vaulted excavations where the sun could not
penetrate, they were empty, but their extent was such that they
seemed capable of holding all the wine in Hurope.

1 Captain Lefebure died rather unexpectedly on the 22nd October. His elder brother, Charles,
was transferred in 1793 to the Engineers from the R.A. He distinguished himself in the
Peninsular and was killed by a cannon shot at the siege of Matagorda in 1810.

2 Lieutenant Charles R. Baldock (Kane’s List No. 1510), retired on half-pay 8th November,
819.

3 9th Company Western Division R.A. now.

(Lo be continued).

aslatcio te a a

7s aaa

SEP SS 1895
7,

: w
S. PATENT 08H
— 495

1D) dove. Ja a
LIEUTENANT W. SWABRY, R.G.A., IN THE
PENINSULA.

EDITED BY \

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATHS, late R.H.A. vp

(Continued from p. 423, No. 8, Vol. XXTII.). \

Cuaprer IV.

Retreat from Madrid. Scenes at Valdemoro. Destruction of the
Retiro. Spanish cruelty. Salamanca. Retreat continued to Ciudad
Rodrigo. Affar at San Muiios. The Army returns to Portugal.

2ith October.—The reports sent in to-day announce the further
advance of the enemy. We are already driven back as far as Ocaiia.

28th October.—The troop crossed the water and went to Casa del
Campo, whilst I was sent to support the cavalry with my two guns
and a battalion of Cacadores to a village near Ocafia.

I dined with the Major of the regiment, an English officer, and
blushed at his expedient to provide wine for his table. He sent a
sergeant to tell the owner of some wine that he would provide him
with a safe-cuard, but should expect some of the wine in return.

29th October.—The enemy’s cavalry and ours were skirmishing
all day. At about 8 o’clock in the evening the cavalry retired through
the village where I was, when I got orders from Sir William Erskine
to fall back and occupy the pass at Aranjuez, where I lay on the
ground, passing cold, till 1 o’ciock. Then came an order to retire
across the bridge to Casa del Campo to join the troop, which I
accomplished by day-hght and found there General Long’s brigade.

[Just before we began the retreat in 1812, the army, except the
picquets, was withdrawn to the Madrid side of the river. I was on
duty the night the French advanced on the other side. So strictly
were we on the defensive, that it had been found necessary to cut the
arches of the bridge, which had only been patched with wood after
haying been blown up a short time before when King Joseph quitted
Madrid. When the piquets were withdrawn and I came down to the
bridge, or rather to the place where the bridge had been, I found I had
been forgotten, and the guns were obliged to be dragged by tackle
through the river and the horses swum over].

80th October.—Our bridges being blown up we moved to Villa
Campo where the troop ‘bivouacked. We had no rations but for-
tunately I found a house where we got some mutton, I performed the
office of cook, and at 12 o’clock at night we had some mutton chops.

9. VOU. XX. 58

426 SWABEY DIARY.

31st October.—Marched again to Casa del Campo. This is one of
the royal wine manufacturies. Its extensive cellars aired by venti-
lators from above, and containing earthen jars each large enough to
hold half a pipe of wine, are very curious. In one of these cellars we
took up our abode. The picquets when posted on the river were
sharply engaged with each other from the opposite banks; being
quiet towards evening I went down close to them at the destroyed
bridge, and they were sitting at each end of the pier mutually civil
and conversable. Some French cavalry crossed by the fords in small
parties.

[It was at the bridge at Casa del Campo near the Casa del Labrador,
afew days after leaving Aranjuez that the French picquets being
amongst the trees on the one side, and our own on the other, that
some of us availed ourselves of the cover offered from behind one tree
to another, and crept on to the bridge. Some French officers seeing
what we were about did the same thing, till at last there sat Hnglishmen
and Frenchmen upon the opposite ruins of an exploded arch with
their legs hanging over the water, and here was held a colloquy more
entertaining than unfriendly. The principal subject of which was on
the French side the vigorous march that they had made, and on ours,
attempts to show that though they might think they were advancing
their movement was in effect a retreat.! There was some truth in both
views of the case, nor was there the least ill humour on either side, on
the contrary a good deal of manly politesse, frequently to be met in
the better class of French officers. When however the time came that
the French picquet was to be relieved, the Frenchmen cautioned us
that ib was better to get under cover as they could not be answerable
for the orders the relief might have, and we all knew that a skirmish
under such circumstances is almost a certain occurrence ; we therefore
made profound reverences on both sides and parted].

Ist November.— At day-light marched to San Pozuelos, giving up the
Tagus, and passing the Jarama, the bridge over which was guarded
by Colonel Skerrett’s brigade just joined from Cadiz. We were under
great apprehension that our commissary was cut off, he being at
Arganda on the wrong side of the river. We got no rations and very
little to eat.

Upon the French under Marshal Soult raising the blockade of
Cadiz, some 4000 to 5000 men under Colonel Skerrett were
ordered on the 9th September, by Lord Wellington to march
vid Seville, Monasterio, Medellin, Truxillo, etc. to join the
force under Sir R. Hill. The brigade was composed of
detachments of the 2nd Hussars, K. G. L., 20th Portuguese
Regiment, 3rd Battalion 1st Foot Guards, detachment 2nd
Battalion 95th Regiment, Company of the Royal Staff Corps,

1 In fact the French army under Marshal Soult that had raised the blockade of Cadiz on the
24th of August, and retired wid Seville, Granada, and Jean, was now advancing against Lieut.-
General Sir Rowland Hill on the Tagus. See Map L—#.4.W.

SWABEY DIARY. 42,7

9nd Battalion 87th Regiment, Captains Rowan’s and
Dickson’s companies Royal Artillery. All artillery horses
and mules (excepting 170 horses) with a due proportion of
artillery drivers. Wellington Despatches, Vol. IX., p. 415.

2nd November.—In the evening we turned out and went to the
heights above the Jarama bridge where there had been all day a
smart fire, these hills form an excellent position and we thought we
were certainly intended to fight. The bridge, guarded by the 87th, but
from the nature of the ground, commanded by the French artillery,
was charged twice by infantry and three times by cavalry, but they could
not make any impression. As soon as it was dark, however, we com-
menced our retreat through Valdemoro, General Cole! having the
conduct of it. At Valdemoro, there were large vats of new wine open,
and so little care was taken that 300 men were left behind drunk and
taken by the enemy. We marched all night.

[During our march towards Valdemoro the enemy kept continually
manceuvring to turn our left and passed over at a distance small parties
of cavalry and light troops at various fords. Our retreat began
over a bridge across the Jarama,’” which was maintained by the
87th Regiment in spite of repeated efforts on the part of the enemy to
gain possession of it. The retreat was continued at night through
Valdemoro, and here a scene of the most disgraceful character ensued.
It was at the time of year when the new wine was in open vats and
there were many at this place. Numbers of men fell out of the ranks
and surrounded them and I saw with my own eyes many actually
drowned in the vats! They were baling out the liquor with their caps
to their comrades till overcome, as much by the fumes of the wine as
by what they drank, they sank down and expired in their glory. What
a death for a reasonable being! Whether they were emulous of
making their exit from this world as famous as that of the illustrious
“ Prince who was drowned in a butt of Malmsey” I cannot say, but
undoubtedly they were as “Royal” when they died as was ever the
unfortunate Clarence. However, it is certain that the army lost in
this way at least 800 men. In all sober sadness this was as melancholy
a scene as I ever witnessed. The men being drunk were rather deaf
to the commands of their officers, and the night was very dark, but the
disorder was at length put a stop to by staving in the vats].

3rd November.—We arrived at the Madrid bridge where we met
Captain Cleves,’ of the German Legion Artillery, who, having the day
before destroyed the greater part of the Retiro and all the battering
train had returned anxious before the French came to blow up one mine
which had failed. I volunteered going with him. When we went

1 Lieut-General the Honorable Lowry Cole, Commanding 4th Division.

2 The Puerte Larga below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares. There was also a bridge
of boats over the former river close by a little above Bayona. Napier, Vol V., p. 311.

8 2nd Captain Andrew Cleves commanded a 9-pounder brigade at the battle of Albuera, where

he was taken prisoner, but escaped on the field of battle. He also commanded a bri ?
9-pounders at the battle of Waterloo.—F,4A.W, ora

428 SWABEY DIARY.

into the mine I could not but notice a want of caution in the way
the train was laid, but nevertheless agreed to do the job with
him. He, anxious to perform his duty without assistance, sent me to
see if the coast was clear, and put the match to the train, when to my
dismay the whole exploded before he was out of the building, and so
persuaded was I that he had perished, that I dismounted from my
horse and took a shovel to dig him out, when, making my way in the
dark through the smoke that almost suffocated me, to my astonishment,
he came out, with no other injury than being well burnt. The day
before two Clerks of Stores and some men were blown up.

As to Madrid, I can scarcely say I entered it, having only gone into
one street to purchase a pack-saddle. As the Hscorial road passes 1t, it
winds majestically above a beautiful stream. Its palaces and buildings
strike the eye as beautiful. How painful it was to me only to have a
distant view! We this day joined here the divisions! of Lord
Wellington’s army that had been quartered there. The people of
Madrid were constant to the last, and even cheered them, though
left to their fate. We did not get into camp until 10 o’clock at
night, and at 12 broke our fast for the first time.

[During the retreat in November 1812 ,we passed by the road to the
Escorial close to Madrid but can hardly be said to have seen it. The
inhabitants however were true to the last and cheered us as we left
them to their fate. The building called the Retiro was a square stone
massive edifice having every capability for a fortress sufficient to over-
awe the inhabitants. It was decided to breach it in several places by
blowing up the angles, and in this there was no great apparent difficulty,
because it was built over immense vaults. However, the day before I
arrived there with the rear guard, it had only been ineffectually done,
and some men had been killed in the explosion. An officer of our
German Legion Artillery was engaged in completing the business and
General Long, whose cavalry were the last in the line of march
ordered me not to assist him, but I suggested it would be safer
to take an escort of dragoons to prevent the inhabitants interrupting
the operation. ‘To one of these I gave my horse and went into the
vaults with the German. I could not help remarking a degree of
recklessness in the preparations; however, there was no time to lose
and I went out to ascertain that there were no persons within reach
of danger. Whether by accident, or because my companion, was
jealous of my presence, I cannot say and never ascertained, but I had
hardly got into the open, and by no means indeed out of danger, when
up flew the corner of the building into the air and the breach was
indeed effectually made! My first act was to rush into the vaults of
the building which I didwithouta lieht. It seemed in vain to hope
that the perpetrator of this rash act, rash if designed, could have escaped,
and my only idea was to recover his body, but to my utter terror
and dismay I ran against him in the dark vault: a feeling of horror came
over me, and my first impression that I had encountered his spirit gave

1 eee Bite infantry divisions and two weak cavalry brigades. Wellington Despatches, Vol.
IX., p. 487.

SWABEY DIARY. 42,9

way to greater anxiety as I led this walking cinder to the light. Here,
as goon as I could see him, was a spectacle! every hair on his head was
singed, and he was perfectly black and blind, yet though he was scorched
by the explosion he was not burnt, and I understood afterwards that in
spite of much suffering he recovered. ‘This gallant fellow’s idea was
that he would rather perish than not succeed in the duty that had been
assigned him, and which had not been effectually done in the first
instance. I have no doubt that the great strength and weight of the
building, together with the immense subterranean vaults which offered
insufficient resistance at any one point, rendered the operation less simple
and easy than might have appeared to a mere spectator.

While detained in the business of rendering the Retiro a place suitable
for anything rather than seclusion, of course the troops, saving the
very last videttes, had passed on. After having provided for the safety
of the poor German officer, whose appearanceas I left him might have made
a personification of the head ofany member of the satanic empire, I was
anxious to get to my corps. Nothing in particular met my observation,
the dragoon escort had gone on some time, but as I advanced on the
road I became alarmed allat once by some firing in front of me. On
getting near the spot one of the most heart-rending and dastardly
spectacles which can be imagined met mv eye; some unfortunate
French prisoners who had been left in Madrid were huddled together
by the side of the road and their Spanish escort was leading them
up one by one to shoot them at a certain tree, which they had
chosen for a place of execution. ‘There could have been no reason
why these emaciated wretches should have been brought from their
hospital in Madrid, had they been left there they would have fallen
again into the hands of their own people. Unable to walk they could
proceed no farther, and their inhuman masters were in many instances
at their own request, taking this summary way of terminating their
misery. For ought I could tell some of the finest spirits that ever
servedin the ranks of the French army might have perished in this
ignoble manner. Whata death to die! certainly the feeling of exas-
peration ran high amongst the Spaniards at this time, but to give it
this vent displayed ignorance and barbarity more suited to savages than
a Christian people claiming to rank in the order of civilization. I
rode up to put a stop to this enormity, but being alone, vain were
my remonstrances, and force was out of the question. I did indeed
draw my sword but the musquets were immediately levelled at me and
I found any resistance useless. This good however happened, a little
time was gained, and a party of the 95th came up under a sergeant
whose orders were to keep up stragglers. These men interfered, and
the French being near at hand the rascals were under the necessity
of abandoning the survivors].

4th November.—Marched to the Escorial taking with us five men of
Macdonald’s troop. Part of the wounded left at Madrid, some of them
with five, six and seven wounds. On the march we passed Majalahonda
where their catastrophe took place. I had not time to visit the ground
where the heroes lay. It appears three guns were taken, and those men

430 SWABEY DIARY.

who were retaken were barbarously wounded. We did not get till
after dark to the Escorial, so that I could not examine it, nor did we
get anything to eat until 10 o’clock at night.

[There was but little time allowed to examine the wonders of the
Escorial, it is on the western face of the Guadarrama mountain, the hasty
view of things which I was constrained to take was very mortifying,
but our orders for marching were rather sudden. Our commissariat
supplies were regularly brought to us by alternate services of two bri-
gades of muleteers, one of these was Spanish and the other Portuguese.
The Spaniards were Andalusians, the finest specimens of that superb
people. The Portuguese had some very handsome fellows among them,
particularly the capitraz or leader.

At the Escorial we happened to have the Spaniards and they were
rather dilatory in starting; though it was not my proper business,
yet I was heiping the commissary in getting them into motion, and in
the haste I struck the leader with a small stick by way of quickening
his movements. The man yowed eternal vengeance and I was several
times cautioned by some of the others that he meant to have my life,
but the affair passed over without any consequences. ‘These Spanish
muleteers who, from their erratic habits and gipsy lives, are not at any
time remarkably amenable to the laws of civilized life, were still less
likely to be so then.

As we approached Lord Wellington I anticipated speedy reunion
with my own proper comrades. On the march from Madrid we over-
took five of them who had been wounded, made prisoners by the French,
and left there after the affair at Majalahonda; one of these never after
quitted me till he and I left the service. The troop on that occasion
had been pushed forward with a brigade of Portuguese cavalry who ran
away and left it to its fate in the hour ofneed. My man had five
sabre stabs, yet he lived to serve me with great fidelity and regard,
and after the war perpetrated matrimony and set up a respectable
shop, I never heard in what line, in his native town of Bolton in
Lancashire. He was a good fellow, very fair, fresh and good looking.
His name was Marsland, which I should not have chronicled had
it not occurred to me that the Portuguese girls who had a great
affection for him always called him “ mas lindo ”’ which being interpreted
means “more handsome.” ‘This poor fellow would have infallibly
lost his life had I not put him on one of my horses, for he was
but a spectre at the time I overtook him. Circumstances of this
kind level all conventional distinctions of rank, and I believe few
stronger attachments exist than between this poor fellow and myself].

5th November.—Marched at day-light. The palace of the Escorial is
not worth seeing, except for the royal sepulchre. It is composed
entirely of marble, as are the coffins, one of which is now ready for
Ferdinand with his name inscribed. The body of Charles V. is said
to be here, though some say at Toledo. The richness and beauty of the
pasturage at the Escorial at once stamps it as the birthplace of
the Merino flocks now gone with their miserable masters. To-day in

SWABEY DIARY. 431

passing the Guadarrama mountain, which is of immense height and
easily defended, I began to realize the miseries of the retreat ;
animals knocked up, men and women failing, and every kind of woe;
but all I saw made but a slight impression compared to the horrid
massacre of some unfortunate French prisoners by a Spanish escort,
who with the utmost composure shot them like dogs. We were not
near enough to arrest their cursed purpose, but when we remonstrated
were told that they frequently served them the same, and moreover,
that they had requested to be shot. Inhuman wretches! They had
reduced them to despair by starvation, and then thought their deeds
justified by the desperate request! O cowardly, villainous Spain! too
proud to take the necessary measures for your own defence, too cruel
to turn a deaf ear to the dictates of dastardly revenge !

We got to Villa-Castin after dark and slept in an empty house after
a hasty beef-steak.

Napier’s opinion of the conduct of the Spaniards towards the
enemy, of which we have had several notable instances, is
given in Vol. II., p. 407 thus: “ The principal motive of action
with the Spaniards was always personal rancour; hence,
those troops who had behaved so ill in action, and the in-
habitants, who withheld alike their sympathy and their aid
from the English soldiers to whose bravery they owed the
existence of their town, were busily engaged after the battle
[Talavera], in beating out the brains of the wounded French
as they lay upon the field, and they were only checked by the
English soldiers, who in some instances, fired upon the
perpetrators of this horrible iniquity.”

6th November.—Marched to Martinmufioz, where, with General
Long’s brigade, we expected to be quiet for a few days, not knowing
which road the enemy might take, Salamanca or Segovia.

7th November.—Set off in a hurry ; the brigade lost some baggage
and we had two men taken prisoners who were employed by the
commissary. ‘‘he troop marched on and I joined the Hussars with
my guns and slept all night on the ground in my cloak.

Sth November.—In the morning joined the troop ; marched all day in
the rain, and after dark encamped at night on the Salamanca road also
in the rain. As we could not make the fire burn and had no wine, we
had little food to eat.

Ith November.—Marched at day-light and encamped with the whole
army just at dark at Penaranda. For the last three days the unfor-
tunate sick, unable to proceed, have been daily falling into the
hands of the enemy.

10ih November.—This morning I rode forward into Penaranda to
buy some cloth, being entirely without clothes; whilst in the shop
there a cry was raised that the French were coming and the Spanish
cavalry galloped in disorder through the town. Sutton and I mounted
our horses and rode our best till clear of the town. I then pulled up
and with another officer tried to rally the Spaniards. We soon halted

432, SWABEY DIARY.

all the Hnglish, and discovered that the cause of the false alarm had
been some of the heavy dragoons galloping in by General Hill’s order,
to stop plunder, which had commenced. I then went back and com-
pleted my purchases, happy in having seen at so little expense the
effect of the French entry into a Spanish town. Whoever was in the
street, man, woman, or child, took to their heels, many mounted their
neighbours’ mules which had thrown their riders, and much baggage
was plundered and cut away so that the people in charge might
escape.

We crossed the Tormes at Alba! in the rain, and the troop halting
on the other side, I bid it adieu, and pushed on to join Macdonald at
Salamanca ;” encamping with Ross who was on the side of the road.

11th November.—Saw the two Arapiles and the position contended
for on the 22nd July, by which I was sufficiently convinced that
darkness alone saved Marmont’s army from total ruin. Arriving at
Salamanca I found Macdonald there, and rode with him to Villa
Mayor where the troop was, and joined my old friends with infinite
satisfaction, being very glad of the rest.

12th November.—Rode to Salamanca to purchase clothes from the
want of which I had suffered much. Salamanca is a good town and
contains more shops than any other I have visited in Spain. What
remains of its desolated convents is grand; the cathedral, externally
very little inferior to Toledo, still stands.

13th November.—Tarned out early this morning in consequence of a
skirmish between the out-posts, and returned late to Villa Mayor.

14th November.—One day of welcome rest.

15th November.—We marched out in force to-day and took up the
position of the Arapiles. The enemy was engaged twice to-day on the
river with the second division and was repulsed. It rained all day and
all night in our camp.

16th November.—Finding the enemy declined fighting and turned
our flanks, we were obliged to recommence in the rain a precipitate
retreat on the Rodrigo road, which was so deep that many a poor
wretch actually perished in the mire. Nothing could exceed the
distress of the infantry ; worn out men and women resigned to their
fate waiting the enemy on the road, some even already dead; of these
stragglers the greater number were Portuguese. It was evident that
in adverse fortune these fellows had not half the fortitude of the
English, and even sobbed aloud in an unmanly manner. We
bivouacked after dark in the wet and rain.

7th November.—We retired at day-light, the light division forming
the rear-guard and ours their support. In passing a wood, actually
within shot of our division, 50 or 60 French cavalry posted there
plundered the baggage of our Commanding Officer, Lord Dalhousie.
We chased them with our detachments, but they made off having

1 The troops under Lord Wellington from Burgos, were now united with those under Sir
Rowland Hill from Madrid.
2On this date Lieutenant Swabey quits “D” troop and his diary in future deals with his own “BH.”

SWABEY DIARY. 433

taken prisoner Sir Hdward Paget,' who was riding out of sight in
front of us, and who, I suppose, would as soon have expected to see the
devil.

Directly afterwards we crossed a rivulet,’ and took up a position to
check the enemy. At the place where our rear-guard forded there was
a height that entirely commanded us. On it the enemy brought
up their guns with astonishing rapidity, and from thence fired with
great execution on the light division as it boldly dashed through the
water. When all had crossed they turned their fire upon Whinyates’
and our guns? which were immediately under their muzzles, and
unable on account of their height above us to return the compliment.
Almost the first shot wounded poor Macdonald and three men at my
gun; Macdonald being so close to me that we touched, I supported
him till he was carried off. We remained four hours calmly receiving
the enemy’s fire, and occasionally checking their infantry and keeping
the passage of the river; Jiord Wellington gave no orders but to
reserve our fire for formed bodies, nove of which appeared. Many
were the hair-breadth escapes of men and horses; the wet state of the
ground, which kept the shot from rising, and the mercy of Providence,
alone saved us from certain destruction. At 11 o’clock we got to a wet
camp in the rain and broiled some beef.

18th November.—We continued our retreat, the road up to our axles,
objects of misery accumulating at every step, wounded forced to walk,
dead and dying strewing the road. What hurt me more than any-
thing else was that from the urgency of the service we were obliged to
refuse to carry them on our carriages. We encamped again in the wet
with nothing to change or to eat.

19th November.—We arrived to-day unfollowed by the enemy at
Rodrigo, and crossed the Aqueda. There I saw poor Macdonald who is
seriously wounded by a splinter, of immense size, which passed through
the upper part of his thigh; it is not thought dangerous but will be a
terrible trial of constitution. Hncamped in the rain.

20th November.—Marched at last to quarters in Alamedilha; the
town so crowded that we could scarcely find room. It appears this
year that we shall have the start of the people in regard to forage, as
here it is all unconcealed.

21st November.—Having a little leisure to think and to write, I
record my impressions of late events. The fundamental cause of our
giving up Madrid, I attribute first of all to the total abandonment by

1 The commander of the French cavalry on this occasion was a Major Mourelle, as will be
shewn from the following extract. ‘‘ Amongst a number of agreeable persons whom I met that
evening was a Major Mourelle, who had long served under Napoleon in Italy and Spain, but
unfortunately for his own interests, had adhered a little too long to Napoleon’s cause. It was
Major Mourelle who took Sir Edward Paget prisoner at Huebra near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 17th
of November, 1812. He wore a seal which was given him by Sir Edward Paget. After ihe peace
Mourelle was reduce to the rank of Captain. WheaI met him [December 1830] he was in command
of ie troops at Bintenzorg [Java].” ‘Fifty years in Ceylon,” by Major T. Skinner, c.m.e.,
p. 137.

We The Huebra, a branch of the Yeltes river, the place of crossing was at the village of San
unos.

8 On this occasion 6 of the guns of “‘D” troop were injured by the fire of the enemy.—-F.4.W,

A434 SWABEY DIARY.

everyone of the slightest hope that the Spaniards will ever do anything
to help themselves. The trial was fairly made during our possession
of Madrid. The imbecility of their government, but more than all
their national arrogance, blinded them to the necessity of active and
efficient measures, and rendered the opportunity useless. The moment of
action whilst the country was in possession of their government was lost.
They were then too short-sighted to fancy anything farther necessary,
they failed in their engagements to Lord Wellington, and lost their
independence for ever. I should be far from taxing them with a want
of patriotism ; they gave the most unequivocal proofs of their loyalty
and even of their friendship for the English, by following them with
vivas to the very gates of Madrid.

In stating an opinion of the regular Spanish troops already in the
field, it may be said that the same causes render them collectively
useless. They will not face the enemy, and, excepting at Saragossa
and Gerona,! they never have done so. They are deficient in officers,
and the leading feature in those they have is presumption. So great
is this national fault that it extends to all ranks; it prevents the
general from taking up a good military position, and induces the
soldier to despise with his tongue an enemy, at the first rumour of
whose approach he is ready to run away. For want of co-operation
with the civil authorities, a large army of Spaniards cannot be supplied
without plundering or distressing the inhabitants; this is carried on
without regard to humanity, and starvation is not the only evil
accruing from it.”

To return to the immediate causes that obliged our retreat. At the
head of them I must place the failure before Burgos, and, in justice to
my profession I must censure, though unwillingly, the conduct of Lord
Wellington. Though frequently warned that the means were totally
inadequate to success, and while confessing that the fate of the place
was not of importance, he would not, after once sitting down before it,
raise the siege till Soult was encouraged to advance, and Masséna* had
arrived with a superior force in his front. Some think General Hill

i The sieges in which the Spaniards distinguished themselves were :—

Saragossa besieged twice in 1808. ‘The first siege was raised in August in consequence of the
surrender in July of General Dupont at Baylen to General Custafios. The place was again
invested December 20th by the troops under Marshals Moncey and Mortier; on January 22nd
Marshal Lannes assumed the command. The Spanish defence was prolonged, and most heroic by
the civil population as well as by the garrison. But they were forced to capitulate February 21st,
1809. See Napier, Vol. I[., p. 25, e€ seq.

In the lately published memoirs of General Marbot, aide-de-camp to Marshal Lannes, are some
interesting details of the operations.

The French twice besieged the city of Gerona in 1808. On June 4th, 1809, it was invested for
the third time by General Verdier. Marshal Augereau assumed the chief command on October
12th. But the defence under the brave Governor, Mariano Alvarez, was so determined and gallant
that the city held out till December 10th, when after a period of six months of opened trenches it
surrendered : a defence which eclipsed the glory of Saragossa. See Napier, Vol. III., p. 22, et seq.

2 The Spaniards, now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the state described by Sir John
Moore, “without an army, without a government, without a general.” Napier, Vol. V., p. 253.

3 Masséna after the battle of Fuentes de Honor, in May, 18i1, resigned his command and
returned to France. He was succeeded by Marshal Marmont; upon his being wounded and the
French army defeated at Salamanca, in July 1812, Masséna who had been given a command in
Provence, was again nominally put in command of the army of Portugal and of the north of Spain
(see Wellington Despatches, Vol. IX., p. 44), he did not however take the field, though likely
enough reported in the allied army to have done so. At Burgos the French army was commanded

by General Souham.

SWABEY DIARY. 435

might have fought to cover Madrid, but he would then have felt him-
self in an awkward situation, because Soult might have delayed as long
as he pleased, while Masséna might either have united with Soult
against him, or what was as bad might have marched on the Segovia
road and thus have placed himself between Lord Hill and Lord
Wellington. The force of the latter would not have been sufficient
to have prevented the enemy from chosing his own plan of operations
as their communications were open. ‘The only way then that could
succeed was for us to fight united at Salamanca; this, Soult knew,
would not drive us to Portugal so easily as moving on our flanks, he
therefore declined, and we could not keep our position when turned.

Another cause that helped to move us was our want of provisions,
for it is well known that many regiments were for two or three days
on the retreat without rations, and the very officers of the 16th
Dragoons had nothing to eat but acorns. As to our horses, for four
days and nights they actually had not so much to eat as a blade of
erass, the poor devils eat the very harness off each other, and I
mention it as a remarkable fact, that to one horse we gave a feed of
sand stone which he munched up with infinite satisfaction.

That Lord Wellington quite endorsed the above opinions re-
garding the Spanish troops is evident from what he wrote
to Lord Bathurst.

“They [the Spaniards] cry ‘ viva,’ and are very fond of us
and hate the French: they are in general, the most incap-
able of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known,
the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant,
particularly of military affairs, and, ‘above all, of military
affairs in their own country.’” And, replying to Mr. Croker,
““ Did you ever see the Spanish troops stand to their work ?”’
He replied, “No! the best would fire a volley while the
enemy were out of reach, and then all ran away. They were
no doubt individually as brave as other men. I am sure they
were vain enough of their bravery; but I never could get
them to stand.”

22nd November.—No news from the front to-day. The enemy
does not come on but appears satisfied with what he has gained. The
out-posts send in our stragglers, I understand to the amount of 1000
men. Our loss altogether no one ventures to compute, but I should
think not less than 4000, 600 were killed and wounded the day we
were engaged.

23rd November.—For the first time got a comfortable dinner and
some of my clothes dried: it is remarkable that very few of our men.
have suffered from sickness.

24th November.—Our little doctor joined us to-day from attendance
on Macdonald.’ He takes the same view of the case that I have

1 Assistant-Surgeon A. Macdonald, M.D. (Kane’s List 187}. Served with the troop to the end
of the war. He accompanied it to Belgium in 1815, and was present at the battle of Waterloo.
In 1834, when he was employed on the Medical Staff at Halifax, Nova Scotia, he bought land in
Prince Edward Island, which he visited in after years, and then met his old comrade and friend
much to their mutual satisfaction,

436 SWABEY DIARY.

before given, but to me the opinion about the trial to his constitution
is by no means satisfactory.

25th November.—Upon calculating our losses on the retreat, we find
we have only destroyed four horses and two mules, and brought in all
our carriages; one brigade. of artillery lost 48 horses and blew up
various carriages. ! believe in proportion to our numbers, no regi-
ment, troop, or company has come off so well in the whole army.

26th November.—Went out coursing; killed a hare which we sent to
poor Macdonald.

27th November.—Marched by route through Villa Mayor to Minsella,
crossing the Coa at Ponte de Aigues. Never was such a place for
artillery. St. Hstevao,! Val de Lobo, and Villa Velha are jokes to
this; we were obliged to take the guns down by hand. It is owing to
the difficulty of the country from Almeida to the mountains of Plasencia
that the Coa is esteemed a defence. We did not arrive till late at
night. The circumstance of a triumphal arch being built on this
bridge, leaves no doubt in my mind of its being a Roman work, which
idea is strengthened by the antiquity of Villa Mayor though I cannot
exactly trace the Roman building in it, but this is very seldom to be
found here in consequence of so many different superstructures being
erected on the ruins. ‘

28th November.—Marched to Sardiera where, bad as they were, we
had our quarters to ourselves.

29th November.—Marched over the Guarda mountain, part of the
Estrella, to Ponte de Carne. The road is very difficult for artillery,
and it is to be noted that facing towards Celorico there is a road round
the right of the Guarda mountain, which though difficult is far prefer-
able to the ascent at Guarda. In crossing it the perch of an
ammunition waggon broke, and I remained till we contrived to make
it fit to travel. This job took us till dark and under these circum-
stances I descended the stone road from Guarda. The hill is at least
a league in length and so rough that nothing but the fact of its being
dark and our not seeing it could have given us nerve for the attempt ;
one shaft horse fell three times. By dint of perseverance I arrived
after dark at Ponte de Carne, where I overtook the troop.

50th November.—Began to reascend to Celorico by terrible hills, the
final one up to the town being next to impassable for artillery. One
of my waggons was overturned into a deep hole, and I can scarcely
account for our getting it out; but we accomplished it with such
promptitude that it surprised every one. We passed through Celorico,
a place of which I had heard a great deal, but like all Portuguese towns
ib is filthy and has little trade or other recommendation. Quarter-
masters may get tolerably supplied here on Tuesdays, and it is a safe
situation for a depot. We halted at Villa Cortes, where we did not
arrive till late. Captain Brandreth’s brigade? of artillery, which we
passed on the road, was obliged to leave all its spare carriages at

1 Passes in the Sierra de Estrella.
2 No. 10 Company, &th Battalion, R.A., reduced 1819,

SWABEY DIARY. 437

Celorico. Rather a feather in the caps of those who have brought in
their number.

Ist December.—Remained in our quarters on account of General
Clinton’s division having made a general halt for their clothing.

Ramsay with Bull’s troop came in the evening with a route to this
place. As the town could not hold us both, he, presuming on being
senior officer, ordered us out, Dyneley very properly refused to move,
which unfortunately set the two Commandants at loggerheads, this
however did not make us change our quarters.

To be continued.

439

EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF
MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

A IREWEW 2

BY
MAJOR, H. C. C. D. SIMPSON, R.A.

Tau organization of the various Huropean Mountain Artilleries has
been freely discussed in the pages of these Proceedings. The service
of Mountain Artillery is not exclusively confined to these Powers, and
in the two great Nations of the Hast and West, Japan and the United
States of America, public attention has been recently drawn in the
military journals of these countries, to the useful and more general
employment of this efficient and economical branch of the Artillery
Arm.

The Mountain Artillery of Japan, prior to the commencement of the
present war, would appear to have consisted of 1 Mountain Battery
of the Guard, and 6 Line Artillery Divisions each of 2 Mountain
Batteries.

The establishment of a battery consists of 1 Ist Captain, 1 2nd
Captain, 3 Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, 1 Sergeant-Major, 6
Sergeants, 1 Quarter-Master-Sergeant, 1] Armourer-Sergeant, 1
Sergeant-Artificer, 12 Corporals, 6 Artificers, 148 Gunners and
Drivers, 86 Riding and Pack-Horses, and 6 Guns.

The guns are French piéces de 4 de Montagne of the Lahitte system,
and a few batteries of Mondwell Mountain Guns.

The officers and drivers carry cavalry swords, the gunners Spencer
carbines and sword-bayonets. ‘The dominant colour of the European
pattern uniform is blue, with brown leather long boots, and the
German cap.

The pack-animals are cobby ponies, height from 13 to 14 hands.
The girths are put on with one girth in front and another in rear
of the animal’s belly. Guns can also be put in draught.

The men of the Iield Batteries are instructed in Mountain Artillery
duties, so as to be available when required for this service.

In the Insurrection in Kin-Sin in 1877 they were so employed on a
large scale. It seems to me a pity that some training is not given to
some of our Garrison Companies in the colonies on the same lines, in
order to fit them for service with our small expeditionary columns,
for which our regular Mountain Artillery is an insufficient source of
supply, and which are of constant recurrence throughout our colonial

1 Official reports on Mountain Artillery of Japan. The Pack-Mule and Mountain Artillery,”
by Captain Schenck, Second Artillery, U.S.A. ;

9. VOL. XXIT.

Japan.

United
States.

44.0) EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

possessions, The expense would be very small a4 stations where there
are government pack transport animals.

During the present war the Mountain Artillery has rendered most
distinguished services, notably at the taking of Port Arthur, where
from the rough and hilly nature of the ground, it was only possible to
bring the mountain guns into action ab the commencement of the
assault, the heavier guns being unable to get into position. Tokio,
Thrishimo, Nagoya, Basaka, Sendai, and Kumamoto are important
Mountain Artillery depots.

In America up to within the last twenty-five years the 12-pounder
mountain howitzer was largely employed in the Indian Frontier
Expedition. The 1:65" B.L. Hotchkiss—so-called—mountain gun of
110 lbs., firmg a projectile of but little more than 2 lbs. weight, and
without a time fuze was introduced some years ago in its stead. ‘I'he
Indian had a wholesome dread of the former, but none of the latter
gun, so Mountain Artillery has rarely been employed by American
commanders in recent years.

A very able paper (see foot-note p. 439) was published in the October
number of the U.S. Artillery Journal, advocating the employment of
an efficient mountain gun by the government for employment on their
Indian and Mexican frontiers. The nature of the proposed equip-
ments and its organization are laid down after very careful consider-
ation of detail, and the paper is well worth reading by officers
interested in Mountain Artillery matters in our own army. The
author commences his paper by laying down as an axiom, that the
question of mobility as applied to Mountain Artillery appears to be
of as great importance as in any branch of the Field Artillery, and
that in a consideration of the subject, two distinctions are met with,
viz. :—On the one hand an organization suitable for rapid movements
with cavalry over the most difficult country in which military opera-
tions is practicable for this arm, the gunners being mounted as in
Horse Artillery, but dismounted when the guns are to work with
infantry. And on the other hand, an organization and material
wherein mobility is in a measure sacrificed, in order to secure in-
creased power ot fire for the guns, a maximum supply of ammunition
with as few animals as possible, and the gunners always on foot, and
therefore the battery incapable of serving with cavalry on long and
rapid marches, it being held that cavalry can find no legitimate use in
a field of operations necessitating resort to Mountain Artillery. In
these extreme views, few European Mountain Artillery officers of
experience would agree. Small bodies of Cavalry or Mounted Infantry
as scouts, orderlies, etc., find even in mountainous country a suitable
vole ; and where cavalry could act in large bodies and Horse Artillery
could not keep up with them, must be a rare occasion indeed, and not
at any rate in our service worth providing against.

However, for the two conditions of service he lays down, the author
says the result is two very distinct classes of guns with packs for the
animals corresponding therewith, these latter for the more mobile
batteries ranging from about 260 lbs. to 290 lbs. per pack, and in the
other from about 290 Ibs. to 350 Ibs. This apparently small difference

EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY. 441

in the weights of the packs is in fact a wide one, and very materially
affects both the mobility of the battery, the power of the fire, and the
ammunition supply—if not in number of rounds, at least in weight of
projectile, for the number of rounds per gun can seldom vary much
from 100.

Now with on the one hand the gunners mounted with a light gun,
and on the other hand gunners dismounted and a heavier gun, each
country on service must in its selection be governed by the conditions
which are likely to predominate in war.

Now in the United States in the most important operations on her
N.W. Frontier, against the Indian tribes, the most formidable portion
of whom are mounted, the Cavalry or Mounted Rifles has always been
the most important arm. In the British service, whether in the
mountains of our Indian frontiers, the jungles of Burmah, the desert
of the Soudan, or the bush of Ashanti, the Infantry has always been
the most important arm, and attention has been directed towards
providing two different pieces, organized however on much the same
lines, for the following conditions of service :—

(a) Long range fire with as powerful a piece as is compatible with
a certain fixed limit of pack-animals for its transport.

(b) Curved fire with a heavy projectile at shorter ranges, under
circumstances when the minimum number of animals may
be slightly exceeded.

The 2°5" screw gun and the 4” jointed howitzer are the most modern
representative pieces of these two desiderata. Batteries are only
equipped with the former, the double shell of the small 7-pounder
200 lbs. gun inefficiently fulfilling the requirements of (b) at present
in the equipment of a few batteries.

Personally I believe in a general service gun for our Mountain
Artillery ; that is, one with a slightly lower velocity than the 2-5"
gun, but with a lighter projectile than that of the 4” howitzer. In
other words, a gun in two portions that will throw the same projectile
as our Horse Artillery gun with a muzzle velocity of 1300 f.s., and a
limit of effective range 3500 yards.

Captain Schenck believes that with the improvement in the construc-
tion of guns and their greatly increased ballistic powers, it would appear
reasonable to be able to secure a sufficiently powerful mountain gun
and an adequate ammunition supply with such pack-loads as to permit
of service with the cavalry when necessary, by providing mounts for
the gunners, and at the same time to possess a gun whose power of
fire will prove ample for any demands when serving with the Infantry.
Indeed for reasons economical as well as of expediency, the United
States he says must adhere to a single gun and equipment for all
Mountain Artillery.

That this may be possible, necessitates a proper relationship between
the pack-loads of the battery and the loads carried by the cavalry
horse, and ordinary cavalry pack-train, the degree of mobility, z.e.
weight of pack-loads being suited to the movements of the Cavalry
rather than to the foot-pace of the Infantry. At the same time

Top-loaded
mule

442, EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

the greatest possible power of fire of the gun together with the
ammunition supply for war purposes, without entailing an unwieldly
organization in matériel and personnel for the battery must be secured.

Before passing to the consideration of the matériel for a Mountain
Battery, he enters into a long dissertation on the pack-mules of the
United States and those of their neighbour, Mexico.

Although interesting there is nothing very novel in his remarks.
He certainly proves the excellence of the Mexican mule as a weight
carrier, which we might take a note of in India for future reference,
when seeking for remount mules for our batteries there. He reckons
that a good mule will carry of solid freight a load equal to 80 per cent. of
his own service weight (trom 800 to 1000 lbs.), that is from 280 lbs. to
360 Ibs. including pack-saddle, excepting in long and rapid marches
when animals of this weight should not be loaded in excess of 240 lbs.
The pace of the mule should be about 4 miles. If required to trot,
the trot should be the “slow trot,” 7.e. 6 miles an hour. Captain
Schenck now puts this equation before us :—

Let d = the distance a mule can travel daily if unloaded.
n w= the weight under which he could not travel at all.

» w' = some weight less than w, under which he could travel
d’ miles per day.
Then there obtains—
w' d* = w (d—d)?’.

Now the work or useful “effect” will be a maximum when w’ d' is a
maximum, or when w' =4wandd’=4id. Or in other words, the
mule will accomplish the most work when he transports 4 of the load
under which he would stagger; and he will travel just 4 of the distance
he could if he carried no load at all.

If a mule is able to travel 20 miles per diem carrying a load of 256
Ibs., and 50 miles per diem when he carries nothing, his best load will
be 316 lbs. carried about 17 miles per day.

I have personally after experience in our own Mountain Artillery,
and from witnessing that of continental nations working under service
conditions, arrived at the following conclusions, as to this knotty
question of the weight-carrying powers of ordnance mules in different
climates and conditions :—

(a) A carefully selected mule can carry, throughout the vicissitudes
of active service, a total load (including its harness) of 304
Ibs. of which 5’, weight may be a top-load. But I consider
that the mule must be “relieved” on long marches whether
in hills or plains in a tropical climate. In a temperate
climate the mule need not be “relieved” in marches in the
hills, but there are circumstances in which it may be desir-
able to do so in the plains. This is in accord with the
French and Italian views, and is for this reason. In march-
ing along the hill paths, the centre of pressure of the
road is constantly shifting, the air is purer and cooler, and
from the absence of macadamized roads, the mules do not

EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY. 443

become so foot-weary, and so are naturally less fatigued.
This is one of the strong reasons in favour of draught in
Mountain Artillery. In tropical climates this relief must be
carried out by additional pack-mules; but in a temperate
climate the relief in the plains can be carried out as hinted
above by some simple arrangement of draught, varying
according to the nature of the equipment, a sine qua non
being, that there must be no increase of consequence in the
pack-loads and none of mules.

(b) For compact side-loads, such as boxes of ammunition, an ordnance
mulecancarrya pack (including its harness) 20 per cent. greater
than that of a top-loaded mule and requires no regular
seelaiaitn

The above weights are a maximum, and require mules of the best
type of the breed, and their height varies with the breed. In hot
climates the mules do not run so high as in a temperate climate, other
conditions remain the same.

But, says Captain Schneck, if we are to march with Cavalry without
becoming an encumbrance upon its movements, it becomes necessary to
study the loads common to that arm of the service, both for its troop
horses and the mules of its pack-trains, and govern our pack-load for a
Mountain Battery accordingly. He then enters into details on the
weight carried by a cavalry troop-horse, and arrives at the result that
the heaviest nominal load for the latter is 272 lbs. in the United States,
of which 2 of it is “ live” weight. Now the pack-mules of the United
States cavalry-train carry 225 lbs. including pack-saddlery, and with
care can keep up on the march with the Cavalry. But the Artillery
pack-mule will be a more powerful and more carefully selected animal
than the ordinary pack-mule, better fed and receive more care and
attention, and is more likely to be relieved when sick or over-worked.
But when all the conditions of such service have been carefully con-
sidered, it would appear safe for us to conclude that no pack-load in a
Mountain Battery for American service should exceed the maximum
load carrried by their cavalry horse—272 lbs.—when for service with
Cavalry. Naturally if it can work with Cavalry, it will be able to
manceuvre over any ground with Infantry.

Having decided on his pack, it is obvious that the pack-saddle
should be reduced to a minimum weight consistent with efficiency.

In the Mountain Artillery it always must constitute a large percentage
of the weight which an animal can carry on account of the necessity of
adding special features to the cradles in order to secure the gun, carri-
age, etc. The Moore pack-saddle used in the United States transport
weighs complete 40 lbs. Generally speaking, however, a set of artillery
pack-harness varies from 45 to 71 lbs. in weight. The pack-saddle,
harness, and lashing of the old United States 12-pounder mountain
howitzer weighed 50 ibs. and served its purpose well. In the British
service a set of pack-harness for the 2°5” R.M.L. gun varies in weight
from 72 to 87 lbs. according to the nature of the load transported.
The United States artillery pack-saddle weighs from 58 to 65 lbs., but

Side-loaded
mules.

444, EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

Captain Schenck is confident this can be reduced all round to 55 lbs.
at the most, by converting the saddle to the Moore principle. The
ammunition saddlery can be brought down even to 50 lbs. in his
opinion. He does not describe the Moore saddle. He then arrives
at the remaining factor of greatest importance in a Mountain Battery,
viz. the power of fire of the gun, modified by the condition that the
gun, together with the carriage and implements etc., must in his
opinion, admit of being carried on not more than 8 mules, and that
each gun shall have with it in the field about 100 rounds of ammu-
nition, without the latter necessitating an unduly large number of
mules for its transportation. This is generally limited to 6 or 8 packs
per gun, with a reasonable supply of pack-animals spare—3 per gun—
increased in the batteries to act with Cavalry, by the animals of
mounted men killed in action. This latter statement seems a very
unreliable one in my opinion, as presumably the percentage of mules
killed, or put out of action temporarily will be almost as high as the
men.

The writer then details all the old arguments for and against quick-
firing guns as compared with the ordinary loading piece, arriving at
the same conclusion as ourselves, that the carefully observed fire of a
heavy shrapnel from the latter is preferable to the rapid loading light
projectile of the former. The weight of projectile for the most
powerful class of mountain guns in Hurope varies from about 8 to 18
Ibs. nearly. With 18 lbs., allowing 4 lb. as a maximum possible service
charge of smokeless powder, and 20 lbs. as the weight of the ammu-
nition box—the same as for the old 12-pounder howitzer, with 7
rounds in a box; the weight of the ammunition box packed would
be about 115 lbs., or the total weight for ammunition pack-load of
14 rounds would be 280 lbs., the same as for the old gun. Captain
Schenck does not however tell us how he disposes of the following
very necessary stores for the service of his gun, viz.:—boxes of fuzes,
fuze keys, cartouches with their wax cloth, tubes, grummet wads, etc.,
to say nothing of the necessary small implements carried by us in our
“small store” boxes, the saddle and box paulins, stable requisites for
the mules, etc., all of which go to form such a large percentage of the
weight of our ordnance equipment, and which cannot be dispensed with
on active service.

The author then goes on to say, that although his tried limit of
272 lbs. is exceeded in the ammunition load by 8 lbs., these boxes
are compact, best riding and easiest on the animals, are expendible
packs, and that with 7 loads per gun there would be 98 rounds per
gun, which may be considered satisfactory both as to number of rounds
and of animals required, he considers.

In order to secure the sectional or spherical density obtaining
for projectiles of the present date, which alone will secure good
ballistic results at battle ranges without undue recoils and strains on
gun and carriage, the calibre for a required gun for a 13 lbs. projectile,
in his opinion, should be about 2°9”, the length of the shrapnel shell ~
without fuze being about 3:25 calibres. Adverse reflections are then
made in the article on our screw gun equipment, and we are then

EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY. 445

informed that it is proposed to secure even greater power of fire from
a gun requiring only 3 mules for its transportation, without any other
“velief” than willbe afforded by the ordinary spare mules required for
the battery, the special allowance for the guns being one each, as, on
account of the reasonable weight of the loads, relief will only be
required in case of sickness or death of a mule, to be helped out by
the aforesaid mules of gunners killed in action. ;

Commenting on the various forms of shrapnel, Schenck then says,
“That for the English mountain gun weighs 7°87 lbs. and contains 100
bullets, 35 to the lb., 70 buck shot, and ten cast iron fragments re-
quiring, at point of burst, a velocity of not less than 660 f.s. to render
it effective; it is doubtful whether the buck shot are effective.”
Now how he arrives at this is not quite clear. We are informed at
p. 62 of our Field Artillery drill that 400 f.s. striking velocity is
sufficient, and our 2°5" screw gun gives a striking velocity of over
600 fs. at 4000 yards—an excessive range for Mountain Artillery
requirements.

He then continues, “A 13-pounder shrapnel, equally well designed
and made, will contain more than 200 bullets and equally effective
fragments, the bullets being 34 to the lb., which are probably quite as
small as should be used in shrapnel, the weight of the bullet being
206 grains. Bullets 34 to the 1b. require a velocity of not less than
646 f.s. to render them effective. ‘To ensure at a range of 3500 yards,
a velocity of 646 f.s. for a 2°90", 13 lbs. projectile will require a
muzzle velocity of 941 fs. with an energy at this point of 79 ft. tons,
as against 1440 f.s.and 113 ft. tons for the much lighter English
projectile.” Why? ‘The heavier shrapnel if properly made will
deliver double the number of effective bullets and fragments, and
although starting with 34 ft. tons less energy, it will still reach this
range of 3500 yards with 12 ft. tons greater energy than the ‘high
velocity,’ but relatively as well as actually, ight 2°5” projectile. Such
is the penalty enacted by natural laws for neglecting sectional density
and exceeding a velocity of 970 f.s. for this class of guns, at about
which velocity the law of atmospheric resistance changes so unfavour-
ably for the artillerist.”

All this may be quite correct in theory, but I can safely say that
the French mountain gun which answers the description most, of this
ideal gun of Captain Schenck’s, does not on the shooting ground justify
the above disadvantageous comparison of our screw gun.

A seventeen years experience of our screw gun equipment has
convinced our Mountain Artillery officers of the following :—

(i.) That it is at present the most serviceable and powerful
mountain gun in the world against personnel.

(u.) That the projectile is ineffective against “ matériel.”

(iii.) That in its transport we have arrived at the maximum
number of animals permissible for the effective mobility
of the battery.

(iv.) That the gun has a comparatively short life and requires
careful handling and treatment.

(v.) That the impossibility of making use of high angle fire is a
great defect,

446 HASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

In my opinion, as I have before remarked, we require a general
service mountain gun with a projectile similar to that of our Horse
Artillery equipment (12-pounder) which shall have an effective striking
velocity at 3500 yards, and which will permit of our making use of the
advantages of curved fire. This gun may be in two portions, each
portion not exceeding 54” in length, and a total weight of not more
than 425 lbs. The carriage complete may exceed the weight of the
gun by 4 weight of latter. It must not be composed of a larger
number of distinct portions than the present equipments (to save
greater delay in coming into or out of action). The carriage with all
the small stores, etc. must be limited to three mule loads.

As regards the ammunition the following points must be con-
sidered:—

At present we carry with the battery 96 rounds per gun in “ammu-
nition lime,” and 50 per cent. reserve on active service with “baggage
line ’’—a total of 144 rounds. In Italy 74 rounds are carried with the
battery, 60 rounds with the ammunition columns, and 150 rounds per
gun with the section of park. In the French Mountain Batteries of
the Alps 54 rounds per gun are carried with the battery, and 89
rounds by ammunition columns. After a careful consideration of the
number of rounds fired by our Mountain Artillery in the different
actions in which they have been engaged, I am of opinion that 84
rounds per gun with the battery, and 65 per cent. with the reserve would
meet the case. ‘Total number of rounds would not be affected.

The number of rounds must be arranged for each ammunition mule
so that we may not have to crowd our fighting line with a greater
number of mules in action than necessary. I think it may be con-
ceded that 1 ring shell and 1 case shot might be dispensed with from
every mule load (16 rounds), leaving 14 rounds to each mule, or 84
rounds to the six mules allowed at present. Could this be carried in
12-pounder ammunition ?

T consider it could by this means :—

(i.) Reduction of rounds from 16 to i4.

(ii.) Substitution of cordite in the cartridge.

(iii.) The abolition of shell plugs and fuze boxes, shell being
kept fuzed as in Continental Mountain Artillery, deto-
nators being dropped in before ammunition is placed in
the box.

(iv.) Gun bucket to be carried on axle instead of ammmnition
mule, and weight of harness and ammunition paulins
reduced in weighg.

(v.) Pads to be stuffed with cork chips, which have proved most
serviceable stuffing after experiments with Mountain
Artillery in India.

If a reduction of ammunition is not considered desirable with the
battery itself, then the extra ammunition mule per sub-division re-
quired with a battery must be obtained without increase of establish-
ment, by reducing the number of bare-back mules in batteries in India

EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY. 44.7

to the number found sufficient for the battery in Natal—18. But
great care must be taken to ensure that the spare mules are thoroughly
efficient for work, and not, as so often happens, composed partly of
remnants too young to work, and partly of mules, old, worn-out, vicious,
or unworkable for various reasons.

Captain Schenck disposes of his loads as follows :—

Gruner oe i ...217 lbs....No. 1 mule.

Carriage and implements ..,203 1 ...No. 2 mule.

2 Baffington spring brakes 32 1

2 Wheels. 176 4 } No: 8 male.
628 lbs.

This total weight he considers sufficient to stand up to the energy of
his gun. The axle is to be provided with hooks into which an eye on
the end if the brake engages. When the packs are made up the
brakes go with the wheels, being buckled to the sides of the pack-
saddle below the naves of the wheels; the trail is to be hinged as in
the French system. He is against draught under any system, using
all our arguments against it. In the following table the Canet gun is
mentioned by him. It is not, however, the one adopted by the French
service, of which 7 batteries are proceeding to Madagascar.

Mountain Guns.

8 x
a 3 eS vi
a a | as | 3,
"ep 3 8 36 BS
a ss iS) SA rq o0
aa <4 aa RD
(5) rt
CalibreNinchesit.aeuecaeey <i coe. Reem nny amrcpn 2°50 2°60 2°95 oe 2°90
Length, ,, A uclos wh meee Secu. Sho lb 7(O 5) 86:28 | 42°70 | 37-21 87°21
Wcities 6 5 15 6 GREG obo Biol 4 5 400 197 218 214, 217
Carriage and equipments, Ibs. . . . . . . . 589 244 824 287 417
Crum eunel Gaming, MB. 5 0 5 0 0 0 © Oo fo 939 438 542 501 628
WiheclsWibst) ki Mme a. JB, Ree ees 108 44°70 | 48°50 60 88
iWheeljdiameter, inches! .) 4 1 4) 4 se 36 87°40 37 38 36
Rrackowin chess wear, et) oe Smh a eee ae ee es 36 24 26°30 | 30:28 QA
Elevations deo Ae ies. ior Bog) wena una 25 24 nee 9 25
MICO, 9, GIR «gg G6 bp 6 GO 15 10 es a 15
Jeena dls 5 o of 6 6 ob bo wy 6 0 6 7:87 6:3; 10°14 12 13
Noe cp tee ey 6 | Gee eaten Lota Idd soles dm TO) me 984 rhe 941
Gunes. Us 6 ep eee 88 56°5 hee 50 55
Pack-saddles and Conmaleyr, Ik 5 6 2 6 o 84 58:4 ane ve 55
harness. Ainge, WS G6 Goo 87 Rik ne a0 55
Ammunition, Ibs... . . 86 61:2 me eS 50
Ammunition box, packed, Ibs). . . ... ./| 116 84°9 000 116 115
(Gunyvlbs: = haeeen ae eee 296 ale bi te ae
822 292 900 268 272
Cosine, ilk 6 0 6 0 6 0 0 0 306 809 ree au 258
HRCI swanctibliggs ¢ > o o 6 o « o 2 |. 88 Ul cm oh | 263
| acmmmnpumnom, lI co 0 6 0 0 © © 317 266 000 ae Nee
341 306 a 284? 280
Gun and carriage per ton of energy at one mile,
Semmes re ha “te 5 yee a 26'8 13'8 116

448 EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

Proposed United States Mountain Artillery Battery Organization of Siw 13-Pounder Guns.

W ar.

March.
Men. | Horses

Officers 4 4,
Staff sergeants . oP a oe ata 3 3
SORRME 6 6 » io 616 & 6b 6 9 4 4
Corporals 8 8
Artificers 3 3
Trumpeters . 2 2
Guidon 1 1

Total enlisted and horses . 21 25

Mr op owoa

Mules

Cannoneers (and muleteers) 48 48
Gun, carriage, and wheel ee ore 12
Ammunition fe. An 24
Baggage, officers . 000 3
Baggage, men . 0 8 9 90 8
Hospital’. <: Ho. lo. e 2
Cooking, rations, &e. ool thebeats es 4;
Water o ov 3 2
Stores . 2
Office . o ¢ 0G 0 G6 o DO 6 1
AGHIOS 9 a 6 6 2 0 Go 6 4 bo G 3
Chawoall, ¢ 59 9 0 0 6 0 0 6 6 9 6 i
Wonenmany 0 6 0 59 9 0 6 0 0 3 bo 1
Pioneer 2
Spare. 12

Total, men and mules . 69 126

1 Not required for Batteries with Infantry.

Men. | Horses

Mules.

OCOWRMRE OTH & O&O Uw

234

In conclusion, I think that, had the writer had more experience of
Mountain Artillery, he would have found reason to qualify some of his
statements. But in theory his paper is an excellent one.

44,9

IN| Oan dn SS"
ON

GERMAN MANCUVRES, 1894.

BY |

COLONEL A. H. TURNER, C.B., A.-A.-G., R.A.

Last autumn I had the privilege of being in the field for about a fort-
night with the 3lst German Division during its manoeuvres, on the
ground on which took place the events of the 4th, 5th, and 6th
August, 1870 in the war between Germany and France, as far as
the 3rd German Army under the Crown Prince of Prussia and the
force under Marshal MacMahon were concerned.

I was present at a night alarm at Weissenburg, followed by a rapid
march of the troops in and bivouacked round it, to the Geissberg,
whence they repelled an attack on the far side from the town. Four
batteries came into action at the “ Drei Pappeln,” on the position taken
up by the guns which were toilsomely dragged up the heights on the
4th August, 1870, when it was found that without artillery the brave
French defenders could not be driven out of the chateau.

TL also accompanied a brigade pursuing another from Worth to Siilz,
during which advance I had an opportunity of seeing the fine monument
to the late Emperor, erected on the spot from which he, as Crown
Prince, directed his army at the Battle of Worth. MacMahon’s position
on the opposite heights, marked by the tree, now known as “‘ MacMahon’s
Baum” is clearly visible to the naked eye. I was also present ab an
attack on Albrechtshatiserhof and the Niederwald, from the direction of
Gunstett ; and I witnessed a night attack upon a very strongly posted
skeleton brigade in the heights between Reichshofen and Hberbach
by a strong brigade supposed to be advancing from Bitsche and
Niederbronn.

The position was about a mile long and was captured about day-
break. As soon as it was light it became manifest that that had
happened, which must generally be the case after such an attack. The
troops of both sides were intermingled in curious confusion, most of
the position was captured, but the defenders in many portions of it held
on, long after the troops on either side had been driven far to the rear,

1 These notes formed the concluding portion of a lecture delivered to the City of London Artillery
Volunteers on the 8th February, 1895 on the Battles of Weissenburg and Worth,

9, Vou, Xxit. 61

450 NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@UVRES, 1894,

with the result that those who remained were captured from their rear.
Tt seems clear that a successful attack just before dawn must result in
the splitting up and utter annihilation of the enemy, owing to the
impossibility of conveying orders for a simultaneous retreat when once
the two sides are in contact, and the great difficulty of retreating at
all in an orderly manner under such circumstances.

The principal event was on the last day of the manceuvres: and I
give a translation of the orders for the day to both sides. (Vide
Appendix). The 11th Corps, as on the day of the battle of Worth, had
taken Morsbronn and Albrechtshaiiserhof, it had changed front to the
right and had forced the French almost through the Niederwald ; its
advance was brought to a stand-still on the road in the middle of the
Niederwald, and here a hardfightwas going on. Its rear was covered by
a force on the heights above Kberbach. This force was attacked by a
French division supposed to be that of de Failly, which it will be
remembered took no part in reality in the battle, but retreated with the
stragglers of MacMahon’s army, whom it attempted to rally about
Nederbronn.

Its attack was successful, Eberbach was taken, and the heights
stormed, when the Vorspitze of another German corps appeared at
Morsbronn. This ended the manceuvres.

I will conclude by giving an account of the present system of the
attack of a position by the Germans, which I saw carried out on many
occasions, and which, though no fixed regulations are given for such
attack, varied very little.

Toe Atrack or A GERMAN Division or 12 BarraLions.

The divisional cavalry is thrown out well in front of its division and
falls in with the enemy, who is posted in a defensive position, it
reconnoitres along his front and round his flanks if possible, and sends
in such information as to his position and strength, that the general
commanding the division determines to attack him; the cavalry with-
draw and take post behind one of the flanks of the division, and the
general, in order to cover his deployment and subdue the artillery fire
of the defence, sends all his batteries to a position about 2000 yards
from the enemy’s guns; here the artillery duel commences. When the
enemy’s fire is somewhat subdued, the guns are pushed forward to about
1800 yards of the position, and at this decisive range, the artillery fire
of the defence must be silenced or nearly so. ‘Tull thisis done, it is
considered that an infantry frontal attack has little chance of success.
This artillery duel is a long affair, it may be a matter of 2 or 3 hours,
but in manceuyres it rarely lasts over an hour. In the meantime the
infantry are approaching. The first line consisting of (1) firing line in
single rank, extended at intervals of one or more paces in single line
march on the designated point of attack, (2) the supports also extended
in single line follow at about 250 yards, and (8) the reserve in any
convenient formation follow at about the same distance. There is little
or no firing till the firing linearrives within about 1000 yards of the
position ; here it halts for a short time, and the supports close up and
reinforce the former, the reserve also diminishing its distance and

NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@UvRES, 1894. 451

extending. The reinforced firing line then moves rapidly forward in
one general line, without any rushes, and halts at about 500 yards of
the enemy ; here the reserves close up, and the now dense line for a few
minutes form in a heavy and sustained independent fire. This line
appeared to be very dense indeed, but in peace manceuvres it must be
borne in mind that there are no casualties to cause the gaps in the
ranks, which would be the case in war. Inthe meantime the rest of
the division, with the exception of a small reserve which the commander
holds in hand, is split up into companies and gradually advance in
single rank with drums beating and fifes playing. They move quite
independently and the whole country seemed covered with them, but
they all slowly but surely converge in the direction of the point o
attack till they are arranged in a sort of formation in many lines
opposite the objective or object of attack.

The firmg line followed by the rest then moved rapidly forward to
300 yards of the enemy and here a tremendous fire was poured in.
The mass in rear then closed on the firing line; suddenly one of its
companies followed by the rest, rushed forward and in a minute a huge
swarm without apparently any formation rushed upon the enemy, the
firing line supporting the assault with a rapid and ceaseless fire; the
swarm was at least 30 deep. ‘The guns had in the meantime advanced
to about 1100 yards. It is held that when the infantry approach the
enemy, artillery from a longer range than this cannot distinguish
between friend and foe. It may be said that it is highly dangerous for
artillery to approach within such a distance of infantry armed with the
present rifles. This would no doubt be the case when the enemy’s
infantry is unshaken and can devote its attention to the guns. But
all its time will be taken up with the infantry of the attack, and under
such circumstances, the guns can approach -to the nearest ranges.
Besides, the artillery is bound to take the same risks as the other
troops, and its propinquity gives an enormous amount of confidence to
them. Ifat such a time the guns remain at such a distance that it
becomes useless, it does not give the amount of support to its infantry,
as the latter has every reason and right to expect from it.

To return to the infantry. The position is captured, and it must be
evident that after such an attack all cohesion will be lost, and the
units must be all mixed up. This condition of things is constantly
practised, and the men fall in under the nearest officers without any
regard to their own companies, battalions, or even brigades and
divisions.

This was remarkably the case in the attack on the Niederwald which
I have described, where various units of the XI. corps were mixed up in
an indescribable manner. They were soon formed into cohesive bodies
and resumed the forward movement. But while this is going on
there is considerable danger of a counter-attack by the infantry: it is
the duty of the artillery to guard against this. From its position in
rear it is ready to cover a retirement if the assault fails; and on the
other hand if it succeeds and the position is captured the guns must be
hurried up to crown the position whence it must pour its fire on the
beaten enemy, it must prevent his reforming and, if necessary, pursue

452 NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@UYVRES, 1894,

him. As we have seen in the Niederwald the guns came up actually
in line with the skirmishers and repelled counter-attack after counter-
attack on the part of the French.

The Germans do not believe in very long ranges, guns and rifles now
carry very far, but after all it is the power of vision of man which must
fix the extent of ranges, and firing at long distances means small effect
and great waste of ammunition.

Little use was made of cover during the attack, the great object
being to press forward as rapidly as possible at all costs and seek a
decision at close ranges. It is very difficult indeed to fire with effect
at scattered lines advancing rapidly; the men get more and more
flurried as the enemy advances, and it takes cool heads to adjust the
sights properly and constantly to change them correctly. If you study
carefully Part V. of our new infantry drill-book, a most admirable
compilation, I think you will recognize that the system of attack there
laid down is in letter and spirit very much like the German system,
which I have endeavoured to describe.

The marching powers of the men are really very great, the Germans
say that the secret of victory liesin the legs of the men, and certainly
this was exemplified in the wonderfully long marches of the infantry
to the battle-fields of Vionville and Gravelotte. It is the practice of
the German army to carry in all work, outside the actual drill field, the
full marching order kit, so that the men become quite accustomed to
carry it.

One regiment from Heidelberg, which I know well, marched 53
kilometres or about 85 miles as an experiment carrying the new kit,
which weighs 26100 kilogrammes. Not aman fell out. On another
occasion I was present with a brigade which rendezvouzed at Worth,
and proceeded to Sulz in pursuit of the other brigade of the division
which was retiring. Many of the troops had already marched from
Reichshofen and Niederbronn to W6rth, which is,16 miles from Sulz;
they came up with the enemy first in position about 7 miles from Sulz
and after a tough fight drove him back; he took up another strong
position on the road to Sulz, from which he was driven, and he then
passed Sulz and took up the strongest position ofthe day, on a ridge
beyond the town, from which he delivered a powerful counterstroke
which terminated the manceuvre for the day. I accompanied the
infantry of the attack all day ; they marched much over 20 miles, and
forced two strong positions—I can vouch for the fact that not a man
fell out. It must be remembered that all the men were very young ;
very few indeed having more than two years service, which is now the
term for the infantry. No one could desire to command better soldiers.
The two years’ men were for the first time discharged after the
manceuvres last year. In 1893 many German officers told me that it
was a mistake to introduce thetwo years’ service law in place of the
three. But last autumn the same officers told me that they had been
mistaken, and they had found that it was quite possible to make a
thorough infantry soldier in two years. The men worked better,
knowing that they would return to their homes in two instead of three
years. Naturally it entailed more work on the officers and under-

NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@UvRES, 1894, 453

officers, but in Germany both these work in earnest.

Smokeless powder was used to a great extent. This gives a very
great advantage to the troops of the defence, as it is much more
difficult now to discover their positions owing to the absence of smoke.
In the case of artillery it enables the intervals of the guns to be very
much reduced where the ground is cramped and confined. The
Germans however never reduce these intervals if it can be avoided,
owing to the clearer target presented to the enemy. I once saw four
batteries massed in action, and the intervals were less than half. The
gunners and drivers were armed with revolvers; this I think is wise, if
cavalry can get within charging distance, say a mile, of guns, they will
if resolutely led assuredly get among them, and then unless the escort
of the guns is strong enough or other troops at hands, the men of the
battery are at the mercy of the enemy’s horsemen. There is no power-
ful case or grapeshot now as at Waterloo. Thus in the war of 1866 8
squadrons of the 5th Prussian Cuirassiers charged on 20 Austrian guns
and took them nearly all.

At Vionville on the extreme German left, north of Mars-la-Tour,
the French Chasseurs @ Afrique charged abattery of Horse Artillery
and held it for a few minutes till the German 11th Hussars drove them
off. The men of the battery took shelter behind the wheels and
carriages and defended themselves with revolvers; they suffered but
little loss. At the same battle Bredow’s brigade of the 7th Cuirassiers
and Uhlans in their celebrated charge rode through the French
batteries and cut down many of the gunners and drivers.

AY PEPER ND Text

MANQUVRES OF THE 31st DIVISION OF THE 247n
SEPTEMBER, 1894.

DAS Dis IN ATR ML YE «

SKELETON Enemy.
Special Idea :—

At daybreak the Eastern Army attacked the enemy, who was in position on the
left bank of the Sauer above Worth.

The 11th Corps has advanced from Diirrenbach and Gunstett and has driven the
enemy out of Morsbronn, Lausberg (Albrechtshaiiserhof), has occupied the heights
west of these places, and has taken Eberbach. The main body of the corps has
pursued the retreating enemy into the Niederwald, where a severe struggle
ensued, with the result that the victorious progress of the 11th Corps is brought
to a standstill on the high road leading from Eberbach to Spachbach and Worth.

Four batteries crown the heights between Morsbronn and the Niederwald, but
after the capture of Eberbach, they have no objective to fire at.

General yon Rocklin’s Infantry Brigade has occupied Eberbach and the small

454 NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@uVRES, 1894.

woods south-east of it with three battalions. Two flag battalions hold Albrecht-
shatiserhof ; three battalions (1 flag) and two squadrons are posted at Morsbronn.
The pioneers have thrown several additional bridges over the Sauer.

The 14th Army Corps is expected from the direction of Walburg.

General von Rocklin, under whose command all available troops south of the
Niederwald are placed is held responsible for securing the safety of the rear of the
troops fighting in the Niederwald against any reserves which the enemy may
bring up.

Troops at his disposal :—

Staff of the 61st Infantry Brigade.

Infantry Regiment 126th.

1st Battalion 137th Regiment.

3rd Battalion 138th Regiment.

5 Squadrons 15th Dragoons.

5 Squadrons 15th Uhlans.

3rd Abtheilung of the 31st.

Field Artillery Regiment reinforced by a Field Battery.

Pioneer Battalion No. 19, with the exception of 1 company.
Remarks :—

1, It is supposed that two flag battalions of the 126th Regiment hold
Albrechtshauserhof, and 1 flag battalion from the 8rd battalion 138th
Regiment, Morsbronn ; while 2 and 3 companies 19th Pioneer battalion
represent three flag battalions and hold the western exit of Walburg in
a position under cover with flags unrolled: upon the appearance of the
latter who represent the advance of the 14th Army Corps, the General
commanding will give special orders, on his own initiative.

Each flag battalion will be represented by a detachment under the command of

an officer, equal in strength to a section, and will be marked with a red flag.

2. The fight of the main body of the 11th Corps in the Niederwald north
of Eberbach will be marked by means of red and blue flags. The men
representing the Eastern Army will wear helmet covers and carry red
flags ; those representing the Western will have no helmet covers and
carry blue flags.

3. The skeleton enemy with blue flags should take up the positions assigned
to them by 7a.m.; where they will remain with piled arms till 7.30 a.m.

4, The Pioneers should increase the means of crossing the Sauer according
to present requirements. To carry out this the 19th Pioneer Battalion,
less 1 company, has been available since 9 p.m. on the 22nd.

5. All further dispositions for the marked enemy and for the position of
the blue flags are to be made by General von Rocklin.

6. The commencement of the manceuvres, z.e. the advance into the theatre
of operations at 7.30 a.m.

WESTERN ARMY.

3lst Division.
Special Idea :-—

A battle is going on on the banks of the Sauer both above and below Worth.

The 31st Infantry Division and the 31st Cavalry Brigade is standing in reserve
about 1000 metres west of Schirlenhof.

An officer of the General Staff brings an order to the General commanding the

NOTES ON GERMAN MANG@UVRES, 1894. 455

above troops to move in the direction of Gunstett, and to drive the troops of the
enemy, who are pushing forward on the south side of the Niederwald, back over
the Sauer; then to wheel to the left and join vigorously in the fight in the
Niederwald.

He gives the following directions :—

The enemy has seized all the passages across the Sauer: on the other hand our
positions on the crests of the heights east of Nehweiler, Froschweiler and
Elsasshausen have so far been victoriously maintained in face of repeated attacks
by very superior forces.

Advancing from Diirrenbach and Gunstett the enemy has occupied for more
than two hours Morsbronn, and Lausberg (Albrechtshaiiserhof). Our right wing
has been hurled back in a north-westerly direction into Niederwald, while
Eberbach, after being cannonaded by several (4 or 5) batteries from the heights
between Morsbronn and the Niederwald, has also been lost.

In the Niederwald the battle appears to have come to a standstill on the high
road Eberbach—Spachbach and Worth.

Troops :—

61st Infantry Brigade.

132nd Infantry Regiment.

138th Infantry Regiment (less the 3rd Battalion).

62nd Infantry Brigade. ~

60th Infantry Regiment.

137th Infantry Regiment (less the 1st Battalion).

31st Cavalry Brigade.

15th Uhlan Regiment t ieee a

15th Dragoon Regiment, | (less 5 squadrons).

Field Artillery Regiment No, 31 (less the 3rd Abtheilung
and 1 Field Battery.

19th Pioneer Battalion, 1 Company.

Remarks :—
1, The enemy’s troops (with helmet covers) are partly in full strength and
partly skeleton which are represented as follows :—

G) &X battalion by a detachment and a red flag, (this is a
departure from the rule so far during the Autumn
mancetvres).

(.) A battery by a gun with a yellow flag.
(c.) A squadron by a detachment with a white flag.
Blue flags mark the extremities of the flanks of the troops already engaged with
the enemy ; our own without helmet covers, the enemy’s with.

2. The operations commence at 7.30.

Ve
aw) eS

fa)
(b)
(Cc)
(d)
(@)
(f)
(8)
(h)
(Dp

(k)
(1)

(m)
(n)
(0)
(p)
(q)
(P)
(s)

REFERENCES,

The Orange Grove.

Point Negro.

The. Spanish Hospital.

The Enemies’ Fascine Park.
The Spanish Camp.

The Duc de Crillons quarters.
The Town of St. Roch.
Grand Park of Artillery.
Tessiers Battery.

Camp of the Grenadiers of Ireland.
Camp of the Catalanes.
Neapolitan Brigade.

Batteria del Rey.

Stone quarry.

French Brigade.

Queen of Spain’s Chair.

St. Felipe . ) Part of the
Infanta, Battery of 7 Guns _) Spanish Lines.

REFERENCES TO THE WORKS, &c. OF THE

No.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

GARRISON.

The Old Moorish Castle.
The White Convent.
The Old Mole.

The Governor’s Quarters,
The Spanish Church.
The King’s Bastion.
The Grand Store.

The South Bastion.
South Port.

The Citadel.

The Fascine Park.

The Princess of Wales’s Lines.
Rage’d Staff.

Lunette.

Ragged Staff Head.
Eight Gun Battery.

View of the Grand Ettack on the Garrison of Gibraltar on the 13th Sept., 1782,

From a Water Colour by Captain Tuomas Histor, 39th Regiment of Foot, in the possession of the R.A. Institution.

THORN Wootwicn.

457

SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

BREVET-LIHUTENANT-COLONEL J. ADYE, R.A.

The great Siege of Gibraltar as related in a manuscript diary kept
throughout the siege by Captain Spilsbury, 12th Foot, an officer of the
garrison, and hitherto unpublished.

THere are few if any military operations in English history in which
the Royal Artillery has borne a more important or distinguished part
than the defence of Gibraltar during the great siege of 1779-1783, and
any records of this defence must possess undoubted interest for officers
and men of the Regiment.

Fortunately such records are fairly numerous, and the pages of the
best known account—that of Drinkwater—contain much detailed infor-
mation of considerable value.

In his excellent history of the Regiment the late Colonel Duncan
devotes a chapter, written with his usual charm of style, to this impor-
tant struggle, and gives much imformation about the conduct of the
artillery part of the defence.

Such information must necessarily have more interest for those who
have a personal knowledge of the Rock—fortunately a large portion of
the Regiment—and who may perhaps have carried out practice from
some of the batteries constructed during the siege and named, as they
often are, after individuals who have been distinguished in the history
of Gibraltar.

A short time ago a most interesting volume dealing entirely with the
great siege was brought to my notice, and I at once saw that it would
prove a valuable addition to the already existing chronicles of that
period, for it purported to be an original manuscript diary kept by an
officer who was present throughout the siege, and who illustrated his
written diary by numerous water-colour and pen and ink sketches.

This diary, which was presented to the Gibraltar Garrison Library not
long ago by a descendant of the writer of it, has never, I believe, been
published, but had remained in the custody of the diarist’s family in its
_ original manuscript form for over a hundred years.

On reading it through attentively it seemed to me so interesting as
well as so quaint in its expression and wording as to warrant the repro-
duction of parts of it. I accordingly communicated most of the more
interesting portions to the local paper—the Gibraltar Chronicle—in a
series of twelve short articles which appeared once a week from the
3rd of September to the 19th of November 1894, with such brief notes
and comments as I was able to add.

9. VOL. XXII. 62

458 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

It then suggested itself to me that many of the extracts, especially
those dealing with the Royal Artillery, would perhaps have sufficient
interest to bear their reproduction in the “ Proceedings” of the Royal
Artillery Institution, hence the following pages which do not of course
pretend to any originality but are merely a reprint of some of the more
curious or more interesting entries in the journal.

The writer—Captain Spilsbury—was not an artilleryman, but be-
longed to the 12th Foot, but the great interest he evidently took in all
artillery matters and the details he gives regarding them make it
probable that he—like so many infantry officers—was told off to assist
the artillery in their very arduous duties.

One very satisfactory point about his diary is the remarkable way in
which it almost invariably agrees with Drinkwater’s history, even to the
smallest details—indeed I cannot help thinking that the better known
writer may have had the advantage of perusing Captain Spilsbury’s
account before publishing his history.

But Drinkwater’s more sober pages do not possess the naiveté and
sarcasm of some of Spilsbury’s remarks, and so thoroughly characteristic
a diary is not often seen.

It has an added attraction in the many painstaking and accurate
drawings accompanying it, drawings which may not perhaps possess
great artistic merit, but are certainly very faithful pictures of the bay,
the surrounding country, the enemy’s ships, works and approaches, our
own guns, howitzers and carriages, and many other things connected
with the siege.

Besides these sketches there are tables, some of great interest, giving
heights and distances about the Rock, soundings in the bay, nature and
number of ordnance mounted or rounds fired both by the attack and
the defence.

IT have not confined myself to artillery matters only but have given
some extracts which are of general interest by reason of the importance
of the events they narrate or of the language and sentiments of the
writer.

Before commencing the extracts from the diary it may be of interest
if I give a few particulars as to the garrison of the Rock and the Royal
Artillery at that period, and for these particulars I have drawn upon
well known authorities, such as Duncan, Drinkwater, &c.

The Royal Regiment of Artillery in the year in which the siege com-
menced—1779—consisted of 82 Service and 8 Invalid companies,
which were augmented at the end of the year by the addition of 2 more
Invalid companies. Sixteen of the service companies were in America,
one in Newfoundland, three in the West Indies, three in Minorca, and
five in Gibraltar, leaving but four of the whole thirty-two at home.
The five companies at Gibraltar were the five senior companies of the
2nd Battalion, and were commanded by Colonel Godwin! when the siege
commenced, but on his coming to England in 1780 the command passed
to Colonel Tovey? who died during the night of the great sortie, 27th

1 Kane’s List, No. 66.
2 Kane’s List, No. 92.

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR, 4.59

November, 1781 and was succeeded by Major Lewis.!

The strength of the artillery was 25 officers, and 460 non-commis-
sioned officers and men who had to work the following armament which
was mounted by the end of the siege :-—

Guns. Mortars. Howitzers.
77 32 pounders. 29 18 inch. 19 10 inch.
122 24 and 26 pounders. 110 inch. 9 8 inch,
70 12 pounders. 6 8 inch.
16 9 pounders. 34 smaller natures.

25 6 pounders.
38 3 and 4 pounders.

348 Guus. 70 Mortars. 28 Howitzers.

A total of 446 pieces of ordnance, or nearly as many guns, we. as there
were gunners.

The expenditure of ammunition between September 1779 and Feb-
ruary 1783 was 57,163 shot, 129,151 shell, 12,681 grape, 926 carcasses,
679 light balls—or 200,600 rounds and about 8000 barrels of powder.
The enemy’s expenditure from April 12th 1781, to February 2nd
1783,—the period of their greatest activity—is said to have been
175,741 shot, and 68,363 shell, or 244,104 rounds in all, “ agreeable to
the laboratory accounts,” as Drinkwater says, while the Spanish gun-
boats threw 4283 projectiles to the 4728 from our gun-boats.

The artillery losses were—killed 23, died of wounds 8, totally disabled
13, wounded 116, died of sickness 36 = 196, a percentage of 40 on the
total strength.

The original garrison of the Rock numbered 5382 men, consisting of
Artillery, Engineers, a company of Artificers, the 12th, 39th, 56th,
and 58th Regiments of the Tine, and a Hanoverian Brigade, com-
prising Hardenberg’s, Reden’s, and De la Motte’s regiments. They
were reinforced in 1780 by the 73rd Highlanders (over 1000 strong),
in 1781 by 700 of the 97th Regiment, and in 1782 by 1600 men of the
25th and 59th Regiments.

We now come to the diary itself, on the fly-leaf of which, written in
the neat running hand which characterises the whole contents, is the
following :—

“CapraIn JOHN SPILSBURY’S JOURNAL OF THE Great SrEcE.”

“This Journal was kept by Captain Jno. Spilsbury, 12th Regiment
Foot, who remained in Gibraltar from lst March, 1776, to i0th
November, 1783.” -

The first entry in the diary is dated June 21st, 1779, and the last
November 10th, 1788. The very first entry runs thus :—

“ 21st June, 1779.—This day the communication is shut with Spain,
the Guards are reinforced and Grand Battery made a Captain’s Night
Guard, the Picquets are ordered to lie accoutred, with their arms
loaded. No one to pass at Landport but Workmen, Engineers, &c.,

1 Kane’s List, No. 176, : =

460 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

and in Case of an Alarm the Town Regiments to Line the Wall of the
Town, and those of the Southward to form on their Parades.”

Various other entries relate to the precautions to be observed and
the early measures taken during the Siege, the most curious of which
is perhaps—

“21st July.—The Guards to mount without Powder in their Hair.”

We shall see presently how the writer accounts for the disposal of
the said powder.

“5th August.—People employed making three Batteries, one above
Willis’s and two below it, also in making an Encamp Ground for about
600 men just above the Devil’s Gap, where a mortar is planted, and in
making Bomb Proofs in the Wax Yard.”

Willis’s, it may be explained, was then, as it is now, the name given
to a group of batteries looking north across the Neutral Ground, and at
some height up the Rock.

There is now a battery at Devil’s Gap.

“29th August.—Our Men of War’s Boats go out now and then, but
are always either too soon or too late. The Admiral continues to live
on shore.”

“ 12th September.—Green’s Lodgement being finished, which is about
900 feet above the level of the Istmus, Willis’s, &c., began firing on
the Spanish Lines about } past 6 a.m., and made very bad practice—
the Dons had several working parties there, and had last night thrown
up a Fascine Battery to the Hastward of their common entrance. The
Devil’s Tower Guard called in before the firing.”

The writer always speaks of the besiegers as “the Dons,” never as
“the Spaniards” or “the enemy.”

The Devil’s Tower is a tower still standing just below the perpen-
dicular face of rock on the North Front.

“ 14th September.—The Batteries fire as usual, they hit the Forts of
Phillip and Barbara, &c., frequently but do them little damage, nor
are they likely to be knocked down, so much the boast of the Artillery;
but on September 30th we find “The Officers of the Artillery receive
double pay.”

“ 16th September.—Two Shells from the Sea Mortar at Willis’s fired
with 33 lb. of Powder burst in leaving the Mortar but one with 28 lb.
fell and burst about half-way between Fort Phillip and their Encamp-
ment, about 3500 yards. 24 Pounders mounted at Green’s Lodge.”

“24th September.—A duck and a small plumb-pudding cost 7 shil-
lings.” i

“29th September.—The Dons have raised a parapet from Fort Philip
to the Corporal’s Guard and from thence seem to cover themselves
towards their Laboratory Tents at the Foot of the Queen of Spain’s
Chair, so cautiously do they act on all occations. They have erected a
Stage at the Orange Grove for landing their Stores. Mortars seen
there.”

These names are still in use and indeed Spilsbury very rarely employs a
name whether of a place on the Rock or in Spain, that is not in com-
mon use at this day. Wegnow come to a very curious entry—

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 461

“3rd October.—One 58th man was overheard saying that if the
Spaniards came damn him that would not join them. The Governor
said he must be mad and ordered his Head to be shaved, to be blis-
tered, bled, sent to the Provost on bread and water, wear a tight
waistcoat, and to be prayed for in Church.”

Unfortunately we are not informed if this entensive and peculiar
treatment restored the 58th man to sanity.

“6th October.—Road making to the Rock Guard—failed in getting
a 24 Pounder up by Ropes. Nothing to be seen Offensive in the
Spanish Lines, except some Traverses of Fascines and a Covered Way
from the Hntrance towards their Emcampment.”

On October 9th we read “ The gun is got up to the Rock Guard ;”
and on the 13th “ The Rock Gun is fired.”

The “ Rock Gun” is situated at the high point at the extreme north
end of the Rock—some 1830 feet high.

“14th October.—The Sailor’s Battery in the Navy Yard is watched
to keep people from walking on the Platforms which being made of
Clay sinks in when wet very deep, the Engineer late Master of the
Ad. has a Cob a day for making it.”

“15th October.—Charged 7 shillings sterling for a Dinner of Salt
Beef, and little bit of Fish and Pudding.”

“26th October.—The Navy pick the Fish-Boats and spoil the market,”
is his querulous complaint, and on any question of food he is very
touchy, as we shall presently see.”

“27th October.—Geese at a guinea each and ducks at two dollars.
Traverses are building up the Main Street,” is his odd entry.

“4th November.—The Dons have opened three Batteries in the Lines
two of 14 Guns ani one of 7 and have raised their Parapet very high in
several Places. An officer and 40 men to join the Lines Guard. The
Guns at All’s Well fired several times, and otherwise much firing.”

“5th November.—The Artillery have not fired these 48 hours, and
are now not to fire till they see something to fire at,” which looks as if
they had, up till then, been in the habit of letting off their guns
promiscuously in the hope of an occasional ball finding its billet.

“7th November.—Nineteen shillings given for a Pig’s Head. The
Governor does not care how dear things are, but he has left off treating
with Hock and Claret. Traversing platforms seem to be quite in vogue,”
a most curious mixture of information that reads very delightfully.

“ 8th November.—Method of reporting for repair of Quarters to the
Chief Ingineer altered—so no more partiality.”

Then on the 9th November.

“The Governor seems desirous to have as many Gardens made as
possible, he has tried what a man can subsist on, and lived himself for
8 days on 4 oz. of rice per day, so that without a supply we are like to
know within a grain or two what we areable todo. Some of his Horses
in bad trim, and wear no shoes, he files their feet.”

Finally we culminate on November 12th with—

“It seems the Governor has bought up all the Hair Powder, and eats

462 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR,

Puddings made of it. Veal sells at 2 guineas per quarter.”’

“22nd November.—A. Ten Inch Howitzer was fired and found to carry
as far with about 5lb. powder, as a 138 Inch Mortar that requires
ror L052

A little later we read that “the above Howitzer at 39 Degrees
Elevation throws to Fort Barbara with only 2lb. 10 oz. of Powder, is of
a new Construction, few of them only are in the Garrison.”

Presently we read that “ Mr. Boyd, Carpenter, constructed a en
with which to mount a Gun.”

On December Ist he has the following amusing entry: “ Some of the
Artillery so careless as to make use of a Magazine as a Guard Room.”

The British Gunner is proverbially a careless person, but he perhaps
excelled himself in that respect in this instance.

On December 2nd:—“ A mule on the works strayed to the Spanish
Lines”; and on the 4th “A Parley, and the mule sent back.”

Here is a quaint experiment in Artillery practice.

‘11th December.—Tried if a shell would go further from a Height or
upon a Level which proved in the former. It was thought here that a
shell went straight forward from the Piece to the end of the Progressive
Force and then fell perpendicularly down.”’

Where was the Gunnery Instructor ?

“« 14th December.—A Deserter killed and hanged by them, a Dragoon
in pursuit of him was knocked off his Horse by one of our Guns and lay
some time but afterwards got up and walked awa

Practice at a moving target was evidently well ‘understood by our
Artillery if they hit a dragoon on the wing, but the efficacy of their fire
is rather discounted by the fact that the dragoon afterwards got up and
walked away, unless Spanish dragoons were made of particularly hard
material a hundred years ago.

“ 19th December.—The Donsexercised small arm and fired a good deal.
Vessels not to be fired at unless within the distance of 6 Degrees
Elevation.”

* 12th January, 1780.—Forts Barbara and Phillip fired several shots
at our waggons going to the Devil’s Tower for stone, one came to the
French Parade through a House and fellin the street and wounded a
woman—to the great surprise of everyone who did not think they could
throw a shot so far.”

“26th January.—A shot came near the Demi Bastion from their Morning
Gunat Point Malo.” This is probably what is now known as the Hesse
Demi Bastion flanking the Grand Battery at the entrance to the
Fortress.

Punta Mala is about 4,000 yards distant from the Demi Bastion.

In January 1780 arrived Admiral Roduey’s fleet with provisions for
the garrison—not before they were wanted—and the surrender from
starvation which at one time seemed not impossible was averted.

The diary for the next few months contains little of special Artillery
interest, and most of it 1s devoted to the price of food, scarcity or other-
wise of provisions, and the health of the garrison.

A new excitement was to arise however in June 1780, Itisthus noted
by Captain Spilsbury.

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 4.63

June 7th, Wednesday, Wind about N.W. “ About 2 a.m. came the
Fire Ships, one a 2 Decker, the others 9 in all, some Frigates, other
small Craft, appeared near the Enterprise and answered Swedes, but
on being fired at were set on Fire and burnt most furiously, our Sailors
steered them clear of the New Mole for which they were steering: six
fell on the Rocks from Rosia to Huropa, and the other 3 were carried by
the Current burning to the Eastward.”

“8th June.—The Sailors employed in geting in the Bottoms of the F.
Ships and seling them for Fuel.”

“24th June.—A 70 Gun Ship, the St. Michael, 2 Frigates and a
Xebeck coming near Huropa were fired at, which they returned and fired
many broad sides at the Rock and Shipping and threw several Shot on
shore. The Enterprise had 19 men burnt and wounded by their own
bad Management.”

The entry of the 29th August is a curious one.

This day remarkable for the death of one Colonel and Trial of another.
Colonel M and Colonel R , the latter tried for attempting to
depretiate Genl. B in the eyes of his Regiment. Arrived a boat
from Mr. Logie in Barbary. A Duel between 2 Officers 1 wounded.
Salt Pork 24 Reals p. 1b. Salt Beef 1 Real 12 Qts.”

The Ist of October 1780 was a day of some importance because it was
then that the Mill battery was begun by the Spaniards on the Neutral
Ground, a battery that afterwards caused a good deal of annoyance to
me ereisen: and was destroyed in the sortie of the 27th November,
1781,

There were at one time two Towers on the isthmus, the Devil’s
Tower which still exists, and the Mill Tower near the Western beach
1100 yards distant from the Grand Battery and destroyed by fire from
the Rock during the Siege. Captain Spilsbury marks this tower in a
sketch of these advanced works, which is inserted at this point in the
Diary, and it was doubtless from it that the Mill Battery was named.

A The West Guard House. B The Middle Guard House. C The Approaches. The 13 Gun
Battery, E The Empetrardo Battery. F The Mill Battery, B The Mahon Bathory od

464 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

“1st October (Sunday).—A bout 2 a.m. the Dons erected the first of the
Mill Battery and set fire to the Huts and Canes in the Gardens, and
hung fire Machines on the Palisadoes of Bayside and Forbes’s, and set
fire to the latter but the Guard put it out. The Dons advanced under
cover of heaps of dung, Rubbish, &c. that have long been let to remain
before these outposts ; the guards fired several shots, but the Dons hid
themselves immediately—in short those are bad works and were badly
managed.”

“9th October.—Queen’s Lines making. The Rubbish &c. leveled
before Bayside and Forbes’s and the large Stones broke and the Holes
filled up to prevent the Dons secreting themselves there, and Casks put
up by way of Breastwork within the Palisadoes, but after alla miserable
work and poor invention.”

“26th October.—Last night the advanced work made as big again.
Much firing on our side.”

“ 19th November.—Last night the Gun Boats came again and on our
firing an Iron 32 Pr. on the King’s Bastion it burst and killed one of
the Artillery and wounded three other men of different Regts :—several
large pieces flew about the Town.”

26th November.—They have begun their approaches to the advanced
work from their Lines, and have fired small arms and drove in our
gardeners, and the Gun Boats have drove in our men of war to the New
Mole and most of their Vessels are gone to the Westward.”

“ 20th December.—Arrived the Speedwell King’s Cutter with Dis-
patches, but no News, great secretcy at Head Quarters.”

“Last night the Water run in such Floods at Willis’s that one of the
Gunners was carried down by it and broke his Thigh.”

“‘The Marksmen have mounted Guard for some time at the Lines,
and fire frequently on the Dons at work, but they make game of
them.”

The year 1871 opened unfavourably for the besieged Garrison of
Gibraltar, for the Emperor of Morocco had been induced to let his
three ports of Tetuan, Tangier and Larache to the Spaniards, with the
result that the supplies from that country, on which Gibraltar so
largely depended, were cut off, and the English Consuls and many
of the English inhabitants of those places were obliged to leave.

« 25rd January.—A 18 Inch Mortar mounted on the highest part of
the N. Rock on a Swivel Platform, and answers very well. Yesterday
a Sergeant of the 56th deserted from Lower Forbesses Guard, and one
Hardenberg deserted down the back of the Rock, and the Master of
St. Firming killed himself by drinking.”

“28th January.—The Governor has given gratuities for having fired
and kept a good look out, and now they fire pretty often.”

“ 30th January.—Tried a gun at 2, 4, and 5 Degrees elevation lashed
so as not to recoil, and again unlashed and free, when the latter went
the farthest. At 2 degrees it ricocheed 6 times and went farther than
at 5 degrees when it ricocheed only twice.”

“26th February.—Several experiments made on Platforms of Guns
and Mortars. One by laying Junk with a Spindle in the Centre by

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 465

which the Bed goes on a Swivel and answers very well.”

On March 7th he says :—“The 8 Inch Howitzer broke the Swivel
Pin, but the 42 stands 8 lb. of Powder.”

“6th April.—Fired three 13 Inch Shells from the Rock Mortar at
the advanced work, 2 of which struck on the Parapet and damaged it
much.”

Food had gradually been getting scarcer, and entries in the diary
make constant mention of rising prices, but on April 12th a fleet under
Admiral Darby escorting a large convoy arrived in the Bay. Spilsbury’s
entry runs—

“ About 11 a.m. arrived the Convoy, about 130 sail, of which 28 of
the Line, 4 or 5 Frigates, a Fire Ship, Cutter, &c. being preceded in
the night before by the Kite Cutter, who brought despatches that were
immediately taken to the Governor, and about + after just as the leading
ship dropped her Anchor their Batteries began Bombarding the Town
which they kept up, resting only in the middle of the day for their
Siesto.”

On the 15th we find this entry. ‘Such a scene of drunkenness,
debauchery, and destruction was hardly ever seen before,” the result
of the arrival not only of food and stores but of wine and rum.

It was on this day that the besiegers commenced their bombard-
ment of Gibraltar which went on with but slight intermission for many
months.

Presently we read—

“27th April.—The traverses not shot proof and several men
wounded, &c., in the South Flank King’s Bastion. The magazine
was in that Flank but shifted a day or two ago.”

The number of ordnance bearing on the place at this time is given
by Drinkwater as 114—guns and mortars.

“ 15th May.—The Mill Battery fired three shells, one Middle Yard
South Barracks, one near the Old and Grand Magazine Rosia, and the
other to near St. Michael’s Cave.”

The Spaniards had constructed some gunboats with which at about
this time they commenced to harrass the Garrison, and their fire from
their land batteries increased also, so that much damage was done to
the town, and many people killed.

The following entry gives a fair idea of the horrors of the bombard-
ment.

“24th May.—About midnight a shell fell into a House South Shed
and buried about 16 people for 2 or 8 Hours, but they were got out by
the Assistance of the Picquet except a Child belonging to the poor
woman 68th that was killed some time ago, which perished by it.
Three Jews, one that had lost all he had in town, near 10,000 Pounds,
his clerk, and a Relation a woman were killed by a shell in their House
in Black Town, and 2 Butchers, inhabitants, were killed and one
wounded and one 73rd was killed in his Bed in S. Barracks. Two
shells fell in the Hospital Yard, and a shot went through the Roof of
the pavilion at the Hospital where Lt. Lowe was. Our batteries were
manned but did not fire.

466 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

Not a bad record of disaster for 24 hours.

“4th June.—Hoisted the Royal Standard, and the Dons fired a great
deal at it, and sent one shot through it. At 1 p.m. our North Front
fired a Round from Right to Left at the Mill Battery, but only shewed
the Dons they could hardly hit it.”

“9th June-—About 11 a.m. the Laboratory of the Dons took fire
and blew up, with a great number of Loaded Shells, &c.”

In order to counteract the effect of the enemy’s gun boats the
Governor caused some prames or gun boats to be constructed at about
this time, and to be moored within range of our guns, but at a suffi-
cient distance to keep the enemy’s gun boats from coming close in.
Drinkwater says that two brigs were cut down to form these prames,
one of which was called the Vanguard, carried two Spanish 26
pounders two 12-prs and was rigged like a settee; and at the end of his
diary Captain Spilsbury gives coloured drawings of this boat and the
Repulse, and also the Fortune which was cut down to a prame later
in the year.

His entry referring to it is—

21st June.—One of our Gun Boats or Prames enioheds and carries
four 26 prs. and two 12 prs.”

Another development of the defence devised about this time was
the construction of a battery at the end of the old Mole from which
the enemy’s camp could be shelled. The annoyance this work caused
the Spaniards made them name it the “ Devil’s tongue” battery—and
as such it is known to this day.

Its armament consisted of a 13 inch sea service mortar fired with a
charge of 284 to 30 lbs. of powder, and five 32 pounders and one 18
pounder sunk in the sand at an angle of 42°, and using charges of
fourteen and nine pounds of powder respectively. Spilsbury says—

“27th June.—All ready at the old Mole for throwing shot and Shells
into the Spanish Camp.”

This battery was first fired on June 28th and produced an excellent
effect.

Here is an experiment :—~—

“7th July.—tTried the Strength of Powder, when a difference of 40
or 50 yards was found in two ounces of different Powder dried against
undried.”’

Here is another very curious entry :—

“ 15th July.—tVhe Jews’ Burying Ground dug up in the night by
Captain W Artillery and made a garden of.”

_ © 16th July.—The Dons now and then return a shot but reluctantly,
our Batteries tease them.”

“One 12th that had had his Thigh broke by a shell came. out of the
Hospital yesterday, got Drunk and broke it again.”

“19th July.—The Merlons Queen’s Battery Willis’s Cassoned and
finished last night, and the Dons have not fired at it.”

“20th July.—The Dons saluted us from the Lines with 28 or 9 shots,
and fired a Feu de Joie, from the Camp, Island, Shipping, Gun Boats,

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR, 467

&c., the whole three times over, a very pleasing sight.” It would have
been less pleasing, we imagine, had the rounds been ball.

“22nd June.—A duel 8 Pistols each between the Major and
Adjutant, — Reet.”

“ Ist August.—Found that the most Powder makes the shell burst
closer and in most pieces.”

“14th August.—Several of the Gun Boats gone to the second River,
where they repair and careen them.”

The hospital seems to have suffered very severely from the fire of
the enemy’s gun boats, and there are constant entries relating the
damage done and the casualties incurred there. Perhaps the most
thrilling of these is related in the following extract, which is confirmed
by Drinkwater :—

“ 28th August.—About 1 am. came the Gun Boats, 16th time, and
fired shells only. One fell” (in the) “ Artillery ward on the Bed of a
man that was wounded before, and burnt for some time. He called for
assistance but none dared give it him; it burst, carried off one Leg,
broke the Thigh of the other, and burnt him much, he died some time
after,” and Drinkwater adds “ His last words were expressive of regret
that he had not been killed on the batteries”—a proper sentiment for
a Gunner.

The same day Captain Spilsbury writes :—

“Verbal and private orders given out, so that Officers are stopped by
Centries without knowing they are wrong.”

“31st August.—An experiment—wooden Ramrods against the Sailors’
Rope one, but the wooden ones remain in practice.” This no doubt
refers to rammers for the heavy guns.

12th September.—The Shell that fell on the Magazine in the Moorish
Castle, Hastern Side, 8.H. angle made a Hole in bursting &c. that held
Six Thousand filled sand Bags of a Bushel each, and went six Inches
into the old work of which the Arch &c. is 7 feet thick.”

“16th September.—A shell fell up the Rock and roled down to the
Northernmost Gun Princess of Wales’s Lines and bursting fired it off.
This is the 8rd gun that has been fired in that manner since the firing
began.”

At times Captain Spilsbury waxes rather sarcastic, but as he hits all
round, from the Governor downwards, we must not resent his remarks.
Here he has a hit at the Royal Artillery.

“27th September.—It seems the Governor has given leave to the
Artillery to exert themselves, only instead of knocking down Fort
Barbara, which was their first boast, to prevent them from covering
the merlons, even which they are not able to do, two of them being
covered already.”

“29th September.—The Rock mortar split by a shell’s bursting in it,
which is contrary to the given opinion. It seems Cradles are not
sufficiently provided for the Hospital, nor places to perform Surgical
operations in, the Wards where the sick are, are all they have, the others
being Inhabited by Families, &c. The H. Doctors.are little better than

468 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

Butchers, and ours are not trusted with medicines. When Major B.
was wounded no proper dressings were at the Main Guard, where a
Mate attends, the Director being accused of it next morning, answered
there were, having sent them just before at daylight.”

“2nd October.—The Enemy firedabout2,000rounds lastnight. Every
gun that could bear kept going.”

“6th October.— The Dons fire now at our working parties, from ten to
twenty guns at a time, yet we continue to have about 200 men at work
on the Hill perfectly exposed, when half the number, well attended,
would do more work, and not be in one anothers way.”

“ Some cows killed on the Hill, when a shell falls they go and smell
to it.”

“ 12th October.—The gunner that fired the Rock Mortar when it burst
is dead, having broke a blood vessel in his head,’ and another, “A
drummer of the 12th punished for beating two Surgeon’s mates,” and
again “The officers of Artillery dine with the Governor the day they
come off guard.”

“ 16th October.—It seems a remarkable circumstance happened on the
10th instant. A gunon Montagu” (Montagu Bastion) “ being loaded
with a shell, and a hole as usual bored in the cartridge for the priming
it was fired with a Tube, and the contents shell and all fell on the Glacis
Waterport, the shell having got fire lay a short time and burst, but the
Cartridge was taken up untouched by the Fire, and reported to the
Governor.”

The above statement can, I fear, scarcely be swallowed by a gunner.

A few days later we read ‘‘ The men have only one or two nights in
bed,” which shows how hard the duty was at this period.

On the 25th October the daily entry concludes with “The officers
riot a little.”

“ 29th October.—On complaint that the sick have not Room enough
at the Hospital all the Interlopers are turned out, but the Governor’s
Housekeeper ; the Doctor B. is not to have a whole ward to himself.”

“ 6th November.—A man or two that came with the Boats are taken
up aS spies, and one a native of Gibr. has confessed he was sent here
for that purpose. The Line Wall about Montagu and the Demi Bastions
very much damaged by their shot, and our men in the Works do any-
thing but work. Old Junk has been hung over the Batteries and has
preserved them very much.”

“19th November.—The Dons throw long Rangers now from the Mill
Batty. all about the South Barracks.”

‘21st November.—The Dons continue their long Rangers, and the
splinters fly all about even to Bona Vista.”

We now come to one of the most important and perhaps the most
remarkable event of the siege—the celebrated and successful sortie of
November 27th 1781.

Captain Spilsbury’s entry is unfortunately a very meagre one, which
is odd from one who paid so much attention to trivial details, and whose
regiment was actively engaged. From the way he words it it would

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 469

appear that he did not take part in the sortie. He redeems his
omissions with the pen by his use of the pencil and the brush, for he
not only gives an excellent and apparently very correct plan of the
North Front, the Gardens, and the enemy’s works, but he adds a
coloured table showing the disposition of each regiment, corps, and
detachment, the order of their attack and the numbers of men engaged.
These numbers agree in every respect with those given by Drinkwater.

In a corner of this coloured plate—the colours of which are as bright
as if painted yesterday—are two admirably drawn coloured repre-
sentations of sections through the enemy’s two principal works, the
Mill Battery and Empetrardo_Battery, showing the positions of a gun
and a mortar in the act of being fired at high angles of elevation from
behind cover,

Section through the Empetrardo Battery.

This is his entry for the day.

About 12 last nt. a detachment of the Garrison assembled on the
Red Sands, and waited for the Moon’s going down at about 3 am.
when they marched out at Land Port under Command of the Governor
by the name of Brigr. Ross; and attacked, burnt, and destroyed the
Dons’ new and advanced Batteries, and returned to their Quarters
before daylight with loss of only 4 killed and 17 wounded, and 1 missing,
Rhedens. One 12th, two Hardenbergs, and one 78rd killed. Lieut.
Tweedy 12th, 4 sailors, and a Sergt. 89th wounded. ‘Two officers were
brought in with 10 Privates prisoners.”

The Royal Artillery taking part in this bold and admirably executed
affair numbered 114 of all ranks—and while they were playing their
part in the action—that of spiking the guns, destroying the magazines,
and firing the works, their commanding officer, Colonel Tovey, was
dying in Gibraltar. ‘’he command was then assumed by Major Lewis.

Captain Spilsbury writes, on the following day :—

“ At about 3 a.m. the work still on Fire, and some of the loaded shells
going off. The Don’s threw up a Rocket and continued an incessant
fire Cannon, small arms, &c. on the work for the space of an Hour
supposing our second attack.”

“ 4th December.—A Flag of Truce, with some things for the prisoners
with the Walloon’s Compliments and Thanks for our care of them.
The Spaniards put from 138 to 18 lbs. of Powder into their 13 Inch

470 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

Mortars to reach the Town from their Lines, and from 22 to 26, for
their long Rangers, but their lb. is heavier than Ours.

Their Patroles come very near since the Sortée.”

“5th December.—The Dons have picketted out a work in the Front of
the Old M. Battery.” Mill Battery no doubt. The besiegers lost no
time in reconstructing their works, and their progress was rapid, but no
doubt the moral effect of the Sortie was great in both camps.

“6th December.—No officer of the Line to presume to interfere in
pointing a gun or give directions concerning it, but when on Guard if
found necessary, they are to apply to the Artillery, who are there for
that purpose.”

The last entry in 1781-is as follows :—

“29th December.—Last nt. died the Baron Helmstatt, Ensign in the
Walloon Guards with the Rank of Captain and lost his Leg at the
Mill Battery when taken Prisoner. A Flag of Truce to send his Body
to the Camp, and it was escorted by the Grenadier Compy. 12th Regt.
to the New Mole, where they fired 3 Rounds over it.”

“ Ist January, 1782.—Our people are putting up the Cassons of
Princess Ann’s Battery, Willis’s, before which they expose a curtain
which the Dons have fired at.”

“ Ist February.—Several stone Balls of different sizes found in the
Ruins of the Moorish Castle, and Cells all over the yard. Fired Lieut.
Koyler’s! depress Gun Carriage which answers from the Heights.”

This carriage? was one invented by Lieut. Koehler, R.A., for firing
from high sites at angles of considerable depression, up to 70° in fact.
A description of it is to be found in Drinkwater’s history of the Siege,
and Spilsbury gives several sketches of it.

“ 4th February.—Our batteries are repairing with Ship Timber like
Port Holes. They are making small Ditches in the Front of their
Works, in case of another Sortée.”

The following figures are for the year 1781.

“ 10th February.—-The Dons computed expence of ammunition Shot
102,084 ; Shells 28,943. Powder about 16,000 Barrels, a cwt. each.

Our expence of Ammunition.

About 1952 Barrels of Powder, and 46,010 Rounds of Shot, Shells, &c.

“ 17th February.—About 1 a.m. asmall Brig from Ireland came off
Kuropa and tho’ desired frequently to anchor near the other shiping she
came to back Old Mole, and drove on shore—the Dons have fired about
300 shots at her. ‘The Master deserved hanging for destroying other
People’s property.”

“ 4th March.—lIlt appears the Governor has ordered the Artillery not
to make Reports or Returns to the Lieut.-Governor.”

“ 29th March.—The Dons have blown off some of their guns, advanced
work, and appear to be making a Lodgement by the Devil’s Town, and
running a Communication to it from the Mill Battery.”

1 Kane’s List, No. 605.
. A picture of this gun was given in No. 6, Vol. 14, R.A.I. “ Proceedings”’ and the Institution
possesses two original pictures of the gun signed by Koehler.—4.J.4, !

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 471

18th April.—The Dons have made a great number of Traverses, and
a work about half way across the Istmus for small Arms.”

“ 16th May.—About 6 a.m. the Charles, Hlianora and Charlotte Store
Ships standing for the Bay were spoke to by the Spanish Gun Boats,
and hoisted French Colours and appeared to stand for Algazeras, but
when left to themselves they hoisted English Colours, and came safe in.
The Dons saw their mistake and did what they could to intercept them
but were too late. They brought about 2,000 Barrels of Powder and
shells for 832 pounder guns.”

29th May.—Lieut. Whetham 58th to do duty with the Artillery
when he chuses and to command next to an officer.”

A very interesting period of the siege is that now about to com-
mence. It had been evident for some time that a determined effort
was about to be made to reduce the place, and great preparations were
going on in the Spanish Lines and along the shore. A certain
Chevalier d’Arcon had devised a scheme early in the year by which he
thought Gibraltar might be taken. It consisted in attacking it from
the sea by bombproof boats.

“ Tncombustibles et insubmersibles” as their French inventor claimed
them to be. In appearance they seem to have resembled Noah’s Ark,
or the popular idea of that ancient ship—and their wooden roofs were
permeated with water by an ingenious arrangement of pipes. It
was claimed that no shot—not even a red-hot one—could set them on
fire, and as the wood work was very thick they could not be penetrated.
I have read a very interesting pamphlet written by the Chevalier in his
defence and published in Cadiz in 1783. <A copy of it is now in the
Gibraltar library.

Spilsbury gives several carefully drawn pictures of these curious
vessels. Besides the Chevalier several other distinguished persons
joined the besieger’s camp about this period eager to witness the
closing scene in that long-protracted drama ‘The Siege of Gibraltar.”

On our side we had not been idle. lieut.-General Boyd—the
Lieutenant Governor of the place—had conceived the idea that red-
hot shot would be most efficacious against the enemy’s gunboats—
whether modelled on d’Arcon’s plan or not, and furnaces were con-
structed in large numbers, some of which may yet be seen on the
Rock. Another great addition to the strength of the fortress was
commenced about this time in the shape of the rock cut galleries first
suggested by Sergt. Ince. Curiously enough Spilsbury first mentions
both these developments of the defence in the same entry—that for
June 7th 1782, it runs thus—

“Tn practising red hot shot from the King’s Bastion, one man was
blown to pieces and 3 wounded. 2 Briggs from the eastward alarmed
the whole Tribe of the Dons. A Gallery is Blasting in the North Face

of the Rock above Willis’s to get to the Hook or a prominent piece of
Rock, to make a Batty. there, one man is killed and 2 wounded.”

This undoubtedly refers to the Upper Galleries, and the “‘ Hook ” ig
probably what we now know as St. George’s Hall.

“ 71th June.—About 10 a.m. an expense magazine Princess Ann’s
Battery, Willis’s blew up by a shell from the Dons, about 100 Barrels

472, THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

of Powder were in it. About 5 men were blown down into the Lines,
30 men were killed and wounded of which 15 are lost to the service.
The Dons Huzaa’d and kept up a heavy fire ; its explosion burst open
the doors of the other Magazines. The officers’ sevants go on Fatigue
work, the Regiments not being able to find their Quota of Men.”

“26th June.—Stone Balls are made and a hole bored in them to hold
about 2 oz. Powder, and they answered the purpose of shells.”

Some reinforcements arrived at about this date for the enemy who
began to be very active. Spilsbury notes that they began their ninth
Junk ship, and on June 27th he says: “Between 2 and 3 a.m. some
officers of the enemy came to under Forbesses and being challenged
from the Queen’s Lines, they desired the Captain 58th, not to fire and
run off, a Court of enquiry of 5 Lit.-Colonels to sit upon it.”

“2nd July.a—A Xebeck going out was fired at by the Store ships,
she returned a shot or two but they hardly reached as far as the Place
where the Store ships’ shot fell, so ridiculous do we make ourselves at
times. The Dons are raising a kind of Roof over their Junk ships, by
way of Bomb or Splinter Proof.”

Here is a mention of the celebrated Sergeant Ince.

“4th July.—Sergeant Ince’s gallery going on well. 13 men in
about 5 weeks have cut about 82 feet long by 8 feet high and broad in
the solid Rock North Face.”

“ 10th July.—Some of the Stone Shells are very heavy and have a
Colly flower head coming out of the Mortar.”

712th July.—One 73rd told his Dream and pretends fore knowledge,
that this Place will be taken in 3 weeks after it is attacked.

“The men have a number of stories among themselves, but their
allowance of Grog is drank before night, and they are obliged to go to
Bed sober, so no wonder they have disagreeable dreams. 4 gallons of
Grog only to be sold by each Wine House per day.” The idea that
sobriety leads to bad dreams is a strange one. Spilsbury does not
relate the sequel to this soldier’s dream, which was that he was taken
to the provost ship to await the expiration of the period he named, and
then be flogged.

Here is a delightful note.

“6th August.—The Germans conduct themselves very differently
from our Young People, for though Young, and even Buckish, they
never appear in any Riot, or in doing anything that can bear the least
Censure, how different their Hducation.”

This evidently refers to the men of the Hanoverian regiments in the
garrison.

“ 19th August.—Sergeant Ince has got 165 feet into the Rock and
has made two Embrasures, but his people have got the Disorder. A
Flag of Truce with a present of Game, Fruit, &c., for the Governor,
Lt. G.” (probably Lieut.-Governor) “and Commodore, and a Packet
of Letters for some Inhabitants brought by the Count d’Artois come
as a volunteer for the siege.”

“29th August.—Ince’s Gallery 200 feet long and has two 24 pounders
mounted there. All our Prames come into the Mole and the Boom is

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 473

continued from the Tank to the 8 Gun Battery. 6 of the Junk ships
are hauled out, and the Deserter says about the 15th of next month,
the Dons will be ready.”

The deserter was quite right. The long threatened attack from
which so much was expected was at last about to take place, and on
the 13th of September 1782 exactly a hundred years before the battle
of Tel-el-Kebir (18th September 1882), the bomb ships, ten in
number, were anchored off the King’s Bastion, and the action com-
menced. Spilsbury gives particulars of the preliminary actions as
follows :

“8th September.—At 7 a.m. by the Lt. Governor’s desire our
Battys. began their utmost fire of Red hot Shot &c. on their advanced
works, kept it up till 4 p.m., and destroyed the Mahon Battery.”

The list of Guards and Picquets given by the diarist agrees in most
particulars with that given by Drinkwater, and added to it are pictures
of the enemy’s Junk Ships, and our own Gunboats and Prames. Very
carefully drawn are these ships, notably the representation of the
“ Pastora Junk Ship—Don Buena Ventura Morena—Admiral.”

Pastora Junk Ship—Don Buena Ventura Morena—Admiral.

On the 9th September the besiegers made a signal and commenced
a heavy fire from all their works, while their “ Admiral with five ships
of the line stood within gun and fired at the vessels and garrison, one
or two shot came on shore, but they made themselves very ridiculous.”

“About 6 P.M. about 15 Gun Boats came and attacked the King’s
Bastion, but being within Grape Shot they stayed only half an hour.”

This attack was continued the next day, and Spilsbury says—“ It
was ridiculous enough to see one of the ships put about whilst firing,
and the men at some of the guns not being informed of it kept firing
the same guns, being then the contrary way.”

He adds: “ According to our calculation they fired in the first 24
hours about 6,000 shot and shells.”

On the 11th of September the heavy firing continued and Spilsbury
calculates that the enemy fired 120 to 200 rounds per hour during the

4.74, THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

night, and set on fire the palisades at Bayside.

On the 12th he writes: “About 1 a.m. came the Gun Boats &. and
staid till 3. They have a Mortar Battery at the Hast End of the 64”
(the 64 gun batterv of the besiegers lay north-east of the gardens on
the North Front about the centre of the Neutral Ground according to
a plan he gives of it, and appears to have had two long divisions in it
containing respectively 42 and 22 embrasures) “to play on the Rock
Gun, and they divide their fire at the heights and Grand Battery, shot
by day, shells by night. About noon arrived in the Bay a Fleet of
about 40 and odd Sail of the Line, French and Spaniards with a few
Transports &c. so that the Bay is nearly full of them.”

His entry for the 18th of September, the day on which the great
attack was made, runs as follows :—

“ast night the Dons threw from about 70 to 130 shells per Hour,
and several People wounded &e. About 4 past 9 a.m. Ten Junk Ships
came and anchored off the King’s Bastion, and to the northward at a
Distance of about 1000 yards, but 2 of them remained further off than
the Rest, they were commanded by a Rear-Admiral, and fired a great
deal into the water, that being a new way of making Breaches. They
appear Rigged like Polaises. The Brilliant and Porcupine scuttled.
Kilns having been erected to heat the shot, about noon we began to
fire them. About 5 P.M. one of the Junk Ships apparently on fire,
and about midnight they ceased firing and were most of them in
Flames, having thrown up signals of Distress three or four Hours
before, and gave our gun boats a fine opportunity, had they chose to
have profited by it. Their Batteries kept a very heavy fire on the
Town, &c., and the Extremity of the Lines East End of the Queen’s
Battery at Willis’s and Caroline’s are rendered almost useless, and the
Line Wall from the Demi Bastion to Montagu’s much wounded, with
the merlons of Grand Battery and the King’s Bastion. The Remains
of the Houses knocked about and the Town full of Rubbish. A Bomb
Ketch anchored without the Junk Ships and kept firing on the Town.
Captain Reeves! Artillery lost his arm and died, Captain Groves? of do.
burnt by an ammunition Chest blowing up, Lieuts. Godfrey? and
Whetham wounded.”

The entry for the 14th is a very long one, the longest apparently in
the whole diary. It commences: ‘“ About midnight our Gun Boats
got out and began firing on the Junk Ships. About 4 a.m. three of
the J. Ships blew up, our G. Boats having been on board and brought
what they could, wounded men, &., away. About 10 a.m. two more
blew up, in short, all are blown up, except two that burnt down, and
one that there is hopes of saving. Numbers of the Spaniards were
blown up in Vessels, some that would not leave them, and others that
were so wounded they could not get out. The Prisoners are 12 Officers
and 844 men.” He continues: “The Colours of the Admiral, who was
Morino, were brought to the South Parade, and exposed, to the ex-

1 Kane’s List, No. 427.
2 Kane’s List, No. 187.
3 Kane’s List, Ne. 608.

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR, 475

treme satisfaction of those who but yesterday felt rather heavy at the
Awfulness of their appearance. he Dons kept up a heavy fire on our
Boats while they were saving the unfortunate objects, they had left in
the Learch.” ‘The garrison loss in the two days is given as one Captain,
2 Sergts. and 14 Privates killed, and 3 Captains, 2 Lieuts., 1 Seret., 2
Drummers, and 78 Privates wounded. Among the bodies found in the
wrecks was that of a priest. Spilsbury adds—“ Notwithstanding this
Juncture our Workmen Labour as though they were paid for being
Idle,” and he calculates that from batteries and ships about 40,000
rounds were fired in the 24 hours, a somewhat liberal estimate surely.
He relates that the Gunners in our batteries were so exhausted that
they drank the water in the buckets in which the sponges were
washed, and that had it not been for some Companies of the 39th and
72nd, the batteries would have been silenced before the middle of the
night for want of men to work the guns.

“15th September.—It appears the Junk Ships had about 166 guns
and 5,000 men on board when they began the attack. How differently
the sailors are treated from our People—the soldiers—they are generally
served Grog at their guns, but ours were at their guns and carrying
ammunition four and twenty Hours without a bit or drop, except
some water that the officers took from some of the working men.”

With the successful repulse of the great attack of September 18th,
1782, the efforts of the besiegers gradually fell off, and no really serious
attack was subsequently made; although, for a time, it was feared.
The prisoners taken by the garrison were placed in charge of the
Corsicans at Windmill Hill, as Captain Spilsbury relates :—

“16th September, 1782.—The Prisoners are now allowed to be spoke
to, but not except by Officers. The Corsicans have charge of the
Prisoners, they are armed with a Firelock, Bayonet, and Pistol.”

On the 19th he makes the following observation :—“ The Artillery
not pleased with what was said to them by the Governor.”

On October 2nd, Captain Spilsbury gives a list of the enemy’s ships
that took part in the attack of the 13th, and as it differs in certain
particulars from that given by Drinkwater I append it.

He calls it a “ List of the Junk Ships destroyed by the Garrison
September 18th, 1782.” Drinkwater, whose list of names is identical,
calls them “ the battering ships.”

Names. Guns. Men. Commanders.
PastOva..........svesvsseveeeee 26 ..s000... 700 .....00n Buena Ventura Morena, Admiral.
MallasRedramenereceet secon mt ies TOD) ox6.000 Don Juan Mendoza.

San Frans. de Paula...... FAS cove bos BUD so¢000 Don Cayetano Languara.
TMA, SECLENGIO seocvovcneco 8) coo oho 000 FSO) codooc Don Pablo de Casa.
TRON coqassocaoscasonoccoces G21 og andc0n PATO) soa.cce Don Ramon de Villa.
Stan CHUA cocooooccccs HO so0000000 BLO aooows Don Fred. Gravino.
IPMS, CEMA So65.c00 000000 LL coo sana00 BHO) 0.000 Don Antonio Bassura.
Sain, UWE gog0c0000 c00s0>000600 BD eco cco000 BOO) coov0e Don Joseph Archiocha.
Sarai, Air qo00000000000003 © OD cdovo0000 AED) coceoe Don Joseph Angeli.

TBI IDONGRES coo qooadoco0c000d @ocanoocc0 PED) oo0000 Don Pedro Sanchez.

Total... 166 4560

476 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

He appends a note “taken from the Boatswain Ist Paula,” that is,
from the Boatswain of the 8rd ship on the list.-

Their mortar boats continued to bombard the Rock at night, and
they fired also from their Lines, generally commencing before sunrise
and continuing till noon when they desisted for what Spilsbury calls
their “ Siesto.”

On the 3rd of October he says that the Commodore and Secretary
went on board a Spanish frigate under a flag of truce, and on the 4th
he writes: “The Commodore and Secretary gone to dine with the
Duke,’and to settle the Cartel.”

“6th October.—Jones’ Gallery has had one man killed in it by a shot
come in at a Port, and the communication Kings’ Lines has had 8.”

The enemy’s camp was now diminishing but a deserter who came in
on November 4th reported 11,000 men there. On the same day is this
entry :—“ Received Bat and Forage money a Capt. 40 Pounds.”

“9th December.—About noon a 82 Pr. gun on a new carriage
elevated at 45° fired shells and about } over the Bay, or about 5,000
yards.” On December 17th we read, “A Flag of Truce. Peace
talked of.”

The last year of this remarkable siege commenced on January Ist,
1783, the entry for which date runs as follows :—“ One of the guns of
the Junk Ships being got on shore it was drawn from Ragged Staff
to the Mole Parade, where it had the Spanish Colours fixed on the
Carriage and then drawn to the New Mole Battery attended by the
Musick of the 12th Regiment—playing God Save the King. Itisa
very plain Iron 26 Pdr.—9 feet 6 inches long, and about 5 feet in the
Chace.” On the next day we read“ One of the Brass Guns of the
J. Ships brought to Ragged Staff nearly 6 feet in the Chace, and
4 feet 8 inches in the Breach, a 32 lb. shot goes into it, but
it has been run in the firing. The make seems to be French Idea, but
badly Imitated. It hasits name, viz. Brazen Face.” He later gives
particulars of another captured Brass gun, “ the Bellicoso.”

“ 12th January.—The Old Mole fires a 24 pr. grape every half hour
during the night at Bayside Guard House, and the other Battys. keep
up a constant fire on the Istmus.”

“14th January.—Jones’ Gallery 370 feet long, has 6 Embrasures
and 4 guns mounted in it, also a good covered way up to it.”

“19th January.—The cficers have acted a Play, Cross Purposes,
and true Blue.” But on the 22nd we read “‘ The officers’ Playing put
an End to by the Governor.” On February 4th Spilsbury gives a list
of Casualties from 12th April, 1781 to 8rd February, 1783 as follows:—
“ Killed 6 Officers, 24 Sergeants, 4 Drummers, 275 Rank and File.
Wounded 32 Officers, 2 Surgeons, 70 Sergeants, 15 Drummers, 959
Rank and File,” and he adds a table of shot and shell supposed to be
fired by the enemy during that time, differentiating between Gun boats
and batteries in each year. The total is 182,516 shot, and 75,861
shell.

Several very carefully drawn sketches are interleaved here, chiefly of

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. A477

guns, mortars, and carriages. They include, a gun on a traversing
platform, the Rock Mortar, a Swivle Platform, Lieut. K’s. Depress
Carriage, Col. W’s Empetrardo Carriage, a Depress Mortar, Carriage
and others.

Depress Mortar Carriage,

478 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

The near approach of the concluding act of the Great Siege is
indicated by the entry for February 5th, 1783, which runs thus :—

“A Flag of Truce from them, and we are given to understand there
isa Peace.”

“22nd Hebruary.—The Donsemployed carrying away their artillery
from their advanced works. Writing paper, the first we have had for
some time at 5 Reals per Quire.” One wonders whether the paper on
which the Diary is written was some of this paper.

On March 4th there is an entry as to the desertion of a Bombardier
of the Artillery from Willis’s. This is the first mention of the desertion
of an Artilleryman we have come across in the Diary. A little later
we read :—“ ‘I'he Artillery at exercise every day, learning to march ” ;
they had probably had more important duties to perform during the
preceding 3 or 4 years.

The Duce de Crillon paid a visit to the fortress on March 81st, and
this is Captain Spilsbury’s account of it :—

“ About 10 a.m. the Duke de Crillon came into the Garrison attended
by 5 officers, 2 Dragoons, servants, &c., he was saluted 17 guns from
Grand Battery, and had a Captain’s Guard. All the Officers were
presented to him at the Convent by Corps. The men were all dressed
as for Sunday, and the 73rd wore their Plaids &. and the streets were
so crowded they could hardly pass, the soldiers cheering all the way he
went. After seeing Willis’s and Ince’s Gallery, he dined at the
Convent, and had all the Brigadiers and Staff to attend him, after which
he went round Huropa &c., the Regiments falling in as he passed, and
returned about 8 P.M. through Landport when the same Salute was
fired as at his Hutrance.”

The work in our Galleries still went on, as is shown by several entries,
among others the following :—

“ 19th April.—Nine Embrasures are now made in Ince’s Cave, and
one is made under the Queen’s Battery at Willis’s, and the whole going
on. It appears that our Ingineers have been out and seen their
advanced works and some even into Fort Phillip, and that the Dons
have been extremely civil, but this is done as it were underhand for the
orders on both sides are still against the Communications being opened.”
Two days later,we read that ‘‘ Several officers have been out to the
Spanish works, St. Rock, Algazeras, &c.”

For some time past we read of great preparations being made for the
investiture of General Hliott with the Order of the Bath, and on April
28rd, St. George’s Day, the ceremony took place and is thus described
by Spilsbury, the whole of whose entry we give or account of its
amusing character.

“About 9 am. The Governor came on the Red Sands where a
Detachment from each Corps of the Garrison was drawn up in two Lines,
opposite the Center of which he read a Letter thanking them for their
services and then hisown Thanks. The whole Saluted and the Artillery
who were drawn up in Front of the Left wing fired 21 guns, and a
Round from the Troops by way of running Fire, then the Guns as
before, 3 running fire 3 times and then 3 cheers.

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 479

“ Afterwards the streets were Lined and the Procession went from
the Convent to the Collonade on the King’s Bastion, General Boyd as
King’s Commissioner, and after the Ribband was put on, The Grenadiers
that followed the Procession fired, and then the Guns from right to left
of the Bastion, from Hesse’s Batty. to the Flat Bastion Included. The
Field Officers, &c., and Staff dined at the Convent, and the Soldiers,
&c., have a Bottle of Wine and a Pound of Fresh Beef each, gratis, so
that the Captains and Subalterns are the only ones not taken notice of
in this day’s Hntertainment. At about Dusk the Lamps were lighted
in the Colonade, but were blown out in general except those in the
Center Arch, and there being no musick all seemed extremely dull, or
like Ranelagh or some of the publick Places deserted. About 9 P.M.
the Fireworks were exhibited, but 1t rained at times very hard and of
course did them no service, but they were too much of a sameness to
have been good at any Rate, except the Sun and the Rockets that
answered very well. At last the rain coming through the Canvas the
Spectators were obliged to seek shelter in the best manner they could,
and to conclude, the Gates at Southport being shut, and the wickets
left open, such a mob gathered there that some Lives were in danger of
being lost, there being nothing but a scene of confusion, fighting, &c.,
till the Gates could be got open and the whole dispersed, it seems the
Guard threatened to fire at them but were only laughed at, in short some
of the C—” (? Colonels or Captains) “ had made a little too free with
the Bottle, and were hardly able to manage themselves much less a mob
they had so perfectly contrived to set together by the Hars, but it
turned out to be all of a Piece. Never was a worse salute performed
by Artillery; they not being able to fire a salute of 21 Guns,
from 6 they had in the Field, two of them being so neglected as to have
a shot in each left at the bottom before the Loading was put in, and
their Tubes were in General too long. A worse Feu de Joye fired
by Troops, worse weather, worse musick, worse fireworks, or worse
Entertainment.”

It is quite evident that General Hlott made a great mistake when he
omitted to feed the Captains and Subalterns, and no doubt had he been
aware that one of the former was taking notes in so adverse a spirit, and
that they would eventually be published more than a century later he
would have taken steps to propitiate his Chronicler, whose entry is at
once so amusing and so characteristic.

We may take this ceremony as fitly closing the Great Siege of
Gibraltar which lasted three years, seven months, and twelve days from
the commencement of the Blockade to the Cessation of Arms. There
are no more entries in Captain Spilsbury’s diary which very directly
concern the Siege save an account of a visit he paid to the Spanish Lines
which may be noted here:

“29th April, 1783.— Having the Governor’s leave, which is now asked
for by the Commanding Officers, who did not venture to ask it before,
to go out at Land Port, stroled to the Spanish advanced works, from
one end to the other they have a Sergt’s Guard and some Centries who
hesitated at our going in. They are from 9 to 12 Fascines high well
faced with sand sandbags etc., and full of Travesses, but the ‘limbers

480 THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

are now all taking away. ‘heir Magazines and Guard Houses are well
constructed being slopes of Timber against the Fascine work, well
covered with thick Plank or rather Timbers, the former, of which they
had many, were well ramed with clay and sandbags and held only about
8 Barrels of Powder each, made up in Cartridges which they brought
every night. The Communication betwixt the Batteries had a Banquet
about half way from the Top to the Bottom and 4 or 5 Fascines broad
for the men to be drawn up on and very easy to be got down or assaulted,
their ditches in their Front were all lined with Fascines, but were soon
filled with sand as we could see long ago. The Empetrardo Battery
had six guns, fixed on a kind of wooden Mortar Bed sunk very deep in
the ground. The floor of their works or batteries was all ramed Clay,
very hard, and easily kept free from sand. The sleepers of the Mortar
Platforms were about 7 inches thick of which they were 8 deep well put
together and ramed with Clay, their splinter proofs were chiefly in the
Mortar Batteries which were well Traversed and very high, the other
splinter proofs in the branches were very slender but covered over with
daubed canvas apparently to keep out the Rain, and if one may judge
from circumstances their People though in the T'renches were not nearl
so exposed as ours either to the weather oreventhe enemy. They allow
having had 1200 killed and 400 disabled, but the chief of their loss
must have been at the times their works were on fire (for the working
parties always shifted from the place they saw us, when we did fire, fire
at) which is surprizing did not happen oftener from their being so
crowded with Fascines, but the red hot shot were much wanted, our
shells chiefly 13 Inch being too heavy and sunk too deep into the sand,
want of 10 Inch for that service, and our very small ones could only
annoy the Patroles and Straglers. Their Mortar Beds are much
smaller than ours, or one cut horizontally through the center.”
Other interesting Artillery items are—

“11th May.—Ince’s gallery has 10 Embrasures and an air hole broke
out, and is about 600 and odd feet long, the 9th Chamber or Cave is
large enough for a Guard Room, has 2 doors and is tolerably dry.”

‘3rd June.—Ince’s gallery got to within a few yards of the notch,
anda gallery is now making to it on the outside from the furthest
Hmbrasure.”

“18th July.—Most of the Junkship guns are expected to be got up.
An Algerine dives and slings them.”

Such is the contemporary chronicle of the Great Siege—one of the
greatest in history, as written by one who took an active part in the
defence. From certain signs I think that the actual diary before me
was probably not written up day by day during the siege, but was
written out afterwards from notes taken no doubt on the spot and
afterwards brought into the form of ajournal.

Whether this is the case or not I think that everyone must agree that
this diary is of very great interest both for historians and for military
men, and especially I think for gunners, whose arm of necessity played
so conspicuous a part in the defence.

The many references to Artillery matters made by Captain Spilsbury

THE GREAT SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 4.81

—-an infantry ofticer—testify to the important share the Artillery had
in the successful defence, but I have ventured to transcribe other entries
than those referring to Artillery—some of them because they treat of
important events, and others because of their quaintness of expression
or meaning.

Readers of the diary will probably agree that we can apply to it what
Drinkwater says of his own historical record, namely :

“Thave been reduced to greater accuracy and minuteness than
ordinary historians are obliged to observe ; and instead of the acuteness
of investigation, or a splendid sententiousness, I have been necessitated
to pursue the narrative, almost uninterruptedly, in the tedious form of
a Journal. I have not presumed to intersperse many animadyersions of
my own: the only merit to which I can lay any claim, is that of a
faithful narration of facts; and, I confess, I would at any time rather
walk in the beaten track of truth, than mislead the judgement of my
readers in the wilds of fancy and conjecture.”

The singularly exact manner in which Spilsbury’s narrative agrees
with that of Drinkwater—the acknowledged historian of the siege—
leads one to the gratifying conclusion that both writers succeeded in
keeping to the ‘ beaten track of truth,” and therefore lends consider-
able interest and historical value to the diary of the former which after
considerably more than a century is now brought to the light. It is
hoped that this interest may be considered sufficient excuse for the
publication of the foregoing extracts from Captain Spilsbury’s diary in
the “ Proceedings” of the Royal Artillery Institution.

res)
cuts hee eee
i eons

483

ON MAGAZINE REGULATIONS.

COMMUNICATED BY THE

DEPUTY-ASSISTANT-ADJUTANT-GENERAL, R.A.

(1.) The following amendment to “ Regulations for Magazines, &c.,”’
1894, will shortly be published or included in the next revise of that
work :—

Part IT., section IT., paragraph 223 (0) :

* Filled cartridges, in groups which will be as far as possible,
identical in nature and age. The age of the cartridges to be
reckoned from date of filling and grouped by years. If there ts
a sufficient number of cartridges of the same lot, they may be
grouped separately.”

(2.) The numbering of the groups according to dates of receipt or
age, is intended to serve a double purpose:

(a) To ensure a reasonable amount of uniformity in shooting in
each series.
(b) To secure the regular turnover of the ammunition.

The revised edition of Equipment Regulations which will probably
be issued this year, contains the following instructions at Section XII.
of Part II., paragraph 186;

“ For all practice the ammunition of oldest manufacture and that
contained in packages which have been opened for inspection,
will always first be expended, and will be replaced by the next
supply from store.”

(3.) There are insurmountable difficulties in the way of carrying out
this excellent proposal, if date of making up the cartridges is to deter-
mine the group; but it may be remarked that the amendment to the
Magazine Regulations quoted above in (1) is considered to be the closest
approximation to a solution of this difficulty which is really practicable.
Many cases of small groups have been closely investigated, the worst
that was brought to notice however proved that though the number of
small groups appeared excessive, yet the actual difference in shooting
of the different groups did not nearly approach the limits of error of
the gun as shown by the 50 per cent. rectangle.

@, WOy SOR,

dt) OL AL JER SE

LIEUTENANT W. SWABEY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA. ‘|

EDITED BY \

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATHS, late R.H.A. ~>=

(Continued from p. 487, No. 9, Vol. XXII.). ff

PART III.

Taz Campaign From May ro Sepremper 1813.

Summary of the Peninsular Campaign from April to September 1813,

During the winter of 1812-13 unremitting attention was paid to
restore the discipline and organization of the allied army, and con-
siderable reinforcements were received.

The Cortes of Spain in the month of December, conferred on Lord
Wellington the rank and authority of Generalissimo of the Spanish
forces, and decreed that in the coming campaign he should have the
active co-operation of 50,000 Spanish troops.

The French armies in Spain at the beginning of 1813 numbered
140,000 men. With the exception of 40,000 under Marshal Suchet in
the eastern provinces of Catalonia and Valencia, they were spread
over Castile, Leon, and the northern provinces under command of
Joseph Bonaparte with Marshal Jourdan as Major-General; their
object was to guard the line of the Douro.

Lord Wellington determined in the coming campaign to adopt the
same strategy which in the previous year had liberated Andalusia, and
by a flank movement through the province of Tras os Montes to turn
the enemy’s defences on the Douro. In conformity with this plan on
May loth, the left wing under Sir Thomas Graham marched through
that province towards the Hsla, while on the 22nd, the right wing
under Wellington advanced through Salamanca on Zamora. On June
Ist, after slight opposition, the wings were united at the latter place,
and the first object of the campaign accomplished.

As a result of this, King Joseph concentrated his army on the
Burgos road along which were good defensive positions and depdts of
supplies. Lord Wellington continued his turning movements, mancu-
vred to his left and marching on Palencia forced the enemy on the
12th, to fall back on Burgos which he evacuated and blew up. Some
fighting took place on the succeeding days, and on June 21st, in front’

10. VoL. XxuI. 66

486 SWABEY DIARY.

of the town of Vitoria, the French were defeated with great loss and
driven in confusion towards the Pyrenees, leaving to their fate the
fortresses of Pamplona and St. Sebastian.

On hearing of these events, the Emperor Napoleon despatched
Marshal Soult to take command of the French army. He arrived
early in July, and having reorganized the troops, commenced on the
25th, a series of operations with the object of dispossessing the allies
of the passes of Maya and Roncesvalles in the Pyrences and relieving
Pamplona. At the outset Soult was successful and drove them back,
but Wellington bringing up reinforcements and assuming the com-
mand, after very hard fighting between July 25th and August Ist,
repulsed the French at all points, and the armies were established in
nearly the same positions as before the advance of the enemy. The
siege of St. Sebastian, which had been meanwhile converted into a
blockade, was resumed, and on September 9th, the place was taken.

Cuapter I.

H” troop occupies cantonments at San Payo. Defective arrangement
for the sick. Lord Wellington's strictures on the Retreat. Ineu-
tenant Craster. The troop moves to Mello. Captain Macdonald
goes home. Methods of procuring forage.

end December.—Marched into our cantonment at San Payo,! an in-
convenient dirty village without forage, on the high road to Coimbra.
The quarter falling to me by my own arrangement for the winter, is
an empty room with a through draught from two windows with only
shutters, certainly built im the dog-days. I was luckily never born to
be nice. The inhabitants have a better room which I am entitled to
claim, but I do not like these severities. I found it necessary, however,
before I could get chairs and table to hold out a threat that I should
find another house and send soldiers to be quartered on them. This
arises from the vile, heartless disposition of the Portuguese.

3rd December.—No. fire in my house and obliged to lounge away
my time sadly. I and many others suffer from a remarkable lameness
caused by the continual wet we have been exposed to, and our then
putting our feet close to wood fires. There is no external appearance
of soreness, but at night the most terrible pain in the ball of the foot
totally takes away my rest, and in the day I cannot bare to put my foot
to the ground.

4th December.—Found our situation for forage unfortunately very
disadvantageous, it all being at a great distance and the roads to it
very bad. I hope nevertheless our horses will cut a better figure
than they did last year.

5th December.—Still so lame as to be unable to walk in pursuit of
any amusement.

6th December.—The difference between the price of tea, sugar, and

1 The villages of San Payo, Mello, etc. will be found situated in the vicinity of the river
Mondego. Sce Map II.

SWABEY DIARY. 487

all articles of import in this country and in Spain, is very great, and
even since last year these articles have fallen; so certain and secure
are the blessings of peace, and so advantageous the two years repose
that this part of Portugal has now enjoyed.

7th December.—I am obliged once again to cry shame against the
regulations for the transport of the sick. The unfortunate beings
more fit for their death-beds than for being moved from one place to
another, are daily passing through here from Celorico to Coimbra on
cars without springs, every jolt of which is sufficient to fracture a
limb; others dying are left neglected and unpitied by the road side,
two hundred probably having only one hospital mate to dress their
wounds or minister to their diseases. I caught an infamous Portu-
guese bullock driver, the lowest coward perhaps in creation, beating
with a stick an unfortunate wounded soldier who had spilt his blood
for the villain at Burgos, because he was too helpless to dismount from
the car to walk up a hill. I need not add that the revenge I took on
the miscreant was ample and severe. I actually beat him till I could
not stand over him.

The officers and escorts with these parties are too small and too
inhuman for their duty. Pity and humanity are, I fear, neither allied
to the modern hero nor his regulations. Lord Wellington, when the
sick of his army are mentioned, hastily replies that he wishes never to
hear but of effective men. Jivery day the effects of the retreat begin
to shew themselves in the deaths of hundreds.

It is but just to Lord Wellington to quote here the following
incident (f.4.W.) :—

“ As I think you will be amused and interested by an authentic
anecdote of Lord Wellington, I will tell it to you. It comes
from his aide-de-camp, Major Gordon,’ who brought over the
account of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo.

“Some little time ago, when a party of officers were dining with him,
one of them happened to say that he had just returned from
a place where a post of our soldiers were stationed, and that a
considerable number of sick were without shelter, and ex-
posed to the severity of the weather. When the party broke
up Lord Wellington ordered his horse and set off with Gordon.
They rode to the post in question, about 30 miles® off, and
arrived there about midnight. They found a great number
of sick lying in the open air.

“Lord Wellington immediately knocked up the commanding
officer, and asked why the men were left in such a condition.
He said ‘there was no accommodation for them in the place.’

1 © T have already seen enough of the unfortunate sick of this army to authorize the conviction
that there is great room for improvement in the arrangements for the sick, and that more medical
aid is much required. Humanity and policy equally dictate the necessity of care and tenderness
towards sick men. J fear in many cases both have been wanting.” ‘Letters of Sir Augustus
Frazer,” Coja, 21st January, 1813, p. 53.

2 Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Gordon, K.C.B., was killed at Waterloo.

3 Probably this distance is incorrectly given, they could hardly haye ridden 60 miles during the
night ; possibly it should be 13 miles,—(¥.4.w.).

488 SWABEY DIARY.

““¢ Be so good,’ said Lord Wellington, ‘as to show me this house.’
After he had walked over and inspected it, he told Gordon
immediately to remove 150 of the sick into it. He then went
to the next officer in rank, and so on, till he had removed the
whole of the sick; and, then addressing the officers, he read
them a severe lecture on the impropriety of their conduct,
and told them that if they or any officer under his command
should presume to consult their own convenience or luxury
while a single sick man should remain unsheltered, he would
make an example of them; and that, as to themselves, they
might procure accommodation as they could somewhere else,
for that the sick should remain where he had placed them.

“He and Gordon then mounted their horses, and returned to head-
quarters before day, and without anyone suspecting they had
been absent. On the following evening, however, he told
Gordon he suspected, from the sulky manner in which his
orders had been received, that they were likely enough to be
disobeyed ; he therefore determined to pay those gentlemen
another visit. Accordingly, they mounted their horses again,
and arrived past midnight at the post, where they found the
sick removed into the open air, and the officers comfortably
reposing in their old quarters. However, he soon aroused
them ; for he ordered the sick to be instantly brought in, put
the officers under arrest, marched them to head-quarters,
where they were tried for disobedience of orders and
cashiered.” Sir James Bland Burges, to his son Charles,
11th February, 1812. “ Wellington,” by Lathom Browne,
p. 38.

8th December.—An order! was published from Lord Wellington
justly censuring the want of discipline lately shown by the army during
the retreat, in which he says: ‘“ Never have I seen or even read of such
relaxation in the discipline of anarmyaslong as] canremember.” His
Lordship’s remark is only toojust. The cause originates in the officers
who certainly have not exhibited, except in the moment of action, the
necessary energy in the execution of their duties, and have neglected to
enforce discipline amongst their men. This falling off has not, Iam
proud to say, reached the officers of artillery, who are doubtless more
soldiers by profession than any other part ofthearmy. With this con-
viction, how shall I add that the constitution of their corps prevents their
exertions being rewarded ! ?

9th December.—Rode to Moimenta da Beira to call on the Earl of

1 Memo. dated 28th November, 1812. Addressed to officers commanding divisions and brigades.
Wellington Despatches, Vol. IX., p. 582. It was intended to be a confidential communication,
but was published in the regimental order-books.—(¥.4.W.).

2 2nd Captains, R.A., were at this time ineligible for brevet promotion. The officers of. that
rank in the Peninsula at the beginning of 1813, memorialized Lord Wellington on the subject, the
memorial was referred home and favourably received. The gazette, after the battle of Vitoria, con-
tained the first brevet promotion of the kind ; 2nd Captain Jenkinson of “A” troop. See “ Memoir
of Field-Marshal Sir Hew Ross,”’ p. 36. j

SWABEY DIARY. 489

Dalhousie whom we found had heard by letter from Macdonald. Iwas
glad to hear that he was doing well.

10th December.—Rode all day in the rain to find forage, I am sorry
to say without success.

11th December.—It 1s ascertained that Clausel and Souham have set
off for France with some force in consequence of disturbances.! There
are only two regiments of cavalry at Salamanca. Soult, it is supposed,
will winter at Madrid, probably despatching something southward.
Meantime, Lord Wellington has gone off in person to the Cortes at
Cadi and declares his intention of entering Spain again at the end of
March, on which subject my expectations are by no means hopeless.
Unfortunate Salamanca was given up to four days plunder.?

12th December.—The rains set in with determined perseverance,
consequently the exposure of our men in foraging becomes greater
every day, and our hospitals begin to fill.

Lsth December.—To-day an unfortunate officer, a victim to the hard-
ships of the campaign, arrived here on a bullock wain, having been all
the night before in the rain. His servant came to us to beg a few
rations. I was surprised to find I had humanity enough to go to see
his master ; he was in a house or hovel, not proof against the inclem-
encies of the weather, stretched on the remains of his bed that his
servant had been able to carry. All his baggage animals were lost,
and he, without more than a dollar in his pocket, was helpless and
quite worn out with exposure to the inclemency of the weather. J am
ashamed to say that the interest I should have felt for any fellow
creature in such a state of distress was redoubled when I found him
address me in the most gentlemanly manner. He seemed to me
worthy of a better fate. I got him removed to a better house though
there was none in the village capable of affording him the comfort his
situation required. The Doctor saw him and we gave him tea and
soup and took every step that suggested itself to assist him. It is not
usual to find, particularly in soldiers of the line, that dutiful attention
to their masters which wag evident in this poor fellow’s servant.? I felt
for him the greatest regard possible on account of his kindness. He
told us his master had left the army at Burgos, at the commencement
of the siege, was a little better when he was hurried out of the hospital

1 This was due probably to news received from Paris of the conspiracy of General Malet, which
so nearly succeeded in overturning the Empire. The 2nd Vol. of the lately published memoirs of
the Chancellor Pasquicr adds considerably to our previous knowledge of this strange enterprise.
Napoleon heard of it December 5th just before he quitted the army at Smolensk during the retreat
from Moscow, and it most likely determined him to take that step.—(F.A.W.).

* There does not appear to have been any recognized plundering, but a very bitter feeling existed
between the Spanish civil and military authorities and the British army whilst the latter occupied
Salamanea during the retreat from Burgos and Madrid, many acts of violence were committed on
both sides. See Napier, Vol. V., p. 320, e¢ seq.

3 Apropos of what is here stated. Captain McCarthy, who was severely wounded at the escalade
of the Castle of Badajos, and not removed till late in the day following the assault, says in his
“* Recollections of Badajos,” ‘‘I had strictly ordered my servant to seek for me amone the fallen
if I did not return from the attack in the morning ; he had, however, remained in charge of my
baggage he said ; but I said that he had remained, in preference, in charge of a large pot of soup and
a bag of wine, for regaling himself and fellow servant. I dismissed him ag soon as another could
be obtained,” : ; ;

490 SWABEY DIARY.

at Salamanca, from whence he had got to Celorico, and had impru-
dently set out to get to Lisbon in conformity to the orders he received.
I should like to see who would prescribe my death and persuade me
to move unprovided with one single necessary for such ajourney! This
is the way we weaken our army and reward our sick and wounded.

Napier’s remarks concerning the French and English hospitals
in the Peninsula are worthy of attention here.—(r.A.w.).

“Tt is a common, yet erroneous notion, that the English system
of hospitals in the Peninsula was admirable, and that the
French hospitals were neglected. Strenuous and increasing
exertions were made by Lord Wellington and the chiefs of
the medical staff to form good hospital establishments, but
the want of money, and still more the want of previous insti-
tutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now there was no point
of warfare which more engaged Napoleon’s attention than
the care of his sick and wounded; and being monarch as well
as general, he furnished his hospitals with all things requisite,
even with luxuries.

“Under his fostering care also, Baron Larrey, justly celebrated
were it for this alone, organized the establishment called the
hospital ‘ Ambulance, that is to say, waggons of a peculiar
construction, well horsed, served by men trained and incor-
porated as soldiers, and subject to strict discipline. Re-
warded for their courage and devotion like other soldiers,
they were always at hand, and whether in action or on a
march, ready to pick up, to salve, and to carry off wounded
men ; the astonishing rapidity with which the fallen French
soldiers disappeared from a field of battle attested the ex-
cellence of the institution.

“ But in the British army, the carrying away of the wounded
depended partly upon the casual assistance of a weak waggon

train, very badly disciplined, furnishing only three waggons to

a division, and not originally appropriated to that service ;

partly upon the spare commissariat animals, but principally

upon the resources of the country, whether cf bullock carts,

mules, or donkeys, and hence the most doleful scenes after a

battle, or when a hospital was to be evacuated.” Napier,

Vol. V., p. 248-9.

14h December.—Our unfortunate patient, who now engrossed every
spare moment, expressed his anxiety at not having heard for a long
time from his friends. At his request we wrote to his regiment, the
Ath, to enquire for his letters.

15th December.—Incessant rain continuing, our men, daily exposed to
its effects, crowd the hospital.

16th December.—Rode in the rain in search of forage which is already
becoming scarce, and only to be found ata distance. I find the natives
are, with their usual apathy and ignorahce, refusing any assistance to

SWABEY DIARY. 491

the troops and we are obliged to seize what we want. How much less
oppressive it would be if a regularly administered government fixed on
an equal contribution from the individuals in each jurisdiction in
the vicinity of our quarters and enforced its collection. Instead of
which the only answer from the justices is, that they have nothing in
the country, which we all know to be false, and so are obliged to rob
the first we meet.

L7th December.—Our unfortunate friend, poor Craster,! became 80
ill that he would not or could not speak, and his faithful servant fell ill
with the same complaint, that is, typhus produced by fatigue.

L8ih December.—Incessant rain, I was nevertheless obliged to scour
the country for forage.

N.B.—We hired a cook who is wife to an artillery soldier, whom we
likewise detained. Dinner very elaborate, sauces, ragofits, hashes,
roast, boiled, and baked, not to be sneezed at. Ido not think I am
a glutton, but there is a pleasure in entertaining one’s friends comme

al faut.

19th December.—My house being too cold to sit indoors one moment
I was obliged to go out though it rained as usual. The unfortunate sick
daily passing, notwithstanding the known and expected inclemency of
the season, too clearly prove that humanity has no place in the
bosom of those who are daily accustomed to the cruelties of war. As
we might expect the unfortunate victims of this heartless system are
left dead, and even unburied on the road side.’

c0th December.—Misery ever before my eyes renders this the most
uncomfortable abode I ever inhabited. I can look without compunction
on the field of battle, but this sort of murder is too inhuman even to
bear thinking of.

21st December.—Received some English newspapers. Among other
articles, Lord Somers in supporting the motion of thanks to the Marquis
of Wellington,’ prompted by civilities rendered to his son,‘ bears testi-
mony to the very reverse of that exalted personage’s character. He
says, that, “Lord Wellington is in the constant habit of having about

1 Lieutenant W. T. Craster, 4th Regiment, 1st Commission, 27th June, 1811.

2 66

As the war enlarged, the increasing number of the sick and wounded pressed on the limited
number of medical officers, and Wellington complained, that when he demanded more, the military
medical board in London neglected his demands, and thwarted his arrangements. Shoals of
hospital mates and students were indeed sent out, and they arrived for the most part ignorant alike
of war, and their own profession ; while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors and their subordinates,
acting without any military organization or effectual superintendence, continually bade defiance to
the exertions of those medical officers, and they were many, whose experience, zeal, and talents
would with a good institution to work upon, have rendered this branch of the service most distin=
guished.” Napier, Vol. V., pp. 249-50.

3 Vote of thanks moved by Lord Bathurst in the House of Lords on 31d December, 1812 ‘ That
the thanks of this House be presented to General, the Marquis of Wellington, for his many and
great services; more particularly for the great and decisive victory of the 22nd July last, whereby,
the siego of Cadiz was raised, and the Andalusians rescued from the hands of the enemy.”’ Courier
newspaper, 4th December, 1812.

4 Major, the Honorable I. C. 8. Cocks, 79th Regiment, killed in a sortie from the Castle of
Burgos, 8th October, 1812. He was an excellent officer, and began his service in the 16th Light
Dragoons, In the “Diary of a Cavalry Offcor in the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns,” the
writer, Tomkinson, who served in Cocks’ troop, gives many particulars of his soldierly qualities and
kindness of heart.

4.99 SWABEY DIARY.

him young officers whom he conciliates by his attentions and takes pains
to instruct. One of the remarkable parts of his character is the kind-
ness and humanity he possesses.” What a humbug! I should like to
place his Lordship one half-hour at my window. I may be wrong in
imputing the miseries to be seen from it to Lord Wellington; he has
not witnessed them as they necessarily take place out of his sight, the
head-quarters of course being in advance of the hospitals. But for the
medical department, odious and detestable may their memory and
their fate become, in proportion to the want of feeling they possess!
On these wretches I have even scen the public prints prostitute the
supposed medium of truth, and this not from any party feeling but
from the secret inspiration of that diabolical part of society called the
medical staff of the army ; for from what other source can such frauds
on the public mind have risen ?

As to Lord Wellington’s condescension and kindness to officers, it
requires only to ask to be satisfied as to its existence. On this point I
do not blame him. I think those qualities would lead to endless inter-
ruption and impertinent intrusion. I therefore think he judges wisely
in not exhibiting them. People in general affect to be dissatisfied
with the measure of his praise ; his despatches however have no right to
be compared to those of our officers commanding what we term “an
expedition,” who to make their own fame deal out encomiums to those
under them.

22nd December.—Major Downman and Harding! arrived, and dined
and slept as our guests. J was very happy to meet the latter.

23rd December.—As usual raining all day. Our visitors remained,
but we had no amusement to offer them. The Major, who is not free
from the imputation of being an epicure, did not fail to praise our cook.

About this time the Horse Guards and Horse Guards Blue arrived at
Thomar, six troops each.

24th December.—The rain ceasing for a time, I was over-persuaded
to join the Major and Harding and set out with them for Taboa. Owing
to the guide’s and their obstinacy we made our journey which ought to
have been 7 leagues into 9, and the Major being ill we went at a walk.
We did not arrive at their abode till 8 o’clock at night, after travelling 2
hours in the dark over such a rocky road that I was in momentary ex-
pectation of breaking my neck. My horse fell twice, but “ up again ”
said the spurs.

25th December.—Having ridden thus far to spend Christmas day, I
could not enjoy myself because I thought only of how it had been
passed in the preceding years of my life; it was before always a time
of pleasure.

26th December.—Ramsay, with Bull’s troop, lying in the road home
to San Payo, they prevailed on me to spend aday withthem. It com-
menced by shooting on our way. In this operation I lost the party and

1 Lieutenant R. Harding (Kane’s List No. 1322) was appointed adjutant R.H.A.in October 1812,
and held that appointment until August 1813, when he rejoined and remained with “ EH” troop
until the end of the war. He served with it in the campaign of 1815, in the retreat from Quatre
Bras and at Waterloo. 2nd Captain Harding retired in 1825, and died in 1849.

SWABEY DIARY. 4938

had to pass the day by myself, but arrived notwithstanding at the
Medico’s in time for dinner, and passed a stupid evening. It appears
to me rather an odd arrangement to send cavalry to be quartered in
this district, as it affords nothing but Indian straw, whilst hay and
good forage are to be found elsewhere.

27th December.—Refusing all inducements to stay, I returned to San
Payo where I found poor Craster nearly dead and the servant, though
still sensible, in a totally hopeless condition.

30th December.—Poor Craster died last night; on opening his papers
we found letters of a most affectionate strain from a mother and sister
complaining of not having heard from him; we were afraid we should
be obliged to write direct to them till at last we found one from another
hand which relieved us from so painful a task. I penned the letter for
us all which Dyneley sent off.

31st December.—I read the service over the unfortunate Craster, it
is of itself an awful ceremony, but when I reflected that the poor fellow
had no friend, no relation to pay him the least tribute of affection, and
when I read over and over again his sister’s letters, I could hardly con-
ceive a more affecting case. A soldier that dies in battle falls ina
noble pursuit, and his loss, as being always looked forward to, is dis-
armed of half its severity, but when a friend is lost who might have
been saved but for many melancholy circumstances, there is no bound
to one’s grief and indignation.

1st January, 1815.—I did not so soon expect to have again to per-
form the duty that I went through yesterday ; two of our men, however,
have died and I have been obliged to repeat it. Three others have
been buried since our coming to this accursed place; what between
the weather, and the contagion consequent on the miserable sick taking
shelter in our houses, such calamities were to be expected.

2nd January.—We received our long expected permission to change
our quarters to Mello.

3rd January.—Marched for Mello. The principal object in our
moving is to get a commodious hospital, and leave a dreadful contagion,
notwithstanding which our place is to be filled by other troops. We
had so few men we could hardly drive the carriages. We moved the
sick on bullock wains.

4th January.—I found myself in a comfortable clean quarter, and
the troop well put up.

5th January.—Major Frazer,' passed through on his way to head-

1 Major Augustus S. Frazer (Kane’s List, No. 765), who had previously served in command of “ G”
troop and the R.A. of the expedition against Buenos Ayres in 1807 ; joined the Peninsular army
in November 1812, having temporarily exchanged with Major Bull invalided, In April 1813,
Frazer was appointed to command the H.A. vice Downman. He was present at the affairs of
Salamanca and Osma, at the battle of Vitoria (brevet Lieut.-Coloncl), siege of St. Sebastian,
passage of the Bidassoa, at Nive, Nivelle, investment of Bayonne (wounded), and battle of Toulouse.
He was made a K.C.B., and received the gold cross with one clasp at the end of the war. In the
Waterloo campaign Sir Augustus again commanded the H.A. He was afterwards at the head of
the Royal Laboratory. He died in 1835. His interesting letters from the Peninsula and the
Netherlands were published in 1889. ‘¢ Although a reserved man in public, and fond of solitude,
he was almost diffuse in his correspondence.” Duncan’s R.A. History. Captain Mercer, who
served under him as a subaltern says, ‘‘ He was a most active and zealous officer, and a very precise
and particular little man.”

an
ce
—

SWABEY DIARY.

quarters, he is improved so much as a companionable creature that he:
is really exceedingly pleasant.

6th January.—-Our forage is somewhat nearer than at San Payo, but
still scarce, and we have 50 men in hospital; about 7 horses to one
man, the only possibility of exercising them is to turn them out.
Fortunately the weather though cold has ceased to be wet.

7th January.—Rode with the commissary to find bullock wains ;
these are so difficult to obtain that we take them by force, and their
owners are so expert at running away that we can scarcely ever retain
them.

Sih January.—Ascended the Sierra de Estrella in pursuit of forage
by a road scarcely passable, I found a considerable quantity carried
there by the inhabitants to elude our search.

Sth January.—Foraged from Figuerio, but with little success, some
cars were sent to the mountains, but the people took them from the
escort. I to be sure was not in a passion when they came without
them !

Vth January.—The first snow fell on the mountains. Although we
are posted at their foot we did not feel it the least; which proves that
it certainly falls on the mountains when it is not seen anywhere else.

11th January.—Foraged from Linhares, a town on the edge of the
mountains. J found there that the commander-in-chief’s order for
laying up a store of forage for the use of the troops had been attended
to, but this was a rare instance and the quantity was so small as to be
of little use.

12th Janwary.—Macdonald arrived on his way to England, Frazer
and Jenkinson! with him. He is so rapidly recovered that his wounds
are nearly closed but it is feared he never will recover the use of his
right leg. He goes poor fellow to England, not to meet the satisfaction
of seeing his family surrounded by happiness, but to encounter great
domestic sorrow.

13th Janwary.—Macdonald being in excellent spirits we passed the
day very pleasantly. Jenkinson and Frazer contributed their share
to our enjoyment.

14th January.—Our friends still with us, but rain prevented any out
of door amusements. Towards evening Frazer, to whom such scenes
are new, lugged me up the side of the mountain till I was ready to faint.
When there, he was surprised to find I had no enthusiasm in my praises
of pine trees, stony ravines and fir-clad precipices ; these are grown so
familiar that they cease to be objects of surprise.

15th January.—Macdonald, after being very generous in the distri-
bution of his effects, left us with his party in a spring waggon. Icould
not help contrasting his situation, surrounded by conveniences, with
poor Craster’s. These are certainly more within the reach of an artillery
officer than any other.

1 Captain George Jenkinson (Kane’s List, No. 1032) served with “‘A” troop throughout the
Peninsular war.

SWABEY DIARY. 495

16th January.—We received Russian news,! our exploits so diminutive
in comparison, shrink quite out of recollection, and the battle of Sala-
manca 1s scarcely mentioned without a blush.

I7th January.—I went to Linhares in pursuit of bullocks. Having
found a pair at plough, I left a man as sentry whilst I pursued some
others that were in sight. Daring my absence the peasants got about
him with guns and all sorts of weapons. He behaved very well and
intimidated them so much by repeated charges that he kept them all
at bay till I came back, when he pointed out one fellow who had
threatened him very much and was thenrunning away. I immediately
rode after him, but he took such a line of country that, after jamping
two or three walls, my horse could go no further, so I dismounted and
pursued the rascal on foot. I got so close to him that he was frightened
out of his wits and jumped down the most dreadful precipices. I
followed till at last he took such a tremendous one that he lay groaning
at the bottom. Iwas afraid he was killed, and notwithstanding the
crowd went round to his assistance; they had however carried him off
and told me he was not much hurt. I then proceeded and made my
complaint to the magistrate and threatened him till he sent off three
prisoners to jail. These fellows, who will take any advantage of a
single Englishman, run like cowards the moment he receives any
assistance.

LSth January.—Being reduced to our wits’ end for forage, we searched
the very chimneys, cupboards, ovens, and beds of two neighbouring
towns, and by that means found a great quantity.

19th Janwary.—We rummaged Mello in the same way we had served
the other two towns. In the house of a fat rich priest we found forage
admirably concealed, but we were too cunning for the parson. A
large cellar with nothing apparently but wine in the barrels contained
pipes of straw; and cupboards with the doors pasted up with paper, and
false roofs gave us a plentiful harvest ; last year we did not know how
to play these tricks.

20th January.—We continued our search; the same priest however
certainly beat us, for I had information that he had hay in hig house
and with the utmost diligence could not find it.

21st January.—The weather is now a settled frost with fine whole-
some sunshine every day.

22nd Janwary.—Lord Wellington being hourly expected at Lisbon
from Cadiz great preparations are being made to receive him. He is
the undoubted deliverer of Portugal, but I believe, except in the
capital, there are few who are not too ignorant to be grateful; this
stupid, idle, dirty, cowardly race is daily becoming more unpleasant.

25rd Janwary.—Rode to Videmonte in the mountains for forage.
There I had the mortification to find it bespoken by the infantry. The
towns in the mountains are situated in an infinitely finer country than
those at their feet, the pasturage and soil are beautiful, and there is
not a stone or a rock to interrupt the fertility.

* Probably account of Battle of Borodino, 7th September 1812, when Napolcon defeated Kutusoff,

496 SWABEY DIARY.

24th Janwary.—Occupied on the same business as yesterday. We
are now obliged to turn the water off the water meadows and send our
horses in to feed ; these meadows produce repeated crops by the sim-
ple process of turning the brooks over them. ‘To effect this of course
the meadow must be on a slope, and a stream of water adjacent to the
top. A ditch with small channels at intervals is then dug along the
upper part of the meadow, into which the water being turned it flows
continually over the soil, which produces repeated crops, and can be
drained at pleasure.

(To be continued),

497

Je ie ASH AR! Ase) dew,

TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE,

LIEUTENANT F, BROWN, I.0.M., R.A.

Tn lecture delivered by Major MacMahon, R.A., F.R.S. on “ Ter-
restrial Refraction and Mirage” I have read with much pleasure,
more particularly perhaps, as [ happened to be serving in Rangoon
during the same period as Major Barlow, R.A. and, therefore, well
remember the interest this question of refraction and mirage occasioned
in that command.

Since the object of the lecture was to investigate whether any
correction in elevation should be given to guns to counteract the
influences of refraction, and if so, how much, it has occurred to me
that it might not be out of place for me to submit to the Institution a
correction for quadrant elevation which appeared to me some few
months ago as desirable. The correction is definite, though small,
and possesses the merit of not fluctuating with the varying atmospheric
conditions.

It is as follows :—

The formula at present in use for calculating the quadrant elevation
of guns in elevated batteries is—

i
= ipl Cpeateatee meeeee

where 6 = quadrant elevation in minutes.
»» = angle of elevation in minutes as per range table,
» = height of battery in feet.
» =range in yards.

Now this formula does not take into account the curvature of the
earth, and moreover, the mean water level at the battery itself appears
to be just the place where it is of the smallest importance. Of course
this height must be known before the corrected height can be obtained,
but it is not, in my opinion, the proper altitude to use in the calculation.

That curvature should be taken into account must be admitted, be-
cause the height of the gun above the object aimed at will vary with
the range, or distance of the object. With a range of 5000 yards, or
say three miles, the dip due to curvature amounts to about 70 inches,
and this amount must obviously be added to the height of the gun

IQ, WOlt, seguir,

sects NS epee el

498 A LETTER ON TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

above the mean water level at battery, to give its height above an
object three miles off; this is seen from Fig. “l,

Fig. 1.
BATTERY
Ava ras = = 2, Ea
j cA WA
>]
O:rWw
tho t < |"
ale S55 (
bl eal
Git E|=
| < { | EIN
=|a 3 MILES \ mi:
5 ——— —— = = {|b
| wig
U = i 3 o } >)
ihe le
[eo aT
Pe 2 ale
pANeO US
= =
<=
Ee

In the new calculation the dip due to the extreme fighting range
of the gun could be allowed for, and the range would, of cour se, vary
with the gun used, the limits being probably between one and threo
miles; the amount to be added to the height of the battery would then
be approximately as follows :—

Extreme fighting range Feet to be added to
of gun in miles. height of battery.
il 65
2 . 2°60
Dae dee ete nem hen slot steetieatcostntnowces 5°85
4, 10°40
Dio ano a oadees Horloss Sepang anon sop mnneD 16°25
The formula would then be—
h+aA
6=o— (7) 1146.. Facet stdatiadco de sasnese pee rome ce)

Where 4 = additional height to be added to the height of the nate and
corresponding to the dip at the extreme fighting range of ¢ gun.

This formula, although probably better than the one at present in
use, is not absolutely correct, because “4A” is taken as a constant,
whereas it is really a variable varying with the range “ R.”

As the varying dip for any range can easily be calculated and
embodied in a general formula, I would therefore suggest the follow-
ing :—No. 3 as the most satisfactory of the three, because the variation
of dip due to any range, ‘‘ R” is taken into account.

he 65 R
— (G+ aT DM Bn Alene pens AO)

6, @ and / are in the same vans as tani (QQ)
this is equal to—

6=$— (i + -0000002098 rn) MB. onan

Working out the examples given on p. 181, Part III., Garrison
Artillery, according to this formula, the amount to be deducted is 23:4
minutes, or ‘48 minutes more than given by the old formula (the book
says 22 minutes deduction, this should obviously be 22°92 minutes).

A LETTER ON TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE. 499

Take another range, say 4000 yards—
the old formula gives 11°46 minutes deduction
» lew oy) ”? 12°43 »” oe)

—————

a difference of °97 minutes.

This difference, although small, is a correction, and as one formula is
worked as easily as another, the modification is probably worth con-
sideration.

The D.R.F. is corrected for this curvature, and therefore it would
appear that the quadrant elevation of the gun should also be subjected
to a similar correction, that it has been ignored i is Shewn by the manner
the formula (1) is deduced :—

Fic. 2.

io) Sane [RB ATHTICR Yee com? Mn ts Lee ee,
A eee ay i
Wao \
ee

Wy = angle of depression in minutes.
h = height of battery in feet.
t= range in yards.

h
then 3: 2aR :: Y : 360,60 (approximately).

__ 360 Xx a xh 3600 4
Dar lb Tita) el
3600
Bw yas, 1146
{ = amount to be deducted in minutes from he range table elevation to )
(give quadrant elevation, as per formula—(1).
‘This proves, conclusively, that this formula does not consider cur-
vature.
In Fig. 8 the effect of curvature is shewn; instead, therefore, of yy
Fie. 3.

being substracted from the range table elevation, the larger angle 8

500 A LETTER ON TERRESTRIAL REFRACTION AND MIRAGE.

should be deducted, this being the correction considered in formula (3).
It is perhaps worthy of note that, with a range of three miles, the
dip is approximately 5-85 feet, and this is equal to about 1! 17”, or say,
within a second or two of the maximum refraction given by Major
MacMahon. The total amount of depression at this range—for very
low batteries—would therefore apppear to be—
l’ 18" for refraction
1’ 17” for curvature

2’ 35" = additional depression required on the gun.

for a range of three miles, if the present method of calculating
quadrant elevation is continued.

It will be probably considered that a dip of ‘65 feet for one mile is
too great, I rather think it is, but in the absence of anything reliable—
no two authorities absolutely agreeing—lI have considered ‘65 feet as
sufficiently near for the purpose.

THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL.

IBS

CAPTAIN G. F. HERBERT, R.A.

Tue following is an account of the part played by the artillery in the
Chitral Relief Expedition. The batteries which were actually engaged
during the campaign were :—

No. 3 Mountain Battery .. ... ... ... Major J. D. Cunningham.
5 8 i oe lah i mee ae ee , J. C. Shirres.
»» 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery ... ... Captain J. L. Parker.

The 15th Field Battery also formed part of the expedition. Un-
fortunately it was not sent up from Campellpore till some time after
the rest of the troops had started, consequently it was not in time to
take part in the fight at the Malakand Pass, and beyond this point it
did not go. I believe the battery was delayed while experiments were
being made with a view of the guns, &c. being carried over the passes
by elephants, but it seems a great pity that it was not sent up at once
to march as far into the country as it could.) It could certainly have
been brought into action at the Malakand and would probably have
been most useful as, at the first two positions occupied, the range was
too long for the 2°5” gun to have very much effect.

It is much to be regretted that the opportunity was missed as the
12-pr. B.L. has never, I believe, been firedagainst a real enemy and much
valuable information might have been gained even if it had taken part in
one action only. Moreover it is now more than ten years since our
horse or field artillery has fired a round on service while every single
mountain battery, British and Native, has been through at least one
campaign during that time.

In the Chitral campaign the mountain batteries were again to the
fore. Mach of the three was engaged in more than one action and on
every occasion played a very prominent part.

I do not propose to write a regular narrative of the campaign, but
only to record as much as is necessary to describe the movements of
the batteries.

I was fortunate enough to obtain leave to accompany the expedition
as a newspaper correspondent. Lieutenant Pack-Beresford, R.H.A.,
went up in the same capacity. We travelled together and had a most
interesting trip, returning to India from Gilgit vid Chilas. We left

1 This was done in the case of cavalry with excellent result, as, contrary to expectation, they
found country where they could act and were of the greatest possible service in at least two of the
actions. Beyond the Janbatai Pass the country was quite impracticable and they were not sent on,

10. VoL. XXII, 68

Ist April.

2nd April.

8rd April.

502 THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL.

Hoti Mardan on Ist April and reached Murree on 14th June, during
which time we marched about 800 miles.

At the time mobilization was ordered the three mountain batteries
were stationed ;:—

No. 3 and 8 at Rawal Pindi.
No. 2 (Derajat) at Kohat.

Their respective strengths were :—

Officers. N.C.Q.’s and men.
INOSS* ite, ee ene ee eee eC)
Fy en see age 2 ange HOP gay oe ue ene ETE
British Native Fighting :
; ‘ ; Officers. Officers. men. Followers.
IN@s AGW EN) oho BE nc Gan. 000. son Jb ban 0g BB

[A section of this battery was on command in the Kurram Valley and
did not take part in the Chitral Expedition].

These three batteries were under command of Lieut.-Col. W. Aitken
with Captain G. C. Dowell as adjutant.

The Colonel on the Staff, R.A., was Colonel W. W. Murdoch, Staff-
Captain, Captain M. F. Fegen. .

The batteries proceeded to Hoti Mardan by march route, seven
marches from Rawal Pindi, ten from Kohat.

At Hoti Mardan they joined the brigades to which they were origi-
nally attached, viz. :—

No. 3 to lst Brigade ... ... .... ... Brigadier-General Kinloch.
» SB o wimg 5 Rant ne , i Waterfield.
» 2% (Derajat) to 3rd Brigade Gatacre.

The batteries having come by march route instead of by rail, as was
the case with the infantry, were probably the fittest troops on the ground
at the time of concentration.

3) 33

The advance from Hoti Mardan commenced on Ist April when the
2nd and 3rd Brigades marched to Jalala (14 miles) while the Ist went
to Lundkhawar to make a feint against the Shahkot Pass.

On 2nd April the 2nd Brigade marched to Dirgai at the north of the
gorge leading to the Malakand Pass while the other brigades encamped
a few miles away, the Ist still heading for the Shahkot Pass.

On 8rd April the 2nd Brigade moved out at 8 a.m. to attack the
Malakand, both batteries from the other brigades haying come up to
join it before it marched.

General Low’s plans had been kept profoundly secret. Until the
last moment the whole force thought that an attack was also to be made
on the Shahkot Pass by the Ist Brigade while the 3rd Brigade was to
remain in rear, ready to support either of the others if necessary.

In reality the movement of the lst Brigade were merely a feint and
they eventually came up and reinforced the 2nd at the Malakand.

I suppose it was owing to the closeness of this secrecy that the C.R.A.
was left at the base, in ignorance that his three batteries were to be

-brigaded together on 3rd April.

THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL. 503

Tn his absence the command fell to Major Cunningham whose place
as Battery Commander was taken by Captain Grier.

The three batteries advanced in line of battery columns along the
east of the valley encountering a good deal of rough broken ground
en route, but one must see a mountain battery on the war-path to know
what marching really is, and it wasa great sight to see how they swung
along taking everything as it came.

The first shot was fired at 8.55 a.m. by the enemy at the Guides’
cavalry who were reconnoitringe towards the pass, but it was not till
nearly 9°30 that No. 3 came into action on a ridge running across the
valley with a narrow crest, very rocky and broken. The range from
here to the enemy’s sungurs was about 4000 yards, rather excessive
for the 2°5" gun, and I do not think much damage was done. No. 8
came into action beside No. 3 a few minutes later and took up the fire.
No. 2 (Derajat) also unlimbered but did not fire.

I believe Major Cunningham did not select this very long range
position but was ordered to take it up. Presumably the General did
not wish to send troops too far forward up the valley until the flank
attack being carried out by the Guides and 4th Sikhs on the high hills
to the left was more developed.

At 10 a.m. the guns limbered up and advanced to a range of about
3000 yards, still too long for very great effect, though the practice was
good and many shell appeared to tell.

1 «This position they maintained for about an hour, shelling the
village of Malakand (at the head of the pass), the adjacent sungurs
and any groups of the enemy that came into sight. The effect was de-
cidedly good as any attempt on their part to form a large gathering
was at once frustrated and subsequent observation showed that their
loss from shrapnel fire was very great, a good deal, no doubt, having
been inflicted from this position. At 11.15 the artillery ceased firing,
limbered up and advanced along the foot of the hills on the right of
the valley, the main body of infantry also advancing along the centre,
the whole moving up to within 1400 yards of the village where the
batteries came into action ona prominent spur.. The batteries quickly
got the range, and from-this time to.the final. assault of the position,
they fired with deadly effect.” The top of the crest on which the
batteries came into action was so narrow that one gun of No. 3 had to
be kept in its place when fired by the gunners holding on to drag-ropes
attached to the axles to prevent it recoiling down hill.

Major Cunningham has kindly supplied me with the following notes :

“At the third position I kept the fire of all three batteries on the
lines of sungurs that successively opposed the advance of our infantry,
firing with time shrapnel close over the heads of our infantry. As
British infantry use cordite, they made no smoke, and their khaki
clothes being the same colour as the hillside, the men were most diffi-
cult to see. Consequently one had to keep a very sharp look-out indeed
so that one did not continue fire too long after they had masked targets
unnoticed.

I quote from the Morning Post (Allahabad) for which paper I acted as correspondent,

4th April

504, THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL.

I controlled the fire from a hill peak, having one battery on my right
and two on my left and used my voice for orders, first calling attention
by the whistle. I found it very advantageous to have men from each
battery on the flanks nearest me, watching me for orders and calling
the attention of Battery Commanders when I wanted them to hear,
At no time were infantry firing nearer than 600 yards; had they been
nearer the task of controlling the fire of three batteries in the way
I did would have been most difficult, if not impossible. A Maxim gun
that occasionally fired near us completely drowned my voice. The three
batteries occupied a front of 300 to 350 yards. When the enemy was
driven out of all sungurs on the hillside and our infantry were near the
top, the fire of all three batiteries was concentrated on the village. The
shells burst most regularly.

At the second position No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A. fired at a large
sungur on the top of the hill on the left about 2000 feet above the
battery. Range 2525 yards. The third shell struck the top of the
wall and the three following did likewise. Trails had to be sunk inthe
ground to get the necessary elevation.”

I accompanied the infantry at the assault of the hill and I particularly
noticed the absolute confidence that they placed in the accuracy of
artillery fire and observation. The possibility of danger from that
quarter never seemed to strike anyone though many of the shells
sounded unpleasantly close, and [admitthat I, personally, had occasional
reminiscenses of incidents while on range duty such as bad fuzes. Cer-
tainly a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.

(‘) “Had it not been for the heavy shelling which the position
underwent from the three batteries of artillery, the final assault would
have been infinitely more troublesome. The effect of the shrapnel fire
was very deadly and far-reaching. Not only in the sungurs, but in the
village and for some distance beyond it were traces of the terrible way
in which it had done its work.”

The expenditure of ammunition was :—

Ring. Shrapnel.
ENORS! cinstdietee teens HASH eee Ge aL
ins he Re 11 HORRY Sore AOI Rote Beet Betta 69
op 2 (Demee) —co0 BO cn o0p-000st(iéC NL

After the pass had been forced, the three batteries ascended the hill
and bivouacked on the top with the Ist Brigade. The ascent was
terribly difficult and the road was much blocked. ‘The Derajat battery
took three hours to reach the top. Hardly any of the transport got up
that night and comparatively little the next day, so those bivouacking
on the summit of the hill had a very rough experience, suffering as they
did from cold, hunger and fatigue.

On 4th April No. 8 Mountain Battery accompanied the Ist Brigade
which moved on to Khar in the Swat valley—about four miles. They
were attacked on the way and came in for some sharp fighting. Indeed
it is considered that the enemy were in greater force and sustained
heavier losses than on the previous day. On this occasion they were

1 Morning Post.

THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL, 505

acting more on the offensive and were consequently more exposed—a
fact of which our troops did not fail to take advantage. The Guides’
cavalry made a successful charge and, in spite of very heavy going and
tired horses, inflicted considerable damage while the battery made some
beautiful practice at groups of the enemy and accounted for a very large
proportion of their total loss.

I again quote Major Cunningham’s notes: “ On 4th of April, at one
time, No. 3 Mountain Battery, R.A. came into action against a large
sungur on the hilltop that was full of men and flags, and giving a lot
of trouble to our infantry. A man was standing on the wall waving a
green flag. The mekometer gave range 1800 yards. Ring shell was
used. First round, 1300 yards—short. Second, 1400 yards—over.
Third, 1350 yards—shell burst on top of the wall just under the
man with the flag, who went up in the air and came down flat. The
remaining three rounds burst in the sungur, silencing it for the rest of
the day. I heard afterwards from the political officer that the man
with the green flag was a leading tribesman. On 4th April I used
time shrapnel at ranges up to 1000 yards, without previously getting
the range, where rapidity in catching the enemy by surprise was
necessary, with excellent results. The enemy’s losses that day were
estimated at 500, of which the larger portion must have been due to
guns.”

With regard to the incident of the man with the green flag, the
correspondent of the Hnglishman (Calcutta) writes: “There is one
incident which took place when Major Cunningham’s battery first
came into action, which is worth recording. The enemy had planted

many coloured standards over their defences, and before the guns had.
found the range correctly, and when the shells were not getting home, -

one of the enemy, evidently a deserted sepoy, stood on the centre
‘sungur and signalled the misses with military precision.—‘ Miss, low
to the right, high to the left!’ in accordance with the inaccuracy of
the firing. Though our fighting line was extended with fixed bayonets
in anticipation of a rush, and the tension was great, yet the affair was
too palpable and absurd, and a laugh passed right down the line. But
No. 3, R.A. made up for this show of sarcasm when they found the
range.”’ ‘The same writer says, “Major Cunningham gave the sungurs
a last benefit. The shooting of the battery was simply perfect, and the
last fire of the day must have had a demoralizing effect. Shell after
shell burst upon the defences, and, in one instance, four shells in
succession fell into the centre sungur almost at the same spot.”

That night the Ist Brigade bivouacked in the open in momentary
expectation of an attack, but none was made and the night passed off
quietly.

On oth April the 2nd Brigade marched to Khar, bringing with
it No. 8 and the Derajat batteries. No fighting took place on that
day, nor on the 6th, though large bodies of the enemy were seen in
the neighbourhood with flags, tomtoms, and other warlike stores, and
a few stray shots were fired at our convoys and reconnoitring parties.

On 6th April the 2nd Brigade, with No, 8 and No, 2 (Derajat)

5th April.

6th Apvil.

7th April.

8th April.

9th to 12th
April.

13th Apzil.

506 THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL.

batteries, moved on about eight miles to Aladand.

On 7th a working party of sappers and miners, with a small
infantry escort, went out at daybreak to commence bridging the Swat
river, from which the camp was about a mile distant. As they ap-
proached, the river parties of the enemy appeared on the hills opposite
and began firing at them. It was soon evident that the enemy was in
force, and General Waterfield ordered out all the troops at his disposal.
The ground near the river was very bad, consisting of deep, boggy rice
fields intersected by watercourses, many of which were quite impas-
sable for horsesand mules. At 7.30 a.m. No. 8 Mountain Battery came
into action, near the place where the bridge was to be built, against
parties of the enemy firing from sungurs and hilltops, at ranges of 1300
to 1600 yards. The Derajat battery was proceeding to join No. 8, when
it was ordered to take up a position higher up stream to cover the
crossing of the cavalry, but, owing to the villainous nature of the
ground, the movement took some time, and the action terminated soon
after they had commenced firing.

By 11.80 a.m. the cavalry had forded the river and put the enemy to
rout, so the action was then at an end as far as the other arms were
concerned.

; Ring. Shrapnel.
ArmmmmmniiOn )) INO, 3 Mlommuenim Watery soo 00 000 % ooo oo Sil
expended § No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery .. 8 ... ... 1

On 4th April the Derajat battery had handed over to No. 3 Mountain
Battery 48 ring and 148 shrapnel shell, so they had now only 56 ring
and 97 shrapnel remaining.

On 8th April No. 8 and No. 2 (Derajat) batteries forded the Swat
river with the 2nd Brigade, the latter going forward with the ad-
vanced guard to the Katgola Pass, about nine miles, while No. 8
remained at Chakdarra, close to the river, where the main body of the
brigade halted till the 10th. Captain F. W. Stanton was sent back
to the field park at Dirgai for a fresh stock of ammunition. Starting
on the 8th and moving by double marches, he caught up his own
battery (No. 8) at Chakdarra on the 10th and the Derajat battery at
Sado on the 1]th.

On 10th April Lieutenant Hare’s section of the Derajat battery,
while marching by an unreconnoitred road, lost a mule and gun carriage,
the mule falling with his load into the Panjkora river and being
drowned. ‘The rest of the day was spent in fruitless endeavours to
recover the load. It was a very serious matter as there was no spare
carriage with the force, and this meant that the battery was reduced
to three guns. Fortunately, however, on the following day the mule
floated to the surface, and the carriage was recovered unharmed.

No more fighting occurred till the 13th, by which date the 2nd
Prigade had been halted for two days at Sado while the Panjkora river
wa» being bridged.

On 13th Lieutenant Edwards came into camp about 10 a.m. and,
from his account of the state of affairs at Umra Khan’s headquarters,
it was thought that there was no prospect of further fighting, at any

THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL. 507

rate, in that neighbourhood. It was therefore a great surprise when,
at about 1.30 p.m., the 2nd Brigade received orders to turn out at once
and support the Guides, who were being attacked by two large bodies
of the enemy. The Guides had crossed the Panjkora by a temporary
bridge on the evening of the 12th, and had started up a valiey
on the Jhandoul side early on the 18th to burn villages. Dur-
ing the night of the 12th the temporary bridge was washed away,
and there was then no means of communication across the river
except a small mussuck raft on which some four or five men
could cross at a time with great difficulty and danger. Consequently,
when it was known that the Guides were being attacked, all that could
be done was to send troops along our side of the river to support them
by firmg across it. The position which these troops took up was about
three miles from camp, and, most fortunately, it was such as to com-
mand a view of the spur along which the Guides were retiring at a
range of from 1900 to 800 yards. They reached this position at about
2.30 p.m., and No. 8 Mountain Battery came into action on some high
ground above the river while the infantry lined the banks below. At
this time the Guides were firing occasional volleys, and a few of the
enemy were to be seen on the hilltops.! “For some time it was very
difficult to see for certain which were our men and which the enemy,
as both kept pretty well under cover, and little could be seen beyond
puffs of smoke.” Presently the enemy grew bolder and showed
in great numbers. ‘The guns then began to fire more rapidly and with
right good effect, directing their shrapnel here and there as occasion
demanded. ‘The ranges were from 1400 to 1700 yards. Their fire
soon relieved the Guides from any severe pressure and enabled them to
retire deliberately and slowly. . . . . At 4.20 p.m. the battery
(No. 8) came into action in their second position, opposite the end of
the spur which the Guides had just descended, and presently commenced
to shell a village some 1400 yards distant from which the enemy were
firig, the shells appearing to go plump into the buildings, raising
clouds of dust while the firing from that point quietly ceased.”

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery left camp at the same time as the
rest of the troops, but were, for some reason, ordered to halt after going’
a short distance, and were not brought into action till about 4.30 p.m.,
when they took up a position on the river bank nearly opposite the
Guides’ camp, and made excellent practice at sungurs and bodies of the
enemy at ranges varying from 650 to 3100 yards.

By the time the Guides reached their camp, night was falling, and, as
the enemy remained in force in the neighbourhood, evidently much
elated at the result of the day’s proceedings, it was considered almost
certain that they would make a night attack. Consequently, the Derajat
battery and some companies of infantry remained in position to afford
what support they could from across the river. What actually trans-
pired is described as follows by the Hnglishman. “ From information
received on the following day, it appears that we were right in sur-
mising that the enemy intended rushing the riverside camp, for a cap-

} Morning Post.
? The Guides are armed with Martinis, as are all the Native infantry at present

14th to 16th
April.

17th April.

508 THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL.

tured Pathan gave the following story. . . . ‘Hven the severe handling
by the supporting force did not stay them and, at nightfall, 3000 were
waiting in the cornfields for the signal to rush the camp. But suddenly
the night was turned into day, and then again and again, and our
courage forsook us.’ The ‘night into day’ was the effect of the star
shell which the Derajat battery sent over them. And thus the Guides
were saved from a tight place.”

At daybreak, on the 14th, the enemy were seen to be still in force,
but, after keeping up a heavy fire for about twenty minutes, in the
course of which Captain Peebles was mortally wounded, they melted
away altogether. In the action and during the night and morning
following the expenditure of ammunition was :—

Ring. Shrapnel. Star,
INO, 8 dulommawayin ISAC E sab. sab vebg db® cos + boon a Sb vpoam aces =
No, 2 (Dewar) Momo Bailey 51, == con ono JB a0 oo.

The Derajat battery remained covering the Guides’ camp from 18th
to loth without kits or shelter of any kind, and, as there was a great
deal of heavy rain on those days, they had anything but a comfortable
time.

On 14th April No. 3 Mountain Battery, who were at Khar, received
orders suddenly at 3.40 p.m. to march without delay and join the 2nd
Brigade at Sado. They were off by 5 p.m. and marched that night to
Chakdarra, about 8 miles, crossing the Swat river. Next day (15th)
they marched 24 miles to Sado where they arrived full of go at about
3 p.m.—a pretty smart performance over bad roads.

No further advance was made till the 17th when the 2nd and 8rd
Brigades crossed the Panjkora by the new suspension bridge. From
this time the lead was taken by the 8rd Brigade. After marching afew
miles in the direction of Mundia (Umra Khan’s headquarters) they
came in sight of a very numerous enemy.

The passage of troops over the bridge had been very slow as infantry
had to cross in single file while, in the case of mules, only three were
allowed to be, at one time, on the bridge which had a span of 95 feet.
Consequently it was almost mid-day before the action commenced.

There was some misunderstanding about the succession in which
troops were to cross, and I believe it was by a piece of simple luck that
the Derajat battery went over ahead of the other batteries.

From the bridge to the place where our troops assumed fighting
formation was about six miles and the battery did most of this distance
at the trot, a pace of manceuyre not generally recognized in Mountain
Artillery, in order to catch up the infantry who had got a long start of
them from the bridge. I happened to be standing near the Headquarter
Staff when it was reported to General Gatacre that the battery was
coming up and general astonishment was expressed at the rapidity with
which they had covered the ground.

The action—called Mamagai—was not a very sanguinary affair as the
enemy appeared to have but little stomach for the fight and, although
they were possibly in greater force than on any previous occasion, they
kept ata discreet distance and offered a very tame opposition to the
advance of our infantry.

THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL. 509

The Derajat battery occupied two positions and fired 18 ring and
28 shrapnel shell, making good practice and very quickly dispersing
the enemy. The latter at one period had occupied a small fort on a
high bank of the river from which they were directing a very harassing.
fire on our cavalry in the river bed. ‘The battery turned its fire on to
the fort—range 1850 yards—and a few shell were burst just over the
parapet with the result that the enemy were quickly seen streaming out
at the back—a striking difference from the tenacity with which they
stuck to their sungurs on the Malakand under fire of three batteries.

This was the last action of the campaign. Next morning (18th 18th April.
April) Mundia was occupied without a shot being fired, Umra Khan
and his following haying left for Afohanistan the previous evening.

On arrival at Mundia, General Low, having received news that the
Chitral garrison were in great straits, ordered General Gatacre to push
on with all possible speed with a flying column consisting of—

The Buffs.

4th Ghoorkas.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.

x No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
2 Maxim Guns.

The Derajat battery drew on No. 8 Mountain Battery to fill up its
deficiencies of ammunition.

This column moved forward the same evening starting at 3 p.m. and
arriving at dusk at its camp near Barwa—about 10 miles—the battery
mules having been saddled for 12 hours.

On 19th April the column started to cross the Janbatai Pass. From 19th April.
the accounts given by Lieutenants Fowler and Edwards, who had been
brought along this road, it was thought that the pass was a fairly easy
one. It proved to be anything but easy. The troops took from.
5.30 a.m to 4.30 p.m. to reach the top while very little of the transport
got up at all that day. The Buffs went down the other side of the
pass for a distance, but the Derajat Battery and the Ghoorkas bivouacked
on the summit of the hill that overhung us.

One incident of the bivouac was connected with some doombas (moun-
tain sheep) the joint property of the G.O.C. and the Political officers.
Somehow these sheep strayed and were never found. Many a hungry
officer thanked his patron saint that night for a mouthful of mutton :
but the brigade orders next day contained some very stringent orders
under the marginal heading of ‘loot.’ ” :

On 20th April the baggage all came up and the Battery moved on and 20th April.
joined the rest of the force at Bandagai—about & miles ahead.

On 21st the column started at 5.80 a.m. to try and get to Dir—about 21st April.
23 miles. ‘The march was a most trying one, constant stoppages being
made while the sappers made the road practicable. At last, at 7 p.m.,
the advanced portion of the column halted for the night at Kotke, two
miles short of Dir, while the remainder halted afew miles further back,
half the battery being with each. A heavy thunderstorm, about 4 p.m.,
drenched every one to the skin and made the going worse than ever.
The advanced party fared best as they came in for a square meal
provided by the Khan of Dir consisting of cooked delicacies for the

510 THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL.

officers, and sheep, goats, fowls and ghee! for the remainder, and most
welcome they were.

On this day news was received that the siege of Chitral had been
raised and there was no more occasion for forced marches. Sub-
sequently the Derajat battery crossed the Lowarai Pass (10,500 feet),
marched to Chitral with the 3rd Brigade and took part on 16th May
in the parade of the Chitral garrison and the two Relief Columns.

On the whole the equipment, ammunition, etc. of the Mountain
batteries appears to have given great satisfaction. Major Cunningham
remarks that “The time and percussion fuze No. 55 Mark III. acted
admirably. Shrapnel shell Mark III. often failed to break up, the
bullets remaining intact in a mass in the resin in the body of the shell.
I found two like this at Malakand, the fuzes of which had evidently
acted quite properly. Ring shell good. Mekometer very useful.”
Captain Parker says “ The star shell fuzes seem to require an improved
uncapping arrangement as, in the dark, the priming frequently strips
off with the cap unperceived. I attribute 2 blind star shell out of 7
fired on night of 18th April to this cause, proof of which was afforded
by the 8th shell loaded but not fired and subsequently unloaded.”

The shooting seems to have been conducted generally on the lines of
the latest instructions. Major Shirres says that “It was sometimes
necessary to find range and fuze for one central part, then others were
estimated and corrections made according to observation. This was
necessary to save ammunition, as many points were shelled and the exact
spot to be fired at changed constantly according to the enemy’s move-
ments. As observation was very easy this system seemed to act well.”
Captain Parker found that “the enemy frequently made off too quickly
to allow of the ranging system being carried through. The regulation
system had to be adapted to circumstances.”

1Native butter.

dll

MORE BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS

COAST DEFENCE.

LIEUT.-COL. D. O’CALLAGHAN, R.A.

To many gropers in the dark, General Geary’s paper in the R.A.I.
“Proceedings” of December last (No. 12, Vol. XXI.), must have come
ag a boon anda blessing. People walking in darkness, of which the
terrors are not only caused by the absence of light, but by its being
thronged by grim spectres and fearsome bogies, invoked and invested
with sinister power by those who hug themselves in the fond belief
that the garrison gunner must, of necessity, be a scientist, and a
mathematician of a very high order to boot.

Here, in General Geary’s paper, is the whole art of Coast Defence,
stripped of its verbiage, its calculations and its formule. A hostile
critic would probably call the style of the article fragmentary—but so
is that of the book of Proverbs, to say nothing of the later contribu-
tions, in staccato treatment, of Mr. Martin Tupper. In the pithiness
of the style—in the absence of redundant word making—lies the force
-and the usefulness of the article.

Generalties—and nearly all sets of conditions obtaining in Coast
Defence conform to broad generalties—are grasped by a bold and
masterly hand, their leading features dissected out, and a few simples
prescribed to meet each case. An enemy’s vessel is looked upon by
General Geary much in the light in which the younger Mr. Wemmick
regarded a church. “Here,” he virtually says, ‘is a ship—let’s hit
it.” He does not send for his book of confidential photographs that
he may identify this vessel with that which the Coast Brigade signal-
man has pronounced it to resemble, nor does he scan the description
of the amount of plating carried by the supposed ship, nor divide
it into squares and assign to each its own appointed projectile,
carefully discriminating between the various thicknesses of metal
covering these imaginary rectangles. He does not do this, partly
because it may have occurred to the enterprising captain to disguise
his ship as a North German Lloyd Liner, or as a steam trawler,
according to size ; but mainly because the ship, should she wish to do
so, would have passed far out of range and possibly out of sight, be-
fore his dispositions for the proper distribution of fire, and his calcu-
lations as to the chances of the various projectiles selecting their
appropriate squares, were completed. No—this nicety in the choice

10, you, XXII,

512 MORE BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS ON COAST DEFANCE.

of missiles is, he says, allwsory, and many perturbed spirits who have
dared to think, but not to give expression to their thoughts, will thank
him for that word. Common sense and common shell are the things
to use, and the way to use them is to hit the ship as often as you can.

From the foregoing it will be seen that, not only do I cordially agree

with General Geary’s maxims, but that I rejoice in the freedom and in-
cisiveness with which they are set forth, and this I think I may be per-
mitted to do without suspicion of presumption or of unctuous flattery.
But I would go a little further than he and try to deal with possible
results. In no work, treatise, pamphlet or discussion have I seen or
heard analysed the difference in the réle of a man-o’-war and of a Coast
Defence battery when engaging a hostile vessel—but they are vastly
different. ‘The man-o’-war fights his adversary with a view of sinking,
disabling, or capturing her, the last being usually the corollary of the
second, and the end most devoutedly sought. The fort, on the other
-hand, fires at the ship in self defence or to prevent her forcing a narrow
passage leading into waters where her fire may be productive of danger.
The landsman would like to sink the ship-—would be glad to see her
‘disabled—since this would cause inconvenience to the enemy; but his
main object is, as an Irishman would express it, “to make her lave
that ’’—he has no idea of effecting a capture. Given a disabled ship
which, from want of knowiedge of the local resources, has struck her
colours, what is the officer in command to do? He cannot tow her in
with the garrison boat—the Sappers would probably find it incon-
venient to lend one of their Submarine Miners, the A.S.C. boats
would doubtless be under repair, and he would hesitate, for obvious
reasons, before putting a prize crew on board under the command of
a yachting subaltern. He wants to cripple and to send her away
limping and innocuous, and it seems to me that if he keep on hitting
her all over with common shell, she will not make a lengthened stay in
the vicinity of that fort.

Look at any battleship, or any so-called protected cruiser, and see

-how exposed to the effects of bursting shells is a very large proportion
of her crew. ‘The auxiliary armament, such as the 6-inch and 4:7-
‘inch Q.F. guns is shielded by thin (about 44-inch) steel plates, while
the smaller Q.F. and machine guns are practically unprotected. It
may be urged that the crews may be withdrawn from this part of the
-armament, but they cannot take their guns with them, and a ship,
using her turret or barbette guns only, would not engage a modern,
well armed fort with much prospect of success. The ship, therefore,
should one ever attack such a fort (which is highly improbable), may
be considered as all target, and common shell may be fired at all parts
of her indiscriminately, with the full hope of inflicting the class of in-
jury we most desire; while the armour piercers, should any properly
so-called have been issued, may be reserved for the cowps de grice if
her disabled condition prevent her from “ laving that.”

A word next as to high angle fire. It is tacitly admitted that a ship
can do no damage in the way of long range bombardment unless she
anchor stem and stern—and very little then. But it is to prevent her
doing this little that the system of high angle fire from heavy howitzers

MORE BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS ON COAST DEFENCE. 513

has been inaugurated. It goes without saying that we should find
considerable difficulty in hitting a ship at say, 10,000 yards, by fire
from such howitzers, unless she anchored stem and stern, but even at
that range, our fire is quite accurate enough, thanks to Colonel Watkin,
to prevent her doing so.

Here again, however, there has been an attempt to paint the lily—to
gild refined gold—by devising a special projectile for piercing the
steel protecting decks and bursting in the entrails of the devoted
cruiser. If any of my readers have ever been on board a man-o’-war,
be she line of battle ship or cruiser, they will surely see the futility of
expecting a shell, in obedience to the wish of the firer, to avoid the
superstructure, boats, torpedo nettings, spare spars and all the hetero-
gencous mass of gear scattered about her upper works, and to steer a
tortuous, intricate path down to the steel turtle deck, to penetrate it,
and to burst, having kept its percussion fuze inactive until this supreme
moment! Is this not crediting an inanimate thing with rather subtle
powers of discrimination? This fad has, I trust, been abandoned and
its spirit finally laid to rest. As in the case of direct fire, therefore,
common shell with large bursting charges, probably of high explosive,
will be the only projectile, and these the garrison gunner may cheer-
fully launch into space, without the hampering thought that he is
asking them to do rather more than he would expect of his terrier, did
he enter him at a badger in a difficult earth. Let him take courage to
himself, and, when the time comes, let him say with General Geary
(and Mr. Wemmick), “ here’s a ship, let’s hit it.”

or
Cr

A NEW METHOD OF SETTING THE
TYRES OF WHEELS.

Wd OI Ere 1, OW IWIN, 1, A.

Ir may be of interest to some of my brother officers to know that a
new method of setting the tyres of wheels has been invented and is
now being introduced in London.

The advantages claimed for the machine are that it sets the tyres
cold, quicker, cheaper and better than any other known method.

When it is realized that the average period in which an omnibus
wheel requires re-tyring is three months, it will be understood what a
large field is open to a machine doing what West’s! Tyre-setter claims
to do.

The machine is in two parts, together weighing 5 tons.

The Tyring machine itself consists of a stout Bessemer ring, about
62 inches in diameter. Around and inside the circumference of this
ring are some 18 hydraulic rams set at equal distances and in pairs
on the opposite ends of the interior diameters of the Bessemer ring.

The second part of the machine is a double pump for working up
the requisite pressure, and this requires a force of 4 h-p. to work it.
The fluid employed is oil. When it is required to set the tyre on a
wheel, all that is necessary is to place the wheel resting on the
interior with its hub over the centre of the ring and the tyre outside
the wheel.

Blocks of cast-iron of the requisite thickness, according to the
diameter of the wheel to be tyred, are then dropped round the outside
of the tyre, one opposite each ram.

ihe pressure is then applied and the tyre is gradually compressed
until it fits the felloes accurately, the whole process not requiring more
than half a minute.

The metal does not rebound when the pressure is removed, nor is
the metal injured in any way.

When under pressure the metal of the tyre sheds small filings and it
is claimed that the metal is rendered more homogeneous and harder,
the wear of the tyre being in consequence much increased.

On the face of it the method would appear to be a great advance on
the present system of shrinking the tyres on.

1 This method has been adopted and a fully equipped machine hag been installed in the B.C.D.
Royal Arsenal Woolwich for some months.—4.J.A,

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517

THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT.

MAJOR R. F. JOHNSON, R.A.

Or late years much has been done to improve the fire of Garrison
Artillery. Papers frequently appear in the “ Proceedings” describing
various methods of increasing the accuracy of ranging and of aug-
menting fire discipline, but the ammunition service does not seem to
have received the attention it deserves. Nveryone recognizes the im-
portance of securing uniformity in the charges, and the necessity of
sufficient speed in the supply of projectiles, but little or no advance has
been made in either direction.

There are several reasons for this. The advantages of large groups
of cartridges are obvious to the practical gunner, but the cartridges
are supplied by an independent department ; the regulations require
the oldest cartridges in store to be used for practice, the amounts so
used are generally very small, and consequently groups are becoming
lessin size. The structural conditions of the older forts present difficult
problems, for the solution of which other duties of the Majors in charge
leave little time. The practice of supply from the stores to the guns
entails much fatigue work in replacing the heavy projectiles, especially
where lifts are used, as few of them are made to take the shells down
from the gun to the magazine floor. Ammunition drill is not required
at inspections, and gun-drill, which is, takes up all the time spared
from bayonet exercise, marching-order parades, employments, fatigues,
&e. The whole subject is dry, uninteresting until understood, gives
trouble and occupies time without affording a show in the end. The
spirit of the age passes it by.

The system of supply to the forts requires reorganization, and the
principles of construction, on which the system of supply from the
stores to the guns depends, want regulation, in some of the older
forts perhaps alteration, but this paper is designed chiefly to assist
officers in dealing with the subject under existing conditions.

However perfect the system of supply and the construction of the
work, a thorough organization of the service is necessary, and the first
step in this direction is a proper system in the storage of the ammunition.

‘A group of cartridges is composed of cartridges of one nature
filled on one day with powder of one lot; that being considered the
greatest amount of uniformity attainable.? Now, it looks neat and also

1 The following amendment to ‘‘ Regulations for Magazines, &c.,” 1894, will shortly be pub-
lished or included in the next revise of that work :—
Part II., section IT., paragraph 223 (0) :
‘Filled cartridges, in groups which will be as far as possib’e, identical in nature and age.
The age of the cartridges to be reckoned from date of filling and grouped by years. If
there is a sufficient number of cartridges of the same lot, they may be grouped sepa-
rately.’—Communicated by D.A.4.G., R.A.

2 Since this was written, the Regulations, as stated in note 1, have been altered and cartridges
are now grouped by years of filling. This facilitates the supply to the artillery and gives an appear-
ance of uniformity as the groups will be larger. If an officer, however, desires to ensure accuracy
of shooting he will sub-divide his groups by day of filling and lot of powder, and therefore I leave
the paper without alteration.

N@; (Olin SOX, 70

518 THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT.

saves trouble at inspections and examinations, if there are only one or ©

two groups ina cartridge store. Consequently it is no unusual thing to
find the following arrangement :—A group of three guns served from
two stores, having, say, five ammunition groups composed of 100, 75,
15, 20, and 90 cartridges. One store holds 100 cylinders; the Master-
Gunner therefore puts the first group init. Is this right ? Not unless
ene store is made the expense one for the whole gun group, which in
some cases would lessen the speed of supply too much. If the guns
are fought with separate P.I’.’s it would not much matter, unless the
P.F.’s were used as D.R.F.’s when the Battery Commander would make
the corrections. If the gun group is fought by one range instrument,
P.F. or D.R.F., and both stores are used as expense, as will generally
be the case, then it is decidedly wrong, because the difference in the
charge of the third gun will upset all the ranging. One of the stores
in this example should have one-third and the other two-thirds of each
of the five ammunition groups.

Another example of the same error may be found where, say, two
gun groups fought by one range instrument are supplied with cartridges
from the same magazine, particularly when the supply is by different
hatches. Here instead of the supply of both gun groups being from
one cartridge group it will be found that groups of cartridges have
been placed near one hatch, which are different to those near the
other.

This leads to my first proposition, which is, that the range-finding
arrangements of a fort should govern the distribution of the cartridges.
Let me give an example.

I was in charge of a fort consisting of four detached batteries on a
triangular island (see diagram) A, three guns; B, two guns; C, one

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Ww, hey

gun; D, three guns; all of same calibre. A, B, and C commanded
the North Channel worked by D.R.F. at X. D and C the South
Channel with D.R.F. at Y. Here it was clearly desirable that 4 and
B should have uniformity of charge, and that C should have it with
both A and Band with D. I therefore divided the cartridge groups
into two batches, one of 550 and the other of 850 cartridges. Hach
group of the larger batch was divided into 11 parts, of which A had
six, B four, and C one. D had six and C one part of each group of

1 Groups of cartridges, or of shell, or of tubes, &c., are now all called ammunition groups, but it
would be simpler and clearer to call them cartridge groups, &c., and to only use the term ammu-
niticn group for fixed ammunition.

THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT. 519

the smaller batch. The distribution was simplified subsequently by
the provision of a third D.R.F. for C, whose store then received all
the small groups.

The small indivisible groups were a difficulty, and the regulation re-
quiring the groupsin each store to be numbered according to the date
of receipt prevented simplicity in the orders for the ammunition officer.
Thus in A store a small group of 5 came after group I.; therefore group
III.in A store was identical with group II. in B store, and it was im-
possible to make the numbering in C'store identical with that in any other
except in the case of group I. which was the same as group I. in A and
B stores.

1The numbering of groups according to dates of receipt or age
is not really necessary, nor would any harm or confusion result if the
numbering in a store did not begin with I. The largest group is the
one first in action and it should have the lowest number. The number
is really only a name and my second proposition is that 7t should be
treated as such and no restrictions placed on the naming of any particular
cartridge growp. With this latitude in the example just given, sup-
posing there were five cartridge groups divided between A, B, and C
stores, the largest would have been I., and the largest in D store VI.
The small group of five cartridges in A store would have been numbered
after those in D store. Then the orders for the ammunition officer
would have been :—“ Issue to all guns from lowest numbered group in
each store taking care when C works with D it has identical cartridges
as shown by the group numbers or names. If a group becomes ex-
hausted in any store pass to the next, making the change in the other
stores at the same time, and inform the Battery Commander as to the
difference between the groups.”

One more example may be of use. Ina fort (Plate I.) gun groups
D one gun, H two guns, and #' two guns, all of one calibre were
served from cartridge stores Nos. V. and VI. Groups D and H were
worked by one range instrument, group #’ by another. Cartridge
store No. V. held 400, No. VI. 100 cylinders. No. VI. was assigned to
2; Fl drawing from No. V. This arrangement prevented uniformit
of charge in F’ group, and there was no advantage in having Fl gun
uniformly loaded with the other groups. I therefore made No. VI. ex-
pense store for # group, the ammunition officer being directed to fill
up from No. V. store as required. Here, however, the regulation
numbering of groups again interfered, for there were several groups
in No. V. store, and the oldest were not the largest. The ammunition
officer will have to be told to use, say, groups V., VIII., 1V., VI. for D
and # groups, and to fill up No. VI. store with groups VII., 1X., X. It

is extremely difficult to arrange the stacking in such cases, as the

! The numbering of the groups according to dates of receipt or age, is intended to serve a double
purpose :
(a) To ensure a reasonable amount of uniformity in shooting in each series.
(b) To ensure the regular turnover of the ammunition,
The xevised edition of Equipment Regulations which will probably be issued this year, contains
the following instructions at Section XII. of Part II., paragraph 186:
“ For all practice the ammunition of oldest manufacture and that contained in packages
which have been opened for inspection, will always first be expended, and will be replaced
by the next supply from store.’ --Communicated by D.A,4.G., R.A,

520 THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT.

groups must be arranged round the store in numerical order, and the
result of much thought and trouble is altogether unsatisfactory, which
is the more annoying when the remedy is so simple.

* Of course very small cartridge groups should never form part
of the equipment ammunition. Whatis wanted is that no groups’ shall
be issued to the Artillery which are not large enough to give at least 25
cartridges to each gun fought by one D.R.F. or one group of P.F’s. This
is my third proposition. ‘The groups of the equipment should not be
broken into for station or any other practice, but the powder for prac-
tice should be supplied from cartridge groups marked for change by
the Inspector of Warlike Stores, a whole group being exchanged at
one time. ‘The cartridges can of course be broken up and remade to
suit various calibres used for practice.

There is a corollary to my first proposition that deserves notice be-
fore leaving the subject of cartridges, viz :—that the cartridges should
be considered in determining the number and distribution of range in-
struments. That it is possible to instance a battery of 10-inch R.M.L.
and 10-inch B.L. guns provided with only one D.R.F. for the whole,
is a slight to “the spirit of Artillery,” it will not forgive if occasion
arises. A lot of powder will make into 200 9-inch R.M.U. cartridges
or 25 each for 8 guns, and therefore eight is the limit of the number of
9-inch R.M.L. guns to be fought by one D.R.F., while for 10-inch and
11-inch R.M.L. the numbers are six and four.

The grouping of projectiles is simpler than that of cartridges, for
although the regulations divide them into groups of one nature of one
mark filled on one date, the date of filling makes no difference in
shooting and can be disregarded in numbering the groups; the regu-
lations being sufficiently complied with if the shells of different dates
of filling ina group are slightly separated and a record of the dates
kept on the inventory board of the store.

The ‘Garrison Artillery Drill” says that it is desirable that a store
should only supply to one gun group. I would go a little further and
add, it is desirable that the supply to a gun group should be from one
store.

I once found in a circular fort the two guns of a group supplied from
different shell stores. There were separate lifts and the stores were
near them and next each other, but unfortunately on the magazine
floor the passage was interrupted between the two. Consequently
orders for shell had to be sent separately for each gun and the
personnel required was very large. I therefore made room in one
of the stores, by forming a third into its reserve, for nearly all the
shell of the gun group. Of course, if this had affected the speed

1 There are insurmountable difficulties in the way of carrying out this excellent proposal, if date of
making up the cartridges is to determine the group ; but it may be remarked that the amendment
to the Magazine Regulations quoted in note 1 p. 517 is considered to be the closest approximation
to a solution of this difficulty which is really practicable. Many cases of small groups have been
closely investigated, the worst that was brought to notice however proved that though the number
of small groups appeared excessive, yet the actual difference in shooting of the different groups did
not nearly approach the limits of error of the gun as shown by the 50 per cent. rectangle.—Com-
municated by D.A.A.G., R.A.

2 Of course the cartridge group intended here has the uniformity of day and lot. A lot is 10,0C0
Ibs. Jt is the constant consumption of small quantities that creates the difficulty of supply.

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THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT, 521

of supply, and the speed of supply in the first instance had been
sufficient, this would have been wrong, but in any case the formation
of a depdt was necessary and the lift from the emptied store was not
of a safe description. ‘The change simplified the service and made a
large reduction in the personnel, and also facilitated an arrangement
of stores otherwise desirable.

As there are different natures of projectiles for each gun it is not
possible to reduce the orders for the ammunition officer quite to the
same simplicity as it should be in the case of cartridges. You cannot
say, “begin to supply from group I. and go on.” But the groups of
each nature are kept together and therefore the order can be, to begin
with the lowest numbered group of each nature.

The same rule applies to the distribution of marks of shell as to
groups of cartridges. or instance if a battery of 9-inch R.M.L. guns
with more tban one shell store has its complement of shell, composed of
some steel common and some iron common, each lot must be divided
among the stores in proportion to the number of guns supplied from
each of them.

It is necessary that every cartridge cylinder and every shell should
have its group designation marked on it. It is not sufficient to
mark one or two of a group as they may be issued early in an action.

There is not much to say about the grouping of tubes and fuzes; but I
think i would be better instead of putting them in the shell stores, serving
rooms, or recesses for action to have a depét for each D.R.F. or group of
P.#?s, v.e., for each collection of guns whose fire is directed by one
officer, and to have a R.A. gunner or a N.C.O. for each depét to distri-
bute to Gun Captains. Vhis.is my fourth proposition. It would
simplify the service and lessen the chances of mistakes.

In the last paragraph I find I have passed from the subject of
storage to that of the organization of the supply to the guns, which is
the second step in the direction of establishing a systematic ammunition
service,

Guns must not be kept waiting for ammunition, but at the same time
the personnel employed in its service must be kept as lowas possible in
its numbers, both to avoid confusion and on account of want of men or
barrack accomodation. I know of a fort, of which the full ammunition
details would amount to nearly, if not quite, 300 officers and men, and
in the case of Plate I., with 14 pieces of ordnance a complete service
would absorb 117 or just over 8 per gun or 38 per cent. of the garrison
(Table I). With allthese men it would be good work to put 10 rounds
per gun on the gun floor in half an hour. ‘This is not quick enough, if
the rate could be maintained and there was no danger of confusion, both
of which points are doubtful. The service of cartridges need cause no
anxiety, but directly it becomes a question of moving heavy projectiles
from one level to another sufficient speed cannot be obtained without a
very large personnel or cxtraordinary mechanical appliances.

The drill-book recognizes this by directing the formation of depdts
before action, but it only gives want of specd in the case of lifts as a
reason, and my experience is that the great importance of the direction
is not fully appreciated, as nearly all manning tables make provision
for a shell service. My fifth proposition is, that shell depéts shall al-

522, THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT.

ways be formed unless the gun details can take the shells out of the stores
themselves. It reduces the personnel by about one-half, simplifies the
supply and enables a more complete cartridge service to be arranged.
The greatest saving is at the top of lifts, because with shell it is neces-
sary to have sufficient men there to take them out and put them on one
side, whereas with a simple cartridge service the gun details are
sufficient.

In most cases there is no difficulty in finding suitable sites for these
depots, but in some, recesses or other protected places should be made.
Their size depends on the probable consumption during action, which
is governed by local conditions; the lighter the nature of the gun the
greater the number of rounds; works subject to bombardment will be
longer in action than those an enemy will run past ; guns behind ports
in curved works will not fire as often as those with larger training arcs.

The drill-book suggests placing Palliser between shells in the depdts
to lessen the danger of explosion, but the danger of explosion seems to
me small and the chance of mistakes large. :

Gas-check and a wedge-wad for every projectile on the gun floor
must be placed at the shell depdts when they are formed.

Hconomy in personnel as well as speed in supply should really be
taken ito consideration in the design of works, but in the majority of
cases there is not much indication of it having been.

My sixth proposition is that the ammunition details should be divided
into sections corresponding more or less with the gun details they serve.

There has been a tendency, for which the form of our manning tables
is somewhat to blame, to mass the ammunition details together and to
regard the whole as quite separate from the gun details. I think this
ilitates against due co-operation in fighting a fort and often prevents
economy in personnel. It certainly necessitates a great deal of expla-
nation on the manning table and increases the difficulty of getting the
men into their places. In many cases if the ammunition details were
divided as I propose it would be possible for the Gun Group Commanders
to supervise their own ammunition supply which would often, if not
generally, be advantageous.

livery organization for fighting requires testing by practice, and there
must be someone in command or assisting the commander who is
thoroughly conversant with all the details. Therefore itis desirable
(1) that in each fort with lifts there should be at least one by which
shell can be returned expeditiously and safely to the magazine floor ;!
and (2) that the Master-Gunner should belong to the ammunition
details.

A description of the organization proposed in the case of a fort as
shown in Plate L. may serve to illustrate what has been said.

Storace.—Cartridges: A and B groups in No. I. cartridge store.
C group in No. III. cartridge store. .D and H groups in No. V. cart-
ridge store. group in No. VI. cartridge store, with reserve in No.
VY. cartridge store. Hach store to have at least one large group of
cartridges. Palliser: ingunemplacements. Shell: A group in No. I.
shell store. B groupin No. III. shell store, leaving No. Il. shell store
empty for reception of empty cylinders. C group in No. V.shell store,

+ Conditions excluding chain lifts with clips,

THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT. 528

with reserve in No. IV. shell store. .D, H, and # groups in No. Vil.
shell store with reserve in No. VI. shell store. Case shot: in gun
emplacemets arranged as seats for the detachments. Tubes and fuzes:
in central depét in four divisions, I. for A and B groups, II. for C
group, III. for D and H groups, 1V. for # group. Qwick-firing
ammunition : in case shot stores. Nos. II. and LY.

Suppry.—Shell : 25 rounds (20 common, 5 shrapnel) for each gun
placed in depdts by the ammunition details assisted by the gun details
(Table II.). These depdts to be placed in the verandah behind each
gun, except in the cases of C.2 and C.5 where there are large recesses
available.) G'as-checks and wedge-wads are also placed at the depéts.
Cartridges, tubes, fuzes and quick-firing ammunition supplied during
action (Table III.).

Disposal of empty cylinders : A and B groups in shell store, No. IT.
vid lift No.1. C group in yard behind on gun floor level. D and H
group in yard on right rear on gun floor level. # group in yard by
west entrance to magazine passage, vid lift No. 15.

Lirrs to be assigned during action as follows: No. 1, with improvised
hook, removal of empty cylinders A and B groups. No. 2, A group.
No. 3, B group. No. 4, quick-firing ammunition. No. 5, C.l gun.
No. 6, not used. No. 7, C.2 gun. No. 8, not used. No. 9, 0.3 gun.
No. 10, quick-firing ammunition. No. 11, not used, so as not to block
communication or impede disposal of empty cartridges. No. 12, D
group. No. 13, H group. No. 14, F group. No. 15, removal of
empty cylinders £ group.

Ammunition Daraizs to be divided into three sections. No. I. or C
Section, parade by east entrance to magazine passage; gun floor de-
tachment proceeds by steps not shewn. (Note—This is No. I., because
it has to pass through part of magazine passage in which No. II. works
and it is desirable it should goin first). No. £1. or A B Section, parade
on left or behind No. I.; enters magazine passage by east entrance; gun
floor detachment proceeds by circular stairs. No. IIL. or DHF Section,
parade by west entrance to magazine passage; gun floor detachment
proceeds by magazine passage to small yard outside No. IV. cartridge
store and thence by circular stairs. Zube and fuze servers. One
N.C.O. at central depét, one man carrying to Gun Captains for each
division (see Storage). ‘The whole under the command of an officer,
whom the Master-Gunner will assist, when lamps are lit, stores issued,
and permanent staff placed.’

Probably the organization described is capable of much improvement.
tt has not been tested by practice, and, if I may be allowed to say so,

1 Objection may be taken that the positions are exposed, but they can only be reached by direct
fire and the projectile must first enter by a small port and strike either the gun cr its mounting.
In the cases of D, 4, and # groups positions behind the traverses might be safer, but inside the
emplacements they would impede communication, and in the verandah it is necessary to keep the
tops of the lifts clear for the cartridge service.

? In Tables II. and III. the details are enumerated in the order they should stand in on parade.
To enable this to be done the column of duties in the manning tables should be left blank. The
plate is in many respects imaginary, but it is not exaggerated.

DA THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT.

time and thought expended on the production of its material and on the
augmentation of the accuracy of fire may be rendered useless.
TABLE I.—Ammunition SERvicE FoR Worxk.—Puate I.

Durtiss, &c. g S 5

© Zi &
Ammunition Officer a, 1 — —
Assisting Ammunition Officer whe 6 2
Inside Cartridge SWORTS soe ao 000 = - §
Supplying: Chartmarclexess tr ILIA oon 006 000 000-0000 = _ 10
aie F URehsecc Soo cob peat “Son ogo. Saou score mee bb _ _— 12
Ammunition Lifts eer BM vin! chap alot tiene MiSs, Sam ARE LES =e 12
Read 9 UNIS 53. “554 c0D.. cdo. dba Sunt edhe odows abe == — 4
Cartridge Lifts... ae Rie Looe -bagu eGo:, —OS0R Fougumacke LAcoe" cae = ~ 4
aa ( Top o00 000.880 cae, GoD: 00a — — 6
pan ILRI, goo 0959) TRG gy tq goo cos same co co oon gud) ua 6
iimeiiéle Snell Shores cco 400. cd-SSad.«s000-«w0s.'s—«siwssitSC _— = 16
Compeymines Smell tO WS 05 000 con a0 00 0G. 000 : _ — 12
Stacking Empty Cylinders ; — —_ a
Inside Quick- -firing Ammunition Stores .. bao) Fahb” acc dons _ _ 4
Carrying to Lifts... Be Sa hE ISHN Cory Maton ectee rach — — 2
2 LOD OMe ON Tote tee pesce a Tery. wisest meKscne Mec _ — 2
Lifts See ie leet (ie ous COD! oote O00. -sah. o¢b | boo » oO! | 000 => — 2
TRokall abiomaninMp OI SEAEE co G00 00 609 00 600. 000 000 1 6 110
Other Details Bisse Waste’ oan Saar MEO, Eboet pund. nod ned WE tbe 13 22 157
WNowall; GBWEIOM50 G00 v0 + d00 090 00-600 14 28 267

Tapre I].—SnEeLt Service ror Worx.—Puare I.
For forming depdts before and in intervals of an action.

a | a | | Se |B
a I 2 a
Durins AND ORDER ON PARADE. a S 5 iC S eI
5 5
o Ai io} ie) zy o
Staff. : 4
Magazine Floor... 66. ee eee tee tee ate i = as
Gia INO 3s, 006, 06 000 000 000s a i 1 2 2
Hast ENTRANCE.
No I. or C Section.
: Superintending... . — = eh eioke bo
Magazine Bottom of Lifts 6 and on pele _ 4, a — at
Bloor Supplying from No. V. shell store... «| — — 6 — = os
Top of Lifts 6 and 8 .. 0 000 o0a|| = — 4 == == —_
Gun Floor ; Horne. Depdots ; = — 8 =, 1 22
5 Jtils oP Al IB Section. ki
. Sins intending... . _ 1 — — = ==
Magazine Bottom of Lifts 2g and 3 —_— — A = on pass
dikes Supplying from Nos. I. & II. shell store] — — 6 = = a
1 (Top of Lifts 2and3... .. ... = _ 4 — = _
Gun Floor Lilo satel) Depots b60 PLD ectee: och tari - 8 os ] 92
No. LLL, or Di F Section.
5. Corton OF Wnitig Wy 12, 1, Wb oa g00|] _ 8 = a nae
Magazine } Supplying from No. VII. shell store ...| — 8 = = =
Blown Superintending .. colton sear | es 2 _ oa os —
: Boor Top of Lifts 11, 12, 13, 14 = me 8 a, Ne: : ke
Gun Floor Forming Depots ae — — 10 = 2 34
West ENTRANCE.
Total Ain | ude’ Sonameobe odo. a fol| «cost — a= 2 6 80

= = . . . .
N.B.—The Gun Group Commanders and Gun Captains assist in the superintendence on the gun
floor.

THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF A FORT. 525

TABLE IJI.—Carrripér Servicrk ror Worx.—Puate I.

a a 2 a a sg
a & H 3
DuTIES AND ORDER ON PARADE, 3 < 5 S © g
& o 5 cS o 3
Ola |eie 4 | &
Staff.
Magazine Floor.. 1 1 1 —_ —
Gun Floor, supplying “Tubes and Fuzes _ 1 4, H 2 5
East ENTRANCE.
No. I. or C Section.
( Superintending .. _ 1 _ a _ —
Inside Nos. IL. and IV. cartridge ‘stores
(quick-firing ammunition) . — _ 4 _ _ =
| Carrying from No. LY. cartridge store to
, No. 10 lift _— _ 1 =_ _ —
eraee < Carrying foom No. il, cartridge store to
oe Noa uli aanmes —-|—- 1};—|—|{—-
Bottom of Lifts Nos. 4and 10. — — 2 — _ —
Inside No. III. cartridge store... ...) — — 2 — — =
Carrying to Lifts Nos. 5, 7, 9... = = 3 _ — —
( Bottom of " " " boot Coy 3 = — 7
Gun Floor—Stacking Empty Cylinders — — 1 — 1 17
No. II. or A B Section.
(Superintending... .. c00 coo. poof! => 1 _ —_ _ —
| Inside No. I. cartridge sist eee ee _ 2 oa _ —
Magazine } Carrying to Lifts Nos. 2, 3 — — 2 -— — —
Floor + Bottom one Ibatig Th, By Sco oe — —_— 3 — —_ --
| Stacking Empty yl linders No. II. shell
SUORCE ET mmES a0 1 _ _ _
Gun Floor—Top of Lift No. 1 receiv ing ¢ Empties _ _ 1 — 1 9
No. III. or DEF Section.
Stacking Empty Cylinders, # group _ — 1 _ _ —
| Inside No. V. car rtridge store... .. —_ _ 3 _ — _
Magazine } Bottom of Lifts Nos, 12, 13, 14, 1b _ — 4 -- — =
Floor Carrying to nn " — _ 3 _ — —_
| Inside No, VI. centile store — _ 2 _ — _
(Superintending... . — 1 — — — a
Gun § Stacking Empty Cylinder Dand 7 group —_ _ 2 — — =
Floor tan of No. 6. Lift, Empty Cylinders F group] — — 1 — 1 16
West ENTRANCE.
Total —

as
2 hee oe ai
Paes 0 ae

te and ee

ee ee aad Sis ay ne aE ean Animate

CR RATE at cere when neem imamate ating Tammy mtn Tn ete

527

1D) IL AN 1 SE

LIEUTENANT W. SWABEY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA.

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATES, late R.H.A.

(Continued from p. 496, No. 10, Vol. XXIT.). \
PART III. a

Cuaprer II.

Complaints from Head-Quarters about foraging. Lieut.-Colonel Downs
man imspects “ H” troop. Coursing. Major Gardiner exchanges
with Captain Macdonald. Idle days.

25th January.—Dyneley received a letter from the Deputy-Adjutant-
General of the division, with an enclosure from Lord Wellington’s
secretary, containing complaints on the subject of forage from Fama-
licoa, to which place Sergeant Wightman had been sent with orders to
procure hay and straw. The letter called on Dyneley to state his
answer to the complaints of the magistrate which set forth, that a
party of ours under a sergeant had entered the houses of the above
town, and without applying to the constituted authorities, had taken
away the forage, forcing their way through the doors and windows,
and, further, without authority, had taken from the inhabitants and
used as means of transport their bullocks, some of which had died.

“6th January.—Was employed in framing an answer to Lord
Aylmer’s letter, in which I did not fail to deny the forcible entry into
houses, and stated as a reason for the sergeant’s not having made
regular application according to orders, that we uniformly found that,
instead of receiving the necessary assistance from the constituted
authorities, we considered any reference to them as only the signal
for the removal of the supplies we stood in need of and that in regard
to bullocks, unless seized before application was made, they never
could be procured. I further justified the employment of bullocks
for transport by making it evident that in our crippled state we could
not send a sufficient number of horses as was usual for want of men.
It was then necessary to set forth the steady character of the sergeant,
and to throw some of the blame on ourselves for the sake of saving
the man, which we wished very much to do, although he had certainly
without any orders committed himself by not applying pro forma
through the regular channels. If he had done this, and they had
failed in assisting him, he would then haye been at liberty to act for

11, You, XXII, 72

528 SWABEY DIARY.

himself. It had not, however, been the practice for the reason above
stated. To lessen his offence, as well as the commanding officer’s, I
set forth that an officer (in this case myself) was sent with the party,
but not being intended to remain out and it being very late, he had
returned. Having thus composed Dyneley’s defence, he, in no small
stew, copied it and sent it off.

e¢th January.--Jenkinson arrived on his return from Oporto; the
description he gave of it made me very much regret that I had not it
in my power to make such a jaunt, but in the present state of the troop
it is impossible. ;

2th Janwary.—lient.-Colonel Downman, with Harding, arrived to
inspect the troop, sick, ete. From the unavoidable backwardness in
our equipment, and through sickness, we certainly did not cut a very
great dash, but, after making minute enquiries into the economy of the
troop, he sat down and wrote a letter to head-quarters highly ex-
pressive of his satisfaction.

29th January.—I was favoured this morning by a ¢éte-a-téte with
the Lieut.-Colonel, from which I gathered that he intended to propose
to Colonel Fisher! to reduce the troop to four guns. This intelligence
did not of course give me much pleasure, knowing as I did how fairly
we were entitled to at least a part of the remount men from Lisbon,
in place of killed, wounded, dead, and prisoners, and besides I was
quite aware that his differences with Colonel May, the Deputy-
Adjutant-General, R.A. were at the bottom of his scheme, the latter
being fully determined if possible to equip and complete us. Lieut.-
Colonel Downman, however, looked on the arrangement as an undue
interference with his command, and therefore, from that moment, was
determined to keep down us unfortunates, who were the subject of
their disputes. I shall here say nothing of the private civilities he had
always received from us, but only condemn his conduct in a public
light.

30th January.—We discovered this morning that Corporal Betty, a
member of that nest of infamy, the R.A. Driver Corps,? was concerned
in selling at the gun-park the very ammunition out of our cartridges.
He was fully detected and brought forward by a gunner of the Foot
Artillery, one of the guard.

51st January.—Sat as a member on Betty’s court-martial of which
Jenkinson was president ; the rascal’s villainy was clearly proved, and
the evidence brought forward made me certain that some of the Foot
Artillery were hkewise concerned. I was glad to find none of the old
troop implicated. The purchasing of ammunition is an evil of such a
vital nature to the service that, had my advice been followed, the buyer,
a Portuguese, would certainly have been given over to the laws as an
example.

I always was an advocate for vigorous justice. I conceive its strict

1 Then Commanding the Royal Artillery in the Peninsula.

2 The Driver Corps was formed in 1794, it was an additional corps to the Royal Artillery, but
its officers were, until after Waterloo, drawn from a different source, and its men were neyer
Axtillerymen. It.was abolished in 1822. Duncan’s History, R.A., Vol. II., p. 30.

&
PA,

yaa,

SWABEY DIARY. SVS p,., ae aeee. 529
“> iS a

execution to be a duty to society, and that all who forget themselves,
so far as to let their compassion be an obstacle to it are unworthy of
its protection. I never could understand why a thief should be for-
given from motives of compassion. A mind at all in the habit of
reasoning would easily see how such lenity would increase the number
of thieves, and not only the property of all be the more endangered, but
humanity the more injured by giving encouragement to offenders, and
increasing thereby the number of punishments. ‘Thus, in this country
where the people under us are exempt from capital punishment for thiev-
ing, we soldiers see honesty daily falling into disrepute; it is hardly
credible how the best soldiers lose their early principles, in this matter,
and a fellow who is ever such a thief is sure to be countenanced by his
companions.

The arbitrary law of Portugal punishes with transportation to the
Brazils the purchaser of any article whatever from a soldier, a sentence
not dependent on a jury as in happy England, but on the order of the
magistrate who has only the power of taking depositions. This recu-
lation, as it is only temporary, is certainly adapted to the exigencies
of the times, because, as a soldier is in the habit of stealing whatever
he can lay his hands on, it is the only real security for property. ‘The
punishment is not as ib first appears out of proportion to the crime,
because, as perhaps the soldier sells the value of 4 doubloons (one is
worth £3 4s,) for a pint of wine, to be a purchaser might soon become
a lucrative trade.

Ist February.—Jenkinson, after having enlivened our circle for some
days, left us. There is a sort of phlegm about him I cannot under-
stand: he must have been aware that we knew of his brother’s mis-
fortunes, and yet he could bear to talk of his going to Scotland for
change of air, etc., etc.

2nd February.—Lord Aylmer’s answer came relative to the com-
plaint. It was short and pithy. ‘If the people of Famalicoa are not
satisfied in a week’s time from this date, the captain, the officer, and
the sergeant shall be brought to trial before a general court-martial.”
For my own part, as I dread few circumstances that do not implicate
my character, I believe I should not care if it were to take place. I
could anticipate its results without the smallest apprehension; they
could be of no consequence to me. First, I could easily prove I never
received any orders respecting the party, and secondly, supposing the
decision of the court-martial to have deprived me of my commission,
that would be only taking away a clog that has served to delay my best
and dearest prospects, and if the verdict has been against me I should
have appeared in the very proud position of having sacrificed myself
for others. Dyneley, however, could not fail, as commanding officer,
to be implicated, and though every such person in charge of horses is
daily guilty of misdemeanours, that would have been nothing to the
“ord”? or to the court-martial, therefore all pride was waived, and
how to get out of the scrape was the question !

ord February.—Harly in the morning I started over the mountains

1 «The thord,” ‘* The Peer,” terms by which Wellington was known in the army.—(F.A.W.)

580 SWABEY DIARY.

to Famalicoa to endeavour to bring about an agreement with our com-
plainants, and well knowing the value of money in these cases, took a
tolerable quantity with me. The road, passing over a considerable
part of the Estrella, was very difficult, but the business was urgent
and my spurs not to be sneezed at. I did not delay much to admire
the mountainous beauty of the scenery. On my arrival I found the
principal person of the town who had been at the bottom of the
business, and told him I was there to apologise for the conduct of a
sergeant, and very carefully admitted all he had reported, which
certainly was not much in the man’s favour. He seemed, however,
to doubt and hesitate a good deal till I pulled out the money and
offered to pay all the bullock owners; this seemed quite to open his
heart, and he immediately exerted himself on my behalf. At last,
through his interest, which was besides somewhat biassed by a letter I
took with me from a colonel of Portuguese militia in whose regiment
he had a company, I procured a letter from him to Dyneley, expressing
his satisfaction for the reparation made, and a certificate from the
magistrate to the same purpose. This done, he gave me a good
breakfast in the English style, and I started homewards. On my
return I crossed the Mondego very near its source. The scene was
beautifully wild and romantic, and I had sufficient time to contemplate
it owing to the mule I rode knocking up and being obliged to walk.
I got to Mello by dusk when, lo and behold, clever; I had lost the
certificate, the best and most formal part of the business! I always
was a great deal more careless than other people.

4th February.—Went over to Moimenta da Beira to tell Lord
Dalhousie! what steps we had taken, he expressed himself very
indignant at Lord Wellington’s severity. I confess I do not see it in
that light, because if the latter did not act up to the letter of his orders
where would be the security for the inhabitants in regard to payment for
their forage, etc. It istrue that they do not, by their aid and assistance,
merit such steps in their favour, but the prudence or imprudence of
an act must be measured in public matters more by its policy than its
justice.

5th Februaryw—We forwarded to head-quarters the letter from
Famalicoa, resting on our oars about the certificate, having merely
stated that one had been given us.

6th February.—W ent to Gouveia to attend the funeral of Colonel
Collins, who died there a few days ago. He commanded the Portu-
guese Brigade, of the 7th Division, by which he was attended to his
grave. The ceremony was so ill-conducted by the Portuguese troops
that the solemnity which generally is so impressive on similar
occasions was not at all striking. He was buried in a convent garden.
His last disorder was brain fever, but there being a post-mortem after
his death, a ball was found that had been seventeen years under one of
his ribs, three of which on the opposite side had been broken in storm-
ing a fort in the West Indies. He was an excellent officer and is a
great loss to the Portuguese service.

1 Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie, Commanding 7th Diyision,

SWABEY DIARY. . ddl

7th February.—Uord Dalhousie and a large party came to meet us
and course near Mello ; lots of cockneys, consequently no sport.

Sth February.—Had a tolerably lengthy ride of five leagues to assist
a foraging party. N.B.—Set down the neighbourhood of Casal Vasco
for the best foraging district, between Celorico, Vizeu, and Coimbra.

Ith Kebruary—Major Crespigny! dined and brought his grey-
hounds.

L0th February.—Went coursing, and having no cockney incum-
brances, killed a leash of hares in great style.

L1th Febrwary.—On inspection found still more powder stolen. We
have the satisfaction of knowing that none of our men have mounted
guard over it, which is not a little satisfactory.

L2th February.—W ent with Dyneley to dine with General Barnes,’
whom we found to be a very hospitable pleasant fellow. He even
wanted me to sleep in his room, but haying taken my own bed, there
was fortunately no occasion. In appearance, he put me in mind of
General Hay, who, by the way, notwithstanding I was an old Packham
acquaintance, permitted me last year to sleep, wet as I was, in my
clothes without offering me a blanket.

4th February.—We received letters expressive of the “ Peer’s”
satisfaction at the steps we had taken in consequence of the Famalicoa
business. We were not of course sorry to see it terminated.®

15th February.—Bought Newland’s chestnut horse “ Purbrook,”
giving him my Spanish brown horse, value 80 dollars, £20, and 300
dollars, or £75; so much for coming down with the rhino.

16th February.—Having established a system in the way of con-
ducting the troop business, and finding time begin to hang heavy on
hand, I actually read a book; a history of Charles XII. of Sweden,
which was at this moment the more interesting on account of the
genius of the Russian government and the history of Peter the Great.
His achievements appear almost a romance, for no one ever performed
so much in so short a time; perhaps he was better entitled to the epithet
‘Great’ than any other dignified person, for all his endeavours were
characterised by having a laudable and a rational aim. It would be
difficult to define a hero without ambition, though many have existed
who have been great without grasping at reward. ‘To give the Czar
the praise of having been the most useful one that ever adorned society
would be perhaps the most just way of describing his title to greatness.
That a man uneducated, and apparently without the means of instruc-
tion within his reach, and certainly not called upon by any immediate

1 Major Crespigny, 68th Regiment.

2 Commanding a Brigade in the 7th Division. He was Adjutant-Gencral of the army at
Waterloo. Governor of Ceylon 1824. Commander-in-Chief in India 1831. Sir Edward Barnes
was M.P. for Sudbury. In conjunction with Admiral Sir William Bowles, he founded the Army
and Navy Club.

3 The supply of forage in the Peninsula was a common difficulty with commanding officers.
Captain E. C. Whinyates wrote: “I risked so much in foraging for the troop during the time I
had the command, that, if the Spaniards and Portuguese had not been my personal friends, or had
reported me, I should have been tried by court-martial and most likely broke. A friend of mine
was tried for cutting down and seizing forage, but was happily acquitted.”

982 SWABEY DIARY.

necessity to make himself a man of knowledge, should have become a
philosopher, an artisan, a warrior, and a politician, and moreover under
the disadvantage of being in a country where manufactures and politics
were not at all, and philosophy and war scarcely known, is extraor-
dinary. His character and life are the greatest examples of the benefit
the human mind derives from being above prejudice, and at the same
time a more extraordinary instance of the difficulty, or indeed of the
impossibility, of being divested of early religious predilection. Religious
bigotry and its attendant tyranny appear to have been the only imper-
fection in his scheme of government. As refinement is a plant that
can only flourish in its natural soil, we must remember before we con-
demn his want of it that he was really a true native of the Russias; he
was, however, so well aware of this.truth that he imported from the
more advanced nations of Hurope, wholesale to his infant capital, the
seeds of politeness and civilization, which are now become natives of
St. Petersburgh.

17th February.—lt took such a few hours to read all the English
books that could be mustered, that I was obliged again to have re-
course to my friend Gil Blas de Santillane, it certainly contains the
most faithful picture of Spanish character, and that even without any
high colouring. Such adventures as its hero met with I believe daily
to take place in Spain, where jealousy and intrigue are the common
pursuits of all ranks in society.

18th February.—I went to see a convent about a league from Mello
in company with an old gentleman, and had the usual happiness of
seeing the nuns through the gratings, ete. In returning I had a good
deal of conversation with the old man, and ventured to talk about the
cruelty of immuring unfortunate youth in these diabolical cells. I
need not say that the practice could not be justified by argument; he
however dryly told me that his only daughter, standing in the way of
his nephew’s inheriting his property, was to go there next year, as he
was determined to have a male heir. I do not even conceive that a
young woman choosing a voluntary abdication of the world is the more
entitled to heavenly favour for making a desperate resolution, generally
the result of some temporary delusion, for where is the merit in virtue,
if there is no temptation to vice ; the heart can sin in the convent with
as much freedom as it can in the mazes of the world.

L9th February.—W ent out coursing and killed a brace of hares.

20th February.—Reports seem to say that the French are with-
drawing the troops from the Peninsula. I think the time may come
when it will be necessary for them to do so, but do not give the least
credit to the present report.

The report was however correct from the cause as specified
below—(F.4.W.)

“ Owing to the disastrous Russian campaign, and the vast combi-
nation now formed against him, Napoleon had organized a
new and enormous army, even larger than that employed in
the campaign of 1812, But the Emperor wanted old officers

SWVABHY DIARY. 533

and non-commissioned officers, and experienced soldicrs, to
give consistency to the young levies with which he was pre-
paring to take the field, and he could only supply this want
by drawing from the veterans of the Peninsula; wherefore
he resolyed to recall the divisions of the young guard, and
with it many thousand men and officers of the line most
remarkable for courage and conduct. In lieu he sent the
reserve at Bayonne into Spain, replacing it with another,
which was again to be replaced in May by further levies ; and
besides this succour, 20,000 conscripts were appropriated for
the Peninsula.” Napier, Vol. V., pp. 432-8.

elst February.—There is such a complete vacancy and want of em-
ployment in our time, that I cannot congratulate myself of a night of
having done anything either useful or entertaining.

gend Kebruary.—I received an unlooked-for parcel of clothes from
Hngland by a private friend, I do not kaow whom, and so much the
better as it will save me the trouble of returning thanks.
23rd Kebruary.—Letters from England. I cannot think it quite
kind of my Hampshire friends never communicating with me, they
must have made a very unfair presumption that their correspondence
is uninteresting.
24th February.—A good enough anecdote of Macdonald. His
servants, etc. came back from Lisbon to-day and without a helmet,
which he had, unsolicited, written word he had left for me at Coimbra.
eoth Kebruary.—
Oh day ill-spent that can no action tell!
A blank—for neither good nor evil dwell
Recorded in thy page. The patient knell
That tolls thy flight sounds neither ill or well.
26th February.—1 could almost put the same stamp on this “ busy
day,” to save my shame I certainly did go out shooting.

2/th Kebruary.—letters from England hinted to Dyneley that
Gardiner ' had been posted to the troop? vacated by Major Foy’s pro-

1 Captain Robert W. Gardiner (Kane’s List, No. 979) served at the capture of Minorea in
1798 ; in the campaigns in Portugal and Spain in 1808, including the battles of Rorica, Vimeira,
and the capture of Lisbon; he was Brigade-Major of Artillery in the retreat to Corufia, and with
Lord Chatham’s expedition to Walcheren, and was present at the capture of Middleburg and
Flushing. In 1810, he returned to Spain and served at the defence of Cadiz and the battle of
Barrosa. In 1812, he was present at the siege of Badajos, battle of Salamanca, capture of Madrid,
and siege of Burgos. In March 1818, he succeeded Captain Macdonald in command of “ E ”
troop, and served with it, attached to the Hussar Brigade, at the battles of Vitoria, the Pyrenees,
Orthes, and Toulouse, and other minor affairs. At the conclusion of the war he marched through
France with the troop and embarked at Calais for England. In the campaign of 1815, Sir Robert
was present with his troop in the retreat from Quatre Bras and at Waterloo. In 1816, he was
appointed equerry to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, and was Aide-de-Camp till his promotion to
Major-General in succession to George IV., William IV., and Queen Victoria. For his dis-
tinguished services he received the G.C.B. and K.C.H., the gold cross and two clasps, and the
silver medal and three clasps for the Peninsula; the Waterloo medal with the Order of St.
Anne of Russia for the campaign of 1815. In 1848, he was made Governor of Gibraltar. Sir
Robert Gardiner was author of numerous pawphlets, most of which were written in the interest of
the Regiment with which to the last he thoroughly identified himself. He strongly advocated the
establishment of an “Artillery of the Guard” as exists in other armies in Europe. He dicd
Colonel-Commandant, R.H.A. in 186-4,

2ST oops Leki At

534 SWABEY DIARY.

motion, and that most probably, as Macdonald was stirring heaven and
earth to exchange, he would be posted to us. Gardiner being nearly
the youngest captain in the regiment, will stick by us a long time, it
is therefore an important change in our society. I cannot record the
circumstance without mentioning the extraordinary part Macdonald
has acted in this business. I certainly never had an idea that; Dyneley
would lead the troop into the field this year, much less did I conceive
that Macdonald, after wishing him hearty success with it, etc., was
working all the time secretly to exchange ; it certainly would have
been much more handsome to declare his sentiments, and I think he
could not have done less for the 2nd Captain than have put off his
exchanging as long as possible; but he is north of the Tweed.

28th Kebruary.—Sir Rowland Hill about this time had his advanced
posts at Coria beat up by a plundering party of about 1500 French.
The 3rd Regiment beat them back with very little ceremony, these
adventures generally indicate retreat.

1st March.—As a proof of the dark unfriendly character of the Portu-
guese to each other, I have had lately information given me by the
Prior of the place, my patron, that several of the inhabitants had forage
in their houses, though the strictest search had been previously made.
I found it according to his directions, and of course was thankful, but
what was the beast’s motive for informing me I know not; it could
not be friendship, as I never spoke two words to him.

2nd March.—We received letters from Gardiner himself announcing
his appointment.’ The tenour of them proved clearly to me what I
have long suspected, that some secret enemies of ours had been under-
mining the troop in describing it as reduced, unfit for service, etc., and
this only with the view of sharing in the spoils if they could succeed in
getting it broken up.

3rd March.—This day not even remarkable for idleness.

4th March.—I feel myself so constantly engaged in the daily pursuits
of infantry officers in England, viz.: Watching fishes swim under the
bridge, throwing stones at pigs, etc. I am ashamed of it, but have
nothing else to do.

5th March.—More letters from Gardiner, who, I fear, has a scribbling
mania, a complaint, thank heaven, not catching.

lf copy. |
SIR, February 8th, 1812.

There is no part of ny official duty more embarrassing than that of selecting officers for the
service of the Horse Artillery, a service so generally an object of ambition, and for which there are
so many meritorious competitors, but on reference to the course of your service, I had no hesitation
in nominating you to the vacant troop of Horse Artillery, in compliance with the request made in
your letter of the January 9th from Vizeu, fully persuaded the command could not be placed in
better hands.

I am, with sincere esteem, Sir,

To Ycur most faithful and obedient servant,
Captain R. Gardiner, R.A. MULGRAVE.

Captain Gardiner was appointed to “ L” troop, vice Major N. Foy, promoted January 28rd,
1813, and then exchanged into “‘ E”’ with Captain Macdonald, invalided, who was re-appointed to
it when Sir Robert Gardiner vacated the troop in 1816, on appointment as equerry to Prince
Leopold, ‘‘L.” troop being reduced the same year.—(F.A.W.)

SWABEY DIARY. 535

6th March.—Major Frazer and some other wiseacres have recom-
mended the disuse of covers for gun carriages; we find, however, much
of our ammunition damaged by the exposure of the boxes to the rain
during the wet season on “the retreat”? and at San Payo. N.B.—Do
not set everything down to be an improvement, because the author of
it igs esteemed a witch, but draw your own conclusions.

7th March.—Dedicated the day to the sports without much success,
however, we do indeed pass our time most stupidly: get up with the
sun, inspect a parade, and see no more of the troop, which immediately
goes to grass, till 4 o’clock. We then see the horses cleaned, dine at
6, and go to bed immediately afterwards, any reasonable conversation
being out of fashion. Indeed, it is one of the evils of an Englishman’s
life in Portugal, that he is obliged in the winter to go to bed as soon
as ib is dark, because he has no fire and it is too cold to sit up, and it is
useless to attempt to read with any satisfaction by the nasty dim lamps.

(To be Continued).

emer te ental ARON At is rte ee ena nt ee teen ne c= Eee

rab} 4
co

THE CASUALTY RETURNS OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY

AT THE

BATTLES OF COLOMBEY, MARS-LA-TOUR, & GRAVELOTTE,

IME oS Oia I, 565 SIP OUN i), 1, A

Even as the Devil can quote Scripture, to serve his own ends; so can
a less talented individual draw deductions from statistics, which are
calculated to deceive the unwary, and lead them to jump too hastily at
conclusions.

A few years ago a certain statesman, who was laudably desirous of
proving the superiority of our short service army, over its long service
predecessor—compared the death-rate which had obtained in our army
in India in the preceding year, with that which had obtained twenty
years previously: the result was much in favour of the more recent
death-rate, and proved (so said the statesman) that our short service
soldier was less liable to succumb to the Indian climate than the old
soldier of the bygone days. ‘I'he argument was certainly plausible on
the surface, and the statistics were undeniable; but some uncertainty
in the infallibility of hasty deductions from statistics, was caused, by
an eminent hygienic authority making use of precisely the same figures,
a few days later, to prove that “ sanitary science and hygiene had ad-
vanced so greatly in India, in twenty years, that the death-rate in the
army had been considerably reduced, and this, notwithstanding the fact
that our soldiers were younger, and therefore more prone to disease.”

With this preliminary caution to myself and my readers against
drawing hasty conclusions or waxing dogmatic over statistics, let us
proceed to examine the casualties and expenditure of ammunition at the
battles of Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte, and see what in-
ferences may reasonably be drawn therefrom for our guidance (see
appendix A.).

Ihe three battles selected are of special interest for the purpose, in-
asmuch as they took place in close succession to each other, on the
14th, 16th, and 18th August; they were all offensive actions, com-
mencing with comparatively small forces at Colombey, where only 26
batteries were engaged; developing into the more important battle of
Mars-la-Tour in which 37 batteries were engaged, and which probably ,
represents the most severe strain both in fighting and marching of any
battle during the war; and culminating in the gigantic contest at
Gravelotte on the 18th, when no less than 115 batteries were engaged,
and in which the result was so nearly being a success for the French

IDL, \/Oiy SO-05%,

938 CASUALTY RETURNS OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY.

arms. Of the German batteries engaged, 36 took part in two of the
battles, and four in all three.

The battle of Mars-la-Tour was tactically a drawn fight, though
strategically the Germans obtained an important advantage: each side
retained its ground at the close of the battle, and each side lost about
16,000 men. j

In the summary at the end of appendix A. and in all the following
tables the casualties to wheels have been computed on the most liberal
scale, in order that whatever deductions we may draw as to proportion
of spare wheels required, we may err on the side of advocating an
excessive rather than an inadequate provision.

It may be urged, with some show of reason, that the casualties to
poles and wheels are likely to be greater during an arduous march
over difficult country, than on the actual battle-field, where it is
notorious that casualties to matériel due to shell fire, are insignificant ;
and that though the figures given here may be a guide for a campaign
in Western Europe, where the roads are usually good; they cannot be
a trustworthy guide for such campaigns as we are frequently engaged
in all over the world.

I do not however hold with this argument, for two reasons :—

(1) Because in battles like those of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte,
the rough cross-country work on the field of battle, is an in-
finitely greater strain than the most trying march along the
worst roads ; and—

(2) Because experience has shown that our matériel is so excellent,
that the roughest marches can be successfully performed, with
little or no damage to wheels. As an instance, we may
recall the march of 1 Battery R.H.A., 3 Batteries Field, and
2 Batteries Heavy Field Artillery, from the Indus to Kandahar,
without the loss of a wheel; this is probably the most severe
march that a mixed Artillery force has ever been called upon
to undertake.

As stated above, the casualties to wheels have been most liberally
computed in the summary and comparative tables, the system which I
have adopted being to count every vehicle which has been abandoned,
as a loss under the heading of “wheels” equivalent to the number of
wheels on the vehicle—thus a wagon is counted as 4 wheels, a limber
as 2, etc. Now it is obvious that this system gives us a wide margin
of safety ; inasmuch, if a vehicle is so damaged that it has to be aban-
doned, not only is it possible that some of its wheels may still be
serviceable, but such wheels would actually become available as spare
wheels for other vehicles, which have suffered no other injury than
damage to their own wheels.

Before proceeding further we may note that the establishments of
the different natures of batteries were as follows :—

Officers. Men. Horses.
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Rounds Fired.

AC EN | A,

Killed and Wounded.

Casualties to Material,

A Shell. Case. Men. Horses.

i=] )

o Batteries, 5 :

b 3 H ci aaa si Mioe pee esealie con phe ies 4

8 b S SiSlESTEs 2 el sis Colombey. Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte.

< 2 e SileiF@lelsalielisja)/h)s

q 3 Oo |EIS|/S] eis; e]a|sie
3 ) a/S)/e2!/8]2/el2]2/]2]2
: iS} FE | 6 /Sialo]slelsjs|3is
a | a a
— pare Bit
1st heavy fi an eae oon S00 ae pa
f nal eer Hoke BS oe "s ae 8 on || 2b gun-carriage and breech-
i nd 5, % eee ee 704 16 | + 28 or sie ay piece.
i wheel, elevating - screw
Istlight ,, a (00) | | Gaol bees a9 ae er) oe os on and ees tee

- || 2nd_,, ik ee O82 The ies 24]... | 365i ee aa wheel and limber-box,

Bal ataheney i 494 fo. | 2 wilias| 0 “ + | lumber.

El | ath parce 607 ‘ ; 26

Q Ms . x oa ees 12 os ‘5 5 eae oo eee 60) bad

age ee Be ee pe epee | aber a, a ON ge re

| 2” » tee + | oe oa peerage Brett] vere limber exploded breech-

& |, 5th heavy ,, pe 590 cool Megeah vee f 1G Micee) ees || a bes po ae piece.
6thiosae 03 bene ieee eee aiyey| aged |e Palin eles Be : i, is e

Bthlight ;? BA B75 W coe foes vee | 23 ep | ae ” . oe - . oe
Ben een ace ene a a Ci | | aoa ere ee paola Ae) as - oe ce 5 ”
Ist horse battery .. nee 82 342 4 o lh ote Siar, ial iy oe cs oe
{ 2nd; se ata Pe an 800 i oon Valeo a | 46 ee see eos ocell tf hs
3rd ,, peice ee 820]... a ia ines me alls A Da ay i
|
i Ash heavy, ny ne! De Malet aaa) Hi ai oe vee wa ~ See
mn i ait Seal ia ah, +. coe . ove vs
| Ist ight a ane he iB i a . s a iy ceentaneee
~20) 33 5 ue atl Ac aes on tt bye

a || 8rdheavy ,, 7% be aoe en ia ni ei 1 = Saar .

gee es ae eae 4 mae ane as 5

Se ee ere ree ea ee oe a

aah : bea ee "ty ale Aiea ete i me = : bn Ee

B4| 5th heavy 77 ie os i S| PES | Gee ns Ms i ifs Be i

BO GN cre ne co ox

| sthiight 5; is 4 ssid i oe is :

era ad sgl bee aca got ao es ee

aa battery ... 227 693 gy HE GHP oad oa eI mo 9 breech-piece.
[| 4nd ,, 2» 168 oy =|h 00 Ou Fea tis ase . . oe a0 ot)
Warde eg ree 175 Hie 4 2) ign tea a Pe few aie Bate i ial iA MeN Ea ris
é pgs vakl diel dir. i at 7

mi a4 Wlaee ose: ke a ae tee AR oo eee eee eee too oe eee on pis be ie he

Videttigne | 2 i ig te se hk | ficee toe Ife al . ; ay x ve A © im

al ? x a 15 . | (aa hear 833 ono ose oo ae on 4 ooo

2nd , oes

su | ’ 2” tol 6 . Lifes Th urs Ad ob ose ae oe om on

fal 3rd heavy ,, ne ; 1 one p60 me :

mi] sth 3, Aeon a hee ihre (Cr ba fees ; : as : i eee

= | un inane : = ee | etary bea ee) cap is 20 om ies 2 i

PU Ue eregaoth arpa ceo [ered NSH bs a A bar et ene. He Actin t.

a | Leper battery ... if ee a at Lelie 5 attached to 10th Army Corps. oe . “ “

a 22 29 Oe BS eee mielshii | pelo iL + see eee eee eee oe fers _ ae
Uj 3rd, 2 1 bi (aeeat be ed 0 a nb mee Bes
fa ae Bd field 47 He 40 Blea oe a Bae gun wheel. ose : oe
Waliceerunte? > 1650 68 i ie 3 centre box of limber.
j | 1st eh oa om mA wee Poe on 3 -* . ‘ : : eal
| andes in foe hs ie | Gah a : spew poles, lid of lim- i es :

5 tet oes poke Me a ae ess melee, F ee

Bre pena) no 925 | 283 Hy) oe t|ee | wa at i 0 ig a Le ‘i

S) ard ueht ” ae 735 461 13 Ses a ae Be * is

D rd lig a 5 cub

A 552 | 382 PR ete [reso || 10) Paty, : . : oe co oe bo :

4 i athe ye 417 | 416 Malan al 1 two wheels and elevating-

I oe eee ore screw.

na | pin heavy 5, . 562 3 oe 14 14 . “ ood

Ge) |p| on 432 | 21 meal PG 5 ;

e3 || 5th light ,, om a a 7)... Je | 13) 3 is oD 3 ane
| | Sth eee te 8 14[ ow. fe 3 4 see - oo a os

a || 2a, : Tile 168 ee 6 ie : et a ee

2.) | 8rd heavy ,, Dee 306 oo 13H [Bear even . on Be wheel and pole.

a ana a 609 eve i nts El Peta oes ae ° . be See

Q || sed waht > se lee iol We aoe ee rae

g<|4th ,. % is A 10 Sat ect ta iol Wi ue as Hs vs two wheels.

< | ae heavy ,, 28 211 445 21113} 1423) 19 wheel gun carriage. tee mn e

eh | AE soa 182 | 289 | 178 i317 ne ee one wheel

|] 5th light 17, : a tes con ee :

nding oS . + ddan | ds wee | oces his ‘ nt i ‘
Ist light ae . ae elie Be ave ABs : “ oe - - ” os
Bil oeales a nl y bt i pa tent ny ibe sed BA ie 4 fe ua

4 | 3rd eae *. 572 fe ans 2 ase . _ oS Ls

Bl) th Y » BY 468 * a Baia te 3 Pee a a aM 8 %

3S 3rd Kent i S| bad Bs ie Ee eal hoe . cen oe . “= 208

B 4th a0 552, Oo to) ie 2 a . os see eee oe Iu a

lay 9 2 416

= || 5th heayy a te tt see [cee x iy te vi a ‘ a

eaulila % i 261 a i

d || 6th. % ce Ke a Reales Gs i Ms ye bese ae nas

|| 5th light si 7 u elige oe ib a wee i wheel,

co) i 6th aa ” 423 & lel . . aes 3 a0 ose

3 ue) 5 ve [oes
| | Ist horse battery a bh a) ii ve fae | 8 i t aa in iy
pa e260 ey 8 Bi ss ey i uy
eee ema? 3 212 ie 29 x A cS oo: i
U BOR SEE in 5 226 mil 14 sas tee oo o is a
(| Ist heavy field... 3h 28 52 ied tes a a two limbers.
gun-muzzle indented but
1320 ‘ remained serviceable,
2nd ie two store -wagons so
| is i ae os i | 27 1 | 70 one ae #0 in ose oss damaged that they had

i | ee lett pend during

Bi} | det cht subsequent advance,

fe eane cents Ha GRACE ve [oe 42 Leap ee a ie ae a

Bby| he heavy ,, ae i 261 fig 39 3]... 2 eal ; He 3 bs zl My

EN seaneue Ne etl meee ae 48 || 49 a as a

< 29 eh : 341 26 Silber: ‘ 4 ae o's oe

a | 4th ,, iB a 533 =| a7 two wheels, a limber and

a 1st horse batt a ee) i i gun-curriage.

se battery ... 702 33 101 , mas ae i pole.

(isi Glstibeary, ics. 3 651 5 10
}]@3 | 2nd ,, A eal I ye ih i fy ie
25 J Ist light 920 a ie : se te Moe aher, i
S38 | 3rd 2» 960 15 13 ick bl a wheel and a limber.

2 ” 776 22, a ey] tse a5
y horse 676 39 Be ee two wheels.
(| Ist heavy field \, i 597 3 18 ; hs
| ann Bee ie i 332 15 ae 2 7 a op : i. :

mo 1g. ” M4 677 59 TS) 0) Melina as u gun-wheel and limber. .

e|| 8rdheavy 3) iB Bee - Gill as ea nas gun-wheel & gun-carriage.

mn 2” eee ae pt pu se b00 B60 see see see

B || 4th ,, Ms 157 32 7 Pa ee pole, six spokes, rail of | store-wagon, replaced by

pj | ordiieht s, 475 31 3 :

ey) ata 225 | Bl Tanase Metis : i Selatan ue a i

Z | oa heavy ,, ae i LOnl gas 14 : Be axle-tree box-seat. oo aoe

a ” ” on 8 eos oon . :

S ||| Sth ight 5, 248 «| 228 98 | 3 eu lins i i ee un-wheel. .

on | 6th ,, ” Bee 141 181 7 2 PAD |) ib . ‘ g

1st horse battery ... 1048 99 Di PRR Ee 2 3B cee i ia ‘ ii
gad 2» oy ave 785 07 ai} 4 Be 2 : ates : ee Bo
| a My eae 603 269 231 7 49 | 27 sith rs limber-wheel,
regiment, 2nd A.C.... 87
Hi te Cai 3) eee ove coe a i
(f ue heavy field... iat a 8
n 55 a vee . eee ee . eee in rite Hy:
ied Sa cps wpe |e | BIS i vs ead ere

. 2nd ” a9 . oe ry 96 bie ie te 3 is ‘i fe eee oe

é ae heavy ,, a 5 58 he Hie A Whee eee 3 Suh 8 Wi he i a. is

O]| 8rd light {| is Wr is le a oe a i f a os

Rel egene Bia oe g ey 6 i "i Bit 5 ; ee eh “

B } sth ineenay a ue ie ier Gat bs a Ne aa aly is ss & es &

< || 6th , 4 e i arate w : : x i . es he

a Bini ehe mae le pb ee 8 Ad ee Shins ue < is ii

Ss tee . est waLOeiEe ileal) ee ee “ 60 Sob ose ase

oy || 6th ,, yy o ney 162 il gun-wheel,
|| 7th heavy ,, Ba 173 vi Fal iie Pu op se ; ee i ;

AC ORT orale anne) ap ae ae a o See
{ Ist horse battery ... ae 42, idc 1 ‘ 0,0 i ie es i
er ee a ee oe oe :
> J IMM Ave x.
| two gun-carriages, six lim-
26 batteries at Col fy B i bers, one store-
ies at Colombey | 2849 | Cal ieeeul crs FSD] ieee 159 |... |... | gun-carriage, five wheels, | gun-carriage, two limbers, ee hove left benaa

37 Ms

115

Mars-la-Tour,

Gravelotte

34483

ove | oe 1918

958

including two for gun-
carriage, framework of
limbers.

13 wheels, including six
for gun-carriage and
limbers, six poles, one
elevating - screw, four
limber-boxes, &c.

next day), 36 wheels in-
eluding four for gun-
carriages, 12 for limbers
and four for store-wagon
two poles, one elevat-
ing-screw, three breech-
oe two limber-boxes
(Gs

cent til

CASUALTY RETURNS OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY. 539

The following table shows the maximum loss under the various
headings sustained by any individual battery in the three battles;
combined with this is shown the average loss per battery under the
same heading :-—

Tasie I.

Comparative table of maxima and average casualties.

At the battles ae g Ee 3 gi | 3 g
es 8 5 Be S co | S)
) Co

! Maxima | 29 28 315 6 1 3 nil

Colombey ... =f average 5 6 109 23 04 HW 15

ee ' Maxima 47 78 1148 8 1 4, 4.
BMGT ATNEY.c0 00g { average | 19 26 531 5 027| +35 16

De Maxima | 48 101 965 | 16 1 6 1
Gravelotte v ; averago 8 13-4 | 299 19 “02 26 02
Mean for the three ( Maxima 41 69 809 10 1 4:3 107
battles average 1 15 313 31 029 27 ‘06

An analysis of the above table shows that the battle—viz. Mars-la-
Tour—which attained the highest average in losses to personnel and
horses as well as in rounds fired, also arrived at the closest approxi-
mation between its average and maxima casualties under these headings,
a pretty good indication of the general severity of the Artillery fight
as well as of its intensity at a critical point.

The number of case shot expended strikes one as very small,
whether we look to the maximum number—16—fired by any one
battery throughout the three battles, or at the highest average per
battery—‘o——attained ; when we further note that the next highest
expenditure in any one battery was only 8, the conclusion seems
irresistible that it is almost a wicked luxury to allow more than 2 case
per sub-division as the equipment of a battery.

This question of case is a somewhat serious one, inasmuch as we are
fully aware that in order to provide for the exceptional circumstances
in which case would be required, we are obliged under normal conditions
to burden ourselves with a projectile which in all probability we may
never use. We are, however, willing to accept this irksome necessity
for the simple reason, that if the exceptional circumstances should
arise, the fate of the battery will absolutely depend upon the rapid
firing of a few rounds of this projectile.

An examination of the conditions under which these battles were
fought will, however, show how dangerous it would be to accept
these figures as any guide for the number of rounds of case to
be carried with the battery; in the first place these battles were
offensive fights on the part of the Germans, and the occasions
upon which a resort to case had to be made, consequently rare ;

540 CASUALTY RETURNS OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY.

the Turkish Artillery at Plevna, and our own and Italian experi-
ence in the Soudan were examples of the expenditure of case in
defensive fighting which would tell a very different tale. Again the
battles under discussion were not merely offensive on the part of the
Germans, they were also successful: we have unfortunately no statistics
of the Artillery fire of the Austrians at Konigeritz, but if we had, they
would probably prove instructive, as regards the expenditure of case
shot by Artillery which is covering the retreat of a beaten army. To
sum up, the very factors which make all the other casualties so emi-
nently instructive, tend naturally to diminish the value of the statistics
in regard to the expenditure of case.

When it is said that these battles were successful from the German
point of view, it must be borne in mind that they were severely con-
tested, in fact Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte were both most conspicuous
examples of battles in which the only material advantage gained by
the Germans was a strategic one; there was certainly no difference in
favour of the Germans as regards losses. At Sedan, on the other
hand, the German Artillery so completely established its superiority
as to render the statistics of that battle of no value, unless it be to
prove the advantage of a superiority of Artillery fire, and the possibility
under certain conditions of so paralysing the enemy by the action of
the Artillery alone, as to force him to throw up the sponge, without
coming to close quarters, except at a few tactical points.

There is, however, even another reason for discarding the statistics
of case fire of the battles under discussion, and this is the absence
of anything on the part of the French approaching the furious on-
slaughts upon the enemy’s guns, to which we have become more or
less accustomed in dealing with half civilized tribes who refuse to be
bound by any laws of tactics or self-preservation.

Thus Hoffbauer, in writing of the German Artillery at Mars-la-Tour,
says :—

te The repeated and vigorous attacks made by the enemy with great
gallantry and in large masses, were by no means always checked at
the longest ranges only, but generally at moderate ranges of between
1200 and 1800 paces. At some points they were not stopped by the
cautious and well delivered fire of the line of batteries, until within
800 or 900 paces. The advance of French skirmishers completely
covered by the copses of Trouville was arrested by common shell (!) at
ranges of from 900 to 1000 paces. All these instances of short ranges
occurred at decisive moments, when attention had to be paid to the
effect of fire, without regard to cover.”

Again the same author, writing of Gravelotte, says :—

“ At ranges of 400 paces the 8rd Heavy Battery of the 9th Regi-
ment repulsed an attack of skirmishers from Champenois, and the 3rd
Light Battery an attack from Moscow.”

It is permissible to conjecture that our troops in the Soudan would
have been very pleased if they could have secured similar results ; but
as that pleasure was denied them, and is likely to be denied them again
in some of the fierce little wars we so frequently embark upon, it will
be wiser to base our estimates on a fair share of close quarter fighting,

CASUALTY RETURNS OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY. Bad

instead of relying upon our Artillery fire dispersing infantry attacks
before they come within a quarter of a mile of the guns.

As regards casualties to material, it will be instructive to consider
the maximum figures in the following form :—

Tasie II.

Material

(1)
Maxima in
any one battle

(2)
Averages for
the 3 battles

(3)
Totals for
the 3 battles

Gun-carriages ...

1 per 26 batteries at 2

1 per 44:5 batteries

1 per 15 batteries

| Colombey 5

AWARCTIS — 500 0:00 uy Loe aes oe 1 per 15 batteries 1 per 5 batteries
TEBIES ooo ocs HOO Ne ee Oa eae ert 1 per 21 batteries 1 per 7 batteries

A comparison of Tables I. and IH. shows that the loss of a gun-
carriage disabled is an altogether exceptional circumstance, and that
under no circumstance should we anticipate such a casualty occurring
twice in the same battery; moreover that the relation which this nature
of casualty bears to the total number of batteries engaged, in the action
which shows the heaviest proportion under this head, is only 1 to 26
batteries ; whereas if we take the average for the three battles the
casualty would be only 1 per 44°5 batteries: if now we imagine the
same batteries engaged in each of the three battles and consider
the casualties as cumulative, we arrive at the loss of | gun-carriage
per 15 batteries.

Now this last assumption gives, I think, a fair idea of what our
greatest possible requirements in the shape of spare gun-carriages can
amount to. Appendix B. gives the proportion which are actually to be
provided in our service,with the 15-pounder Field and 12-pounder of
6-cwt. H.A. equipments.}

The same line of reasoning applies to the spare wheels and poles
required; but since the figures in column (1) under these two headings
show a heavier casualty rate than the figures in column (3), we should
adopt the former figures as our basis instead of the latter.

There is one case (see Table I.) of a single battery losing 6 wheels,
and a comparison with column (1) in Table II. shows that this loss
was most abnormal ; the case in question was at Gravelotte, and
occurred in the 4th Light Field Battery of the 9th Army Corps; this
battery had two wheels disabled, but it also had a gun-carriage and
limber disabled, accounting, as previously explained, for the remaining
four wheels, which are required to make the total up to siz. 4

And now, before jumping to any conclusion, it behoves us to consider
carefully the relation which individual maximum casualties bear to
average Maximum casualties, and endeavour to arrive ata fair adjust-

1 Appendix B. has been omitted, as a final decision on certain points affecting it, has not yet been
given. —/'.G.8. ‘

542 CASUALLY RETURNS OF TIM GERMAN ARTILLERY.

ment of our requirements therefrom. We have seen that even under
the most exceptional circuinstances of the same batteries being engaged
in three consecutive battles, each of which has been supposed to reach
the highest record in casualties under the particular head we are con-
sidering—the cumulative loss in gun-carriages would only amount to 1
in 15 batteries: against this take the battle of Gravelotte, in which 2
gun-carriages were disabled in a total of 115 batteries ; suppose that
these gun-carriages were disabled in two batteries of the same Brigade
Division (which was not the case), it is obvious that the fact of no
other Brigade Division requiring the spare gun-carriage from its
ammunition column, would not be of any immediate benefit to the
Brigade Division in which two gun-carriages were disabled; should
we be justified then in assuming that each battery should have a spare
gun-carriage with its own line of wagons? I think not. The absurdity
of adding 115 spare gun-carriages to the column of route, in order
that such a case as I have depicted should be met immediately, needs
no argument. A proportion of 1 spare gun-carriage per Brigade
Division with the ammunition columns is, I think, a most liberal
proportion, and may be considered as quite sufficiently near the
batteries to meet requirements within reasonable time.

The same line of argument applies with more or less force as regards
wheels and poles. It will now be interesting to analyse the average
casualties per battery in the Horse and Field Artillery respectively, in
order to see whether there are any appreciable ditferences between the
casualties in each branch ; to what extent such differences, if any, are
repeated in each battle ; and to what causes they may be attributed.

Taste III.

Average casualties per battery of Horse and Field Artillery respectively.

Shell Case Men Horses | Wheels} Poles Total number of

batteries
g |x elefeglizlgizi/e|s
Se Male salce BS] Ee iS] 8 |S] 8 |S] Howe | Field
battles cf— a | & oli (elo | ele | is
Colombey ...J 127} 1049... |-3 | 2 4 | 7)°33 |:015 6 20
Mars-la-Tour ...| 792 | 460 § °75 | -45] 24 |18 543-5 214-125 |-414. 2 8 29
Gravelotte ...] 810/207]... |-21] 12 | 7 | 265 | 12}-29 |-34 fos | ol] 22 94.
“Mean for the 2 410 | 9874-25 |-32} 13 |10 | 24 | 13]-215 |-256|-017| -07
8 battles J i |

From the foregoing it appears that Horse Artillery may be expected
to expend from one-fourth to one-third more ammunition than Field
Artillery ; probably owing to the fact that the more mobile branch
gets earlier on the scene of action in an offensive fight, and con-
sequently has the opportunity of remaining longer in action: it is
therefore of even greater importance for the reserve ammunition of
the Horse Artillery to be up early in the day than it is for that of the

CASUALTY RETURNS OF TIE GERMAN ARTILLERY. 543

Field Artillery. An organization of the ammunition columns, which
will provide for the distinct and separate supply of Horse and Field
Artillery, will become a necessity upon the introduction of a different
gun and different ammunition for the two services, and thus the way
will be paved for any action which may be necessary on the field for
ensuring the earliest possible supply of reserve ammunition to the
Horse Artillery. These remarks, as to a separate organization of the
reserve ammunition supply, apply only to the Corps Artillery, which is
the only “ mixed” Artillery unit.

As regards casualties to men and horses, the same law seems to hold
in a greater or less degree, and for the same reason. ‘The following
table of ratios is illustrative of the proportion of horses to men in the
Horse and Field Batteries respectively, and of the average propor-
tionate losses.

Tasle IV.
Men Horses
Proportion of horses to men on the estab- ( Horse Battery ... 1 .. 1°84
lishimentlotaabautetyanetassans Seeneesr(alleldebattenrya as.) lau eb emmles0

Proportion of casualties as between horses ( Horse Battery ... 1 ... 1°38
and men, and calculating by averages ( Field Battery ... 1 ... 0°85

From this it will be seen that the casualties in men and horses
respectively, when calculated on the basis of percentage of strength,
show relatively a greater loss in men than horses.

The data regarding the expenditure of case shot, point to the fact
that its use is of so accidental a nature that no deductions can be drawn
as to its being more likely to be used by one branch than the other.
Similarly, the casualties to wheels and poles appear to be so rare in
occurrence, and of so chance a description, that it is impossible to say
that one branch is more likely to suffer than the other in this respect.

I have previously alluded to the fact that four batteries were en-
gaged in all three actions, let us see what proportion the average
casualties per battle in each of these batteries bear to the total average
casualties of all the batteries.

TABLE V.

Rounds Men Horses Wheels Poles
Average for the four
batteries which were OL ae jacam eat). Mosae UW) Roa . OTe SNS
engaged in each battle
Mean average for all
the batteries, as per ONB nog cog NS Sto I DE
Table I. ae

This table, as we might have expected, does not show any special
features in regard to the casualties to men and horses in the batteries
which were engaged in three successive engagements ; the ratio, as
regards proportion of horses to men is slightly higher, which is what
one might reasonably anticipate, as many horses must have succumbed

544, CASUALTY RETURNS OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY.

from the continuous strain to which they were exposed. The casualties
to wheels and poles are also higher; this again one might expect, from
the fact that many wheels and poles may have been only partially
disabled, or perhaps even only strained, in the first or second battle ;
and that, owing to the absence of time and opportunity to thoroughly
overhaul and refit, the weak points asserted themselves when the strain
was continued.

There is one more point of view from which it is interesting to study,
the casualties to personnel and horses and the number of rounds fired.
Appendix C. gives a graphic representation of the figures attained
under each of these heads in each battle!; the batteries are arranged
in the order of casualties to personnel, the actual figures reached being
given by reference to the horizontal line cut by the curve; the casual-
ties to horses and tens of rounds fired will be found for each battery
in the same vertical line as the casualties to men, the actual figures, as
in the case of personnel, being found by reference to the horizontal
lines.

The general result is not precisely what we might expect: it shows
that the losses to horses bear a most variable ratio to the losses to
personnel ; while the number of rounds fired does not appear to bear
any ratio whatever to the casualties in personnel or horses; perhaps we
may reasonably infer from the latter fact that the Artillery duel by no
means represents the principle part played by Artillery in a modern
battle-field, and that the Artillery on both sides may be better engaged
than in firing at each other; the cases in which the Artillery duel was
necessary, and formed the principle réle of the batteries, are easily
deducible from the diagrams. In such cases it will be observed that
the number of rounds fired bears a distinct relation to the number of
casualties.

1 Owing to the expense of printing, it has been thought sufficient to illustrate Mars-la-Tour
only.—F.G.S.

Sty

9 :

ge)

‘TANNOSUAd OL SASSO1 4O UBaHO NI

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WH KC Q VY KH &

SOSSO vi,

; i 7. ‘ : j : 4 fare
? ; ‘ ! id :
% ~
f ‘
; 4 5 \
. s ¥ 10
a we ra
5 ; \ Wy Py §

t:, Es +

; a ihe,

3 is p : :
f © é
‘
ai *.
= ; i

soeacieesntn tin obsastt de panes cnc camila Al haenrec Us “4

if
: at i e
- ; fe ny u
f - ,
if sl t : *
: , onk
y pe : \

: :
ae ji : : : ‘ :
y : :

Losses in Men & Horses. & Tens of rounds frred.

APPENDIX C.

E OF| MARS LA TouR.

Commarative Thblle of Clasublities to Personnel (in units) ©
: , Horses (in units) X
N mber of rounds fired | GhiexaGe mc

aU 1 &

Vs
D
4

z
72345 67 89 071 7218 Ue 15 1617 18 1G 20 21 22 232425 2b 27 98: 2G 30 31 32 33 34 35 Bb
NUMBER OF BATTERIES IN ORDER OF LOSSES TO PERSONNEL.

545

ADJUSTING CLINOMETER PLANES
OF ORDNANCE.

A PROPOSAL TO LEVEL GUNS ACROSS TRUNNIONS BY
A SPECIAL. SPIRIT-LEVEL.

CAPTAIN W. E. DONOHUE, R.A., L.0.M.

Taz clinometer plane on a gun should be parallel with the axis of the
gun and trunnions.

The ordinary method of levelling the gun is to place a long straight-
edge in the bore (see Fig. 2) and adjust with an ordinary spirit-level.

Fie. 2.

If great care is taken, a good horizontal position can be obtained by
this means ; but with a narrow straight-edge there is a danger in the
straight-edge being slightly inclined (see Fig. 3), one edge will there-

Fig. 3.

Sketch showing straight-edge in bore out of the vertical.

fore be slightly higher than the other, and should the level get slightly

1. vol, xxin,

546 ADJUSTING CLINOMETER PLANES OF ORDNANCE,

across the straight-edge (see Fig. 4), a small error will be introduced.
Fra. 4.

SET Mince ny DMITA

Sketch in plan showing the spirit-level laying across the straight-edge,

For levelling the guns across the trunnions, an instrument as shown in
Fig. 1 is used. For the larger natures of ordnance, this is a very

Fie. 1.

SPIRIT LEVELS —-oo Pes.
oy Fa a

inconvenient instrument for carrying about.

‘The writer, having found it necessary to examine and adjust the
clinometer planes of guns in localities and under conditions where it
was inconvenient to carry about instruments which would not stand
rough usage, constructed a spirit-level with an angle iron base of
portable size which enables the gun to be levelled across the trunnions
easily ; and at the same time, when used for levelling the bore of the
gun, eliminates the possibility of error, previously mentioned, caused
by the spirit-level getting across the straight-edge, as shown in Fig.
4. The angle iron spirit-level is shown in position on the trunnion of
the gun in Fig. 5.

Fie. 5.

|
Sketch showing angle iron spirit-level on trunnion of gun.
The instrument can be constructed by any Armament Artificer.
It is considered that a spirit-level so constructed would be a very
useful instrument for general purposes.

547

ON THE EMPOYMENT OF ARTILLERY
IN CUBA.

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. C. DALTON, R.A.

THERE is an interesting paper in the Spanish Memorial de Artilleria
for last May, by hieut.-Colonel D. Gabriel Vidal y Ruby, under
the above heading. ‘The author is a talented officer, who for many
years was employed as a Professor in the Artillery Cadet Academy at
Segovia, and who has, amongst other subjects, written on and studied
that of rifled howitzers and mortars for general artillery use.

The heading of this paper is perhaps at first sight somewhat mis-
leading, because it might lead one to believe that it referred to the
actual employment of artillery in the campaign which is now being
undertaken by Spain in Cuba; and any account based on actual ex-
perience of artillery in that campaign would be very acceptable and
instructive. This paper, however, as Colonel Vidal is careful to explain,
is entirely theoretical. It is the outcome of his study of the subject,
and is in fact a treatise on the employment of artillery, according to
his views, in a campaign of the peculiar nature of that now being carried
on in Cuba. Unfortunately it does not appear from his article what
nature of artillery the Spanish Government is employing in the field.

I propose to do little more here than to give a brief outline of hig
ideas which seem to be sound and practical.

He begins by remarking, what everyone who has read the newspapers
must have noticed, that the accounts published by the press are vague
and contradictory. One day they will be of an optimist character and
the next they will rush off to the other extreme. Colonel Vidal, while
fully recognizing the formidable nature of the resistance which the
rebels are offering, has no fears as to the ultimate result, and believes
that peace and tranquillity will eventually be assured.

It is a well-known rule that when an army has to be equipped and
prepared for any definite purpose the following points have, amongst
others, to be kept in view, viz.: the nature of the theatre of war, the
numbers, valour and qualities of the enemy’s troops, the resources and
armament which he has at his disposal, his special organization and
method of fighting, and to be aware in advance, if possible, of the
quality of the military genius of the enemy’sleaders. Knowing these
points, it is then easy to settle on the composition of the force which is
to be sent to oppose the enemy.

Cavalry, infantry and artillery are the elements of every field force,
and their relative strength must be regulated by the special circum-

Dk, Win SSUES

548 ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA.

stances of the case. At present we are only concerned with the
artillery.

We are all aware that Field Artillery is employed with armies which
operate in fairly level country ; that when this country becomes moun-
tainous and abrupt we must adopt a lighter, simpler and more mobile
branch of the arm—1in other words the Mountain Artillery.

After these and other general considerations the author proceeds to
investigate the peculiar conditions of the present Cuban insurrection
and the means which, in his opinion, should be adopted to combat
them.

The actual theatre of operations in Cuba is, as a rule, mountainous
and broken, with great extents of very thick copse and thicket in which
grow large trees and an abundance of entangled and climbing plants,
and obstinate leafy shoots and branches. The natives of the country
call these thickets by the name manigua. There are intervals which
are free from this jungle, where the ground is more open, and these are
called sébanas.

According to the papers the number of insurgents amounts to some
5 or 6000 men. Their courage is not to be despised, but their quality
from a military point of view would appear to be very defective. The
resources at their disposal are probably sufficient with which to com-
mence a campaign, they thoroughly know the ground they fight on
and are not likely to fall short of provisions. They have modern
weapons for their infantry and cavalry, and for choice they use the
machete or short broad-bladed sword. ‘They have no artillery.

Their usual system of fighting is by means of surprises, ambuscades
and coups de main. They will not fight unless circumstances appear
favourable, and retire in dispersed formation before a superior force.
Their organization corresponds with their system of fighting. Up to
the present they have but few leaders of prestige, but those they have
are well acquainted with the strategy and tactics which they adopt,
and they possess the advantage of an excellent system of espionage
amongst persons who are adherents to their cause but not under arms.

The author then proceeds to consider the question as to what sort of
artillery would be best employed in such a country as Cuba and against
an enemy as above described.

Field Artillery is of course out of the question, and though at first
sight Mountain Artillery may seem to be the most suitable, still when
it ig borne in mind that the country is mostly covered with thick forest
and undergrowth, it is more than probable that Mountain Artillery
would in many cases be useless as it could not be properly carried and
worked. What seems to be wanted is something more simple, more
elementary and more easily manipulated than Mountain Artillery and
yet capable of producing sufficient effect. Colonel Vidal reminds his
readers that the English constructed in a very short space of time some
guns for the Abyssinian campaign which were specially suited for the
country they were to be used in, and he goes on to advocate the pro-
vision of war rockets for usein Cuba. These projectiles can be thrown
at convenient ranges without the aid of ordnance; they can be carried
ona mule’s back in suitable boxes over undulating country, and when

ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA. 549

this is not possible the boxes can be carried by hand and the rockets
can be fired from almost inaccessible positions. It is of course well
known that for range and accuracy the rocket cannot compare for a
moment with a piece of artillery; but in cases of this kind something
must be sacrificed, and more especially so in order to attain simplicity,
and above all when, as in the case in point, it is “ Hobson’s choice.”
“ We must either carry and use rockets ” he says “ or deprive ourselves
of the valuable assistance of artillery and suppress it absolutely.”

The transport and manipulation of the war rocket is easy and simple ;
easy on account of its relatively small weight, and simple because noth-
ing more is wanted than some elementary trestles or tripods for firing
at high angles.

The author then enters into a recapitulation of what is known of war
rockets which I shall only touch on very briefly. Dating from the end
of last century they were known of in India by Colonel Congreve, R.A.;
the natives used them, and they consisted then of thick bamboos filled
with incendiary compounds. Congreve introduced them into England
and greatly improved them, but kept them still as incendiary missiles.
The English fired 200 against Boulognein 1806,and many against Flush-
ingin 1809. Nelson, in 1807, fired 40,000 against Copenhagen in 3 days
with great success. The Danish government commissioned Captain Schu-
macher to study this new weapon with the result that a war rocket was
improvised which fired shot and bullets, besides incendiary matter.
The Prussians and Swedes began to use them in 1818, in which year
Rocket Troops were formed in the English artillery and were employed
at Leipzig' and Waterloo. Later, rockets were studied by all the prin-
cipal Powers. France used them in Algeria, the Crimea and Mexico,
and even tried them in 1870-1, for the French Minister of War tele-
graphed on the 19th November, 1870 to the Director of the School of
Pyrotechny, ‘Let me know, by telegraph, if you have any war
rockets.” Russia has used them in Central Asia, England in Africa
and India, and Spain in Marocco in 1859. From that period rockets
have gradually been allowed to die out, though England alone still
keeps them on both for field and siege operations. None can wish to
compare rockets in value with artillery, but in certain places they are
undoubtedly of use, and Cuba seems to be one of these. Their fire is
somewhat uncertain—this has always been recognised—and hence they
should be fired in numbers and at an extensive target.. Congreve ad-
vocated fire by salvos and Captain Harel, who commanded the rocket
batteries before Sebastopol, says in his memoir on the employment of
war rockets that ‘above all and where ever possible they should be
fired in great numbers.”

The maximum range of the field war rocket is some 2700 to 8000
yards; with the siege pattern the range varies up tosome 7000 yards.
The minimum angle of projection for the former should not be below
10° and for the latter 25°.

The author next proceeds to describe the war rocket and means of

1The valuable services of the Rocket Troop R.H.A. at this decisive battle are a matter of history,
Captain Bogue commanding the troop was killed, and Lieutenant Fox-Strangways, who was lator
on severely wounded at Waterloo and killed at Inkerman, succeeded Captain Bogue in command:

550 ‘ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA.

firing it, into which description we need not enter—and more par-
ticularly he describes our Hale war rocket. He afterwards studies
briefly what type of war rocket would be most suitable to employ
against the Cuban insurgents. Direct fire would not be of much use
in a country such as that in which the enemy have taken refuge, hence
indirect fire is necessary. He does not think a shrapnel would be of
any use, and recommends an explosive shell loaded with granular gun-
cotton which would ensure the shell bursting into a large number of
fragments. Time fuzes should be used to guard against premature
explosions owing to unforeseen shocks which would be liable to take
place with the percussion fuze. If it were found difficult to invent a
time fuze which would ignite the gun-cotton powder then it might
be necessary to substitute ordinary gunpowder for the latter. The
incendiary rocket would not appear to be of much use for Cuba,
because it is impossible to destroy by means of it the virgin forest and
exuberant vegetation, though rockets might come in usefully on certain
occasions.

As regards the construction of the rocket, Colonel Vidal recom-
mends the Hale system of rotation, or the French pattern with central
tail-piece. It should be fired by a percussion tube. The tripod should
be of the English pattern. The calibre of the rocket should be 7™
(2°75") and the shell of 8™ (3°15") which would give a total weight of
some 8°8lbs. asa maximum. The length would be about 19” without
the tail-piece, and with it about 39", and it is calculated that one mule
could carry two boxes of 12 rockets each. ‘The boxes should be
adapted for mule or hand transport.

The author then proposes the following establishment for a rocket
battery, viz. :—

Captain.

Lieutenants.

Sergeants in charge of two tripods each.
Corporals, layers, one per tripod.
Gunners as assistants to above.

Gunners to supply the rockets.

Mule drivers.

Master Artificer.

Assistant to ditto.

Shoeing-Smith.

Assistant ditto.

Collar-Maker.

Assistant ditto.

Artificers (a carpenter and a blacksmith).
20 Gunners in reserve (with shovels and picks).

The men to be armed with carbine and sword-bayonet (machete).

po ee
De KHRE Ree PONADaCcNre

To each tripod there would be one layer, one assistant, and two men
to supply ammunition (proveedores).

On the tripods being placed in position each assistant layer would
equip himself with a pocket containing a lanyard, a pouch with friction
tubes, a knife and a level. A weather-cock on a pole should be placed

ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA. 551

in a convenient position so that the direction of the wind may be
known. Fire should be by salvos.

Rockets could be employed against masses of infantry in the open,
against the insurgents when lightly entrenched, using in this case high
angle fire and, finally, they would have. (as has been observed on many
previous occasions) a good moral and material effect against cavalry.

The author fully recognizes the difficulties which present themselves
with regard to the adoption and employment of war rockets in the
Cuba campaign, viz.:—

(1.) The campaign is now actually in operation.

(2.) Not being able to provide at short notice either the rockets
or all the necessary material for their service.

(3.) Having to improvise the manufacture.
(4.) The need to experiment with them and draw up fire-tables.
(5.) To train the personnel in the manipulation of the rockets.

The difficulties are no doubt great, but if it is not wished to manu-
facture rockets in Spain they might be bought in England.

The author then considers how they could proceed to manufacture
them in Spain and does not apprehend any difficulty in training the
personnel. But, he goes on to say, let us suppose that the Spanish
government actually decline to consider the question of rockets for the
Cuba war; there still remains the question whether the Spanish troops
in Cuba ought not to have the advantage of the great moral and
material support which artillery supplies, and he therefore propounds
a second suggestion, viz.: to employ light batteries of the 9™ (3°5”)
field mortar. They would be more mobile than mountain batteries ;
their high angle fire would be most efficacious against the enemy under
cover of the thicket (manigua), and they could fire common and
shrapnel shell both with time fuzes. It is necessary to discard the per-
cussion fuze in order to avoid the premature bursts of shell owing to
impact with intervening trees, branches, &c. The following are the
relative weights of the 9™ mortar and 8™ Plasencia mountain gun :—

gem Mortar. 8cm Plasencia.
WISTRIE, OE JOISTS. con ao coo 00 SS Nos, 225°1 Ibs.
* carriage with wheels sno OOM! 5 BSH 5
otaliwershtrolgsys teu ares my rms emnnnC TONE 582°6 ,,

With an angle of elevation of 45° and a charge of about 13 ozs. we
obtain with the 9™ mortar a range of 3094 yards.

With the first line of ammunition there would be 48 common and
24 shrapnel shell, with 72 charges of various weights (from 7 oz. to
2 oz.) and 80 tubes.

The advantage of the mortar over the gun consists in being able to
carry the former on its bed by hand, which cannot be done in the case
of the gun. Three men are sufficient for this work. In general all
the material for the 9™ mortar would be carried on mule back, but

when the country presents difficulties it can be carried by hand.
75

552 ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA.

Finally this mortar would be of great use to assist mountain guns
when the enemy gives battle from an entrenched position or from be-
hind a stockade, &c. Moreover this was done in the previous war
with the 8°™ §.B. Coehorn mortar.

The author concludes with the following summing up :—

(1.) Mountain artillery could accompany the troops destined to
operate in mountainous and broken ground, which is fairly
open.

(2.) When the enemy fights entrenched or behind stockades and
natural cover the 9° mortar might be used for indirect
fire as an auxiliary to the gun.

(3.) The above-named mortar, firing at high angles, could also be
used to expel the enemy from the dense cover of the
thickets, and in case of guns being unable from the nature
of the ground, exuberance of vegetation, &c. to be of
service, mortars could take their place.

(4.) Ifthe nature of the ground be considered so bad that
artillery is deemed useless, and if at the same time
it is thought that war rockets would be valuable, then
these might be adopted and fired at high angles to search
the cover under which the enemy is taking refuge.

(5.) The war rockets would also be useful in the open in cases
when, for various reasons, the artillery cannot be got up.
The rockets would be fired at low angles to skim along
the ground and would be specially valuable against
cavalry.

In another paper on the same subject in the Memorial for August
1895, Lieut.-Colonel Gabriel Vidal makes further suggestions which
are briefly as follows :—

(1.) He has noticed in the reports of the war that the rebels
are in the habit of attacking isolated posts which are
garrisoned by small bodies of loyal troops, and in the
event of not being able to take these posts by assault, they
attempt to starve or burn out the defenders.

As a rule the defenders are only armed with small-arms, and
though doubtless the breech-loader or, still better, the
repeating rifle is the first necessity, nevertheless, in the
absence of quick-firing or machine guns, the author is of
opinion that hand-grenades should be supplied to all these
small works andthat the soldiers should be instructed in
their manipulation for use at close quarters. He therefore
proceeds to describe the hand-grenade as used in the
French army, which weighs 1 kilogramme (2:2 lbs.) and
which is ignited by means of a fuze fitted with a friction
tube. He recommends as an improvement on the French

ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA. 553

system that the fuze should be screwed into the shell
instead of being pressed in, and that the hand-grenade
should be projected either by hand or by means of tubes
or troughs. The bursting charge should be 384 oz. of
R.F.G. powder. very small detached work or post
should be furnished with a supply of these missiles.

(2.) It being a recognised axiom of war that troops destined for
the attack should march by different roads and combine
for joint action, it is necessary that the various columns
should be in perfect communication with each other. For
this object the telegraph, telephone, and signalling either
by sound or vision are the surest means to employ. In
Cuba, however, the conditions are such that visual signal-
ling is probably the only means at the disposal of the
troops for keeping up communication. He then describes
the American ‘‘ Very” pistol and signal rockets. The
former is adopted at the present time in the United States
army and navy and in the Italian army,! and is a breech-
loading central-fire pistol. The pistol discharges red and
green stars, and by means of combining the two colours
and adopting longer or shorter series of lights a code of
signals is readily formed for use at night. The Italians
also use smoke rockets for use during the day. The
signals with these depends on the degree of the intensity
of the smoke, and the rockets also emit a considerable
sound by means of a petard which they enclose.

Colonel Vidal recommends, therefore, that each work of de-
fence should be furnished with a proportion of signal
rockets for use during the daytime; and for use at night
he recommends for each defended post a “ Very” pistol
with a supply of cartridges.

Similarly all the operating columns should be furnished with
“Very” pistols and signal rockets for night and day use
in conjunction with the forts or other works of defence.
In all these works also there should be a supply of torches
and light-balls for aiding the defence if attacked at night.

(3.) In certain special cases the author advocates the use of trains
armed with field guns as was done by the English in the
Egyptian campaign. ‘To support this proposal he quotes
an incident of the campaign in Cuba, when in June last
a Spanish officer in command of a detachment embarked
250 men in a train and started down the line to attack a
force of the enemy which was reported as being in the
vicinity of a factory not far off. The insurgents, 800
strong, were conveniently drawn up in a semicircular
formation to receive the train, and while disembarking
the men some considerable losses were caused. Once

1 Also in the British Royal Navy I believe,

504 ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA.

the troops were disembarked and got into attack for-
mation they repulsed the enemy, but Colonel Vidal main-
tains that if there had been a field-piece on the train to
cover the disembarkation the loss alluded to might have
been saved, the principal loss to the attackers being at
the moment of alighting from the train.

Colonel Vidal concludes his paper by saying that he is of course
aware that he has put forward nothing new, but he ventures to think
that the simple auxiliaries he has advocated might be of great use on
the principle that “ small causes may produce great results.”

EXTRACTS FROM OLD ORDER BOOKS,
R.A., SHHEERNESS.

CoMMUNICATED BY

CAPTAIN W. H. CUMMINGS, R.A.

Tur enclosed are transcriptions from one of two old Order Books
discovered by Captain W. H. M. Duthie, R.A. in the R.A. District
Office, Sheerness, in 1878, who designed and presented to the Officers
Mess a casket to contain them under lock and key, and also the bound
M.SS. with a transcript which can be taken out for general perusal,
thereby ensuring the preservation from destruction and safe custody
of these valuable and authentic curiosities of an epoch just 100
years old. I venture to think that the perusal of these orders will
prove as interesting to the readers at large of the R.A.I. “ Proceedings,”
as to the officers stationed at Sheerness.

Suuerness, 11th August 1795.

It having been represented to His Royal Highness Field Marshall
The Duke of York, that allowing the exchange to take place between
Lieutenants Wilson and Wyville would be contrary to the uniform
practice of the Army: His Royal Highness has therefore for the
present suspended the said appointments.

SHuERNess, Sth September 1795.
Joseph Martin Royal Artillery now confined for giving ill language
to Sergeant Baxter of the same Corps and refusing to go Prisoner
when ordered, is therefore by order of the Lieut.-Governor debarred
port liberty for a month from this date and in that time to mount
Four Extra Guards. His name is to be put up at the Gate and Sally
Port accordingly—should Martin persevere in such turbulent un-
military behaviour the Lieut.-Governor is determined to bring him
to a Garrison Court Martial.
SHEERNESS, 21st October 1795.
Lieutenant Roskrow! Royal Reg* Arty to direct the Master Gunner
or anyone else of his command to make out the Muster Rolls
for the Garrison Staff and Artillery. These plain and easy made-out
Rolls, were formerly done by the Master Gunner; but the total debility
both body and mind of the late Master Gunner rendered him unfit for
that, or anything else.
Suuurness, 24th October 1795.
Divine Service to-morrow the men are to be very clean.

1 Kane’s List, No. 669.
Wl, Olin SOS,

506 EXTRACTS FROM OLD ORDER BOOKS, B.A.) SHEERNESS.

SHEERNESS, 28th October 1796.
All sentinels posted within the Garrison as well as without, and all
out-guards are to Receive Major Booth, the Chief Hngineer of this
Fortress, with rested arms.
SHEERNESS, 30th October 1795.
The Commanding Officer on coming from Blue-Town last night
between the hours of 12 and 1 o’clock was not challenged by the
sentinel at the Main-Gate, nor was the Single Horse Chaise with a
Stranger stopped and properly examined before Admitted into the
Garrison. He desires that the like irregularity may not happen again
for the future.
SHEERNESS, 2nd November 1795.
The Royal Artillery and Royal Invalids off duty to parade to-morrow
noon ; the latter with arms; the working men excepted, who may fall
in in their Labouring Dresses, when the Sentence of the Garrison
Court Martial Held this day to be carried into execution, under
direction of the officer on duty.
The Surgeon to attend and the Drummers with their Cats.

Suurzrness, 5th November 1798.
As the Admiral is fortunately recovered from his late indiposition
and gone hence at present; the Garrison Drummers are therefore to
Beat round the Parade as formerly.

SuerRnuss, 10th November 1795.

Yesterday afternoon about half an hour past One, the Lieut.-
Governor found Richard Edwards, Private of Captain Figg’s! Com-
pany, fast asleep when Sentry, at the Salient angle of the Minster
Bastion; lying with his Thighs and Legs stretched out from the
Sentry Box.

Such a flagrant, and highly hazardous breach of duty, should come
before a Garrison, nay even a General Court Martial. The Lieut.-
Governor is however willing to show lenity; therefore only debars
Hdwards Port liberty for six weeks from this date; and during that
time to mount an Hxtra Guard Weekly. He is also denied the
privilege of working.

SHEERNESS, 20th November 1795.

The Lieut.-Governor repeats his orders of the 12th November 1788.

The Non Commissioned Officers to see that the Barrackrooms, stairs
and Passages are kept clean. % % -% To prevent the women
from ironing Linen on the Barrack Blankets; or using the Sheets, as
Bed, or Window Curtains. % Ye

The Non Commissioned Officers and Privates of the Invalids in this
Garrison, having often complained of the number of Seamen and
Marines that are in the Winter Season permitted to Lie all night in
the Guard House. The Lieut.-Governor therefore in common justice
to his command is necessarily obliged to refuse such men being so
admitted in future; as the soldiers on duty have thereby greatly
suffered.

1 Independent Companies of Inyalids.

EXTRACTS FROM OLD ORDER BOOKS, R.A.. SHEERNESS. 557

Suerrness, 21st November 1795.
Lest the Muster Master should come down to-morrow morning by
water; the Garrison to be ready to fall in at Hleven o’clock—need not
add in their usual soldier-like manner. The whole to parade without
Powder in their hair.
SHEERNESS, 23rd November 1795.
The Garrison to be ready to parade for the Muster this morning at
eleven o’clock.
The strictest sobriety is expected.

Sueerness, 27th November 1795.

As the new formed company of Invalids commanded by Major
Forch,' have behaved in a very unmilitary and irregular manner, on
and of duty. The Lieut-Governor therefore assures them of his
determined resolution to support due order, and subordination in this
Garrison and gives this fair warning, that should they persevere, they
shall be punished agreeable to the rules of War. The Masters of
Canteens in this Fortress to be warned not to trust them.

SHEERNESS, 14th December 1795.
The Sergeant of the Main Guard to be correct in reporting the
names of Strangers who come into this Fortress. Yesterday morning
Lord Hill and Colonel Blake of the Guards were reported, instead
of the Harl of Errol and Lieut.-Colonel Black of the 32nd Light
Dragoons.
Sururness, Sth January 1796.
The Surgeon having reported Joseph Rotheray of Captain Malcolm’s?
Company fit for duty; and the Commanding Officer has for some time
past been convinced that Rotheray shammed sick to evade duty: there-
fore orders he may in future be strictly watched, being a skulking
soldier.
Saeerness, 17th January 1796.

Complaint having been made to the Commanding Officer that a
number of Idle Boys daily assemble on the Grand Parade; and in
their various Gambols, break windows, spoil the parade with their
stilts, and make an Hideous noise. The Non Commissioned Officers
and Privates of the Roy! Art’ and Roy! Ind‘ Inv“ are to prevent
their children from making such disturbances in future.

SHeERNESS, 19th January 1796.
The Sergeant who superintends the serving of Water is to take care
that it does not run over the parade as it has of late, which is wasting
that very necessary article; and making a disagreeable Puddle.

Sueerness, dth Hebruary 1796.
The Lieut.-Governor shall not give the Garrison any further trouble
about that fraudulent, pitiful, pilfering scoundrel, Daniel McGane.
Therefore remits the remainder of his corporal punishment; and

! Independent Companies of Invalids.
® Independent Companies of Inyalids;

558 EXTRACTS FROM OLD ORDER BOOKS, R.A., SHEERNESS.

orders him to be Drummed out to-day noon; with a Label on his
breast expressive of his crime.

The Lieut.-Governor flatters himself, there is not another Soldier in
this Garrison tainted with similar dishonest principles; but should
there be, he is determined to weed out all such miscreants.

SHEERNESS, 15th February 1796,

As our avowed and inveterate Hnemies the French and Dutch have
now a considerable force at the Texel, ready to put to sea; if not
already out, this Garrison should therefore be particularly watchful
and alert; ready at all times to repel any Attacks that may eventually
be made against this very Consequential Fortress.

As our chief defence depends on the Artillery being well served ;
the Lieut.-Governor therefore orders the Cannon Practice to be
recommenced under direction of Lieutenant Roskrow Roy! Arty.
Major Forch’s Company being lately formed, and mostly consisting of
Raw undisciplined men, are to be carefully attended to, in that neces-
sary point of duty. Such men of Captains Malcolm and Fige’s com-
panies who have lately joined are likewise to be trained in the Artillery
Practice.

SHEeerness, 19th February 1796.

On any appearance of an attack against this Fortress, Major Forch’s
company is to take post in the Half Moon Battery; Captain Malcolm’s
on Craig’s Battery and Captain Figg’s on the Saluting Battery and
Minster Bastion.

The small Detachment of Royal Artillery to be posted at the Guard
House Battery and from thence distributed as the nature of the service
may require.

The men on their respective posts to draw up in rear of the guns.

Should the enemy point to a land Attack, the order and the dispo-
sition of the defence shall be arranged accordingly.

Sueerness, 29th February 1796.

The Artillery Practice to be continued every Sunday morning till
farther orders.
SuHerrness, Sth March 1796.
To-morrow being the day appointed for a General Fast: the Garrison
to parade for Divine Service at the usual hour.

Suzerness, 10th March 1796.

The cruel and unprovoked treatment the Russian Marines met with
at the Tuns Canteen last Sunday induces the Lieut.-Governor to ac-
quaint the Masters of Canteens in this Fortress, that they are respon-
sible for the bad behaviour of their servants. And should such mis-
creants in future dare to knock people down (as last Sunday) either in
the house or streets; the Master and servants of such canteen, shall
be immediately turned out.

When a Party of the Main Guard is called to quell any disturbance
within the works, the Soldiers are to conduct the rioters out of the
Fortress; but not to suffer them to be beaten, as lately. Should any

EXTRACTS FROM OLD ORDER BOOKS, R.A.. SHEERNESS. 559

of the Russian Seamen or Marines disturb this Garrison, the Guard is
to beckon them out of the Canteen or Fortress.

Suemrness, 2nd April 1796.

In spite of the Lieutenant-Governor’s repeated orders that the
Corporals shall go regularly round with the relief in posting the
sentries ; he notwithstanding finds that they often send one man to
relieve another. Should any Corporal on duty dare to do so in future,
he shall be tried for disobedience of orders.

Before the Guards march off the Parade, the officer on duty is to
pitch upon a proper man to act as Corporal, which man then becomes

responsible in that line.
Surgrness, 26th May 1796.

The Lieutenant-Governor expects that the women who are indulged
to live in the Barracks with their husbands, will behave with decency,
and regularity ; if otherwise, they shall be turned out, as Duncan’s and

Rothery’s wives are.
Surerness, 380th June 1796.

As the Lieutenant-Governor’s repeated orders against Drunkenness
when men are warned for or on duty seem of late totally forgotten.
He therefore once more gives them fair warning of his determined
resolution to crush that truly unmilitary, and hazardous crime, by
exemplary punishment, agreeable to the Rules of War. Is atthe same
time convinced that drunkenness and most irregularities proceed from
remissness in the non-commissioned officers ; who too often sink their
rank, by making companions of the men; thence, weaken their com-
mand, and connive at crimes. Hopes without further admonitions the
non-commissioned officers and Privates, will strictly attend to their
respective duties.
Suuzrness, 24th July 1796.

Ralph Bishop, Private of Captain Fige’s Company, For disobeying
the Lieutenant-Governor’s order.

By cohabiting in the Barracks with a woman without being married :
and when detected, went and got married; without leave, or even
knowledge of the commanding officer of the company.

Ralph Bishop is therefore by order of the commanding officer,
confined to this Fortress for a month, from to-morrow, and for that time
to mount an extra Guard weekly. His name to be put up at the Gate
and Sally Port accordingly.

SHEERNESS, 27th August 1796.

As the utmost alacrity and attention, become more necessary than
ever in this Garrison, the officer on duty is to take care that the Main,
Artillery, and Line Guards are fully and clearly instructed, in the
Signals of Alarm from the Sandwich Flag Ship at the Nore. In
particular the sentries, on Craig’s Battery, the Cavalier, and Minster
Bastion.

The Relief and Patrole, in going round, are likewise to have an eye
to the Nore.

aia eepha eB hedmpedns hee nap SR
tiesto ee

561

BALAKLAVA.

CS RE GONE eS HO Ne

In a lecture on the Co-operation of Horse Artillery and Cavalry,
delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution on the 7th of March and
appearing in the April number of the “ Proceedings,” an account—
open in several respects to considerable criticism—is given of the
doings of “C” Troop at the hattle of Balaklava. Of “I” Troop,
commanded by Captain Maude, the only troop which was seriously
engaged or took any important part in the action, not one single
syllable is said. Apparently, the lecturer seems to have overlooked the
fact that, beyond “C” Troop, there was any Horse Artillery in the
field.

It is with the object of rescuing from oblivion the deeds of a most
gallant troop that this recollection of the 25th October, 1854, is here
given.

SIL! MRO (ivory 1D))

The sky, and the rocky summits of the hills which encircle on all
sides the plain of Balaklava were beginning to redden with the first
faint glimmer of day ; the hillsides, and the whole plain at their feet,
lay wrapped in a dense autumn mist; it was half-past six o’clock.
For an hour past the Cavalry Division had been on parade, as usual,
in front of its camp near the village of Kadikoi and was impatiently
awaiting the order to return to its lines and to breakfast, when the
sound of guns amongst the hills around Kamara startled it from its
apathy and aroused speculation as to whether there was to be a
repetition of the exciting skirmish which had taken place a few days
previously. But the increasing fire, and its development in other
directions, the rapid circling to either hand of the vedettes posted
along the crest of the Causeway Heights, with the occasional passage
along it of horsemen at a gallop betokened that there was something
more than usual astir in the morning air. And soon, spurring out of
the darkness, came an aide-de-camp with orders for the Division to
mount and advance. ‘Threading its way through a vineyard which at
first impeded its progress and accompanied by the Heavy Brigade “I”
Troop pressed forward towards a point a little to the right of where
No. 8 Redoubt crowned the Causeway, and breasting the slope at
a gallop suddenly emerged into the clear daylight and sprang swiftly
into action. But the level rays of the rising sun, now well above
the horizon, smiting directly in the faces of the detachments dis-

12. VOL. XXII. 77)

562 A RECOLLECTION OF BALAKLAVA.

turbed and bewildered their vision and it was in vain that they sought
around for some tangible enemy. The repeated flashes, however,
which darted continuously out of the dense mist that hung on the hill-
sides revealed the presence of a long line of guns ranged, seemingly,
between Mount Hasfort and the Fedioukine Heights and whose fire
appeared to be directed principally against No. 8 Redoubt. The
rapid cannonade now opened by the troop against this line of flashes, for
the guns were completely invisible, soon attracted the attention of the
Russian gunners and they began quickly to pick up the range.
Standing out boldly on the skyline the 6-pounders of “1” Troop pre-
sented an admirable target.

The enemy’s fire became hot. The detachment horses were with-
drawn behind the reverse slope of the Causeway (where the Greys
were drawn up) ; but for the limbers there was no shelter from the
merciless rain of shot and shell under which the horses were falling (in
No. 6 gun alone five were struck down); several spokes too were
knocked out of the limber wheels. The men around the guns seemed
to bear charmed lives, for though the gun carriages were scored and
injured by the shell which burst around them and this was especially
the case in the left half troop, yet the round shot passed harmlessly
over or between the sub-divisions, and at this period there were no
casualties of any consequence amongst the gunners though there were
some remarkably narrow escapes.

The troop might have been in action some fifteen or twenty minutes
when Captain Maude, whilst calling attention to the advance of some
grey-coated infantry skirmishers through the brushwood that lay
in front of and below the troop and directing the howitzers to open on
them with shrapnel, had his horse killed by a shell which bursting at
the moment of impact brought that fine soldier to the ground desperately
maimed in the arm and leg besides inflicting a wound in his face.

A tourniquet which he fortunately had in his holsters was placed on
his arm, the artery of which was lacerated ; and four men conveyed
him on a limber blanket to the rear where his wounds were properly
attended to, but for some days his recovery was doubtful.

The command of the troop now devolved on Lieutenant Dashwood
the senior of the two subalterns present. He at once mounted his
horse but it was soon killed by a round shot. Barely was he in the
saddle of a second when that too was shot.

It was at this juncture that Lord Lucan appeared on the scene.
Finding how completely the troop was overpowered by a superior
artillery—superior numerically and in weight of metal—that its front
was now assailed by infantry, that nearly every round in its limbers
had been expended in maintaining this useless and unequal combat,
and seeing dead on the field a third of its magnificent gun horses he
gave orders for it to limber up and withdraw to the lower plain. As
it retired a round shot dashed Gunner McBride of No. 4 Sub-division
dead out of the saddle and slew the two centre horses of No. 4 gun.

When the troop came into action the Heavy Brigade, which had
accompanied it to the foot of the Causeway, detached the Scots Greys

A RECOLLECTION OF BALAKLAVA. 563

as a support and moving away to its right was occupied for a time in
protecting the retreat of the Turks then streaming in disorderly rout
from the Redoubt (No. 1) on Canrobert’s Hill, which had about that
time been captured; and afterwards in checking the advance of a
body of the enemy which threatened to issue from the gorge betwixt
that hill and Kamara; but beginning to feel the fire opened on it by
some Russian batteries which had been pushed forward it received
orders to retire towards its camp. It was at this moment that “I”
Troop and the Greys coming down from the position which they had
been occupying were directed to form a line and cover the retirement.
This movement was executed with great steadiness, the Greys falling
back by alternate squadrons and the guns by half-troops, though the
former had some horses killed or disabled by the fire from Canrobert’s
Hill and its vicinity. As this line passed the village of Kadikoi the
Troop (which was on the right) was met by Captain Shakespear, with
the waggons, who halted it, replenished the exhausted limbers, and
took over the command. He had gone with the waggon horses,
as usual, early in the morning to Balaklava to assist in the trans-
port of siege matériel to the front, but anxious at the continuous
firing he returned to camp and brought the waggons into the field.
The limbers having been filled up and various casualties made good
the guns moved off to rejoin the Cavalry Division, which was found
drawn up not far from No. 4 Redoubt and close under the precipitous
steeps of the plateau of Sevastopol. Soon after, the Heavy Brigade
filed off in the direction of Kadikoi and “I” Troop was left with the
Light Brigade under the command of Lord Cardigan.

The ground in the vicinity of No. 4 Redoubt is very irregular, being
broken up by numerous small hillocks, so that the view from the spot
occupied by the Light Brigade was confined and obstructed; and to
this cause also it is probably due that the Officer in Command of the
Brigade was so completely unaware of certain important events that
were transpiring close at hand. By some means or other it at last
came to his knowledge that only a few hundred yards away a dense
column of the enemy’s cavalry was in motion to his left front and
beginning to pass over the Causeway Heights from the outer to the
inner plain. “I” Troop was immediately pushed forward a short
distance and brought into action, but was not permitted to advance
sufficiently to the front to obtain an uninterrupted view of the enemy.
It however succeeded in putting a few shot into the column as it
pressed forward, so soon to meet defeat at the hands of Scarlett’s
gallant horsemen.

Kinglake alludes incidentally to “I” Troop firing into the column,
but he makes a mistake, not an unpardonable one considering the
rapid passage of events, in his supposition as to the time when this
occurred. He says it was as the column was retreating whereas, as
as we have seen, it was during its advance.

The passage is as follows :—

“The troop of Horse Artillery which accompanied the Light
Brigade had by this time some pieces in battery which
discharged a few shots at the retreating horsemen.” !

1 Kinglake, Vol. IV., p. 202,

564 A RECOLLECTION OF BALAKLAVA.

After the retreat of the Russian Cavalry there was a considerable
lull in the battle, during which the Light Brigade moved into the
Outer Plain and finally formed across it in two lines, “1” Troop being
posted on the right of the leading one. The Heavy Brigade lay to the
right rear of the “ Lights” and had to its right front No. 4 Redoubt.
Whilst awaiting in this position the arrival of infantry from the front
Captain Nolan arrived on the field bringing from Lord Raglan the
order the intention of which has provoked so much discussion. Its
closing words were “Troop of Horse Artillery may accompany.” This
order was not communicated to Captain Shakespear till the Light
Brigade was already in motion and slipping away to the front at ever
increasing speed. hough uninformed as to what he was expected to do,
an inherent spirit of obedience at once prompted execution of the order.
But it becoming momentarily more and more apparent as the troop
trotted steadily forward that before it could render any efficient service
the fire which it was encountering would in all probability entirely
cripple it, the word was given to go about and it retired to a position
not far from the Heavy Brigade. This judicious decision of Captain
Shakespear was rewarded by the subsequent commendation of the
General Commanding Royal Artillery in the Crimea.

It is difficult to form any idea of the precise hour at which the
different events of the day took place. The several breathless scenes
seemed to the participators in them to have occupied a time pro-
portionate to the magnitude of their importance and when the action
came to an end the day seemed verging to its close and yet in reality
it was but a little past noon. From this hour till nightfall the troops
remained in the proximity of the northern end of the Causeway, when
fires having been lighted so as to mislead the enemy as to its
occupation during the night, the whole force retired to the neighbour-
hood of Kadikoi. The troop reached its camp to find that during the
day it had been plundered by the lustful soldiery of Turkey; all
eatables had disappeared but the Moslem spared the fluids forbidden
by Allah. Of drink there was enough and to spare, both for officers
and men, but a hungry day was succeeded by a hungry and restless
night.

TEE

HN Ae IB WY Jel IE IN| “a0

MARCHING AT HOME AND
ABROAD.

LA J) © 1 dio TELCO) BP ek ANIME | 18) 6 1ab IN,

INTRODUCTION.

Nearty all officers have marched during their service and know all
about it, but some there are probably who have passed most of their
service abroad, and others who have served mostly at home; therefore
as one who has had a great experience of marching in both countries,
I have compiled these few notes with the hope that they may prove of
assistance in some cases.

It is perhaps scarcely necessary to insist upon the importance of
having the horses fit to march, before going on the road, hard and full
of muscle, or to say that the harness should be soft and pliable, not
harsh and brittle with beeswax and heelball, that the saddles should be
in good order and not restuffed and pricked up some three or four days
before starting (a certain cause of sore backs) : that the valises should
be well curved over the backs and should not be flat, and that the
arches of the saddles should be well fitted to the withers of the horses.
Still I have seen batteries at the end of a march arrive tied up ina
sheep skin and numnah, the horses covered with galls, and looking like
towel horses ; I have seen cavalry with scores of sore backs, and these
things I imagine must have come about owing to the C.O. having
started unprepared and with fat, soft horses.

If horses start well on a march, and are treated judiciously for the
first few days as regards the rate of travelling and halts they will arrive
at the end in the best of condition, hard and bright, with no loose
flesh but all muscle; provided of course the forage be fairly good and
the weather ditto.

The officers should look over all saddles and harness carefully before
starting, and see that everything fits, that all ties are made up and in
good order, all the carriages in good repair, the horses shod up to date,
and also that the store shoes are complete.

They should lay down distinctly what kit is to be carried in the
valises, etc. on the road, and what is to be packed in bags or left be-
hind. They must insist on the kits being properly packed in the
valises and blankets daily; I once opened a bulging valise on the

W225 WOiio XO,

Officers.

Farrier.

Collar-
makers,
and sadler
sergeants.

566 MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD.

Limerick and Tarbert road when starting on a 43 mile march, and
found 4 lbs. of bacon in the centre, a nice lump on a horse’s backbone !
The officers must also see that kits if left behind are properly packed
and stowed away in a safe store; the engineers may strip the roofs off
your barracks while you are away, without letting you know, or without
asking you to hand over, and the rain may come in and ruin the kits if
left there. It has happened to me, and by some extraordinary reason-
ing I was ordered to make good half the damage, though I had left
sentries and watchmen over the barracks, and had received no orders
to hand over and vacate.

In India the officers should see to the details of carriage for tents
and baggage, mess traps and cooking utensils (this is often neglected).

The Farrier must look well to his shoeing, no long toes on rough and
stony roads, a broken knee on the march is a very bad case. He must
fit and pack his store shoes, no time on the march for much fitting,
he should fill his field companion with dressings and physic, and also
the regimental or battery chests. ‘The government supply is but a
poor one and none too liberal, so he had better ask the C.O. to buy a
few simple things, such as carbonate of ammonia, ginger, iodoform,
nitric, ether, laudanum, camphorated carbolic oil, epsom salts, and
some extra bandages and medicated lint. He must see to his needles
and suture wires, weights and scales, and thermometer. He should
also make up a few balls, two drachms carbonate ammonia, three
drachms ginger and put them in a tin box, and mix a bottle of simple
dressing for each shoeing-smith’s satchel. Also he had better have
two or three hinged shoes ready for the shoeing-smiths to tack on the
road if necessary.

The Collar-Maker should make up a few small pads with ties, and a
set or two of skeleton harness in case of galls. Links and traces will
sometimes rub from horses pulling unevenly; a few little shields
of leather, and a few bits of sheep skin with ties should be made up so
as to be able to pop them on quickly on the road ; he should make up
a dozen or so ‘‘dealers” or “ Yorkshire boots ;’’ horses will brush at
times however well shod, and the soft cloth boot is far superior to
the nasty hard leather things with straps that Collar-Makers delight in
making.

What is wanted is merely a square or rectagonal piece of old horse
clothing, with a tie in the centre to fasten round the leg, the top half
folded down over the tie.

The Sergeant-Major should see a box packed up with all writing
materials and forms that he is likely to require on the road, the Pay-
Sergeant and the Quarter-Master-Sergeant, if the latter is marching,
should do the same. In England the Q.-M.-S. will not be on the road,
but in India he marches with the regiment or battery, or rather a day
ahead carrying his office with him.

Marcuine at Hous.

Orders are sure to be received with the route some days before the
start, and it is well for the C.O. to ask the firm with whom the regi-
ment or battery bank to write to their agents at the different towns

MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD. 567

along the road to honour drafts. The Captain, Q.-M.-S. and some few
old married men will be left behind to close the barracks, send off the
heavy baggage and kits, and to hand over to the Barrack Department;
they will then, if the regiment or battery is making a permanent move,
proceed by train to their destination ; but if the vacation of barracks
is only temporary, a senior N.-C.O. and one or two trustworthy men,
such as the storeman, will be left to take care of the barracks and
stores during their absence.

The billeting party, which for a battery or squadron consists generally Billeting
of two N.-C.O’s. and two privates to look after their horses, will pre- P2"v-
cede the battery or squadron by oneday. The N.-C.O’s. (and especially
the senior) should be very intelligent, reliable men, with tact and good
manners ; for the comfort of the men depends a great deal on these
doing their work in a satisfactory manner. ‘The route or a copy of it
will be in their charge, and on arriving at the town or village where
the halt is to be made for the day, they should proceed and report their
arrival to the Superintendent of Police showing the route; he will then
issue the billets for themselves and their horses for that night, and later
will give them in detail the billets for the regiment or battery. They
should go round with a policeman and visit all billets and apportion
them off, taking care as much as possible to keep the different units
together.

The parade ground or gun-park is generally in the market place, and
they should rent a room close by for a guard-room. ‘The Sergeant-
Major, Farrier, senior Trumpeter, and Pay-Sergeant should be billeted
close to head-quarters.

The billeting party should then draw up lists of the different houses,
with the names of the streets where the billets are situated, for the use
of the C.O., the Pay-Sergeant, the Sergeant-Major, and also for the
subalterns and sergeants for their special commands.

It is advisable also for the senior N.-C.O. to draw a rough sketch of
the village or small town, filling in the names of the streets, head-
quarters, post office, station, and so on for the convenience of the C.O.
This of course is impracticable in large towns. (Wehada German bom-
bardier in “C” Troop in 1879 who had served in the Prussian army ;
he spoke broken English but his maps were wonderful. This man was
promoted from “C” to “A” Troop in 1880 and deserted very soon after,
he had a clean defaulter sheet, and had risen to Sergeant in about three
years.)

The billeting party meet the regiment or battery when it arrives
just outside the town and shows the C.O. the way to the parade ground
or gun-park, where they will distribute the lists and billets and give
any directions they can to guide the men. This being done the party
should get ready to go on to the next halt on receipt of orders from
the C.O.; it saves a deal of work to send the billeting party on by rail
if possible; it gives them more time and they get through their work
easier ; I invariably did so myself, and it costs but little.

Tt is a good plan to pay the men daily at the mid-day halt, one day, Pay
say, one shilling, the next day eighteenpence, thus avoiding very “partment
small change. My own plan was as follows: this daily pay was put

Marching

Halts,

568 MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD.

by the Pay-Sergeant and myself overnight into six little bags, two of
which I gave at breakfast the next morning to each subaltern, I kept
a double set of bags and the empty ones were returned to me on my
issuing the full ones; the bags were marked with the sub-division
numbers.

I carried as a rule money enough for one day or two, but it depended
of course on our vicinity to a bank. In some places there might be no
hank at all. :

I gave the Pay-Sergeant daily the billeting money, and calculated
out the pay, and entered it both in his pay-book and in my pocket-
book ; the Pay-Sergeant should accompany the C.O. round billets in
the evening, and pay all up in the presence of the different sectional
officers, taking receipts, which he should file—I had a book for him.
Never but once, in my experience of several long marches, have I had
a demand for repayment from an innkeeper, for the reason perhaps
that an officer was always present to witness the payments. I also
recommend that a copy of all payments be kept by the C.O. personally.
Pay-books may get lost, therefore a duplicate is useful; I had at one
time a Pay-Sergeant who was a capital fellow but inclined at times to
go on the spree; he did so on the march once, and lost his books, and
if I had not had a copy I should have been in a fix.

About 8.15 or 8.30 a.m. is the best time to get away on the road, it
is not easily managed earlier, for the hotels and public-houses are not
open much before 6.30 or 7 a.m., neither is it good for man or beast to
make too early a start, unless the weather is abnormally hot. I re-
member once trying to start out of Bath at 6.30 a.m. to catch the tide
at Avon mouth and embark on that terrible old tub the “ Assistance ”’
for Ireland, half the men could not get into the stables, and half could
not get out of the inns before 5.30 a.m. and so we were nearly an hour
late in getting off. Many C.O.’s have a good plan of giving a cup of
coffee and a biscuit at parade before falling in; the plan I recommend
is to have the camp kettles packed overnight with 4 oz. of cheese and
+ lb. of bread a man (in a regiment this can be put in the squadron
carts); at the half-way halt, pay, water the horses, and let the men
lunch, the halt should be made near a public-house and near water, to
enable the men to get a glass of beer or lemonade, and the horses
to be watered if necessary. From an experience of a long march, I
found that after the first ten days very few men drank wayside inn
beer, because 1t was so bad and so dear ; my reason for recommending
the half-way meal is, that young soldiers especially, on arriving in
billets at say 1.30 or 2 p.m. hot, dusty, and very empty, often drink
straight away the two pints of beer allowed them before eating any-
thing, this amount on an empty stomach makes them unfit for work
and the horses suffer. If, on the contrary, the men arrive having had
a good lunch of bread and cheese, they do not want the beer at once,
and even if they take it, it has no bad effect ; they are ready to get to
work on their horses and when they have done them up, they have
their dinners, and enjoy them, with a pipe after as they finish their
work.

About fifteen minutes or so after marching off from the place of

MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD. 569

parade, or when clear of the town, a halt should be made to tighten
up girths, and look round; horses invariably empty themselves at first
when coming out of stables; also when their backs are cold, will not
allow themselves to be properly girthed; again, some of the men may
have been late and hurried, and their kits and gear a bit askew in
consequence ; but remember on girthing up not to over girth, a tight
girth is as bad for a horse or a deal worse than a loose one; I have
seen horses swell up terribly from overtight girthing, and it takes
days sometimes for the swelling to go down.

A cavalry regiment or battery R.H.A. should travel at the rate of 5 Pace.
miles an hour including halts; a field battery about 4milesan hour. ‘To
manage this you will have to shove along, and not waste much time ;
a twenty minutes halt to water and lunch; and a five minutes halt
every hour is all that is wanted on an ordinary march. For the first
two days the pace should be a bit slow, about 4 miles an hour, the
horses must be accustomed gradually to the work, on a long march
about half way before the mid-day halt, I recommend a long trot of 3
to 5 miles at a stretch, and a little longer halt, say half-an-hour to 35
minutes, every advantage should be taken of the road and the state
that it is in. ‘To avoid dust, and crowding and checking in rear,
sections and squadrons should march independently with an interval
of two or three hundred yards, nothing distresses horses more than an
uneven pace, which is hard to avoid when in rear of a long column.

When guns are halted for watering or feeding for any length of Watering.
time, put on the drag-shoes, it prevents accidents. I once knew of a
case where three teams got away, and some horses were badly injured ;
this was not in my own battery. Do not let the horses drink too
much, a few goes down, and a wash out of the nostrils is all they
should get.

If the march be over 20 miles I recommend a half feed being carried Feeding.
and given on the road, but if under that distance this is not necessary ;
far better for the horses to eat it in the stables where there is less
waste.

On arriving at the place appointed for parade or gun-park, usually Billets.
the market place, the Nos. 1 or sergeants should distribute the billet
papers to the men, and direct them as far as possible to where they
have to go; the men when broken off will file away at a walk. The
guard should mount at once, a guard-room having been rented close
to the gun-park or parade. In a battery, the Wheeler should with the
limber-gunners see that the guns and carriages are all lined and
dressed immediately, you cannot be too particular about this being
well done, the limber-gunners should take all kits off, and file off to
their billets, returning after dinner to wash the guns. The Wheeler
will be in charge of the gun-park, and should look to all wheels and
fittings daily. The time of arrival is generally between 12 and 2 p.m., the
officers having given orders to the sergeants or Nos. 1 where, and at
what time to meet them, will go to the hotel where they are billeted,
and the Sergeant-Major and Pay-Sergeant having received orders as to
what time the C.O. will go round billets, can do the same. The officers
should start round their billets about two hours or so after marching

Backs.

Police.
Cells.

Defaulters.

Landlords.

570 MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD.

in, and see that all is correct, Shoeing-Smiths, Collar-Makers and
Saddlers should go round their sections during the afternoon, to do
anything that is required of them, and the former will report all
casualties to the Farrier. At about 4 o’clock the C.O. will go round
billets with the officers, the Sergeant-Major, Farrier and senior Collar-
Maker, in small towns it is easy to visit all, and I always made a point
of doing so myself, but in very large towns, and especially in the
suburbs of London, the billets are so scattered that to miss some of the
extreme outlying ones might be unavoidable. All casualties should be
pointed out to the C.O., also anything wrong as to stabling or the
accommodation of either horses or men, and he will then adjust it.

I generally made a point of seeing the landlord and of having a chat
with him, sometimes there might be a little trouble to be smoothed
over, but in most cases this was easily done, I generally found all very
willing to please, and in parts of the country where troops rarely go,
they were delighted to have them and féte them. The Sergt.-Major
should warn the hour for parade, and arrange any changes in horses
as he goes round and the Pay-Sergeant should pay the billets. If the
Farrier notices any horse at all off, he should administer a ball as laid
down, and see that all small chafes and sores are dressed.

The sectional officers or subalterns should instruct the men, when the
saddles are removed, to wisp the backs well over, or beat them with the
palms of the hands for five minutes, and then quickly dry them to pro-
mote circulation and prevent lumpsrising ; if the horses can be racked
up so as not to roll, it is better to leave the saddles on till after the men
have had dinners, and groom the rest of the body first; the N.C.O.’s
should examine and feel every back carefully daily, reporting any ten-
derness at once to the officer in charge; swellings often occur from
overtight girthing, especially at the mid-day halt when watered and fed.
An oyvertight girth is a very painful thing to a horse.

I recommend before marching that a dealer’s halter be purchased for
each horse (I carried them rolled and folded on the near side), they
save a deal of cleaning of head-collars and head-ropes, and the men will
be much pleased. The Sergeants should report to the Sergt.-Major
again at roll-call at head-quarters.

In case of any disturbance (very rare), or if there be any men or
prisoners to be confined, the police will take charge of them, and look
after them carefully. I remember in 1880 an old gunner in “C”
Troop at Blandford, who had slipped his head-collar, and was creating
a disturbance, and whom we had to put in police-cells with a cut head.
Poor Cumming, afterwards surgeon in the Guards, since dead, and (the
orderly officer) myself went to see him, popped a couple of stitches in
his head, gave him a drink (an emetic), and left him; in the morning
the kindly constable’s wife told me that the poor man felt so sick that
he could not eat a couple of new laid eggs she had given him for break-
fast. A pair of handcuffs or two should be carried on the road.

Billeting is not too popular among landlords, especially in much fre-
quented routes, such for instance as Woolwich to Okehampton, they
get too much of it and the pay is not good, but in places where few
troops pass through, the landlords are most kind, and- the men and,

MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD. 571

horses fare sumptuously. Of course a great deal depends on the be-
haviour of all ranks, and on the tact of the officers and N.C.O.’s.
When I marched as a C.O. at home, I gave the men before starting
a little lecture about behaviour in billets, and told them that a
civil tongue and aready manner, especially with the ladies, often meant
a breakfast in the morning; they evidently took the hint, for I had not
one complaint in six weeks, nothing but praise of them from the land-
ladies, and the men were nearly all of them under three years service.
The young officers should also try and have a chat with the landlady
or landlord at every house, it does good, not only to your men but to
those who follow after ; I have marched in the wake of corps that have
made themselves liked by their courteous behaviour, and also in the rear
of others that have got themselves disliked by their own rough
manners.

As regards the officers own billets, officers are apt to forget that 2s. for
a bed and a private sitting-room ig not what the innkeeper is accus-
tomed to get, and that in busy times they may be a trouble and a loss;
I have followed a battery where the officers grumbled apparently at
every inn at 6s. a head for dinner and drank no wine (possibly they
may have been teetotalers). I think myself one should do something
for the house, and for the credit of ,the army, and in all the batteries I
have served with, and marched with, we always had a bottle, and if
good a couple of the best port in the house, and I have unearthed
some rare good stuff too in out-of-the-way inns, especially in hunting
counties.

Sometimes it was almost impossible to get a private sitting-room,
and we have gone without to do the landlord a turn, and have been
treated none the worse in consequence. With but one or two excep-
tions, | have invariably been well done and the officers have always
parted the best of friends with the landlord and staff. As a subaltern
I have a vivid recollection of some old British brandy in the com-
mercial room, at I think the Bear Hotel at Bath, and some whisky at
Roscrea that took a deal of beating, though I had a bad head the next
day from either too much or too little of it.

Both officers and men should be made to dress as smartly as possible
on the march, and when about the streets, it does a deal of good
to the army, also there are lots of old soldiers, both officers and privates,
in all country towns who are on the look-out, and it soon gets about
as to whether the soldiers be a smart or a dirty lot. I regret to say I
have met batteries of R.A. and have heard of a battery of R.H.A. (it
must have been a very bad one) of which the officers marched in
serges. I also insisted myself on all officers dressing for dinner at the
inns, just as they would do at mess.

As doctors do not now accompany troops on the march, a medical
practitioner can be called in if required, the man if necessary will be
sent to the nearest military hospital by rail ; if too bad to move, to the
civil hospital; the same in the case of horses; it should be borne in
mind by all ranks that it takes but a very few sick horses to disable a
battery, and thus every care should be taken to prevent casualties with
batteries not on full establishment.

Hotels.

Dress.

Sick,

With dis-
mounted
party.

Supplies.

Tents.

572 MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD.

A small dismounted party is allowed by rail daily some 12 to 20
men. ‘The new guard, officers’ servants and grooms should go on with
the officers’ baggage, where there is no railway they must of course
ride or march.

In conclusion, as an instance of a successful march, I may refer to
that of 66th Field Battery from Christchurch to Okehampton, 3 weeks
in camp, back to Christchurch, and on the next week to Newcastle-on-
Tyne, roughly 680 miles ; all young soldiers and three 2nd Lieutenants,
no horse was left out, only two men were sent sick, one to Sheffield,
and one detained at York; there were no complaints from the police
or landlords, not one regimental entry, and not one case of drunken-
ness on the way, although at some of the places billeted at, a battery
had not been seen for 20 years, and in some of the mining towns on
Saturdays very nearly the only men sober in the public-houses were
these young soldiers. What spoke also well for the subalterns, the
Sergeant-Major, and the Nos. 1, was that the battery never once
moved off parade more than 5 minutes after the time appointed to
start, and nine days out of ten was ready to move off when the clock
struck the hour.

Marcuine in Iwnpia.

Whereas in England, the men billet and are fed, the baggage going
on by rail, in India on the contrary, the men are in tents, and all
supplies, light baggage, cooks, servants, etc. accompany them on the
road ; the preparations for a march in the latter country are thus more
extensive, the details require thinking out before starting, tents
have to be drawn, carriage requisitioned for, and notices sent to the civil
authorities in the districts that your route takes you through, so as
to ensure supplies being collected at the different camping grounds ;
these grounds are all laid down in the route book; care must especially
be taken to give due warning to the Durbar officials, when passing
through native states, and a probable estimate for all the different
supplies should be sent to them. A commissariat agent is sent with
the regiment or battery to procure and arrange for all supplies, and to
pay for all Government issues, he cannot always though get quite what
is wanted, and it sometimes happens, especially in Native States, that
the proper supplies are not forthcoming unless early and repeated
warnings have been written on through the proper channels; this
agent should report daily to the C.O. at each camp, that everything
has been settled up for by him, and that he has the receipts, the
head man of the village being present also so that the C.O. can per-
sonally satisfy himself that such is the case.

The best tents for the march are the I.P. General Service 160 lbs.
single fly tents, to hold about 10 to 12 men; the H.P. takes too long
to pitch, and is too heavy to pack and carry, though when once pitched
it is more roomy, and being a double fly tent is much cooler, and
decidedly better for a standing camp; in the Madras and Bombay
Presidencies, the sun is hotter in the marching season and H.P. tents
are more used, still for marching and camps of exercise the small
handy tents are preferable in every way, for in case of rain it is im-

a is

MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD. 573

possible at times to move with H.P. tents, as they become from the
moisture too heavy to carry.

The transport for troops varies much in different parts of the country Transport.
and in different stations. At large stations you may get all mule carts,
pack-mules, or camels or elephants ; it depends much on the district ;
at smaller stations where there is no commissariat depdt, the transport
will consist principally of country carts and camels hired for the march
only. In all cases some of the transport will probably be hired carts.
Mule carts and pack-mules are the best of all transport, they can if
well looked after travel almost as fast as the troops, they are easy to
load and unload, mules are also very hardy. Camels are slow, they
cannot travel in wet and are disagreeable brutes, and none too nice or
easy to load. Hiephants are also lumbersome, delicate and slow, and
country carts, though easy to pack and requiring but little looking
after, cannot travel at more than 2} miles an hour; most regiments
and batteries up country keep up a certain mule cart transport of their
own, enough for line gear and kit at any rate, if not for the tents.
An indent must be made out for the authorised transport, and sent
three weeks before the march to the Chief Commissariat Officer to
check, as well as that for any private carts required (unless the C.O.
prefers to get his private carts direct through the collector and civil
authorities). Half the rate is generally paid in advance for private
carriage, and. when carts are once taken over, strict watch must be
kept over the cart men, or they may bolt, for many are impressed and
don’t care for the job ; a number of private carts are always wanted
for officers, canteen stores, sergeants’ mess, coffee shop, master-tailor,
syces, native followers, etc., etc.

The transport will be collected by the commissariat authorities, and
handed over the day before the regiment or battery moves; the trans-
port officer (in a battery the captain) should take it over, and with the
Q.-M.-S. detail it all to the different units, giving the subalterns and
sergeants an exact list of the transport apportioned to their commands,
with instructions as to how everything is to be carried. A senior
N.-C.O. should look after all commissariat transport, the regimental
transport of a battery has an N.-C.O. already in charge, and that of a
regiment an officer. A guard should be detailed daily, in a battery of
from 5 to 6 men, to accompany the baggage on the road.

The best and quickest means of transport, such as mule carts and
pack-mules (if the transport supplied is mixed, as is generally the
case), should be taken for the line gear, the men’s kits, cook’s traps,
and things that are first required on arrival. When marching with
other corps it 1s wise to have a distinctive mark or colour for your
own regiment’s or battery’s baggage, some regiments have small flags
on the carts etc., but coloured puggaries for the native drivers answer
better as they do not so easily get lost, and they have the additional
charm of pleasing the natives hugely, especially if made of a good
striking colour. The tent bags should all be labelled with the number
of the section or sub-division, painted on large leather labels securely

sewn on; and the mule carts or camels told off every day to do the
same work and in the same place.

The
Q.-M.-S.’s
camp colour
party.

The hour of

starting.

574: MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD.

The Government and private transport, with the exception of officers’
private carts, etc. should be parked in a place told off daily, and the
feeding and watering of the animals carefully seen to; the Farrier
going round and inspecting all the animals at each camping ground.

The Q.-M.-S. with the camp colour party, and the grain grinding
machines should proceed the afternoon before to the next halt, to lay
out the camp, draw supplies and get everything ready.

In a regiment the Q.-M. of course may be in charge of the
advance party. ‘The camp grounds and horse lines being marked out
with thin cords and large and small flags (regimental colours). He
should see to the rations (mens and horses), get the grass in, or procure
what he can in lieu of it if very bad; he should make arrangements for
watering, damming up a nullah, hiring bullocks to fill a trough, if
there be one, or what not (a few canvas drinking troughs should be
carried by each squadron or battery, they are most useful), he should
see the cooking places marked out; the cooks go on ahead every
afternoon under the cook orderlies, so as to be in time to prepare
breakfasts. It is well to give the cooks the quickest and best carts of
the transport and every advantage you can, for much depends on them.
In my battery I have a spring cart into which I put a horse to carry
the cook orderly and cooking gear, but a mule cart is as good or
better.

The Q.-M.-S. should arrange about water for drinking, and set up
filters which he carries on with him, and the conservancy men under
him will see to the digging and marking out of the latrines, these
should be marked ont by flags, a portion of the regimental conservancy
establishment marches with the advance party.

He should send for letters if there be a post-office and in fact make
all arrangements possible. The regiment or battery will probably
march in about 11.30 a.m. if the roads be good, or perhaps a little
before; the breakfasts should be ready about 2 of an hour after that
time; the Q.-M.-S. however will get instructions daily from the C.O.
at about what time to expect him.

The time to start is about 8 a.m., not before 7.80 at earliest,
unless the march is known to be a very long and tedious one, or there
are more troops on the road; it is bad for both men and horses to
start earlier, neither is anything gained by so doing. When I first
marched in India in 1875, in the Bombay Presidency, there was an
insane habit of starting at 4.30 and 5 a.m. in fact in the middle of the
night, I never knew why, perhaps the doctors ordered it; I believe in
those days regiments always paraded about that hour; now, thanks to
Sir George Greaves they know better; of course in those parts, or in
Madras, if marching very late in the season, you might perhaps start at
6.30, though personally I am against starting before 7.30 unless under
special circumstances.

Any man, whether white or black, should be punished who hammers
a tent peg, or makes a noise before reveille sounds, unless this is done
you will have the men and syces hammering up pegs, and harnessing
up horses before 5 a.m. and there willbe no rest ; on no account either
should a horse be stripped, or a saddle put on, before boot and saddle
sounds, half-an-hour before the time to march off ; fifteen minutes after

MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD. S775)

reveille, feed should sound, the tents should then be struck by bugle-
call, and packed; an hour gives ample time to do all. The camp
ground should be cleaned up, and straw and rubbish burnt by the rear-
guard, who should see this carried out before moving off.

The coffee shop should go on half-way over night, so that the men
can obtain a cup of hot coffee and biscuits or cake at the halt. The
plan I recommend is to halt and look round, if necessary water and
feed (but this only on long marches), and then for each sergeant or
No. ] to send a N.-C.O. and a man to draw coffee and cake, etc. for
every man in his section or sub-division ; the coffee and cake is all put
out ready in cans and baskets, with three or four pannikins per sub-
division by the man in charge of the coffee shop, he having the night
before received intimation of the number per sub-division; this saves
the men leaving their horses and avoids crowding or fuss, a man will
at the same time go round the battery with extras and cigars; the
mess can arrange for the officers’ coffee or tea, etc. to be at the same
place. I pay the coffee shop, and pass it through the men’s accounts
at the end of the month. The coffee shop then packs up and moves
on quickly to set up in camp, a portion haying already gone on ahead.
Before starting on the road, the officer in charge of the coffee-shop
should make arrangements for a good stock of tobacco, cigars, cheese,
bacon, soda water, lemonade, etc., etc. to carry on the road, and also
on a long march, that consignments meet the battery at places where
the camping ground is near to a railway station ; a well organised and
furnished coffee shop is a great boon on the march.

The canteen will make similar arrangements for beer, this can
generally be done, as now the trunk roads are always meeting the lines
of railways. Rum being easier to carry than beer, a certain amount of
it can be taken if there is any possibility of being a long time distant
from the rail.

On arriving at the camping ground, the lines and gun-park will be
found: already marked out by the Q.-M.-S., also the places for
tents, the regiment or battery then draws up on the ground allotted
for parade or gun-park, and proceeds to water and picket ; a battery
draws up its guns in line, the wagons covering them (small flags
having been placed to mark where the points of the shafts should be
for the guidance of the drivers), unhooks, and while the drivers and
horse-holders file to water, the duty numbers lay down the picket
ropes, lines of white cord haying been pegged out for them to follow,
the sergeants taking care to dress all the picket posts and heel pegs
correctly. I carry a spare set of strong iron posts in my battery also
serviceable heel pegs, and a few iron mallets, as the Government issue
knock up in a day or two. The horses then file on the lines, and are
tied up by their head-ropes until the line gear arrives, which it should
do in from 20 to 80 minutes, that is if conveyed on mule carts; after
filing on the lines a little grass should be given at once to each horse
to keep him quiet until the line gear comes in; the men then roughly
groom the horses over, and take off kits, in about fifteen minutes the
order “ off saddles”? should be given, and the horses’ backs sharply
wisped, or beaten with the palms of the hands and well dried to pro-
mote circulation, and to prevent heat lumps rising, the blankets should

Coffee shop

Canteen.

Camp.

Feeding.

Veterinary
Surgeon-
Farrier.

Wheeler,
saddler
and collar-
maker.

The mess,

576 MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD.

then be folded over the loins if hot, if cold the horses should be
blanketed up, and the men turned out for breakfast, having previously
given the horses their feeds, these will all be mixed and prepared, as the
line orderly and his party will have come on overnight; the grass and
grain crushers, etc. will be in the centre of the lines at the end. Allow
an hour for breakfasts and then turn into stables, if the tents are in
pat them up first, this should be done by the Orderly Officer, as laid
down in regulations. Dinners will probably be ready about 3 or 3.30
p-m., according to the hour the regiment or battery marched in.
Stables and water between 4 and 5 p.m., then feed, give the last feed
about 8 p.m. and with it a good proportion of the day’s grass, it keeps
the horses quiet at night. The Q.-M.-S. and party should move
off about 2.30 p.m. and the cooks about 4.30 p.m., one or two of the
latter being left to serve up teas.

Gram is generally easily obtainable and good, but bran may be hard
to procure. On the Madras side you may have to take cooltic, which
must be boiled, boosa or chaff can be often obtained, and serves instead of
bran ; grass is very often bad and very hard to get, in which case kirby
or chirrie, the stalks of jowari, and bajori, or sugar-cane are fairly good
substitutes. There are several grains that can be used in emergencies,
barley, Indian corn, mote, barjree, urreed, etc., these can often be ob-
tained in the villages. If half a feed be taken on the road, it is deducted
from the morning feed; when marching off trunk roads and on cross
country tracks it is always wise to carry a half feed; I have personally
had experience of some very rough roads in Khandeish and Rajputana,
and once or twice spent a day or more crossing a river.

A Veterinary Surgeon marches with a regiment but never with a
single battery, the Farrier in his absence should take his place as far as
possible, and the C.O. should see the Veterinary—history sheets
are kept up to date, very sick horses can be sent in by rail (if near
a railway station) to some military hospital. The Farrier should
carry a good supply of ready mixed drinks, and also the ordinary medi-
cines to make up on the road, a good stock of bandages, carbonate
ammonia, ginger, vasiline, and simple dressing, antiseptics, etc. He
must arrange to carry some charcoal for the field forge, and a certain
amount of iron for shoeing purposes, his forge will be set up daily in
the place told off for it, if possible under a tope of trees, where he can
carry on his work protected from the sun ; as there is always Sunday’s
halt, and one daya fortnight besides, he has ample time to keep the
shoeing up to date ; charcoal and iron can nearly always be purchased
in the larger native bazaars on the road.

The Saddlers, Collar-Makers and Wheelers and other artificers will
have a tent pitched for a shop, the former will probably have a good
bit to do, and must draw their supplies from the store wagon as
required. The Wheeler has charge of the gun-park in a battery, and
should dress all wagons at once on arriving in camp, he should examine
every wheel throughout daily, and see that they are cleaned and
properly greased.

The officers’ mess should have two sets of tents, one to go on ahead
every night, and the other to stay till after breakfast next morning,
and then to follow on, for the same reason also nearly a double supply

MARCHING AT HOME AND ABROAD. Ad

of servants is required, it is also essential to have a first-rate cook, or
better still two for the march.

A good supply of stores, wines, etc. must be laid in and carried on
carts, arrangements must also be made to pick up fresh supplies at
railway stations on the road, also with the postal authorities to send on
letters and papers; a list of post towns, with dates of arrival at cach,
should be furnished to the postmaster before leaving for his guidance.

A native banker usually accompanies regiments and batteries on the Money.
road, and he carries money which should travel under guard ; in case
of his not accompanying them, the money will be carried regimentally
also under a guard, the money being placed every night in the guard
tent under a double sentry. A native banker however saves a great
deal of trouble.

A good supply of oil must be carried on the road, though kerrosine Lights.
oil is obtainable in nearly all bazaars. Hach tent should be supplied
for the march with a strong hurricane lamp, these lamps should be filled
and trimmed daily by one man detailed by the Q.-M.-S. for the job, he
is generally the same man who superintends the filters and conservancy.
In a standing camp large lamps placed at intervals of 20 yards up
each side of the camp, outside the tents, and with the number of the
regiment or battery painted on the glass, are very useful.

Chowkidars or watchmen should be obtained nightly, the head man Chowkidars
of the village is obliged to supply them free of cost, it is a form of
blackmail, but still if chowkidars are not employed compensation inevent
of robberies will not be obtained. This holds good in native states
especially, but there they may have to be paid for.

In rough countries where marching is often done on cross country Guides.
tracks, it may be necessary to have a guide, he should also be obtained
from the head man of the village.

Marching in India may appear on paper to bea more tiring and tedious
business than marching at home, but after the first few days when the
men have learned to picket, pitch tents and the routine, and the trans-
port and all ranks know their places, the work is really less for both
officers and men than it is ona march in Hngland; camp life is good
for all ranks, and enjoyed by all for a period, if the weather be fine,
there are no inducements to drink, and the sport and shooting obtained
on the road give great amusement to everyone, the men also learn more
real soldiering during a month in camp than they do during 6 months
in cantonments. The people who have a rough time, and are hard
worked are the syces and followers, they are however as arule a cheery
and hard working lot; their wages being very small, every considera-
tion should be shown them, such as giving them (out of the funds) a
cart or two for their traps and kits, and a few spare tents if there be
any to shelter them in case of wet weather. In concluding I must
apologise for having spun out this paper to a greater length than I
had originally intended, but many small details struck me in writing,
all which may be useful as a guide to some. I have laid down no new
theories, the whole is an old story, but as I constantly meet men coming
out as Majors and Captains to India, who have never served in it
before, any small hints will be acceptable to them I feel sure.

SEER, Geleiey: gts

& Le haan. TH 3

te E Ley
DES oa Bre ey Hit
mae

fo lis ao ra ah
at ‘Sak Let oR 1a tt
|e 7.
gash fool ar waa bb ai

579

A LIST OF THE ARTILLERY COMPANY
IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE
UNION, AND THEIR PAY.

CaHVAS KK TsHeS = DrAsE EONS
Editor of English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714,

Tue Military Hstablishment for Scotland included, for many years prior
to the Union, a permanent Company of Artillery whose headquarters
were at Edinburgh. This Company was sometimes designated a
“Train” but the latter appellation, which is to be met with occasionally
in the Warrant Books for Scotland, may seem somewhat hyperbolical
as the Company consisted of a mere handful of men, including officers,
as appears from the following Establishment List.

CNOE EF fs 3
“Captain of the Company at 8s. perdiem... ... 146 0 O
Chief Engineer at 7s. perdiom ... ... ... 127 15 0
Lieutenant and Bombardier at 5s. per diem ... St)
Commissary at 5s. perdiem ... ... 1... 91 5 0
Corporal at 1s. 8d. per diem ... ... 0... 22 16 38
Menn Gunners! each Is. a day) 9. 2 9... ,.. —182)10) 0
Six Practitioners each 6d.aday ... ... ... 54 15 0
£716 06 3

“ Proposed to be added :—
“Six Bombardiers each 2s. perdiem... ... ... 219 0 O
Two Minors each 1s. 6d. a day SOAR eee 5415 0
One Petardeer at 2s.aday ... ... ... 1. 86 10 0

£1,026 11 3”

The names of the officers are omitted in above List but we get at
them in the Warrant Books for Scotland where their several commis-
sions duly appear. In 1707 the names of the Artillery officers were :

John Slezer, Captain.

Theodore Dury, Chief Engineer.
David Livingstone, Lieutenant.
Colin Ramsey, Commissary.

l State Papers, Scotland, 1707, Bundle 3, No. 1.
12, VOL, XXII,

580 ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION.

Before saying anything about the Captain of the Artillery Company
it is necessary to mention that the superior officers of the Artillery
Company had their commissions from the King, or Queen, direct and
not from the Master-General of the Ordnance. And the inferior officers
of the said Company appear to have been generally appointed by the
Commander-in-Chiet in Scotland as will be shown presently.: As regards
their pay the Artillery Company were paid by the Lords of the Treasury
in Scotland who seem to have been worse paymasters than the
Honourable, though impecunious, Board of Ordnance in England.

Captain John Slezer is believed to have been a Dutchman but of his
parentage and early career nothing isknown. Nor has the date of his
coming to Scotland been yet ascertained. In his account of himself as
given in his Petition, or Case as it was then termed, setting forth the
unjust. treatment he had received at the hands of the Government, he
speaks of himself as “a foreigner who had been honoured by the
patronage of Charles II. and the Duke of York.” It is certain that
Slezer was Captain of the Scots Artillery Company for at least a quarter
of a century and that he was a remarkable man who made himself a
name in the world but whose fame, unfortunately for himself, was
posthumous. ‘That he was a zealous artillerist is abundantly proved
but, curious to say, it was not as a soldier that he won distinction but
as an engraver on copper and as atopographer. The labour of his life
was his Theatrum Scotie showing the “ancient and present state of
Scotland” with folio engravings of palaces, castles, noblémen’s seats,
&c., with descriptive letter-press. ‘I'his valuable and interesting work,
which has gone through several editions, bears witness to Slezer’s skill
as an engraver, ‘The latest edition! contains a preface by the Rev. John
Jamieson, D.D., giving a biographical. sketch of Slezer’s career which
is taken. almost entirely from “the stated Case of Captain John
Slezer,” printed in 1708, and a copy of which is given in the first
edition of Theatruwm Scotiz now preserved in the Advocates’ Library,
Edinburgh. Dr. Jamieson’s admirable review of Slezer’s life only
commences-in-1690 before which date this writer owns there are no
landmarks to be found bearing on the subject in question. But since
the learned Doctor wrote the above biographical sketch several of
Slezer’s letters on military matters have been unearthed and printed
by the Historical MSS. Commission.?. These letters.carry us back
to the year 1681. when Charles II. thought fit: to: give.a fresh
impetus-to-Artillery matters in Scotland by augmenting the “Train ”
in that kingdom. With this end in view the Hon. John Drummond,
Master-General of the Ordnance in Scotland, acting as the King’s
mouth-piece, issued ‘Instructions for J. Schlezar, Lieutenant. of
Artillery ” to the following effect : pee

_ His Majesty having appointed some gunners to.‘be levied for the
attendance of his Train in Scotland “and there being none sufficiently
qualified to be found in this kingdom at present”? Mr. Schlezar was

1 Theatrum Scotia, London, 1874, folio.

_? MSS.of Chas. Stirling Home Drummond Moray, Exq.—Historical USS. Commission, Report
X., Part I., pp. 182-136

ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION. 581

directed with the first convenience to go by sea to Holland and look
out for “attenders following ” :—

“One Master-Gunner and Fireworker at 3s. per diem for twelve
months at 28 days in the month.

“Two as near the same pitch of skill as he could obtain at 2s. per
diem.

“Wour well-qualified gunners at 1s. 6d. per diem who must all
have been actively employed in the Service of the States
General, of France, Spain, or Germany the time of the late
wars.”

He was also directed to order :—
“Two 12-prs. and four 3-prs. according to the models sent.”

Mr. Drummond was to send Slezer “ by first occasion” certain old
brass ordnance which he was to sell “at the best advantage for His
Majesty’s Service,” and having paid for the new guns from proceeds
of sale “was to lay out the superplus as he should be thereafter
directed.” Slezer was also directed “to keep Mr Drummond informed
of his progress and return before the 20th of May next.” The
latter stipulation was a physical impossibility considering what Slezer
was expected to perform.

The above instructions were dated “ Hdinburgh Castle, 30 March,
1681,” and were signed by “J. Drummond” who was afterwards known
as the Karl of Melfort, Secretary of State to Jas. II. and the companion
of the latter’s exile.

We now come to Slezer’s adventures in search of experienced foreign
gunners which are detailed in a series of letters from the former
addressed “to the Laird of Lundin,! Master-General of the Ordnance
in Scotland, at Hdinburgh Castle.” For lack of space only the pith of
Slezer’s letters are now given :—

“Whitehall, 24 May, 1681.—-Would at length get away; had
taken places in the Harwich Coach. My Lord Duke and my
Lady Duchess [of York] take journey on Thursday next for
the Bath and he was to leave Friday after. Had been
learning about the rank the officers of Artillery held in
England and found that the Master of the Ordnance had
always a Regiment and commanded all Major-Generals, except
a Major-General be Commander-in-Chief. Had been promised
£150 for his expences.”

“Hague, 1 August, N.S., 1681.—Believed the Prince of Orange
would give leave to gunners to go to Scotland but the pay
was thought too small. ‘When I propose the instructions I
haiue as to their pay peopel smiles at me. Those that in
England, or Scotland, are called gunners aire called heer
Stackyonkers or gentlemen of the cannon. Their pay is 40
gilders a month (at six weeks a month) in time of peace,

1 Lt.-Gen. the Hon. John Drummond married first, 30th April, 1670, Sophia, daughter and heiress
of Margaret Lundin, of Lundin, Co, Fife, and took the titular title of “ Laird of Lundin” on his
wife’s coming into that estate.

582 ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION.

beside the benefit of their quarters; now they aire tyed
almost toe no kind of duyty ; and in time of warre they haiue
seuntie gilders a month.’”

“Rotterdam, 12 August, N.S., 1681—Had been in treaty with
Capt. Seilo at Amsterdam to be Master-Gunner, who had
been 20 years in the service of the States, who would come if
his salary could be brought to 4s. sterling a day and a com-
mission were sent over to him. ‘I haiue gotten a tasck upon
me that I wisch from my hart it was well off my handes to
your satisfaction. For if I send ouer men that can doe no
more then our aine men, it will be [said] ‘theis aire Slezer’s
men, he can maicke choice of such bleads when he is entrusted
with it. If he brought none he would be charged with
neglect ; and he could get no good men at the rate of pay
allowed.”

“ Rotterdam, 20 August, 1681.—Letter in French sent by Antoine
Lermeny who had offered to enter the service of the King of
Scotland in the Artillery. Slezer had engaged that his
passage back to Holland was to be paid if he was not taken
into the service and had given him 30s.”

“ Rotterdam, 22 August, 1681.—Was to go to-morrow to Breda
and thence to Antwerp and Brussels. The ‘caruing’ of the
guns was begun by the Founder at Rotterdam.”

“Rotterdam, 23 August, 1681.—His fireworker was to go by
another ship as Capt. Frissit might stay too long.”

“ Dunkerke, 4 September, 1681.—The 24th of August last he
went from Rotterdam to Breda where he met Capt. Maxwell,
an acquaintance, who introduced him to Monsieur Bombel,
the Engineer of the Place, who showed him several ‘ bleads’
who offered to engage but asked too high wages, &c.”

“ Rotterdam, 26 September, 1681.—His last was from Dunkirk
and gave an account of his progress through the Spanish
provinces—in which ‘insteade of gunners I didde not meet
with a man whom | would haiue brought alongh with me for
a metrosse. Went to Douay by Lisle (sic) wherea Scotsman
found him out who was in the gens d’armes who found him a
‘coppel of bleads’ in present service but they wanted higher
salary. Saw the Foundry at Douay which turned out 16
pieces of cannon very curiously wrought every three weeks.
Gives a description of the casting of the cannon and had
spoken with the founder’s master-man about coming to Scot-
land to start a foundry there. Returned to Amsterdam two
days ago. Could say nothing about the old metal till he saw
it. Hxpected Capt. Seilo on Monday next and would send
him away with the first ship. Saw the change that had been
made in the Establishment and that he was to take one [fire-
worker] at 8s. per diem, one at 2s. 6d., and three at 1s. 6d.,
or two at 2s. per diem, which fell out very well as he had a

ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION. 583

proffer of service from a fireworker in Denmark, by letter
from Copenhagen, whose name was George Erdman Hummel
who had served 28 years in the Artillery of the Elector of
Brandenburgh and who had written that Mr. Slezer need
not trouble himself for gunners for he would make gunners
enough ‘if we give him but men that haiue hands, feet, and
coraidge.’ Tho founder was soon to proceed with the casting
of their cannon. ‘I am in peine for our old brasse [guns],
it has ben veerie hard wether this two days and I would give
a plack to be at home again myself.’ Hopes his precept on
the Treasury would be looked after ‘for I suspect my wife
will be as skairce of siller as myself.’ ”’

“ Rotterdam, 30 October, 1681.—Had been badly used by Capt.
Seilo but everybody told him he need not repent it ‘for we
should haiue ben fascht with him.’ Had got no answer from
Copenhagen. Had heard of one Rokilje at Mastricht and
had taken him on at 2s. per diem ; he was no fireworker but
had had the command of some gunners as Stackyonker—
was of English parents and born at Cleve, and spoke very
good English and was Adjutant of the Artillery at Mastricht.”

“ Rotterdam, 4 November, 1681.—No word had come from Copen-
hagen. Had been in treaty with a Capt.-Lieutenant of
Miners—a Vallon [Walloon] black as a gipsy and had agreed
with him to come to Scotland. ‘The brass had not yet arrived.
The mottos for the muzzles of the new guns sent by Mr.
Drummond, ‘ Non sine fulmine regnat’ and ‘ Haec regia vow
est, Mr. Slezer thinks were so large as to spoil the shape of
the heads, &c.”

“Rotterdam, 18 November, 1681.—Would be able to send plenty
ofgunners. The Lieutenant of the Miners had accepted of 8s.
per diem and was coming to Rotterdam. Had also taken on
a fireworker at 2s. 6d. per diem; he had been long in
service and present at various actions. Had also taken on
the Captain of the Canoniers at Breda at 2s. per diem. ‘He
is a lustie bleade, has ben serdgent before the year ’74 and
euer sence by the Artillerie.’”’

“Rotterdam, 24 November, 1681.—Requests a bill of credit as
there were many expenses to pay. ‘The cannon would not be
ready for 6 months. The old brass arrived last night. Had
not heard from Copenhagen. Hxpected the Capt.-Lieutenant
of Miners and the fireworker from Mastricht every day. ‘So
soon as they come they are to be thrown into aship and away
with them.” Thanks Mr. Drummond for his approbation of
what he has done about the mottos on the guns and adds:
‘I hope you wont thinck sheame your naime stands upon
them.’ ”

The above is the last of Slezer’s letters from Holland. It is to be
presumed that he set sail for Scotland the end of November, 1681], in

584 ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION.

company with his Wallon Capt.-Lieutenant of Miners who was
“black as a gypsy,” the Captain of the Canoniers at Breda who was a
“Justie bleade,” the Stackyonker from Mastricht and a few gunners.
But Slezer had to sail without Capt. Seilo, the Amsterdam Master-
Gunner, and Capt. Hummel of Copenhagen, who felt competent to make
gunners out of any men with “hands, feet and coraidge,” as these
“trustie bleades ” required more “bawhbees”’ than the Scots Hstablish-
ment could afford to pay.

There is something sad, as well as ludicrous, in honest John Slezer
being sent abroad to drive Scots bargains for the good of the Artillery
at home when the Merry Monarch could always find money for his own
worthless pleasures and still more worthless favourites.

The next news we have of John Slezer is in November 1688, when
we find him in command of the Artillery Train and ready to take the
field against King James’ enemies. Among the MSS. of the Duke of
Leeds is a letter! dated “Hdinburgh, 20 November, 1688,” from Capt.
Slezer to Lieut.-General Douglas, Master-General of the Ordnance in
Scotland, the pith of which is to this affect :—

Wrote this day “senight” with account of his arrival with the
Train of Artillery. Account of his march to Edinburgh ;
delayed at Aylisson bank by reports of the rebels. Need of
additional men and of instructions about precedence of officers,
and the writers authority.

From insular slowness, and insular ignorance, Great Britain did not
grasp, until the middle of the last century, the absolute necessity for
settling, by a Royal declaration under the King’s Sign Manual, the
vexed question of the Army rank of Artillery Officers.

In the Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland for 1689 appears the
following notice dated 18 March, 1689 :—

“ A report from the Committee for securing the Peace was read
whereof the tenor followes . . . . . ‘It is also their
opinion that the Canoniers and Artillerie men be drawen
together under the command of Mr. Sledzer (sic) and
receives the Hstate pay immediately and to continow and be
maintained thereat as they were formerly, he giveing his
oath of fidelitie to the Hstates.’ ”’

Remembering the favour shown him by James II. Capt. Slezer
refused to give his allegiance to the Scottish Parliament :—

“ Mr. Sledzer being called and having refuised to give his oath of
fidelitie to the meeting warrand was given to secure him
until he find caution not to return to the Castle [Hdinburgh
Castle.” ]

When the new régime was firmly established Slezer wisely gave in
his adherence to the new Powers and was reinstated as “‘ Captain of
the Artillery Company and Surveyor of the Magazines.” His com-

1 Historical MSS. Commission—Report XI., Appendix VILI., p. 25.

ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION. 585

mission was signed by William III. at Kensington 11 January, 1683.

About this time Slezer paid a visit to Court and renewed his ac-
quaintance with William III. The latter writing to the Harl of
Melville, Secretary of State for Scotland, from “ Kinsington, ce $$
March, 1690,” says :—

“ Aujour d huy est parti Slezer avec l’Artillerie et munitions de
guerre.” —(Melville State Papers, p. 421).

As far back as the reign of Charles II. Slezer had been engaged on
a magnum opus which was intended to be brought out with the fitting
title of Theatrum Scotiew giving “ prospects” of the most notable
palaces, castles, noblemen’s seats, &c., in Scotland. The “ prospects ”
were trom large engravings on copper executed by Slezer himself, and
the descriptive letter-press was also supposed to be by the same hand
but there is no doubt much of Sir Robert Sibbald’s handiwork in the
scholarly descriptions given with the engravings. The first volume of
above work was brought out in 1693, and Queen Mary, by Royal
Licence dated Whitehall, 6 June, 1693, gave the author the sole right
to print and publish the three volumes of said work, thus securing to
him the copyright. Like many another man who has chosen the
thorny path of literature Slezer found his book did not sell rapidly and
that the chances seemed small of his recouping himself for the heavy
expenses of publication. After waiting two years for the profits that
never came the disappointed author exhibited his book to the Scottish
Parliament who thought so highly of it that, to facilitate the completion
of the work, they passed an Act,! for which they had the King’s Warrant
“in favour of John Adair, geographer, and Capt. John Slezer,”’ which
ran as follows :—

“Ordered that 16s. Scots be exacted from 1 August, 1695, for
every ton of foreign ships which comes into any harbour or
road within this kingdom, ilk voyage ; and 4s. on every ton
of Scots ships above 12 tons burden, once ilk year, for the
space of five years to be applied by the Prioy Council for
compleating the saids Mapps and Prospects of Scotland and
ordaine the same to be collected by the Collectors of the
King’s Customs,”

Hope, which is said to spring eternal, once more revived in Slezer’s
breast. Speaking metaphorically he flourished the above Act in the
faces of his creditors and told them “ to bidea wee.” He set to work on
new copper plates, and ordered fresh printing presses, for expediting
the bringing out of the second volume of his magnum opus.

Nor did Slezer neglect the welfare of his Artillery Company in the
pursuit of art and literature. A general order was issued in 1696 for
the Artillery to be encamped during the summer months. This order
gave general satisfaction to the Artillery Company but there was one
serious drawback to this plan and that was that the gun carriages were
so old and rotten that they were quite unserviceable ! By order of the
Lords of the Scottish Treasury Slezer contracted with workmen for the

1 Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, Vol. IX., p. 492.
80

586 ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT TOE TIME OF TUE UNION.

necessary repairs. Whether Slezer overstepped the limit allowed by
the Treasury, or whether the latter were short of funds, certain it is
that they only paid 2 of the account, which was a large one, for these
repairs. Added to his other debts, and heavy outgoings, Slezer now
found himself obliged “ for his personal safety ”’ to betake himself “ to
the sanctuary of Holyrood House; here he had remained thirteen
years at the time his Case was printed.’

Nothwithstanding the Act of Parliament passed in his favour, con-

jointly with John Adair, F.R.S., the map maker, Slezer appears to have
‘benefited very little. Nor did Adair, in whose favour a tonnage act
had been passed as early as 1686, fare any better, and the latter, in a
memorial to the Prioy Council, stated that his losses were “ three times
more than ever was gotten from the collectors upon the accompt
of tonnage.”* Comment on these facts is needless and it is not sur-
prising to find that Adair, like Slezer, died in obscurity, and in debt,
before the completion of his able work.

Harly in 1699 Slazer had the misfortune to lose his eldest son who
was a Master-Gunner at one of the Scottish fortresses. This event,
small in itself, except to the bereaved parents, was followed by a violent
quarrel between Viscount Teviot, who was Major-General and Com-
mander-in-Chief in Scotland, and the Harl of Argyll who was Captain
and Colonel of the Scots Troops of Life Guards. The bone of con-
tention between these two noblemen was the appointment of a successor
to Slezer’s son as a Master-Gunner, and it is both instructive and en-
tertaining for officers of the Royal Artillery, in the present day, to
read of the storm of angry passions that swept round the little Artillery
Company in Scotland nigh 200 years ago, because two exalted per-
sonages—one Colonel of the Scots Troop of Life Guards and the other
Colonel of the Royal Scots Dragoons—had each a protégé ready to fill

the comparatively insignificant post of a Master-Gunner vacant by
.young Slezer’s death, and each declared emphatically that “his man
should stand.”” The facts are as follows :—Lord Teviot, as General
‘Commanding the Forces in Scotland, had, by virtue of the authority
given to him, power to grant certain commissions in Scotland. This
power he exercised when Slezer’s son died, and he appointed one Crecutt,
late a Lieutenant in Sir William Douglas’s regiment of foot (which had
been disbandoned in 1697) to succeed young Slezer. The latter was
hardly cold in his grave before the Harl of Argyll, without saying any-
thing to Lord Teviot, procured a commission direct from the King
granting young Slezer’s place to his (Argyll’s) nominee. In due
course Argyll’s protégé reported himself in Edinburgh to Captain
Slezer and exhibited his commission signed by William III. Slezer
was placed in a very awkward position as Lieutenant Crecutt had
already taken over the duties of Master-Gunner, but as Lord Teviot
was in London, and the Marl of Argyll was in Edinburgh, Slezer
thought it best to go by the King’s commission and so Lieutenant
Crecutt was displaced and Lord Argyll’s man (whose name does not
appear) took over the coveted appointment. The displaced officer lost

1 Dr. Jamieson’s preface to the 1874 edition of Theatrum Scotia.
? Memoir of John Adair, Surveyor and Map Maker, in Dictionary of National Biography.

ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION. 987

no time in writing to Lord Teviot and airing his grievance. The
equally irate Commander-in-Chief sent the following stinger to Captain
Slezer |! who was sorrowing for his first-born in Holyrood House :—

*“ LONDON,
ISSIR, * March—1699.

“JT thought you understood your duty better as to dis-
obeying orders from such as command you which, in time and place
convenient, we shall talk of; and now only once more command you
to place that Crecutt who formerly was Lieutenant in Sir William
Douglas’s regiment to be gentleman of the cannon” in the Artillery
Company. It seems the Harl of Argyle will continue to meddle in
business he is not concerned in which you may tell him he was not in
this. You did very well. Know that a gentleman of the cannon never
had the King’s commission and if it had been so it was not the Harl of
Argyle’s to meddle with.

Sivan Sir.
“Your servant,
“TEVvIOT.”

On receipt of this epistle Slezer re-instated Lieutenant Crecutt and
displaced Lord Argyll’s nominee. This action was speedily reported
to MacCullum More who appears to have been a man of strong
passions and indomitable energy. He went in person and tackled
Slezer in the Court of Sessions,> where the gallant captain was a
frequent visitor on account of summonses for debt, and taking Lord
Teviot’s letter out of Slezer’s hand hurried off in a towering rage to
Mr. Aitkin, the Secretary at War, who had the commission entry
books in his office. From these books he took what he called
“doubles” of certain commissions to prove that the King, who had
the power of granting acts over all in the army, had given an act to
Captain Slezer’s late son to be Master-Gunner as well as to other
officers of hke rank.* Armed with these proofs Lord Argyll sat down
and wrote a vituperative letter about Lord Teviot to the Rey.
William Carstairs, Scottish chaplain to William III., who had the
King’s private ear and who was consulted by his Majesty on all
business connected with Scotch affairs—hence the court that the
highest in Scotland paid this worthy chaplain who accompanied the
King on his campaigns and who made a good use of the power he
possessed. In order to lose no time Lord Argyll sent his letter to
Mr. Carstairs, enclosing his “proofs”? and the identical letter sent
by Lord Teviot to Captain Slezer, by Lord Lorne who set off for
London post-haste. And he followed up this budget by another letter

1 The sub-joined letter to Captain Slezer is given in the Carstairs State Papers, p. 470.

2 The term ‘* Gentleman of the Cannon” as used by Lord Teviot is somewhat misleading for
Slezer’s son was a Master-Gunner and is so noted in Lord Argyll’s letter to Mr. Carstairs, dated
16th March, 1699. In the Low Countries where Lord Teviot had passed most of his military
career Gunners and Master-Gunners were styled Stackyonkers or ‘‘ Gentlemen of the Cannon.”

3 Lord Argyll to Mr. Carstairs. Carstairs State Papers, p. 469.

4 «T send you,” wrote Lord Argyll to Mr. Carstairs, “a double of the King’s commission
granted to George Calcleugh, immediate predecessor to Captain Slezer’s son who died last in whose
place Teviot now has placed one.’’—Ibid. '

588 ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION.

to the Rev. William Carstairs on the same subject in which he
said: “I sent up a letter or two of his [Lord Teviot’s] to Captain
Slezer in one of which he treats me like a little ensign which I will not

bear whatever be the event.” This remark reminds one of the Border
challenge :—

“O wha daur meddle wi’ me!
And wha daur meddle wi’? me!
My name it is little Jock Elliot,
And wha daur meddle wi’ me!”

Having got his blood well up Lord Argyll sent an account of his
wrongs to the Duke of Queensberry, Secretary of State for Scotland,
and it gives us an insight into the power wielded by Mr. Carstairs
when we find a letter from the noble Duke to the Scottish chaplain
(Mr. Carstairs) begging the latter to settle this pretty quarrel between
the two disputants as if it went on “there was no knowing what it
would grow into.” And Lord Argyll kept the ball going by declaring
there were many in Scotland “would sooner have no army taan have
Lord Teviot for Commander-in-Chief.” How all this storm in a tea-
pot ended does not appear, but pressure was put on Lord Teviot to
resign his command in Scotland and he was succeeded as Commander-
in-Chief by Major-General the Honourable George Ramsay, Colonel of
the Scots Foot Guards, 1 February, 1700. And in the following
year the Earl of Argyll was created a Duke.

We now come to the last chapter of Slezer’s life. On the 25
August, 1702, Queen Anne renewed his commission as “ Captain of
the Train of Artillery in Scotland”? but he soon afterwards lost the
accompanying post of ‘‘ Surveyor of Stores and Magazines.” In 1705
he brought out his “ Case ” which there is every reason to believe is not
exaggerated. Slezer’s biographer (Dr. Jamieson) states that! :—

“Slezer was not less unfortunate with respect to his claims in his pro-
fessional line, than as to those which he made as an author; for he
states in his Case that although his commission as Captain of
Artillery in 1690 expressly bore that he should have 12s. per diem, yet
by the establishment in the year 1693 this was reduced one-third ; that
although in his Majesty’s letter, Anno. 1695, this defalcation was said
to be merely the consequence of a mistake and a mandate was issued
that he should not only thenceforth receive the full-pay, but that the
arrears should be paid up, yet after the receipt of this for two or three
years he had been subjected to the same reduction by a similar mistake;
that although honoured with a new commission from Queen Anne as
captain and also surveyor of the public magazines in which he was
allowed the original pay he had never ‘ received any benefit from her
Royal intentions ;’ that he was the only officer in the Artillery, or in
any other department of the Service, who had met with so hard a fate
‘for what reason he would not take upon him to judge,’ and that
matters continued on this same foot as long ‘as he was upon the
Scotch Establishment.’ ”

One of the debts which Slezer could not meet was for clothing

1 Preface to Theatrum Scotia, p. 10.

ARTILLERY COMPANY IN SCOTLAND AT THE TIME OF THE UNION. 589

supplied to the Artillery Company. Dr. Jamieson points out that Slezer’s
generosity in respect of new clothing was ill-timed as he was then
deeply in debt and a shelterer in the sanctuary of Holyrood House.
Slezer’s excuse for undertaking the above expense was that “he
clothed his Company sooner than suffer them to go naked.” It is also
stated that Slezer’s creditors, “tired with waiting for their money,
prosecuted him for each separate debt and these, by a decree of the
Court of Sessions, he was obliged to pay interest on for 10 or 12 years
and also the costs of each creditor who brought an action.” When
the Artillery Company in Scotland was put on the English Establish-
ment, in January 1708, the unfortunate Slezer once more appealed for
justice and brought out his “Stated Case” in which he speaks of him-
self as “Captain of the Artillery Company in Scotland and late
Surveyor of the Public Magazines,” All his wrongs were recapitulatad
and put in print. But justice is proverbiably blind and it was not until
the author of Theatrwm Scotiw had been long in his unknown grave
that his magnwm opus received the public attention this work
undoubtedly merited. The despairing author left Scotland for ever and
where he spent his last few years is not known but we know the
evening of his life must have been a miserable one :—

“They live too long who happiness outlive.”

Captain John Slezer is believed to have died in June 1714, which
was just eighteen months before that splendid veteran Colonel Albert
Borgard was sent to Scotland with a Train of Artillery and who, on
taking over the command of the Scotch Train found the latter “in
such confusion as cannot be expressed.” Truly John Slezer was
avenged for the reduction of the North British Train was decided on
the same year. By his wife (née Straiton) Slezer left two surviving
sons of whom nothing is known, but it is not improbable that Captain
John Slessor who served in the Royal Irish Artillery 1794—1801 and
was afterwards Major in 35th Foot, was a descendant.

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591

JED) JL HAN, Jey SE

LIEUTENANT W. SWABEY, R.H.A., IN THE
PENINSULA.

EDITED BY

COLONEL F. A. WHINYATHS, late R.H.A.

(Continued from p. 585, No. 11, Vol. XXTIT.).

PART III.
CHaprtrer III.

Opening of the Campaign of 1813. Passage of the Douro. Action at
Salamanca. “ F” troop R.H.A. joins the army. Passage of the
isla. ‘ H” troop joins the Hussar Brigade. Action at Morales
de Toro. Smart affair at Cellada del Camino.

I know not how to account for such a long vacuum as two months
in my journal. When nothing is to be recorded the presumption is
that time has been misspent. How far I plead guilty to this impu-
tation, perhaps, I shall not own; be that as it may, there are some
recollections and I own attachments which in this vacancy of incident
have not been disregarded or unthought of.

Though idle with his pen, Lieutenant Swabey and the other
officers had not been neglectful of the welfare of the troop,
as is apparent from the following written by Major Gardiner,
April 29th, 1813, from Mello, to the D.-A.-G., R.A., Major-
General Macleod.—(#.4.w.)

“Since I quitted the 1st Division I have been constantly and
most anxiously employed. You will hear from everybody
what “‘ EK” troop was :—I joined it! at a time when from its
dismantled state, Downman considered it necessary to recom-
mend a reduction in its number of guns, and its name was
established as being incapable of taking the field. At that
time it was supposed the army could break up from its can-
tonments sooner than it has done, and many of the stores
necessary to complete its refit I had to procure from Lisbon.
I never was more unhappy at the prospect before me; how-
ever, my good fortune did not leave me even here, and the
exertions of Captain Dyneley, Lieutenants Newland and
Swabey have enabled me to retrieve everything. I still

1 In March.
12. vol. xxi.

592 SWABEY DIARY.

want a few men, but in other respects ‘H’ troop will yield
to none in taking the field, and when we have had a little
more time will surpass many. We shall move forward not
merely in an efficient state, but perfectly to my satisfaction.
Our horses are in beautiful condition, and our appointments
of every description entirely new and complete.” }

14th May.—The long wished for and long expected march took place
this morning, and we may say we have not started unprovided. Our
horses and appointments are completed, the prospect bright of returning
home and everything looks cheerily and well. To be sure, as far as
incessant rain went during our march to Cortica, the outset was
unpropitious. The perch of one of my waggons too broke when hardly
out of Mello, but was replaced with great expedition. We did not
reach our destination till 4 o’clock, and a horrid one it was.

15th May.—Marched at 5 o’clock still in the rain for Trancoso, the -
road steep and hardly passable, it runs through Celorico, and crosses
the Mondego by the bridge called Baracal. As is often the case the
natural beauties of the country increased the difficulties of our march,
and when I saw my fine fat horses strike on the hill my heart sank with
despair. I had thought, as 1 said, that this year our horses and our
men would be superior to all obstacles; but think what I might, we
did not get to Trancoso till near dark. Trancoso is a walled town and
is considered as belonging to the chain of defences that are linked
together by Pinhel, Almeida, Guarda, Castel Branco, Castel Rodrigo,
etc., the position is formidable, the place itself of no military importance,
and much destroyed, and altogether a vile nest of more vile Portuguese.

16th May.—The sun at length appearing, we were once more cheered
by a clear sky after a full month’s incessant rain. Marching at 4 a.m.
we got to Marialva by a bad road, though it is to be noticed that through
the stupidity of our guide, we chose a worse one than we might have
done. In Marialva we put up our horses, having preference given us
in point of cover; the infantry encamped. This place is one of the
most complete Moorish towns I have met with ; it has a castle of the
most perfect architecture and in high preservation.

17th May.—At 4 o’clock we marched by a terribly steep ascent to
Villa Nova de Fascoa, a tolerable town and distant only 5 miles from
the Douro. The vineyards in its neighbourhood produce the best
Oporto wine, as well as a prospect pleasing to the eye.

18th May.—At 4 o’clock we marched down to the passage of the
Douro, the descent is adorned by various beauties of prospect and
fertility. On getting to the passage, my long formed ideas of the
campaign were quite confirmed. Instead of building a bridge for which
there was every material at hand, we were passed over in a wretched
ferry-boat, which operation took three hours; in this there was no
preparation by which the French could the least anticipate our move-
ment. As Lord Wellington has not yet made any show or moved any

1 For this document and some others I am indebted to the kindness of General Lynedoch
Gardiner, C.B., R.H.A., son of the writer.—(F.A.W.)

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SWABEY DIARY. 593

troops on the Salamanca road, I should not be surprised if we got un-
heard of to the rear of the enemy by crossing the Douro at this point ;
10,000 men for the defence of its passage as well as their works at
Zamora and Toro will thus be rendered useless. We may even march
on northward without attackmg Burgos. These ideas give me great
pleasure, as the undertaking of so bold a measure proves us to be
stronger than the enemy, and I now look forward to a happy and no
very distant conclusion of the war. At the passage is a redoubt which
prevented the passing of the French at that point. The ascent from
the river is a frightful undertaking for artillery, being long and
steep; our men gave infinite satisfaction by the active way in which
they embarked and disembarked their carriages and horses; but we
met with an unfortunate accident with a gun and ammunition waggon,
which after being pulled by hand a great way up the wharf, broke
away from the men and were considerably injured. Six wheels,
thirty-six felloes and spokes had to be replaced; fortunately we
halted at Torre de Moncorvo, and the damage was repaired. The
ascent from the Douro is the most tremendous ever encountered by
artillery.

19th May.—A vulgar fellow named Lieutenant Murphy of the 7th
Portuguese Regiment in an unmilitary manner demanded Newland’s
quarter, and on Newland’s remonstrating, ordered some Portuguese
to charge into the house, they fixed their bayonets, but seeing we
stood in the door, the men had the respect not to oppose us. Newland!
told the man that he was a vulgar, ill-bred fellow, and as that did not
affect him, put him under arrest, whilst I to be sure did not spare him.
It was only by writing an apology that he escaped being broke.

At Moncorvo there is a Moorish castle and it is on what is called
the Moresco or Moorish Road, but the people only know its name and
cannot tell why it is so called.

20th May.—Marched at 4 o’clock to Fornos, a small village only 9
leagues from Salamanca, as the crow flies, but the crow is the onl
two-legged animal that can cross the Douro, so that I hope the French
will gain no intelligence. he people in this town speak a mixture of
Portuguese and Spanish; the French were never with them, but the
dirt and backwardness of manner is not the less a characteristic of
their Portuguese origin. I should mention that the current where we
passed the Douro is so rapid that communication with Oporto only

1 Lieutenant R. Newland (Kane’s List No. 1229), remained with “EB” troop to the end of the
war, he was present at the battles of Salamanca, Vitoria, Orthes, and Toulouse, as well as other
minor engagements. Captain Newland served in the campaign of 1815, and was engaged in the
retreat from Quatre Bras and at the battle of Waterloo. Medal, and Peninsula medal with four
clasps. Soon after the general peace in 1815, he went on half-pay, retired in 1832, and settled at
Kempston near Bedford, in the neighbourhood of his old comrade and friend. They both hunted
regularly with the Oakley hounds, and in the March number of Bailey's Magazine for 1871, we
find the following :—~“ Captain Newland, an old Waterloo man, who afterwards lived at Kempston
was very popular, and knew more about hunting than most men. Billy Swabey, another Waterloo
hero, must not be forgotten. He lived at Clifton Hall, and was a regular attendant in the field.
He had first-rate horses, and his saddle flaps were always cut square at the bottom. He was in
the artillery with Captain Newland, and it is said when they were both at their guns during the
battle, they saw a cannon ball coming directly in Swabey’s way, and Newland called out‘ Good-
bye, Billy, you’re done,’ but Swabey saw it in time, ducked his head, and burst out laughing.”

a ae Newland, who was a J.P, and served as High Sheriff for Bedfordshire, died J uly 12th,
81

594, SWABEY DIARY.

takes two days, whereas supplies from thence are frequently a fortnight
reaching Villa Nova.

21st May.—Marched at 8 o’clock and arrived early at Villa Della,
where the roads cease to be bad and our horses will begin to recover.
In this day’s march there was both iron ore and coal to be picked up.

22nd May.—Our route was to Sindin, but we found means to go to
Duas Jgrejas, a place better suited to our purposes of foraging and
getting away from the division. Hearing that the road to Miranda
was very difficult, after dinner I rode to that place to ask for instruc-
tions from General Graham. Never having seen the place before, it
must not be wondered at that in the dark I could scarcely find my way
back; I left it entirely to my country horse who took me up to the
stable door. It not being our first intention to march to Duas Jgrejas
all the baggage except my own strayed to Villa Cham, and some of it
did not find its way home till 11 o’clock.

23rd May.—Marched with instructions to halt in the neighbourhood
of Malhadas, but to avoid the society of our friends the infantry, we
proceeded to Constantin, two leagues in front of the rest of the army,
where we got well put up.

24th May.—Some doubt existing as to the safety of our being so
far in advance; Gardiner, by General Graham’s consent, volunteered
my services last night to explore the front to gain information, and
likewise to ascertain the position of the Spanish cavalry with whom
there had been no communication. I accordingly started at 5 o’clock
in the morning and traversing 10 leagues of the front returned by 12
having been enabled through the civilities and assistance of the
Spaniards to obtain the necessary information.

25th May.—Wrote my report to General Graham stating where I
had been, viz. to Ceadea, Saneir, Vide, Losilla, Carvajales, and also that
the Count de Penne Villemur was at Alcauizas with 800 cavalry, and
had posts on the left at Tabara and the right at Carvajales; that the
French had no parties on our side the Hsla; that some part of the
Spanish cavalry had marched on Astorga to cover the advance of part
of the Galician army; and enumerating the different fords as I was
enabled to learn their names, from Benevente to where the Hsla falls
into the Douro. ‘The principle ones are Abnendra, San Vicente,
and San Pedro de las Acevas, besides others passable only by indi-
viduals; the former the Spaniards have endeavoured to render impass-
able by building a sort of stone wall along the middle of the stream ;
none of them appear to be very good. I likewise understood that the
French left Benevente the day before yesterday. The Spaniards in-
formed me that they had only 800 cavalry and infantry at Zamora by
way of a corps of observation. The abandoning of this place by them
is the first effect of our movement. The 6th division Pontoons, and
the brigade of 18-pounders are now up; we expect the Portuguese
cavalry, the brigade of hussars, and Webber-Smith’s troop! imme-
diately.

1 <¥F” troop (now “D” Battery) R.H.A. which had arrived lately from England.

SWABEY DIARY. 595

26th May.—Last night after making up my journal, an order came
to me to meet Sir Thomas Graham at Castro, whither I immediately
went taking with me only a man to look after my horse, as the note
hinted that as small a party as possible was to be seen. I reached
Castro just before dark, where I found Mr. Pitts! of the Royal
Engineers. Soon after came General Graham accompanied only by
Colonel De Lancey,” Quarter-Master-General, and one hussar. After
drinking tea we separated for the night, and it fell to my lot to have
no decent place to lie down in. I did indeed find some blankets but
my good friends the fleas did not allow me much rest. I slept in my
clothes, and at day-light we assembled for our expedition, the object
of which was to find a place to throw a bridge across the Douro to
ensure support by communication with Lord Wellington. It was 5
o’clock when we started at a full gallop, as is the custom of Sir
Thomas Graham. As he had fresh horses, three at different points,
I only one, Colonel De Lancey two, and Pitts being only moderately
mounted, we were soon left in the lurch ; whether the General is mad
or blind I have not decided ; it required one of these imperfections to
carry him in cold blood over the rocks and precipices. I should as
soon have thought of riding from Dover to Calais; nevertheless I
followed him ; yet with all this the General is not quick, for want of
foresight he loses much time and distance in galloping blindly on.
We traversed the rocky bank of the Douro from Pino to El Bano de
Villa Campo, never was there so inaccessible a river; at very few
places was it possible to get to its brink, much less to mount the other
side. Many places were proposed and negatived by me and the Hn-
gineer. At length at Villa Campo we fixed on a spot, not indeed so
good as might be wished, but one where it was not quite unreasonable
to make the attempt.

This over, the General went home and sent me to enquire into the
practicability of some fords on the Hsla. I found no reason to alter
my former report except by stating that the inhabitants, and not the
French as I had thought, had destroyed the ford at Abnendra to pre-
vent invasions from the opposite quarter. On the whole I decided
that the Hsla from Benevente downwards is only to be forded there or
near Villa Beza at this time of the year. I saw a letter from Zamora
stating that 3000 French had arrived, I concluded the rear-guard, be-
cause the letter stated their having destroyed the bridge. It likewise
said that they were rejoicing on account of reported advantages gained
over the Russians; this I take to be the defeat of Beauharnais.® It is

1 Lieutenant Pitts was killed in the affair at Tarbes on March 20th, 1814.

? Colonel Sir William De Lancey was Quarter-Master-General to the army in the Netherlands
in 1816. He was killed at the battle of Waterloo.

3 Beauharnais tells the story of his defeat in an intercepted letter to Berthier, from Sassalie,
November 8th, 1812.—(F.A.w.)

“ During the retreat from Moscow, on November 7th, Beauharnais’s corps was attacked with such
fury by the Cossacks that a temporary dispersion took place, the silence of the French bulletins in
regard to this affair is supplied by the Viceroy’s letter in which he says,” ‘‘ Your highness will be
surprised to find me still upon the Vop, but my situation is critical enough; whole trains of horses
have perished in harness at once ; yesterday 400 died, and to-day perhaps double that number—I
must not conceal from your highness that sacrifices must be expected, and that these three days of
suffering have so dispirited the soldier, that I believe him this moment very little capable of
making any effort; numbers of men are dead with hunger and cold, and others in despair have
eutned themselves to be taken by the enemy.” Quarterly Review, No. 16, December 1812,
p. 470,

596 SWABEY DIARY.

an old saying in the military world that the French only once omitted
firing salutes when they were defeated, and that was after the battle of
Trafalgar where all their guns being taken they had none left to rejoice
with.

27th May.—Not at all sorry to find a day of rest, I availed myself
of the opportunity to write to England.

We heard to-day that Lord Wellington with the 2nd and light
divisions, having pushed on the cavalry consisting of General Fane’s
brigade and Bean’s! troop of Horse Artillery, overtook the enemy’s
rear-guard and killed and destroyed 300 of them.

From a Horse Artillery point of view this action is very note-
worthy, illustrating the mobility of that arm and its effective
co-operation with cavalry in the Peninsula. As Part II. of
this diary deals almost exclusively with “ D” troop, we can-
not fail to read with interest its experiences on this occasion.
Both Lieut.-Colonel Alexander Dickson and Major Augustus
Frazer wrote accounts of the affair, the substance of which is
as follows.—(f.A.w.)

On May 26th, Lord Wellington moved forward towards Salamanca,
on approaching which place infantry columns of the enemy
were seen halted at each side of the town, a part of the
cavalry being however on the left bank of the river to
observe the movements of the allies. As the latter advanced
the cavalry retired across the bridge into Salamanca, but the
infantry remained for a considerable time unmoved. In the
meanwhile Sir Rowland Hill’s Cavalry and Captain Bean’s
troop of Horse Artillery were ordered to push for the ford
of Santa Martha, a little above the town. As soon as the
French saw these troops’ approach the river they moved off
their whole force, which included about 2500 infantry, two or
three squadrons, and three or four guns. General Fane who
was in command of Sir Rowland Hill’s Cavalry passed the
river ina moment. Owing to the ravines and intricacies of
the ground near the river, which obliged the Horse Artillery
to make a detour, it was not possible to bring the guns into
play for some time, during which the enemy retired by
squares along the Arivolo road towards Aldea Langua. At
the distance of a league and a half from thé city however the
guns of “D” troop came into action and fired with effect,
every shot going through the ranks of the unfortunate
enemy, who retired with extreme rapidity but in great order.
The pursuit was continued for five or six miles, the Horse
Artillery cannonading them from every available point
although the interposition of the cavalry between the enemy
and the guns at times masked their fire. The loss of the
enemy was about 400 men killed, wounded, and prisoners,

1 On the death of Captain Lefebure, the command of “‘D ”’ troop was given to Captain George
Bean, known in the Regiment as ‘‘ Handsome George,’”’ he was killed in command of it at
Waterloo,.—(F.A.W.)

SWABEY DIARY. 597

of whom 100 alone were victims to the artillery fire, indeed
few fell in any other way, and so shaken were the squares by.
it that had the regiments moving on the flanks pushed on,
the whole force might have been captured.

Lieutenant Brereton, on this occasion a subaltern in “ D” troop,
writing in 1840, says, “ on this day a remarkable occurrence
took place, which was often afterwards adverted to by Lord
Wellington and Lord Fitzroy Somerset; sixteen men were
killed by one six-pounder shot, they fell in a line per-
pendicular to our position, each man lying partly over
another.” }

28th May.—All the army except ourselves moved to Brandilanes and
bivouacked. We passed them and went to Fonfria where we got cover
for our nags but encamped ourselves. Webber Smith’s? troop having
reached the army, I rode back two leagues to see my old friend
Hdwardes ; our meeting was enviable.

29th May.---Marched to Carvajales where by dint of perseverance
we got in our horses, the rest of the army still being in camp.

80th May.—lLord Wellington and his staff having crossed a ferry at.
Miranda del Douro, suddenly appeared amongst us, the influence of
his presence seemed immediately to give life to every individual, and
nothing was talked of but crossing the Hsla. Accordingly in the
morning Gardiner and I rode a league to see the road and the ford
of Abnendra. We found the current so rapid that I gave up entirely
the idea of passing and returned with the conviction of its impossibility.
I then galloped over to dine with Webber Smith and was not a little
annoyed to be present when he received an order to join and be
attached to the hussar brigade, as I had been setting my wits to
work to put our troop in that situation and had induced Gardiner
to make application by letter for that purpose.

1 Two other instances of the destructive power of round shot are worth quoting. Brevet-Major
Stretton, 40th Regiment, writing of Waterloo, says, ‘‘ towards the evening whilst the regiment was
in open column, a round shot from the enemy took off the head of Captain Fisher near me, and
striking his company on the left flank, put hors de combat more than 25 men. This was the most
destructive shot I ever witnessed during a long period of service.” Waterloo letters, p. 401.

After the battle of Alma, ‘‘ near the bivouac of the light division, there were many dead, among
them a remarkable group of fourteen or fifteen men who had been killed in retreating by one
cannon shot from the French artillery, The shot had passed through their bodies near the waist,
as if a rank of men had push turned and when in perfect covering had been caught in the back in
that position by the shot, for they all lay partly one over the other with faces downward.” History
“©” troop, p. 107.

Apropos to these incidents ; there are some who will remember how in old days the late General
Sir John Bloomfield, G.C.B., of Peninsular and Waterloo experience, when descanting on events of
‘«farty years ago,”’ as he was fond at times of doing, was wont to emphasize the opinion that there
is nothing like a round shot ; in plain truth in the days of defective shells and unreliable fuzes
there was more soundness in this view than the young and inexperienced hands who listened to
the old soldier were perhaps willing to admit.—(¥.a.w.)

= Captain James Webber Smith (Kane’s List No. 877), served at the capture of Minorca, 1798.
At the siege of Malta, 1800. At the defence of Porto Ferrajo, 1802. In the expedition to
Walcheren and at the siege of Flushing, 1809.

In 1818, he embarked when in command of ‘‘F'” troop for the Peninsula, and served with it to
the end of the war. He was present at the battles of Vitoria, Nive, Nivelles, the passage of the
Bidassoa, and the siege of St. Sebastian.

Lieut.-Colonel Webber Smith commanded “F’”’ troop at Waterloo. He received for his services
the gold cross and 1 clasp, the silyer medal and 2 clasps, and the C.B. Licut.-General Webber
Smith died in 1853.

598 SWABEY DIARY.

51st May.—The army assembled at day-light on the banks of the river
to pass the ford of Abnendra; having the day before seen the enemy’s
vedettes on the opposite side, opposition was expected. Arrange-
ments were therefore made to force the way over; whether the enemy
had intended to dispute the passage of the Hsla I know not, but of
this I am certain, that they deemed the ford of Abnendra imprac-
ticable, not only from its depth, the rapidity of the current, and the
badness of the bottom, but from its being commanded by heights on
which a few guns placed would effectually stop a whole army. The
passage being up the stream and very broad each individual would be
at least a quarter of an hour passing. The advance, consisting of the
Slst light infantry regiment and the brigade of hussars, dashed in
and got over with the loss of a few drowned. By their rapidity the
picket of cavalry, which was all the force the enemy had, were taken
prisoners, as it was never conceived that such an attempt would be made.
It soon became our turn to pass. I never saw anything so truly
dangerous; we did indeed by great care get over safely with the
exception of one of Newland’s baggage-mules which was carried off
its legs down the stream and shamefully abandoned by his servant.
At last it was brought up against an island, and seeing nobody would
start I swam my horse there, and landing was enabled to hold the
animal till some of the men took courage, came and finally rescued his
things. We marched to Val de Perdices where for the first time we
encamped, took off our harness and turned out our horses to graze.
They were scarcely loose when an alarm of two regiments of the
enemy’s cavalry being given, we had to harness and turn out. It was
a beautiful scramble.

Ist June.—We crawled along the road with our infantry division
lamenting our bad success in not being able to leave it till we got to
the basin of the Valderaduey, a river which runs close to Zamora and
there joins the Douro. We had scarcely drunk Lord Howe’s! health
when what should come but an order for us to join the Hussars.? All
was life and we were soon put to, the troop to go to Fresno de la Ribeira
to join the brigade, and I to go to Zamora and apply to the Com-
missary-General to let us take the mules attached for our transport. I
spared neither spurs nor horse and flew to Zamora; it was not however
till two hours after dark that I could find Sir R. Kennedy,’ and then
he was a long time unwilling to accede to my wishes. I used every
argument I could think of and at last succeeded in obtaining my re-
quest. It was then too late and too dark to undertake a road I had
never before seen or heard of; in consequence I determined to remain
all night with Harding.

1 To commemorate his victory on June 1st, 1794, over the French fleet off Ushant.
2 HEAD-QUARTERS,
ZAMORA, Ist June, 1818.

Major Gardiner’s troop of Horse Artillery will move this evening to Fresno Ribera and con-
tinue until further orders with the Brigade of Hussars. Licut.-General the Harl of Dalhousie will
be so good as to forward this order by Major Gardiner to the hussar brigade.

(Signed.) GrorGE Murray,
Quarter-Master-General.
3 The Commissary-General.

SWABEY DIARY. 599

Zamora is the best built and handsomest Spanish town I have seen
except Madrid, it commands and defends the passage of the Douro,
the bridge over which is now for a second time destroyed by the
enemy. The town was illuminated and a ball given, and Lord
Wellington was received with acclamations.

2nd June.—Started at day-light to rejoin the troop and the hussars,
who marching by Toro had overtaken the enemy’s rear-guard at
Morales. Colonel Grant! who commands the brigade had by skilful
and rapid manceuvring succeeded in making two hundred prisoners,
and killing in proportion. Our loss was about 20 killed, wounded and
missing, among'st the former, Lieutenant Cotton of the 10th. Captain
Lloyd was wounded and taken prisoner, on which account he took his
parole and was left behind. The pursuit, being checked by the French
Horse Artillerys’ taking up an advantageous position, was stopped. It
was a great disappointment to me to be absent, but as our guns only
fired five rounds, I was easily consoled by knowing the lasting and
essential service my going to Zamora had been to the troop.

I shall now say a few words of triumph about being posted to the
cavalry. It was Lord Wellington’s own order on seeing the condition
and good appearance of the troop, and caused great annoyance to Major
Frazer and our numerous enemies in the corps, who after trying to
break us up, had the mortification to see us arrive at superiority,
while we had the satisfaction to know that in spite of all difficulties
that superiority was owing to our own exertions. We received from
Webber Smith a 9-pounder in place of a 6-pounder to make us a
match for the French 8-pounders. Poor Webber Smith returned
disappointed to take our place with the 7th division.

drd June.—Marched to Pedrosa del Rey without hearing of the
enemy, who, it appears, is satisfied with what he got yesterday. The
troop was with difficulty got into quarters and we suffered considerable
inconvenience from the inexperience of the hussars who do not under-
stand the system of quartering troops.

4ih June.—Marched to Torrelobaton where we got comfortably into
quarters with beautiful forage.

5th June.—Marched to Pefiaflov. Not that Pefiaflov which was the
scene of Gil Blas’s adventure, but an ugly town ona hill, just quitted
by the French rear-guard. Ugly as it was, we did not enter it, but
lay all night in the rain thinking of little else than the state of our
fat horses.

6th June.—Marched to a terrible cold and bleak bivouac with con-
tinued rain. We all looked very darkly at each other, not only because
we trembled at the idea of our horses losing their condition, but also
lest the march by road should be impeded, and Lord Wellington’s
rapid movements be at a standstill.

7th June.—A very wet and unfavourable day. We marched through
Palencia, the cheers and congratulations we met with made us for a

1 Colonel Colquhoun Grant’s brigade was composed of the 10th, 15th, and 18th Hussars. He
commanded a light cayalry brigade at Waterloo.

600 SWABEY DIARY.

while forget its unseasonable influence. Palencia is an extensive and
well built city, close to it passes the great canal that runs from the
Ebro, crosses the Douro near Simancas and terminates at Segovia. It is
precisely on the plan of our inland navigation, and I examined some of
the locks which I found constructed like ours, in a high state of per-
fection, and uninjured by the times. The boats are probably burnt, at
any rate, the canal is in disuse. It is called Canal de Castilla, runs
from Reynosa close to the rise of the Ebro, passes near Burgos and
through Valladolid to Segovia, and is fed by the various streams of the
Douro and the Ebro. There are few manufactures about it; the silk
of Segovia, and a few paper frames at Palencia form the principal
matériel of traffic. From the rise of the Ebro the land carriage to
Santander is not more than 10 leagues.

Halted at Villa Lobau and were tolerably covered as to horses, the
officers in tents.

Sth June.—It was expected that the enemy might take up a position
at Torquemada. Whatever might be his intentions, Lord Wellington
passed columns in the direction of Amusco to our left, General Hill’s
corps only marching by Torquemada; this movement obliged the
French to abandon the position.

Our fate led us to a place called Tamara which as we did not march
till 11 o’clock, we found filled with the 4th and light divisions, so that
though it rained incessantly few horses got covered.

N.B.—The hussars committed great excesses in Villa Lobau, and
before it marched, Colonel Grant severely punished three of them in
presence of the brigade. He paid our troop the compliment of excusing
its attendance by which I felt flattered, but I was, as I always have
been, convinced that an appeal to the pride of a soldier who has been
two years on service meets little good result.

9th June.—To-day we crossed the river Carrion and the canal and
arrived at Fromistra in a terrible wet plight through deep roads.
Our horses unavoidably suffer from such continued marching and wet
weather, we got them covered and they got plenty of green barley.

10th June.—Passed the Pisuerga at Osornillo. This river is not to
be forded in this direction, but the passages over it are so many that
the French had not thought it worth while to destroy the bridge. We
halted at Villa Sandino after five leagues of wet and bad marching. I
pitched my tent, the quarters not being capable of accommodating
everybody.

11th June.—This morning all our spirits were gay at the change
that had taken place in the weather, the principal enemy we had to
fear; had it continued Lord Wellington’s plan of turning and
marching on the enemy’s flanks must inevitably have failed. The
army closed up on Burgos, after only three miles march we halted and
got into capital quarters at Castrilla de la Murcia; the enemy two
leagues from us at Hornillos ; to-morrow or perhaps the day after the
intention in regard to Burgos will be seen.

12th June.—This day’s operations were perhaps as good a military

SWABEY DIARY. 601

lesson as was ever afforded. About 12,000 infantry and a few of the
enemy’s cavalry had taken post on the heights covering the Burgos
high road about Buniel. To cover and conceal his real intention of
marching on the enemy’s right flank Lord Wellington, though he
moved the whole army up to that point, showed only some cavalry.
The operations began by a little manceuvring with the Hussar Brigade.
The ldth Hussars supported by Newland’s two guns, with which both
Dyneley! and Gardiner went off, advanced against the French cavalry.
I was left with the 10thand 18th, who conjointly with the heavy cavalry
and General Anson’s brigade, tried to outflank their infantry, Lord
Wellington and Sir Thomas Graham superintending. My four guns
were immediately called on, and I advanced in front of our troops, and
cannonaded the enemy’s columns as they returned to the high road. I
think there never was such an opportunity for the movements of Horse
Artillery. I followed them on their flank as they retired, and seven
different times came into action, twice within two hundred yards, when
the enemy with the greatest firmness and intrepidity formed hollow
squares and received our fire very steadily giving me two volleys of
musquetry which fortunately, though it could hardly have been ex-
pected, passed over us without injury. In order to determine the
necessary changes in our position I was several times obliged to
gallop close up to them, when many of their men fell out of the ranks
and took steady aim at me, but I kept in motion and was consequently
safe. As soon as they got down the hills, losing a great many men on
the way, one squadron and two Horse Artillery guns endeavoured to
cover their rear, these were charged by a squadron of the 14th and
one of the 8rd Dragoons who took one of the guns.

All this time the staff stood by me, but I was permitted to choose
my own ground and was in no way interfered with. Owing to the
enemy being much below us, and the ground being wet, our shot did
not rise and consequently did not take the effect I could have wished.
Lord Wellington sent me a message to go down into the high road,
where indeed I should have been glad to be, but it was then too late
and on my representation it was left to my discretion. ?

Gardiner in the meantime had done much execution, and the enemy
being now out of my range, he came to me to move. The ground was
very bad, and in doing so one of my guns upset and broke the trail.
I was getting it replaced and the gun mounted on the spare wheel-
carriage ® when General Alten galloped up and requested me to en-

1 2nd Captain Thomas Dyneley (Kane’s List No. 1114) served in the campaign in Italy under
Sir John Craig in 1805 ; and that in Calabria in 1806, under Sir John Stewart; battle of Maida and
siege of Scylla.

In the Peninsula with ““E”’ troop from July 1811 to November 1818, was present at the sieges
of Ciudad Rodrigo (wounded), Forts of Salamanca (wounded) ; at the battles of Salamanca, Vitoria,
and the Pyrenees, and at the affairs of heights of Christoval, bridge of Simancas, Majalahonda,
Morales, and San Mufios.

He accompanied the troop to the Netherlands in 1815, and was present in the retreat from
Quatre Bras and at Waterloo. Peninsula medal and 5 clasps, medal and C.B. for Waterloo.
Lieut.-General Dyneley, C.B. died in London in 1860.

2 «There was a smart cavalry affair yesterday at Cellada del Camino. We took an officer, some
prisoners, and a gun.” Letters of Sir A. 8. Frazer, K.C.B., p. 143. See Lord Wellington’s
despatch June 13th, 1813, Vol. X., p. 483.

3 The spare wheel-carriage, which was also a spare gun-carriage, carried three spare wheels.

602 SWABEY DIARY.

deavour to get off the French gun we had taken as it was threatened.
I took two pairs of horses and though it had no limber got it off to the
rear and delivered it over to General Hill’s division.1

Knowing where the troop was to halt I made for that point and got
into camp at Isar quite wet, it having rained all day. The horses got
a bad night; our men covered with tents fared better.

13th June.—My 28rd year closed this hated day, I am sorry to say
it brought with it many moral and unpleasant reflexions ; how little wiser,
how little better, and little advanced in life [am God only knows. Iam
no nearer the best and only object of all my wishes, the only progress I
have made is in my age. Philosophy may be a source of consolation
but insensibility is so inseparable from it that I am not ashamed to
confess that it has no charms for me; but adieu to melancholy
reflections.

Lord Wellington having made a demonstration on the high road
yesterday, and perhaps having intended to invest Burgos, was with
everyone else surprised and delighted at hearing at 7 o’clock this
morning a heavy explosion which soon turned out to be Burgos, ill-fated
Burgos, flying up in theair. Here ended the curse of the English army,
the obstacle to all our designs. The army was immediately put in
motion and away we went on the enemy’s flanks still keeping General
Hill’s corps in their rear to blind them. Night brought us to a wet
camp in a ploughed field near Tovar.

It is interesting here to learn from Wellington’s own words how
he was influenced by the destruction of Burgos.—(#.a.w.)
“When I advanced upon Burgos the second time, and had taken
my measures for driving back all the French posts and
attacking the place, I was very much surprised by a loud
explosion ; they had blown up Burgos... .. . When I
heard and saw the explosion (for I was within a few miles and
the effect was tremendous) I made a sudden resolution forth-
with—instanter to cross the Ebro, and endeavour to push
the French to the Pyrenees. We had heard of the battles
of Lutzen and Bautzen and of the armistice, and the affairs of
the allies looked very ill.” ‘‘ Croker Papers,’ Vol. IL.,

p. 309.

1 In the days when short ranges exposed Horse Artillery to musketry fire as at Cellada del
Camino, and to close fighting with cavalry as at Albuera, rapidity of movement and celerity in
serving the gun were imperative. In his able work on the “‘ Achievements of Field Artillery,’’
Major May justly says :—‘‘It was not through mere wantonness or love of theatrical display that
smartness was cultivated in the old troops, nor is it open to us less fortunate in experience to deride
methods that were the outcome of years of continuous active service, and which strove for and
obtained efficiency solid and substantial.’’ Apropos to which we may remark that during the long
peace which intervened between the Peninsular and Crimean wars, those who sneered and cavilled
at the drill and movements of the Horse Artillery and called them ‘‘ Woolwich Gladiators ’’ * did
so from lack of experience and knowledge of the conditions of service that had resulted in what
they witnessed. Mobility and quickness in serving the gun must still be the characteristic of Horse
Artillery, and the introduction of a lighter gun than has been in use of late years will it is hoped
enable that arm to resume its touch with the cavalry which since the craze for long ranges and
accurate shooting it has practically lost, —(#.A.W.)

* It is curious that the author of this epithet in after years obtained appointment to that
branch of the regiment which he at one time so yehemenently assailed.— (F.A.W-)

SWABEY DIARY. ~ 603

14th June—We started and marched through an unfriendly
mountainous country to Cornudilla. The army being so long on the
march is in great want of bread, but “ Awt Cesar aut Nullus” being
for the first time Lord Wellington’s motto, on we must go and push
the French to the rear. Sir Thomas Graham passed the Ebro at San
Martin.

15th June-—We marched to the Ebro descending to it by a cause-
way 5 miles in length made between the clefts of stupendous rocks.
Lord Wellington saw us descend with great anxiety for it was not
quite certain whether artillery could pass. The descent was very
sudden and steep, the road very roughly paved, not very wide, and in
many places with frightful precipices at the sides. It was the most
nervous thing I ever did; we had the good fortune to get down with-
out injury though a slip would have been fatal. The pass is called
the Puente Arenas. After crossing the river we wound about its
course by a most beautiful but frightful road cut in the side of the
rock ; perpendicular mountains covered and clothed on all sides with
trees and shrubs hanging over a narrow smiling valley full of fertility.
I have read many flowery descriptions of Alpine scenery, yet never
formed a conception of natural beauty in so fair, or it would be equally
applicable to say, in so ruggeda form. All I have seen and admired
in Portugal was nothing to this. The French passed this road when
they attacked Reynosa, and we found it had been obstructed by walls
built across it. The rock was so hard that I conclude the usual method
of cutting ditches across, had been impracticable. Night brought us
without accident to a camp at Villarcayo.

16th June.—Passing through Medina, a very good town, we arrived
at Torme where I dined with the 8rd Dragoons, and heard some account
of the effect of our fire on the 12th. From all I could collect I am
certain now of my guns having killed thirty on the road, and many
more above it, but no one afterwards went over that ground.
Gardiner’s guns also did great havoc, and in Burgos were found sixty
wounded with cannon shot and shrapnel shells, of which we made
great use.

17th June.—Marched to a camp near Santa de Llorente; again a wet
night.

18th June.—The army marched with some caution this morning, the
enemy with 7000 men having possession of a pass on the Vitoria road.
As the country was not favourable for cavalry operations, we took no
further part in dispossessing them than in looking on. The light
division turned the flanks, General Anson’s cavalry with Lawson’s! and
Ramsay’s guns drove them; there was much skirmishing and the enemy
at length retired in confusion. The light division took 250 prisoners,
a considerable number of oxen anda great deal of baggage. 1 calculate
the enemy’s loss since we marched at 1500 men, our own about 100 or
less, and we have only 500 sick. In consequence of the wet weather
we have unfortunately experienced, Lord Wellington’s plan of carrying

1 Captain R, Lawson. (Kane’s List No. 943).

604 SWABEY DIARY.

camp equipage! has turned out better than was supposed, and certainly
saved thousands. The army having advanced 20 days without halting
begins to experience the want of bread in a serious degree ; corn we
have not seen for 4 days.

1 It was the first year tents, 8 per company, were supplied to shelter the infantry in their
bivouacs.—(F.A.W.)

(To be continued).

605

JON px W OLG, 2XO3CINE

A.
PAGE
Abstract of ‘‘ Proceedings ”’ of the 58th
Annual General Meeting of R.A.I. ... 311
Action of 18th June, 1813 (Swabey) ... 603
Adjusting Clinometer Planes of Ordnance.
By Capt. W. i Donohue, R.A.,I.0.M. 545
Adye, it -Col. J., R.A. Siege ofGibraltar 437
Aldea de Ponte, ‘Action of (Swabey) ... 90
America, The Story of the Civil War in.
A Review by Major E. 8. May, R.A. 109
Ammunition Service of a Fort. By
Major R. F. Johnson, R.A. at 517
Ancient British Ordnance now in the
Artillery Museum. By Lt.-Col. J. C.
Dalton, R.A. . 21
Appendix, German “Manoeuvres, "1894
(Turner) ... . 453

" to Lecture on Gen. Bourbaki’s
Campaign ... 145

Artillery Action, ineemples of, Viller-
sexel (Bourbaki) 147

t " n» Chavanne, Mont-

béliard, Busserel,

Chagey, (Bour-
baki} and others 148

« Company in Scotland at the time

of the Union, Alistof. By C.
Dalton... c00 ooo. SAY)
Argyll, Earl of (Dalton) .. SSMS 586

Attacks on Coast For bresses, the eneral
forms that they take (Nicolls) 328

» particular forms of (Nicolls) 333
n ofa German Division of 12 Batta-
lions (Turner) .. 60 450

Average Casualties per Batter. y “of Horse
and Field Artillery, respectively(Stone) 542

Badajos, Fall of (Swabey) ... 193
Balaklava (a recollection). By F. TT. W. 661
Band, Royal Artillery .. 1. ... 289
Bigelow, Mr. Poultney. Disoussion,

Bourbaki’s Campaign ... ... 0... 143
Billeting Party (Hotham) ... ... 567
Blunt, Capt. HE. W., R.H.A. Disoussion,

Okehampton Experiences bao 16

Brown, Lieut. F. M., I.0.M., RA,
Terrestrial Refraction and] Mirage 497

» Capt. Thomas, Chief Fire-Master

in the West Indies, 1693. By
C. Dalton... . 175

Bourbaki’s Campaign i in Jan. and Feb.,

1871. By T. M. Maguire, Esq., LL.D. 131

Boys, Professor C. V., F.R.S. Discus-

sion, Major MacMahon’s Lecture... 285
Buckle, Lieut. A.S. Discussion of Coast
Artillery (Jocelyn) Lecture.. ... ... 163
Buller, General Sir Redvers. Discussion,
Major May’s Lecture... ... ... ... 284
Burgos blown up (Swabey) ... ... ... 602
Cc.
Camp (Hotham)... w. 575

Carstairs, Revd. William (Dalton). coo (Si/
Centenary Cup, Communicated by the
SORSU7c00 00 a0 co. 000 const LAL

PAGE
Chitral Fort, an account of the Relief of,
from Gilgit and the Siege of
Chitral. By Lieut. C. G.

Stewart, R.A. ... 399
u The Artillery i in. By Capt. Gas
Herbert, R.A. ... noo ono ORL
Ciudad Rodrigo (Sw INV) 00 ooo 123
Civil War in America, a Review. By
Major E.S. May, R.A. _ ... 109

Coast Artillery in Action ; Lecture. By
Lieut.-Colonel J. R. J.
Vooalyin, Mobs 200. con Ll

‘Jocelyn) Training of ... 161

" " 1 The Chain of Com-

mand dc oo” alfaiil

" " " Flexibility S00) pod fH)

" " u Superior knowledge

by each rank .., 153

" M" n The Battery Com-

mander ... .. 155
" 1 » Range Finders ... 155
" " " Targets aes 155

" " » Position of Battery
Commander in
Action in an open
IOHE cos 0 LOG)
" n Correction of Fire
in an open Fort 156
W " " Casemates ... soo AUG)
" ” n» TheFireCommander 157
W " " Section C.R.A. ... 157
fi fT » Range Correction... 157
" " » Communications... 161

" u mp “ANEWAEEHIS coc coo. 000 GIL
" " Training ae See LCL
" " » Discussion ... ... 163

I it TT » Lieut. A. 8.
Buckle ... 172

" iT " n Lieut. - Col.

Rainsford-
Hannay... 164

" " i Major IRs G.
Stone ... 166

" " " " Lt-Col. A. A.
Saunders 167

I " W " Maj.-Gen. H.
le G.Geary 163

" tt " " Capt. 1, DML,
Lowe... 168

" " " " Major Blo Oe
L. Holden 170
Coffee-shop (Hotham) .... «0 575

Comparative Table of Maxima and
Average Casualties (Stone) .. ... ... 539

Combe, Major- -Gen. Boyce. Discussion,
Major May’s Lecture... ... ... .., 229
Colonial Artillery (Williams)... .-. .. 367

Co-operation between Guns and Cay ae
Lecture by Major E. S. May, R.A.... 207

Concluding Remarks (White) 566 oop Behe

Cummings, Capt. W. H., R.A. Extracts
from Old Order Books, R.A. Sheerness 555

Dalton, C. Capt. Thomas Brown, Chief
Fire-Master in the W.I., 1693 175

606 INDEX.

PAGE
Dalton, C., A list of the Artillery Com-
pany in Scotland at the time
of the Union .... . . 579
n Lieut.-Col. J. C., R. A. Ancient
British Ordnance now in the
Artillery Museum, Madrid... 21
" ijeecColl, do Coy HAL, Orn We
Employment of Artillery in
Cubaleeaere 547
Defence, the kind of Necessary (Nicolls) 838
Devonport or Richardson Target (Gray) 29
Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey, R.H A., in
the Peninsula. Hdited by Col.
F,. A. Whinyates, late R.H A.

IDEN Mo Clneys Ie 90 BS

" " " " TS oo 81
" " " " Heleleee 93
" " " W IW ogo HLS}
" " " " Wo . 185
" " m IE " IT. ... 241
" " u IN, 569 PAVIL
Ui] i] " W IDOL. 405
" " " " IV. vee 425
" " " INU Lo. I I, . 485
" " " " int. ooo AY
" IO 550 SOIL

Discussion, Tectarer on Bourbaki’ s Cam-

paign . 1'3

" Major MacMahon’s Lecture 285
n Major May’s Lecture. Co-
operation between Guns

and Cavalry... 227
ni Sir ee Wood, Chairman 227
H " 236
" Col. J. 1D), ronche 000 000 AS}
" Col. G. H. Marshall ... ... 229

on Major.-Gen. Boyce-Combe .. 229
" Lt.-Gen. Sir W. Stirling ... 230

" Lt.-Gen. Keith Fraser ooo ABIL
" General Lord Roberts... ... 234
" General Sir Redvers Buller 234

Major May ... 228

Donaline, Capt. W. E., R.A., 1.0.M.
Adjusting Clinometer Planes of Ord-

mance. 545
Douro, Passage 8, “18th May, "1813
(Swabey) : ... 592
“D” Troop at Salamanca (Swabey) +. 593
E.

Eastern and Western Views of Mountain
Artillery, a Review. By Major H. C.

C.D. Simpson, R.A. ... . 439
Ebro, Passage of, by “Ee” Troop |
(Swabey) 603
Hlectric- Hahts, “Tor pedo - ‘boats Raids
(Vereker) 000 6 . 181
EH] Boden, Action of (Swabey) o00 ooo 0)
“E”’ Troop, Disaster to (Swabey) .. 804
Hsla, Passage of the, by ““E”’ poor
iSwabey)... . . 598
FIR Troop, Passage ‘of Ebro. “by”
(Swabey)... .. 603
" ordered to join Brigade of
Hussars (Swabey) aes 000. HOS

" Refit of 1813. ‘Letter of
Major Gardiner, R.H.A.
about (Swabey) . 691
Extracts from Old Order Books, R. A.
Sheerness. Communicated by Cae
Ai¥o dal, Crmmemmnes, Iho oo 200 000 ABD

PAGE

Fire Command, the Manning of the,
(Williams) ee 865

u Discipline, French Mountain Artil-
lery (Simpson) . 263

Fortress Organization which will facilitate
training (White) ... ... 374
u the Manning of the (Williams) 366

Fraser, Lt.-Gen. Keith. Discussion,
MiajoreMiavassiiectune) Wale nnns Monell
French Mountain Artillery (Simpson) ... 259

» Col. J.D. P. Discussion, Major

May’s Lecture ... . 206 090 KS}
F.T. W. Balaklava (a recollection) coo BIL
G.

Geary, Major.-Gen. H. le G., C.B.
Discussion of Coast Artillery Lecture
(Jocelyn)... ... God | ano «00000 AGH}

German Maneuvres, Notes on. By

Major J. F. Mani-

THMIGL, Teco 200 oon IL

1894, Notes on.

By Colonel A. E.
Turner, C.B.
A.-A.-G., R.A., 449

1 Artillery, The Casualty Returns

of the, at the Battles of Colombey,

Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte.
a, Major F. G. Stone, D-A-A-G.,
R.A ... 537

Gray, Capt. Pp. E., R.A. “Record Targets 27

Greenhill, Professor A. G., F.R.S., Dis-
angstiom, Major MacMahon’s Mecture 237

Guns and Cavalry Co-operation between.

Lecture by Major E. 8. May, R.A. 207
» Torpedo-boat Raids (Vereker) ... 1&2

H. ;

Hansard, Major A. C., R.A. Proposed
Slide Rules for Calculating Battery

Commander's Corrections ... 201
Hay, Major E. O., R.A. Discussion,

Okehampton Lecture ... 17
Herbert, Capt. G. F., R.A. The Axtillery

in Chitral nee 501

Holden, Major H. C. Tn, R. Ne ‘Dis:
cussion of Coast Axtillery Lecture
(Jocelyn) 5a ee Peik70

Hotels, Marching (Hotham) . mies qateme sD UL!

Hotham, Major J.,R.H.A. ‘A few hints
on Marching at Home and Abroad .., 565

Hong Kong Target (Gray) ... ... ... 28

Hour of starting March (Hotham) ... 574

Hughes, Major A. J., R.A. pape
Experiences, WIM oes oo

Instruments for looking through Thick
Walls with Small Apertures. By A. H.
Russell, Capt. of Ordnance, U. S.Army 389

[Sie lnooplateBalaklayarciarnmmebs mm TemOLOL
Italian Mountain Artillery ... .. ... 264
J.

Jocelyn. Lt.-Col.,J.R.J.,R.A. Lecture
on Coast Artlllery in
OHO — 90 ooo op WL

INDEX. 607
PAGE PAGE

Jocelyn, Lt.-Col., J. R.J., R.A. Discus- Mountain Guns, Comparative Table of.
sion, Major MacMahon’s lecture 286 (Simpson) iieerc mae 4071
Johnson, Major Rk. F., R.A. The Am- Morales, Action at (Swabey) ... ... ... 599
munition Service of a Fort ... oo coo ANY Mule, Top-loaded, American (Simpson) 412
1 Side- loaded, " n 443

K.
N.
Kelly, Major R. M. B. F., R.A. A

Naval Attacks (Nicolls) ... .. 829, 332

method of calculating the probability
of Coast Defence Fire ...

55
LL.
Lisbon, Account of (Swabey)... ... ... 46
Llerena, Affair of (Swabey) ... . 190
LLoyd, Major W. N. Discussi ‘on, ‘Oke-
hampton Lecture ... 17
Lockhart, Colonel R. D. E. Discussion,
Major MacMahon’s
Lecture ... 287
" 1 Chairman Okehampton
Gectures.. -.. Wl, 18) 19
Lowe, Capt. F. M., R.A. Miscucciont of
Coast Artillery Lecture (Jocelyn) ... 168
M.

MacMahon, Major P. A., F.R.S., R.A.
Terrestrial Refraction and Mirage, a
LEPXCLATERD: ‘cog 660.060) Oda ach cog ong ASD

Maguire, T. M., Esq., LL.D. General
Bourbaki’s Campaign i inJan. and Feb.,
NEV co 000 131

Malakhand Pass, “The “Attack on(Her bert) 503

Manifold, Major J.¥F., R.A. Notes on
German Manceuvres 6 Al

Marching at Home and ‘Abroad, ‘A few

hints on. By Major J.

(Eo thamspR Ar sAtan nnn 65
" Home (Hotham) ... ... 566
India n 572

Marshall, Col. G. H. Discussion, ‘Oke-
hampton Lecture 14, 17, 18

t 1 Discussion Major May’ s
lecture ee 229

May, Major KE. S., R.A. Discussion,
Okehampton Lecture 16, 17
Discussion of his Lecture 238

The Story of the Civil War

in America. A review.
IhPapo | Gon bec) vay ano. JON)

" » Co-oporation between Guns
and Cavalry, a Lecture 207

McDonnell, Major J.. R.H.A. Discus-
sion Okehampton Experiences ... ... 16
Mechanical Devices (Russell). First form 392
" " H Second , 396
" Third " 397

Method of Calculating the Probability of

Coast Defence Fire. By Major R. M.

tt tt
tt tt

B. F. Kelly, R.A.. . 68
Military Attacks Covered and | Supported

by Ships (Nicolls) .. ... © obo Sat0)
Mitchell Target (Gray) pos) boos enone TER aan

More Brief Considerations on Coast De-
fence. By Colonel D. O’Callaghan . 511
Mountain Artillery of Japan (Simpson) 439
of America ” 440

of France and Italy,

with the. By Major

H. C. C. Simpson,
Ie\ooe0 000 on on LN)

" "
n W

Nicolls, Captain E. G., R.A. Silver
Medal’ Prize) Hssay, 1895... ... ... 327.

Obstacles, Torpedo-boat Raids (Vereker) 179
O'Callaghan, Colonel D. More Brief

Considerations of Coast Defence co boo SUL
Okehampton Experiences, 1894. A Lee-
ture by Major A. J.

Hughes, R.A. it

" " Brigade rachiscme mae:
Oceupation of Posi-

ODS 60 20 2

1" n Appearing Targets 6
" 1 Bchelonand Moving

Targets. 5

1" » Signals and Orders 4

" u“ Ranging. 00 oe 8
" 1 Fire from under

COVER oo 400 000 8

1" Bm dew goo hn gw

" » Competitive ... ... 10

" 1» Equipment ... 11

rT » Experiments... ... 12

Discussin ... 14

Ollivant, Col. E. NG R.H.A. Discussion
Okehampton Lecture coo ooo), IG, NY
Ordnance, Ancient British, now in alle
Artillery Museum, Madrid. By Lieut.-
Col. J. C. Dalton, RAW 21
Out-posts, Torpedo- boat Raids (Vereker) 180
Owen, MajorG. P., R.A. Anew Mcthod
of Setting the Tyres of Wheels <. 2... 515

Pace of Marching (Hotham) ... ... .., 869
Peninsular Campaign, Summary of
(Swabey) from Sept.
1811—April, 1812... 37
from April to Nov.

TMP ooo . 241
u u from April to ‘Sept.,
1813 485
Plea for Heavy Guns in noe Ss Defence,

A. By Capt. G. Tyacke, R.A... .., 69
Portsmouth ‘larget (Gray) 1... 4. 28
Programme of Work (Williams) c00 600 Sha)
Practice, Italian Mountain Artillery ... 267

Raids on Harbours, Torpedo-boats. By
Lieut. C. G. Vereker, R.A.. 179
Rainsford-Hannay, Lt.-Col. R. W., , RA.
Discussion of Coast
Artillery Lecture
(Ciocely:m) pau eETION
Discussion, Major
acMahon’s Lectur
Record pace Ta oe P. E, Gray,

aliko.o 000 OOO o7

I Ui]

608 INDEX.

PAGE

Refracting Instrument (Russell) .. ... 389

Ribera, Affair of (Swabey) .. ... ... 289

Richardson Record angel (Gray)... 0 80)

Rider Target (Gray)... . co» ORI
Roberts, General Lord. Discussion

Major May’s Lecture ... 234

Russell, A. H., Capt. of Ordnance U.S.
Army. Instruments for looking through
Thick Walls with Small Apertures ... 389

Ss.

Salamanca, ““D” Troop at (Swabey) ... 596
Salguciro, Life at. Chap. III. (Swabey) 95
Saunders, Lt.-Cot. A, A., R.A. Discus-
sion of Coast Artillery Lecture(Jocelyn) 167
Setting the Tyres of Wheels, anew method

of. By Major G. P. Owen, R.A. ... 515
Siege of Gibraltar. oy Bt.-Lt.-Col. J.
Adye, R.A. ... » 457

Simpson, Major Tt, Oh ©, “Doy ips
Eastern and Western
Views of Mountain
Artillery (a review) 439
Discussion, Okehamp-
ton Experiences ... 15
With the Mountain
Artilleries of France

and Italy ... ... 259

Sixteen men killed by one Pade shot
(Swabey)... coo ooo HY
Slezer, Captain John (Dalton) s00 00 HY)
" " u Letters from.. ... 581

n ‘*Theatrum Scotia? 585
Slide Rules ‘for Calculating Battery Com-
mander’s Corrections. Proposed by

Major A.C. Hansard, R.A. ... ... 201
Stirling, Lt.-Gen. Sir Ww. Discussion,
Major May’s Lecture ..._. 230

Stone, Major F. G., R.A. Discussion of
Coast Artillery. Lecture orem) 166
u Major F. G., D.-A.-A.-G.,
The ies Returns oe oe
German Artillery at the Battles
of Colombey, Mars-la-Tour and
Gravelotte ... ... . 537
Summary of the Peninsular Campaign
(Swabey) from Sept.
1811 — April, 1812 37
from April to Noy.

1812.. 241
n » from Apsil to Sept.
1813 a0 a0 . 485
Summary (Williams) op 368

Stewart, Lieut. C. G., R.A. "The Relief
of Chitral Fort from Gilgit and the
Siege of Chitral ..._. . 399
Swabey, Lieut. W., R.H. A. , Diary of, | in
the Peninsula. Edited by
Colonel F. A. Whinyates.
Part I., aes SO)

" " " " So 81
" " " g JOE con OB
i] U7 I W Ve see 113
" " a . Wo coo Ike
" " m lll p Alga soy oh
u " " in la co9 BBE
" " " n IIT.... 405

U1] tt " " IV. eee 425

PAGE

Swabey, Lieut. Part III. Chap.I. ... 485
t n tt W Tele eae 527

" tt TF Ui] ss es 591

Tide Corrections (Hansard, Slide Rules) 202
The Training together of the Garrison
Artillery Forces of the Empire, &c.
Silver Medal Prize
Beare 1895. By
Cap. E. G. Nicolls,
IRs o08 327
n 1 Commended Essay
By Lt.-Col, R. F.
Williams, R.A... 852.
" " " Commended Essay
By Lt.-Col. R. W.
White, R.A. ... 369
Terrestrial Refraction and Mirage. <A
Lecture by Major
P. A. MacMahon,
TBoIRIS5 Rolo 50 BBY)
By Lieut. F. M.
Brown, I1.0.M.,

Ryo eas) loo. Gon CML

Teviot, Lord (Dalton) ... .. «.. 586
Torpedo-boat Raids on Harbours. By

Lieut. C. G., Vereker, R.A. ... 175

Training to Suit the Organisation (White) 379
1 Necessity for. orpedo-boat Raids

(Vereker)... ... .. «. —= 183
Transport (Hotham) ag coo, BY}
Travel of Object, Correction for (Hansard

Shde Rule) .. 205

Trench. Colonel C. C. ‘(Chairinan), Major

MacMahon’ s Lecture 95 6 » 288
Turner, Colonel A. H., C.B., eat. e.
R.A. Notes on German Mancuvres,
HD o00 000 449
Tyacke, Capt. G., ,R.A. A Plea for Heavy
Guns in Fortress Defence... 69
Vv.

Vereker, Lieut. C.G., R.A. Moe
boat Raids on Harbours... 5 Le
WwW.

Watkin, Lt.-Col. H.8.8.,C.B. Discus-
sion, Major MacMahon’s Lecture ... 288

Wood, Sir Evelyn. Discussion, Major
May’s Lecture... 227, 236

Whinyates, Colonel F. Ny late R. ra A
Diary of Lieut. W. Swabey,
R.H.A., in the Peninsula.

Tees 1k, CIN D Uo 00 |
" tt u W aTeles see 81
" " " g U0 boo 6B
" " " i WWoos 183
" " " m Wo ooo dists
" " Tegel © hie eee roa ||
" " " mp dl, oo, Agil
" " " n» III.... 405
" " " m. 2lAYoc09 28S
u WW iT Gib. W dig eee 485
W W W W Uf, eee 527
" " " Loco BOUL

PRECIS

AND

AU Teal, IN iS JO oak WP EO) aN

“RUSSIAN ARTILLERY JOURNAL” ~

THE MILITARY TRAINING OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

t
PRECIS BY

MAJOR H. A. LAMBART, R.A.

(Continued from No. 11, Vol. XXTI).

Instruction in Maneuvre.—General Principles.

Exercises in manceuvre may be divided into two parts, viz., simple exercises,
z.e. drill movements, and exercises connected with fire action.

The former, directed to instruction in drill, may be regarded as regulation exer-
cises, such as are included in sub-division, section, battery and brigade-division
drill. The latter consist of movements connected with forming “ fighting ”
formations from “ order of march ” formations, and the solution of tactical pro-
blems with reference to ground, &c. As regards drill, the more clearly and simply
the duties of the different grades of commanders are laid down, the easier will be
the instruction of all ranks.

As described in former chapters, this simplification is best arrived at by the
principle that every commander, from the brigade-division commander down to
Nos. 1, is the guide of his command, which moves as it were independently,
directing itself and dressing by him. As each unit, sub-division, section and
battery completes its instruction as such, it is ready to be worked into the one
above it; the only individual who requires fresh instruction being the commander.
Thus when we pass from the smallest drill unit, the sub-division, to the largest
ones, we merely bring together a number of instructions of individuals in each of
which the instruction is reduced to that of the commander of the next smaller
unit,

From what has been said we may deduce these principles on which to base the
instruction of artillery, viz. :—

(i.) A sharp line of distinction between drill and manceuvre.

(i.) A broad use of individual instruction and personal responsibility.
(i.) Alternation of simple drills with combined manewvre.

(iv.) Practical examples, i.e., tactical problems, &c.

The mancuvring of bodies of artillery, if the instruction is based on these
principles, becomes very simple since the whole attention of commanders of sub-
2. VOL. XXII.

ordinate units is directed not to the execution of geometrically exact movements,
but to the simplest and quickest methods of leading their commands to their
places in the new formation.

Note.—The article goes on to lay down elaborate details for the consecutive in-
structions of the different drill units, sub-divisions, sections and batteries. The
two former of these contain nothing of interest to us, I think, nothing that is any
improvement on our own system. It is suggested that much instruction may be
given at times of the year when mounted drills outside barracks cannot be carried
out, by means of skeleton drill on foot and mounted.

Skeleton Battery Drill.

The guns and wagons are represented by mounted men, the former by two or
three men each if possible, so as to provide a horseholder for Nos. 1.

Very useful instruction can be given in this way to section commanders and
Nos. 1 in keeping the proper intervals and distances, taking up positions for
action, &c.

As the movements are naturally carried out more quickly than with horsed guns
more instruction cau be got through in the same time, and the battery commander
has better opportunities of observing the mistakes made and correcting them.

Battery Drill. -

The preliminary training of the battery as a whole should be carried out on the
parade ground. It is here that it will be shown whether the preliminary instruction
in sub-division and ‘section drill, and of section commanders and Nos. 1 in
skeleton battery drill has been thoroughly mastered. It is not recommended
that much time should be devoted to purely parade movements, nor that a high
degree of precision should be exacted in them. Work on the parade ground is
better devoted to practising the more important manceuvres that are used in the
the field, such as the fighting formations and coming into action. Positions to be
occupied should be marked out with flags, &c., and the section commander and
Nos. 1 practised in bringing their guns accurately and squarely into action at the
proper intervals, accustoming themselves to judge from a distance the points in
the marked position they should make for. Better practice is gained if only one
ffank of the position be marked.

The real training of the battery for service, however, must be carried out beyond
the precincts of the parade ground. Its most important feature is practice in
coming into action from the line of march, with the reconnaissance of ground and
position, &e. This preliminary reconnaissance must be most thoroughly carried
out, with a view to profiting by all available cover for the advance of the battery
and its concealment when in action. The instructing officer having decided on
the ground to be worked over, and observed the approximate position for action,
as well as the position of the imaginary or marked enemy, places at various points
of the latter, officers or N.-C.O.’s told off as observers, who are provided with field-
glasses and compasses. Their duty is to observe and note down everything
connected with the advance of the battery under instruction that would have given
information to the enemy in his position of an impending attack. In the battery
itself notes are also’ kept of the times of its different operations, advance to the
preliminary position, coming into action, &c. By means of these notes the in-
structing officer is able to. ascertain. how.far the advance was concealed, and to
point out faults in not taking advantage of cover, &c. Repeating exercises of this
kind will give officers a true appreciation of the value of cover and cultivate in
them the habit of quickly seizing on the best lines of, and formations for the
advance. uate :

Brigade-Division Drill.

Skeleton drill is not applicable to a brigade-division on the parade ground, but
is an extremely useful form of exercise on manouvring ground, and may be
directed to the same objects and applied in the same manner as in the case of a
single battery.

Parade ground exercises with horsed guns of a brigade-division should be de-
voted to obtaining uniformity of pace, practice in following the brigade-division
commander in changes of direction, and to the formations of columns and lines as
laid down in the drill-book. Advances into action on a marked position should
also be practised, especial attention being paid to dressing and intervals in action.
Brigade-division exercises on manoeuvring ground are, as in the case of a single
battery, to be principally devoted to movements into action from the line of march;
and the same method of instruction and remedying faults should be adopted.

All exercises of batteries and brigade-divisions lose much of their value if the
batteries are not practised at the same time in fire action, which is intimately con-
nected with the supply and replenishment of ammunition, replacement of
casualties, &c.

By lending horses to each other the batteries of a brigade-division may also be
practised in working at full war strength, which is very important in view of the
great difference between the peace and war establishment of a battery.

Conduct of Artillery Exercises in connection with Action.

The instructor formulates the general and special ideas, and himself takes the
post of the next highest commander, such as commander of an advanced-guard, a
division, or detached force.

An imaginary enemy as well as imaginary troops on the side of the batteries
should always be indicated by the instructor, who gives directions on the following
points :—

1.—The movements (imaginary) of the troops on both sides.

2.—Casualties among commanders, as well as among men and horses of the
batteries.

3.—Damage (imaginary) to matériel in the batteries.

4.—The effect of the fire on the enemy.

Replenishinent of Ammunition.

This is of the highest importance and must be most carefully practised in all
its details.

In this connection it is highly desirable that a sufficient supply of drill projec-
tiles to partially replace the service ammunition of at least one battery ina
brigade-division should be kept up, to the extent of one box each of drill common
shell and shrapnel per limber, and full firs¢-line wagons.

It is very important that the second-line wagons should reach the fighting
position before the whole of the first-line ammunition is expended. The battery
commander has his hands too full to be able to keep note of the expenditure of
ammunition, and the same is true of the section commanders, This duty should
therefore be imposed on a superior N.-C. officer (quartermaster sergeant),! who
should be in charge of the first-line wagons. His whole attention, after the
battery is in action, should be devoted to noting the expenditure of ammunition,
and at the proper moment he should inform the battery commander that the time
has come to call wp the second-line wagons.

The second-line wagons await in the nearest position, under cover, the moment
when the first-line of wagons leave the fighting line. This happens as soon as the

1“ Wachtmeister,” “ feld webel.’—H.A.L.

last cartouche! of the kind of ammunition, which is being used, has been sent up
to the guns. Immediately before this moment the teams are hooked into the first-
line wagons which move at a trot to the position of the limbers, where the rounds
remaining in them are collected in one or two boxes of the gun-limbers if any
rounds have been taken out of them. The empty wagons are then refilled from
the wagons sent up by the ammunition column. If the batteries are suddenly
called on to move shortly before the time has come to call up the second-line wagons,
they should take on with them the almost emptied first-line wagons, sending
directions to the second-line to follow by the shortest road to the new position.
On the other hand, if the batteries move when the second-line wagons have already
been called up, the quartermaster-sergeants of each battery should take over and
bring along the latter, sending back the almost empty first-line wagons to be re-
filled. If the fire has been carried on exclusively with one kind of ammunition,
the first-line wagons, although not empty, should be sent to complete from the
ammunition column. In positions at short ranges the guns are supplied direct
from the limbers.

Replacement of Casualties in the Personnel.

This must also be practised in peace time. As soon as the batteries come into
action the spare gun carriages approach to the nearest position under cover,
bringing four bearers and the battery surgeons; the duty of the latter is to
immediately remove from the proximity of the batteries the killed and wounded,
to avoid the unfavourable moral effect of their presence on the remainder. Slightly
wounded men, who are able to walk, after their wounds are dressed, are sent
straight to the wagon échelons, and the remainder are removed by stretchers or on
the empty ammunition wagons going to the rear. This should be practised in
peace time by making use of tickets in the following form, which under the orders
of the instrnctor, are pinned to the breasts of the men indicated.

EHxvample:—No. 2 at No. 5 gun. ‘ Wound by splinter in the right leg below
the knee, three minutes after coming into action.”’ The man indicated falls out,
and according to the nature of his wound, either walks to the rear or is removed by
the bearers.

It is a moot point whether casualties in the gun detachments should be replaced
as soon as possible, or whether the guns should be worked with reduced detach-
ments. Section commanders arrange for the performance of the duties by reduced
numbers in the event of casualties, and the quartermaster-sergeant controls and
arranges for the replacement of them from the limbers and wagon échelons, those
belonging to the first-line and limbers being first called on.

Replacement of Casualties in Horses.

After a battery has come into action and the wagon teams and gun-limbers
have been sent away, the only horses that would remain under fire would be those
of the battery commander and of a trumpeter acting as orderly. In addition there
would be under fire from time to time the wagon teams, during the exchange of
wagons, and the horses of orderlies coming and going. We may therefore expect
comparatively slight losses in the position itself among the horses, whilst the
batteries remain in action. On the other hand the losses would be heavy in the
position where the gun-limbers and wagon teams of the first-line are placed.? (Sic)
It is advisable to tell off an officer or a senior N.-C officer to take charge from
this point of view of the limbers, &c., in rear of the battery, as the échelon com-

1T presume the ammunition is packed in iron cages, holding three or four rounds, as in the
German carriages.—H.A.L.

2 This is not very clear as presumably the limbers and teams would be more or less under cover.—
HAL.

)

mander has quite enough to do in arranging for the supply and replacement of
ammunition,

The horses of officers and Nos. 1 can be replaced by the horses of trumpeters,
coverers, and in horse batteries, the horses of spare gunners. The most im-
portant thing is the replacement of the draught horses. For this purpose, in the
first instance, the spare draught horses will be used, and then the horses of the
first-line wagons by reducing the teams to four horses. The teams of the second-
line wagons must, if necessary, be reduced to two horses to complete the teams
in front, and lastly, all the horses, if necessary, must be taken out of the empty
wagons. It should be taken as a general rule to keep the gun teams up to six
horses and the wagon teams up to four horses, using for this purpose the riding
horses if necessary. As regards horse batteries, care must be taken to equalise
the available horses among the detachments of all the guns. If, when a horse
battery limbers up, there are more detachment horses than men, the spare horses
must be at once put into the wagons that are short of horses. On the other
hand, if there are more men than horses, men must be mounted on the lmbers.

The harness and saddlery of killed and disabled horses should be removed and
as far as possible placed on the wagons, preference being given to hammess. The
forage is also removed from these horses. Replacement of casualties in horses
should be constantly practised in all its details.

The instructor can employ for this purpose, previously prepared tickets as
described for the ‘ personnel.”

Casualties in Matériel.

It will rarely happen with matériel of the present day that guns will be totally
disabled by fire.

Breech-blocks will require to be replaced, gun wheels exchanged, &c. The de-
tachments should be practised in removing dismounted guns and broken gun
carriages by means of the limbers, but it is doubtful whether the exact drill for
each number, in cases of this sort, laid down in the drill-book, will always be
suitable.

Replacement of Casualties amoug Commanders.

Casualties to brigade-division and battery commanders, and the consequent
transmission of command to the next senior should be frequently practised, and at
the most critical moments, as not only do the officers who succeed to the com-
mand, get most useful practice, but opportunity is given to the officers who have
fallen out as disabled to observe at their leisure the working of their commands,
and to pick out the weak points in their military training.

Preparations for Advance or Retreat.

The brigade-division commander, who is watching the tactical course of the
action, will know in good time whether the movement willbe to the front or rear,
and takes his measures accordingly. The chief point for battery commanders to
pay attention to in changes of position is the avoidance of all unsteadiness and
confusion. As soon as the movement is decided on, the limbers and wagon
teams are called up to the guns by orderlies sent by battery commanders, who say
whether the movement will be an advance or retirement. The wagon teams are
at once hooked-in, and the officers and Nos. 1 mount. The N.-C.O. in charge of
the limbers and wagon teams reports to the battery commander that all is ready,
and the latter orders “ cease firing’ and limbers up.

Before limbering up, the gun detachments are made up to five men per gun if
possible.

Change of Position.
Changes of position for short distances are opposed to the principles of artillery

tactics. Changes of position should, as arule, be made by roads, in columns. Only ~
exceptionally and over very favourable ground can the batteries move in line, and to

make use of a network of paths and tracks is only permissible when these can be
easily and thoroughly reconnoitred beforehand.

As a matter of fact, the recon-
naissance of a considerable expanse of ground, as regards its practability for
artillery, is a much longer and more difficult business than is generally believed.
The line of advance, if necessary, must be marked out.
Wagon cchelons follow always in sub-division or section columns by the roads
Route March Hxercises.
These should, if possible, be combined with field movements, and be carried out
by brigade-divisions.
throughout.

Great attention must be paid to preserving an even pace

increased pace.

Loss of distance must never be made up by single teams, but by batteries, the
leading sub-division being halted if necessary, and the whole closing up at an

Training of Orderlies and Scouts.
Very great stress is laid on the importance of thoroughly training orderlies
and scouts, and a scheme of instruction laid down.

The training, it 1s recom-
mended, should be carried out by one officer, specially detailed.

The system is the same as that described in the paper on “ Ground Scouts and
Combat Patrols,” which appeared in the December number of the ‘‘ Proceedings.”

To be continued.

PRECIS

AND

AP IBS AS INAS J vat, A EO) INT

REVUE DARTILUERIE.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS AT THE
BATTLE OF THE YALU.

M. P. MERVEILLEUX DU VIGNAUX.

TRANSLATED BY

IM, 135 16), 10p

M. pu VieNAvx does not attempt to tell again the story of the battle, but avails
himself of the more exact knowledge now procurable to derive some definite con-
clusions from its technical details. The Yalu battle, says he, is but an imperfect
image of what would take place, say in the Mediterranean, in case of an engage-
ment between two Huropean fleets manned by well trained crews and furnished
with up to date material.

The weight of a Chinese broadside was 6 times that of a Japanese, but that did
not suffice to give the Petchili fleet any real superiority. The state of its material,
the absence of quick-firing guns, and the want of training in the crews, placed the
Chinese in a position of marked inferiority. We cannot therefore hope to deduce
from the various phases of this engagement any conclusions of absolute finality
for the conduct of modern warfare.

But some useful instruction may be obtained by the close study of certain
episodes, and by submitting them to a sort of technical enquiry as to how far
training and moral force may be considered negligeable quantities in the estimation
of the particular facts disclosed.

This enquiry will therefore be limited to an examinstion of weapons and armour
Without opening up the complex question of naval tactics.

i°—Hutis or,suips. Machinery suffered little, but top hamper, such as
military masts, was completely swept away. Men were wounded as much by
splinters of the hull and superstructure as by those of shells.

All superstructures increase the number of splinters and the size of the target,
and cause many shells to burst which would otherwise pass harmlessly overhead.
They should therefore be reduced to a minimum compatible with the proper
behaviour of the ship at sea.

There were numerous fires in the cabins and in the coal bunkers. Wood and
paint should therefore be as scarce as possible. The Japanese officers have come
to the conclusion that all bedding must be carried below the armoured deck when

12, vou. XXII. 82a

a ship is cleared for action, for which purpose special bunkers should be supplied.
The existing means on board ship for suppressing a fire seem inadequate.
Finally, the relative values of certain materials of construction have been
determined with some precision. Plates and structures of soft metal were not
split or smashed, but twisted and put out of shape; so that they were susceptible
of rapid repair either on board ship or in the arsenals.

The Japanese in particular made note of this when they had to repair the
“Matsushima” which was fresh from the hands of its French constructors (Forges
et Chantiers de la Méditerranée). This coast-guard vessel had suffered terribly,
and the quality of the chief material of construction was much appreciated. In
other ships, built with harder metal which had been split or broken, some repairs
were extremely difficult.

2°—Prorsuctron. Armour doubtless played an important part. It stopped
the projectiles of quick-firing ordnance, whereas all unarmoured parts were hacked
to pieces, as might have been expected. But armour of moderate thickness all
over a ship’s side would certainly have done more service than a thick belt. All
the more so in future when the use of melinite shells may have to be reckoned
with. Few shells strike the water line, the mean point of impact being much
higher. Practical armour piercing is also much inferior to theoretical, mainly
because the trajectory of a shell is rarely, if ever, normal to the surface struck.

On the other hand armour is not sufficient to command success, for in this
respect the Japanese were much less protected than the Chinese. It seems certain
that as mere dead weight, an increased artillery would be preferable to an increase
of armour.

The hypothesis of a ship with a riddled hull continuing the fight, because its
machinery, turrets and armoured bridge are intact, is illusory. Such a ship floats,
it is true, but may be considered disabled and will be obliged to withdraw from
the fight.

The armoured bridge does not always afford complete invulnerability. A
Chinese ship had a portion of her bridge carried away by a 32°™ (12'6) shell.
A few minutes later she foundered and went down by the stern.

It would appear that the Chinese would have lost fewer ships had thay paid
more attention to water-tight compartments. None of the ships were armed with
nickel-steel or Harveyized plates. The coal bunkers gave good protection. In
one ship they are said to have stopped a shell of large calibre.

3°—Ram. Its effect was nil. Several attempts were made, but none quite
succeeded. We must not conclude from this that the ram is useless. For it may
well serve to annihilate a ship already disabled by artillery and torpedoes, or on
the other hand a ship with its artillery silenced may as a final effort attempt to
ram a better armed vessel which steers badly.

4°—Sprep, This element exercised a predominant influence. Admiral Ito,
thanks to his superior speed, was able to fight the Chinese at the ranges which
suited him best and to take the offensive. He shewed that a swift well armed
cruiser can accept battle with a big battle ship. However, continuous evolutions
at high speed necessitate an enormous consumption of coal.

5°AUXILIARY CRUISERS. One of these, the “Saikio,” an armed merchant
ship, was surrounded and her rudder was disabled. She was in great danger, and
part of the Japanese fleet had to go to her assistance. Such ships, having no pro-
tection, should not attempt to come to close quarters, but should be provided
with powerful artillery so as to assume the offensive at a long range, and high
speed to maintain it.

It was clearly seen at the Yalu how a slow ship could encumber the movements
of a squadron.

6°——RIFLE FIRE. Effect nil. Mitrailleuses were useful at times, but rifles
which employ many men were useless in comparison with mitrailleuses at all
ranges.

7°—Torpgpors. Locomotive torpedoes played but a small part in this en-
gagement. In view of the ravages made in the batteries by artillery fire the
presence of torpedoes in their tubes constituted an ever present and real danger.

The Japanese left their torpedoes in bunks. Several Chinese ships threw them
into the sea to get rid of them.

Submarine tubes are not liable to this drawback, and would appear to be the
only suitable method for discharging torpedoes from battle ships. The Chinese
tried to torpedo several Japanese ships, notably the group of small ships which
they surrounded. But, although the distance was only 80 metres, none of the
torpedoes reached their mark. These attempts, made first with a torpedo boat,
then with a cruiser, imply gross inexperience. The distance was really too small
for torpedoes projected at an angle of depression, for one of them passed under
the “Akagi.” This constitutes an argument in favour of torpedo tubes being
only slightly depressed and as near as possible to the water line. It is generally
believed, and probably with truth, that if the Japanese had had any torpedo
boats they would have inflicted still heavier losses on their opponents than
actually occurred. And, notwithstanding its injuries, their fleet might not have
been obliged to leave the field of battle at nightfall had they had any torpedo
catchers to oppose to those of the Chinese.

8°—ARTILLERY. This arm exercised a predominant influence throughout. It
was in fact gun fire which subdued the Chinese fleet. The highest calibre
in the Chinese fleet was 30°5°™ (12") Krupp; in the Japanese the 82 °™ (12’"6)
Canet with a length of 40 calibres, one shell from which, as stated above, gutted
an armoured bridge and sank the ship. On the other hand some 30°5 ™ shells
disabled the barbette tower of the ‘‘ Matsushima ” when the 32 ™ gnns had fired
but 4 rounds. One of the former shells burst in the central battery of the same
ship causing a conflagration and killing or disabling 80 men.

It is evident that the 30°5 ™ and 32°™ guns had a considerable excess of power
as against the plates of medium thickness to which they were opposed, and that
heavy shells with high velocity crash through all they meet and have an
annihilating effect.

It was proved however that simplicity in the working of such guns was of the
first importance. The loading of the heaviest guns is bound to be a slow job.
The hydraulic gear acted very well at first, but in some cases, after the firing of
3 or 4 rounds, bursting shells broke the hydraulic tubes and disabled the hoists
and the laying gear. There should have been means of working the guns by
hand. Electricity would be equally liable to injury from shell fire, but would
admit of simpler arrangements. The advocates of electricity have always pointed
out the danger of frost in connection with hydraulic gear.

One of the official reports on this subject during the war says: ‘“ Hydraulic
gear was a source of much anxiety in frosty weather, in that stoves had to be
constantly kept alight in the region of the turret and the working gear. It is
believed that electric motors or even hand gear would have been preferable.”

The 30°5°™ guns of the Chinese ships were in pairs, and generally one was
loaded with a commou shell, the other with a chilled or steel shell.

The simultaneous firing of the 2 guns, for which there was of course no good
reason, was sufficient to cause some damage to the ship itself, so great was the
shock to the hull.

10°—Qurck-rirtne GuNs. As regards this class of armament the Japanese
had an incontestable superiority. The Chinese had still Krupp guns with wedge

breech-pieces, the manipulation of which is too slow. It must be added that the
shooting on both sides from the guns of medium calibre was very wanting in
accuracy, and the expenditure of ammunition was considerable.

When the three Japanese ships had been separated from the rest of the squadron
the Chinese held them under their fire and should have been able to overwhelm
them. The Japanese however escaped owing to the courage and mancuvring
skill of their men.

It has been ascertained that several of the steel armour-piercing shells of the
Japanese 12°™ (4°72) guns did not penetrate very deeply into the Chinese
armour. At the ranges at which the battle was fought these guns had a relatively
low remaining velocity, and it is believed that the English guns which the Japanese
had did not possess sufficient muzzle velocity. It was scarcely 700 m.s. (2296 f.s.).
The effect would have been much greater with about 800 m.s. (2625 f.s.). In
addition to the increased vis viva, a flatter trajectory is obtained with a very high
muzzle velocity, so much so that we may almost hope to lay guns point blank at
the ordinary battle range of about 2000 yards. Otherwise the 12 ™ showed itself
to be an excellent calibre, easy to work and every way suitable for a cruiser.

11°—Disposition or THE GUNS. The drawbacks of an armour-plated central
battery were made apparent when one shell disabled 80 men of the “Matsushima.”
To meet this every gun should have its own armoured emplacement, and this more
especially in the case of heavy guns, which should never be mounted in pairs,
whatever advantages that method may afford in the reduction of weight.

The smallest accident to the lifts or laying gear of a double gunned turret at
once disables from one half to two thirds of a ship’s offensive power.

This has often been stated. It has now been proved. At the very commence-
ment of the action the twin 30° (12) guns of a Chinese barbette ship were
disabled by a small shell, of which some fragments struck the hydraulic apparatus.

In the same way a single big gun, as on board the “ Matsushima,” is insufli-
cient. It is better to have two of rather smaller calibre,

It would appear that existing barbette turrets do not protect sufficiently the
men or machinery of the gun from the fire of small guns, a single shell from
which may disable the barbette gun. Before however pronouncing irrevocably in
favour of closed turrets we must remember their disadvantages: their weight, and
their forming with the gun and its platform one single structure. What in fact
would be the result of a shell not piercing a turret, but shaking the whole
structure ?

In any case guns must not be too close to one another, and all guus must have
as wide a field of fire as possible to meet the varying circumstances of an engage-
ment between two squadrons constantly performing rapid evolutions.

Broadside fire is henceforward useless, likewise electric firing from a distance.
We may remark here that during the engagement all the channels for the electric
connections of the firing gear of the quick-firing guns were damaged by the
discharge of the big guns.

12°--EFFECTS OF PROJECTILES. There is no record of the penetration of
thick armour by any steel shell. The Chinese chiefly fired common shell from
their 80°5°™ guns. Of course a steel armour-piercing shell is comparatively
useless against a cruiser. Neither of the fleets possessed any double shells, or
any shells with high explosives. The effect of these may be guessed by the
performance of the common shells.

13°—SupPLy OF AMMUNITION. The Japanese big guns fired but few rounds ;
only 12 shells from the three 32 °™ guns of the three coast-guard ships, a mean of
only 4 rounds each.

On the other hand the quick-firing guns disposed of a large quantity of ammu-

nition. They report 200 rounds for a single 12°™ gun. At a given moment on
board the “ Matsushima” one hundred rounds were fired from 11 quick-firers in
little more than a minute. It is said that one of the reasons why the Japanese
withdrew their fleet at nightfall was the exhaustion of their supply of quick-firing
ammunition.

On the Chinese side the eight 30°5°™ guns fired 197 rounds, say 24 to 25 each.
Those of 15 °™ (6) 268 rounds, or 67 each. But these were not quick-firers.
The Chinese began first with common shell, and when no more of them were to
be had they continued their fire with steel shell. The latter, as already stated,
were found to be less efficient than the former. There was, especially in the
Chinese fleet, a reckless squandering of ammunition, so it would be unwise to
deduce any scheme of supply from their operations. But, as regards quick-firers,
it would appear that 200 rounds per gun may be considered an adequate, but not
excessive supply.

14°—FigutinG raANGE. The Chinese opened fire at 4000 metres (some say
5000). The Japanese reserved theirs till they were 3000 to 3500 metres from
the enemy.

At 2000 metres the cannonade became very lively. The Japanese, who con-
stantly manceuvred at high speed, maintained a distance from the enemy, according
to some accounts, of from 900 to 1400 metres. From this to 2000 metres may
be considered the mean fighting range. If that be admitted, the advantage of
high velocity and trajectory so flat as to admit of point blank firing at 2000
metres is apparent. ‘The distances constantly vary, and it would be a very great
advantage to be relieved from the necessity of continually altering the tangent
scale.

The evolutions occasionally brought the 2 fleets to within a hundred metres of
one another. At such times rapid firing guns become a first necessity, and the
degree of rapidity attainable in breech closing and firing is no longer a negligeable
quantity.

Some have foretold for armoured ships an engagement at short range, with low
velocity guns and highly explosive shells. This would at least have the advantage
of utilising guns of old design. But such tactics can find no place where there
are rapid cruisers maintaining a position at ordinary artillery ranges with an
armament of high velocity guns.

Moreover the fire of the aforesaid low velocity guns would be speedily subdued
even at short ranges by that of quick-firers.

In conclusion then it would seem that the battle of the Yalu points to the
necessity of high velocities both from tactical and ballistic points of view.

It would seem also, as already stated, that armour should give place to increased
artillery of higher power and each gun with a wider zone of action.

Otherwise naval war will be only a bloody struggle, in which both fleets will
retire shattered and disabled, unable to again take the sea, and without victory on
either side. .

As has been justly said: defensive arms retard defeat, offensive arms give
victory.

828

PRECIS

AND

AN 38s 8 IN[ fs) IE) ak, AB Tt) IND

“REVUE MILITAIRE DE VETRANGER.”

FEBRUARY, 1895.

ARTILLERY OF LARGE CALIBRE WITH
FIELD ARMIES,

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. H. G. BROWNE, tare R.A.

Iw a recent number of the R.A. “ Proceedings,’’! attention was called to the steps
taken by Germany towards the formation of heavy batteries with sufficient
mobility to be attached to armies of operation. The same idea is in vogue in
other countries, and although in some cases the period of practical organization
has not been reached, the question of principle has been everywhere decided.
Without speaking of Switzerland, where heavy batteries have been in existence
ever since 1883 under the name of “‘artillery of position,” we know that Austria
and Russia, as well as Germany, actually possess artillery of large calibre, intended
to march with field armies.

Austria in time of war would form groups of portable siege batteries intended,
according to official indications, not only for seige-warfare, but also for certain
operations of field-warfare.

The personnel of these batteries is to be furnished by the Garrison Artillery,
and the horses by the transport department. It is believed that the Austrian-
Hungarian Ministry has provided for the formation of five groups of portable
siege batteries, comprising each one battery of four 12° guns, and two batteries of
four 12° mortars.

Some years ago Russia organised regiments of field-mortars of 15°, actually
furnishing 20 batteries. More recently she has created three battalions of so-
called siege-batteries, which are absolutely distinct from the battalions of Garrison
Artillery. The official documents do not lay down the manner in which these
batteries are intended to be employed, but it is probable that it will be connected
with the question now before us.

The organization adopted by Germany is not known inits details, but it is ina

1 Foot Artillery with horsed carriages in Germany,—April 1895.
ibl, WOlin xoaaiy 764

very advanced condition. The credit demanded by the War Minister in 1892, in
order to form 17 groups of teams of horses intended for foot artillery, has just
been partly granted, and it seems certain that the matériel of these heavy horsed
batteries will be principally composed of 15° howitzers.

Without going further into organization properly so-called, we have said enough
to show that artillery of large calibre has acquired a definite position in foreign
armies. It is therefore absolutely necessary to consider the 7éle which will pro-
bably be assigned to this kind of artillery, and the rules which will guide its
employment under the various conditions of warfare. In default of official in-
structions dealing with the question, we can only follow attentively the military
publications which have appeared abroad, in order to gleam from them, if possible,
some ideas which will throw light upon the new problem now presented.

If we examine the reasons which have eventually led the Germans to form
heavy portable batteries attached to field troops, we shall find that the promoters
of this transformation have drawn their strongest arguments from the probable
character of the wars of the future in the particular theatre of operations, which is
especially interesting to Germany. According to them, the German armies will
act on the offensive, and will certainly have to encounter permanent works manned
by armies strongly entrenched upon positions prepared in advance, and it-will be
absolutely necessary to provide them with an artillery sufficiently strong to obviate
the risk of their being shattered upon these obstacles. According to General Speck
and others, the heavy artillery, attached to armies of operation, is intended exclu-
sively to act against permanent and temporary works of fortification.

General Speck, in particular, taking the supposition that four armies are
operating upon the western frontier of the empire against fortified positions, would
attach the heavy batteries to the two armies entrusted with the front attack, giving
none to the two other armies intended to guard the flanks. This amounts to
saying that this heavy artillery would not be attached to armies of manceuvre.

Now that the desired object has been attained, and that the organization de-
manded by the reformers is an accomplished fact, so much so that foot artillery
with horsed carriages—the fourth arm as it may be called—has actually taken
part in combined manceuvres with field troops, the military writers, who treat of
this question, seem to have modified and enlarged their ideas. They are enquiring
whether this kind of artillery—created with a view to a particular case—ought to
be restricted to the special 7é/e which was originally assigned to it, or whether it
ought not in future ta be looked upon as a necessary element in armies, indepen-
dently of any peculiarities which may be prevented by the theatre of operations.

The advantages claimed to be derived from the employment of this new arm
are :—

Ist. <A moral advantage, because their addition to armies of manwuvre would
act as a new affirmation of the spirit of the offensive and of the will to conquer, at
a time when the power of fire-arms furnishes arguments in favour of the defen-
sive, and induces many people to exaggerate the difficulties of the offensive.

2nd. Considerable material advantages in the battle itself, because this heavy
artillery will be a powerful and hitherto unknown means of deciding the contest
more rapidly than heretofore.

The following words occur in an article recently published in the Militdr Wochen-
blatt, “* When the battle is sufficiently advanced to enable the forces in presence
of one another to be estimated, then the moment has arrived to bring the heavy
batteries into play, with a firm resolve to decide the issue. Thanks to the enormous
effects of their projectiles, they will produce, both morally and physically, an effect
which it would be impossible to obtain by other means. The fact, that the effect
produced by pieces of large calibre is incomparably greater than that produced by

Q
1D)

pieces of small calibre, then shows its full significance and largely compensates for
the restrictions placed upon their use by the smaller supply of ammunition.”

‘This superiority shows itself in isolated effect, because the penetrative and the
explosive force of the projectile are both greater in the case of heavy calibres, and
it also shows itself in cumulative effect, because in the same space of time a
greater weight of metal can be projected upon the target, which amounts to
saying that the same effect can be produced in less time.”

“ This concentration of useful effect, this accumulation of destructive effects, gives
to this attack the terrifying character of a whirlwind let loose by the elements, and
adds to a condition of absolute depression the moral effect which is produced
by the efficaciousness cf fire. The effect of surprise is added to this moral
depression, without counting the fact that the enemy has little time to adopt new
dispositions in the face of the danger which threatens him. This last advantage
is a very important one, the value of which will be especially felt in the battles of
large masses, when the influence of space will be felt to a greater extent.”

Thus the opinion now expressed in the German military press is that the heavy
artillerie @armée can and ought to be used in field warfare and that it should
take an active part in battle.

In itself there is nothing unreasonable in this idea. In fact it may logically
be deduced from the generally admitted principle that it is the duty of the com-
mander-in-chief to concentrate all the available forces of the army upon the battle-
field, which is the highest object of war and the issue of which decides the fate
of the country. The difficulties begin, and the objections have more force, when
we come to the conditions of practical realization. In fact we find ourselves face
to face with a problem which cannot have a perfectly satisfactory solution, because
on the one hand it is laid down unanimously that the introduction of heavy
artillery into field armies must not make them lose their facility for maneuvre ;
whilst, on the other hand, the reasons which have led to the introduction of this
artillery are almost entirely based upon their power, which entails increased weight.
It is necessary therefore, in order to arrive at a suitable organization, to accept a
compromise, and it is here that the solutions adopted in different countries differ
among themselves. For example Russia has kept to the 15° calibre, but has sacri-
ficed the power of the piece of its other characteristics, so as to make it, as far as
mobility is concerned, a trne field-gun. On the other hand in Germany the
military writers who have treated of this question, recommend that the present
matériel should be maintained, lightened only by a suitable reduction in the
quantity of ammunition carried. In fact they consider that the heavy artillery
should only be employed upon points and under circumstances where i¢ alone can
produce decisive results.

“The object of the heavy batteries,” says the author of the article quoted above,
“js to shake the enemy’s infantry upon the point where the commander-in-chief
has decided to break through. If more than this is required of them they will
fail. The talent consists in keeping the right limit.”

According to German ideas it is absolutely necessary that the artillerie @armée
should not be engaged in the artillery combat, in order to preserve the power of
producing at the proper time new effects in a startling manner.

It is evident that by limiting the task of the heavy artillery to preparing the
breach, the necessary time will be gained to enable it to be brought into line,
when required, without checking the movements of the other arms, and also that
the equipment can be very much lightened, because a comparatively small supply
of ammunition will be sufficient. It may be remarked—and it is a coincidence of
some importance with regard to the rules for the employment of this arm—that the
Russian opinions on the employment of the 15° mortar evidently agree with those
which have just been expressed, At a conference recently held at Moscow it was

held that mortars ought not to be brought into line during the artillery combat,
but that they should remain with the general infantry reserve until they are re-
quired to prepare the way for the attack.

It would be quite premature to draw any absolute conclusions from the pre-
ceding remarks. Our object has simply been to show that in foreign countries
much attention is being paid to questions relating to the employment of the heavy
artillery, which is now practically organised in most of the armies of Europe.

The ideas put forward points to the employment of this artillery in field war-
fare, and assign to it a well defined 7¢Ze upon the field of battle, namely to pre-
pare the breach at the point selected by the commander-in-chief.

Both in Russia and in Germany the principle is admitted that artillery of large
calibre should be reserved for this purpose. If we wish to summarize the present
ideas, it may be said that what is recommended is the creation of an ideal artillery
reserve, sufliciently light not to interfere with the manceuvring power necessary
for field armies, but at the same time powerful enough to provide the commander-
in-chief with a certain means of forcing on the decision of the combat by producing
effects hitherto unknown both in a material and a moral point of view.

PRECIS

dB 16s Jeu INT fS) 1) AL AP IL) INTs

“RUSSIAN ARTILLERY JOURNAL.”
|

No. 4, April 1894.

THE RESISTANCE OF THE AIR AT HIGH
VELOCITIES.

CAPTAIN ZABUDSKI, Russian ARTILLERY.

TRANSLATED BY

MAJOR G. T. KELAART, R.A.

From the experiments with elongated projectiles carried out by himself, Bash-
forth and Krupp, General Mayevski concluded that the air resistance, for velo-
cities less than 240 metres per second and greater than 419 metres per second, is
proportional to the square of the velocities; but near the velocity of sound, 340
metres per second, it increases according to a higher power than the second.

In 1884, Colonel Hojel of the Dutch Artillery concluded, from experiments
in Holland and at Krupp’s works, that for velocities exceeding 500 metres per
second the resistance increases according to a lower power than the square; from
his determination the power was equal to 1:91 between 500 and 700 metres per
second. :

In 1890 Krupp issued tables, giving resistances for velocities up to 700 metres
per second, found from experiments with guns of various calibres ; the velocities
being determined at two points of the trajectory.

From these tables it appears that for velocities above 550 metres per second the
resistances increases according to a lower power of the velocity than the square :

from 550 metres per second to 800 metres per second the power is 1°70, from
800 metres per second to 1000 metres per second it is 1°55.

From Krupp’s experiments, published in 1881, General Mayevski deduced the
resistances inserted in his memoir—‘‘ The solution of problems of direct and
curved fire,’ 1882.

These tables gave the resistances for velocities up to 700 metres per second,
and the 1890 tables continued them.

Making use of these tables, I have deduced expressions for resistances at velo-
cities up to 1000 metres per second. Connecting them with the 1882 formule

B WOlin TORR

of General Mayevski, we obtain, with the metre and kilogramme as units :—

From v= 1000 m/s to v= 800 m/s, resistance p= 0°7130 7 R2 yp 1:55

cn)
800 » 550 ' = 02616 r Re y 1-70
cL)
550 x Lae) - = 00394 7 R27 y 2
a)
419 aa 0 STS ¥ 55 =0°04940 7 R27 y 8
ca)
375 295 B 5 =0'09670 r Rey 5
To)
295 -- + - 940 -, 5, =0°04583 7 R27 y 8
a5)
240 downwards % 5 = 0°0140 r R22 y 2
™)

where & is the radius of the cylindrical portion of projectile in metres,
a =the density of the air during experiment,
7) = 1206 kilogrammes per cubic metre.

From the above formulee it is seen that with low velocities, the resistances are
proportional to the square of the velocities ; with velocities near to that of sound
they increase according to a higher power ; and with velocities above 550 metres
per second, the increase is ascording to a lower power than the square.

If we regard the air as consisting of particles: colliding with one another and
possessing velocities various according to their magnitude and direction, then on
the basis of the mechanical theory of gases the mean velocity of the progressive
motion of the particles at a temperature of melting ice is equal to 485 metres
per second and at 15° C. about 500 metres per second.

Thus the law of the increase of the resistance of air changes at the velocities
which are connected with certain properties of the air, 7.¢. at the velocity of sound
and at the mean velocity of the air molecules.

2. Proposing in an edition of Internal Ballistics (which I have undertaken)
to print detailed tables for the solution of problems of fire for velocities up to
1100 metres per second, calculated from the above formule, I shall in this note
attach an abbreviated table of the values of the functions

D (u), A (uw), L (u), T (u), B (w) and M (u)
corresponding to the values w from 600 metres per second to 1000 metres per
second.

In calculating the values of these functions the air resistances is expressed by
the formula

p=0'5091 + R27 y 16,
™
the resistances determined by this formula (for velocities. between 600 and 1000
metres per second) being nearly those of Krupp’s 1890 tables.

This table, together with the ballistic tables of Lieut.-Colonel Langensheld, can
be employed in the solution of problems of direct fire for velocities up to 1000
metres per second, but the signs of the functions must be paid attention to.

For values of w near to 700 m/s the functions, with the exception of I (w), pass
through zero; the functions D (w), 4 (w) and MW (w) change sign and become
negative; the function B (w) has a double root, as it preserves its positive sign
on passing through zero.

The values of w where the functions pass through zero are shown in the note
to the attached table.

_ 8. We shall now apply this table and the tables of Lieut.-Colonel Langensheld
to the solution of two problems.

Eeample I—At the chief artillery polygon when firing on 29th February, 1894,
from the 6-inch Q.F. gun of Canet, 50 calibres in length, with 272 1bs. of Ox-
tensk smokeless powder, velocities were measured at two points of the trajectory.
The distances from the muzzle were

«, = 89'6 metres, mean velocity v7, = 785°9 m/s (2579 feet per second),
H=HOOD x ie » Vg= 745'2 m/s (2445 feet per second).
We require to determine A in the formula !
Ces tt Woh i)
(2k)? “a “dX ° 1000 *
The weight of projectile P = 43 kg. (105 lbs. Russian)
», calibre a 2R = 0°1524 metres (6 inches).
The firing was carried out at a temperature of 74° C. and barometric pressure
757-4™™ ; from this and the table, inserted in Appendix I. to my “ Exterior
Ballistics,’ we shall find

Denoting by C, the value of C for \=1, we shall obtain
log, C, = +2265.
In consequence of the small angle of projection, we can put a cos 0=1, also
a= 1 (Appendix I., “‘ Exterior Ballistics,” p. 19) so that

= a = D(v.) — D(v).
From the appended table we shall find
Dw)= —4307
D(v,)= —238'2
D (vg) —D(v,)= —192°7;

from the expression
Vg — Xy

=] Dene

we shall obtain
KS 12S
The projectiles, intended for Canet’s gun, have a greater length of the head (about
1°75 calibres) than those, for which were found the expressions for the air resist-
ances, cited in No. I; the length of the heads of the latter were about 1°30 calibres
(here X = 1).
Example II.—To determine the tabular data for the projectile, fired from Canet’s

6-inch gun at the range X = 2000 sajenes, we have

P =43°0 kgs. (105 lbs. Russian)

2h = 0'1524 metres (6 inches)

™= 1
™
w= 7728
initial velocity v = 792°5 m/s (2600 f/s).

From the formule of my “Exterior Ballistics’ (Appendix I., p. 46) em-
ploying the attached small table and the tables of Lieut.-Colonel Langeldsheld, we
can calculate the required data.

We have
log C= °3810
and from the formula
; ; p}
sin 2 ¢) = es { 1+ (9-072) =}
v Cc

1 Zabudski. Exterior Ballistics. Part II., p. 10.

the magnitude of the angle of projection (necessary for finding from the table the
value of a) will be found to be :
dy =4° 27.
From the table O== OOO,
and we calculate
SSG 0 OOS y= TIO
We obtain the value of w, corresponding to the point of fall, from the equation

Dw) =" + D(0)

= 1776 — 454
= 1322,
whence u= 468°6 m/s.

From the above cited table we shall find
A (U) = — 26°04

L(G) = 04.969
RD =2—=3 B12
B(O)=— 276
M(U)=— 00113
A @) S BBG?
LG) = ‘14715
1/@) = 2°332
Bi@) = 3°9441

From the formule

_ Caf A(u) — A(U) )
tan ¢ 5) LISD IOM}
_ Ca § Ty) — 4) = 4(0)
tim pe= FY Dl) DIDS
=
a cos O,. -
i C£T(w) — T(U)}
and
— K7™0 Btu) - BU) _
Za K™VX ae mn uv)
we shall obtain
= 20745!
é, =O mONh
Ve = 469°2 m/s (1540 f/s)
sie) OESeCse

Z= 4:73 metres.
In calculating the derivation 7, the coefficient K is found from the formula
ree 2
yh 1000
where [eS SB

c
Ss == 530)
h

T
= == tam 8°,

since the angle of inclination of the rifling is 6° with Canet’s 6-inch gun.

The coefficient K, entering in the formula for the derivation, ought to be deter-
mined on the basis of results of firing in calm weather. Ordinarily the coefficient
K, when found from experiment, comes out larger (approximately 13 times) than
when calculated by the above deduced formula.

780
770

D(u)

BALLISTIC TABLES.
For solution of problems of direct fire for velocities above 600 m/s.

A(u)

I(w)

+
0,02711
0,02791
0,02873
0,02958
0,03045

0,08134
0,032.26
0,03321
0,03418
0,03518

0,03620
0,03726
0,03835
0,03947
0,04063

0,04182
0,04305
0,04431
0,04562
0,04697

0,04837
0,04981
0,05130
0,05283

Ta)

B(u) M(u)
din we

1,947 0,00243
4

1,850 0,0023)
96 5

1 oe 0,00234
4

Il 659 0,00230
94 5

1,565 0,00225
4

1,473 0,00221
5

1,382 0,00216
90 5

1,292 0,00211
6

1,204 0,00205
86 5

1,118 0,00200
84, 6

1,034 0,00194
6

0,951 0,00188
7

0,871 0,00181
78 6

0,793 0,00175
7

0,717 0,00168
7

0,644 0,00161
71 4”

0,578 0,00154
67 8

0,506 0,00146
64 8

0,442 0,00188
8

0,381 0,00130
9

0,324 0,00121
53 9

0,271 0,00112
10

0,221 0,00102
10

0,175 0,00092

BALLISTIC TABLES .— Continued.

u D(u) A(u) I(u) T(u) B(u) Mu)
M/s. = — + — + —

770 | 356 21,04 0,05283 0,487 0, Pe 0,00092
47 254. 159 62 11

760 | 309 18,50 0,054.42 Oe 0, 133 0,00081
48 264 165 36 11

750 | 261 -| 15,86 0,05607 0, pas 0,097 0,00070
48 274 170 30 12

740 | 218 13,12 0,05777 0, 207 0,067 0,00058
49 284 177 26 12

730 164 10,27 0,05954 0, 231 0,041 0,00046
49 296 183 68 20 13

720 | 115 7,31 0,06137 0,163 0,021 0,00033
49 308 189 69 13 13

710 66 4,23 0,06326 0,094 0,008 0,00020
50 320 197 70 6 14

700 16 1,03 0,06523 0,024 0,002 0,00006
+ 60 + 3832 204 + 72 1 + 16

699 34 2,29 0,06727 0,048 0,003 0,00009
51 346 212 74 9 16

680 85 5,75 0,06939 0,122 0,012 0,00025
51 360 221 76 17 WY

670 | 1386 9,35 0,07160 0,198 0,029 0,00042
61 376 229 78 26 17

660 }| 187 13,11 0,07389 0,276 0, ae 0,00059
52 391 238 80 18

650 | 239 17,02 0,07627 0,356 0, 091 0,00077
53 407 248 81 20

640 | 292 21,09 0,07875 0,437 0, 137 0,00097
54 424, 258 83 57 21

630 | 346 | 25,33 0,08133 0,520 | 0,194 | 0,00118
53 443 269 86 69 22

620 | 399 29,76 0,084.02 0,606 0,263 0,00140
54 462 281 88 81 23

610 | 4538 34,38 0,08683 0,694: 0,344 0,00163
54 481 293 90 96 25

600 | 507 39,19 0,08976 0,784 0,440 0,00188

Note.—D(u)=0 for 1=696,8 m/s.
A(u)=0,, 696,8 ,,
Tu)=0 ,, 696,7 ,,
Bu)=0,, 696,24,
Mu)=0,, 696,2 ,,

PRECIS

AND

“REVUE MILITAIRE DE L-ETRANGER.”

July, 1894.

FOOT ARTILLERY WITH HORSED-CARRIAGES |

IN GERMANY, Gh

Wigs

PRECIS BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. H. G. BROWNE, tare R.A,

For some time past the manceuvres of the German Foot Artillery have appeared
to be directed into an entirely new channel. In 1892 they received a special
extension, and the inference was drawn that the Head-quarter Staff at Berlin con-
templated some important change, which would soon be made known.

‘This expectation proved correct. The object of these mancuvres was to prepare
the way for the creation of batteries of foot artillery with horsed-carriages, and
the organisation of these batteries, which are intended to introduce an entirely
new element into the battles of the future, is now an accomplished fact.

As long ago as 1891, 88 heavy draught horses were purchased by the War-
Minister for the purpose of drawing heavy guns at manceuvres. Since then a good
deal has been written on the subject, and a pamphlet published in 1892 by
General Wiebe, of the artillery, is of special interest. After insisting upon the in-
creasing importance of foot artillery, especially for the attack of fortified positions,
the general says:—‘‘ The best way to increase the number of cases in which
foot artillery can be usefully employed, is to form moveable heavy batteries for
the attack and defence of fortified positions. ‘To make this possible, these
batteries must be ready to follow the field-troops over any ground, so as to be able
to come into line when and where they may be required. Now this result will cer-
tainly be attained if the foot artillery are given a light and portable matériel, as
well as sufficient means of transport. Moreover, to enable this arm to realize the
hopes which are founded upon it, it is necessary that it should be trained in peace-
time for the different services which it may be called upon to perform in time of
war. The heavy batteries of the foot artillery ought, therefore, to be thoroughly
conversant with all the details of field service.’’ In conclusion General Wiebe
demanded that a certain number of teams of horses should always be at the dis-

4 vol, XXII,

posal of the foot artillery to enable them to take part in the grand mancuvres in
the same manner as the other troops.

Shortly after the publication of this pamphlet, the chancellor of the Empire
presented his military budget to the Reichstag, in which he estimated for 17
groups of teams of horses intended-for the exercises of foot artillery. This pro-
position was modified by the Reichstag, and the foot artillery at present has
nominally at its disposal only 88 horses, which are attached to infantry battalions.
It is probable, however, that the German Head-quarter Staff has taken some steps
to procure the horses which have been refused by the Reichstag—at any rate the
formation of groups of teams has only been deferred in all probability for a time.
In fact the matériel intended for batteries of foot artillery with horsed-carriages
is, if not actually constructed, at any rate settled in its principal details, and there
is little doubt that the troops will henceforward be exercised in its use, so as not
to be behindhand in the duties, which will devolve upon them in time of war.

The armament of these heavy batteries, which we will henceforth call datteries
@armée, in accordance with an expression much used in the military press, com-
prises at present three distinct pieces of ordnance, viz., the heavy, steel-barrelled
gun of 12 centimetres (5°7 inches); the shell-gun of 15 centimetres (6 inches) ;
and the steel-barrelled mortar of 21 centimetres (8°83 inches).

The heavy 12° gun is of bronze with a central tube of nickel steel, which has
been added to increase the resistance of the tube against the destructive effects of
the obus-torpille bursting in the bore. It fires two kinds of projectiles, an obus-
torpille, and a shrapnel, and is provided with double-action fuzes. It is mounted
on a wheeled carriage with limber.

The shell-gun of 15¢ which has lately replaced the 15¢ mortar and the 15¢ short
gun in the armament of the foot artillery, is a new steel piece, firing a shell of
about 4.0 lb, weight, with a slow burning double-action fuze.

The third piece of ordnance is the 21° bronze mortar with steel tube, which
throws a shell weighing 145 lbs, It is used with a percussion fuze and has a large
bursting charge.

To organize batteries with these pieces, provision must be made for the transport
of equipment, of wood for platforms, &c, For this purpose, the Germans have
made use of old-pattern wagons, suitably adapted for the new service for which
they are intended. They are light enough to be able to follow field-troops with-
out much difficulty.

From the preceding details, the part which these heavy batteries are intended
by the Germans to play on the field of battle, may be conjectured; and although
no official document has been issued on the subject, a perusal of the military press
will give us an approximate idea. It is evident that the Germans cherish the
hope that curved fire will play an important part in the battles of the future, and
if we examine more attentively the properties of the three pieces of ordnance which
we have just described we shall see well enough what is the rdle reserved for each
of them.

Of all the heavy mobilised batteries, those which are armed with the 15¢ shell-
gun will probably play the principal part. This piece, which is lighter than the
others, seems intended by nature to support an attack. It can, at a pinch, be
drawn by six heavy draught horses, at any rate over made roads and at a slow
pace; and it has a powerful projectile which would do serious damage to field
works. If, however, this gun is not powerful enough to destroy the defender’s
shelter-works and to shake his moral, recourse would be had to the 21¢ mortar,
which, however, being much less portable, could be only sparingly employed.

The use of the heavy 12° gun is more difficult to lay down, as none of the Ger-
man military writers seem to look upon its employment as permanent. It is a
direct firing gun and will probably be employed on the defensive, when curved fire

will be of little use, on account of the moving character of the objects aimed ‘at.

With regard to the employment of these heavy batteries, in the absence of official
information we may refer to the Jahrbiicher, published at the beginning of the
year by Major-General Speck of the Bavarian army. According to mtn thesé
batteries would not usually be attached to army corps, but would be | kept under the
orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

German field batteries already possess the means of searching out ground behind
parapets, and recourse would be had to the heavy batteries only when the odus-
torpille had failed.

Probably the whole of the German armies of operation would not require heavy
batteries. General Speck estimates that the armies of the west would not require
more than 64 batteries of this description, or 16-to each army corps. These would
be divided into 12 regiments, 8 of which would be of shell-guns and 4 of mortars.
The greater proportion of shell-guns to mortars is thus accounted for, ‘A: line
of defence, even when prepared in peace-time, would only have its points @appui
and intermediate works strongly fortified ; the rest of the line would consist of
ordinary field fortifications. It will, therefore, suffice to have in the armies intended
for the attack of these lines a small number of mortars of heavy calibre and a
larger proportion of 15° shell-guns.” It is worthy of remark that the general
does not allude to the 12° gun, which does not appear in the organisation, which
he recommends. It seems a pity that he does not try to justify completely the
demand for 16 batteries, which he wishes to be attached to each army corps of the
first-line. In default of such justification it seems difficult to help thinking that
the number is unnecessarily large. There would be 48 six-piece batteries of shell-
guns, and 16 four-piece batteries of mortars, making a total of 288 shell-guns of
15¢, and of 64 mortars of 21°. This seems too much for the attack of one or two
forts, and it would be a triumph for the defenders to have obliged their enemy to
deploy so great a force of heavy artillery.

The composition of these batteries is not laid down, but in all probability the
shell-gun batteries would have ‘six pieces, like field atromest In order, to carry
60 rounds for each piece, 12 ammunition wagons would be necessary. In addition}
there would be one wagon for each gun to carry wood for platforms, one general-
service wagon, one forge, and no doubt two carriages for baggage and provisions:
Thus the whole battery will be composed as follows :

Guns.. wine F craatirs ie sionals Gab pees ett ag

Avinaanoratition WA DONS ere wskt ome deooemiion crete «seawla,

Platform wagons way atta. sah aerate LeaG.

, Conmmibearnies WEROD ooooco00an oO HERG death doodieael
PORES “eso co.000 aah SeR Ee AA Th bales oh Ghat ariapenall

Wagons for Dageage and provisions,........ 2
plOtalU Se Berens homcat tances o 8

This estimate, however, may not be exact.

General Speck gives us to understand that two ammunition columns will be
attached to each battery of shell-guns. The composition of these columns is not
given, but they would probably @arnesist of 20 ammunition wagons, carrying 30
rounds each, “Each column will thus carry 600 rounds or 100 “rounds per piece,
and the battery will thus have altogether a supply of 260 rounds per piece.

The composition of the mortar batteries would probably be the same except that
there would be only four pieces per battery, and that the weight of the projectile
is such that each wagon could only carry 10 rounds, With - its 12 ammunition
wagons the battery would have with it 20 rounds per piece. Hach mortar batter
would have 8 ammunition columns attached to it. Supposing each of- these

columns to consist of 20 carriages, there would be a total of 600 rounds or 150
rounds per piece in addition to the 20 rounds with the battery.

On the march the datteries d’armée would, as a rule, follow the columns and
trains of the army corps, in connection with which they have been mobilized.
According to General Speck, on a good road no slopes of less than 8 degrees would
offer any inconvenience to the batteries of shell-guns, which would keep pace with
the infantry. On bad roads, however, this pace could not be kept up. He makes
no attempt to conceal the difficulties, which the heavy batteries would encounter
as soon as they came near the enemy’s position, when roads are blocked and move-
ments become more and more difficult. In spite of this the heavy batteries would
have to be pushed to the front by forced marches ; and a careful reconnaissance of
the roads would have to be made as their quality is a most important factor in the
movements of the batteries. This reconnaissance must necessarily entail a loss of
time, by which the defenders ought to know how to profit.

So long as the employment of the artillerie @armée is not imminent, it may
follow the army corps to which it is attached, in the same manner as all the heavy
batteries follow the armies. As soon as the attack of a fortified position is con-
templated, it will be decided, according to the nature of the enemy’s works, which
of the batteries must march with the columns of attack. If the works have only
been constructed since the war began, the shell-guns should be sufficient, and
should be placed at the tail of the fighting columns of troops. They should not
be pushed further forward unless the distance to be traversed is short, and cover
can be obtained from ground. If permanent works have to be attacked, mortars
as well as shell-guns must be brought up,

Owing to the length of time which the da¢ter ies d’armée must necessarily take in
coming to the front of the column, it is most important that the army corps should be
able to march on several roads. Also, they move so slowly and offer so large a mark
to the enemy’s guns, that it is almost indispensable that they should be able to move
into position under cover from ground. With this object in view, it will often be
necessary to leave the main roads and take to bye-roads of uncertain character. A
careful reconnaissance of these roads will be necessary to avoid delays. General
Speck considers that a company of infantry must be attached to each batterie
d’armée to clear away obstacles, prepare emplacements for the platforms, &c. It
is evident that such operations can only be carried out under cover from the view
and fire of the enemy, and therefore the infantry must previously be employed to
drive back the enemy’s advanced-posts. As this first phase of the struggle will
probably take some time, and as the movements of the heavy batteries will be
slow, it will probably be difficult to complete the operations in one day. It may
therefore be expected that after the completion of these preliminary operations,
the artillerie d’armée will not be able to open fire before the following morning at
the earliest, and a delay will thus be caused in the operations of the assailants.
This delay will be to the advantage of the defenders, who will gain time to bring
up reinforcements, or to strengthen their field-works.

The position of the assailant will hardly be better when in front of temporary
works. In this case also a careful reconnaissance will be necessary to avoid false
movements of the columns of the artillerie d’armée. These heavy batteries lack
the mobility of field guns. It is difficult for them to change position, consequently
the ground must be carefully reconnoitred beforehand.

It must be remarked that batteries using curved fire can generally be placed in
position more easily than those using direct fire, because it is not necessary that
they should have a clear field in front of them. They may be placed behind obstacles
which shut out the view, as it is sufficient that the result of the fire should be ob-
served from a position near at hand and connected with the batteries by telephone,
if necessary. This diminishes the length of the necessary reconnaissance; but fire

executed under such circumstances must evidently be slow and partake of the
character of siege-firing, rather than that of field-firing.

From the preceding remarks, it is evident that it would be a great mistake for
the defenders to abandon the ground in front of their works too soon. On the
contrary they should hold on to it as long as possible and force the enemy to
make a first deployment of the artillerie @armée. If the defender’s works are only
of a temporary, instead of a permanent nature, the same series of obstacles will have
to be confronted. Of course it will not be necessary to employ so great a number
of heavy pieces, and shell-guns would probably be used in preference to mortars,
but it would still be necessary to bring a considerable number of pieces of large
calibre into action, in order to force the line. :

Even when the assailants have succeeded in approaching within easy range of
the works and have got a part, at any rate, of their heavy guns into position, the
defenders need not abandon exterior action, Curved fire has little effect against
objects in motion, such as infantry marching to the attack, and under favourable
circumstances, the defenders might attempt to capture the batteries intended for
this class of fire, which can change their aim but slowly, and which are conse-
quently more exposed to sudden attack than the other.

General Speck does not attempt to ignore this danger, but recommends that in
such cases recourse should be had to the neighbouring field batteries which, with
their low trajectories are better suited for checking troops on the march. This,
however, would require a good deal of vigour and decision, as these batteries would
have to change their aim rapidly when already engaged in the combat.

It is evident from General Speck’s essay, as well as from the previous essays of
General Von Sauer and General Wiebe, which were noticed sometime ago in the
“ Proceedings,” that the Germans are convinced that curved fire will render works
of fortification of every kind untenable in a comparatively short time, and the
creation of batteries of foot artillery with horsed-carriages is intended to provide
for its use. Considered from the point of view of siege-warfare the new organi-
zation is perhaps a step in advance of the old, but in field-warfare we may believe
that the employment of these heavy batteries will always be attended with
difficulties on account of the weight of their matériel. In order to bring them
into effective action, considerable efforts will be necessary and numerous precautions
must be taken, which will often cause delays, from which the enemy will sometimes
derive great advantage.

NOTES

FROM

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
ERIS I

Tue following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

Major-General Stubbs’s “List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Field Artillery Fire,” by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price

Tpelise ade :

“Notes of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A.
C. Hansard, R.A., price 1s. 2d.

‘Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain S. W. Lane, R.A., price Is. 1d.

‘Achievements of Field Artillery,” by Major E. 8. May, R.A.,
bound, price 2s. 6d.

“The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,” by Major E. 8. May,
R.A., paper covers, price 3d.

*The-Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’ or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,”
by an Officer R.A., price 7d.

The two Numbers of “ Nature” containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on ‘Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (d), and (¢) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 1893 :—

Captains (c) and (d). ... price Is. 1d.
Lieutenants (c) (7) and (e) price Is. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

R.A. “DUNCAN” PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.
The Secretary has received essays bearing the following mottoes :—
* Pro aris et focis.”

“Take him to develop, if you can,
And hew off the block, and get out the man.”

“The delegation of command is a necessity.”

Tux R.A. Institution has recently obtained possession of the Peninsular medal
with 13 clasps of Gunner Rollands, R.A. This medal will be placed in a case for
exhibition in the Institution with an inscription showing that Rollands served from
Roleia to Nive as a gunner without any absence from duty throughout the period.

4, Vol. XXII.

Tr following statistics have been communicated to the Committee, R,A.I., with
a view to publication as of general regimental interest :—

NUMBER DURING
1893 1894 IncrnaAsz. DecrzEaseE.
TRYSETUUNES aoa sao voda00 cconededq 0D n00600cco000 OAL 5003 — #642

IMO IDENT Soanonocecd6 con ceo coog0anen BOS 284 — 14
IDyeeial ” seo ccs sens agadodsobaovedo soo sed cos00m: Bad! 357 26 —
ID ISENETHERAE! 55 069060000000 cb0500000 adoooo000 LOWE 1920 — 86
ING IDESEHUIOIN cobsAeesé0nddodes0 Seocegonsey SOT 642 — 159
INO JIS INSITE “nogeoonap verse hooao0ng Leal 2175 — 66
Courts Martial (Home only) ............ 1082 809 — 223
Minor Punishments (ome only) ...... 18092 11090 — 2002
Fines for Drunkenness (Home only)... 684 641 — 43
Men in possession of Good Conduct

IBeyolexess (Talore Crh) og coocovco000 (T/L 6861 146 —

* The decrease in the number of recruits is due to our requirements having been
less in 1894: as an instance we may quote the fact that in September, 1893, re-
eruiting for drivers was open only in Eastern District and Woolwich. On 2nd
October, 1893, all artillery agencies were opened for drivers. On 25th November,
1898, all districts were opened for drivers. On3lst May, 1894, recruiting closed
for drivers in all districts except artillery districts Newport and Woolwich.

THE

IMO) Wa, Pal IMUGdbddIR Ny VAININ OUI) IDJOSUNEIR

WILL TAKE PLACE AT

QUARTER BEFORE EIGHT O'CLOCK,
On FRIDAY, 7th JUNE, 1895,

THE HOTEL METROPOLE
(Private Entrance in Whitehall Place),

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE COLONEL OF THE REGIMENT
IN THE CHAIR.

Prices as follows :— £& 3. d.

Subscribers Ai a wo 0 16 @
Non-Subscribers ae soo 6k US

Dinner Tickets will not be supplied, but officers are requested to give their
visiting cards at the entrance, on the evening of the dinner, to the official appointed
to receive them.

It is particularly requested that officers intending to dine will furnish early
intimation to the Honorary Secretary ; and, to avoid inconvenience, it is desirable
that the same should be accompanied by cheque, for the amount of subscription
to the dinner, ewcept from officers who bank with Messrs. Coa § Co., who are
imformed that the amount due from them for the dinner will be charged to their
accounts,

274

Names of officers who notify their intention of being present at the dinner
cannot be removed from the list after the 4th June, and officers who omit to
notify before that date will be charged an extra sum of 5s.

Advertisements will duly appear in the Morning Post.
All communications to be addressed to
MAJOR F. G. STONE,
Hon. Secretary R.A. Dinner Club,
Horse Guarps,

War Orriczr, Patt MALL.

Should an officer wishing to dine have been unable to give notice before 4th June,
he should iuform the Secretary at the War Office direct, and not apply to the Hotel
officials.

SHOLBURWYNESS.

As a great number of officers will be coming to Shoeburyness during the year, it
may be of interest to those who are making their first visit to know what amuse-
ments they will be likely to find.

Cricket, of course, is of the best; an attempt will be made to keep the grass
down on the golf links, which are much improved, though the rabbits are somewhat
trying to the secretary’s temper; there are six tennis and two stické courts, and
very fair boating and sailing may be had.

Stické is much played by the courses, the only equipment required is a pair of
tennis shoes and a light tennis racquet.

We enjoyed skating during the whole period of the frost on a private pond for
which we are indebted to Lient.-Colonel Howard. There were several “at homes ”’
on the ice, and the School of Gunnery Band gave an opportunity seldom avail-
able, of dancing to music on skates.

Football has been rather interfered with, but Shoebury has been very successful
of late and can produce a good team. We have won the semi-final in Grays’
Charity Cup, beating Barking, the holders, by 3 goals totwo. We unfortunately
had to scratch in the third round of the Army Cup, owing to the regulations,
which debarred the ‘‘ young officers” from playing, and also prevented No. 2
Company from being represented in the team. The constant changes taking place
here rather handicap us in competing with infantry battalions.

In accordance with the new arrangement, several gentlemen cadets, awaiting
commissions, have joined. They will swell the numbers in mess, and prove, let
us hope, a great addition to all our games.

WOOLWICH.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY DRAG HUNT POINT-TO-POINT RACES.

Committee: R. Stewart Savile, Esq. (M.F.H.), Colonel R. D. E. Lockhart
R.A., Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Yorke, R.A., Major H. V. Hunt, R.H.A., Major
F.T. M. Beaver, R.A., Major L. E. Coker, R.A., and Captain C. D. King, R.A.
Hon. Sec.: Major J. F. Manifold, R.A.

The R.A. Drag Hunt Point-to-Point Races came off on 19th March at Kemsine.
Through the kindness of Sir Mark Collett, leave was given to ride over his land,

and the Hunt are greatly indebted to Mr, Ernest Cronk of Sevenoaks for the
trouble he took in arranging for the line.

A special train from Bromley took down about 70 people and 23 horses, and
arrived a little before 3 p.m. ‘The first race was started soon after that hour, the
other two at about half-an-howr’s interval. The day was fine and the going
excellent. The fences were certainly big, and the last one before finishing wanted
doing. The course which was about three-and-a-quarter miles ran in the shape
of an elipse and was a thoroughly fair hunting one; fences could be taken any-
where and there were no traps. A good many of the people living in the
neighbourhood attended, among them were Mr. Savile (M.F'.H.) and Mrs. Savile,
Hon. Ralph Nevill, and many members of the West Kent Hunt. Although there
were several falls, there were no accidents and the day was pronounced a great
success,

GARRISON CHALLENGE CUP. Presented by Major-General A.
H, Williams, R.A. Tor bond-fide Maiden Hunters that have been regularly
hunted with the R.A. Drag during the past season. Catch weights over
12 st. 7lbs., to be ridden by their owners :—

Capt. Heygate’s MIDSHIPMAN........000 e.ceseseesoeee ...,OWNER 1
Mire Emnielamdess CHOP wm MMe nyacrasstaclssieltes 8 felts Aucte esate OWNER 2

Capt. Birch’s BEBFEATER..........00+. ..Mr. G. Gittson 0
Mr. Head’s Davin . BROS bono Sera one -.OWNER 0
Mar J.B: Aldridge’s Ducusss.. aa tia Rare atte noe Passe "OWNER 0
Mr. C. Prescott- Decie’ 3 INUASTOWRIN TABI 600000600 000 o60006 OwNER 0
AY Eipeed SDA TI KeMe Ase INY K@indaN e#Lingh oa nbGeddladbdoaaGae cou eames dod dobaos OwneER 0
Wop, TPeall’s IDOMOWAN o00 060000000 od000000000 soo s00000 nga noo noo OAR, =O)

HEAVY WEIGHT RACE. For horses the property of Members, and
regularly hunted with the R.A. Drag. Catch weights over 14 st. :—

Mr. C. Prescott-Decie’s SUNBEAM........sssereseee s000050 Owner 1
Whe, (Crilleorarg IPT, 06 4004006 0 g00.000 000 Gn Hoo cHaeGHaDdHD oon OUTING
Mr. H. L. Powell’s HXurEr,. caoa90%000 obcooocoocooc OWN
Cayo, EMS INDUS 66 594000 20600060600 000 086400 00006 ....OWNER 0
INGE, Silas IBACGIENWS.00 000 cda000090000 000006800 d00 oo coo DTT,
Chit, ILC RRUS'S STVAMIROGIK 400 a200000 vondcos no00G00000 000000 OwnER 0
Mie, COnqaerSiranitlis. PARI, .6 oooo0e0 800000 300000000008 006 OWNER 0

FARMERS’ RACE. (Started with the Heavy Weight Race). For horses
the boni-fide property of Farmers resident in the West Kent Country.
Riders to be qualified to ride in the West Kent Hunt Point-to-Point Races.
Catch weights over 12 st. 7 lbs.; owners riding allowed 7 lbs. :—

Mr. Warde’s Mr. SMart......... Sie races «oo MR. P, WinmMor 1
My. Wilmot’s ARGUS...... Ao dncaesGes iehheaceha eee OWNER 0
Mr. Pishenden’s LADY BLANCHE .. ..ccescsceecee Mr. Tanguay 0
Woe, COS IRGINRA?500.00000000000000000800 000 AAT Nhe ..., OWNER 0

LIGHT WEIGHT RACE. For horses the property of Members, and
regularly hunted with the R.A. Drag. Catch weights over 12 st. :-—

OVO, INSTR TS (SLUTRSIUTST o55. 050060000 406000000000000 0001000460 OAKANATS
Woe, Reals Cage IANS) 559000000 000000000000 000 090006000 000 OANEEIS
Ibe, JaleaGls GUNS? 250000 c0000000000 SO GEHOUL coo oDO SDE AGnODUnoG GC ANANIOIS
Mr. Ashmore’s Rock SPRING. RHO ed CORSSOMOOCHODONBOG ae AN PNT
MGR, dy 1B, Aloha (CUASSIDI%54000000000.000000000-c00c0 ccnp 008 ONVINTDTN
Major Cunliffe’s COLUMBINE.......:.c00008 CAPT, W. Pagur
Mr, Williams’s ELEVA TORssosscssescsetsessersectensse ceva, OWNER

Qooooecew re

OBITUARY.

GENERAL R. F. Cophanp-CrawForb, Colonel-Commandant, who died at Harrow,
on 5th March, 1895, was first commissioned as Second Lieutenant 19th May,
1828; became Lieutenant 12th May, 1829; Second Captain 1st April, 1841;
Captain 1st April, 1846; Lieut.-Colonel 17th February, 1854; Brevet-Colonel
28th November, 1854; Major-General 31st August, 1865, Colonel-Commandant
13th September, 1871; Lieut.-General 31st January, 1872, and General Ist
October, 1877. General Copland-Crawford was Commandant at Cape Town from
14th October, 1857, to 17th February, 1858. Since the 6th December, 1886, he
was senior Colonel-Commandant of the regiment, and as such returned thanks at
the Annual Regimental Dinner, in 1894 he was unable to attend the dinner owing
to family bereavement.

By his death General Sir Collingwood Dickson, V.C., G.C.B., Master-Gunner
of St. James’s Park, becomes senior Colonel-Commandant.

Lizvt.-GEnERaL H. P. Goopnnoven (retired) died at Hyéres, France, on 25th
February, 1895. He joined the regiment as Second Lientenant 13th December,
1836; became Lieutenant 13th August, 1839, Second Captain 9th November,
1846; Captain 15th August, 1852; Lieut.-Colonel 15th September, 1857;
Brevet-Colonel 15th September, 1862; Major-General 9th November, 1868;
and retired with hon. rank of Lieut.-General 1st May, 1880.

Linvt.-GEneraL W. J. Gray (retired) whose death occurred at Alverstoke on
3rd March, 1895, joined the Bengal Artillery as Second Lieutenant 8th December,
1843; became Lieutenant 22nd December, 1845; Captain 27th April, 1858 ;
Brevet-Major 31st October 1867; Lieut.-Colonel 7th May, 1868 ; Brevet-Colonel
7th May, 1873; Major-General 31st December, 1878, and retired with hon. rank
of Lieut.-General 7th June, 1882. General Gray served in the Sutlej campaign
1845-6, and was present at the battle of Aliwal (medal); in the Punjab campaign
1848-9, Passage of the Chenab, battles of Chillianwallah and Goojerat, where he
served in one of those heavy batteries which ‘‘ manceuvred with the celerity of light
guns,” and for his services in this campaign was favourably mentioned by Brigadier-
General Tennant (medal with two clasps); he also served through the Indian
Mutiny campaigns 1857-9, including the siege of Delhi where he commanded a
party of 60 European Artillerymen for the assault of the breach of the Cashmere
bastion (medal and clasp).

From 1873 he held various Royal Artillery commands in India until promoted
Major-General in December, 1878.

Masor-GEeneraL H, Heyman (retired) who died in London on 24th February,
1895, joined the regiment as Second Lieutenant 18th June, 1845; became
Lieutenant Ist April, 1846; Second Captain 29th November, 1853; Captain
23rd February, 1856; Brevet-Major 4th March, 1866; Lieut.-Colonel 29th
February, 1868; Brevet-Colonel lst March, 1878 ; retired with the hon. rank of
Major-General 1st October, 1881, and commuted retiring allowance lst June,
1883. Major-General Heyman was Superintendent, Royal Carriage Department,
from October, 1876, to 30th September, 1881.

Masor-Genzrau J. EH. Turine (retired) died at Teddington on 11th March,
1895. He was commissioned as Second Lieutenant 19th: December, 1844;
became Lieutenant 1st April, 1846; Second Captain 19th May, 1853; Captain
23rd February, 1856; Brevet-Major 30th July, 1858; Lieut.-Colonel 6th July,

1867; Colonel 6th July, 1872, and retired on full-pay with the hon. rank of
Major-General 30th May, 1877. Major-General Thring served during the Crimean
campaign, and was present at the siege and fall of Sebastopol (medal with clasp .
and Turkish medal). Indian Mutiny 1857-8, actions of Secundra, Chanda, and
Sultanpore, siege and capture of Lucknow, and relief of Azunghur (five times
mentioned in despatches, Brevet of Major, medal with clasp).

CotoneL Al. pe Vic. Tupper (retired) whose death occurred at Guernsey 23rd
February, 1895, was first commissioned as Second Lieutenant 23rd October,
1854; became Lieutenant 16th December, 1854; Second Captain 28th June,
1861; Captain 28th September, 1871; Major 5th July, 1872; Lieut.-Colonel
23rd April, 1881; Brevet-Colonel 23rd April, 1885 ; was placed on half-pay 23rd
April, 1886, and retired 8th May, 1889. Colonel Tupper served during the
Crimean campaign 1855, and was present at the siege and fall of Sebastopol
(medal with clasp and Turkish medal).

Lrsut-Cotong. 8. M. Gryuts (retired) died at Woking on 14th March, 1895.
He joined the regiment as Second Lieutenant 19th December, 1848; became
Lieutenant 3rd November, 1849 ; Second Captain 13th August, 1855; Captain
20th June, 1862; Brevet-Major 6th June, 1856 ; was on temporary half-pay from
26th January to lst July, 1861, retired on half-pay 22nd September, 1862, and
commuted 8rd January, 1871. He was granted the hon. rank of Lieut.-Colonel
Ist January, 1868. Lieut.-Colonel Grylls served during Crimean campaign
1854-55, including the affairs of Bulganae and McKenzie’s Farm, the Battles of
Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman, capture of Balaklava and siege of Sebastopol
(medal and clasp). Indian Mutiny 1858-59, including the capture of Rampore
Kussie, the passage of the Gogra, and minor affairs on the Nepaul frontier (medal),

Linutenant H. B. Cuarterts (retired) died at Brass, Niger Coast Protectorate,
on 8th March, 1895. He was commissioned as Second Lieutenant on 15th
February, 1889, and resigned 16th May, 1891.

Lizurenant B. Sr. G. Coppoxp (retired) whose death occurred at Felixstowe,
on 23rd February, 1895, joined the regiment as Lieutenant on 28rd December,
1857, and resigned on 19th July, 1864.

DIARY OF FIXTURES.

=== 8 0000008

APRIL.

Regimental.

Senior class joins at Woolwich
R.A, Band Concert at 9 p.m.

Long course leaves Woolwich

Good Friday.

Easter Day.
Bank Holiday.
Firemasters’ class begins

R.A.Band Concert in London

Cricket, &c.

Private.

R.A, Regimental Races at
Aldershot

R.A.v.R.E. Inter-regimental
golf matches, at Sandwich.

MAY.

W list Division (Siege) courseR.A. Woolwich v. R.N. Col-

Day of the
Mth| Wk.
1/M
25
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4.| Th
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23 | T
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25 | Th
26 | F
2718
28; &
29 | M
30 | T

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8 | W
9 | Th
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13 | M
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16 | W
16 | Th
17 | ¥F
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19/8
20; M

at Lydd begins.

lege, at Woolwich.

Ist Division course begins at|R.A. Woolwich v. Shoebury-

Portsmouth and Sandown.
lst Division R.H.A. (Alder-
shot) joins at Shoeburyness.

Position-finding class begins.

ness at Shoebury.

and Division F.A.(Aldershot)|R.A. Woolwich v. N.C. Off

joins at Okehampton.

ooo «

cers at Woolwich.

8rd Division R.H.A. (Wool-|R.A.Woolwich v. Blackheath
wich) joins at Shoeburyness.| at Blackheath.

R.A. 0. Greenjackets, at
Woolwich.

‘Ubique’ Mark Lodge of
Mark Master Masons mects
at ‘* Criterion.”

‘ Ubique’ Lodge meets of
‘€ Criterion.”’ Installation as
W.M.

Day of the
Mth | WE.
2 a
22 | W
23 | Th
24) F
2518

NO TAF Wr F

H EH a

mad 8 gekno yes

Regimental.

Ist Division R.H.A. begins
at Glenbeigh.

2nd Division course begins at
Portsmouth and Sandown.

4th Division F.A. (Woolwich)

joins at Shoeburyness.

“ Chestnut Troop ” Dinner.

5th Division F.A. (Ipswich)
joins at Shoeburyness.
Whit Sunday.

Bank Holiday.

Qnd Division F.A. (Hilsea)
joins at Okehampton.

Annual General Meeting of
R.A.T. at R.U.S.I. at 3 p.m.

2nd Division F.A. at Glen-
beigh begins.

6th Division F.A. (Weedon)
joins at Shoeburyness.

3rd Division course begins at
Portsmouth and Sandown.

3rd Division F.A. at
beigh begins.

Glen-

coo

2nd_ Division (Siege)
at Lydd begins.

course

MAY .—Continued.

Cricket, &c, Private.
R.A. v. Greenjackets, at os
Woolwich.
R.A. 9. Aldershot Division i ~~
at Aldershot. hy
R.A, v. Aldershot Division oe

at Alderghot.

Epsom Meeting begins.
Derby.

one

Oaks. i,

JUNE.

R.A. Woolwich o, B.M.A.,
at R.M.A.

ooe ous eee

REGIMENTAL DINNER.

‘ Ubique’ Royal Arch Chap-
ter meets at “ Criterion.’”’
Installation of Principals.

eee eee

R.A. v. Quidnunes at ,Wool-
wich.

R.A. v. Quidnunes at Wool- 000 600
wich.

R.A. Woolwich v. Shoebury-
ness, at Woolwich.

vee

R.A. v. Eton Ramblers, at
Woolwich.

R.A. v. Eton Ramblers, at
Woolwich.
Ascot begins.

R.A. v BE, at Woolwich.
R.A. v. R.E., at Woolwich.

Old Shoebury match. 006 oon

Old Shoebury match.

R.A. v. Yorkshire Gentle-
men, at Woolwich.

R.A. v. Household Brigade,
at Burton’s Court, Chelsea.
R.A. v. Household Brigade,
at Chelsea,

JULY.

Day of the
Mth| Wk. Regimental. Cricket, &c. Private
1 |™M [3rd Diy. Field (Shorncliffe) 900
joins at Okehampton.
2|T 000 oo 200
4) Th 200 con Oxford v. Cambridge begins. :
6 | F |4th Div. (Field) course at 900 666 900
Glenbeigh begins.
6 | S |Position-finding class ends. |R.A. Woolwich v. Brentwood, see
at Brentwood.
8|M 60 oc R.A. »v. Harlequins, at “ ves
Woolwich.
9| 7 tee 00 R.A. v.... Harlequins, at a
. Woolwich,
lo | W Ee obs oo) b
11 | Th a oo nes ‘ oo
12/ F te 900 _ {Eton v. Harrow begins. .. a)
13 | S |4th Div. course Golden Hill|R.A. Woolwich v. Black- 06
and Sandown begins. heath, at Woolwich.
14) 8S 0 00 a
16 | M ie
16 | T 000 5
18 | Th R.A. Woolwich v. West Kent|‘ Ubique’ Mark Lodge of
at Woolwich. Mark Master Masons meets
at “Criterion.” Installa-
tion of W.M.
19 | F 00 R.A. v. R.E., at Chatham. 060
20| 58 bd R.A. v. R.E., at Chatham.
21|S . os 900
22 | M R.A. v. Gentlemen of M.C.C.
at Lord’s.
9B} | ae fo. OF R.A. v. Gentlemen of M.C.C.
at Lord’s.
24, WwW eee eee .
25 | Th a wea | Ms ay y
26| EF |4th Div. Field (Colchester)|R.A. v. Free Foresters, at o
joins at Okehampton. Woolwich.
27-| S tee 900 R.A. v. Free Foresters, at 0m
Woolwich.
28 | S . 0 aod 9
29 | M eee ee we a0
SD || a 0 by Goodwood begins. ,
31 | W . tee 000

PRECIS

AND

AM 356 YAN. INT TS) IG aX, 40) ILO) IN

THE FIELD GUN OF THE FUTURE,

AS PROPOSED BY

GENERAL WILLE AND HIS CRITICS.

TRANSLATED BY

CAPTAIN H. A. BETHELL, R.A.

October 1898.

(Continued from p. 8, No, 8, Vol. XXIT.).

PART III.

General Wille remarks on the table given below: —

(1.) Mr Bender’s gun with its low velocity is a very weak shooting affair, and
its practically impossible shrapnel of 263 bs. puts it out of count.

(2.). This is only a H.A. gun. As such it is far superior to the English
12-pr.

(8.) Colonel Langlois’ is a quick-firing gun and as such useless and impossible,
Its ballistics are very poor.

(4.) No comment on Uolonel de Sotomayor’s gun.
(5.) Mr. X.’s gun is an enfeebled edition of Captain Moch’s.

(6.) Mr. C.’s gun is intended to be a quick-firing gun with shield mount-
ing. In his pamphlet he gives no idea of how this is to be carried out, and how
he proposes with an energy of recoil amounting to 8°8 foot tons! to prevent his
carriage from running back—especially as he objects to hydraulic buffers! His
gun is to be of steel or aluminium bronze, his shield of chrome steel and aluminium
and his metallic cartridges of the same metal.

Mr. C. is not apparently aware that aluminium, like its alloys, rapidly loses
strength with increase of temperature. It is quite unsuitable for gun construction
and has so far proved a complete failure as cartridge metal.

It should be noted that Mr. C.’s “ battery” consists, in addition to 6 guns, of
two mortars and 6 machine guns. Comment is needless.

(7.) Captain Moch’s designs are both powerful guns, far in advance of anything
now existing. The 18} 1b. shell of the first gun is too heavy and the second de-
sign is preferred.

The annexed table of field guns proposed as rivals to General Wille’s designs
will be of interest.

1C.f. 12-pr. 5°07 foot tons by same formula.
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Neither design satisfies General Wille, who considers that Captain Moch has
not taken full advantage of the strength of his materials.

(8.) Mr. Longridge, in his second design, has arrived at the same estimate of
strength of materials as General Wille.

His gun is shorter and stouter, and his powder pressure of 29°7 tons gives al-
most exactly the same strain on the metal as General Wille’s 25 tons. As
previously pointed out, General Wille considers his gun too short for nitro-
powder, his muzzle velocity too low, and his shell too heavy.!

(9.) ‘Taking the average of the foregoing table, omitting Mr. Bender’s 26-pr.
and Colonel Langlois’ quick-firmg gun, and comparing the result with existing
field guns, we note a large increase in power, velocity, density, and powder
pressure, and a decrease in calibre.

(10.) Next follow some notes on the highest velocities experimentally attained
by various gun-makers :

Canet... ... ... 2°42 inch gun 1892, 3323 f.s.
Ceitelnae . cody yoo BOs) > yy ~ BORB 4
IDSC soo 000) a 1893, BIOU 5
French Government 6°3 55 » 8088 5

Shewing that General Wille’s 2625 f.s., is not so extravagant after all.
(11.) The flat trajectory is objected to on three rounds :

(a.) Danger to one’s own troops in front.
(0.) Want of searching powder of shrapnel against troops under cover.

(c.) The enemy will be safe on the reverse slope of a hill, as shell clearing
the ridge will go clean over him.

General Wille replies:

a.) ‘There is no question of the shell itself striking troops in front, as even
at 100 yards the trajectory is about 9' 6” above the ground when firing at 2000
yards. As for premature bursts, a few degrees of elevation more or less will
make no possible difference.

(0.) The lowest velocity field guns now existing give an angle of descent of
only about 6° at 2000 yards. This is quite insuffictent for searching entrench-
ments with shrapnel. Such work will have to be done with high explosive shell.
c.) Obviously the fire is most effective when the trajectory is parallel to the
reverse slope of the enemy’s position—that is when the angle of descent is equal
to the slope of the ground. Practically, unless you get a ridge like the roof of a
house, at ordinary ranges the slope is always less than the angle of descent, and
the flatter the trajectory the better.

12.) The high pressure in the bore (25 tons per square inch) to which many
critics object, is no higher than that of the French 4°7” and 5°9" quick-firing
guns. —
A 5-inch gun tried at Birdsboro’, U.S., in 1892 stood 262 tons without injury.
The new nickel-steel gun ordered by the American Government is to have a

powder pressure of 20 tons to the square inch. The steel specification is as
follows :

A tube :—Hlastic limit 18°75 tons, breaking strain 38 tons, extension 20 per cent.
Jacket :— Ae 20 55 5 40° ,, s; 18
Outer hoops:—_,, Dalry a 465i, 5

39 16 33

eer things being equal this weight gives 90 rounds per sub-division against General Wille’s

(13.) Various critics have doubted the possibility of using gun steel up to an
elastic limit of 25 tons per square inch.

The French Canet quick-firing guns are now (1892) made of steel to the
following specification :

Elastic limit 25°5 tons, breaking strain 43°8 tons, extension 16 per cent.

This steel is made at St. Etenne, Firming and Havre.
For the experiments at Obuchoff, the Russian Government have ordered a 4-pr.
gun with an 4 tube up to 26°7 tons elastic limit.

(14.) Regarding the possibility of making a gun to stand the premature burst
of a high explosive shell without flying to. pieces, General Wille cites the following
experiments of Krupp’s, carried out 14th October, 1892 :

A shell containing about 4 lb. of picric acid was exploded in a 3} inch gun of
ordinary steel at 1 foot from the muzzle. The muzzle was cut clean off and the
metal round the shell blown into small pieces. The same‘experiment was then re-
peated in a similar gun of nickel-steel. The result wasa bulge of °3 inch at the
point of explosion. “No crack could be detected. A second picric acid shell was
then burst in the chamber of the same gun, causing a bulge of °37 inch and a
hair crack 8 inches long. In neither case was any portion of the steel separated.

(15.) The process of hardening (not tempering) high steel in melted: lead is
said to have given good results. Comparative trials shew an improvement on the
oil-hardening process of 6°6 per cent. elastic limit, 11°8 per cent. breaking train
and extension no less than 38°4 per cent.

(16.) The Swiss Government have just given notice of a competitive trial for
the selection of the new field gun for their army. ‘The conditions laid down are:

Calibre—2°76" to 3°3”.

Density—To be as high as practicable.

Muzzle velocity—With partly arrested recoil, not under 1640 f.s.

*; With completely 3 35 1500

Breech action—Quick-firing.

Obturation—By means of a metallic cartridge.

Buffer and brake—So far as possible to arrest the recoil that the gun
has not to be laid afresh.

Number of rounds carried—36 to 40 in the limber for the 3:3” gun,
or more for smaller calibres.

Weight, marching order, without detachment—not over 354 cwt. for
the 3:3” gun.

General Wille remarks: I do not believe it possible to completly arrest recoil
with a muzzle velocity of 1500 f.s., and a shell of respectable weight.

So far, however, as regards the gun with partly arrested recoil, the conditions
seem very fair.

(17.) The Russian Government have ordered 3 quick-firing field guns, and
intend to carry out a competitive test between them.

These are: A 3°13” quick-firing from Griison.
yy DOB a » Nordenfeldt.
1) Oe ap 5, St. Chamond.

"A varied and thorough trial is to be carried out, and the successful eun must
possess good ballistics ‘and the practical. qualities of a serviceable field gun.
General Wille, as beforesaid, objects on principle to quick-firing field guns.

(18.) It is not stated whether the Nordenfeldt 2°95” quick-firing ordered

by Russia is identical with the Nordenfeldt quick-firing tried at Leraing in Bel-
gium, ‘This has the following remarkable points :—

The trunnions of the gun are vertical, those of the top carriage horizontal.

The gun recoils 1 foot on the top carriage. It is connected by a chain to a
fixed hydraulic buffer, and to springs which return it to the firing position.

The gun itself has a friction brake (besides the carriage brake) to which it is
connected by toothed wheels.

The carriage has a peculiar tire brake. The brake blocks revolve with the wheels
till they touch the ground, when they become drag-shoes and finally inclined
planes down which the gun runs forward. ‘There is a spur or earth-plate under
the point of the trail. The elevating gear recoils with the gun.

The limber has no boxes, but has 8 aluminium portable magazines weighing
empty 4 lbs. each and holding each 6 rounds.

The gun and limber weigh 333 ewt. without M.O. kit or detachment.

There are 9 ammunition wagons, and the battery carries 273 rounds per gun.

The shell weighs 10°4 lbs. smokeless powder, and the m.y. 1500 fis. The
density of the shell is only 1:5 lbs. per square inch of cross section.

When fired, the gun carriage moved only a few inches backwards or forward,
and the laying required only a slight correction after each round. ‘This result
was not considered quite satisfactory and ‘ anchors” are now to be added outside
each wheel.

General Wille remarks: This gun bears out what has already been said about
the impossibility of making a good quick-firing field gun. Everything possible
has been «done to make it answer—the carriage is a mass of elaborate
machinery—and the result is a field gun weaker than anything ever made
before. The ballistics of the gun are simply contemptible—for instance, the
angle of descent at 3000 yards is over 11 degrees—and the gun is merely a
small-bore field howitzer.

(19.) Colonel von Wuich of the Austrian Artillery is considered a high
authority on the Continent, and General Wille discusses his essay on the future field
gun in a separate chapter. He begins by demanding a light field howitzer, to
fire over the heads of one’s own troops and to search cover and entrenchments.

On this General Wille remarks that a light howitzer is only a toy, that the
flattest field gun trajectory will clear infantry 100 yards from the muzzle, and
that as cover and entrenchments can be effectively searched by field guns firing
high explosive shell, it is not worth while to encumber the army with special
howitzer batteries requiring special ammunition trains, which would only
occasionally be of use.

Colonel von Wuich then proceeds to describe his ideal field gun.

This is to possess a high m.y. and density of projectile, giving a flat trajectory,
in order to reduce the importance of errors in estimating range. It must further
possess great mobility and rapidity of fire.

Muzzle velocity 1970 f.s., weight of shell about 17 lbs., calibre not determined,
probably about 3°15 in.; pressure in the bore at least 20 tons per square inch.
Weight of gun and limber, marching order, 354 ewt.

Ammunition to consist of shrapnel and high explosive shell, case shot to be
abolished. All shell to have fixed time and percussion fuzes. Metallic cartridges
objected to. Smokeless powder. Gun to be either of nickel-steel or possibly of
improved bronze.

Carriage to have a separate top-carriage and a muzzle traversing arrangement.
Recoil to be checked, not stopped, by brakes. The elevating gear must Aillow of
fire at considerable angles, as it may often be necessary to ne at balloons.

Though on minor points General Wille differs from Colonel von Wuich, he

65B

considers his system generally sound and his opinions deserving of the highest
respect.

(20.) The new Russian field mortar is a 6-inch B.L. mortar on an iron
bed, It fires a 68 lb. shrapnel containing 6832 oz. bullets, or a 60 1b. common
shell. The battery consists of 36 carriages, including 18 ammunition wagons
and 6 ammunition carts, carrying 92 rounds per mortar.

The battery fires about 3 rounds of shrapnel per minute.

As the result of various experiments, the Russians consider their mortar
superior to their own or any existing field gun, and Captain Schubert compares
it to the English 12-pounder, much to the disadvantage of the latter. General
Lewitzky proposes to equip the Russian Horse Artillery with it !

General Wille points out that the above comparative trials were carried out at
dummies in entrenchments of strong profile at which the Russian field guns had
no chance at all. A more powerful field gun firing high explosive shells would
give a very different account of itself. For Field Artillery work proper and much
more for Horse Artillery work, the mortar battery with its 36 carriages is
altogether too clumsy.

Fancy a Horse Artillery battery obliged to dismount its mortar beds in order
to come into action, and with the shell brought up to the gun in a two-horse cart!
Moreover, on tactical grounds a 68 Ib. field shell is inadmissible.

In the trials above described the mortar battery took from 8 to 12 rounds to
yange itself—and that at known ranges at conspicuous standing objects. A
waste of a dozen 14 lb. shell would be bad enough, but a waste of a dozen 68 lb.
shell at every fresh range before effective fire commenced would be more than any
ammunition column could stand. As moreover the rate of fire is only 3 shrapnel
per minute, the enemy would not improbably move off before the completion of
the ranging series. The extreme range of the mortar is only 3300 yards, and
a field battery at 3500 yards firing at a target like the mortar battery with its
36 carriages would have a very enjoyable time.

(21.) Captain Kuczera finds fault with General Wille for wasting argument
on people who still believe in field howitzers. General Wille replies in effect that
since there are such people—and clever people too—it is his duty to make them
see the error of their ways.

(22.) Comparative trial of Krupp’s new 64 1b. quick-firing gun against a 3°15”
field gun.

This is too long to transcribe.

General Wille admits that the quick-firing equalled the field gun in hits per pound
of shell, and beat it by 3 to 1 for time. He contends however that the field gun
was an old and comparatively weak one, that the target (three rows of screens 9
feet high and 20 yards behind one another) was not a service one, and that the
trial took place at known ranges. Ata service target such as successive lines of
attacking infantry the little quick-firing gun with its narrow zone of shrapnel effect
would have no chance against a powerful field gun. As for time, the field gun
fired 2 rounds per minute, and this rate, equal to 12 rounds per minute for a
battery, General Wille considers quite sufficient for practical purposes.

A further conclusive objection to the use of shell so small as 64 lbs. is their
want of effect against entrenchments, and the impossibility of getting a sufficiently
large high explosive burster into them.

General Wille gives long extracts from articles on this trial by various eminent
military writers to much the same effect.

(23.) A summary of the opinions of eleven critics for and against metallic
cartridges and fixed ammunition. A small majority vote for metallic cartridges
separated from the shell. Metal is preferred because nitro powder keeps better

in metal than in silk, and because there is no danger from burning fragments left
in the bore.

General Wille says the question will have to be decided by experience.

(24.) With respect to the gun carriage twice mentioned by General Wille,
which stood a number of rounds with a recoil of 14 tons without injury Captain
Kuezera objects that this must have been a brand new carriage, and that no
carriage weakened by travelling would stand it.. General Wille replies that over
1000 rounds had been fired from it, and it had done various marches and more
than one railway journey.

(25.) Zhe Du Bange anti-recoil spur.—The end of the trail is bent parallel
to the ground for about 2 feet, and contains a hydraulic buffer and spring. To
this buffer is connected a spur or spike driven deep into the ground. On firing
the carriage runs back but the spike stands fast, and the buffer spring, com-
pressed during the recoil, brings the carriage to the front again to its original
position. On hard ground the spike is not used, but is taken off and hung on
the limber.

The spur brake is objected to as causing violent and irregular jump.

(26.) ‘The anchor brake is a grapnel with spring shank. It is fixed in the
ground in front of the gun and connected by chains to the breast of the carriage,

It is said to have been tried at Calais and to have stood 250 rounds without
giving way. :

With respect to this as to the spur brake, General Wille objects that it can only
be used on favourable ground. The Griison buffer carriage which reduces the
recoil to 2 feet, is good enough for him.

(27.) Various opinions for and against armour shields—General Wille
reckons that a shield would weigh 250 lbs., would demoralize the gunners and
would make a handsome target and a screen for the enemy to burst his shrapnel
on. The gunner’s best defence is the superiority of his own fire.

(28.) Changes in War Material since °91-—Germany had added one
ammunition wagon per battery and reduced one store wagon.

Common shell have been done away with, and shrapnel with fixed double
action fuzes introduced. The high explosive shell have been improved.

Austria has introduced a light Horse Artillery gun and has equalized the
weights of common and shrapnel shell.

Other nations have made no progress.

REMARKS BY TRANSLATOR,

With the exception of the field howitzer man, none of the critics seem to take
exception to General Wille’s main principles. They all seem to agree with him
about deep zone of shrapnel effect, high velocity, flat trajectory, and great power.
But besides the various objections to details, there seems to be a general idea
that he has over-estimated the strength of his materials, and that his gun will
burst or his carriage collapse. As regards the pressure in the bore, the critics
have a trifle the best of it, and he is practically driven to admit that his gun
cannot be made out of ordinary gun-steel. My own view, if I may be exercised
for putting it forward, is that if General Wille trusts to shrinking one tube on
another to equalize the strain on his metal, he will find himself mistaken; and
further that his factor of safety for nitro powder should be doubled at least.
Most of us who use H.C. and Schultze are familiar with the violent cartridges that
occasionally occur in the best shooting batches. I think General Wille will have
to put another hundredweight on to his gun, preferably in the shape of wire. As
for the material of his tube and jacket, it is clear that “low” gun-steel will not
do; the question is whether “ high ” steel—say with an elastic limit of 40 tons
and a breaking strain of 80—can be used or no, Such steel, if required, could

be supplied easily enough, and I have no doubt that it can and will be used for
guns. Twenty years ago we made our guns of wrought-iron because we would
not trust steel; now we use low steel because we will not trust high steel.
Surely itis time we tried a step in advance? If we made our guns of the same
steel as our swords there would be no difficulty in attaining to General Wille’s
requirements.

Several of the details of his scheme will not commend themselves to English
gunners, His metallic cartridge cases would be an awful nuisance in our
service; we should probably make the limber-gunners burnish them. As for
his patent nave-brake, we have tried nave-brakes, tire-brakes and automatic
brakes till we are about sick of them. It rather upsets the Major’s nerves
when he sees No. 1 gun waltzing round or running at him with open mouth
because one side of the machinery has gone wrong. Now that we have got the
drag-shoe I hope we shall stick to it.

The number of rounds per gun (102) will seem to most people too small.

This is based on the numbers actually fired in the Franco-German War. It
might be argued, however, that if the German captains had had more ammunition,
they would have fired faster. 1 can imagine a C.O. economizing his ammunition
when he ought to be at “rapid fire’ for fear of emptying his boxes and being
out of it in the next day’s fight. JI should add 8 more wagons and bring the
number up to 138 per gun.

Tam afraid that in the foregoing précis I have left out many of General Wille’s
best ‘points,’ for which I hope he will forgive me. Among others I do not
think it has been explained that at short ranges up to say 1500 yards the new
gun will practically require no ranging. You have only to get a 400 yards
bracket in the first two shots, and you can start time fuze at once, at the mean
elevation; since a correction of a 100 yards will make no practical difference in
the height of burst. Similarly the fuze will give no trouble, since it is simply
set to the range and corrected by altering on the fuze key the distance short of
burst.

The superior way in which the French and German critics refer to our 12-
pounder as an example of “‘ how of to do it”’ is not calculated to increase our good
opinion of ourselves. Perhaps as a 15-pounder it will please them better. If
there is any truth in the proportion of weight to muzzle energy laid down by
General Wille, Colonel von Wuich and other authorities mentioned above, it
ovght to stand a m.y. of 2000 f.s. with a 15-pounder shell. That would be
something like a field gun! .

The following figures relating to General Wille’s gun, worked out by the
English formulee, may be of interest :

Rance Tass ror 2°76” B.L. Guy,

Projectile, fuzed shrapnel, weighing 14°33 lbs. Charge 3 lbs. cubical smokeless
powder. Muzzle velocity 2625 f.s.

1000 yards. 2000 yards. 38000 yards.
ivemaimin gavel oCiitiyat+Souatcc Ness) eleccn ns TnES 2137 1750 1425
ATI GF OOVHNOD o> woo oo 00 oo oo oot 0° 2637 59’ 1° 40’
Slope of descent pods 060. 66h G00! Loud) "S00" | “66s ToS 35 a
Angle of opening of sprapnel1 ... n,n ae 9° 287 10° 20’ 11° 24’
ge ob zone of effective shrapnel bullets, } “65 726 602

1 General Wille gives Av due to 4 oz, burster =260 fis,

PRECIS

AND

FROM THE

“REVISTA DI ARTIGLIERA E GENIO.”

Ottobre e Novembre, 1894.

FORTRESS WARFARE.

TRANSLATED BY

MAJOR R. M. B. F. KELLY, R.A.

La Guerra di Fortezza (L’azione dell Artiglieria) E Rocehé maggiore, del Genio.

1.—ORGANIZATION,

The defences of an important fortress should be organized in concentric lines
each one within artillery range of and under the fire of the guns of the next inner line.
The lines would be (1) the enceinte of the central nucleus or town or position to
be defended; (2) the main line; (3) the advanced line. In addition there would
be a second or retired line forming a chord between two points in the main line.

These external lines should follow wherever possible the crest line of a ridge or
series of ridges, and an interior line should if possible have command over an
exterior one—vide Fig 1.

Functions and defences of the various lines.—The external line should virtually
be a carefully selected site or sites on which a defensive battle would be fought
before the mobile portion of the garrison withdrew behind the main defences, and
before the place could be regularly invested. The defences of this line would be
obtained by placing the existing features of the country between the 2000 to 3000
yards zone from the main line, woods, farm-houses, villages, streams, and the like,
ina state of defence; and by constructing such trenches and field-works as might be
necessary.

The function of this line is to force the enemy to fight a pitched battle and to
win a carefully prepared defensive position before he can invest the fortress or
commence his siege operations.

The main line of defence should consist of a chain of permanent forts, capable of
giving each other mutual support and connected by lines of trenches, with gaps
for the withdrawal of the mobile army when forced to fall back. The great bulk
of the defensive artillery would be placed in these intervals in guasi siege batteries.
The position and character of the defences for the advanced line and for the inter-
vals in the main line having been carefully decided on in time of peace the works

10, Vou, XXII, '

would be carried out as soon as it was determined to place the fortress in a state
of defence.

Fie. 1.
B
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eh coae aan Late aia
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BA . 40
Dake BAN OE
ADVANCED aINS OB DEF ey, S
aN Ay! S
MAIN Line
\
\
\
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\

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us ee
2175 2175 YARDS
Scheme of Defensive Arrangements for a large Fortress. @ Permanent works.

e Field and improvised works.
c E
A_«<QirE SSS
Section on the line A B. Case of level unaccentuated ground.
7 i I /
o Cc D E p ’
0

Section on the line A B’. Hilly accentuated ground.

The functions of the main line of defence are—

(1.) By the fire of its guns to support the mobile army in the defence of the
advanced position.

(2.) To offer an obstinate resistance after that army has been defeated and
driven in.

(3.) To protect the central nucleus from bombardment.

This main line may be said to form the tracing of a gigantic polygon in which
the permanent forts form the bastions and the lines in the intervals the curtains.

The lines in the intervals should follow the crest line of a ridge or ridges and
the forts be constructed on commanding points on these ridges.

The functions of the enceinte or defences of the central nucleus is to guard it,
i.e. the town or city defended, from capture or raid by small parties who having
penetrated the main line at some point have pursued their advantage so far, and to
make it a place of refuge secure against a coup de main.

For this purpose a slight profile formed by a ditch 13” to 14” deep and 13 to
16 yards wide with a parapet 33” to 39” thick having a command of from 16” to
20" would suftice,

The second or retired line can only be fixed when the besieger has made clear
which face of the fortress he means to attack.

This line should form a chord to the face of the main line under attack and
should extend between two permanent forts in that line not themselves under
attack but on the flanks of the attacked are—the defences of this line should be
similar to those in the main line but necessarily of a slighter and more temporary
type. Field-works erected on prominent points would take the place of the per-
manent forts in the main line. Possible positions for such work should be fixed
in time of peace and the size and character of the works decided on, the functions
of this second line are to provide for the continuity of the defence even after any
particular section of the main line has been pierced or rendered untenable to pre-
vent a successful attack on the main line being immediately followed by the fall
of the place and to facilitate the withdrawal of troops and materiel.

The functions of the forts of the main line are to command by the fire of long
range guns the country over which the besieging army must manoeuvre to attack
the defensive position ; to support the mobile army in the defence of that posi-
tion; to provide these guns with efficient defences which can only be rendered
untenable by a deliberate bombardment from comparatively short ranges, and to
afford such flanking protection to the intervals that these would be secure from
assault till more than one of the forts had been silenced.

T].—DEFENCE.
Armament.—A greater diversity of types and calibres is admissible and even

necessary in the armament of a fortress than in that of a siege-train. And the
armament of a Ist class fortress should include the following types :

(1.) A few long range guns to act against the investing columns at a distance,
to oblige the assailant to place his park or depdt at a maximum distance, to render
the task of arming the siege batteries and the supply of ammunition arduous and
perilous, and to give material support to the mobile portion of the garrison in
their defensive battle and during the other preliminary operations.

Long range can only be obtained at the expense of lightness and mobility, but
as these considerations are not in all cases so essential for the defence as for the
attack the former would surrender an important advantage if it did not include
some long range guns in its armament. ‘These guns should be invariably placed
in the forts of the main line, they will act by direct fire and should be aimed by
direct visual laying. They should if possible command all the “ terrain ” included
in their ares of fire which should be as large as possible—-should be placed behind
defences proof against high explosive shells—and their magazines and shelters
should be similarly protected.

(2.) The remainder of the armament need not be superior in calibre to that
advocated for siege-trains. As the bulk of the armament should be distributed in
the intervals between the forts, mobility becomes a desideratum, and as the defences
of siege batteries must necessarily be slight, powerful guns are unnecessary,
howitzers of about 5:8” calibre and medium mortars! are recommended as most
suitable for indirect or curved fire, the destruction of overhead cover, &e.

(3.) The flanking of the batteries and trenches in the intervals and the im-
mediate defence of the forts themselves should be secured as far as possible by
light and quick-firimg guns on disappearing mountings in the forts—these guns
should have a command over the “ terrain’ in the immediate vicinity of the forts
and over the intervals between themselves and the neighbouring forts on either
flank,

(4.) In addition to the above there should bea proportion of light mobile
guns and howitzers of about 3:5" calibre. apidity of fire is absolutely essential

1 By mortars are meant rifled howitzers mounted at fixed angles of elevation.

to the defence, and as their supply of ammunition should be practically unlimited,
they must utilize this advantage by rapidity of fire, and this rapidity must be
sought not only by employing hight guns but also by the use of fixed ammunition
and short recoil mountings.

The armament of a fortress may be classified as under—

(1.) Protective armament—consisting of guns permamently mounted in the
forts of the main line. These guns are thus always ready and can join in the
defence at the very outset—they include the long range guns mentioned above—
strongly protected and even some in armoured revolving towers ; quick-firing and
other light or medium guns and howitzers for the immediate protection of the forts
themselves, and for flanking purposes, mounted on disappearing mountings.

(2.) Defensive armament consists of the ordnance which it is intended to place
in position as soon as it has been decided to put the fortress in a state of defence,
these guns, &c. would be distributed in the intervals between the forts, in batteries
of the nature of siege batteries.

(3.) Reserve armament.—This armament is intended to reinforce the face or posi-
tion attacked and could only be placed in position when that is known; the batteries
composing it would be told off to the main and second or retired lines respectively.

(4.) Mobile armament consists of field and mountain batteries intended to
accompany the mobile troops of the sectional or general reserve and to support
their operations.

Placed behind epaulments they would assist in the general defence of the various
lines, and form a reinforcement to the regular armament of the fortress.

Tt has been said above that the bulk of the armament would be placed in the
intervals between the forts and that these interval lines should follow the
topographical crest of a series of ridges.

These batteries should be arranged andin three échelons, the first on the crest
line should consist of medium and small calibre guns for direct fire, they should
have a command of fire and view over the eround j in front, they are for direct fire
and should be aimed by direct visual laying ; the second echelon should be placed
a little behind the crest line or on high eround to the rear not commanded from
the front, and should consist of medium and fairly large calibre guns with flat
trajectory for direct fire; the third echelon should be on the reverse slope and
should consist of medium and large calibre howitzers in concealed batteries for
indirect fire by indirect laying.

Defence of the advance line.—The protective armament placed in the first and
second échelons of the intervals should endeavour by direct fire to silence the be-
sieger’s guns charged with the duty of preparing for the assault on the advanced
line, the careful organization and the superior means of observing fire at the
disposal of the defence should ensure a superiority of fire. The long range guns
in the forts would prevent the enemy from bombarding the advanced position
from close quarters and would support the troops engaged in the defence of that
position. The light mobile guns in the advanced “position would support the
infantry in its defence and cover its retreat.

Carefully arranged lines of obstacles would add to the efficiency of the artillery
fire from the main line of defence by delaying the attacking columns. Wire en-
tanglements, owing to the comparative immunity they enjoy from destruction by
artillery fire, form the best kind of obstacle—they should have a depth of from 200
to 300 yards—with intervals 400 to 600 yards wide at certain known points to
allow the defenders to fall back thr ough them.

Defence of main line.—Artillery combat—the main burden of the defence during
this phase will fall on the third échelon of the defensive armament, i.e. those
howitzers placed in concealed batteries on the reverse slopes of the ridge. From

these batteries the fire would be indirect, means of laying indirect, observations of
fire from some points on the crest line, nature of fire curved fire with high ex-
plosive shell for the destruction of overhead cover and indirect shrapnel for
searching effect. The advantage gained by using this échelon is that the batteries
are protected and concealed and can only be touched by curved fire.

The heavy long range guns from the forts would support these batteries by
direct fire.

The guns and howitzers of the Ist and 2nd ¢chelons should be used to repel
assaults, and to harass working parties and would be assisted by the flanking fire of
the guns mounted for that purpose in the forts.

The section of the main line under attack would be reinforced by guns, &e.
from the reserve armament, and during this phase of the siege the second or re-
tired line should be placed in a state of defence and armed. ‘The distribution of
its armament and the organization for its defence would be similar to that of the
main line. The points @appui of this line must necessarily be of the nature of
field-works and their armament less formidable than that of the forts in the main
line.

Construction of batteries for defensive and reserve arnament.

(1.) Batteries on the crest line (1st and 2nd ¢chelon).

Sunken batteries are preferable—Ist because the parapets and traverses are
formed of undisturbed earth and are therefore stronger; secondly, the natural con-
tour of the ground is not interfered with and the batteries are consequently less
conspicuous ; and thirdly, because the desired amount of protection can be obtained
in a shorter time. ‘The deddai should be scattered along the front in such a way
as to conform to the folds of the ground and to aid in the concealment of the
battery. Tig. 2 shows such a battery, the measurements being in métres and

Fie, 2.
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Construction of the Batteries. Scale <1
(900) (009) iy
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Section on the line A B.

decimals, for four emplacements this battery would require in ordinary soil 100
men working eight hours.

Fig. 2a.

The magazines should be in excavations outside the batteries, niches for the re-
ception of a few rounds being excavated near each gun.

Local circumstances may prevent such batteries being constructed.

(1.) The configuration of the ground may necessitate more command than can
be obtained from a sunken battery.

(2.) Water near the surface or a very soft subsoil would oblige the guns to be
placed on unbroken ground.

(8.) A very rocky ground might render excavation too laborious, in this case
the conformation of the ground might admit of the guns being placed as shewn
in fig. 2a.

Whenever a sunken battery is excavated in rock the danger of splinters from
the rear face of the emplacement must be guarded against, the slope of this face
should not be too steep and, if necessary, the length along the line of fire of the
emplacement should be increased, the extra space being filled up with earth at a
slope of ¢ or 4 from the ground level to the floor of the emplacement. When-
ever it is necessary to protect batteries by raised parapets owing to the nature of
the soil, difficulties of drainage, &c., it will be impossible to conceal them from
view, but observation of fire by the enemy must be rendered difficult by the em-
ployment of natural or artificial screens or masks. Lofty trees form the best
screen, especially if planted in suitable rows, the distance of such a screen from
the battery must depend on the height of the trees, local considerations, &c., but
it should be at some considerable distance (100 to 300 yards).

In default of natural. screens recourse must be had to masses of earth, here
again no exact distance can be laid down, but in any case it should not be less
than the length of the 50°/, zone for the guns likely to be employed against it at
the shortest probable range.

When the position of the batteries is commanded in such a way that it is not
possible to screen them, the position of the guns may be concealed by a cloud of
smoke from fires lighted in suitable positions and fed with resinous, smoke-
giving fuel.

Concealed batteries (8rd ¢chelon). These batteries being constructed on the re-
verse slope will only require overhead cover and the magazines can be placed close
to the batteries. The arrangement of such batteries being reduced to the utmost
simplicity will facilitate the rapid instalment of such ordnance as may at any time
be required at any particular spot, whether for offence or defence. When the
features of the ground are not acutely marked the positions of the batteries must
be masked by screens as recommended above; finally, if it is impossible to utilize
any of the above methods to protect and screen the batteries, recourse must be had
to armoured protection.

The advantage of armour for the protection of important guns mounted in the
permanent forts is undisputed, but its employment for the protection of batteries
placed in the intervals presents many difficulties. Shields for the protection of
siege batteries formed of layers of plates of the aggregate thickness of 5°85" have
been tried, and it is not impossible that the employment of more powerful shields

may be found practicable, but the solution of this question is more likely to be
found in the use of armoured mountings, such as that made by the Griison firm
for a 4°58” quick-firing howitzer 18 calibres long, weighing with the howitzer (of
1100 Ibs.) under 40,000 Ibs. (about 18 tons). Itis in 19 sections, the heaviest of
which, the cupola, weighs about 4500 Ibs. (about 2 tons). It was found that six
men including one fitter could put the whole together and mount the gun in a
little over two hours.

The comparative mobility of such mountings and the facilities they afford for
working the gun will render their employment possible not only for the defence
but also for siege guns, on the other hand their cost (£3600 for the mounting
mentioned) will prevent their being very generally employed.

Il].—Tue Arrack.

Nature of siege-train armament.—The number of different calibres and types
of ordnance in a siege-train should be restricted as far as possible. Howitzers
and rifled mortars should have the same calibres as guns so that the same pro-
jectile might do for both.

The bulk of the armament should consist of not more than 8 calibres ; those
adopted by most countries being about 5”, 6” and 8” with two supplementary
natures, viz. a light gun of 3:7 and a heavy mortar of 10°5” i

The 5" usually consists of guns only, the 6” of guns and howitzers, the 8” of
guns, howitzers and mortars. Guns of 8” should be regarded as exceptional
pieces and only form part of a siege-train for the reduction of works of a very ex-
ceptional character.

A siege-train should be organized in sections or échelons, each section comprising
all the ordnance required for some particular phase of the siege of a first-class
fortress or for the reduction of a place of minor importance. In France the siege-
train is divided into six sections of which No. 1 is the light or auxiliary siege-train,
it is separate from and independent of the siege-train proper—every Continental
Power has some such organization, supplementary to the siege-train proper—its
function is to accompany the besieging army—from its mobility it can be brought
into action at once and would prepare the way for the assault on the advanced
line.

The French light train includes 16 howitzers of 6 and 8 mortars of 8:5’!
throwing shell with a bursting charge of 26°4 lbs. and 67°4 Ibs. respectively (rather
heavy orduance for a light siege-train !) :

Sections 2 to 5 comprise the siege-train properly so called, section 6 includes a
mortar of 10°5" and a gun of 8°5", exceptional pieces only required for the reduc-
tion of unusually powerful defences. Siege-trains and parks should usually be
stored in frontier fortresses. The special light siege-train should form part of
the reserve armament of such fortresses so as to be equally available for offence
or defence. As to the number of pieces of ordnance required for the reduction of
a first-class fortress there is a great difference of opinion, the numbers given
varying from 200 (General Saiier) to 700 (General Brialmont), 400 may be taken
as amean. While as to the best proportion of different natures of ordnance no
recent standard has been fixed, the old standard was 55°/, guns, 20°/, howitzers
and 25°/, mortars. The increased accuracy of curved fire would tend to diminish
the proportion of guns and increase that of the other two classes.

Ammunition supply—The weight of ammunition expended at the sieges of the
undermentioned places was—

Strasbourg 31 days’ siege ... .., ... 4000 tons.
Paris 62 by s Booty ont naif OOO eee
Belfort 73 A pp 600 900 oop. ALSO

“1A

- These figures will probably be much exceeded in future, and the probable
amount has been estimated at—

Preliminary engagements andinvestment ... .,. 1000 tons.

AiO OF achran@adl INNG.c9 “soo v0 060 050 oo OOO ,,
aA main pee en EN REN em DAneyew rd: () () (Se ae
ts second OH 66 mantdoo! N50. Wao Mircea noes malar OOO aap
a Compl MWMCEUS 555 ooo con 00 ooo BOOM)

11000 tons.

This would give from 1000 to 1200 rounds per piece, of which 200 to 300 rounds
would form the first instalment which should form part of the equipment of the
siege-train and accompany the guns themselves.

Both for the arming of the batteries for the heavier natures and for the supply
of ammunition, a light railway is an indispensable adjunct to the matériel of each
section of a siege-train. The want of it was severely felt by the Germans at the
siege of Paris. On the 9th November, 1870, 45000 quintals (of about 100 lbs.)
were wanting to complete the first supply of ammunition for the siege batteries,
this had to be brought up by cart from Nanteuil to Villa Coublay, 4 days’ journey
—8 days for going and returning—allowing 15 quintals per cart, this would have
taken 1000 carts 24 days to accomplish, instead of that only 500 or 600 were
available and the roads were so bad that they could only take from 10 to 12
quintals each. Eventually 1500 carts had to be procured from Germany to com-
plete the transport. Nevertheless, when after the fall of Tssy and Vanves the
question arose whether the regular siege of the enceinte could be undertaken.
General Hohenlohe declared that it would be possible if a railway were placed at
the absolute disposal of the artillery, otherwise the attack would fail for want of
ammunition.

The French have adopted for their siege-train equipment the Péchot railway
23°4” onage, average load for a train 30 tons net; putting the distance between
the nearest point of the railway system and the park at 12 miles and allowing 6
hours for each double journey including loading and unloading, or 4: journeys per
24 hours one train could bring up 120 tons a day, and witha double line 4 or 5
trains could be worked simultaneously.

Action.—The attack on the advanced line is virtually a deliberate attack on a
strongly intrenched position. Several distinct points of attack should be chosen
so as to oblige the defenders to distribute their means of defence and to keep them
as long as possible in ignorance of the face or section of the main line it is intended
to attack.

The special light siege-train, which can follow the active army at a day’s march
distance, would be used in this phase in addition to the field artillery with the army,
defensive works would be destroyed by indirect and curved fire from light
howitzers and mortars, placed in positions as far as possible concealed from the view
of the permanent works. Direct fire from light siege and field guns would be used
to clear the infantry trenches.

The advanced line taken, the front to be attacked must be decided on, the main
sections of the siege-train must now be brought up and placed in position. From
the very commencement, certain batteries must be told off for the duty of inter-
rupting the communications along the railways and roads which radiate from or
encircle the central nucleus—indirect fire from medium or heavy howitzers or rifled
mortars with high explosive shell would be best adapted for this work.

The first important duty of the siege batteries would be to silence the long range
guns of the forts in the section of the main line under attack. As these guns will
probably be mounted in armoured towers, curved fire from heavy howitzers or
mortars with high explosive shell must be used against them, ‘This was demon-

strated at the experiments at Chalons in 1887 when armoured towers with cupolas
93” thick, were put out of action by a mortar of 10°5” calibre firing high
explosive shell from a distance of 1200 yards, while it was estimated that at
the same range it would take from 800 to 1000 rounds from a 5°8” gun with
common shell to produce a like effect. The frontal attack of armoured works
then should be carried out by curved fire from medium and heavy howitzers.
placed in concealed batteries at ranges of from 1200 to 1600 yards and
firing high explosive shell, and it is only when suitable positions cannot be found
within those limits that recourse should be had to direct fire from 5” or 6” euns.

For guns mounted behind armoured shields direct fire from guns of 5” or 6”
calibre at ranges not exceeding 1750 yards canbe used. At 1750 yards the 5°85”
common shell 2°8” calibres long from a 5:85” gun 25 calibres in length will per-
forate 6°669" of iron if smokeless powder is used and 5°967” with ordinary powder.
Heavier guns need only be used against defences of exceptional strength or when
the demolition batteries have to be placed at a greater range than 1750 yards.

Curved fire from howitzers of 8:19" or 8°58” will be suflicient for the destruc-
tion of magazines and shelters protected by concrete of medium thickness ; only
when this exceeds 78” need shell with a greater bursting charge than 60 lbs. of
melinite, from mortars of 10°34" or 10°92” be used.

Artillery action against the defensive artiilery in the intervals.—

The direct fire of the guns of the first and second échelon placed on or slightly
behind the crest line of the main line of defence must be silenced by similar fire
from guns, curved or indirect fire must however be relied on to silence the fire of
the concealed batteries of the 3rd ¢chelon.

Tf an efficient system of fire observation by captive balloons or other means
has been organized this can be effected by comparatively light guns and howitzers
at ranges even as great as 4600 yards, and with such a wide margin the besieger
should have no difficulty in concealing his batteries from the view of the direct
fire guns in the intervals or in the forts, but it is absolutely essential that there
should be accurate means of observing and correcting the fire.

Obstacles and the accessory defences of the forts must be destroyed by curved
fire, and the terrepleines and trenches searched by curved shrapnel fire—once the
forts are rendered untenable and their guns silenced the defences in the intervals
deprived of flanking support must soon fall.

The attack on the second line of defence will be carried out in a similar way.

If the fortifications are of a type anterior to those designed to withstand the
latest developments of artillery fire, that is to say, if the forts have parapets of con-
siderable length and great relief, if their guns are not protected by armour and
their magazines, &c. not proof against high explosive shell; lighter guns and
howitzers firing such shell and a less deliberate bombardment will suftice to reduce
them. The siege will be much less protracted and the fortifications will have failed
to accomplish their main object, viz. that of detaining or demobilizing a portion
of the invading army for a considerable time.

Some experiments were recently carried out at Schoorl in Holland to test the
penetration of high explosive shell into concrete, and to ascertain the best com-
position for concrete and the most suitable thickness for bomb-proof roofs, &e.

The ordnance used were—

(a) Rifled mortar 8°19" 7 calibres long, range 3775
633 to 684 f.s., angles of descent between 52° 45
velocities between 594 and 618 fs.

(2) 5°85" gun 24: calibres long, range 540 yards, striking velocity 1320 f.s.

Projectiles—

(a) Steel shell 8°19''5 calibres long, weight 341 lbs., bursting charge 46°2 lbs,
guncotton or 50°6 Ibs, bellite,

yards, muzzle velocity
and 60° 40’, striking

(4) Steel common shell 5:85”, 2°8 calibres long, weight 69-46 lbs., bursting
charge 3°85 lbs. powder.
(c) Armour piercing shot 5°85”, weight 84°75 lbs.

The objectives were—structures used in fortification such as caponieres, maga-
zines, &c. ‘The walls being built of brick rubble, and brick and cement concrete,
the roofs were made of gravel concrete.

The conclusions arrived at were—

(1.) The best composition for concrete was found to be—
1 volume of cement.
Logg 59, Seana,
jae ons », small stones or gravel.
(2.) The necessary thickness for vaulted concrete roofs when the span is

under 53 yards is 4’ 104” and even for greater spans the thickness need
not exceed 6’ 6”.

(3.) The use of panels or plates of iron °39" thick to strengthen the in-
terior of the roofs is recommended, it enables the building to be held
even after fissures have appeared through the concrete and does away
with any danger from the fall of detached masses.

(4.) The material for the walls in the concrete recommended in (1) or
brick and cement concrete the thickness of the walls exposed to fire
should be about 46” inches.

(5.) Rubble revetments present a fairly efficient protection against direct
fire with common shell.

(6.) The best means of strengthening old type masonry or brick struc-
tures is by covering them immediately with a layer of concrete, the
interposition of a layer of sand which has been advocated was found to
be not ‘only useless but detrimental.

(7.) Wire entanglements were found to be the best kind of obstruction
on account of their comparative indestructability even when subjected
to fire with high explosive shell.

(8.) For the attack of covering masses of loose earth or sand, sensitive
fuzes are to be preferred to delay action, for the explosion of high
explosive shell.

A 6:045" shell with a bursting charge of 26-2 Ibs. melinite exploded by means

of a delay action fuze formed a crater varying from 4'104” to 6'6” in diameter
while with sensitive fuzes the crater was 22' 1” across and 6’ 9" deep.

PRECIS

AND

AD 28s a IN PS IL va SE IL) IN

AS PROPOSED BY

GENERAL WILLE AND HIS CRITICS.

TRANSLATED BY

CAPTAIN H. A. BETHELL, R.A.

In 1891 General Wille of the German Army published a book on “ The Future
Field Gun.” In this he worked out with great thoroughness a complete design,
including ballistics, gun, carriages and ammunition, for a field gun far more
powerful than any now existing. This work attracted a great deal of attention.
Some score of Artillery officers, Engineers, and Gun Constructors published pam-
phlets and wrote articles criticising the book. Most of the writers proposed rival
designs of their own.

In his second book (1892) General Wille replied to those criticisms, eliciting a
fresh crop of magazine articles.

In his last book (October 1893) he sums up the results of the discussion.

The whole controversy constitutes a fairly exhaustive resumé of modern scien-
tific opinion on the subject, and it is hoped that a brief précis of it will not be
without interest.

General Wille (1891) says :—

(1.)_ The highest quality of a good shooting gun is a deep zone of effect of
shrapnei bullets. This is attained by high remaining velocity and small angle of
descent, i.e. flat trajectory.

(2.) For this we must have high muzzle velocity. This has the collateral
advantage of increasing the range—a point however of minor importance,

(3.) To get high remaining velocity and small angle of descent, high
muzzle velocity is useless without staying power. A high velocity gun firing a
light shell only smashes its carriage to no purpose. To keep up its velocity a
shell must have a low os z.e, a high proportion of weight to cross section.

(4.) ‘The weight of a shell for a given calibre is limited by its length, which
must not be excessive. General Wille takes the length of his shrapnel at 4:4
calibres including fuze, which gives a projectile weighing 2°39 lbs, per square
inch of cross section.

8, YOU, XXII, Pee any ae ae ee 57A

(5.) An analysis of the battles of the last three great European wars leads
him to fix the number of shell per gun at 102. Hence a further comparison of
existing varieties of field equipment determines the weight of the shell at 14°3 Ibs.,
taking the charge of smokeless cubical powder at 3 lbs.

(6.) It follows from (4) that if the shell is to weigh 14°83 lbs. the calibre
must be 2°76 inches.

(7.) Calculation, and comparison of ancient, existing, and experimental gun
carriages, give the weight of the gun and carriage as 2094 lbs.

(8.) Calculation and comparison give the best division of this weight as
882 lbs. for the gun and 1212 Ibs. for the carriage.

(9.) Calculation, personal experience and the experiments of Griison and
Krupp give 45 métre tons or 14°77 foot tons! as the greatest energy of recoil of
the gun that such a carriage, of the best modern construction, will stand.

~(10.) This energy corresponds to a muzzle velocity of 2625 f.s.

(11.) Given a gun of fixed calibre to produce a fixed amount of energy, it
is clear that the longer the gun the less the powder pressure.

(12.) To bring down his powder pressure? General Wille therefore makes
his gun as long as possible. Practical considerations lead him to fix the length
of the rifling at 7 feet, and the total length at 9 feet 22 inches.

(18.) After considering the claims of the interrupted screw and Krupp
wedge he selects the Griison falling block breech-closing arrangement as being the
lightest and most efficient. (This system is very like the breech action of a
Nordenfeldt Q.F. gun).

(14.) Anticipating some difficulty in obturation at the high pressure pro-
posed, he decides for a metallic self-obturating cartridge with detonating cap
complete—in fact, for “ fixed ammunition.”

(15.) Having regard to the principle laid down in (1) General Wille decides
that all his shell are to be shrapnel with base burster and preferably tungsten
bullets,? except a few high explosive shell. As for case, in the Franco-German
war batteries carried 8 per cent. of case and fired 0°12 per cent. only—whence he
concludes that case shot are useless. Moreover they are neither so quickly loaded
nor so effective as his “fixed ammunition ” complete with cartridge, cap and fuze
set at. zero ready to be loaded into the gun.

(16.) uzes.—A water fuze perfected by himself. During flight the water
(or non-freezing liquid) inside is driven out by centrifugal force. When it is all
out the shell explodes. It is only necessary before loading to regulate the
amount of water inside by turning the head round.

(17.) The principle of the automatic fuze key consists in setting the key,
not the fuze. The key is a socket on the trail or limber with a graduated ring
set to the range, and an adjustable zero set.to the distance short of burst.

(18.) Details of Gun Construction.—General Wille does not fully explain
the construction of his gun, but appears to favor a Mannesmann rolled 4 tube of
nickel steel strengthened by hoops shrunk on. Rifling to be Maitland B.L. with
increasing twist, pitch to be decided by experiment.

(19.) Details of Carriage. —A. Griison buffer carriage (resembling English

(w+ hw’)? V2
E="9 9 W. 2240
~ 2In his second book he reckons the maximum préssure at 26 tons on the square inch.
3 His weights and dimensions are calculated on the supposition that the bullets are of lead.

1C.f. 12-pr. 5:067 foot tons, new 15-pr. 5:44 foot tons calculated by the same formula

12-pr. but with longer buffer). Trail and axle of Mannesmann tube. A nave
brake of circular compressor plates.

He is most particular about his wheels. Height 4 ft. 6 in., weight 165 Ibs., tire
2°76 in. steel, 14 spokes of hickory, felloes Acacia! cut straight and bent flanges
stamped from steel plate. Patent boxes, with the Mannesmann device for taking
off the wheel quickly. Wagon and limber wheels similar but weighing 143 lbs.
only. Can on emergency ibe used on the gun.

He goes into the question of roller bearings, and dismisses them as useless, as
the whole friction at the naves is only (according to German experiments) 1 per
cent. of the draught.

(20.) General Wille’s theory of carriage construction :—

“Make your experimental carriage so light that when thoroughly tried every
part is damaged. Then you know where you are, and can strengthen each part
as required. If you make your carriage so strong that when tried no part
gives way, you may be sure that many parts are uselessly heavy, but you cannot
tell which to lighten.”

(21.) Limber.—Tubular steel frame and pole, spring limber hook, one limber
box with springs under and falling flap behind, to take the fixed ammunition
(30 rounds) horizontally. Limber box wide enough to carry 4 gunners back to
back.

(22.) Wagon body of tubular steel, springs as on limber. 42 rounds.

(23.) Spare Carriages.—Forge wagon abolished and instead a small port-
able forge carried in one store wagon. Lven this might be left behind on a
European campaign. 3 store wagons carrying provisions, 3000 lbs. of oats, and
small stores and light tools.

(24.) Sights —Open sights, tangent scale fixed in the gun (like ot our : Q. 1,
guns). Improved clinometer. A complicated apparatus for altering the elevation
without laying again. Degrees and minutes for military purposes should be done
away with and replaced by a decimal division of the circle.

(25) Horse and Field <Artillery.—General Wille will not admit that the
Horse Artillery gun may be made lighter at the expense of power. As the Field
Artillery weights are the minimum for efficiency, the Horse Artillery gun and
carriage can be no lighter. The necessary reduction of weight must ‘be effected
by mounting the gunners and reducing the number of rounds to 90 per sub-division,

SUMMARY.
Field Artillery :—
Weight of gun ... ... BO Sous FoaBY WO. Be 882 lbs
~ carriage marching onder Wetp e Wegee BAe A een
3 limber with 30. rounds, marehing order, no
gunners a A LS 1874.,,
i four gunners on limber at 12 st. 4 1b. oy ere 688 ,,
" gun carriage and limber complete with detach-
ment in marching order 41 cwt. 64]bs. or 4656 ,,
ss for each horse to pull 7ewt. nearly or... ... TAS 5
R wagon with 72 rounds, marching order no
gunners a 00 600 000 9 coo spd
s five gunners 12 st. 4 Ibs, ... Sciacrset wake. teat 860 ,,
5 total complete 41 cwt) 16lbs.or = ...° 40> %.. 746087),
4 for each horse to pull 7 cwt. nearly or «.. ... 768 ,,

Aa : ca 2

1 We know it in India as babul, and good stuff it is,

Horse Artillery :—
Weight of gun, carriage and limber as above, no gunners,
24 noms Omlby, B4ksy Wits “500 00 000 00 3858 lbs.

x for each horse to pull 52 cwt. or .. iat 633 ,,
i wagon (no gunners) 66 rounds carried, 33h cwt.

or. POE EPID SOUR,
am for each ihonse to pull Da ewt, 0 Ory ee Jae 622 ,,

Detail of Gun :-—

Waeieing Y @w7 OBMOS> GP oo. co 00 000 000 400 v00 882 ,,
Calibre... qonTanG ft oobe | God's) code Saco Spupie tour | ace 2°76 in.
Length over all . Ss sere rig ane ete een cating Cpiuineedet ans
Muzzle velocity .. Dee Pree enreeMees ecciea cent aes mee Oe elt
aes ekenoneey increasing twist.
Breech-closing arrangement—-Griison falling block.
Means of firing—Percussion lock.
‘ Ammunition—Metalic cartridge complete with fuzed shrapnel or high explosive
shell
Charge—About 3 Ibs. cubical smokeless powder ‘“ C/89.”’
Weight of protectile and fuze—14°3 lbs.
Length—44 calibres.
Weight of one round complete! about 19 lbs.
_ Weight of projectile per square inch of cross section?—2°39 lbs.

PART II.

- In his second book (1892) General Wille enumerates the officers and other
critics who have dealt with his book. He then considers their objections seriatim.

(1.) Nine writers find fault with the high powder pressure as compared with
the weight of the gun. They variously estimate the maximum pressure at 24 to
30 tons on the square inch, giving the strain on the metal of the gun as 20 to 25
tons per square inch. It is considered that 15 tons per square inch is the maxi-
mum safe load. In support of this it is pointed out that according to General
Wille’s own figures the energy developed amounts to 1740 foot lbs. per pound of
gun, while the highest proportion yet attained (by Griison) is only 960 to 1.
~ General Wille in reply analyses the calculations of the several critics. He points
out that the discrepancies in their results are due (1) to various estimates of the
effective length of the bore, after deducting for the powder chamber and breech-
block; and (2) to various estimates of the ratio of mean to maximum powder
pressure. He accepts in each case the mean of their calculations, and works on
the supposition thatthe rifling is 7 feet long and the mean to the maximum pres-
sure as 2 to 3. After allowing for twist of rifling and resistance of driving band,
he gets 25 tons per square inch as the maximum pressure.

He then considers the most advantageous distribution of weight in his gun, and
decides on a greatest diameter of 7°875 inches, over a powder chamber of 3°15
inches, giving a thickness of metal of 2°367 inches. Making this in two layers,
and supposing the strain on firing to be equally distributed, then, according to the
German formula? the strain ¢ on the metal is between 225 and 25% tons per square
inch. :

1 This leaves 1°7 lbs, for the metallic cartridge. The 6-pr. Q.F. cartridge (the nearest size in
our service) weighs 1lb. 100z.

2 Q.F. 12-pr. 1°7 Ibs., 15-pr. 2°1221bs., 15-pr. with 1 1b. fuze, or 16-pr. 2°263 lbs,
3 Apparently Barlow without constant,

He then lays down that since the breaking strain of good steel is more than
double its elastic limit, therefore if the strain is below that limit this constitutes
a sufficient factor of safety. The gun will therefore be strong enough if made of
steel with an elastic limit of 27 tons and a breaking strain of 54 tons per square
inch.}

General Wille winds up with a sort of half admission that the foregoing is not
quite satisfactory, as an extra high pressure might strain the metal beyond the
elastic limit and permanently weaken the gun. He says “If a higher factor of
safety be required, we must trust to the discoveries of the future; and then goes
onto hint at a card up his sleeve—a novelty either in steel aking or gun making
—-which he is not at liberty to publish.

(2.) Five writers consider the gun carriage too light to stand the recoil.

One points out that it will be strained 2°6 times as severely as the German
field carriage. Another critic caleulates that a gun of 2095 lbs. and carriage of
1650 would be required to stand the recoil. A third approves of the Griison
carriage but finds fault with General Wille’s details, such as the muzzle traversing
gear. Others simply condemn the carriage as impossible.

In reply, General Wille compares the various existing field carriages (without
buffers) and finds the average strain on them to be 230 foot lbs. per pound of gun
and carriage.

Next, he adduces calculation, result of experiment and the admissions of some
of his critics to shew that: (a) the hydraulic buffer reduces the strain on the
carriage 60 per cent.,? and (b) that nitro powder reduces it a further 15 per cent.
Applying these reductions to the strain on his own carriage, he finds it is about
the same as on the average field carriage.

He finally states that he has seen a number of rounds fired from a carriage of
the same weight as his which had not even a buffer, yet which stood a strain equal
to that of the recoil of his gun.

(3.) One writer approves generally of General Wille’s design, but considers
the length of the gun impracticable. He proposes a 3°15 inch 164 1b. gun,
weighing 926 lbs. and 73 feet long, to give a muzzle velocity of 1870 f.s. with a
powder pressure of 14-7 tons.

General Wille points out that such a gun is so little in advance of present
field guns as to be hardly worth making, as it will certainly be obsolete in a year
or two.

(4.) The same writer concurs with General Wille as to the value of high
velocity in extending the zone of shrapnel effect, but points out as an objection to
a flat trajectory the increased difficulty in ranging a battery, as with General
Wille’s gun. An error in elevation will give double the present error in range.

General Wille replies that this is only a half truth, as the flat trajectory does not
require such accurate ranging as the curved trajectory. or instance, with his
gun, if you include the target in a 400 yards bracket you can proceed at once to
time fuze at the mean of the bracket, since a further correction of 100 yards makes
no practical difference in the height of burst of the shrapnel.

He further proves by comparison of 50°/, rectangles that the length of the
rectangle does not increase with the velocity. For instance a Griison field gun
fired at muzzle velocities of 1500 fs. and 2100f.s. gave at 1000 yards® rectangles

1 See * Treatise on Service Ordnance ’93,” p. 448, giving tests of “‘ high” steel up to 40 tons on
yielding and 71 on breaking.

2 Our G.C.F. people do not seem to agree with General Wille or they would have made the
12-pr. buffer carriage 60 per cent. lighter than Mark I.

It certainly seems unnecessarily heavy.

3 Metres in the original.

57B

of 17 yards and 21 yards, at 2000 23 and 26, at 8000 37 and 32, and at 4000 58
and 40 yards long respectively.

Several other writers concur with General Wille that a flat trajectory facilitates
ranging,

(5.) Follows a long theoretical argument with Captain Moch and other writers
as to whether the ballistic co-efficient is a function of the calibre or of the
velocity.

Captain Moch compares the French 80 ™ gun with the English 12-pr., and
points out that the former with nearly the same weight of shell per square inch,
keeps up its velocity much better than the English gun.

‘This, replies General Wille, is because density is a function of velocity, and the
density which suftices for the French muzzle velocity of 1525 f.s. is unsuited to
the English muzzle velocity of 1720 f.s.

(6.) One writer objects on principle to field guns and goes in fora heavy field
howitzer, which can also be fired at low elevations as a gun.

General Wille fights out the old gun v. howitzer controversy, and ridicules the
idea of vertical fire at a moving target.

(7.) Captain Moch finds fault with the assertion that the proposed gun will
stand the premature burst of a high explosive shell—which he considers absurd.

General Wille admits this, and says he only meant he could make his gun tough
enough not to burst explosively.

(8.) Various French and Belgian critics condemn Krupp’s steel.
General Wille is content to leave Krupp’s steel to answer for itself.

(9.) Captain Moch prefers the interrupted screw (which he considers perfect)
to the falling block. General Wille refers to an article in the “ Revue Militaire ”
enlarging on the defects of the screw, and describing Schneider’s new “ obiurateur
composite”? which is designed to correct them.

(10.) While several critics approve of the proposed Maitland B.L. rifling, others
consider that at high velocities this form of groove will shear the driving band
sideways.

Should this prove true, says General Wille, the objection is easily got over by
the use of shallower grooves and harder metal in the driving band.

(11.) Follows a mathematical argument about the curve of increase of twist.
General Wille prefers a circular to a parabolic curve.

(12.) The critics are far from unanimous about fixed ammunition. Some
approve, others object on the score of weight and expense, others prefer a metallic
cartridge separate from the shell, and others again think that it will not stand
transport in the limbers.

General Wille replies that this question can only be settled by experience. He
foresees no more difficulty with field guns than with Q.F. guns in this respect.

He looks to improved manufacture to reduce the weight of his cartridge to
1b. Breaking up in the limbers is to be avoided by packing the ammunition
horizontally so that it is supported by the body of the shell and the base of the
cartridge leaving a clear space round the body of the cartridge.

(13.) Captain K. points out that the application of the small-bore principle to
artillery is limited by the rapidly decreasing cubic contents of the shrapnel—since
the walls cannot be reduced in thickness without collapsing.

General Wille concurs, but maintains that the limit has not been reached in his
gtn—especially as his shrapnel are to be of stronger metal, rolled from a solid
block in one piece (except the head) by the Mannesmann process.

These shrapnel have already been tried in Austria and found to be enormously
strong.

(14.) Captain Moch fully concurs as to the “curve of least resistance” for
the head of the shrapnel. This he says, has already been adopted in France.
Professor August, however, the inventor of the the curve in question, denies that
the French curve is the right one.

(15.) The same writer, Captain Moch, maintains that in a 2°76 inch shrapnel
there will be no room for bullets.

General Wille finds fault with his arithmetic, and gives the following distribution
of weights :

Bulletse(ead) Masui Beceem neo ectanetae sOn OILS IDSs

FRESIN hey Baie teeter ae eee Pesta Mia Se RO Ona
TRUER BBO OA Ge oo0 coo coo ooo 000 coo WeO a5
Fuze ... Mace ae Ae TD, Le EO COs

Body and heed oh ace 00 ere cee ove ave 6°4:15 29

Total 009 eee 600 000 14°329 ”

With tungsten bullets the proportion of weight of bullets to weight of steel
would be considerably higher.

(16.) Captain Moch objects to tungsten for bullets as too rare and too expensive.
General Wille differs, refers to his book on Wolframgeschdssé, and promises to
confute Captain Moch in his next new book.

(17.) All the critics, with one exception, approve of the proposed abolition of
case shot.

(18.) One critic objects to 30 rounds in the limber, as being “ too little for a
quick-firing gun.”

General Wille shews some annoyance at being misunderstood. He repeats em-
phatically that a quick-firing field gun is an utter impossibility. With admissible
limits of weight it is impracticable to construct a field gun absolutely without
yecoil—so that it need not be laid again after every round—unless indeed the
charge is so small as to render the shooting power of the gun contemptible. Even
if a Q.F. field gun could be made, it would hardly be worth the trouble, since the
“ ordinary’ rate of artillery fire would on service seldom be exceeded. With re-
gard to the insufficiency of his ammunition supply as compared with modern
standards, he considers that the number of rounds carried with the battery is
sufficient for any emergency, and that the extra ammunition should be with the
column on the road, not tearing across country after the guns. His light carriages
with reduced dead weight will much facilitate the supply of ammunition.

(19.) Most of the critics object to the nave compressor brake, as being in-
efficient, heavy, complicated, jerky in its action, and likely to break the spokes.

General Wille replies : (a) that it is lighter than any tire brake; (4) that he has
seen it thoroughly and successfully tried by Griison; (c) that Krupp has just
adopted it for his new field howitzer. After which he considers that there is no
more to be said.

(20.) Captain K. objects to the tubular steel pole. General Wille replies that
this has already been tried and proved a success, and that it has the great advan-
tage of being unbreakable. When ill-treated it bends or doubles up. It never
becomes quite unserviceable, and can always be repaired.

(21.) Follows a defence of the Mannesmann tube rolling process against
various critics who deny that it has yet reached a practical stage.

(22.) Three critics object that the high velocity and long projectile of the pro-

posed gun will require a twist of rifling so sharp as to give a large angle of opening
to the shrapnel, thereby wasting most of the bullets. One of them works out the
angle as 20° for medium ranges.

General Wille replies that this calculation is founded on the formula in the Eng-
lish text-book of gunnery. As however this formula gives results differing over
30 per cent. from those practically obtained from the German field gun, he distrusts
it and proceeds to work out a formula of his own:

Tn: Ca Vi + 02 sin® a
2 vo+s
where 6=angle of opening, % the radial velocity due to the scattering action of
burster, » the remaining velocity, a the angle of rifling, and s the forward velocity
due to base burster. Hence, taking angle of rifling at 7° or 1 in 26, s and 4
140 f.s., v 2110 and 1530 fis. respectively, 0=174 degrees at 1000 yards and
233 degrees at 2000 yards. Or putting s==260f.s., v=2152 f.s., the angles
become 16 and 20 degrees,

Note—These results do not correspond with those obtained by our methods,
General Wille, working Siacci, gets 1530 f.s. at 2000 yards. According to the text-
book, taking a co-efficient of +9, this should be 1750f.s. Perhaps the Secretary
will ask Professor Greenhill kindly to settle this point for us.

Again, taking the twist (vide text-book) at lin 28, and the forward velocity
due to burster at 100 f.s. only, we get by Nicholson and Hadcock’s formula an
angle of opening of 11° 14’ at 2000 yards. This sounds much nearer the truth
than General Wille’s result.

(To be continued).

NOTES

FROM
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

"S466 YF OSI

Tue following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

Major-General Stubbs’s ‘List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Wield Artillery Fire,’ by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price
Is. 2d.

“Notes of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A.
C, Hansard, R.A., price 1s. 2d.

** Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain 8. W. Lane, R.A., price 1s. 1d.

“Achievements of Field Artillery,” by Major H. 8. May, R.A.,
bound, price 2s. 6d.

“The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,” by Major E. S. May,
R.A., paper covers, price 3d.

“The Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’ or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,”
by an Officer R.A., price 7d.

The two Numbers of “ Nature” containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on ‘Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (d), and (¢) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 1893 :—

Captains (¢) and (d) .., price 1s. Id.
Lieutenants (¢) (d) and (e) price 1s. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

The following note was discovered by Mr. C. Dalton too late for insertion in
5. VOL, XXII,

his article on Capt. Thomas Brown (see p. 175, No. 4, Vol. XXII., R.A.I. “ Pro-
ceedings ”’) :—

The Rev. G. Story’s History of the Wars in Ireland, 1689-91. Part 2, p. 212.

SSO UO, MOO,”

[2nd siege of Limerick. |

“And that evening 2 mortars were brought from on board and placed at Mac-
kay’s Fort being managed by Lieut. Brown, Lieut. to Capt. Pitt’s Miners, who
did more execution than all the rest, firing 3 for 1 of theirs and throwing the
bombs very exact; he neither made use of sand upon the bomb, nor fired the

fuse ; but putting it into the mortar with the fuse down, the flash of the powder
kindled the fuse as it was discharged from the mortar.”

Mem.—Story has this marginal note to above :
* Lieutenant Brown our best bombardier.”’—

The Rev. George Story was chaplain to the Earl of Drogheda’s Regiment in
Ireland, in 1691, and at the close of the campaign was made Dean of Limerick.

R.A.I. “DUNCAN” PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

THE Secretary has received in addition to those mentioned in April “ Pro-
ceeding,’ Essays bearing the mottoes :—

‘Mens sana in corpore sano.”

«Tis never too late to mend.”

* One and all.”

“The first duty of a gunner is to hit,”

“* Nil sine labore.”

CSHoxtitonpinae rs

«Dum spiro spero.”’

‘« Per mare per terras.”

«T’union fait la force.”

«In medio tutissimus ibis,”

‘** Labor omnia vincit.”

GOLF.

Tue first inter-regimental Golf matches Royal Artillery v. Royal Engineers were
contested on Wednesday 24th April 1895 over the links of the St. George’s Golf
Club Sandwich. The result was decided by the aggregate holes won in the series
of single and foursome games and as will be seen from the scores below the Royal
Engineers are the first winners. The day was delightful, the course in first-rate
order and the matches were followed by a large number of officers of the Regiment.
Thanks are due to the Secretary and members of the St. George’s Golf Club for
their kindness and hospitality, while the officers Royal Artillery Dover did all
they could in the way of putting up players and visitors to make the meeting a

success. Hvyeryone present agreed that these matches will soon be among the
most popular of inter-regimental fixtures :—

SINGLES (STARTED 10.15 A.M.).

RAY R.E.
IMESOrdal, AN, SO sacstooctodoonosonces CO) Chou dal, IN), IMAI G5, soonn 8
Captain’ GDS Chamicr ho. .cnnesve 4 Lieutenant R. 8. Walker............ 0
Chhyonenund Jako Uh, WISE AOIIM ESSoccb00009 WO) INIENOIE AR, WHE, IGREl S666 sbonooonoodnced 0
Chajoreniin dg hig FSraMIMIN —Go5000000 090080008 TL DY OIE TR's Wo IBS, Goo opd00no00008 0
Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Crookenden ... Major I. Gosset.. Sere eats, = 30)

Captain G. R. Lamb ................... 0 lieutenant A. H. Dumaresq 9000 7
IMajon We El Darby, ..iecnsecraanse | 0) dneutenant Hy AN Cumming’ 0, 0
Captain E. G. Nicolls...... .......... 0 2nd Lieutenant C. St. B. Sladen... 0

8 15
Captain Dumbleton played 88 and Lieut. Dumaresq 86 strokes in the above

matches.
FoursoMEss (STARTED arrer Luncn).

RA. R.E.
Major H. A. Scott ; Capiain H. N. Walker} 9
Captain G. D. Chamier Ane Lieutenant R. S. Walker pac
Captain A. L. Molesworth 0 Major R. M. Ruck ‘ i
Captain J. L. Smith i ae Nd Major I’. W. Bennet aiiher
Lieut.-Col. H. H. Crookenden } 1 Major I. Gosset 0
Captain G. R. Lamb j ae Lieutenant A. H. Damaresq ‘ “

Major W. H. Darby Lieutenant H. A. Cumming 0
Captain HE. G. Nicolls ar Sie 2nd Lieut. C. St. B. Sladen § ****"*

The Royal Engineers won by ten holes on the aggregate.

ALDERSHOT.
ROYAL ARTILLERY RACES.

WEDNESDAY, Aprin 17rH.

Again has this meeting been favoured with fine weather; with big fields, good
racing and large attendance it proved an unqualified success. The Gold Cup,
after “the closest finish known, went to Newcastie while of the other Regimental
Races two went to Woolwich and one to Dover; the winners of these four races
were steered by the two officers of the Riding Bstablishment.

The open races brought out one field of eleven, two of six and there was a match
between two officers of the Ninth Lancers.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY WELTER STEEPLECHASE
of 50 sovs., 13 st. 7 Ib. each. Two miles and a half.

Capt. R. L. Heygate’s Mrpsurpman, 5 years...... Mr. G. Gintson 1
Capt. H. A. Chapman’s SuNFLownR, aged......... Capt. J. Hanwell 2
Capt. C. Prescott-Decie’s SuNBHAM, aged.,,....... Mar. i. J. R. Peel 38

Betting: 5 to 4 against Midshipman, 2 to 1 against Sunflower, and 3 to 1
against Sunbeam. ‘The three went along in close order for half a mile, when Sun-
flower and Sunbeam ran out, and before they were righted Midshipman gained a
long lead. This he retained to the end and won easily by fifty lengths ; twenty
between second and third,

> 4

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY GOLD CUP, value 100 sovs., with
50 sovs. to the winner, 20 sovs. to the second, and 10 sovs. to the third ;
Three miles.

Mr. H. C. Russell-Oldnall’s Lincotn Lap, aged, 12 st. 7 lb.

Wi, 1a, di, Jk, Wiiaig I
Capt. R. L. Heygate’s NortusipE, 5 years, 13 st.

Capt. J. HANWELL 2
Capt. C. F. Blane’s Comrapn, aged, 12 st...... Mr. G. GIntson 38
Capt. H. M. Ferrar’s SunpRIss, aged, 13. st.................0...Owner 0
Mr.-A. Cowper Smith’s Terrinr, aged, 18 st..................Owner 0
Mr. A. F. Becke’s Ratmpayer, aged, 13 st...........0.05......0wner 0
Mr. G. A. Cardew’s Lina, 6 years, 12 st.....,... Mr. C. O. Head 0

Major W. H. Darby’s Gossoon (h-b), 6 years, 12 st
Major A. H. Carter 0
Mr, E. P. England’s CHoprtrn, aged, 12 st......cse...+00-s+-e Owner 0

Betting : 6 to 4 agaist Northside, 4 to 1 each against Lincoln Lad and Com-
rade, and 10 to 1 against any other. ‘Terrier made piay from Chopette, but after
going half a mile the first-named was passed by Lincoln Lad and Northside.
Reaching the stand Terrier came again, and going to the front he cut out the work
with a two lengths lead. At the bend, however, Lincoln Lad and the favourite
gave him the go-by, a fine race home between the two ending in favour of Lincoln
Lad by a neck. Comrade was a bad third, and Terrier fourth.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY LIGHT WHIGHT STEEPLE-
CHIASE of 50 sovs., with 10 sovs. to the second, and 5 sovs. to the third ;
11 st. 7 1b. each. ‘Two miles and a half.

Major W. H. Darby’s Gossoon (h-b), 6 years...Mr. H. J. R. Pest 1
Mr. C. B. Levita’s SprpEr, aged .............. Mayor A. H. Carter 2
Capt. H. A. Chapman’s KaTHuEEn, aged ......... Mr. F.C. Lang 38
Mr. G. H. Sanders’s Hmrewarp, aged ............... Mr. G. Gillson 0
Capt. C. G. Mackenzie’s Lornp Mayor, aged .................. Owner 0
Wir, ©, ©, Tblencls IGT, © EPS 4000000000000008000 0000000000005 Owner 0
Capt. R. L. Heygate’s CINDERELLA, 6 years ......... oun Hanwell 0
Capt. F. C. Johnston’s CLONSHIRE, 5 years.............0.......Owner 0
Mr. E. B. Ashmore’s RocksPrine, 6 yeat sh Aen! ..Owner 0
Mr. J. B. Aldridge’s Canny, ied meee Na aka tt Aten Ouvtior 0

Betting: 5 to 2 against Lord Mayor, 4 to 1 against Cinderella, 5 to 1 against
Spider, 8 to 1 each against Hereward and Kathleen, and 10 to one against any
other. Cinderella led for a good half mile when Gossoon took up the running
and never being headed won by three lengths; Kathleen was twice this distance
away third, with Hereward fourth, and Candy fifth.

THE ROWAL ARTILLERY CONSOLATION HURDLE
RACE of 25 sovs. Two miles.

Captain Blane’s Comranbs, aged ..................... MR. G. Gitmson 1
Ma. Mackenzie’s LorD MAYOR, aged 20.0.0... cescesesn see ses see Owner 2
Mr. G. A. Cardew’s LEILA, 6 years .................. Mr. C, O. Head 3
Ma HB. Ashmore’s ROCKSPRING, 6 Yeal's.......0:.s0-s0.0- «+> Owner, 0
MGs, Ay Conner Shamtilns. Wines 0 on0000dp00000000000'%50000005 Owner 0

Betting: 7 to 4 against Lord Mayor, 2 to 1 against Comrade, 3 to 1 against
Terrier, 7 to 1 against Leila, and 10 to 1 against Rockspring. Won by fifty
lengths ; ; bad third,

REGIMENTAL POINT-TO-POINT RACES.

Tux first Regimental Point-to-Point Races were brought off most successfully on
Tuesday, 26th March, 1895, over a line in the Essex Hunt country about four
miles from Epping. The fields for each race were larger than anyone expected,
while the horses were a remarkably good-looking-and smartly turned out lot.

The thanks of the Regiment are due to Mr. Tyndale White first for finding the
line and secondly for the great assistance given by him to the Stewards. A large
number of people from the neighbourhood honoured the Regiment with their com-
pany and the attendance of officers Royal Artillery was very good; the Woolwich
party had a special train from N. Woolwich, the Colchester and Ipswich party had
a coach from Chelmsford and strong contingents vid London came from Aldershot,
Dover, Shorneliffe and Weedon. The only complaint was of the fences which
some thought too small and easily galloped over; though there were plenty of
ditches they were not as large as those in the Roothing portion of the ‘‘ Essex”
country. The first race, started well to time, resulted in a similar way to the
Woolwich Drag Light-Weight Point-to-Point at Kemsing the previous week while
the Heavy Weight Race was won by Captain J. W. G. Dawkins on Pilgrim, and is
noticeable for the fact that this is the fifth consecutive Point-to-Point Race won by
the same rider and horse.

The Farmers’ Race was most appropriately won by a horse steered by the
Master of the Essex Hunt.

The day was generally fine with one sharp shower about 3.30 p.m.

All who attended thoroughly enjoyed the day and were loud in their praises of
the arrangements; itis to be hoped that next year the Stewards may be equally
fortunate in their selection of a line and that the Regimental Point-to-Point may
become an annual fixture.

Stewards :—L. Arkwright, Esq., (M.F.H.); Tyndale White, Esq. Secretary
Hissex Hunt; Lt.-Col. R. H. Wallace, R.H.A.; Lt.-Col. G. H. O’Malley, R.A.;
Major I. J. Eustace, R.H.A.; Major W. E. Blewitt, R.A.; Captain Wellesley
Paget, R.H.A.; Captain J. L. Smith, R.A.; Captain J. B. Askwith, R.A.

Judge :—Lt.-Col. R. H. Wallace. R.H.A. Starter :—Tyndale White, Esq.

Clerk of Scales :—Major W. E. Blewitt, R.A. Secretary :—Captain C. G.
Mackenzie. R.A.

RESULTS.—
LIGHT WEIGHT RACE.

Ch itig el, WWE WNerae es) SHORTT og eccocovecodagooodocoedoneonanncie al

Mir Hy ahs Reel se G.Uive KL Ai Ken Seaman Re ee meen eek ees

Captr HEU Ne S chotiel dsc con caer pertc maar eee aie an ES

Wlewore das Tels Gamers oe obmoce- odoncoobe ecco. 6 4

IMbe, J 1B, ANIGHHCEe, .66co0 00008 v0 06 5)

Capt. Wellesley Paget 6
also started, Mr. M. S. Williams, Captain C. G. Mackenzie, Mr. C. J. Morris,
Mr. G. H. Sanders, Captain C. HE. Goulburn, Captain J. B. Askwith, Captain
J. P. DuCane, Mr. A. C. Birch.

HERAYVW WEIGHT RACE.
Capt. J. W. Dawkins’s PIL@RIM,........
Mr. A. Becke’s RATEPAYER.,......
Capuplils Gu Ricard omer
Mr. C. Prescott-Decie.
Mat i. A. Bilton...

CAPO cre are cee soe see ree soe artes seesre too eserves tee

Peerteres ceGeor 209 S00 800808
2 eet vee set ree t00 206 000 208 evorercee
OOO Oe ek ce
POCO Pee ATA roc aE ROD OOH Per roeror OTD coe eos TT0 Te

£00000 000 000 000085 G00 000 000 08 200 Foe THe VOL COLTON OC®

Oo>rr Wwor

see vcccoe CO ee ee

also started, Captain H. Ferrar, Mr. A. Cowper-Smith, Mr. G. Gillson, Mr. J. B.
_ Aldridge, Mr. C. Behrens, Captain H. N. Schofield, Major A. H. Carter, Major

OBITUARY.

Masor-Generat C. T. Franx uty, C.B. (retired), died at Tewkesbury, 9th April,
1895. He joined the Royal Artillery as 2nd Lieutenant, lst January, 1842; be-
came Lieutenant, 14th July, 1842; 2nd Captain, 14th October, 1848 ; Captain,
20th June, 1854; Brevet-Major, 12th December, 1854 ; Lieut.-Colonel, 1st May,
1861; Colonel, 30th May, 1867; and retired on full-pay with the hon. rank of
Major-General, 9th August, 1873. Major-General Franklin served during the
Crimean war, including the battle of Alma, and siege and fall of Sebastopol (medal
with two clasps, C.B., 5th class of the Medjidie, and Turkish medal),

Cotonet J. C. D’'U. Murray (retired), who died at Godalming, on 12th April,
1895, was commissioned as Lieutenant, 1st October, 1857; became 2nd Captain,
20th July, 1871; Captain, 5th July, 1872; Major, 6th February, 1878 ; Lieut.-
Colonel, 6th February, 1885; Colonel, 13th February, 1890; and retired on
retired pay, 13th February, 1891. Colonel Murray served in the Afghan war
1878-9.

Lieutenant P. T. Ayre, whose death occurred suddenly at Withernsea, York-
shire, on 17th April, 1895, joined the Regiment as 2nd Lieutenant, 27th July,
1889, and became Lieutenant, 27th July, 1892.

NOTES

FROM

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
"8 £££ YF OS

Tue following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

Major-General Stubbs’s ‘List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Field Artillery Fire,” by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price
1s. 2d.

“Notes of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A.
C. Hansard, R.A., price ls. 2d.

“Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain 8. W. Lane, R.A., price 1s. 1d.

* Achievements of Field Artillery,” by Major E. 8. May, R.A.,
bound, price 2s. 6d.

“The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,” by Major E. S. May,
R.A., paper covers, price 3d.

“The Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’ or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,”
by an Officer R.A., price 7d.

The two Numbers of ‘‘ Nature” containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on ‘Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (d), and (e) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 1893 :—

Captains (¢) and @) ... price ls. 1d.
Lieutenants (c) (d) and (e) price 1s. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

NOTICE.

Tux Committee are having a correctly coloured representation of the Regimental
crest, arms and mottoes prepared by the Heralds’ College. This will be kept at
the R.A. Institution and can be sent out on loan to members wishing to consult it.

GAMES’ FUND.
Tur Committee of the R.A. Games’ Fund have subscribed £5 towards the Chal-
lenge Cup Fund Inter-regimental Polo Fund (India).

This subscription entitles the Regiment to send a team each year to play in the
Tournament, subject to the further charge of 100 rupees to be paid by each com-
peting regiment to provide for the expenses of the year.

The fund is raised to provide a cup to be held from year to year by the regiment
winning the Polo Tournament in India.

3. VOL. XXII. 204

2
CORK HARBOUR.

TuHIs station, in the middle of Cork Harbour, is often said to be unpleasant. It
has, however, some advantages. In summer the boating, fishing and river ex-
cursions offer much amusement. In winter the weather is usually very mild and
healthy. To a married officer living “ashore” the daily run down the hill, the
journey by sea, and the pull up hill to Fort Westmoreland, or occasionally Fort
Carlisle or Camden, and the return journey later in the afternoon, added to parades
and other work, are apt to conduce to a healthy appetite and good digestion.
Only a few weeks ago the officer on guard at ‘“ Rocky,” in rowing with four men
to Haulbowline to turn out the guard there, had his boat swamped in a white
squall at 12 p.m., and just reached some rocks in time to land before the boat
filled.

There is a capital library in the R.A. Regimental Institution on the Island.

“Ashore” the soldier is not without friends in Queenstown. A year ago there
was a great appeal made by Miss Sandes for help for the Soldiers’ Institutes in
Treland. I do not know the result as a whole, but it is plain to see that Queens-
town has not been forgotten. The new Soldiers’ Institute, opposite the Admiralty
pier, is a bright homelike place, the rooms for reading, games and meetings, are
as snug and as comfortable as can be made.

There are many wild waterfowl about the harbour, but they are difficult to get
at, and not many are shot by our people. The Inniskillings, however, have a
novel method of catching wild fowl, which has proved successful to the only man
who has attempted it. ‘ Rocky” Island is known to many; on it is a large
powder magazine, and an infantry detachment is posted there with one officer, “‘ The
King of Rocky.” It is alonely spot inrough weather. The subaltern only holds
his island kingdom for a short period before he is relieved; but to return to the
wild fowl: it was a frosty night, and the lone sentry on one side of the rock
heard the duck flighting in the deepening twilight. The sentries here always have
their bayonets fixed. Suddenly he heard the wings flapping nearer, nearer, till a
fine duck actually rose from the water and was just clearing the rock, when the
sentry delivered a high point, and the fowl fell at his feet—the bayonet had broken
its wing.

A few evenings ago, coming from Spike by the 6.15 launch, justas we had cast
off from the pier-head, and were leaving with tide and wind in favour, there was
a shout and cry of “ man overboard.” A bombardier new to the place had jumped
for the launch and had gone in; it was very cold and wet and dark. We could
not see him and were quickly drifted away. The hands jumped into the small
boat and rowed for where the man must be drifting. We heard his shouts but
could see nothing. At last all was silence. We steamed back to the pier. It
seemed an age for a man to keep afloat on such a cold night with thick boots,
clothing and great-coat. On reaching the pier we found the boat had reached the
man who had been kept up by his overcoat as by a balloon. He was unconscious,
but soon came to and is all right. Had not those in the boat known the drift of
the tide very accurately, they must have missed him in the dark.

All here were deeply grieved to hear that Lieutenant Puxley, R.A., had died at
sea, a day out from Bombay, on the “ Dilwara,”’ of dysentery. He was an excel-
lent golfer, a good sportsman, a good comrade, and a great favourite here.

MANDALAY.

Tuis being a single battery station, regimental news is necessarily meagre, but as
the place offers some special opportunities for sport and news seldom travels from

such an out of the way locality, I think perhaps a few details may interest brother
officers.

Small game shooting is plentiful within a few miles of Mandalay, and lasts for
close on eight months in the year, the rain-quail coming in in August and the
snipe leaving about March. In the 1893-94 season No. 7 M.B., R.A. game book
shows a bag of 9 hares, one pheasant, 10 jungle-fowl, 1563 brace of partridge,
186% brace of quail, one goose, 170 duck, 11393 couple of snipe, 34 golden
plover, 8 pigeons, 2 curlew and 18 various—total 8213 head. This year to the
end of December, the bag consists of 9 hares, 433 brace of partridge, 153 brace
of quail, 12 geese, 105 duck, 694 couple of snipe, 16 plover and 13 various—
total 1936 head. The best bag of snipe was 604 couple by Lieut. Marshall, shot
in eight hours—121 birds bagged and four lost for 223 cartridges—very straight
shooting and, I believe, a record for Mandalay district.. The partridge found here
is the Chinese Francolin, a close connection of the black partridge of India, a fear-
ful runner, hard to find without dogs and very eccentric when put up. Big game
we have not had much chance at, as it has unfortunately been rather difficult to
get away on leave at the right time owing to sections being on command, the drill
season, competitive practice coming on and other causes. Major Gunner with
Surg.-Captain Bean managed to bag an elephant at Maymyo—a fair tusker—and
between us we have shot six ¢hamin (brow antlered deer) but none of them with
heads of any size. Several of the gunners go in for a little small game shooting,
but confine themselves to the larger species, powder being too expensive a com-
modity out here to waste on quail and snipe.

For two years in succession we have won the Carbine Cup at the Burma Rifle
meeting—open to teams of four from any corps armed with the M.H. carbine,
7 shots at two ranges—and are amalgamating the proceeds to procure a Burmese
bowl for the mess. Major Gunner has won the Officer’s Purse for the second
time; in 1898 he also won the Rifle St. Leger—best score at 800 yards, all-comers
—and this year wins the Burma R.A. bronze medal for being second for the all-
comers championship, being only beaten by one point all up the range. Gunner
Johnston won first prize in the Consolation Stakes, and several of the men took
minor prizes in different events.

At the Burma district Assault-at-Arms, our drivers won the Natives Light-
weight Tug-of-War for the second time, but the gunners met more than their
match in the tug for Europeans, the Wilts Regiment producing a well-trained team
that averaged 13st. 8lbs., whereas our men could only scale 13st. 2lbs., of course
three years in Burma has told on some of our men, and four of our former team
were unable to pull from sickness or its after effects; however, I do not think
that affected the result, as the Wilts team would be hard to beat anywhere. One
of our gunners won “ Putting the Shot,” and Major Gunner took the cup for
Officers’ Fencing.

No. 5 (Bo.) M.B. were here with us for about a month in November, having
just come back from our only “ Sanitarium”? Maymyo, where they lost a section
of mules from Surra, and on their return had to invalid a large percentage of their
men. The authorities, I am told, are prospecting for a new health resort.

SHEERNESS.

SINCE last notes there has not been much to chronicle; the Well Marsh has been
changed from a cricket ground into golf links, the polo ponies have become
hunters, officers have joined and officers have left and Sheerness has been buried
in snow, but advantage was taken of it to rig up a sleigh with four ponies driven
four-in-hand through the town and round the Isle of Sheppey, with bells clanging

and whip cracking, to the open-mouthed astonishment of the natives. Rackets
also have been much in vogue when the court has been playable.

During the last fortnight of January Sheerness was quite gay, Mrs. Wells eave
a large dance at Admiralty House on the 24th, which was continued the following
evening on a smaller scale, this was followed on the 29th by a dance given by the
officers in the R.A. Mess which was pronounced a great success; Mrs. Wace kindly
acted as hostess in the absence of Mrs. Uppleby.

Fortnightly smoking concerts are got up for the men in the Recreation Room,
and at them several officers assist.

Captain Hall has jomed 19 Company, Hastern Division, vice Wray appointed
Adjutant of the Honourable Artillery Company.

OBITUARY.

Masor-GENERAL F. G. RAvENHILD (retired), whose death occurred on 17th
February, 1895, was first commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant, 23rd June, 1852;
became Lieutenant, 17th February, 1854; 2nd Captain, 1st April, 1859; Captain,
lith July, 1867; Major, 5th July, 1872; Lieut.-Colonel, lst October, 1877;
Colonel, Ist October, 1881; Major-General, 15th December, 1893, and retired
on retired pay, llth April, 1894. General Ravenhill served in the Crimean
campaign and was present at the siege and fall of Sevastopol, and battle of
Tchernaya (medal with clasp; Turkish medal). He was Inspector and purchaser
of horses from Ist April, 1881, and Inspector-General of Army Remounts from
1st October, 1887, to 3lst December, 1893.

Masor-GEnerat W. L. Yones (retired), who died in London on 11th February,
1895, joined the Regiment as 2nd Lieutenant on 19th December, 1850; became
Lieutenant, 2nd September, 1852 ; 2nd Captain, 17th November, 1857; Captain,
18th December, 1864; Major, 5th July, 1872; Lieut.-Colonel, 23rd December,
1875; Colonel, 23rd December, 1880, and retired with the honorary rank of
Major-General, 29th October, 1887. He held the appointment of D.-A.-A.-G.,
Royal Artillery, from 17th July, 1858, to 16th July, 1863. It was through his
exertions when D.-A.-A.-G. that the Institution was able to publish the “ Cleave-
land Notes,’ and the thanks of the Regiment must always be accorded to him
for this valuable addition to its history.

Masor H. W. B. T. Haverrrep (retired), died at Bishops Caundle, on 20th
January, 1895. He was commissioned as Lieutenant, 15th January, 1867; be-
came Captain, 80th December, 1878; Major, 20th September, 1884, and retired
on retired pay, 19th March, 1890.

DIARY OF FIXTURES.

$= 000 0 O00 00 ——___

MARCH.

Day of the ee
Mth| Wk. Regimental. Cricket, &c, Private.
1|¥ i a
2) 8
3/8
4 | M
5 | 7 a0 00
6 | W |R.A. Band Concert at 3 p.m.
7 | Th |Lecture by Major E.S. May,

DONQNIHEWHH

=|
SHnde Seenay

Les

R.A., at 5 p.m., on ‘The
Co-operation of guns with
Cavalry.”

R.A. Band Concert at 9 p.m.
R.A.T. Committee ‘At Home’
at4p.m. Lecture at 5 p.m.
by Dr. R. Bowdler Sharpe
on “ Curiosities of Bird Lite.”

R.A. Band Concert at 3 p.m.

R.A. Band Concert at 3 pm.
in London.

R.A. Band Concert at 3 p-m.

Senior class joins at Woolwich
R.A. Band Concert at 9 p.m.

Long course leayes Woolwich

Good Friday.

Easter Day.
Bank Holiday.
Firemasters’ class begins

R.A. v. R.E., Rackets and
Billiards at Woolwich.
R.A. v. R.E., Rackets and
Billiards at Woolwich.

APRIL.

é Ubique’ Royal Arch Chapter
meets at ‘f Criterion.”

Day of the
Mth |Wk.
We | WY
18 | Th
19 | F
201 8
21/8
22 | M
23 | T
24 | W
25 | Th
26] F
271 8S
28) &
29 | M
80 | T
1) W
2 | Th
3/F
4| 58
56; 8
6|M
|| ae
8 |W
9 | Th
10| F
it ||
12/8
13 | M
14; T
15 | W
16 | Th
Wy | 1
18/8
19/8
20; M
BL |) fae
22 | W
23 | Th
24] EF
25 | 8
26} $
27| M
28 | T
29 |W
30 | Th
31 | F

APRIL.— Continued.

Regimental.

R.A.Band Concert in London

Ist Division (siege) course
at Lydd begins.

Ist Division course begins at
Portsmouth and Sandown.
Ist Division R.H.A. (Alder-
shot) joins at Shoeburyness.

Position-finding class begins.

2nd Division F.A. (Aldershot)
joins at Okehampton.

8rd Division R.H.A. (Wool-
wich) joins at Shoeburyness.

Ist Division R.H.A. begins
at Glenbeigh.

2nd Division course begins at
Portsmouth and Sandown.
4th Division F.A. (Woolwich)
joins at Shoeburyness.

Cricket, &c,

a en a er

R.A, Regimental Races at
Aldershot:

MAY.

R.A. Woolwich v. R.N. Col-

lege, at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich ». Shoebury-
ness at Shoebury.

R.A. Woolwich v. N.C. Offi-
cers at Woolwich.

R.A.Woolwich v. Blackheath
at Blackheath.

R.A. Greenj ackets, at
Woolwich.
R.A. v. Greenjackets, at

Woolwich.

R.A. v. Aldershot Division

at Aldershot.
R.A. v. Aldershot Division
at Aldershot.

ooo

Epsom Meeting begins.
Derby.

Oaks.

Private.

‘Ubique’ Mark Lodge of
Mark Master Masons meets
at ‘‘ Criterion.”

‘Ubique’ Lodge meets as
“ Criterion.” Installation of
w.M.

ooo

H EM w

gq 2 geeno eS

JUNE.

Regimental. Cricket, &e.

——— —— — —_— | ee ee

5th Division F.A. (Ipswich)

joins at Shoeburyness.

Whit Sunday. ase tee

Bank Holiday. R.A. Woolwich v. R.M.A.,

at R.M.A.

Qnd Division F.A. ‘(Hilsea) eS
joins at Okehampton.

Annual General Meeting of'
R.A.I. at R.U.S.I. at aca Se a
2nd Division F.A. at Glen-
beigh begins.
6th Division F.A. (Weedon)
joins at Shoeburyness.

R.A. v. Quidnunes at Wool-
wich.
R.A. v. Quidnunes at Wool-
wich.
3rd Division course begins at}R.A. Woolwich v. Shoebury-
Portsmouth and Sandown. | ness, at Woolwich.

R.A. v. Eton Ramblers, at
Woolwich.
R.A. v. Eton Ramblers, at
Woolwich.
Ascot begins.

8rd Division F.A, at Glen-(R.A. 0. B.E., at Woolwich.
beigh begins.
Bob R.A. v. R.E., at Woolwich.

R.A. v. Yorkshire Gentle-

men, at Woolwich.
a R.A. v. Yorkshire Gentle-

men, at Woolwich.
2nd_ Division (Siege) course/R.A. v. Household Brigade,
at Lydd begins. at Burton’s Court, Chelsea.
060 000 R.A. v. Household Brigade,

at Chelsea.

Private.

L DINNER.

¢ Ubique’ Royal Arch Chap-
ter meets at ‘‘ Criterion.’
Installation of Principals.

NOTES

FROM

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
——— 4. %G_—-AYF D1

ROYAL ARTILLERY STEEPLECHASES,

In consequence of the great difficulty experienced, under the present system, in
collecting the Annual Subscriptions to the above, it was decided at the last General
Meeting to invite all officers to sign a standing authority to their bankers to pay
their subscriptions to the race fund annually on Ist January.

The amount of the subscription is optional, but badges of admission will only
be issued to subscribers of £1 and upwards.

Officers wishing to become subscribers are requested to notify their wish to Mr.
E. H. Garland, Messrs. Cox and Co., 16, Charing Cross, S.W.

No officer will in future be qualified to enter or ride horses at the Meeting who
is not a subscriber of at least £1 to the race fund.

A copy of the last statement of accounts is published, also a list of subscribers
for 1894.

The 1895 Meeting will take place at Aldershot (probably on 17th April), and
the conditions of the four regimental races will be the same as last year, viz :—

The Royal Artillery Gold Cup value 100 sovs., with 50 sovs.
to the winner, 2O sovs. to the second, and 10 sovs. to the third ; for horses, the
property of, and to be ridden by, Officers on full or half-pay of the Royal Artil-
lery, that have never won a steeplechase value 90 sovs., and have been regularly
hunted during the past season by their nominators or by some other Officer
qualified to enter; 12 st. each; the winner of a steeplechase under 50 sovs. in
value to carry 7 Ib. extra, of two or more such races, or of one or more steeple-
chases value 50 sovs. to carry 14 1b. extra ; no penalties for winners of regimental
races ; entrance 2 soys., but starters free except the winner; three miles.

The Welter Steeplechase of 50 sovs., with 10 sovs. to the second,
and 5 sovs. to the third; for horses (not thoroughbred), the property of, and to
be ridden by, Officers on full or half-pay of the Royal Artillery, or Officers who
have retired from the Regiment, which have been regularly hunted during the
past season by their nominators, or by some other Officer qualified to enter, and
have never won a race of any description; 13 st. 7 1b. each; entrance 1 sov., but
starters free except the winner; two miles and a half,

The Light Weight Steeplechase of 50 sovs., with 10 sovs. to
the second, and § sovs. to the third ; for horses (not thoroughbred), the property
of, and to be ridden by, Officers on full or half-pay of the Royal Artillery, which
have been regularly hunted during the past season by their nominators, or by
some other Officer qualified to enter, and have never won a race of any description ;
11st. 71b. each ; entrance 1 sov., but starters free except the winner; two miles
and a half.

A Consolation Hurdle Race of 25 sov., for beaten horses in the
regimental races ; the second to receive 4 sovs. out of the race; 12 st. each; post
entrance 1 sov.; two miles, over eight flights of hurdles.

Full programmes will be issued in due course, giving date of Meeting, date of
closing, and the conditions of the open races.

1. VoL. XXII.

R.A. BEAGLES, WEYMOUTH.

Ir you want a vent for the proverbial superfluous energy of the Gunner Subaltern
—-aye, and for the matter of that of older ones too—I cannot imagine a more
suitable pastime than the sport of hunting with beagles.

“What about fox-hunting?” you say. Yes, that’s true, but we do not all keep
horses.

Now for beagles all that is wanted is a good pair of legs and bellows, and these
requisites I flatter myself the Royal Artillery possess as well as most people.

It was at the end of last season we started our pack, a modest 24 couple, which
has now risen to 63 couple. But don’t imagine that even last season we had no
sport. Though in the nature of things we only had a few meets, we had some
fine runs, and the cheery ‘‘ Ya-allo-ee find her Brevity” of Talbot-Ponsonby, our
then Master (alas, now absent on leave), echoed often over the downs, till the
tune was changed to ‘‘gone away for’ard, for’ard.” Then what a scattering !
Ponsonby well to the fore, sticking to it through the Lodmore Marshes, now up
to the waist in water, then back again up a formidable hill, over a heavy plough,
stone wall, thorn hedge, another plough sticky and deep, another hill. I mark
the music of the horn as the checks is getting more uncertain; no wonder, after
an hour or so of such work. And the rest of the field by no means make a poor
show. Close supporters of Ponsonby are the whips—Anley, Lowis, Scott,
Broughton (transferred now, to our regret, to another command), Corbyn and
Westerman, both now also among the much missed.

Tailing off are some dozen keen ones, while in the distance seeking, more or
less leisurely, points of vantage for a view, are some 20 or 30 visitors, including
many ladies. Puss of course circles, as all do; and so these latter see a good
deal of the fun.

We do not kill on this occasion; but who will say, as taking a well-earned rest
on Balaclava heights, we scan our homeward road some 250 feet below us, that
he does not feel better for the outing and has not enjoyed himself, or that our little
pack, with their delightsome music and skilful working, has not given us the rarest
of sport. Talk about ‘‘ Odora canum vis’’— Virgil ought to have been there to see
it, and if he had brought Diana with him, she would have fainted with rapture.

Then, in the summer, we are up at al] hours of the morning exercising our pets
before the day’s work begins—and frequent visits to the kennels and talks over
the merits of Duchesses, Rubies, and Carelesses help to while away our leisure
hours.

If the subject interest any members of the Institution, I shall be glad, as far
as I am able, to give in a future paper some account of our (this season’s) doings.
And should the perusal of this short note induce Gunners at other stations to
start packs of beagles, it will not be written in vain.

OBITUARY.

Caprain C. E. Marurtn (retired) died in London on 7th December, 1894. He
joined the Regiment as Lieutenant, 19th August, 1875; became Captain, 14th
August, 1884; and retired on retired pay, 10th August, 1892.

NOTES

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

——_—~ ~~ @ KG WR OSD 2 —

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895.

Tu Subject approved by H.R.W. The Commander-in-Chief for the “ Duncan ”
Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1895, is as follows :—

“The most suitable system applicable for training together in peace time the
Garrison Artillery forces of the Empire, including Regular, Militia,
Volunteer, and Colonial Artillery, with a view to their duties in war
time in Coast Fortresses being more clearly defined.”

The Rules for the Prize Essays now read :—

The Annual Gold Medal, when awarded, to be accompanied by an honorarium of £20; the
Silver Medal by an honorarium of £10.

The candidates must be Officers of the Regiment who are members of the R.A. Institution.

Officers are requested to confine their Essays to about 16 printed pages of the “* Proceedings ;”
other things being equal brevity will count towards success. :

The Essays must be forwarded to the Secretary so as to reach him on or before the 1st of
Apmil.

Hach Essay must be ¢ype-written in triplicate. The Essays must be strictly anonymous, but
each to have a motto, and be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto written
outside and the name of the writer inside ; further, if the writer wishes to recover from
the Committee part of the cost of type-writing his Essay he should state this fact in the
same sealed envelope and write outside it, above the motto, “ to be opened.” }

All the envelopes thus marked will be opened by the Seeretary after the result of the compe-
tition has been announced, and he wiil send the writers the money for their type-writing
expenses. .

The Committee will allow a sum of £1 for type-writing each Essay.

N.B—The Committee draw particular attention to the paragraph in the Rules
above on the subject of length of Essays ; it is not difficult to discover the number
of words in an average page of “ Proceedings” matter, and so to keep an Lssay
within the 16 pages’ limit.

Tue following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

Major-General Stubbs’s “List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Field Artillery Fire,” by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price
1s. 2d.

“Notes. of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A,
C. Hansard, R.A., price 1s. 2d.

“Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain 8. W. Lane, R.A., price 1s. 1d,

“Achievements of Field Artillery,’ by Major E. 8. May, R.A
bound, price 2s. 6d. i

“‘The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,” by Major E. 8. May
R.A., paper covers, price 3d. ce :

“The Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’ or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,”
by an Officer R.A., price 7d, . 4

2. VOL. XXII,

“9

The two Numbers of “ Nature” containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on “Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (d), and (e) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 18$3 :—

Captains (c) and (d) ... price ls. ld.
Lieutenants (c) (d) and (e) price 1s. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

eee

Ir has been suggested by a member that if an officer R.A. in each station, and
others scattered about over the world, could at their leisure copy any memorial
brasses or tombstone inscriptions (in the various churches and chapels which they
may come across) which refer to deceased Royal Artillery officers, a valuable help
would be afforded to the regimental records generally, besides bringing to light
very probably many interesting geneological, military, and regimental facts which
would be of much interest. Officers might send their MS. copies to the Secretary
of the Institution, who would keep them all together and in time get them
chronologically arranged and tabulated. Measures could be taken at some future
date to utilise them in the manner which would appear most interesting to the
Regiment. In many cases these regimental memorials might be photographed
and so avoid copying. It is not to be expected that anything like a complete list
is likely to be obtained for long, if ever, but there can be no doubt that much
might be done in this way without any great amount of trouble. ‘To avoid the
same thing being done twice or oftener, a record of its having been done up toa
certain date might be kept at the head-quarter station, and from time to time lists
of those deceased officers whose memorials had been copied could be published in
the “ Proceedings.” ‘This is merely a rough idea, and the Secretary would be glad
of any suggestions with regard to it.

BOOKS RECOMMENDED FOR THE STAFF
COLLEGE AND PROMOTION EXAMINATIONS

LIEUT.-COLONEL EDEN BAKER, R.A.

[Always follow closely the Syllabus in the Queen’s Regulations.]|

MILITARY LAW,

Lizutenants.—Army Annual Act, 1894.
Manual of Military Law, 1894.—Army Act. Parts I., IL,
and V. (Sections 175 to 184 and 190). Rules of Pro-
cedure. Reserve Forces Act, 1882 and 1890.
Queen’s Regulations, 1894. Sections VI., XIX. and XXII.
Military Law, by Lieut.-Col. 8. C. Pratt. 9th Edition, 1895.

CAPTAINS, IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE :—
Manual of Military Law, 1894.—Army Act. Parts III., IV.,
and V. (Sections 185 to 189), and Schedules. Militia

Act, 1882,

FIELD FORTIFICATION.

Instruction in Military Engineering. Part I., Field Defences 1892 (omit
fougasses and large inundations.)

Manual of Elementary Field Engineering (omit Sections 12 to 15, 18, 20).

Defence and Attack of Positions, by Colonel Schaw. 38rd Edition. Read
Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9.

MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.—Staf’ College only.
The Army Book for the British Empire.
MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY.

Text-book of Military Topography, 1888 (omié pages 110 to 158, and 18]
to 227).

TACTICS.

Infantry Drill, 1893. Read the tactical part on pages xxiv, xxvi, 11, 50
BL, 87, 90, 94 to 192, 244 to 249.

Short Notes on Tactics and Reconnaissance, 1887, by Major Jocelyn, R.A.
ftead pages 7 to 62, but note that Infantry formations have been altered by
Infantry Drill 1893 and Artillery Intervals and Distances by Field Artillery Drill,
1893.

Minor Tactics by Colonel Clery. 12th Edition. Omit examples except for
the Staff College Examination.

Preliminary Tactics, by Major Eden Baker. 1892. Read Ammunition Supply
(the Battery Supply System has been altered), Time and Space (note that the fol-
lowing pages have been altered :—last line page 45, nearly all page 46, top half
of page 48, and on page 49 lines 6 to 16 and 29 and 30), and Marches. Read
also pages 82 to 91, and 140 to 152.

Field Artillery, by Lieut.-Col. 8. C. Pratt. The tactical portion.

ARTILLERY.—Lieutenants R.A. for Promotion Evamination.
Text-book of Gunnery, 1887. Chapters I., I1., XII., XIV., and XVII. (A

new Hidition is in the Press).

Treatise on Service Ordnance, 1893.

Treatise on Military Carriages, 1888. (A new Hdition is in the Press).

Treatise on Ammunition, 1892.

Regulations for Magazines, &c., 1894.

Manual of Field Range-finding, 1890. Wieenene

Hand-book for the Depression Range-finder, 1893. } Pilg. ae

Vield Artillery Drill, 1893. For Horse and Field Batteries only.

Garrison Artillery Drill, 1891-92.

Siege Artillery Drill, 1891.

Handbook for Field Service, Vol. I., Field Artillery. Omit Parts I.; IV. ; WAMes
land 3; VIII., 2 and 3; IX.; 2 and 8; X.; XI., 2,7 and 10. (Now being re-
written).

Preliminary Tactics, by Major Eden Baker, 1892. Read pages 171 to 174, 178,
179, and Chapters V, and IX.

ARTILLERY.—Volunteer Officers (Captains and Lieutenants).
Official Handbooks of Guns on which examined.
Wield Artillery Drill, 1893.
Garrison Artillery Drill, 1891.
Handbook of Artillery Matériel, by Liewt.-Col. Morgan,

For Garrison Artillery only.

STAFF COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION, 1895.
' MILITARY HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY.
Vide “ Regulations respecting the Staff College,” issued with Army Orders,
Ist May, 1894.—Also Army Order 132, September, 1894.

Officers going up for the Staff College Examination are recommended to read
all Magazine Articles, Lectures, §c., that refer to Kield Subjects.

ARTILLERY COLLEGE, WooLwicnH,
January, 1895.

ROYAL ARTILLERY DINNER CLUB.

The following Rules have been agreed to by a majority of the Members of
the Club, and approved by H.R. the Colonel of the Regiment. They came
into force from Ist Jauuary, 1891.

RULES.

Officers of the Royal Artillery, on full or half-pay, can become Annual Sub-
scribers at the rate of five shillings per annum, under the following conditions :—

(a) On joining the Regiment. ;
(6) Ifa Subaltern, by payment of five shillings for every year of service up

to five years, which shali be the maximum number of years subscrip-
tion chargealle to officers of that rank on joining.

(c) Ifa Captain, by payment of six years subscriptions, 7.c. £1 10s.
(d) Ifa Major, by payment of seven years subscriptions, ze. £1 15s.
(e). Ifa Lieut.-Colonel, by payment of eight years subscriptions, 7.c. £2.

THE

RX SEAL AI UG Io NINN Cla JDUONUN ees

WILL TAKE PLACE AT

QUARTER BEFORE EIGHT O'CLOCK,
On FRIDAY, 7th JUNE, 1895,

THE HOTEL METROPOLE
(Private Entrance in Whitehall Place),

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE COLONEL OF THE REGIMENT
IN THE CHAIR.

Dinner Tickets will not be supplied, but officers are requested to give their
visiting cards at the entrance, on the evening of the dinner, to the official appointed
to receive them.

It is particularly requested that officers intending to dine will furnish early

intimation to the Honorary Secretary ; and, to avoid inconvenience, it is desirable
that the same should be accompanied by cheguwe, for the amount of subscription
to the dinner, except from officers who bank with Messrs. Cow § Co., who are
informed that the amount due from them for the dinner will be charged to their
accounts.

Names of officers who notify their intention of being present at the dinner
cannot be removed from the list after the 4th June, and officers who omit to notify
before that date will be charged an extra sum of 5s.

Should an officer wishing to dine have been unable to give notice before 4th
June, he should inform the Secretary at the War Office direct, and not apply
to the Hotel officials,

Advertisements will duly appear in the Times, Morning Post, and Army and
Navy Gazette.

All communications to be addressed to

MAJOR F. G. STONE,
Hon. Secretary R.A. Dinner Club,
Horse Guarpbs,
War Orricr, Paty MALL.

NOTICE.

Ir is proposed that the first Inter-Regimental Golf match, R.A. v. R.E., shall be
contested in April, 1895, by eight players on each side, probably at Sandwich.

Any officer desirous of representing the Royal Artillery should send his name
to the Hon. Secretary, R.A. Games’ Fund, Woolwich, together with a statement
showing the club where he generally plays and his handicap in it, and an account
of any match play in which he has taken part.

R.A. BAND.

Tue R.A. Band Committee desire to submit to officers of the Regiment, par-
ticularly those serving abroad, that it would be for the convenience of all concerned
if officers would arrange to authorize Messrs. Cox and Co. to credit their band
subscriptions as they fall due by a standing authority.

Owing, in many cases, to similarity of names and difficulty in deciphering sig-
natures, remittances by money order or cheque frequently causes difficulty, not
only to the band accountant but it is thought to the officers themselves.

R.A. Banp Concerts in London are fixed for 22nd March and 26th April.

WOOLWICH.

Many readers of the “ Proceedings” may like to know how the “Old Drag” ig
getting along. The annual dinner to the landowners and farmers was held on
27th October and was exceedingly well attended. Major-General Smart very
kindly took the chair, and in a speech thoroughly to the point proposed the health
of the guests, which was responded to by Sir John Pender. ‘The hunt has as
usual met with encouragement from the occupiers of land, and there is every
hope of a good season. ‘The wet state of the land has been rather a hindrance to

148

the usual number of runs before Christmas, and a few days have been lost from
frost, but with the disappearance of the latter good runs may be looked for, The
fields have been large as regards numbers. ‘There is no doubt that there has been
a great increase in wire lately; but several of our good friends remove enough of
it to let the hounds and field pass with safety over their lands.

Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Yorke is Master, and Captain Birch, A.-D.-C. and Lieut.
Cowper-Smith are Whips.

OBITUARY.

Masor-Gennrat J. H. P. Anpzrson, Retired List, Royal Artillery, died at
Wimbledon, on the 7th January 1895, aged 58. He entered the service 28th
February, 1855, and retired 7th September, 1886, with the honorary rank of
Major-General. He served in the Crimean campaign, 1855, including the siege
and fall of Sebastopol (medal with clasp, and Turkish medal); and in the China
War, 1857-60, including the capture of Canton, 1857, actions of Sinho, Tangku,
capture of the Taku Forts, actions near Tangchow and surrender of Pekin (medal
with clasp).

Lrzvt.-Cotonet J. B. Swerve (retired), whose death occurred on 20th January,
1895, was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant into the Madras Artillery on 10th
December, 1847, and retired as honorary Lieut.-Colonel 1st August, 1872.
Lieut.-Colonel Swete served in the Indian mutiny, and was severely wounded at
the affair at Chichumba (medal),

Masor A. L. Prince (tetired), who died at Richmond on 21st January, 1895,
joined the Regiment as Lieutenant 12th January, 1866; became Captain 14th
April, 1878, and retired with honorary rank of Major, 9th July, 1885. He served
in the Hazara campaign of 1868 (medal).

Lieutenant R. B. L. Puxuzy died at sea, on 23rd December, 1894. He joined
the Regiment as Second Lieutenant, 27th July, 1889, and became Lieutenant,
27th July, 1892.

NOTES
FROM:

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
—__- — ¢ AKO

“DUNCAN” GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1896.

Tue Subject approved by H.R.H. The Commander-in-Chief for the “‘ Duncan ”
Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1896, is as follows :—

“ Ammunition Columns and Parks, considered with reference to the replace-
ment of ammunition, horses and men during and after an action.”

The Rules for the Prize Essays now read :—

The Annual Gold Medal, when awarded, to be accompanied by an honorarium of £20; the
Silver Medal by an honorariwm of £10.

The candidates must be Officers of the Regiment who are members of the R.A. Institution.

Officers are requested to confine their Essays to about 16 printed pages of the ‘‘ Proceedings ;”’
other things being equal brevity will count towards success.

The Essays must be forwarded to the Secretary so as to reach him on or before the 1st of
April.

Each Essay must be type-written in triplicate. The Essays must be strictly anonymous, but
each to have a motto, and be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto written
outside and the name of the writer inside; further, if the writer wishes to recover from
the Committee part of the cost of type-writing his Essay he should state this fact in the
same sealed envelope and write outside it, above the motto, ‘ to be opened.”’

All the envelopes thus marked will be opened by the Secretary after the result of the compe-
tition has been announced, and he will send the writers the money for their type-writing
expenses. :

The Committee will allow a sum of £1 for type-writing cach Essay.
The Essays will be submitted for decision to three Judges chosen by the Com-
mittee.

The Judges are empowered to recommend :—
1. That two Medals, one Gold and one Silver, be awarded, or
2. That only one Medal, Gold or Silver, accordmg to the merit of the
Essay, be awarded, or
8. That no Medal be awarded.

The names of the successful candidates will be announced at the Annual Meet-
ing, and Medallists will be distinguished as such in all Lists, &c., issued from the
Institution ; and in the event of a University man gaining a Medal, a report of
his success will be made to the University of which he may be a member.

The successful Essays will be printed and circulated to members by the Insti-
tution.

N.B.—The Committee draw particular attention to the paragraph in the Rules
above on the subject of length of Essays ; it is not difficult to discover the number
af words in an average page of “ Proceedings” matter, and so to keep an Essay
within the 16 pages’ limit.

12, Vol, XXII,

Tue following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

“Twenty-four hours of Moltke’s Strategy’? by Fritz Hoenig,
Translated by Colonel N. L. Walford, price 5s.

Major-General Stubbs’s ‘List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Field Artillery Fire,” by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price
Is, 2d.

*‘Notes of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A.
C. Hansard, R.A., price 1s. 2d.

** Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain 8S. W. Lane, R.A., price 1s. 1d.

“‘Achievements of Field Artillery,’ by Major E. 8. May, R.A.
bound, price 2s. 6d.

“The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,” by Major E. 8S. May,
R.A., paper covers, price 3d.

“The Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’ or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,”
by an Officer R.A., price 7d.

The two Numbers of ‘‘ Nature” containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on “Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (@), and (¢) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 1893 :—
Captains (¢) and (@) ... price 1s. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

Se a ee ee
DINNER TO H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G.

Tur Dinner given by the Officers of the Royal Artillery to H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge, on his relinquishing the Command of the Army, was the finest enter-
tainment in the Royal Artillery Mess, Woolwich, for many years past.

Officers of the Regiment attended from 28 different stations; enthusiasm ran
high and regrets were sincere.

The occasion and the varied attendance of Officers are both worthy of record,
so for that purpose the accompanying diagram of the seats in the mess-room is
published.

The ranks of the Officers present were as follows :—

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ANE peste HIS

R.A. LIBRARY, WOOLWICH.

Turs Library, probably one of the best military reference libraries in the king-
dom, has recently been catalogued by Mr. Francis Edwards, 83, High Street,
Marylebone, at a cost of nearly £200.

The catalogues are divided into 3 sections —

(1) Miltary.

(2) General Literature.

(3) Fiction.
and a limited number of these are on sale at the comparatively small prices of
9d., 9d. and 6d. respectively.

Every Artillery Mess should possess copies and probably every officer in the
Regiment who takes any interest in literature or books will provide himself with
these catalogues. Study of them will show what a magnificent collection the
Library is and how information on any subject connected with the military arts
can be obtained from it.

A comparison with the catalogue of the R.A. Institution Library will show
that there is little fear of the two clashing as the most valuable additions to the
latter are greatly in the form of the newest and best foreign military books, the
purchase of which scarcely comes within the scope of the R.A. Library.

HONG KONG, CHINA.

Tue R.A. Polo Pony Club has now been running for three months and is
a flourishing concern and is well supported, the only difficulty being one that
affects all players in the Colony, the inferiority of ponies.

The Regiment though making a good show at the monthly gymkhana failed to
win as many events as during the previous month.

Several gunners are away on leave in Japan and Mongolia but are returning
at the commencement of the cool weather, when we hope to have the four R.A.
yachts in commission.

One of the men here—Sergeant W. H. Smith of 35 Co. S.D.R.A.—received a
silver Hong Kong medal in the recent distribution for his services in the epidemic
last year.

MADRAS.

Aw Association Football Tournament open to all batteries stationed in the Madras
Presidency has just been inaugurated. A handsome Challenge Cup, to be com-
peted for annually, has been purchased from subscriptions given by the Colonel
on the Staff and the batteries in the Presidency. This year the final ties were
played off at Bangalore and the cup won by the 29th Field Battery team from
Belgaum, beating “S”’ R.H.A. in the final, four goals to one. Twelve batteries
entered teams this year.

OBITUARY.

CoLonEL C. HE. Newrorr (retired), Royal (Bombay) Artillery, who died on 6th
November at Bonnyrigg, Midlothian, was first commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant,
9th December, 1854; became Lieutenant, 27th August, 1858; Captain, lst July,
1863 ; Major, 5th July, 1872; Lieut.-Colonel, 31st December, 1878 ; Colonel,
31st December, 1882; and retired, 19th April, 1888. Colonel Newport served
in the Persian Expedition, 1856-7 and was present at the surrender of Bushire,
and battle of Kooshab. Medal with clasp. Indian Mutiny, 1858. Pursuit of
Tantia Topee.

Tue death is announced at Cheltenham of Major-General G. B. Shakespear
(retired), He was first commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant, 13th December, 1836 ;
became Ist Lieutenant, 11th September, 1839; 2nd Captain, 9th November,
1846; Captain, 30th August, 1852; Lieutenant-Colonel; 22nd December, 1857;
Colonel, 22nd December, 1862, and retired with the rank of Major-General,

10th March, 1875.

NOTES

FROM
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
—- “42% YF GS

“DUNCAN” GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1896.

THE Subject approved by H.R.H. The Commander-in-Chief for the ‘‘ Duncan ””
Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1896, is as follows :—

** Ammunition Columns and Parks, considered with reference to the replace-
ment of ammunition, horses and men during and after an action.”

The Rules for the Prize Essays now read :—

The Annual Gold Medal, when awarded, to be accompanied by an honorarium of £20; the
Silver Medal by an honorarium of £10.

The candidates must be Officers of the Regiment who are members of the R.A. Institution.

Officers are requested to confine their Essays to about 16 printed pages of the ‘‘ Proceedings ;’’
other things being equal brevity will count towards success.

The Essays must be forwarded to the Secretary so as to reach him on or before the Ist of
April.

Each Essay must be ¢ype-written in triplicate. The Essays must be strictly anonymous, but
each to have a motto, and be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto written
outside and the name of the writer inside; further, if the writer wishes to recover from
the Committee part of the cost of type-writing his Essay he should state this fact in the
same sealed envelope and write outside it, above the motto, “ to be opened.”

All the envelopes thus marked will be opened by the Secretary after the result of the compe-
tition has been announced, and he will send the writers the money for their type-writing
expenses.

The Committee will allow a sum of £1 for type-writing each Essay.

The Essays will be submitted for decision to three Judges chosen by the Com-
mittee.

The Judges are empowered to recommend :—
1. That two Medals, one Gold and one Silver, be awarded, or

2. That only one Medal, Gold or Silver, accordmg to the merit of the
Lissay, be awarded, or

3. That no Medal be awarded.

The successful Essays will be printed and circulated to members by the Insti-
tution.

N.B.—The Committee draw particular attention to the paragraph in the Rules
above on the subject of length of Essays ; it is not dificult to discover the number
of words in an average page of “ Proceedings’? matter, and so to keep an Lssay
within the 16 pages’ limit.

li, von. xxtr. 768

On the Employment of Artillery in Cuba.

Wiru reference to the remark in paragraph 2, page 547, of the current number
of “* Proceedings,” “What nature of Artillery the Spanish Government is em-
ploying in the field.”’ Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Dalton, R.A., writes: “Since the
above was printed I have ascertained that the force of Artillery at present in Cuba
consists of 8 fortress companies and 2-4 mountain guns of the Plasencia system,
but up to now their services have not been called into requisition, possibly because
the war has as yet not assumed great proportions.”

Tue following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

“Twenty-four hours of Moltke’s Strategy”? by Fritz Hoenig.
Translated by Colonel N. L. Walford, price 5s.

Major-General Stubbs’s ‘List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Field Artillery Fire,’ by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price
1s. 2d.

“Notes of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A.
C. Hansard, R.A., price ls. 2d.

* Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain 8. W. Lane, R.A., price 1s. 1d.

“Achievements of Field Artillery,” by Major E. 8. May, R.A.,
bound, price 2s. 6d.

“The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,’ by Major E. 8. May,
R.A., paper covers, price 3d.

“The Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’-or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,
by an Officer R.A., price 7d.

The two Numbers of ‘‘ Nature’’ containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on ‘Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (d), and (¢) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 1893 :—

Captains (¢) and (¢/)_... price ls. ld.
Lieutenants (c) (7) and (e) price Is. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

WEEDON.

The “Centenary Cup.”

On Wednesday, 9th October, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, R.A. went to Weedon
to present the Centenary Cup to the 52nd Field Battery ; this battery having won
the lst prize competitive practice at Okehampton, 1895.

The Cup (presented by Major-General I’, T. Lloyd, C.B., D.-A.-G., R.A.) is to
be competed for annually; this year by the Horse and Field Artillery at
Okehampton, next year by the Garrison Artillery. As this is the first year of its

existence special interest attached to the occasion. The D.-A.-G. addressed
the battery as follows :

“Major LLoyd, Officers, N.-C. Officers and men of the 52nd Field Battery, it
was with much pleasure that I accepted Major LLoyd’s invitation to come down
here to-day to present this cup. In instituting it there were two motives; one
being to do honour to the memory of a great and gallant soldier of the Royal
Artillery, whose centenary as first Deputy-Adjutant-General of the Royal Artillery
we celebrate this year, and who above all others was instrumental in raising our
regiment to a position of greater importance and efficiency than it had ever occupied
before. A short history of Lieut-General Sir John Macleod is contained in a parch-
ment scroll in the plinth of the cup. The other motive was to mark every sense of
the importance of excellence in shooting. ‘To secure such excellence as you had
attained you have need of officers who knew their work and did it and N.-C.0.’s
and men yielding a cheerful and ready obedience. Further than this you must all
from your training have acquired a knowledge of the necessity for that co-operation
which is the very essence of successful warfare from the largest to the smallest
operation, and you must have been taught to realize the importance of correctness
in details, the omission of which is fatal to success. Some may say that you
were lucky in winning this cup, I cannot think so, for your history for the past
three years shows that every year you attained a high figure of merit, and long
continued excellence must sooner or later take the first place—just as in cricket a
first-class bat may go out fora duck’s egg, but at the end of the season his
average will be a high one. Your average has been high and this year you have
again come out with the top score.

You will, I am sure, agree with me that you owe much of your success to the
energy and ability of your Commanding Officer, and in a less degree to the Officers
and N.-C.O.’s of the battery who have so well supported him.

The history of this battery is remarkable and distinquished—raised in 1817 as
the Indian “ Rocket” Troop it became in 1818 the 7th Troop of Bengal Horse
Artillery and remained a Horse Artillery Battery in the East India Company’s
Service and in the Royal Artillery till 1887, when it was converted into a Field
Battery as T/2nd Brigade and afterwards as 52nd Field Battery. The war services
of the Battery are numerous and important and include the following campaigns
and battles, viz. :

Siege of Hattrass, 1817.
lst Burmese War, 1824.
Siege of Bhurtpore, 1825-6.
Afghanistan—Siege of Ghuznee, occupation of Cabul, 1839.
Gwalior Campaign—Battle of Maharagpore, 1843.
Sutley Campaign—Battles of Aliwal and Sobraon, 1846.
Punjab Campaign—Battle of Chillianwallah, 1849.
3 Be A Goojerat, 1849.

Indian Mutiny, 1857-8.
N.W. Frontier, 1868.

. Such a record, must, inspire a strong feeling of pride in you all, and I cannot
-doubt that if im the future this battery is called on for active service in the field it
will not be unmindful of the glorious services in which it took part in past years.
I have the greatest pleasure in congratulating Major LLoyd and the whole
‘battery on their success in being the first to win the Centenary Cup.”
Major LLoyd having briefly thanked the D.-A.-G. on behalf of the battery, the
proceedings terminated.

760

BOMBAY.

Tux following extracts from the General Report of the practice in the R.A. Poona
Circle for the season of 1894- 95, though reproduced somewhat late in the year
are full of interest; their publication has been delayed in the hope of receiving
similar reports from Bengal and Madras :—

wit,arat An experiment was tried to utilize more artillery fire when in action behind

trati 7
Geen On COVE, and also to enable guns to withdraw from a position when the enemy

anthem. has been re-inforced, or the batteries troubled by advancing skirmishers during

pongeested the artillery duel.

W.Lane,R.A, Tt was found that with the addition of a wooden movable continuation bar for
each gun, put on the ordinary deflection leaf, for the occasion, that the fire can be
concentrated very successfully from behind cover with ease and accuracy.

The manner in which these experiments were carried out, was as follows :—

BrigapDE Division.

Range and concentrate under cover.

All batteries place pickets lined on to the object, so that distribution can
commence at first round.

Batteries then come up and take up their positions independently and come into
action, elevation being given by clinometer or Scott’s Sight.

Centre battery finds ‘the range (the Commanding Officer placing himself to a
flank and keeping up communication with his battery) ; this is communicated to the
flank batteries, who verify with 3 rounds each to get a bracket.

Centre battery also gets fuze and communicates this to batteries (Captain up
with centre battery to carry on), then all take up slow fire 25’ intervals, and on
order to concentrate, the number of minutes or division of deflection on con-
tinuation bar will be ordered; but flank batteries must, on concentration, increase
their range themselves over range found by 50 yards at medium yanges. .

A Brigade Division being overwhelmed by a re-enforced enemy, or attacked by
skirmishers when in action.

Three Batteries come into action on ridge and each finds its own range on
opposing guns, each gun placing out 2 pickets in rear for line. The centre
battery retires and gets into action, laying forward on pickets and using clino-
meter elevation; it commences firing directly the flank batteries come into action
with it, and each battery verifies with four rounds. The Commanning Officer of
the centre battery will be on the flank and keep up communication with Battery
(Captain to come up and carry on), then gives elevation and fuze to flank batteries
who get the order as to number of Divisions on continuation bar required to
concentrate on centre batteries. Then all take up slow fire.

Flank Batteries must remember to give 50 yards more elevation on concentra-
tion being ordered.

90 per cent. of the shell fell in the Battery concentrated on. As few rounds as
possible were used to carry them out as ammunition was scarce.

The cost of addition of the wooden movable bar to the present tangent scale is
very small, and all that is required is simply to put the bar on or take it off the
tangent scale when RAMU, gg gg oui

Reconnais- The Reconnaissance class consisted of two selected men from each of the five
sauce. batteries, and the following rules were drawn up :—

1. The scouts are not to proceed in any direction more than one mile from
the Batteries in open and half a mile in enclosed country (except
under special instructions), and they must never lose touch of the
Batteries.

2. Their duties are generally to keep their eyes open and note anything
relating to the enemy on the disposition of his troops, especially with
regard to woods, villages, hills or rivers. But their chief duty is to
ascertain how the Batteries can best advance in the direction indicated,
what ground must be passed over, whether cultivated or not, and
what are the best positions for the guns to occupy in action for the
accomplishment of the purpose of which the Commander has in-
structed them (the scouts).

3. They are to make a sketch of the ground, marking the N point, which
should show all the details above described and they must write any
notes descriptive of these details in their pocket-books,

4, Directly they have finished their task they are to hasten back to the
Commander and deliver the report.

It is not intended that the scouts shall undertake the whole duty of
reconnaissance, which can only be properly performed by Cavalry ;
but it is believed that while accomplishing their special duty, they
will be able without delaying that duty to collect much valuable
information, .

Service Practice Serres IX (@) anp X (@).

On the last day of service practice batteries were set a task intended to show
their real fire strength. Two targets, an infantry one at about 1,300 yards, and
a coun target at about 2,000 yards, were placed on a range new to all the Batteries,
They were to fire, in succession, for 4’ on the infantry, then turn on to the guns
and fire for 6’ thus firing for 10’ in all, including ranging twice, no range-takers
allowed. From the results it may be seen that, supposing the 5 batteries
had been in line, each with its own targets, the percentage of the Infantry Target
destroyed per minute was 23°1 and that of the Gun Target, 12°98 (or 92°4 and
77°88 of the entire targets),

OBITUARY.

Cotonen C. E. Strrimne@ (retired), who died at Lucerne on the 7th October,
1895, joined the Regiment as 2nd Lieutenant, 18th June, 1851; became 1st
Lieutenant, 3rd October, 1853; 2nd Captain, 5th June, 1858; Captain, 8th
August, 1866; Major, 5th July, 1872; Lieut.-Colonel, 1st May, 1880; and
retired on retired pay with the hon. rank of Colonel, Ist July, 1881. Colonel
Stirling served in the Crimean Campaign from April 1855, and was present at
the seige and fall of Sebastapol (medal and clasp, and Turkish medal).

Lirvr.-Cotronen W. Rippgtt (retired), whose death occurred at Edinburgh on
15th October, 1895, was first commissioned as Lieutenant, 15th January, 1867;
became Captain, 31st December, 1878; Major, 7th November, 1884; Lieut.-
Colonel (on half-pay), 7th November, 1891, and retired on retired pay, 27th
June, 1894. Lieut.-Colonel Riddell served in the Afghan war of 1878, and was
present at the attack and capture of the Peiwar Kotal (medal with clasp).

Captain A. G. Naprer died at Zurich on 20th October, 1895. He joined the
Regiment as Lieutenant, 27th July, 1880; became Captain, 10th May, 1889, and
was placed on half-pay owing to ill-health, 2nd September, 1894. Captain Napier
served in the Soudan Expedition 1884-5 (medal with clasp and bronze star),

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NOTES
FROM
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
——- “6 2% YR soBed uty

IPQILO).

Tue R.A. team this year made a better fight for the Regimental Cup than they
have ever done before. Unfortunately they drew against the 13th Hussars in the
first round, but with any luck in the draw ought to have been in the final.

The sides were as follows :—

R.A. v. 137TH Hussars.
J Captain Tisdall. Mr. Pedder.
2 Mr, Peel. », Wise.
3 ,, Aldridge. », Church.
Back Captain Hanwell. Captain Maclaren.

The 13th Hussars won the toss, and elected to play with the wind, thereby
gaining a decided advantage.

The regiment lost the first goal, but with the wind equalised matters before the
end of the first ten minutes, thanks chiefly to Mr. Peel.

At the end of the second turn the score was two all.

In the third ten minutes, owing to the want of ponies, the R.A. came rather to
erief, the Hussars scoring two goals to love.

After this however the R.A. were at their best, and fairly out played their
adversaries, hitting two goals, one a splendid shot of Captain Hanwell’s of about
100 yards, thus making the score four all.

Nothing was scored in the fifth turn, and so the last ten minutes was started
with game still four all.

Towards the end the R.A. ponies again rather failed, and the Hussars once more
had the best of the game, and so scored for the fifth time. Just as the bell was
about to ring they added one more, and so won by six to four.

The regiment however were far from disgraced, as no other team could equal
their performance, the 13th eventually winning the cup for the third time.

Captain Hanwell was in his best form, scarcely making a mistake from start
to finish, and it is chiefly due to his coaching that the others have learnt their
places and played so well together. Captain Tisdall had the somewhat hopeless
task of keeping Captain MacLaren out of the game, but he managed to do so as
well as any other No.1. Myr. Peel as 2, played brilliantly, making some of the
best runs of the whole Tournament, while Mr. Aldridge, considering it is his first
year in first-class matches, may be fairly proud of his performance,

Q, WO SSxiT,

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY (WOOLWICH) POLO TOURNAMENT.

TEN teams entered, but at the last moment the 9th Lancers, R.A., Aldershot,
Essex Club, Stansted Club, and a Hurlingham team had to scratch, which only
left a team from the Household Cavalry, the Scots Greys, Fetcham Club, R.H.A.,
Woolwich, and Field Artillery, Woolwich. The first ties took place on Monday,
July 22, as follows :—

FrIrLp ARTILLERY. v. HovusEHoLD CAVALRY.
Major Manifold. Mr. Rose.
Captain Schofield Captain Milner.

» Ferrar. » LitzGerald.
Major Porteous. Mr. Schreiber.

The R.A. began well, but were eventually defeated by five goals to two. The
ground was in perfect condition, and play was fast from start to finish.

The second match was between—

Tur Greys. v, FretcHam Cuvus.
Mr. Conolly. Mr. Drake.
5, Harrison. » G. Sheppard.
Major Hippisley. » Fort.
Mr. Pringle. » Trollope,

Fetcham scored the first goal, but the Greys soon equalised matters. The game
continued in a most equal manner, and as the last quarter began the score was two
all. The Greys, however, then played better together, and won by three—two.

On Tuesday, the 23rd, the R.H.A., who had drawn a bye, played the Household
Cavalry. The sides were :—

TROLL AN. v. HovusEHOLD CAVALRY,
Mr, Butler. Mr. Rose.
» Peal Captain Milner.
, Gillson. » FitzGerald.
,, Aldridge. Mr. Schreiber.

This proved to be quitea first-class game, and well worth seeing. The R,H.A.
team were, with the exception of Mr. Butler playing for Captain Hanwell, the same
team that won the Rothschild prize in the Paris Tournament last month. The
visitors were a good deal better mounted than the home team, and eventually won,
in spite of some brilliant play by Mr. Peel, by three goals to two.

After this match the R.A. played the Fetcham team, who were defeated on the
previous day. On this occasion, however, the R.A. had Captain Hanwell to

lay for them, and won rather easily by five goals to two.

The final took place on Thursday, the 25th, between the Scots Greys and the
Household Cavalry. Owing to an accident to Major Hippisley, Mr. Barnes, of
the 4th Hussars, kindly came at the last moment and took his place. The ground
was still playing beautifully, and the game was fast, the ball going the whole length
of the ground in three or four hits. The Greys won the toss, and played down
wind, which gave them some advantage. ‘The first four goals were made with the
wind, making the score at half time two all. Then the Household scored against
the wind, and changing ends, made the score four—two. ‘The Greys, however,
added one more to their score, and looked like equalising matters, but this was
not to be, for the Household team, playing well together in the last turn, won by
five goals to three.

The tournament proved a great success, thanks chiefly to Captain Hanwell,
Captain Blane, and Mr. Gillson, and will be repeated next year, when, with longer
notice, more teams ought to be able to compete. ‘The R.A. entertained the
visiting teams throughout the week, and stabled all the ponies.

ALDERSHOT.

Royat ARTILLERY Polo at Aldershot has been waking up lately, thanks partly
to the arrival of the Brigade Division from Woolwich. I never can understand
why polo, so enthusiastically supported there, languishes amongst us of the regiment
at Aldershot. We have an excellent ground, placed in a central position, open five
days a week, from 1st May until 30th September, so that during those five months,
even in race weeks, you are certain of agame. Added to this, the ground on
every side of the field is eminently adapted for training the young idea, human and
equine.

The first match we were able to have was against the 4th Hussars’ subalterns.

R.A. v. 47H Hussars.
a Beas carbone 1 My. Churchill.
2 ,, Head. 2 ,, Savory.
3 ,, Cowper-Smith. OI Oabane
4 Captain Mackenzie. 4 ,, Barnes.

The R.A. scored almost at once, but towards the close of the first ten minutes
Mr. Pim’s pony falling heavily, completely laid his rider out. It looked a very
nasty fall, and though no bones were broken, it will probably be some time before
the gallant No. 1 will be fit to play again. Both he and his ponies have been
greatly missed, Mr. Byron was looking on in flannels, but ready for all emergencies,
he took the place of our unfortunate No. 1.

Naturally we felt the change, as a strange man on strange ponies, however good
individually, generally upsets a side. The Hussars scored three goals in the next
ten minutes, and the game stood at three to one against us. During the next
twenty we held them well, getting two more goals to their one. ‘The game re-
mained at this, four goals to three, until the last half-minute, when one of our
forwards scored, leaving us four goals all. It was too late to play it off.

Our next match was against the 9th Lancers’ second team.

R.A. v. 9rH LANCERS.
My. Byron. Mr. Campbell.
>, Head. ,», Henry.
», Cowper-Smith. » Beale-Browne.
Captain Mackenzie. Captain Wykeham-Fiennes.

It is always a pleasure to play against a combination of the Ninth, as, whoever
the individual player may be, they always play polo. This day, as our opponents
chivalrously allowed, we had the best of the game most of the time, though at the
call of time the score stood four to three in their favour. This of course means
better shooting on their part than ours, which means better polo. They did
not get through very often, but scored each time they did, whilst we were constantly
shooting at their goal and missing it. However, it was a good and cheery game.

Our next was against a Divisional team.

R.A. v. ALDERSHOT.
Mr. Byron. Mr. Campbell, 9th Lancers.
» Head. ,, Lawson, Scots Greys.
Captain Mackenzie. Captain Hickman, Worcester Reet.
Myr. Cowper-Smith, »» Maxwell, Scots Greys.

We were now to feel the advantage of having a team which had played together
a few times against one which had not, and we won somewhat easily by eight
goals to three.

Our next antagonists were the 4th Hussars, a stronger and better mounted
team, Though they beat us easily by four goals to nil, it was not a bad game, and

4A,

was a fairly fast one. One of our back’s ponies gave out after the first ten
minutes, and he practically played the rest of the game on one good grey pony.
The sides were—

wae

TA. v. 4rq Hussars.
Mr. Byron. Mr. Churchill.
», Head. Major Peters.
Captain Mackenzie. Captain Hoare.
Mr. Cowper-Smith. Mr. Barnes,

We had now come to the end of our-ponies, and had to turn to Woolwich for
assistance. The head-quarters responded nobly, sending Ferrar and Aldridge, to
enable us to take on a strong team of the 9th Lancers.

R.A. v. 97H LANCERS.
1 Mr. Head. 1 Mr. Campbell.
2 Captain Ferrar. 2 Major Little.
3 a Mackenzie. 3 Captain Wykeham-Fiennes.
Mr. Aldridge. » Hon. C. Willoughby.

The ground was in very bad order, caused by the heavy rain and much play.
We started somewhat brilliantly, Mr. Aldridge hitting two goals in the first ten
minutes. In the second the Ninth equalised matters, and soon after made a
third goal. The R.A. now played their hardest, and if a “sitter”? had not been
missed in front of goal, would have made the score even again. The fourth goal
was obtained by the Ninth out of a scrimmage, and the score, at the beginning of
the lasttwenty minutes, stood at fourtotwo. A somewhat lucky goal was soon after
hit by Captain Mackenzie, and we did our level best to make it a tie. Just before
time, however, a fatal backhander in front of goal placed the ball for Willoughby,
who swooped down upon it and scored, leaving us defeated, after a well contested
game, by five goals to three.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Hobson, a good and keen player of the
game, who has lately joimed the Horse Artillery from India. He enabled us to
play most of these matches by unselfishly (and quite unasked) placing his one
made pony at the disposal] of Byron, whose stud has been reduced by an accident
to oue pony. Captain A. King has also assisted us considerably by valuable
advice, and by umpiring for us.

I have written this long yarn in the hope that officers of the Regiment coming
to Aldershot may believe that it 7s worth while keeping ponies there.

OBITUARY.

Snconp Linurenant A. A. Fatcon, died at Malta on 2nd August, 1895. He
was commissioned on 3rd January, 1894.

Lizutenant A. S, Mriumr, who died at Cherat, E.I.,on 9th August, 1895, from
disease contracted during the Chitral Expedition, joined the Regiment as Second
Lieutenant, 16th February, 1890, and became Lieutenant, 16th February, 1893.

Seconp Lizurenant C. A. L. P. Busue, who died at Charlton on 11th August,
1895, was commissioned as Second Lieutenant, 15th February, 1889.

NOTES

FROM
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
TS 6K YE ESI

Owine to the length of “ Proceedings’ matter all Notes, Cricket and Diary are
omitted this month,

R.A. GAMES’ FUND.

Tue Annual Meeting was held at the R.U.S.I. on Friday, 7th June, when the
following Report and Accounts were presented: the accounts are for the year
1894 and show an increase in the credit of £50.

The number and yalue of grants to various stations exceed those made in any
one year since 1883.

The results of the current year’s Racket and Billiard matches were most satis-
factory as the Regiment succeeded in winning back both cups.

As the silver plates on the plinths of the cups were full of names the committee
of the R.E. Fund suggested that each Fund should pay for another step to the
plinth of one cup this step to be provided with enough silver plates for recording
the names of winners for sixteen years. This has been ingeniously carried out by
Messrs Elkington without necessitating the enlargement of the cases in which
the cups travel.

The Inter-regimental Golf Match, the institution of which was approved by the
last Annual meeting, was played for the first time over the St. George’s Club,
Sandwich, Links, on 22nd April and resulted in a victory for the R.E. by 10
holes in the aggregate. The meeting was attended by several officers of the
Regiment, principally from Dover, who agreed that it will soon become a most
popular annual fixture. No cup has yet been provided as the Committee of the
R.E. Games’ Fund on going into the matter could not see their way to meeting
the R.A. Committee.

A subscription of £5 has been paid from the Fund on behalf of the Regiment
to the Indian Inter-regimental Polo Challenge Cup Fund; this entitles the Regi-
ment to send a team each year to play in the Tournament the winner of which will
in future hold a cup provided out of these subscriptions. Any regiment not
subscribing and wishing to enter will have to pay £10 in addition to the usual
rupees 100 for the expenses of the year.

The number of subscribers to the Fund June, 1894 = 614.

5p bp % ; s May, 1895 = 639.
The report having been adopted and the accounts passed, it was resolved to
_ Invest the sum of £300 in some stock to be selected by the Committee, and to
deposit the balance of £500 in the Post Office Savings’ Bank,
In the remarks that followed Major-General F. T. Lloyd, ¢.8., said he thought
it a pity that the Committees of the R.A. and R.E. Games’ Funds eannot come

7. VOL. XXII. 52a

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NOTES

FROM
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
——- 4 KRAFPS 23
NOTE.

THE notes on ‘“‘ Magazine Regulations’ communicated by D.-A.-A.-G., R.A.
and published in the September number of the “ Proceedings,” were intended as
notes on Major R. F. Johnsou’s paper on the ‘ Ammunition Service of a Fort; ”
the publication of these notes separately, was due to a misunderstanding ; and as
they have now been inserted in their proper place, members are requested to
cancel p. 483 of the September number of “* Proceedings.”

Tuer Committee of the Engineering Congress held in Chicago in 1898, have
collected a small number of the proceedings of the Military Engineering group ;
some copies are kindly offered to members of the R.A. Institution at the
small charge of 2s. 6d. a copy and postage. Officers wishing to obtain a copy,
should write to the Publisher of ‘‘ Hngineering,” 35, Bedford Street, Strand,
London, enclosing a remittance of 3s. 2d.

H.R.H. tus Duce or Campripven, Commander-in-Chief has accepted an invita-
tion to dine with the Regiment at the R.A. Mess, Woolwich on the 9th of
November. Any officer wishing to be present, who has not received an inti-
mation through a Mess or otherwise, is requested to notify his desire to dine to
the Hon. Sec. R.A. Mess, Woolwich.

R.A. POINT-TO-POINT RACES, 1895.

From a sporting point of view the first attempt at a regimental point-to-point
meeting was a complete success, and it is therefore hoped that it may become an
annual event.

There were more than twenty starters in both the regimental races, and the
secretary, having paid all bills, finds himself with about £56 in hand.

On this head, however, it is only fair to remember that this year, owing to the
kindness of Mr. Tyndale White, secretary of the Essex Hunt, the expenses for
damage were unusually small.

Of course the future success of the meeting is mainly a question of finance.
This year, the support afforded, especially from Woolwich and Aldershot, was
most generous. Begging for money, however, for what purpose, is always un-
pleasant, especially when there is a danger of people feeling any obligation to give.
I venture to think too, that, if the effort to collect money has to be made each year,
there would be some difficulty in getting anyone to perform the duties of secretary.

The amount of money required is not large, and might be met, should the
regiment approve, in the following manner without seriously interfering with any
other subscriptions. This suggestion, for which there is the authority of the
General Meeting held in London on Friday, 7th June, is that officers commanding
batteries and companies, serving at home, should guarantee £1 per annum to the
R.A. point-to-point fund at Messrs. Cox & Uo. This, which would only cost each
individual officer some four or five shillings, would suflice to keep the fund solvent.

Should any other officers (not serving with batteries or companies) desire to be-
come subscribers, they are requested to write to Messrs. Cox & Co. Their
subscriptions will be very welcome, and will be acknowledged annually in the
published accounts.

Officers commanding batteries and companies would be doing a great kindness
by letting the Hon. Secretary know their views, whether they are in favour of
this suggestion or not, as early as possible.

It was feared by some that we are likely to interfere with the Royal Artillery
steeplechases. The success of both events this spring, proved, I think, that there
is room in the regiment for both.

The following conditions were agreed to at the General Meeting.

The stewards to be the same as last year (with the addition of Lieut,-Volonel
Yorke, the master of the R.A. drag hounds), with power to add to their number,
viz :—Lieut.-Col. Wallace, R.H.A.; Lieut.-Col. O’Malley, R.A.; Lieut.-Col.
Yorke, R.A.; Major Eustace, R.H.A.; Major Blewitt, R.A. ; Captain W. Paget,
R.H.A.; Captain J. L. Smith, R.A. ; Captain J. B. Askwith, R.A.; and Captain
C. G. Mackenzie, R.A., Aldershot, Hon. Secretary.

The horses entered to be maidens (winners of the R.A. light weight and R.A.
heavy weight race excepted), to have been the property of their owners since the
Ist February preceding the race, and to have been regularly hunted by them during
the past season.

Other conditions the same as this year.

The time and place and any other point which may arise to be left absolutely
to the stewards, whose decision is to be final. Three stewards to form a quorum.

“T should like to add the following to the above circular which, with the
authority of the General Meeting of R.A. races, was sent to officers commanding
batteries and companies. Most of the replies received have been favourable, and
I think that some of the few adverse letters have been caused by a misconception,
for which, I dare say, my clumsy wording has been responsible.

The primary reason of the suggestion was a desire to make individual subscrip-
tions as small as possible, the secondary reason to give the secretary some line to
go on, as to the probable amount of his subscription list for the coming year, so
that the financial part of the business might work automatically. Of course it
was never intended that a commanding officer should be asked to pledge the credit
of his battery, even to the amount of one sovereign, indefinitely. He was only
asked to promise that amount for one year. As soon as the subscription was dis-
approved of by the officers of the battery it could be withdrawn,

All that was asked was that this battery should undertake to subscribe £1, the
matter of collection being left entirely to the officers of the battery, and the sug-
gestions were circulated with the belief that all our batteries, and many of our
companies, have two or three officers at least serving in them who are interested
in hunting, and may not object to subscribe a small amount for a purely hunting
fixture.” C. G. Mackenzie, Capt., Hon. Secretary.

SINGAPORE.—_STRAITS SETTLEMENTS.
Tue R.A. quartered in the island of Blakang Mati are about to have new quarters
and mess premises built for them. Jor the last five years or more, both officers
and men have been living in sheds thatched with atap palm leaves, whilst the
Colony and the Home Government fought over the amount of the Military Con-
tribution, but now this question has been practically settled, and the Colonial
Government have commenced building the new barracks.

The old mess and quarters had many discomforts which have been celebrated
in yerse and song by the marooned subaltern condemned to live on the island

3
)

whilst his more fortunate brother was having a fairly good time in the head-
quarter mess at Fort Canning. When heavy rain came (and it knows how to rain
in this part of the world) the roof was much too hospitable to keep it out, and
one had to get up and push the bed round the room to dodge the wet. To add
to this, the atap was the happy home of the white ant, the scorpion, and the
centipede, and one could never claim to feel very lonely. .

The last reorganisation of the R.A. results in having two companies of Artillery
stationed here, 25th Company which is quartered on Blakang Mati, and 88th
Company at Fort Canning. Major Wace, R.A., D.S.O. and 2nd Lieutenant
Griffith are coming out next month to join the latter company, which will then
be up to full strength.

The R.A. in the Straits possess a capital football team which has just won the
Singapore Association Football Challenge Cup in grand style, ultimately defeating
the runners up by three goals to one. This cup competition has a rather curious
history. Last year the two teams left in the final were the Ist and 2nd teams of
the 2nd Batallion Lincolnshire regiment, now quartered at Woolwich, and these
two teams tied no less than seven times and finally decided the competition by
tossing. This year the R.A. met in the final the team entered by the 5th
Northumberland Fusiliers. The latter were the favourites, the betting being
about 2 to 1. The game resulted in a very fine exhibition of football, the short
passing and shooting of both teams being very good indeed. Where so much
good play was shewn, it would be difficult to single out particular individuals for
praise, but such play as was shewn by the R.A. backs is rarely witnessed in the
Hast.

The command of the Singapore Company, R.A. has just changed hands.
Lieutenant J.G. M. Watson, who formerly served in Singapore in 26th Company,
Southern, relieves Lieutenant Corrie, who goes to a native mountain battery in
India.

Major Hawkins, R.B. and Lieutenant Paul, R.A. have just returned from
Muar (Johor) through Malacca, after climbing Mount Ophir, said to be the Ophir
of the bib’e from whence King Solomnn brought gold and peacocks. It is only a
little over 4000 feet high, but it is the highest mountain in the Malay Peninsula,
south of Perak, and a very fine view can be obtained from the summit. They
failed to bring back any talent of gold with them, but some very pretty orchids
and ferns were brought down.

In another month or so the snipe season will have commenced. No bags of
any size are made in Singapore, but Malacca, Penang, and Province Wellesley
are said to be the best snipe grounds in the world, and a good bag can always be
made by a fair shot.

Lieutenant J. T. MacDougall has returned, after a fornight’s leave, to Java.
He reports the climate as delightful, especially in the hills, the food good, and
the hospitality unbounded. Some very good shooting can be obtained én the
island with a little trouble, and in Batavia, cricket, and golf are merrily played
all the year round, ,

OBITUARY.

Mason J. M. Stpson (retired), who died on the 16th September, 1895, joined
the Regiment, as Lieutenant, 17th August, 1874; became Captain 12th Septem-
ber, 1883; and Major 7th November, 1891. He was placed on temporary half
pay, owing to ill health, 20th January, 1895, and retired 7th August, 1895,

CRICKET 1895.

ROYAL ARTILLERY v.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

PLAYED AT CHATHAM, 19TH AND 20ru JULY.

RoyaL ENGINEERS.

Major Friend, c Adair, b Straubenzee... .. ono 13}
Capt. W. C. Hedley, ¢ Foster, b Waymouth . 380
EH. M. Blair, c Curteis, b Way: ‘mouth . 15
Captain Hamilton, c Straubenzee, b Hollowa ay 58
M. 0O.C. Tandy, ¢ Quinton, b Straubenzee.. 50
Major Renny-Taily our, b Waymouth . 33
Capt. Druitt, c Way: sanoretih, b Quinton 4
1Bjg 18L, Rookeve Curteis, b Spentibenzce 53
C. B. O. Symons, b Waymouth ... 23
I. G. Turner, run out ... oo sal
Major Rawson, not out . 10
Extras 27

Total . 437

Royal Artillery: J. M. Macgowan (not out),
(for no wicket), 19.

13; Gbraeiia ida (not out), 6
W. Strong, W. L. Foster, F. W. D. Quinton, C. C. Van Straubenzee, Capt.

3 extras, 1. Total

Wynne, Major Curteis, C. H. de Rougement, W. O. Holloway, and E. G. Waymouth did not bat.

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. GENTLEMEN OF M.C.C.
PLAYED AT LoRDS, 22ND aND 23RD JULY.

GENTHEMEN oF M.C.C.

1st Innings.

2nd Innings.

A.E. Stoddart, c Waymouth, b Holloway 2 MOG @U 300 00000 oo | AO
G. F. Vernon, ¢ Perkins, b Holloway 9
Capt. E. G. Wy nyard, c Wynne, b Straubenzee .., 72
Capt. H. B. Trevor, run out 00 oo ZA)
E. C. Mordaunt, b Macgow an. ot 600 26
J.M. Quinton, c Waymouth b Maegowan am 3
Capt. Phipps-Hornby, not out .. 15 not out 0
C. Heseltine, b Straubenzee . 5
Lieut.-Col. Rice, ¢ Quinton, b Hollows ay 9
Archibald Campbell, c and b Holloway iL
¥F. Walkinshaw, c Quinton, b Straubenzce 0
Extras ... 3 Extras 3
Total ... 200 Total (for no wickets)... 23
Royan ARTILLERY.
Ist Invings. 2nd Innings.
Capt. Wynne, b Stoddart ... ... 2 c¢ Heseliine, b Sree it
C. C. Van Straubenzee, b Mordaunt POO eso IN bss toddantiame..: p00 8
Major Curteis, c W: alkinshaw, b Mordaunt ... 15 bMordaunt ... 10
F. W. D. Quinton, ¢ Wynyard, b Mordaunt 7 ¢ Wynyard, b Mordaunt... 0
Capt. Adair, not out ... 3 b Mordaunt E 0
W. Strong, ¢ W alkinshaw, » Campbell .. 28 ¢ Walkinshaw, b Mordaunt . 10
Capt. Dorehill, c Wynyard, b Mordaunt 0 Ibw, b Mordaunt sas an 1
ANe Wo dia Perkins, b Mordaunt... ... 0 not out on too, sO)
W. O. Holloway, ¢ W alkinshaw 5 19 Mordaunt 1 run out ms sa 23
Bears Waymouth, e Walkinshaw, b Mordaunt 14 ¢ Wynyard, b Stoddart O60 3
J, M. Macgowan, ¢ Trevor, b Mordaunt O run out doo) ob 15)
Extras vs. 60g od 9 TOPSHHDS 965 000. 000 18
AOI Go oak gan A 80 Metall ooo 0000 co i

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. FREE FORESTERS.
PLuayvEeD aT WooLwicn, 26TH AND 27TH JULY.

Roya ARTILLERY.

Ist Innings.

C. C. Van Straubenzee, ¢ Pree am, b Collins..

Capt. Wynne, b Collins dec
Major Curteis,b Hornsby... ... ..

Ii, dels (Cr Stanton, ce Lewes, b Giolla, soe
W. O. Holloway, ¢ Gillman, b Collins ...
Capt. Phipps-Hornby, b Hornsby ...
K. St. G. Kirke, b Collins is
Capt. Cramptom, not out ...

TBDRIRS: 609 cdo 0H

Totalerect: ese ascow ie ss's

FREE FORESTERS.

Ist Innings.

J. H. Hornsby, ¢ Craig, b Holloway
P. F. Warner, ¢ Hollow: ay, b Kirke
D.F. Gillman, b Holloway Ne
G. J. Mor daunt, ce Wynne, b Hollow ay.
F. M. Ingram, b Hollows ay ba te
Lieut. -Col. Rice, b Holloway .
Jalaale Harrington, e Hollow Be: b ide
3B. Atkinson, not out . ne
Cc. M. W oodbridge, b Hollow ay. d
Wi. EW). Collins, ce Wynne, b Hollowa: ay
R. P. Lewis, b Holloway ... ..

GSS ey ee aes

BNO 50

.. 12 c Ingram, b Collins...
. 6 b Gillman ... ;
: @ Jp Jal@rIas ORF g05 coo) on
an, 1 b Hornsby ... 3
» © b Hornsby .. Jo
11 b Collins :
EO mecran dat, Gillman
. 13 e¢ Ingram, b Hornsby
po Jo) TELCOS ONT 500 000
pe On NOt Out
.. © hb Collins s
yy ys iHixtras) &--
60 Motaliaeers
2nd Innings.
8 not out Ba Ace
ooo UY)
.. 9 not out 600
oo. 9)
32
0
0)
3l
2
¢)
10)
13 JOSE B55 Go

2nd Innings.

eee

eas

Total (for no wickets) ... 21

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. BAND OF BROTHERS.

PLAYED AT WOOLWICH, 2ND

Banp oF BROTHERS.

Ist Innings.

A.W. Fulcher, b Kirke ... aa
A. M. Streatfield Moore, b Moorhouse ic
Rev. W. Rashleigh, b Kirke WN Ae
G. J. Mordaunt, ¢ and b Dorehill .
G. C. Hubbard, c and b Kirke ..
E. Fisher, ¢ Craig, b Kirke
M. C. Kemp, lbw, b Moorhouse
C. V. Isaacke, b Moorhouse ne
C. Watney, c and b Moorhouse
J. Sores, TOL OWL coo oo be
F.S. W. Cornwallis, b Moorhouse mh

Extras Achy 8 ods eine

ARO oc ay SRG

27
0
6

11
0
0
1
4
3

D AND 38RD AUGUST.

b Straubenzee
ec and b Kirke

e Craig, b Moorhouse
b Moorhouse oo
b Moorhouse

not out
not out

ood

ISPAHBIS go C00

Roya ARTILLERY.
C. C. Van Straubenzee, st Kemp, b Hayes do

R. A. Craig, e Fisher, b Hubbard
Major Curteis e and b Hubbard .
Capt. Dorehill, lbw, b Rashleigh .. 009

Capt. Cooper, b Hubbard
Capt. Wynne, b Jones

A. E. J. Perkins, b Jones ase
H. C. Moorhouse, ¢ Fulcher, b Tones...
L. K. Stanbrough, not out .., 90

Bmbdr. Osmond, b Jones

K. St. G. Kirke, e andb Fisher i

Extras

Motalermmnens

Total’ <.

2nd ED
b Moorhouse oc

ce Perkins, b Moorhouse ... ...
e Straubenzee, b Moorhouse ...
st Cooper, b Moorhouse .,,

aoe

ood

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. I. ZINGARI.
PLAYED AT WooLWIcH, 71H AND 8TH AUGUST.

1st Innings.

C. C. Van Straubenzee, ¢ Wheble, b MOIReD coo |B

Capt. Cooper, ec Wheble, ¢ Mcrdaunt
Maior Curteis, b Morgan ... a
R. A. Craig, b Morgan...

R. A. Birley, c Mitchell, b Morgan...
A. E.J. Perkins, b Mitchell 00
1B) Ag dite Jetetell 10) Mitchell .

W. O. Holloway, ¢ Mitchell, b Mozgan.. Gotaleaolan

a C. Moorhouse, b Mitchell .
. G. Waymouth, not out...
Major Abdy, b Mitchell
K. St. G. Kirke, b Mitchell
IBRQGEAS cq 000

ARON core. 68a -c9d

Ist Innings.

Capt. DuCane, Ibw, b Waymouth ..
J. H. J. Hornsby, b Holloway...
E. C. Mordaunt, b Holloway ..
¥F, A. Soames, b Holloway...
W. Morgan, b Holloway ...
L. K. Jarvis, b Waymouth
J. A. Turner, b Waymouth ...
Capt. W. Thesle. ce Curteis, b Holloway
G. F. Vernon, b Waymouth 900
J. Hargreaves, b Holloway ...
R. H. Mitchell, ¢ and b Way mouth
R. W. Mitchell, not out

Extras

Rotaliees

Roya ARTILLERY.

0
2

4
7

4,
5
3
1
(0)
6
0
2
7
Sor macber “Ano dl28}

I, ZINGARI.

°
6 5 8
8 8 8

ws
SCWwanNnroae

| to
wee De

Or
Je)

2nd Inninas.

e DuCane, b Mitchell

b Mitchell ... eae

b Mitchell ...

lomElorn's Diver

e and b Turner ...

e and b Hornsby

b Soames

not out =

e DuCane, b “Mitchell

c Soames, p Hornsby

b Hor nsby 3

ce Wheble, ri Hornsby |
Extras

Total

2nd Innings.
st Cooper, b Kirke ...

e Holloway, b Waymouth

b Moorhouse
e Craig, b Moorhouse
b Mooxt house
b Kirke
b Moorhouse
b Kirke 86
st Cooper, b Kirke
b Kirke
not out
b Kirke
Extras

Total

1
| DONWOWNH®A AS

5 hI

NOTES

FROM

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

7" “L646 YF ODS 2

Tue following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

Major-General Stubbs’s ‘‘ List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Field Artillery Fire,” by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price
Is. 2d.

*‘Notes of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A.
C. Hansard, R.A., price 1s. 2d.

“Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain 8S. W. Lane, R.A., price 1s. 1d.

“Achievements of Field Artillery,’ by Major E. 8. May, R.A.,
bound, price 2s. 6d.

“The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,” by Major E. 5. May,
R.A., paper covers, price 3d.

“The Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’ or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,”
by an Officer R.A., price 7d.

The two Numbers of “ Nature” containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on ‘Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (d), and (¢) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 1893 :—

Captains (¢) and (@)_... price Is. 1d.
Lieutenants (¢) (d) and (e) price 1s. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

THERE is a movement on foot to erect a memorial to all who fell in the Matabele
campaign, more especially to the late Captain C. F. Lendy, Royal Artillery, over
his grave. A public subscription is now being made in Bulawayo for this
purpose.

Any officer wishing to subscribe should send his subscription to the “ Civil
Commissioner,” Bulawayo.

THE name of Major H. C. L. Holden R.A. appeared in the last list of Fellows
elected to the Royal Society. The office at the Proof Butts Royal Arsenal fitted

6, VoL. XXII, A2QA

9 /

with many of the electrical measuring and recording instruments invented by
Major Holden has for some time past been one of the principal objects of
interest to societies and men of science visiting the Arsenal. Major Holden
deserves the congratulations of the Regiment on the honour done him by the
Royal Society.

Tue Secretary R.A.I. has received a letter asking to withdraw the essay bearing
motto ‘Tis never too late to mend” from the Duncan Gold Medal competition
1895. This has been done.

SHIRE ERNESS.

StncE last notes the following changes amongst the officers have occurred.
Major A. S. Pratt and Lieutenant Byron have gone to Field Artillery, both much
missed; Major R. M. B. F. Kelly has joined as Instructor in Gunnery vice Major
Pratt and 2nd Lieutenants Blount and Barnes to fill vacancies.

As a mark of appreciation for the use of the R.A. golf links the golfers of the
Royal Navy presented a silver flask to be played for under handicap. This was
played for on Tuesday 27th April, the competition being match play against Bogey,
the flask was won by Captain Cummings, at scratch, who made a record
for these links, 40 first round and 41 second round of 9 holes, beating Bogey by
6 up. ‘The second prize, sweepstake, was won by Lieut.-Colonel Uppleby, who
with a stroke at 9 holes-was 4 up with Bogey.

Golf has now to be given up for the summer, making way for cricket,
tennis and polo.

The R.A. polo club has opened stronger than ever, 4 quarters twice a week
being easily arranged for, there being 20 ponies already and more expected; the
field has greatly improved since last year and a good season is anticipated.

The officers of the Dutch Royal Yacht “‘ Valk’? were entertained at dinner in
the mess prior to Her Majesty’s departure, the table being very tastefully decor-
ated with red, white and blue flowers arranged in stripes as a compliment to the
Dutch national flag.

The mess plate has been enriched by the gift of a very handsome silver milk
jug, matching a coffee pot in use, by Lieutenant Frank Rundle, R.E. lately gone
to India.

Three gentlemen cadets, Stanbrough, Castle and Lennox, are attached here
awaiting commissions so that the mess is as full as it will hold, every room in
the officers’ quarters being occupied.

The Cricket season opened with a match against R.A. Dover on 11th May, in
which the Sheerness eleven were defeated by 24 runs. For Sheerness Captain E.
F. Hall distinguished himself by making 59 out of the 99 total. The match was
played at Dover and the visitors were hospitably entertained at luncheon in the
R.A, mess.

OBITUARY.

GENERAL H. P. Baron DE TEISsIER, Colonel Commandant, who died at Leather-
head, on 27th May, 1895, joined the Bengal Artillery as 2nd Lieutenant, 11th
December, 1837; became Lieutenant, 17th August, 1841; Captain, 11th
December, 1852 ; Lieut.-Colonel, 18th February, 1861; Colonel, 18th February,
1866; Major-General, Ist October, 1877; Lieut.-General, 1st September, 1881 ;

General; 31st March, 1883; and Colonel Commandant, 7th June, 1888. General
de Teissier served in the Sutlej campaign, 1846, and was present at the battle of
Sobraon (medal). Punjab campaign, 1848-49; battles of Chillianwallah, and
Goojerat (despatches, London Gazette, 3rd March, 1849, medal with 2 clasps).

Generau Sir J. W. Firzmaynr, K.C.B., Colonel Commandant, whose death
occurred at Ross, Herefordshire, on 27th May, 1895, was the son of an officer
Royal Artillery; he was commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant, 6th November, 1830;
became Lieutenant, 26th October, 1831; 2nd Captain, 12th April, 1842; Captain,
9th November, 1846; Major, 20th June, 1854; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 20th June,
1854; Brevet Colonel, 2nd November, 1855; Major-General, 29th December,
1867; Colonel Commandant, 26th November, 1876; Lieut.-General, 15th April,
1877; and General, Ist October, 1877. General Fitzmayer served during the
Crimean campaign 1854-55, was present at the affairs of Bulganac, and McKenzies
Farm ; battles of Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman; siege and fall of Sebastopol ;
and repulse of Sortie, 26th October, 1854 (despatches, London Gazette, 10th
October, 12th November, and 2nd December, 1854; medal with 4 clasps ; Brevet
of Colonel, C.B.; Officer of Legion of Honor; 4th class of Medjidie; Turkish
medal.) He was Inspector General of Artillery from Ist April, 1875, to 31st
March, 1877, and appointed Colonel Commandant Royal Horse Artillery, 7th
December, 1886.

Lrevrenant G. V. Green, who died at Bombay on 19th April, 1895, was com-
missioned as Second Lieutenant, 25th July, 1890, and became Lieutenant 25th

July, 1893.

Tin death is reported through the capsizing of a yacht off Southend-on-Sea, on
16th May, 1895, of Second Lieutenant I’. M. Marston, commissioned 20th March,

1895.

ner

Pen cn a

NOTES

FROM

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

7 “L6G YF ODS 2

“DUNCAN” GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1896.

Tue Subject approved by H.R.H. The Commander-in-Chief for the ‘* Duncan ”
Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1896, is as follows :—
“ Ammunition Columns and Parks, considered with reference to the replace-
ment of ammunition, horses and men during and after an action.”

The Rules for the Prize Essays now read :—
The Annual Gold Medal, when awarded, to be accompanied by an honorarium of £20; the

Silver Medal by an honorarium of £10.
The candidates must be Officers of the Regiment who are members of the R.A. Institution.

Officers are requested to confine their Essays to about 16 printed pages of the ** Proceedings ;”’
other things being equal brevity will count towards success.

The Essays must be forwarded to the Secretary so as to reach him on or before the 1st of
April.

All the envelopes thus marked will be opened by the Secretary after the result of the compe-
tition has been announced, and he will send the writers the money for their type-writing

expenses.
The Committee will allow a sum of £1 for type-writing each Essay.

The Essays will be submitted for decision to three Judges chosen by the Com-
mittee.

The Judges are empowered to recommend :—

1. That two Medals, one Gold and one Silver, be awarded, or

2, That only one Medal, Gold or Silver, according to the merit of the
Hissay, be awarded, or

8. That no Medal be awarded.

The names of the successful candidates will be announced at the Annual Meet-
ing, and Medaliists will be distinguished as such in all Lists, &c., issued from the
Institution ; and in the event of a University man gaining a Medal, a report of
his success will be made to the University of which he may be a member.

The successful Essays will be printed and circulated to members by the Insti-
tution.

N.B.—The Committee draw particular attention to the paragraph in the Rules
above on the subject of length of Essays ; it is not difficult to discover the number
of words in an average page of “ Proceedings” matter, and so to keep an Essay
within the 16 pages’ limit.

SNR V.O Lr eeSoXeLiIrs

THE following works are now on sale at the R.A. Institution and will be for-
warded post free at the prices noted after their titles below :—

“Twenty-four hours of Moltke’s Strategy”? by Fritz Hoenig.
Translated by Colonel N. L. Walford, price 5s.

Major-General Stubbs’s ‘List of Officers of the Bengal Artillery,”
price 5s. 3d.

“Field Artillery Fire,” by Captain W. L. White, R.A., price
Is. 2d.

“Notes of Lectures on Artillery in Coast Defence,” by Major A.
C. Hansard, R.A., price 1s. 2d.

** Ranging Note-Book,” by Captain 8. W. Lane, R.A., price 1s. 1d.

*‘ Achievements of Field Artillery,” by Major E. 8. May, R.A.,
bound, price 2s. 6d.

“The Value of Mobility for Field Artillery,” by Major E. S. May,
R.A., paper covers, price 3d.

“The Young Officer’s ‘ Don’t,’ or Hints to Youngsters on Joining,”
by an Officer R.A., price 7d.

The two Numbers of “ Nature” containing Professor C. V. Boys’s
Lecture on ‘‘ Photography of Flying Bullets,” fully illus-
trated, price 8d.

Examination questions in (c), (@), and (¢) set in the four examina-
tions ending May 1893 :—

Captains (c) and (d) ... price ls. 1d.
Lieutenants (c) (¢) and (e) price 1s. 1d.

Tables of Four-Figure Logarithms, pocket edition, mounted on
linen, price 3d.

Lithographic plates of Field Artillery Harness stripped and laid
down for inspection, price for pair (lead and wheel), 1d.

B.A. (WOOLWICH) POLO CLUB.

A Handicap Tournament was played off as follows; the teams having been selected
so as to be as equal as possible.

No. 3 Team. v No. 2 Team.
Back. Captain Blane, Mr. Aldridge,
3 », Lachlan, Major Manifold,
2 My. Gillson, Mr. Peel,
ene sauler Captain Maxwell.

No, 2 team were not at all in their best form, and were beaten by five goals to
love. Mr. Gillson did most of the work for the winners, and was well supported
by Captain Blane as back.

No. 4 Team. v. No. 5 Team.
Back. Captain Heygate, Captain Hanwell,
3 Major Cunliffe, Mr. Harman,
2 Mr. Head, Captain Schofield,
Ly, Pim. Mr. Browne.

This proved a much more equal match, No. 4 won by two goals to one, but the

losers had rather the best of the match. Mr. Pim devoted his time to keeping
Captain Hanwell out of the game, and thereby did much towards victory.

No. 1 TEAM DREW A BYE.

Second Round.
No 1 Team. v. No. 4 Team.
Back. Captain Honner, Captain Heygate,
3 » Tisdall, Major Cunliffe,
2 oy _ LRGIPRANE, Mr. Head,
il ,, Hon. J. Vereker. 59 tea

Another good game in which No. 1 eventually won by two goals to love. Cap-
tain Tisdall was originally intended as ‘‘ back,” but Captain Honner producing a
good pony filled the place most successfully and so allowed Captain Tisdall to go
up.

Final.

No. 3 Team. v. No. 1 Team.

Back. Captain Blane, Captain Honner,
3 Pe euachlans iccallls
2 Mr. Gillson, mee errate

1 ,, Butler. » Hon. J. Vereker.

This proved the best match of the Tournament. No. 3 team thanks chiefly to
Mr. Gillson had rather the best of the game, and near the end of time were two
goals to one. Just before the bell rang No. 1 team scored and so equalised
matters.

In playing off the tie, No. 2 team scored the first goal and so won the Tourna-
ment.

Captain Blane was again ‘all there’ as back, while Captain Tisdall and Captain
Ferrar did a lot of work for the losers,

Mr, Butler had the honor of hitting the deciding goal.

PoLo In Paris.

A team of R.A. officers from Woolwich, very sportingly went over to play for the
International Cup, given by the Paris Club. They were defeated by the Rugby team
by six goals to three. The winners were exceptionally well mounted, which gave
them a great advantage. The R.A. team however played a good game, especially in
the 2nd and 3rd quarters. i

After this defeat, Baron de Rothschild kindly offered a prize for a match
between them and the Paris Club. This took place on the 7th June, the sides
were as follows:

R.A. v. Paris Crus.
1 Mr. Peel, 1 Monsieur Bousod,
2 ,, Gillson, 2 5 De le Escandon,
3. ,, Aldridge, 3 Lord Shrewsbury,
Back. Captain Hanwell. Back. Mr. Wheeler. ~

The R.A. began by pressing the home team but failed to score for the first two
quarters. Then the Paris team playing well together, brought the ball down the
ground with one run, and Captain Hanwell having broken his stick, they scored the
first goal, this put the visitors on their mettle, and Captain Hanwell went up to
No. 3, leaving Mr. Aldridge back; the change soon told, as Captain Hanwell ver
guickly scored two goals. During the last part of the game the R.A, still

continued to have things their own way, Mr. Peel and Mr. Gillson each adding
another goal, the match thus ended in favor of the visitors by four goals to one.

At the conclusion of the game the prizes, which consisted of four gold cigarette
cases, were presented by Viscomte Charles de la Rochefoucauld, the President of
the Paris club, who congratulated the winners, and said he hoped the R.A. would
pay them another visit next year. Captain Hanwell in reply thanked the Paris
Club for the great hospitality they had shown his team, and Baron de Rothschild
for his kindness in giving the prize they had had the honor of winning.

R.A. WOOLWICH GYMKHANA MEETING.

Tue Meeting took place on the Polo Ground in Charlton Park, on 14th June,
and was attended by some two or three hundred people.

THE COCKSHY STAKES.—Won by “G” Battery R.H.A., the Paris
Polo Team being second, no less than ten teams competed.
Captain Chapman, Mr. Powell, Mr. Best, and Mr. Butler............ iL
Captain Hanwell, Mr. Peel, Mr. Gillson, and Mr. Aldridge ......... 2

POLO BALL RACE.—The ball had to be taken through obstacles, round
a post and back through a goal.
IN Ges (obec laa Shs aren ons ents scarce rinnaee ect aiia UCemOOG eR te ice oe oedo il
MVianorga Vari ol Gl iiaen er eeeneon ee ence ere aha, Rn erin coat nen eee EE
Mr. Gillson .., eho 3 3

12 Competed.

THE AWFENETY STARES.—Gentlemen to. saddle pony or horse,
open umbrella, run to lady, who will light his cigar, thread a needle and
sew a button on to his coat. Gentlemen must then return to pony, mount,
ride round a flag and back to winning post, with umbrella open, cigar alight
and button on.

itis, Inno Clarke avnal Chiniauiin Inlarnalll coscocconestounapsdb coscapateasocen il
* Milaasig Levene pal WieyfoND TBM oes sco coosooadseeb bee sommcous s60hd6 one ateaaa mas NiRSce 2

18 Competed.

Captain Hanwell got his saddle on quickest, and thanks to his partner’s rapidity
with the button and light for his cigar, won comfortably, from Major and Mrs.
Pratt.

POLO SCURRIES.—The first race for oes Ponies was won by
Captain Heygate’s HaLMa............ Nera snes ..Mr. Gitison 1
Captain Heygate and Copia Schofield ha into me straight, but running wide

at the turn by the pony stables, were carried right into the carriages. Captain

Heygate had a nasty fall but was very pluckily up to time to compete in the next

event.

The Second Race for all Hastern Ponies was won by
Mr. Peel’s Rayon D’Or.. wie Se ee OMNER, ol

After a very close finish ate Chaean Vanoline on one of Cases Tisdall’s.
TENT-PEGGING BY SECTEONS.—The Ist Division R.H.A.

defeated the 2nd Division F.A.

Wit, Toyrelll, Wie, IDexom, Ite, Welllteminn, Wire, Isles 25005 ca cov0c0000 lL

Captain Hanwell, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Thwaites, Mr. Tyler............... 2
After the competition two sections tent-pegged from different directions passing

through each other as they took the pegs. Then in Indian file passing each other
bridle hand to bridle hand. Captain Hanwell finished the entertainment by taking
a peg, while standing up on the saddle.

THE “GRETNA GREEN” STAKES.—Gentlemen to ride a horse
or pony, leading another with side saddle to the pavilion, where the expectant
brides will be waiting in fancy costume. Gentlemen to dismount, help bride
to mount, then both will ride over a hurdle to a table, where they must
dismount and sign their names, and mount again, returning over hurdles.
First pair back to win.

Mors imaubenzeemandiosVireskal\Mct callin: saeiae seem taCeen reben tats
Captain Chapman and ‘ Miss’ Best ...........005

Mr. Ashmore and ‘ Miss’ Hnegland......

Captain Hanwell and ‘ Miss’ Gillson
MissEarnygandigMasswaDixo nee nes meet recen aneoneete ates ater
Captain Maxwell and ‘ Miss’ Stanton
Mr. Vallentin and ‘ Miss’ Aldridge .

This caused a great deal of amusement, ie “wife | in ae cases being too lovely
for words.

Peet ee cer ecre cee rrr soe rerres toners roe

Pee eee ree rer eee reese res cre reeee 09

OBITUARY.

Coronet G. G. Canner (retired), died at Ealing, 7th July, 1895. He joined
the Bengal Artillery as Second Lieutenant, 13th December, 1827; became
Lieutenant, lst December, 1834 ; Brevet-Captain, 13th December, 1842 ; Brevet-
Major, 20th June, 1854; Lieut. -Colonel, 27th August, 1858; and retired 10th
October, 1858, with the hon. rank of Colonel,

Linut.-CoLoneL H. M. Smiru (retired), whose death occurred at Bromley-by-
Bow, on the 7th July, 1895, was first commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the
Bengal Artillery on 12th December, 1845; became Lieutenant, 21st July, 1851;

Second Captain, 27th August, 1858 ; First Captain, 13th January, 1864; Major,
5th July, 1872; and oined with ihe hon rank of Lieutenant- Colonel, Ist August,

1872. TL Rewienante Colonel Smith served on the Indian Frontier during 1851- 2
(medal and clasp).

CRICKET 1895.

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. ALDERSHOT DIVISION.

PLAYED aT ALDERSHOT, 247TH AND 25TH May.

RoyaL ARTILLERY.

1st Innings. 2nd Innings.
Capt. Adair, c Bradford, b Campbell ... ... ... 6. c Bradford, b Campbell... .. .. 0
C. C. Van Straubenzee, c Luard, b Bradford ., 8 bShute ... Sop 655 Fado. ad
Capt. de Rougemont, c Trevor, b Shute. 86 c McLaren, b Campbell sity Seon rode LD
Major Curteis, ¢ Bradford b Shute SO. lo Cermypvlllce co on on co coo _
Capt. Wynne, b Shute 90 SHIP SiO OUR!” ded deo ood. God aoe 000 WE
d: E. Cairnes, b Bradford... ... 8 b Campbell... co BO dn lor cet
E. E. N. Waters, ¢ Ritchie, b Bradford... 17 “
R.A. Birley, c Ritchie, b Shute 6 6 not out ob 36
IR, 1D HNO, lo Hyanchiordl 355 G00 © s00o 9
C. E. D. Budworth, run out 6. 8S 1
Gunner Butler, not out Aue | ce 1 °
IBS — o90 0000s) 9 TS. no mo oe to cc AD)
Total ... 165 Total (for 5 wickets) ... 318

ALDERSHOT DIvIsIon.

Capt. Luard, ¢ Curteis, b Butler... .. 11
Lieut. Bradford, ce Budworth, b Cairnes 62
n Campbell, c Adair, b Cairnes ... . 380
Capt. Cuthbertson, b de Rougemont ... oe 624
Lieut. Ritchie, c Waters, b Budworth 32
Capt. Bunbury, c and b Budworth... ... «. 50
Lieut. eerie st Curteis, b de Rougemont... . 148
Lieut. Liddell ¢ de Rougemont b Straubenzee ... 24
Capt. Trevor, b Cairnes . O00 on 18
Capt. Shute, ’b Straubenzee eee . 0
Corp]. McLaren, not out ooo Go C 7
Ei xctrasi ey ete ess 13

Totalamee een ne 426

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. QUIDNUNCS.
PLAYED aT WooLwicuH, 138tH anp l4tH JUNE.

QUIDNUNCS.

Ist Innings.
H. Eaton, c Dorehill, b Waymouth... .. «we ... 64
E. H. Bray, c Adair, b Waymouth... .. .. .. O
H. M. Leaf, c Adair, b Waymouth.. .. .. « 8
C. G. Pope, b Holman dope ie dbO SOD. Abe Leadon ee)
KE. A. J-Maynard, b Butler 0.0 0. 00. .su: © veer 1 24
1D, Ckevaaeti TO WLS “450 000 con con + c0n.-—sceo con,
H. Carew-Hunt, b Holman | Bert eb tno, Medan ato, Gs
E. M. Lawson-Smith, 1D TEL@IIETR op 900 oasis
Vo El, Manley, candb Holman... mo oo 0
Rey. T.,Greatorex, ¢ Stanton, b Holman | Ao) toc”) Ble
A. E, Leatham, c Stanton b BL ae og onc’ too ol
IBRATR S000 ond oo. oo oo &
Total ... pho! GoD OR mgt IS)

2nd Innings.
CaButlerappAdainiamescmmisccdntes stn econ nalt

lo WWeymomtin 52. coo coo cco on)
1D) WAVES RENO 056 | toes
b Straubenzee ... Sees, | ee 15
ce Adair, b W aymouth co oo on Oh
c Denisa, DPEolim anwar sae ometoneS O
not out Fr Sl ae oS
e Adair, b Holman ha odin oh cos ae
db Waymouth - bo 003) 0d
¢ Dorehill, b Tights hs oh |e 3k)
c Dada, b Waymouth... .. .. 2
DODGE) ooss Goo. ed odo, oo 2A

ANGE Gas 00s coo ooo SKY)

Roya ARTILLERY.

1st Innings.

2nd Innings.

Capt. Adair, c Bray, b Pope... 13 ce Carew-Hunt, b Hake 7
©. ©. Van Seraubenzees ¢ Garnett, b Thana Smith 59 b Pope 0
Major Curteis, b Pope... eel Omcrandepi@anenwi- Hunt, 5
Capt. Dorehill, b Lawson-Smith .. 0. us ww 18 Leatham, b Carew-Hunt 84
Capt. White- -Thomson, b Carew-Hunt .. .. .. 23 bGarnett ... . 26
F. H. G. Stanton, b Carew-Hunt ... ... ... .. 18 b Lawson- Smith 4
A.E. J. Perkins, c Garnett, b Pope... ..: ... 7 not out 5 Bo 29
B. W. Holman, c Lawson-Smith, b Pope... .: 2 ¢ Manley, b Pope cos 1B
E. G. Waymouth, b Carew-Hunt .. .. 1. 0. 0 ean Smith, b Carew-Hunt . 4
Major Abdy, not out ... _.. Se eee er CERODOMD Carew-Hunt 7
Gunner Butler, b Carew- Huntin eee ek! Eo 5G Ne Bray, b Leatham ... 9
Extras 00 «0 acs msg ccs IDEAS “on oo 4
MBCLEIL Sos" G00 G00 00d 00d. ceo coo. diets) Tobales etuctce mec emi ae,
ROYAL ARTILLERY v. ETON RAMBLERS.
PLAYED aT Woouwicu, 17TH AND 18TH JUNE.
RoyaL ARTILLERY.

W. OQ. Holloway, b S.A. Foljambe . 606 ano oh,

C. C. Van Straubenzee, b 8S. A. Folj ambe.. s00 600 ooo 0483

Major Curteis, e Cobbold, b S. A. oljambe coo coo

CaptrpAldainssbe bel h aria gine cans itt amen ns mn 0

J. E. Oriana, b Pelham eo wa 4

Capt. White-Thompson, cS. A. Foljambe, pb Cobbold 1) 43

Capt. Dorehill, b Cattley ... a0 000 000 ong.)

A. E. J. Perkins, econpord b Cattley | Goo eek PH

E.G. Waymouth, not out... > wo 8

B. Atkinson, bS. A. Foljambe ...... p00. 6

Gunner Butler, c Cattley, bS. A. - Foljambe See ee eS

Extras ss 66 Ono 20

Total... C5 00g coo coo J

Eton KAMBLERS.

1st Innings. 2nd Innings.
Io Ob Erasing, In EON aie cco co on on co tb Winder ETS eko3
V. W. Yorke, b Waymouth _... op oop 4) OANGEND, 15 Butler ci leet G)
P. ‘W. Cobbold, e Perkins, b Waymouth... 5 b Butler Hh iTS
G.-R. aan b Holloway af co oc om 6) Io ANG iS rt)

8. W. Cattley,b Waymouth .. ... ... «. ws. 25 ¢ White-Thompson ei

A. B. Whatman, b Waymouth... ... ... 0 b Waymouth ze i 2 Pe, nies 7
3.B.Pelham,b Waymouth oo uu. ue 14 b Butler a) MG
G.S8. Foljambe, iy WRN PTAOHBD oc odo 000 o> wsi(i) BI gy 7, 4
S.pAr Holjambess bmHollowayaieesmnctaleome ccc ela DeButlerele nme ed)
A. E. B. Ind, not out... ... ere fase sO c Dorehill, b Adair . O00 Mento
C.K, Pechell, c Adair, > Holloway... 0 not out rT
Extras... ss 6 Extras ve 4
SBOE! 00 ono ogo on oo. 64 ANE o50 00 96

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. ROYAL ENGINEERS.
-PLAYED AT WooLwicuH, 21st anp 22ND JUNE.

; Roya ARTILLERY.
1st Innings. 2nd Innings.

C. C.. Van pianos ce pony eee 1) WYo :

@ 7 Hedley... 2. 9 .. 68 b Druitt os
Capt.. Wynne, « e Mainprise, b Hedley doo. aco cog, -0}0). 10) Joo zs
Major Curteis, b Hedley... boa. 000; 000 CE SOLR OIE. oc 00
18 Vio ID). Quinton, e Stafford, b Rooke SE: See! -e and b Druitt . x
W. Strong, b Druitt ... ee ee ee ee een OLZOUG a,
Capt. Dorehill, ¢ and b Rooke ... Aves ee,

Capt. White-Thompson, ¢ poe b Healey nO)
Capt. Adair, b Rooke... ... coo &
Ww.O. Holloway, b Hedley 900 8 cops ooo |
HK. G. Waymouth, ce Hamilton, bDruitt 0.0... UL
J. M. Macgowan, not.out... ... odo, dun’ con, 21S)

IBSAIHRDS coo 000 000 ot 0« cE Extras ..,

dRowAll cco 300000 323 ‘Total (for 3 wickets) ..
nee THEE

ist Innings. 2nd Innings.
aor W. C. Hedley, c Curteis,b Macgowan.. ... 44 ¢ Adair, b Waymouth

H. M. Blair, ¢ Curteis, b Wowmcniny ae tis) Hollow ay
ca Ss. Liddell, b Macgowan ... 00 000 on I) WAVE TAGUMIL — 0
Capt. Hamilton, b Holloway _... coo oo =k @ GL TH Waymouth ..

M.0O’C. Tandy, c Curteis, b Waymouth... Se ee OS ET UNROUY "
Major Stafford, b Macgowan_... Coens OD AVVAAbyama ott
Major Renny-Tailyour, b Holloway... x03 oon co's—Cs sd) WV
1B), JEL, ROOK, 1) TEteMlOWA.c0 200 a0 cso cos MG AN Lag
B. W. Mainprise, b Waymouth boos ah Weoshe cool Meee ao) Waymouth
Major Rawson, b Li olowiey, s00 tus. 000 coo ooo UK I) Milena
Cay Otin IDM, MOL OLKG oo 500900 000s ws om, ops's—CiD OH out 00

ul IBECHTRAS) S00 000 000000 on 000 on0stts Extras

MEO, 400, 000 000009 soo IB) Total

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. YORKSHIRE GENTLEMEN.
PLAYED AT WooLWICH, 26TH AND 271TH JUNE.

Roya ARTILLERY.
1st Innings. 2nd tae
Capt. Wynne, c E. M. Lawson-Smith,bC. Lambton 73 b Fox... ...
C. C. Van Straubenzee; c E. B. Firth,b D. Lambton 24 b eecone Santin, 4
Sergt.-Major Cochrane, c C. P. Sykes, bD. Lambton 0 c Bruce, b C. Lambton

Major Curteis, ¢ Firth, b Bae dod 66 ¢ and b Lawson-Smith
W. L. Foster, c Sykes, b . Lambton ... ... ... 9 ec Landon, b Lawson-Smith
A.E. J. Perking, st Tala b D. Lambton ... ... 35 bC. Lambton .. 2.
J. EH. Cairnes, b D. Lambton Oot hes ae = « 85 candb C. Lambton
H. C. Moorhouse, ¢ C. Lambton, b ‘Sykes Boo boo. JAS) OTE UTE a
¥. H. G. Stantcn, c Firth, b Lawson-Smith... ... O run out Strat
Capt. Handley, not out ... 4. “ue 12 b C. Lambton «.,
Gunner Butler, b D. Lambton tis, tthe: tse Tah | 4T ot out atick ted tases. choi ne
Extras Weems Fil a6. 2 tee ante wd ea, IDSA 00 ox) GoD 000
Total cs lev! ss. aseseae ace bee tio4S Total (9 wickets)...
YORKSHIRE GENTLEMEN. be
Ist Innings. 2nd Innings.
Capt. C. D. Bruce, b Butler... _.. 88 ¢ Moorhouse, b Butler ..,
Oy Wo Ji Fernandes, ec Wynne, b Moorhouse ... 2 ce Curteis, b Butler nS
H. G. McL. Amos, b Perkins ... . Roe Once berkins spp Vloorhouscenammers
Rey. E. B. Firth, b Moorhouse soo 'o00 000 «ooo OS) @ Sugino, lo IBiNMlaP oo.
Hon. D. Lambton, b Butler HH .. 14 »b Butler ,
Hon. C. Lambton, ¢ Straubenzee, b Moor “house .» 32 b Butler
C. W. Landon, b Butler Ne ait) Ree ho, abe Butler xu
C. P. Sykes, ¢ Wynne, b Stanton en he eee pCR Loon nousesmD Perens)
EB. M. Lawson-Smith, not out ... .. ... .. «. 14 e Curteis, b Butler .. . i.
C. J. Fox, ¢ Straubenzee, b Butler... ... .... ... Ll c Curteis; b Butler a
a, ts Walker, b Butler MET) ceece Uv. at) ae Oseenotiout Ay horas, SO OD
Xtras perce | Gee iees Matesy) <cstanuese ss IeLO ixtrast eee mee a
Total 900 oy a0 eee eee are 262 Total tee vee

Bsrumo cra aren

=
women ocwoour

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. HOUSEHOLD BRIGADE.
Prayep at Burton’s Court, CHELSEA, 28TH AND 297TH JUNE.

Royan ARTILLERY.

1st Innings.

GC. C. Van Straubenzee, b Powell 102
W. 1. Foster, b Gosling at 1
H. C. Moorhouse, b Dixon (0)
F. H. G. Stanton, b Dixon 6
Major LLoyd, b Dixon 2
Capt. Adair, b Powell... ... 57
Capt. Phipps-Hornby, b Powell | 2
Major Davidson, b Gosling... .. 0... 11
E. W. Davies, ¢ Cotton, bd Gosling Res 6
Ifo 1Bio 1B. Balllains, not out . Boe 0)
Gunner Butler, b Powell 0)
Extras... 20

ANG ac . 207

2nd Innings.

b Powell is ects latices

lbw, b Amory

b Gosling ne

b Amory

not out wes wee

ec Cumner, b Gosling

run out 60

e Cumner, b Amory d

e Cumner, b Powell...
‘Extras

{Rott G0 cap

HovusrEnoLp BRIDAGE.

Ist Innings.
By Wo Wemugrortiln, To IBwillee 59g can g00o.s«iwwts UL
Capt. Cotton, ¢ Adair, b Bellairs doo. ono. 0p!
Wo So Croallihnyes, © Ise, 10) IeMleMS 554 500 o0n ono)

Sergt. Cumner. c Hornby, b Bellairs ... 0... 1. 2
H. H. Amory, b Bellairs ..._. mo oho Goo ats}
diy Jal5 Ik, Bailey, ec Davies, b Butler. Siac Lie uC.)
Drummer Hughes; b Butler 2. 1. 1. 1. .. 13
ify, Jel, Bathurst beButlerMex eh BA ce ee ene 2
Gr, TROWHI, TA OW 400 900° 00-000 g00-s«siws—its—(“(«—Ci
PIO TOWEL, TOL UNG 40 d00 «00000000, vga ~—«gay’-—sNS}
IP IDrexoing Worn 1 LEWES? o60 000 0nd ond ositos—(s«YD)
IODATENS WAG hOooe SOD doen fee note Gg | oie

Total ... coo 188

run out =
lbw, b Butler
b Butler
b Butler
eand b Adair
e Butler, b Adair
b Butler :
b Bellairs ...
b Butler
b Butler
not out
Extras

2nd Innings.

Total ...

ROYAL ARTILLERY v. HARLEQUINS.
PLAYED AT Woouwicu, 8TH AND 9TH JULY.

Roya ARTILLERY.

Ist Innings.

C. C. Van Straubenzce, ¢ Collins, b Cunliffe ... 29
Capt. Wynne, b Collins v0 -00 7
W. L. Foster, b Cunliffe 75
Major Curteis gos 0
Capt. Adair, ¢ Collins, b Robertson- Walker .. co |B)
R. A. Craig, b Robertson- Walker 15
A. KH. J. Perkins, b Cunliffe... a0 12
W. O. Holloway, ¢ Capt. Webbe, b Cunliffe... 1

F. H. G. Stanton, ¢ Phipps- Hornby, b Cunliffe... 11
Capt. R. P. Benson, c A. J. wee b Cunliffe ... 16

Gunner Butler, not out .. eo 000 00) too ddh
Extras aces) oh God oOMeModch ncmmar Blk?)

Totalietew envaasiee me 288

HARLEQUINS.

Ist Innings.
H. T. Hewett, c Wynne, b Holloway .. ... .. 19
Av J. Webbe, c Craig, b Benson «.. .. «. «. 32

B. N. Bosworth- Smith, ea hee ead 600. ton 8}
J.G. Walker, b Holloway... ppd Soc 006, B60. > oh pw
C. Seymour, ¢ Benson, b Aaeatie 508 Cone ds}

Prince Christian Victor, c Craig, b Benson oe 3
J. Robertson- Walker, ts Benson 0
Capt. Webbe, ¢ Craig, Io XENON — GQ gonad omwSs—C«)
I. A. E. Cunliffe, b Adair... ... BY ers eee 1G)
Gee Phipps- Hornby, b Hollow ays. 1
. KE. W. Collins, not out.. te 3
Bxtras Sad 8

Aorta 605 y0

2nd Innings.

J) Ciwwalbuieks 005 200 00

lbw, b Cunliffe ...

b Collins

b Cunliffe ...

Jo Cowbings — 55 Yoo

c A. J. Webbe, b Cunliffe

b Collins...

ce Bosworth- Smith, b Cunlifte..

not out ee

b Collins
Extras

Total ...

ooo tee

2nd Innings.

e Curteis, b Butler ...
¢ Curteis, b Holloway
c Wynne, b eet
b Holloway :
b Holloway Bab
c Straubenzee, b Wynne...
not out 090
ce Adair, b Butler
b Butler
¢ Adair, b Hollow. ayn
b Holloway

Extras

eee

Totaly vy.

=
WDOwhENOH COMA

Bl eoe,.s
Sy

cre
.
rie

Day of the
Mth] Wk.
iL | Aho,
2) F
3) 58
4/8
6| M
@ || 4
7|Ww
8 |Th
9 | F
10| 8
11/8
12 | M
alg} | at’
14 | W
15 | Th
16) F
17| 8
18| 8S
19 | M
20 | T
21
22 | Th
23) EF
24; 8
25| S
26 | M
Pe | Me
28 | W
29 | Th
30 | EF
31) 8

DIARY OF FIXTURES.

== 200099000 ————_____.

AUGUST.

Regimental.

Bank Holiday.

7th Diy. F.A. & ‘U’ R.H.A.

(Woolwich) joins at Shoe-
buryness.

Sth Division F.A. (Exeter)
joins at Okehampton.

coe

2nd Field Gunnery Course at
Okehampton begins.

8th Division F.A. (Woolwich)
joins at Shoeburyness.

Cricket, &c.
v. B.B. at Woolwich.
v. B.B. at Woolwich.

RA. v. LZ. at Woolwich.
R.A. v. I.Z. at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich v. N.-C. Offi-
cers at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich v. West Kent
at Chislehurst.

R.A. Woolwich v. Charlton
Park at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich ». Brentwood
at Woolwich.

ooo

‘Ubique’ Lodge
“Criterion.”

meets at

Day of the
Mth |Wk.
1) 8
2|/M
3) T
4 | W
6 | Th
@ it
Y |S
8/8
9) M
i@ |; 3¥
11 | W
12 | Th
13 | F
14| 8
15|S
16 | M
iy || ae
18 | W
19 | Th
20 | F
21/8
22 | 8
23 | M
24 | T
25 |W
26 | Th
27 | F
PRS
2918
M

Bae eNog8Ss4enode ay

Regimental.

Special _ Class Hydraulics 9
Steam &c. begins,

SEPTEMBER.

Cricket, &c,

Doncaster begins.
St Leger.

Private.

‘Ubique’ Royal Arch Chapter
meets at ‘‘ Criterion.’’

OCTOBER.

‘Ubique? Mark Lodge’ of

Mark Master Masons meets

| at * Criterion.’

toe ano

INSP ER Re GIVE Nie

RACKET AND BILLIARD MATCHES.

gD OO

R.A. « RE.

Played at Woolwich, March 29th and 80th, 1895.

ee PPD Oe

DOUBLE RACKETS.

PLAYED AT 2,30 P.M., 29TH.
R.A. BR.H.
CAPTAIN A. M‘N. i ta hese J. HE. HAMILTON.

LIEUT. FE. D. QUINTON.

lost to
LIEUT. E. M. BLAIR.

Ist Game. 2nd Game. 8rd Game. 4th Game. 5th Gane. 6th Gane. 7th Game.

RA. 15. R.A. 8, Intent hs R.A. 15. R.A. 15. RA. 4. Its, Whe
RE. 6. R.E. 15. R.E. 15. RE. 6. R.E. 4. R.E. 16. R.E. 15.

SENGLE RACKETS.

SEconD ParR PLAYED AT 10.15 a.m. 807TH.

R.A. R.E.
LIEUT. A, E. J. PERKINS. beat LIEUT. E. M. BLAIR.
Ist Game. 2nd Game. 3rd Game. 4th Game. 5th Game.
VANS: Tega TE Dae abG IEE IN WS Wee lees. Je
R.E. 16. TG Ay 8 TRAY, Us, ye eT esa dh,

First Parr PLAYED Av 11.30 a.m. 30th.
CAPTAIN A, M‘N. COOPER-KEY. beat CAPTAIN J. E. HAMILTON.

1st Game. 2nd Game. 3rd _ Game. 4th Game. 5th Game.
Toth, IMS, R.A. 8. R.A. 15. Wolke ddl, R.A, 18. £5
IB Yo R.E. 15. TRB, Gh, R.E. 15. ARaDpaksp ype

The R.A. won the odd event after every game had been contested in all matches and keep the
Cup through the ensuing year.

BELEEFARDS.

THIRD PArR PLAYED AT 5 P.M. 297TH In R.A.I. Lucrure THEATRE.

Be.A. R.E.
MAJOR F. A. CURTEIS. beat 2np LIEUT. C. St. B. SLADEN.
800. 297.
Best breaks 28, 27, 26, 25, 22, 20, 19, 15, Best breaks 33, 30, 21, 20, 20, 18, 12, 11,
14, 14 unfinished. Wl, Ahk, WO; 1,
First PAtrR PLAYED Atv 9.45 P.M.
CAPTAIN E. M. LACHLAN beat LIEUT.-COL, A. R. E.DORWARD, D.S.O.
3800. 210.
Best breaks 43 unfinished, 35, 21, 18, 16, Best breaks 27, 19, 18, 15, 12.

16, 18, 11, 10, 10, 10.
THirp PatR PLAYED AT 11.45 p.m.

2np LIEUT. 8S. SELIGMAN. lost to CAPTAIN H. N. DUMBLETON.
288. 300.
Best breaks 36, 21, 17, 14, 14, 18, 11, 10. Best breaks 27, 20, 19, 19, 17, 17, 16, 15, 13,

18, 18, 12, 12 unfinished.
The R.A. won the odd event and keep the Cup through the ensuing year.

BDA

2
R.A. & R.E. Amnual Racket and Billiard Matches.

The results of the Racket and Billiard Matches up to and including
the present year are shewn below :—

187s.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. Roll, ils R.E. A, Double. R.A. 500. R.E. 497.
Lieut. W. E. Denison. Lieut. L. K. Scott. Lieut.-Col. Drayson. Capt. Seton.

1» W. L. Davidson. 1 S.M.Maycock. Major Maitland. » Mant.

Single. Iai, Do TkeIB5 Bo Single. R.A. 500. R.E. 361.
Lieut. W. L. Davidson. Lieut. S. M. Maycock. Major Maitland. Capt. Mant.

ES7A.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. RA. 4. IRI, IL, Double. R.A. 500. RE. 492.
Major Newman. Lieut. L. K. Scott. Major Maitland. Capt. Warburton.
Lieut. Crookenden. » ‘Tower. Lieut. Anstruther. u Seton.

Single. R.A. 0. RE. 3. Single. R.A. 370. R.E. 500.
Lieut. Crookenden. Lieut. Tower. Major Maitland. Capt. Warburton.

1875.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. Its, Os R.E. 4. Double. R.A. 6500. RE, 494.
Capt. Anderson. Lieut. Tower. Capt. Hazlerigg. Major Warburton.
Lieut. Crookenden. 1 Hon.M.G.Talbot. Lieut. Anstruther. Capt. Skinner.

is76G.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. R.A. 3. RE, 4. Double. R.A. 500. R.E. 451.
Major Murdoch. Lieut. Penrose. Capt. Hutchinson. Major Warburton.
Lieut. Anstruther. 1 Onslow. Lieut. Anstruther. Capt. Skinner.

Single. RMoAls ils IRI, Be _ Single. R.A. 479. R.E. 600.
Major Murdoch. Lieut. Penrose. Lieut. Anstruther. Major Warburton.

i879.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. R.A. 4. R.E. 0. Double. R.A. 500. R.E, 430.
Capt. Griffiths. Capt. L. K. Scott. Major Hutchinson. Major Seton.

Lieut. D. C. Carter. Lieut. W. A.Cairnes. Capt. Anstruther. Capt. Glancy.

Single. R.A. 3. RE. 1. Single. R.A. 500. RE, 421.
Lieut. D. C. Carter. Lieut. W. A.Cairnes. Capt. Anstruther. Capt. Glancy.

ES8@.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. RA. 4. R.E. 0. Double. R.A. 6500. R.E. 430.
Lieut. King. Lieut. R. 8. Hedley. Major Hutchinson. | Major Manderson.

» Cooper-Key. » W.A.Cairnes. Capt. Anstruther. Capt. Glancy.

Single. R.A. 0: R.E. 3. Single. RA. 4658. R.E. 600.

Lieut. D. C. Carter. Lieut. W. A. Cairnes. Capt. Anstruther. Major Manderson.

issk.
Rackets. Billiards.
Double. RA, 4. 1X18, O, Double. R.A. 500. R.E. 362.
Lieut. King. Lieut. §. M. Maycock. Major Hutchinson. Capt. Glancy.
n Cooper-Key. no W. A. Cairnes. Capt. Anstruther. » Broadfoot.
Single. ANE os Iai, dle Single. R.A. 500. RE. 468,
Lieut. Cooper-Key. Lieut. W. A. Cairnes. Capt. Anstruther. Major Mant.
i8s2.
Rackets. Billiards.
Double. RA. 4. TRIB Bs Double. R.A. 300. R.E, 252.
Licut. C. D. King. Lieut. Tower. Col. Maitland. Major Seton.
» Cooper-Key. 1 Friend. Lieut. Bruen. Major Glancy,
Single. RA. 3. 189; al Single. R.A, 500. R.E. 437,
Lieut. Cooper-Key. Licut. Tower. Col. Maitland. Major Seton.
1883.
Rackets. Billiards.
Double. Tolls Ile R.E. 4. Double. R.A. 267. R.E. 3(€0,
Licut. C. D. King. Lieut. Tower. Col. Maitland. Lieut. Bor.
» Cooper-Key. n Friend. Capt. Anstruther. Lieut. Dumbleton.
Single. R.A. 1. RE. 3. Single. R.A. 500. IIB, A/G

Lieut. C. D. King. Lieut. Tower.

Capt. Anstruther.

Lieut. Dumbleton.

E884.
Rackets.
Double. TR iN, Go RE, 4.
Lieut. Cooper-key. Lieut. Tower.
n (Oj, JD), King. I Friend.
Single. IR, Bo IolBis Bo

Lieut. Cooper-Key. Lieut. Tower.

Lieut.-Col. Hazierigg.
Capt. Anstruther.

Capt. Anstruther.

Billiards.

Double. IRs. Beele R.E. 300.

Lieut. Dumbleton.

Capt. Digby.
RE. 398,

Lieut. Dumbleton.

Single. R.A. 6500.

E885.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. Rel, Gh R.E. 2. Double. R.A. 300. R.E. 274,
Lieut. Cooper-Key. Capt. Friend. Major Anstruther. Capt. Digby.

m CdD) Hatin, Lieut. Hamilton. Capt. MacMahon. 1 Baddeley.

Single. Iolo “Bo R.E. 1. _ Single. R.A. 500. R.E. 248,
Lieut. Cooper-Key. Capt. Friend. Major Anstruther. Capt. Digby.

£890.
Rackets. Billiards.

Double. Rode Ike Wolds 4b, Double. R.A. 2535. R.E. 800.
Captain Cooper-Key. Lieut. Hedley. Major Anstruther, Captain Digby.
Lieut. Simonds. u Sheppard. Lieut. Lachlan. rf Dumbleton.

Single. Roi, O. Too Bo Single. R.A. 500. R.E. 489,

Captain Cooper-Key. Lieut. Hedley.

Major Anstruther.

Captain Dumbleton.

isS9i.
Rackets.

Double. pik, Bo
Captain Cooper-Key.
Qnd Lieut. Galloway.

Single. RA. 3.
Captain Cooper-Key.

RE. 4.
Captain Hedley.
2nd Lieut. Sheppard.

Ios Be

Captain Hedley.

Billiards.
Double. R.A. 300.
Major Anstruther.
Lieut. Pollock.
Single. R.A. 444,
Major Anstruther.

R.E. 250.
Colonel Glaney.
Capt. Hedley.

R.E. 600.
Colonel Glancy.

1892.

Rackets.

Double. R.A. 4. R.E. 0.
Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton.
Lieut. & Capt. Quinton. Lieut. Blair.

Single. R.A. 3. IRB, ;

Billiards.

Double.
Captain Curteis. Colonel Glancy.

Captain Pollock. Captain Roberts.
Single. R.A. 600.

Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton. Captain Pollock. Colonel Glancy.
E893.
Rackets. Billiards.
Double. R.A. 4. Iolo dhs Double. R.A, 281. R.E. 300,

Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton.

Lieut. & Capt. Quinton. Licut. Blair.
Single. ACs R.E. 3.

Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton.

Major Curteis.
Captain Pollock. Lieut. Jones.

Single. R.A. 600. RE. 303.
Major Dorward, D.S.O.

Major Curteis.

i894.

Rackets.

Double. IRpAly de RE. 4.
Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton.
Captain C. D. King. Licut. Blair.

1Single. R.A. 3. 1IBo Aly
Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton.

2S8ingle. R.A. 0. RU. 3.

Billiards.

1 Single. ER Aye 200% R.E. 300.
Captain Vans-Agnew. Major Dorward, D.S.O.

2 Single. R.A. 285.

Major Cutteis. Lieut. Jones.

8 Single. R.A. 3800. RE. 1384,

Lieut. Quinton. Lieut. Blair. Captain Lachlan. Major Ruck.
1895.
Rackets. Billiards,

Double. ACES. RE. 4. 1 Single. R.A. 300. R.E. 210,
Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton. Captain Lachlan. Lieut.-Col. Dorward.
Lieutenant Quinton. Lieutenant Blair.

1 Single. R.A. 3. IRoIBin Be 2 Single. R.A. 288. RE. (200:
Captain Cooper-Key. Captain Hamilton. Lieutenant Scligman. Captain Dumbleton.
. 2 Single. iol, Be RolBo By 3 Single. R.A. 300. THe? O76

Lieutenant Perkins. Licutenant Blair.

Major Curteis. Lieutenant Sladen.

R.A. 300. IR Ey 29)

RU. 469.

Major Dorward, D.S.O.

R.E. 300.

Day of the
MthjWk.
neat | Ee ee |
ik WY
2/Th
3) F
4 |S
5|S
6|M
@ | At
& |) Any
9) |) 2h
10) F
aul || 1S)
12/8
18} || Rut
14) T
aMBS |) AWE
NG 4) Wn
ily | ie
18/8
19|/S
20 | M
Sat | Ay
22 | W
23 | Th
24) F
25 | 8
26/8
27 | M
28 | T
29 | W
30 | Th
ol | F

DIARY OF FIXTURES.

—==000900000==——__

MAY.

Regimental.

ist Division (Siege) course
at Lydd begins.

1st. Division course begins at
Portsmouth and Sandown.

Ist Division R.H.A. (Alder-
shot) joins at Shocburyness.

Position-finding class begins.

1st Division F.A. (Aldershot)
joins at Okehampton.
and Division F.A.(Aldershot)
joins at Shoeburynes.

3rd Division R.H.A. (Wool-
wich) joins at Shoeburyness

Ist Division R.H.A. begins
at Glenbeigh.

2nd Division course begins at
Portsmouth and Sandown.
4th Division F.A. (Woolwich)
joins at Shoeburyness.

eee

‘* Chestnut Troop ” Dinner.

Cricket, &c.

R.A. Woolwich v. R.N. Col-
lege, at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich v. Shocbury-
ness at Shoebury.

R.A. Woolwich v. N.C. Offi-
cers at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich v. Blackheath
at Blackheath.

R.A. v. Greenjackets, at
‘Woolwich.
R.A. v. Greenjackets,
Woolwich.

R.A. v. Aldershot Division
at Aldershot.
R.A. v. Aldershot Division
at Aldershot.

Epsom Meeting begins.
Derby.

Oaks.

Private.

‘Ubique’ Lodge meets at
“ Criterion.”’ Installation of
Ww.M.

fon) Oui co bo Lael

Muy 2 SHeno FES

Regimental.

5th Division F.A. (Ipswich)
joins at Shoeburyness.
Whit Sunday.

Bank Holiday.

Qnd Division F.A. ‘(Hilsea)
joins at Okehampton.

Annual General Meeting of

R.A.I. at R.U.S.I. at 3p.m.
2nd Division F.A. at Glen-
beigh begins.
§th Division F.A. (Weedon)
joins at Shoeburyness.

Ball at R.A. Mess, Wool-
wich.

3rd Division course begins at
Portsmouth and Sandown.

3rd Division F.A. at Glen-
beigh begins.

coe

one

2nd Division (Siege) course
at Lydd begins.

M {3rd Division F.A.(Shorncliffe)

joins at Okehampton.

4th Division (Field) course at
Glenbeigh begins.

Position-finding class ends.

Ist Field Gunnery Course at
Okehampton begins

aes 4 gM

JUNE.

Cricket, &e.

R.A. Woolwich v. R.M.A.,
at R.M.A,

REGIMENTA

R.A. v. Quidnunes at Wool-
wich.

R.A. Woolwich v. Shoebury-
ness, at Woolwich.

R.A. v. Eton Ramblers, at
Woolwich.
R.A. v. Eton Ramblers, at
Woolwich.
Ascot begins.

R.A. v. BE, at Woolwich.
R.A. v. R.E., at Woolwich.

Old Shoebury match.

k.A. v. Yorkshire Gentle-
men, at Woolwich.

RA. v. Yorkshire Gentle-
men, at Woolwich.

R.A. v. Household Brigade,
at Burton’s Court, Chelsea.
R.A. v. Household Brigade,
at Chelsea.

JULY.

Osford v. Cambridge begins.,

R.A. Woolwich v. Brentwood,
at Brentwood.

R.A. v. Harlequins, at
Woolwich.
R.A. v. Harlequins, at
Woolwich.

Eton v. Harrow begins.

Private.

DINNER,

‘Ubique’ Royal Arch Chap-
ter meets at ‘ Criterion.’’
Installation of Principals.

Day of the
Mth | Wk.
13) §
14/8
16 | M
16) T
17 | W
18 | Th

19 | F
20/1 S
21;§8$
22 | M
23 | T
24 | W
25 | Th
26 | F
27
28; 8
29 | M
SON
31 | W
aL} nv
2 || de
3|8
4|$
5 | M
@ |} ab
|
8 |Th
| a8
UO} 1S
11/8
12 | M
ig} |} ae
14 | W
15 | Th
WB |} 18
17| 8
18|S
19 | M
2X0) || ae
21 | W
2|Th
23 | F
24) 8
25 |S
26 | M
27 | T
28 | W
29 | Th
30/ F
31} 8

Regimental.

4th Division course Golden
Hill and Sandown begins.

4th Division F.A. (Colchester
joins at Okehampton.

Bank Holiday.

Sth Division F.A. (Exeter)
joins at Okehampton.

2nd Field Gunnery Course at
Okehampton begins.

JULY .— Continued.

Cricket, &c,
IRA. Weolwich 9. Black:
| heath, at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich %. West Kent
at Woolwich.

R.A. v. R.E., at Chatham.
R.A. v. R.E., at Chatham.

R.A. v. Gentlemen of M.C.C.
at Lord’s.

)R.A. v. Free Foresters, at
W oolwich.
R.A. v. Free Foresters, ati
W oolwich.

Goodwood begins.

AUGUST.

v. ‘B.B. at Woolwich.
v. B.B. at Woolwich.

R.A.
R.A.

v. TWA, at Woolwich.
v. I.Z. at Woolwich.

R.A.
R.A.

R.A. Woolwich v. N.-C. Off-
cers at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich v. West Kent
at Chislehurst.

R.A. Woolwich v. Charlton
Park at Woolwich.

R.A. Woolwich v. Brentwood
at Woolwich.

Private.

‘Ubique’ Mark Lodge of
Mark Master Masons meets
at “Criterion.” Installa-
tion of W.M.

‘Ubique’ Lodge meets at
** Criterion,”

it M Fake

POTS ECE ones hte sere SL gp

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